Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80,
Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and
MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
1
from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Said
judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of
2
Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996. as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the
3
People's motion for reconsideration. Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.
More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of
4
the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995,
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days "to be
released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in
the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch
261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms
and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was
issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store
resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings,
papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses
and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00
(receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however
returned to the respondents upon order of the court on respondents' motion or request. Included
allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1)
fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3)
Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical
ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.

3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without
mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private
respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged; **" and on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search
Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment on petition for
certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted
by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the order dated
January 30.1996 ** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent
to the Abigail's Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it is
correspondingly called only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store
to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective
doors used for ingress and egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be
reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly granting the motion to quash
5
search warrant**;
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss** ;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed opposition/comment and
supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration** ;
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated
motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the Solicitor General
forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper, however.
As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11,
1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search
warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings

wherein, not objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The
place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No. 1.
It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to,
Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to the
application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched was
effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not
signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable
Judge (Bacalla, who) instead **directed them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207** in
the Order **dated December 15, 1995" this, too, being the address given "in the Application for
Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the
Team Leader." The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the People's admission, during
the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not
attached to the application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for
7
reconsideration."
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge Casanova
8
contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:
d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place
mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger
James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all
EDUCATED CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and who
were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH
to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the
words "KATABI", or "KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE
ang papasukin namin" or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking
POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the
ENGLISH WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or "NEXT to
ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place (herein
private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and
9
immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law.
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant
itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11,
10
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant, pursuant to
the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous
ruling of the Supreme Court in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule
that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof and a criminal
case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that
search warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal
case is more substantial than the search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the
criminal case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully
obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of "Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil action of
certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following
errors, to wit:

1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing
Court and overturning the latter's determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to
be searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the application for
warrant despite the clear evidence** to the contrary;"
3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"
4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the tardiness by
which the return is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal although
the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule;" and
6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the warrant
when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the
apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular
apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had
direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of said officers,
in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four
(4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually
effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in
mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the
Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For
in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be searched,
which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt
1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search
was made more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be
"limited only to the premises herein described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in the area
involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment
units. These are housed in a single structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting
doors through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is
independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers
did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety
Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store and the apartments
behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in
the warrant. Even after having received the warrant which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises
herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the
store they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own
definite idea of the place to be searched clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have
submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient particularization of the general
identification of the place in the search warrant.

11

The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, allegedly to
the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may,
in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed an
obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed
in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to
the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because
both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place
where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the
error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search
of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct
addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in
the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge
intended to be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by
the "obviously typographical error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the official court file.
12

The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous
descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without
ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately
perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the
place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated
in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is
material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in
their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store
would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal
knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place
to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to
abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution
has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly
be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's finding of probable
cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge Casanova did
was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself,
13
as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. In Judge Casanova's view, said
inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on
which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the
issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the
search warrant which, of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not
that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected
to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search
warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 the
first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the private respondents
were then residing.

It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:

14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
things to be seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
15
he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest
intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly
describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision
that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for
16
any purpose in any proceeding.
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be made by the Office of
the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the residential apartment
units the place to be searched being plainly marked was in fact attached to the application for the search
warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners),
among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the return was
made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive "evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been
denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of
the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is
different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway the
premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a search warrant has been
"issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal case," the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to
quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the
17
subject of the warrant is afterwards filed. In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by
18
this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals concerning "possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the
exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second
19
guideline reads:
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal case) issues the
search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by
the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known
shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise
they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action
based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash
the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be
filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is
alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and
the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly
stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a

motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject
to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon
City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in connection with the explosives
subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to
quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have
properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been
commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The
case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have
acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996 which
dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial
Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the
foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186529

August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional
Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu.
The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to
apprehend the appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical description. He also assured
them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would
arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves
along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted
from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As
appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying

shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope
slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. 5
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police
Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory
examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 6
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering;
and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01)
[or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any permit or
license from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and there,
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their
ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the
circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced
him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for
investigation.9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of
Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his
supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless
search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings
when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the case.13
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the
admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the
validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and
thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi1 This Court is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case.

Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every
accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 14
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find that appellant can no
longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time
that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with
jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded
the alleged contraband was lawful.16
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Said
proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.19
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act of actually committing
a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with
him a sachet of shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful
arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.21 Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine
whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition,
it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 22
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the established facts. On May
19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent
reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at
11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler,
Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national

highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from
the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his
hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was
marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that
appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that
information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio
City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed
themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in
front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman,
"Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When
asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain
dried marijuana leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City, received a report from a
civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the
police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m.
that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a
bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of
the box which yielded marijuana leaves.29
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30
years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of
marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who
fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon
inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth.
In his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves.
Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them,
introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag
turned out to be marijuana leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate probable cause. We
required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting
officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to
commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and
conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant,
appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would
not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a
lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.

Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35 People v. Valdez,36 and People v.
Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts
or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to
commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to
the rule against warrantless searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As
testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on
May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there
the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. 39
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in
evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active
participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if
we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal
search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they
were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more
rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages
the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to
act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means. 42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being
lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten
(10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita
Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to
pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves,
which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City.
(Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and testimonial
evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves
weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana
contained in the plastic container; "B-1-a"another plastic container; "C"Chemistry Report No.
D-668-81;"C-1" Findings: Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1"
photographs of accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"
Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H" Request for Field
Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo;"H-1"date of of the
request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping
paper; and the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel
Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc,
Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo
City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for examination. The specimen
consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper
placed in a plastic bag with a marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her examination, she
prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted
three eliminations; microscopic examination, the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory
examination of thin layer chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC
Danilo Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married, policeman and
residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia testified that he has been a member
of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation
Division as operative. His job then was among other things to follow up reports in their office,
recover stolen items and apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with
the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in
Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City.
On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second seat at the back. While he was thus
seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting
a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia. The bag placed by suspect behind
his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the
accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic)
nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic

bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted
one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The
plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of
marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at
that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that
there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the
accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the
accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying
himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was
carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this
at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and
with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her
bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of
Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag
was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that
he could detect marijuana even before the application of chemicals because of one year and a half
assignment with the CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused,
photographs were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with
Pat. Obia and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified photographs shown to
him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of
marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one
confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also
shows the date and time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled
already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio City to
Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated from the
accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented the body number of the bus he
wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not
pay his fare from Baguio City because as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981 and underwent
treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for medical treatment. He
stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to
July 21, 1981, witness never knew the accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when
she boarded the same Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven
plastic bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her
seat. Witness Obia became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they reached San
Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at said town to load some
gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He
confirmed his testimony on direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with
her in order to settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had to take his
medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine that his apprehension
was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando,
Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the bag. He Identified his sworn statement
regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified
accused Anita Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo
City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was inside the Investigation
Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of the same day, Pat. Daniel Obia arrived at the Police Station with a woman and
Identified her in the courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia reported to him that he apprehended
Anita Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana
leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote tops, bananas and
some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic wrapper with the name National
Book Store colored black and white. Witness Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag
contained the markings of Pat. Obia which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781

representing the date which was placed by Pat. Obia after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected
marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he interviewed
apprehending officer Obia and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the sworn
statement of Obia (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed accused Anita Claudio who was all the while
inside the Investigation room seated on a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he
asked the accused whether she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused
refused. Hence, no statements were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the
investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified by Pat.
Obia, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat. Obia and the
accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the plastic bag were turned
over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo
City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21,
Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already assigned to the CANU General
Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22, 1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt.
Galindo more than a kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he
conducted a field test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a
request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a Certificate of
Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test indicated the presence of
tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can be only be found in marijuana, a
prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he
later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to
the PC Crime Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married, residing at No. 27
Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with Police
Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In July, 1981, he was then
assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up
to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he
was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. He was
then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at the said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted
from the Victory Liner bus ordering somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat.
Obia he approached him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obia told him he
apprehended a certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the
bus. Pat. Obia then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with her a buri
bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while Pat. Obia sat behind the
driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle to police station. He went inside the
Investigation Section of the Police Station and he was there when Pat. Obia reported to Cpl.
Tiongco his apprehension of the woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first
time inside the Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed
the taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl. Tiongco
and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang Identified the accused
in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana when it was brought out from the
bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the
buri bag, there were vegetables and bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he
saw found in the buri bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat.
Obia, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to Cpl. Tiongco's
questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger long
at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana and heard the answer of the accused to
Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness
likewise Identified an initial DO-21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial,

and not a signature, stands for Daniel Obia. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the
prosecution rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II
CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF THE ALLEGED
BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS WRONG
BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN
FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep. Act No. 6425 and
not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs. Therefore, she may not
be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only delivery which is
penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of probihited drugs. Claudio was caught
transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of marijuana. This is a
considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such
considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user
of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said
marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a warrant to arrest
Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in
itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of
marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having had with her
marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of possession. In a complete
turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere fabrications and the
marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. De
Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their
testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in Olongapo City
all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself (People v. De
la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La Cruz, supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found
guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and
1
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were
2
verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later,
the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
3
4
and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a
5
'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
6
eventually convicted .
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused7
8
appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was Identified by name.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from
9
the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It
10
was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, who
testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of
11
a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit
he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
12
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
13
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged
to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room
14
of the PC headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to
Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending
15
P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret
pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers
16
nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and
17
gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, to a friend whose full name he
18
said did not even know. The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
19
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him.
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate
access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of
tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose
the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant
fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really
beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or
realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC
authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been
allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and
searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against

him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed
this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section
6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no
warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they
had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by
boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
20
21
22
arrest, another two weeks and a third "weeks before June 25." On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of
the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of
Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information
from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of
the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984
with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information,
maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many days before you received the intelligence
report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was
coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but
on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was
coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was
already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to
Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the
subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need
a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.

23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme
Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by
him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention
24
of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject
to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law.
The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it
has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust"
25
operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the
accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger
that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship,
when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only
ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution
and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying,
that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he
will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That
evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The
search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did
not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the
evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our
law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for
the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers
with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is
innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag
at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation
of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was
committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and
the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule
126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag
at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation
of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was

committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and
the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule
126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25232 December 20, 1973

ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and MANUEL
CUARESMA, respondents.
Astraquillo, Laquio, Brillantes and Associates, Taada, Carmon and Taada and Alidio, Elegir, Anchete and Catipon
petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for respondent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr.
Antonio Barredo for respondent Manuel Cuaresma.

ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila,
and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have
been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso
Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an
undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and
Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at
Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following
language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath NBI Agent Celso J.
Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that Mr. William Li Yao or his employees has/have in his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor
Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of
the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used
as the means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss,
Loss Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger,
check vouchers, income tax returns, and other papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to
1964 to be dealt with as the law directs.

Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the
premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance
company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance
firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the explicit
provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935 Constitution, now
Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder
quoted for convenience of reference, viz:
Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnessed he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons, or things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)
Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of
the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of
Court)
Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice of the peace is thereupon
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable
cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant in the form prescribed by these rules.
(Sec. 5, Rule 126)
Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time,
unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the night or
day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a
detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the
absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in
which he found the seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) .
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection
1
and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147
N.E. 472)."
I.
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2)
falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126,
of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." The aforequoted
provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this
amendment prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense either in the
2
American books on Criminal procedure or in American decisions." It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S.
3
Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice where this Court said:

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision
abovequoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would
happen in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court
by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this
qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense.
II.
Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the search and seizures
of personal properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It also assails the
noncompliance with the above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal
property:
(a) Property subject of the offense;
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be
seized and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not cancelling the description of one or two
of the classes of property contained in the form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the
respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent impossibility
because the description of the property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters
Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash receipts
and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the corporation to
wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it impossible for Us to see how the above-described
property can simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the
same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether
the property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of personal
property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The
respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the personal properties to
be seized. Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation,
4
which if seized (as it was really seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its business, petitioner in several
motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has
paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of
its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general
5
public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous
general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896, cited with approval in the Bache
case, supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no

discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and
seizures" may not be made. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this
case.
III.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules
for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and
"B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register,
four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of
various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of which there
were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the
possibility that the respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is
not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by
respondent Judge as their passport.
IV.
6

The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126. Annex "A" of the Petition which is the
search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual search was conducted in the evening
of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold
7
inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities are of the view that where a search is to be made during the night
time, the authority for executing the same at that time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.
8

In their Memorandum respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1), argued:
Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality thereof would not
render the incriminating documents inadmissible in evidence.
This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill case, supra). Most common law
jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus
9
the Supreme Court of the United States declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secured
against such searches and seizures is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the Court or by the office
of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner dated October 24, 1972, for early
resolution of this case.
V.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the application for search
warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far remote in time as to make the probable
cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on
Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the following general rules
are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:

(1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite and must not be
too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense is too
remote from the time when the affidavit is made or the search warrant issued, but, generally
speaking, a lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant
while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the affidavit as to the
date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the
time at which the observation of the offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable
the conclusion of establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set
aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized
or taken thereunder. Without costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernandez * and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., concurs in the result.