Parayno vs Jovellanos

Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some
residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or
transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of
Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the
Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline
station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and
disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning
Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School
and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual
measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly
populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still
endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain
of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose
residents
to
illness,
and
4)
It
hampers
the
flow
of
traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she
filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the
mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was a
valid exercise of the latters police powers
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negativeThe respondent is barred from denying their previous
claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the
business of the petitioner was one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Art. 3, Sec. 21 of the zoning
code and not as a service station as differently defined under Art. 42 of the said official zoning
code;The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making
them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily
included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service
station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling station. As regards the main issue, the court
ruled that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of
petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures
to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the
law
and
the
rights
of
petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement
refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50.
While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest
public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance,
notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of
Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation
never
conducted
such
measurement
either.
Furthermore, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a
nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a
nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed
down
or
transferred
summarily
to
another
location.

City of Manila vs Laguio

Facts: On March 30, 1993, Mayor Lim signed into Ordinance no. 7783 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting
Establishment or Operation of Business Providing Certain Forms of Amusement, Entertainment, Services
and Facilities in the Ermita-Malate Area, Prescribing Penalties for Violation Thereof, and for other
Purposes. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels, hotels and inns from
operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers.
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) contends that the ordinance is invalid as it includes
hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates
that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that
under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City on the other
hand reiterates that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power as provided as well in the LGC. The
City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is constitutional.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and
for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.The Classification of Hotels,
motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court Said that it is
baseless and insupportable.
Furthermore, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the
respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of
property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and
conduct to avoid. The Ordinance however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful
curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of
trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid
Finally, petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of

necessity. It cannot be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without
judicial intervention.
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. vs Balandalan
Facts: Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their
son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9-ft.
deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always
open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or
fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friends, they saw the tank inside the factory and began
playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out
later, already as a cadaver, having died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The Court of Appeals
decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of
attractive nuisance.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One
who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine
generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bench, the tanks
themselves cannot fall under such doctrine therefore the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios
death.