G.R. No.

182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT, ARNOLD

GOMEZ YFABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS Y DELANTAR, AND ROGER
JALANDONI Y ARI, Appellants.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But
the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards
that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need
such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the
Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during
the pre-trial conference.

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that she
received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove
that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not
have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those
messages.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station
where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to
hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was
that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish
and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the
same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the
sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,
for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to
the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously
parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the
police station because of the questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent
inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that contained messages which led to the
entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away
from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified Kua Justin as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to Kua Justin as the one who was hit in such shootout
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of Kua Justin, one of the gunmen, and
his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group
of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call
numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that
accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a)
aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to
murder. In aid of armed men, the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in
the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they
are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the
other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

Page 1 of 24

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming
that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text
messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current
jurisprudence.18crallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR-HC 03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold
Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the
lesser crime of HOMICIDEwith the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court
also MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by increasing it to P30,000.00, with an
additional P50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005]

MERCEDES G. DUDUACO, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kabacan, North Cotabato, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
On March 4, 2002, complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco charged[1] respondent Judge Lily Lydia A.
Laquindanum[2] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabacan-Carmen, North Cotabato with
grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office and/or gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2001, respondent brought her vehicle to the Toyota
Service Center in Davao City (Toyota-Davao) for repairs and replacement of parts that were
damaged due to a vehicular mishap.
Upon being advised that her vehicle is ready for pick-up, respondent went to Toyota-Davao on
June 23, 2001 at around 11:00 a.m. She was met by Jeson M. Garao, a service advisor, who
told her that the vehicle would be released upon payment of deductible franchise. Respondent
allegedly refused to pay insisting that the same will be paid by the insurance company. She then
asked to speak with the manager, herein complainant, but the latter was in a meeting.
At 3:00 p.m., respondent was referred to Randy A. Saragoza, Toyota-Davaos Administration
and Marketing Head. Saragoza claimed that he tried to explain to respondent that the payment
of the deductible franchise was upon instruction of the insurance company but the latter got
angry and raised her voice while demanding to see the manager.
She was eventually referred to Vicente U. Yez,[3] Service Department Manager, who alleged
that respondent heatedly disagreed with him and shouted that she was a judge and insisted on
seeing the manager. Upon being told that complainant was in a meeting, respondent furiously
replied that she should be given preferential treatment over said meeting.[4]
At this point, respondent asked for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, she paid the
amount stated therein under protest.
Thereafter, Saragoza required respondent to sign the Release of Claim with Subrogation but she
again refused. She allegedly became enraged and said that as a judge, she knew better than to
sign a blank form. Yez offered to fill in the blanks but respondent curtly informed him that she
will not sign just the same.
Judge Laquindanum left the service center without the car. On July 4, 2001, she filed a case for
Replevin, Damages and Attorneys Fees, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Replevin.[5]
In her Comment,[6] respondent denied that she threw her weight around and abused her judicial
authority. She claimed that upon being informed by Garao about the deductible franchise, she
instructed the latter to communicate with her insurer. After the lapse of two (2) hours, Garao
told her that he could not contact the insurers office because it was closed on Saturdays. She
was referred to Saragoza and Yez but when no agreement was reached, she suggested that
they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise before she would pay.
She eventually paid[7] the deductible franchise under protest. She averred that she requested for
the execution of a demand letter[8] to serve as proof of her claim for refund. Thereafter, Garao
brought out the vehicle and gave the key to her driver, who inspected the car to make sure that
everything is in order. She then directed Salvador Caducoy to transfer her belongings from
another vehicle.[9]

Page 2 of 24

When respondent and her party were about to leave, Garao ran after them and told her that she
needed to sign a release form.[10] She was given a blank Release of Claim with
Subrogation[11] form which she refused to sign. When Saragoza advised her that the vehicle will
not be released, she retorted that she will only sign if the form has been properly filled up. The
parties were at an impasse when Yez angrily said di fill up-an!, then took back the form and
went to his office but did not return.[12]
It was already 6:50 p.m. and respondent was still at the Toyota-Davao premises. She wrote a
letter[13] to complainant detailing her ordeal. The letter was received by a lady employee who
gave her another demand letter[14] stating that in addition to the payment of deductible
franchise, she is also required to sign a release form which she refused because some portions
were blank. She left Toyota-Davao without her car.
On July 19, 2001, Yez, Saragoza together with complainant and Joe Linaza (Linaza) from FEB
Mitsui Marine Insurance, Co., came to see respondent in her sala to apologize.[15]
In his report, the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended[16] the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed
that respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. No
fault can be attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. Had respondent grossly
humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or Saragoza, they would not have gone to her office,
together with complainant and Linaza, to apologize.
The OCA adopted the Investigating Justices recommendation with modification that
complainant Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for filing this baseless harassment
suit. The OCA opined that complainants insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated charges
despite lack of personal knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent but
also of the Investigating Justice and this Court.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA.
In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence
the allegations in their complaints.[17] Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature,
highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The
quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more
substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[18]
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and
corruption.[19] On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of a person
concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right
determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[20]

true and correct of her own knowledge and belief.[23] Significantly, she also went to respondents
office and apologized.
Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by the aggrieved with
zeal. Yet, it appears that it was more than eight (8) months after the incident that complainant
and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint against an alleged erring member of the bench. Verily,
the delay militates against the veracity of their allegations.
Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case after Toyota-Davao lost possession
of the vehicle in favor of respondent and after she refused to settle the replevin suit she filed
against them. More specifically, the instant complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002 or about
eight (8) months after respondent filed the replevin case and secured the writ on July 4, 2001.
As the Investigating Justice fittingly observed, the timing couldnt be worse.[24]
The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. In complainants
letter dated January 21, 2002,[25] she informed this Court about a similar complaint filed before
the Judicial and Bar Council for the purpose of objecting to (respondents) application for
appointment as Regional Trial Court in Midsayap, North Cotabato or elsewhere. Clearly, this
administrative case was filed not for the purpose of obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons,
however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of degrading respondents reputation and
exposing her to public ridicule. This should not be countenanced.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,[26] this Court penalized respondent-lawyer for filing a groundless suit
against a former client in order to harass and embarrass her by suspending him from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
In Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. v. Bondad,[27] we affirmed the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses imposed against petitioner for filing
an unfounded suit in bad faith.
The fine of P10,000.00, as recommended by OCA, is commensurate under the circumstances.
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the
bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded
suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This
Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of the
bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.[28]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint against respondent Judge
Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum, now Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato
City, Branch 24, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco is FINED in
the amount of P10,000.00 for having filed this baseless and unfounded suit.
SO ORDERED.

Respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the
demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form,
did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She
was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be
deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund.
We agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this unfounded
complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. This
right, however, must be exercised in good faith.[21]
During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the event transpired on
June 23, 2001,[22] which means that she has no personal and direct knowledge of the incident.
Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the allegations therein were

Page 3 of 24

Arnado vs Suarin
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof.[19] Atty. Dela Victoria failed to substantiate this burden. In stark contrast, Atty. Maloloyon proved truthful her defense when she submitted a copy of the entire court records involving
the criminal case against the Veranos,[20] including the certification[21] of Branch Clerk of Court
Atty. Villariza that Atty. Dela Victoria did not file any motion to set bail and the certification [22] of
the MTCC Executive Judge Omelio that she did not arrogate unto herself, at any time in her
capacity as clerk of court, the authority of determining the amount of bail to be posted.
Culled from his very own complaint, it was the failure of Atty. Maloloy-on to apologize to
Atty. Dela Victoria that drove him to institute this administrative case, especially after being
lectured on why she could not accept his tendered cash bond. Obviously, he considered this
an affront, given that he is a former judge and has been engaged in the practice of law for
three (3) decades. Thus, he filed his complaint for alleged gross ignorance of the law, even
without competent evidence to support it.
We cannot overemphasize that a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice.
Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments.
He should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethical or improper
practices that impede, obstruct, or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary
task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice by Canon 12 [23] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.[24] Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the
right to litigate, this right must be exercised in good faith. A lawyer who files an unfounded
complaint must be sanctioned because as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty
by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.[25] Such filing of
baseless complaints is indeed contemptuous of the courts.[26]
Ordinarily, lawyers who file unfounded complaints are disciplined by imposing upon them a fine
in an amount commensurate to the gravity of the offense to be determined by this Court as the
disciplining authority.[27] On various occasions, this Court has imposed a fine ranging
from P2,000.00 toP5,000.00 for cases similar to the one at bench. In this case, the OCA
recommends a fine of P2,000.00. We agree.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by

the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given
the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance
of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

As to Atty. Dela Victoria's request for further investigation, the same must be denied, it having
become moot under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, for filing his unfounded complaint against Atty. Maria Fe O. Maloloy-on, Atty.
Alfonso L. Dela Victoria is found guilty of Contempt of Court and is meted a FINE of P2,000.00,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. For having become moot because of the dismissal of his administrative
complaint, the request of Atty. Dela Victoria for an investigation isDENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 4 of 24

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and
admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal
evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. 4

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that
he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not
even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b)
of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a
lawful arrest.

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant therefor having been previously obtained.
Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote
was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that
the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also
have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we
here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken
from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and
must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said
firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to
him.

**Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is
the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an
incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did
not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search
was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they
allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the
requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they
had invalidly seized.

Page 5 of 24

Umil v Ramos
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
***3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to
their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.10 A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the
said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded
man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the
same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital.
The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5)
"sparrows" including Dural;second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie
Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as
the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the
effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the
attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and,
therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed
to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant,
an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about
the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one
Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house
was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant
duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was
then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio
and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the
CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra
who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of
her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she
admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13
August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said
date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in
the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

Page 6 of 24

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May
1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of
the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the
time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found
ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya.20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the
reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and
Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the
search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named
Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their
arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in
the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or
irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers,
in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest
without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not

liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke
at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National
Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney
and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988.28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for
subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in
the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to
insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the
peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the
bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 8868385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section
5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to
know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest
had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the
lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without
warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:

Page 7 of 24

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging
Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was
filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as
Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by
the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed
by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to
hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad
taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set
forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will
promptly look into and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality
of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,
as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,
with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions,
not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On
the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to
her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records,
strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based
their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested
were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the
persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant
is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

Page 8 of 24

Chapter IV: Testimonial Evidence

Bar 2005
Competency and Credibility
Q: When may the trial court order that the testimony of a child be taken by live-link television?
Bar 2004
Q: Distinguish: competency of the witness and credibility of the witness
A: Competency of a witness has reference to the basic qualifications of a witness as his capacity
to perceive and his capacity to communicate his perception to others. It also includes the
absence of any of the disqualifications imposed upon a witness.
Credibility of the witness refers to the believability of the witness and has nothing to do with the
law or the rules. It refers to the weight and the trustworthiness or reliability of the testimony.
In deciding the competence of a witness, the court will not inquire into the trustworthiness of
the witness. Accordingly, a prevaricating witness of one who has given contradicting testimony
is still a competent witness.
Bar 1994
Q: Al was accused of raping Lourdes. Only Lourdes testified on how the crime was perpetrated.
On the other hand, the defense presented Als wife, son and daughter to testify that Al was with
them when the alleged crime took place. The prosecution interposed a timely objection to the
testimonies on the ground of obvious bias due to the close relationship of the witnesses with the
accused. If you were the judge, how would you rule on the objection?
A: I would overrule the objection, interest in the outcome of a case which also includes close
relationship is not a ground to disqualify a witness (sec. 20 R132)
Bar 1994
Q: Louis is being charged with frustrated murder of Roy. The prosecutions lone witness, Mariter,
testified to having seen Louise prepare the poison which she later surreptitiously poured into
Roys wine glass, Louise sought the disqualification of Mariter as witness on account of her
previous conviction of perjury. Rule on Louises contention.
A: The contention of Louise has no legal basis. Basic is the rule that previous conviction is not a
ground for disqualification of a witness, unless otherwise provided by law. Mariters conviction is
not sufficient to have her disqualified to testify. Her situation is not one of the exceptions
provided for by law.
Competency of a Child Witness
Q: May a person over 18 years old be sometimes considered as a child?
A: sometimes, he may. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over 18 years but is found by
the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition (Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness).

A: The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link tv if there is a
likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying the presence of the accused, his
counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma must be of a kind which would impair
the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child (Examination of a child witness).
Survivorship Disqualification Rule of the Dead Mans Statute
Hypo:
Mr. D approaches Mr. C one rainy Sunday morning to borrow one hundred thousand pesos to be
paid exactly a year after. Without hesitation, c gives d the amount requested. C does not require
d to execute a promissory note. They had been very good friends for as long as they can
remember. Years ago, when Mr. Cs small business was on the verge of bankruptcy it was the
generosity of the then wealthy Mr. D that bailed him out. Exactly a day before the agreed date
for payment, Mr. D dies without paying the debt. What does Mr. C do? Well he does what every
creditor would do under the circumstances. He goes to the executor of what remains of the
estate of Mr. D, and tells him of the debt of Mr. D. he says: Today is supposed to be the due
date of his debt. I cannot demand payment from him because his dead. You are the executor
and alive.
What is the effect of the death of Mr. D? Mr. C is rendered incompetent to testify as to the
transaction he has with D. he is incompetent because of the possibility that his claim is
fraudulent. If C were to be heard there would be a high risk of paying
a fraudulent or a fictitious claim. It is C who has the motive to lie. He is the survivor. D cannot
lie. He is dead. He did not survive; he cannot answer back, nor disprove the claim of C. To level
the playing field between the lucky survivor and the poor deceased our remedial law ancestors
devised a rule that would seal the lips of the survivor by declaring him incompetent to testify on
the transaction between him and the deceased the rule is definitely one that does not protect
the survivor even at the risk of not paying a just and valid claim because it is the survivor who
has the stronger reason to file a false claim. The rule is for the protection of the guy who died.
Hence the name, dead mans statute.
The rule will not apply where the plaintiff is the executor or administrator as representative of
the deceased or if the plaintiff is the person of unsound mind. So if the executor of the estate of
Mr. C sues Mr. D to collect an unpaid debt incurred in favor of C by D before the death of C, D
although a survivor, is not precluded from testifying as to the transaction he previously had with
C because the case is not upon a claim against the estate of C
but a claim by his estate against D.
Bar 2001
Q: Maximo filed an action against Pedro, the administrator of the estate of the deceased Juan,

Page 9 of 24

for the recovery of a car which is part of the latters estate. During the trial, Maximo presented
witness Mariano who testified that he was present when Maximo and Juan agreed that the latter
would pay a rental of P20000 for the use of Maximos car for one month after which Juan should
immediately return the car to Maximo. Pedro objected to the admission of Marianos testimony.
If you were the judge, would you sustain Pedros objection? Why?

Refer more to pp266-267 (Riano)

A: The objection of Pedro should not be sustained. The testimony is admissible because the
witness is not qualified to testify. Those disqualified under the dead mans statute or the
survivorship disqualification rule are parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. The witness is not one of those enumerated under the rule
(sec23 R 130)

Q: Vida and Romeo are legally married. Romeo is charged in court with the crime of serious
physical injuries committed against Selmo, son of Vida, step son of Romeo. Vida witnessed the
infliction of the injuries on Selmo by Romeo. The public prosecutor called Vida to the witness
stand and offered her testimony as eyewitness. Counsel for Romeo objected on the ground of
the marital disqualification rule under the rules of court. (a)Is the objection valid? (b) Will your
answer be the same if Vidas testimony is offered in a civil case for recovery of personal
property filed by Selmo against Romeo?

Bar 2007
True or False
Q: The surviving parties rule bars Maria from testifying for the claimant as to what the deceased
Jose ad said to her, in a claim filed by Pedro against the estate of Jose.
A: FALSE
The rule bars only a party plaintiff, or his assignor or a person in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. Maria is merely a witness
and is not one of those enumerated as barred from testifying.
Marital Disqualification Rule
NOTE!!!!
-The marital disqualification rule under sec.
22 of Rule 130 forbids the husband or the wife to testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse except in those cases authorized by the rule. The prohibition
extends not only to a testimony adverse to the spouse but also to a testimony in favor of the
spouse. It also extends to both criminal and civil cases because the rule does not distinguish.
-In order that the husband or wife may claim the privilege, it is essential that they be validly
married. If they are not, there is no privilege. Rule does not cover illicit cohabitation.
-Sec 22 r 130 requires not only a valid marriage but the existence of that valid marriage at the
moment the witness- spouse gives the testimony.
- the rule applies whether the witness- spouse is a party to the case or not but the other spouse
must be a party. That the other spouse must be a party is evident from the phrase neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other...

Exceptions to Marital Disqualification Rule

Bar 2000

A: (a) The obejection is not valid. While the rule provides that neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, the prohibition is
merely the general rule. Said rule is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is in a criminal
case committed by one against the direct descendant of the other. Romeo is accused of
committing a crime against Selmo, the son of Vida and the latters direct descendant.
(b) The answer will not be the same. The rule in a criminal case is not the same as that in a civil
case. In a civil case, for the marital disqualification rule not to apply, the case must be by one
spouse against the other. In the case under consideration, the case is by the son of one spouse
against the other spouse. Romeo may thus, invoke the marital disqualification rule against Vidas
proposed testimony.
Testimony by the Estranged Spouse
Bar 2006
Q: Leticia was estranged from her husband Paul for more than a year due to his suspicion that
she was having an affair with Manuel, their neighbor. She was temporarily living with her sister
in Pasig City. For unknown reasons, the house of Leticia's sister was burned, killing the latter.
Leticia survived. She saw her husband in the vicinity during the incident. Later, he was charged
with arson in an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City. During the trial, the
prosecutor called Leticia to the witness stand and offered her testimony to prove that her
husband committed arson.
Can Leticia testify over the objection of her husband on the ground of martial privilege?
A: Leticia cannot testify. Sec22 of R130 bars her testimony without the consent of the husband
during the marriage. The separation of the spouses has not operated to terminate their
marriage.
Pls consider this!
Leticia may testify over the objection of her husband. Where the marital and domestic relations
between her and the accused husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony,
peace or tranquility to be preserved, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital

Page 10 of 24

Disqualification rule.
Bar 2004

objection to the testimony of one spouse against the other may be invoked only during the
marriage. At the time the testimony of Narita was offered, the marriage was already dissolved,
besides, the crime was committed against a direct descendant of Narita.

Q: XYZ, an alien, was criminally charged of promoting and facilitating child prostitution and
other sexual abuses under RA 7610. The principal witness against him was his Filipina wife,
ABC. Earlier, she has complained that XYZs hotel was being used as a center for sex tourism
and child trafficking. The defense counsel for XYZ objected to the testimony of ABC at the trial
of the child prostitution case and the introduction of the affidavits she executed against her
husband as a violation of espousal confidentiality and marital privilege rule. It turned out that
DEG, the minor daughter of ABC by her first husband who was a Filipino was molested by XYZ
earlier. This, ABC had filed for legal separation from XYZ since last year.

2. The answer would not be different and the court may likewise be asked to overrule the
objection. The marital disqualification rule may not be invoked in a criminal case for a crime
committed against the direct descendant of the other spouse. Here, liza is the daughter of
Narita.

May the court admit the testimony and affidavits of the wife, AB, against her husband XYZ, in
the criminal case involving child prostitution?

Writers comment: it is submitted that the testimony could not be validly objected upon by
Basilios counsel on the basis of the marital priv comm.. rule. Basilio does not own the privilege.
The prerogative to object to a confidential communication between spouses is vested upon the
spouses themselves, particularly the communicating spouse, not a third person. This is clear
from the provision cannot be examined without the consent of the other the proper objection
should be on hearsay grounds not on privileged communication.

A: If the testimony and affidavit of the wife are evidence of the case against her husband for
child prostitution involving her daughter, the evidences are admissible. The marital privileged
communication rule under sec 24 rule 130 as well as the marital disqualification rule under sec
22 of rule 130 do not apply to and cannot be involved in a criminal case committed by a spouse
against the direct descendants of the other.
A crime committed by the husband against the daughter of his wife is considered a crime
committed against the wife and directly attacks or vitally impairs the marital relations.

3. Suggested answer: I could validly object to the presentation of Allan as a witness on the
ground that the communication of Narita was a privileged communication which could be
invoked during or after the marriage. Moreover, the testimony of Allan would be hearsay.

Bar 1998
Q: C is the child of the spouses H and W. H sued his wife for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage under Art. 36 of the FC. In the trial, the ff. testified over the objection of W: C, H, and
D, a doctor of medicine who used to treat W. rule on Ws objection which are the ff:

Bar 1995
a. H cannot testify against her because of the rule on marital privilege
Q: Allan and Narita were married on Aug 1 1989, after 2 months, Narita told Allan in confidence
that the 10 year old Liza whom she claimed to be her niece was actually her daughter by a
certain married man
In 1992, Narita obtained a judicial decree of nullity of her marriage with Allan on the latters
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital obligations. When the decree became final, Liza
assisted by narita, filed 10 cases of rape against Allan committed in 1991. During the trial,
Narita was called to the witness stand to testify as a witness against Allan who objected thereto
on the found of marital disqualification.
1. As a public prosecutor, how would you meet the objection?
2. Suppose Naritas testimony was offered while the decision nullifying her marriage to Allan was
pending appeal, would your answer be different?
3. Suppose Narita died during the pendency of the appeal, and soon ager, the legal wife of
basilio sued for legal separation on sexual infidelity in view of Basilios love affair with Narita. At
the trial Allan was called by Basilios wife to testify that narita confided to him during their
marriage that liza was her love child by basilio. As counsel for Basilio, can you validly object to
the presentation of
Allan as witness for the plaintiff? Explain.
A: 1. I would ask the court to overrule the objection. Under the marital disqualification rule, the

A: The objection should be overruled. The rule invoked by W, the rule o marital privilege does
not apply to a civil case by one against the other. The suit between the spouses is a civil case
against the other.
Attorney-Client Privilege
Bar 2008
Q: A tugboat owned by Speedy Port Service, Inc. (SPS) sank in Manila Bay while helping tow
another vessel, drowning five (5) of the crew in the resulting shipwreck. At the maritime board
inquiry, the four (4) survivors testified. SPS engaged Atty. Ely to defend it against potential
claims and to sue the company owning the other vessel for damages to the tug. Ely obtained
signed statements from the survivors. He also interviewed other persons, in some instance
making memoranda. The heirs of the five (5) victims filed an action for damages against SPS.
Plaintiffs' counsel sent written interrogatories to Ely, asking whether statements of witnesses
were obtained; if written, copies were to be furnished; if oral, the exact provisions were to be
set forth in detail. Ely refused to comply, arguing that the documents and information asked are
privileged communication. Is the contention tenable? Explain.
A: The contention is not tenable. The documents and information sought to be disclosed are not

Page 11 of 24

privileged. They are evidentiary matters which will eventually be disclosed during the trial. What
is privileged under sec. 24b of R 130 is (a) the communication made by the client to the
attorney, or (b) the advice given by the attorney, in the course of, or with the view to
professional employment. The information sought is neither a communication by the client to
the attorney nor is it an advice by the attorney to his client.
Physician- Patient Privilege
Bar 1998
Q: C is the child of the spouses H and W. H sued his wife for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage under Art. 36 of the FC. In the trial, the following testified over the objection of W: C
H and D, a doctor of medicine who used to treat W. Rule on Ws objection which are the ff:
(C.1.). D cannot testify against her because of the doctrine of privileged communication.
(c.2) C cannot testify against her because of the doctrine of parental privilege
A1: D cannot testify over the objection of W where the subject of the testimony is the advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending to W in his
professional capacity.
A2. W cannot invoke the privilege which belongs to the child. C may testify if he want to
although he may not be compelled to do so.
Priest/Minister- Penitent Privilege
NOTE!
The privilege extends not only to a confession made by the penitent but also to any advice given
by the minister or priest. The confession and the advice must have been made or given
pursuant to the course of discipline of the denomination or sect to which the minister or priest
belongs. Thus, the minister or priest must be duly ordained or consecrated by his sect.
Not every communication made to a minister or priest is privileged. The communication must be
made pursuant to confession of sins. As clearly provided in the rule. The advice given as a result
of the confession, must be made in the ministers processional character or in his spiritual
capacity. Accordingly, where the penitent discussed business arrangements with the priest, the
privilege does not apply.
Privileged Communication under the rules on electronic evidence
Priv. Comm apply even to electronic evidence. Under sec. 3 rule 3 of the rules on e-evid, the
confidential character of a privileged communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in
the form of an e- document.
Other Privileged Communication not found in the Rules of Court

-trade secrets
-info. contained in tax census returns; and bank deposits
-under Art. 233 Labor Code information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall
be treated as
confidential. AMLA, institutions covered by the law and its officers and employees who
communicate suspicious transactions to AMLC are barred from disclosure the fact of such report
to other persons.
Examination of Witnesses
Examination of Witness and Record Proceedings
Bar 1978
Q: After the accused himself had testified in his defense in a murder case, the trial judge over
the objection of the fiscal, allowed the defense counsel to file and merely submit the affidavits
of the other witnesses of the accused in lieu of their direct testimony but subject still to cross
examination by the prosecution. The fiscal thus filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the order of the trial court judge allowing such a procedure.
Should said petition be granted?
A: The petition should be granted. The provisions of the Rules of Court require that the
examination of the witnesses shall be done in open court and their answers be given orally, not
in writing unless the exceptions mentioned therein apply to with the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer. None of the exceptions apply to the
case under consideration. The court therefore, acted in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it allowed the presentation of the affidavits without an oral examination of
the witness. Rights and Obligations of a Witness Bar 2005
Q: Under Republic Act No. 8353, one may be charged with and found guilty of qualified rape if
he knew on or before the commission of the crime that he is afflicted with Human ImmunoDeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim.
Under Section 17(a) of Republic Act No. 8504 the court may compel the accused to submit
himself to a blood test where blood samples would be extracted from his veins to determine
whether he has HIV.
a) Are the rights of the accused to be presumed innocent of the crime charged, to privacy, and
against self-incrimination violated by such compulsory testing? Explain.
A: The rights of the accused are not violated by such testings. This is a settled rule. There is no
testimonial compulsion involved by extracting blood from the accused for testing purposes.
There is hence, no violation of the right to privacy and the right to be presumed innocent.

-editors may not be allowed to disclose the source of published news

Bar 2004
-voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted

Page 12 of 24

Q. At the scene of a heinous crime, police recovered a mans shorts with blood stains and
strands of hair. Shortly afterwards, a warrant was issued and police arrested the suspect. AA
during his detention, a medical tech extracted blood sample from his finger and cut a strand
from his hair, despite AAs objections
During AAs trial for rape and murder, the prosecution sought to introduce DNA evidence against
AA, based on forensic matching of the materials found at the crime scene and AAs hair and
blood samples, AAs counsel objected, claiming that DNA evidence is inadmissible because the
materials taken from AA were in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination as
well as his right of privacy and personal integrity.
Should the DNA evidence be admitted or not?
A: The DNA evidence should be admitted. The right against self-incrimination applies only to
testimonial evidence. Extracting blood samples and cutting strands of hair do not involve
testimonial compulsion but purely mechanical acts which neither requires discretion or
reasoning.
Bar 1998
Q: A was accused of having raped X. rule on admissibility of the ff. pcs. Of evidence:
A pair of short pants allegedly left by A at the crime which the court, over the
objection of A, required
him to put on and when he did, it fit him well.
A: The pair of short pants may be considered as circumstantial evidence when taken with other
circumstances. No valid objection may be interposed over the order of the court to put on the
pair of pants. The right against self-incrimination does not apply to a physical and mechanical
act. It applies only to testimonial compulsion which is not the case under the facts.
NOTE: if the witness is the accused, he may totally refuse to take the stand. A mere witness
cannot altogether refuse to take
the stand. Before he refuses to answer, he must wait for the incriminating question.
Leading questions
Q: The case is a collection case. The defendant contends that the debt has been paid. He calls a
witness to testify to the
fact of payment.
-while the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in a conversation on the date and time you
mentioned, did you see the defendant deliver 50k to the plaintiff?
Here, the question of objectionable on the ground that it is leading. Here the examiner obviously
wants the witness to directly testify that money was delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff
in his presence. The question could have been properly framed in this manner: what have you
observed if any, while the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in a conversation

Q. The fact situation is a robbery case. The accused claims innocence and that a couple of hours
after the alleged robbery, he is arrested by the police while in the park with his children. The
defense counsel calls the accused to the stand.
- What where you doing in the park? I was taking a stroll with my two adolescent children,
- While you were in the park with your children, the police officers arrived to arrest you, is that
true.
The question is leading. It suggests the next event which the witness should testify to. The atty.
Could convert the question into a non-leading one by taking the suggestive element our of the
question. Thus What happened if any, while you and your children were at the park?
Opinion Evidence
Open of an Ordinary Witness; When Admissible
Bar 2005
Q: Dencio barged into the house of Marcela, tied her to a chair and robbed her of assorted
pieces of jewelry and money. Dencio then brought Candida, Marcelas maid, to a bedroom
where he raped her. Marcella could hear Candida crying and pleading.Huwag! MAawa ka sa
akin!
After raping Candida, Dencio fled from the house with the loot. Candida then untied Marcela and
rushed to the police station about a kilometer away and told Police Officer Roberto Maawa that
Dencio had barged into the house of Marcela, tied the latter to a chair and robbed her of her
jewelry and money. Candida also related to the police officer that despite her pleas, Dencio had
raped her. The policeman noticed that Candida was hysterical and on the verge of collapse.
Dencio was charged with robbery with rape. During the trial, Candida can no longer be located.
b) If the police officer will testify that he noticed Candida to be hysterical and on the verge of
collapse, would such testimony be considered as opinion, hence, inadmissible? Explain.
A: The testimony would be admissible even if it would be an opinion. The opinion of an ordinary
witness is admissible when such testimony refers to his impressions of the emotion, behavior
condition or appearance of person.
--------x--------o---------------o----------x
CHAPTER V
HEARSAY EVIDENCE Q. What is the hearsay rule?
In relation to the hearsay rule, what do the following rules of evidence have in common?
1. The rule on statements that are part of the res gestae;
2. The rule on dying declarations;
3. The rule on admissions against interest. A: 1. Sec. 36 R.130

Page 13 of 24

2. They are exceptions to the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. They are in other
words, admissible hearsay
Bar 2004

A: The ruling is correct. While declaration of Carlos is hearsay evidence, the declaration is
admissible as a dying declaration and hence, admissible as an exception. The declaration of
Carlos contains all the elements of a during declaration (should enumerate the elements).

Q: Distinguish hearsay evidence and opinion evidence

Bar 1985

A. Hearsay evidence is one that is not based on ones personal perception but based on the
knowledge of others to prove the truth of the matter asserted in an out-of-court declaration
(sec36R130)

Q: Fallen by a bullet upon being fired at, Santos before expiring told Romero, a passerby who
came to his rescue, I was shot by Pablo, our neighbor

An opinion evidence is based n the personal knowledge or personal conclusions of the witness
based on his skill, training or experience (sec. 49 R 130)
Independently Relevant Statements
Bar 2003
Q: The prosecution presented in evidence a newspaper clipping of the report to the reporter
who was present during the presscon stating that X admitted the robbery. Is the newspaper
clipping admissible against X?
A: The newspaper clipping is admissible as non-hearsay if offered for the purpose of showing
that the statement of X was made to a reporter regardless of the truth or falsity of the
statement. The admissibility depends now on whether the fact that the statement was made is
relevant to the case. It is relevant, it is admissible as an independent relevant statement. It
would
be hearsay if offered to prove the truth that x was the robber.
Note: The statement of X to a reporter may be admitted as an admission under sec 26. of R130.
This answer should also be considered by the examiner because it has a clear legal basis.
Bar 1991
Q: What are the requisites to the admissibility of a dying declaration?
See sec 37 of Rule 130
Q: One evening at 9:00 just as he reached the gate of his house in Apas, Cebu city, and as soon
as he alighted from his car to open the gate, Carlos was shot by tito, who had been waiting
behind a coconut tree nearby, with a .38 caliber revolver, Carlos was hit at the sternum of the
second rib. Hearing the shot, Marilyn, Carlos; wife ran out toward the gate and found Carlos
lying on the ground, with blood splattered on his chest. With her son Y, she brought Carlos to
the Cebu Doctors Hospital. In the car, although he was in a semi0conscious state, Carlos told
Marilyn that it was Tito who shot him. Carlos was brought to the ER. However, two hours later,
he expired. Tito was then charged with murder before the RTC of Cebu. Marilyn was presented
as witness for the prosecution by her testimony regarding the above statement of Carlos was
objected to under the hearsay rule. The court overruled the
objection on the ground that the statement may be considered as a dying declaration. Is the
ruling correct?

May Romeros testimony o what was told him by Santos be offered and admitted in evidence in
the separate civil action for damages brought by the heirs against Pablo Cruz? Discuss
A: The statement is admissible. A dying declaration, as in the facts in the case at bar, may be
offered in a civil case provided that the cause and circumstances of the death of the declarant
are the subjects of inquiry.
Res Gestae
Spontaneous Statement
Bar 2005
Q: Dencio barged into the house of Marcela, tied her to a chair and robbed her of assorted
pieces of jewelry and money. Dencio then brought Candida, Marcelas maid, to a bedroom
where he raped her. Marcela could hear Candida crying and pleading: Huwag! Maawa ka sa
akin! After raping Candida, Dencio fled from the house with the loot. Candida then untied
Marcela and rushed to the police station about a kilometer away and told Police Officer Roberto
Maawa that Dencio had barged into the house of Marcela, tied the latter to a chair and robbed
her of her jewelry and money. Candida also related to the police officer that despite her pleas,
Dencio had raped her. The policeman noticed that Candida was hysterical and on the verge of
collapse. Dencio was charged with robbery with rape. During the trial, Candida can no longer be
located.
a) If the prosecution presents Police Officer Roberto Maawa to testify on what Candida had told
him, would such testimony of the policeman be hearsay? Explain.
A: The testimony would be hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the statement of Candida,
but an admissible hearsay as an exception to the hearsay rile. Under the rules of court,
statements made by a person while a startling occurrence are taking place or immediately
proper or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, maybe given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. The statements made by Candida to the police officer falls
within the res gestae rule.
If the statement of Candida is offered merely to prove the tenor of the statement, i.e. what
Candida told the police officer without regard to whether the statement is true or not, it may be
considered as an independently relevant statement and this not hearsay.
--oOo

Page 14 of 24

Chapter VI
Burden of Proof, Quantum of Evidence and Presumptions

1. In a summary proceeding because it is a proceeding where there is no full blown trial

2. Documents judicially admitter or taken judicial notice of

Bar 2004

3. Documents, affidavits and depositions used in rendering a summary judgment;

Q: Dist: Burden of proof and burden of evidence
A: Burden of proof is the obligation of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to go forward with the evidence to overthrow any
prima facie presumption against him.
Bar 1995
Q: Explain the equipoise doctrine in the law of evidence and cite its constitutional basis.
A: The equipoise doctrine is based on the principle that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.
The doctrine refers to a situation where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced or there
is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates. In this case the decision should be against
the party with the burden of proof. Hence, where the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the
evidence does not suggest that the scale of justice should weigh in his favor the court should
render a verdict for the defendant.
Substantial Evidence
Bar 2003
Q: Dist preponderance of evidence from substantial evidence
A: The term preponderance of evidence applies to civil cases. It means the greater or
superior weight of evidence. It is the evidence that is more convincing and more credible than
the one offered by the adverse party. It means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one
side is superior to that of the other.
Substantial Evidence applies to cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies and
which requires that in order to establish a fact, the evidence should constitute that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Chapter VII

4. Documents or affidavits used in deciding quasi-judicial or admin. Cases

5. Lost objects previously marked, identified, described in the record and testified to by
witnesses who had been subjects of cross- examination in respect to said objects
Bar 2003
Q: X and Y were charged for murder. Upon application of the prosecution, Y was discharged
from the information to be utilized as a state witness. The prosecutor presented Y as witness
but forgot to state the purpose oof histestimony much less offer it in evidence. Y testified that
he and X conspired to kill the victim but it was X who actially shot the victim. The testimony of U
was the only material evidence establishing the guilt of X. H was thorognly cross-examined by
the defense counsel, after the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a motion for
demurrer to ecidence based on the following grounds:
a. The testimony of Y should be excluded because its purpose was not initially stated and it was
not formally offered in evidence as required by s. 34 r 132 off evidence
Rule on the motion of the demurrer. A: The demurrer to evidence should be denied.
While under the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered this is true only when the failure to offer evidence has been objected to. The
failure to object to the omission of the prosecutor and the cross-examination of the witness by
the adverse party, taken together, constitute a waiver of the defect.
How an Offer of Evidence is Made
Bar 1983
Atty. Felipe Malang was the counsel for the plaintiff in an action to collect the alleged purchase
price of a tractor. For his principal defense, the defendant alleged that the true transaction
between the parties was only a lease of the tractor, not a sale thereof, and therefore the
defendant, being a mere lessee, was not liable for the alleged purchase price
In the course of the trial, lawyer was asked his witnesses to identify certain documents which he
marked as: Exhibit A, the delivery receipt signed by the defendant acknowledging delivery of the
tractor,..Pls refer to p461 (toooooooooooo long)

Offer of Evidence and Trial Objections

When Formal Offer of Evidence is Not Required

Did Atty. Malang commit any error in the manner by which he made an offer of the
documentary evidence made by the plaintiff? Reasons

A formal offer of evidence is not required in certain cases:

A: Atty. Malang committed errors in the manner by which he offered is documentary evidence

Page 15 of 24

RULES OF EVIDENCE
Under the rules, when a party makes a formal offer of his evidence, he must state the nature or
substance of the evidence, and the specific purpose for which the evidence is offered. Atty.
Malang failed to do all these.
Bar 1997
Q: What are the two kinds of objections? Explain each briefly. Give an example of each
A: Formal and substantive Objections
A formal objection is one directed against the alleged defect in the formulation of the question.
Examples of defectively formulated questions: ambiguous question; leading and misleading
questions; repetitious questions; multiply questions; argumentative questions
A substantive objection are objections made and directed against the very nature of the
evidence, i.e., it is in admissible either because it is irrelevant or incompetent or both. Examples:
parol; not the best evidence; hearsay privileged communication not authenticated; opinion; res
inter alios acta

Evidence the means, sanctioned by the Rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth
respecting a matter of fact.
Relevant evidence evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
Material evidence evidence which is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the
rules of substantive law and pleadings; evidence of such quality of substantial importance to the
particular issue, apart from its relevance
The terms relevant and material are practically the same. They are used interchangeably by
the SC.
Competent evidence evidence which is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court
Direct evidence evidence which proves a fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption

Bar 2004
Q: in a complaint for a sum of money filed before the MM RTC, plaintiff did not mention or even
just hint at any demand for payment made on defendant before commencing suit. During the
trial, plaintiff dully offered Exh. A in evidence for the stated purpose of proving the making of
extrajudicial demand on defendant to pay P500k the subject of the suit. EXh A was a letter of
demand for defendant to pay said sum of money within 10 days from receipt, addressed to and
served on defendant some 2 months before suit was begun. Without objection from defendant,
the court admitted exh A in evidence.
A: The admission of the evidence was correct. There was no objection when Exh S was offered
in evidence. It could have been objected to on the ground that is not related to an issue raised
in the pleadings. However, it is a basic rule that inadmissibility of evidence may be waived.
Tender if Excluded Evidence (Offer of Proof)
Bar 1991
Q: Dist. Formal offer of evidence from offer of proof
A: Formal offer of evidence refers either to the offer of the testimony of a witness prior to the
latters testimony, or to the offer of the documentary and object evidence after a party has
presented his testimonial evidence
Offer of proof, is the process by which a proponent of excluded evidence tenders the same. If
what has been excluded is testimonial evidence, the tender is made by stating for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the proposed witness and the substance of his
proposed testimony. If the evidence excluded is documentary or of things, the offer of proof is
made by having the same attached to or made a part of the record.

Circumstantial evidence proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the existence of the
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence
Expert evidence testimony of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade, when he
is skilled therein
Prima facie evidence evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until
contradicted and overcome by other evidence
Conclusive evidence evidence which is incontrovertible and which the law does not allow to be
contradicted
Cumulative evidence evidence of the same kind and character as that already given and tends
to prove the same proposition
Corroborative evidence evidence of a different kind and character tending to prove the same
point
Best evidence evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question
Secondary evidence evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best evidence and shows
on its fact that better evidence exists
Factum probans the evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is to be established;
material evidencing the proposition, existent, and offered for the consideration of the tribunal
Factum probandum the ultimate fact sought to be established; proposition to be established,
hypothetical, and that which one party affirms and the other denies

Page 16 of 24

RULE 129 WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

Factum probandum

Factum Probans

Proposition to be established

Material evidencing the proposition

Conceived of as hypothetical; that which one

party affirms and the other denies

Conceived of for practical purposes as existent,

and is offered as such for the consideration of
the court

Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are
of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.

Collateral facts matters other than facts in issue and which are offered as a basis merely for
inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in issue
Real evidence evidence furnished by the things themselves, or view or inspection as
distinguished from a description by them of a witness; that which is addressed directly to the
senses of the court without the intervention of a witness
Rebuttal evidence evidence which is given to explain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given
in evidence by the adverse party
Positive evidence when a witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative evidence when a witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact
Admissibility of evidence

Weight of evidence

Pertains to the ability of the evidence to be

Pertains to the effect of evidence admitted
allowed and accepted subject to its relevancy and
competence
Substantive essence or characteristic feature of
evidence as would make it worthy of
consideration by the court before its admission

The probative value of evidence which the

court may give to admit after complying with
the rules of relevancy and competency

When court takes judicial notice

1.
2.

Hearing is necessary when

1.

During the trial, the court

1. motu propio, on request of a party
2. announces its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
3. After trial
1. before judgment or on appeal
2. motu propio, on request of a party
3. takes judicial notice of any matter, and
4. if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
Hence, the court can take judicial notice of any matter during the trial as long as there is a
hearing. If trial is already over, the court can take judicial notice only of matters decisive of a
material issue in the case as long as there is a hearing.
Instances of Judicial admissions
1.
2.

Proof

Evidence

Effect and result of evidence

Medium of proof

End Result

Means to the end

Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

During trial, on any matter allow the parties to be heard thereon

After trial, and before judgment or on appeal any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case

3.
4.
5.
6.

the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document copied or attached to

a pleading, when the other party fails to specifically deny under oath (Rule 8 8)
material allegations in the complaint, when the other party fails to specifically deny it
(Rule 8 11)
admissions in superseded pleadings, when offered in evidence (Rule 10 8)
act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact (Rule 130 26)
implied admission of guilt in an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases,
except quasi-offenses and those allowed by law to be compromised (Rule 130 27)
admission by silence (Rule 130 32)

RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY (RULE 130)

Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant
to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

Page 17 of 24

Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.

4.

Best Evidence Rule When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself
Exceptions: When the original
1. has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
2. is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
3. consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
4. the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office
Original documents
1.
2.
3.

one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.

When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals

Requisites for admission of secondary evidence, according to grounds

1.

2.

3.

the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court

1. prove execution or existence
2. prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the offeror
3. proof of contents in the following order
1) copy
2) recital of its contents in
a) some authentic document, or
b) testimony of witnesses
the original is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party
1. adverse party had reasonable notice to produce the original (Subpoena
duces tecum)
2. proof of the originals existence
3. adverse party fails to produce the original
4. proof of contents in the following order
1) copy
2) recital of its contents in
a) some authentic document, or
b) testimony of witnesses
the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and

the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a

public office contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer
in custody thereof
1. Rule 132 25: What attestation of copy must state
1) the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof
2) under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
2. Rule 132 27: Public record of a private document may be proved by
1) the original record, or
2) by a copy thereof
a) attested by the legal custodian of the record
b) with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody

Parol Evidence Rule: When the terms of an, agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
Exceptions: a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading
1.
2.
3.
4.

An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement

failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties
validity of the written agreement; or
The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement

If the ground is subsequently-agreed terms, the subsequently-agreed terms must also be put in
issue in the pleadings.
The rule applies only to the terms of an agreement. If the evidence sought to be admitted refers
to matters other than the terms of the agreement (e.g. statement of facts), then the PER does
not apply, such evidence is admissible.
PER applies only to the parties to the agreement. It does not apply where PER is invoked
against a litigant who is a stranger to the agreement.
Requisites for mistake as exception to PER
1.
2.
3.
4.

mutual between the parties

of fact, not of law
alleged and put in issue in the pleadings
proved by clear and convincing, not merely preponderance of, evidence.

Parol Evidence Rule

Best Evidence Rule

No issue as to the contents of a writing

Issue is contents of a writing

Parol evidence is offered

Secondary evidence is offered

Page 18 of 24

Presupposes that original is in court

Applies when the original is not available

Effect is can not add, subtract, or explain the

contents

Effect is can not present any evidence on the

contents other than the original

Invoked only if the controversy is between

parties to the agreement

Invoked by anybody, whether a party to the

instrument or not

Applies only to agreements and wills

Applies to all kinds of writing

The following persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be mentally capable at the time of
production, even if he was not so at the time of perception. A child must be mentally mature
both at the time of perception and at the time of production. With regards to the subject matter
of the testimony, we must make a distinction between absolute disqualifications and relative
disqualifications. Objections based on absolute disqualifications may be raised upon the calling
of the disqualified witness. Objections based on relative disqualifications may be raised when it
becomes apparent that the subject matter of the testimony covers inadmissible matters.
Marital Disqualification (Sec. 22)

Marital Communications (Sec. 24)

Covers all matters regardless of source

Covers only those communicated by one

spouse to another

Applies during the marriage

Applies during and after the marriage

A spouse must be a litigant

A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a spouse is called to testify

Invoked when the testimony appears to

cover privileged matters

Requisites for dead mans statute (Sec. 23)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff

Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased person, or the person of
unsound mind is the defendant
upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind.
[no counterclaim is filed]

Privileged Communication (Sec. 24)

The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime

committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants;
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which
has been acquired in such capacity;
A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
the reputation of the patient;
A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure.
In civil cases, an offer of compromise is inadmissible regardless of the cause of action. In
criminal cases, the general rule is an offer of compromise is admissible. However, it is
inadmissible under the following cases:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)

cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can compromise tax cases)
plea of guilty later withdrawn
unaccepted offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense
offer to pay or payment of expenses occasioned by an injury
[the offer is made only to avoid the consequences of litigation]

Note that the inadmissible offer to pay refers only to expenses occasioned by an injury. It does
not include offers to pay other expenses. Ergo, an offer to pay for damages to property is
admissible in criminal cases.
Further note that an offer to pay for expenses other than those occasioned by an injury is
inadmissible in civil cases. Though the 3rd paragraph of 27 excludes in civil cases offers to pay
only for expenses occasioned by an injury, offers to pay for other expenses fall under the
general rule that an offer to compromise in civil cases is not admissible. The exclusion in civil
cases of offers to pay for expenses occasioned by an injury is merely a superfluity. Even if the
exclusion was expressly applied to only criminal cases, an offer to pay for expenses occasioned
by an injury is in the nature of an offer to compromise which is undoubtedly admissible in civil
cases. The bottomline is: an offer to pay for any expense in civil cases is inadmissible.
Requisites for admission by silence
1.

The act or declaration is made in the presence and within the hearing or observation

Page 19 of 24

2.
3.
4.

of a party
The party does or says nothing
The act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true
Such action or comment is proper and possible on the part of the party.

Requisites for the admissibility of a confession

1. the confession must be voluntary;
2. the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;
3. the confession must be express;
4.. the confession must be in writing.
Testimonial Knowledge (Hearsay Rule Sec. 36)
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule (Secs. 37-47)
1. Dying declaration the declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
2. Declaration against interest The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received
in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.
3. Act or declaration against pedigree The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces
also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
4. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree The reputation or tradition existing
in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
5. Common reputation Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting
facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral
character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
received as evidence of common reputation.
6. Parts of the res gestae Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part

of the res gestae.

7. Entries in the course of business Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know
the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
8. Entries in official records Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
9. Commercial lists and the like Evidence of statements of matters of interest, to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them therein.
10. Learned treatises A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history,
law, science or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the
court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject.
11. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible. (Sec. 48)
Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown

to possess, may be received in evidence.
the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or the appearance of a person

GR: Character evidence not generally admissible (Sec. 51)

Exceptions
1.

In Criminal Cases:
1.
2.

3.

accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the
accused which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.

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4.
5.

In Civil Cases only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the
case.
good character of an impeached witness

BURDEN OF PROOF (RULE 131)

Burden of proof the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law
Instances of conclusive presumptions
1.

2.

a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

Statutory instances of estoppel

1.
2.
3.
4.

non-owner transferor who later acquires title passes ownership to the transferee by
operation of law (Art. 1434 NCC)
agent who alienates can not claim title against the transferee (Art. 1435 NCC)
a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as
against the lessor or bailor. (Art. 1436 NCC)
in a contract between 3rd persons concerning immovable property, one of them is
misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real right over the real estate, the
latter is precluded from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all these
requisites are present:
1. fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the
party estopped;
2. party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as
misrepresented;
3. party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
4. party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresentation.
(Art. 1437 NCC)
5. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of personal
property for the purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he received
the sum for which a pledge has been constituted, set up his own title to
defeat the pledge of the property, made by the other to a pledgee who
received the same in good faith and for value. (Art. 1438 NCC)

Disputable presumptions The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but

may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is
the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(1) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in
the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was
overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence
has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for

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a declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of

reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.

as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have
survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed
to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same
time.
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (RULE 132)

(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit are equal.

The order in which an individual witness may be examined is as follows:

(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rides shall govern in the
absence of proof to the contrary:

2. Cross-examination by the opponent Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue.

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born
within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in
tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title
of such person or his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such

1. Direct examination by the proponent the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party

presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.

3. Re-direct examination by the proponent After the cross-examination of the witness has
been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his
answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct examination, questions on matters not
dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
4. Re-cross-examination by the opponent Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination,
the adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct
examination, and also on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
Leading questions a question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining
party desires
GR: Leading questions not allowed.
Exceptions
1. cross examination;
2. Preliminary matters;
3. difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
1. ignorant, or
2. a child of tender years, or

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3.
4.
5.
6.

feeble mind, or
a deaf-mute;
unwilling or hostile witness; or
witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party.
Misleading question one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated.
Misleading questions are never allowed. No exceptions.
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful
acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
GR: The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
Exceptions: When party may impeach his own witness (except evidence of bad character)
1.
2.

an unwilling or hostile witness; or

a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Grounds for objection Hearsay, argumentative, leading, misleading, incompetent,
irrelevant, best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, question has no basis
When evidence considered offered

People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997) The court shall consider no evidence, even an extrajudicial confession, which has not been formally offered. Mere fact that evidence has been
identified and marked in the course of the examination of a witness, without the contents being
recited in his testimony, does not mean that it has been formally offered as evidence.
Identification of documentary evidence is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by
the marking of the evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary evidence is
done only when the party rests its case.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991) Where the genuineness and due
execution of documents of an instrument attached to a complaint are deemed admitted by
failure to specifically deny it under oath, such instruments are considered as evidence although
they were not formally offered.
Rule 8, Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon
a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an
inspection of the original instrument is refused.

Grounds for declaring a witness unwilling or hostile

When objection should be made
1.
2.
3.

adverse interest
unjustified reluctance to testify, or
misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

Consequences of being an unwilling, hostile, or adverse witness

1.
2.
3.
4.

may be impeached by the proponent, except by evidence of bad character

may also be impeached by the opponent
may be cross-examined by the opponent, only on the subject matter of his direct
examination
proponent may ask leading questions

Sec. 36. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993) Objection to testimony on the ground of lack of a formal
offer of the testimony should be done when the witness was called to testify.

Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) Objection to documentary evidence
must be made at the time it is formally offered (i.e. when the party rests its case) as an exhibit
and not before. Objection prior to that time (e.g. identification of the evidence) is premature.
Mere identification and marking is not equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence. A party may
decide to not offer evidence already identified and marked.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE (RULE 133)
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider
1.
2.
3.
4.

all the facts and circumstances of the case

the witnesses manner of testifying
their intelligence
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying

Page 23 of 24

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

the nature of the facts to which they testify

the probability or improbability of their testimony
their interest or want of interest
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.

A cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if
it is supported by substantial evidence
Substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion
Generally, the motive of the accused is immaterial in a criminal case, not being an essential
element of the crime, hence, it does not need to be proved.
Exceptions:
1. when there is no eyewitness and the suspicion is likely to fall on a considerable number of
persons;
2. when there is doubt as to whether the accused is or is not the person who committed the
offense;
3. when it is necessary to determine the sanity of the accused or the voluntariness of the act,
the specific nature of the crime committed, or whether the shooting was intentional or
accidental;
4. when the accused interposes self-defense or defense of stranger.
- O -

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