Dulay vs.

Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220

By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of
which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty.
Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in
her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting
was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based
on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners filing of
the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employers subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also
filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela
is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action
against the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those
arising from, quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theory of
private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article

2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
(2) No. The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however,
that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35095

August 31, 1973

GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated
October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after
conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan
Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital,
hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by
respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from
Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of
government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health
Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight
curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71
owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala.
As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which
necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident
driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent
manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers
aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed
on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action
for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers,
respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for
preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but
alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence
of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger
bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed,
chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger
bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the
accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the
damages caused on petitioners.

On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion
to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of
action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite
verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3)
that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro
Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no
cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for
damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal
Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for
"double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with
the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless
the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of
the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been
rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil
Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or
homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the
aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents
under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to
Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which
remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the
arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that
whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence
known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a
showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to
institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be
tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the
prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable
for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action
was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence
this appeal on certiorari.

There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private
respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the
passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the
collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault
or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated
traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and
imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as
one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of
said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on
petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of
negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief
of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners,
it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would
substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or
create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607,
620-621). 1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action,
may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said
party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that
neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be
made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had
already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with
the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was
convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in said
criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in
Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did
not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no
pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of
private counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not constitute
such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same

action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on
the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said
criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners
have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and
have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has
ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action.
For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of
the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the
result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32,
33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these
articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in
what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do
not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the
institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether
as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which
require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action
even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby
foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need
not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the
action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for
respondent court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I would like to limit my concurrence.
I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code which read as follows:
ART 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2177.
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850
is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the
Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to
the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that
the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot
stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding
the Rules of 1940.
Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required,
there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order
that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured
party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I would like to limit my concurrence.
I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code which read as follows:
ART 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2177.
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850
is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the
Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to
the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that
the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot
stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding
the Rules of 1940.
Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required,
there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order
that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured
party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.
Footnotes
1
"Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or
culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a
situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761

November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF
OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances

within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered
the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation,
for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-90782.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of
Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasidelict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its
title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be
liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4)
That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent
on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting
from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by
defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side
of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man
height inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant
cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the
same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also
built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates
the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the
same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5)
That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water
being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No.
2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water
below it seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of
plaintiffs.

6)
That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water
conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein
plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a)
Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b)

Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.

c)
During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in
danger.
d)
Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the
basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss
and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and
damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a
clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.
If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act
or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court
has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in
the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18
(Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is
ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R.
Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the
case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent
corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1

Rollo. pp. 27-30.

Rollo, p. 33.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4977

March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.
W. L. Wright, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David
Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an
electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small
island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power
plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the
westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15
years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age,
and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of
age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made
on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving
the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they
walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in
the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass
fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means

of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive
power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9
years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of
experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and
obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a
hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding
that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while
Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents
of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel
had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the
metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its
removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the
defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears,
however, that some months before the accident, during the construction of the defendant's
plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used in
sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears
that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the
construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps
when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a considerable
time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as
detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent
visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to
do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play
sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the
uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were
found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the
defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees
were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing
and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a
day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature
both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.

The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established
by the evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact
which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by
plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they had
come from its possession and control, and that the company or some of its employees left them
exposed on its premises at the point where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently
relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the
plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think,
however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations
in this regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively,
on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used
in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from
the place where the caps were found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies
and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and
that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the
company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for
the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by
the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the
contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they
were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the
defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its
possession and control. We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or
detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot
where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the
ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps
defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left
them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play,
where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known
that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which
these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the
company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively
proven, however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was regularly
employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and
immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's foremen, and
there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done

by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that
he understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his own
knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, or of the
relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having been proven that
detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on work done by the defendant
company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should have introduced the
necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference
that it was the owner of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for
tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been
intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should
not be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those found on
its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in
the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes
the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on
its premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of
its employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor,
upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and
1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the
facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the
provisions of these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for
us to consider the various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised
in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps,
be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order
to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts
it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty
arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under
consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left
exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping
them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured
had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and
strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked
up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he
not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry
upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent
act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in
his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be
deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place
where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident
which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the
courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable"
cases, and the cases based thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an
injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of
amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad
company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there
found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of
which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found
upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it
probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and
where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of
the premises liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question
was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its
premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under
circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these
cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard
to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by
it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence
or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged
by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult
that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of
tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity
only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and
sharply criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan
vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable
cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein
it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers
thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no
exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery
naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the
premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to
interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the

circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon
another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by
the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass.,
349). And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and
perhaps in other States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and
approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B.,
29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that announced in the Railroad
Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous
opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and
reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and
critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English and American,
formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs.
Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The
plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and
visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's express permission or invitation, and
while there, was by accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he
had no knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises without any fence
around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or
had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff
could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the
premises in question, against the unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no
obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved
to the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and
would seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a
trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for
injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case
now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving
unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have
forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and
pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its
mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow
path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and
young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality

and playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest
regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in danger from
being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when snow, wind, or
rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned
to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that
the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was
a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to
make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited with
flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs passing
along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their
instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and
thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord Ellenborough, C.J.,
"is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of his instinct which he
can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference, in reason we may
observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of this village to visit the
defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license, resulting from the
habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or warning, to do so at will, for
purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge
Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would
be a barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon,
baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run
into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the consequence of leaving
exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child attracted
to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby be killed or
maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of
Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and
others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon
this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children
anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might
naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to
be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation
to visit the premises of another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for

children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be
equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away
upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication
should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less
cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children
here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled
by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the
public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which
arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as
inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic
influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed,
or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the
owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "
must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the
premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without
his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation
whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering
his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam
about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least
equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions
the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from
unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of
duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had
entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold
otherwise would be expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and
unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might
naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a
man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the
care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of
sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure
the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided
January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd and
unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or
guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing
boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child
the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right
to recover in such cases a point which we neither discuss nor decide.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for
injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore
was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other
hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the
injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of
plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should
not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree
with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As
was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an
adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence
of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant
of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and
capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." As we
think we have shown, under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting
from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age,
because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or
invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have been free
from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match
to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion.
On this point, which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the
doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is
worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has
been directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been
affirmed, were of such tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand
the nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury
was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials

on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a
stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a
match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there
be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous,
in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put
the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him,
or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts;
and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of
things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand
the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said
to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the
age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with
the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of
the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from
an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively
presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities,
though it can not be said that these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases
such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become
responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the
provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of
committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact that he is
less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance
(Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose
which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for
the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec.
765). And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code,
art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the
cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred
by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for
the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the
injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire.
(Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)
According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down
the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation
placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes
vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar
the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained
by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil,
391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a
source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of
cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or omissions of a
third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission were
imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury
was the negligence of the injured party himself.

The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or
negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in his
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of March 7,
1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when between it and the
damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage caused does not arise
from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter,
even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is shown
that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured party himself.
And again
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September 27, 1898, have
especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the
proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the
liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or
omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the
decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately and
directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal
ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. (Scavoela,
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely
settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.
(supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was
exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the
casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902,
stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain
"define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we
are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we
declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of proportional

damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured
party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving
occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was
an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly
or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less
a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the
explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match
to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon
defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation
of cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of
these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very
tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in view
of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of
unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without
fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither
discuss nor decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of
the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the
record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in
favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day.
So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

Footnotes
1

Phil. Rep., 85.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50959

July 23, 1980

HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and
ROMEO VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the following facts:
On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar,
Pedro Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a
complaint 1 for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and
Romeo Villa y Cunanan docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 alleging among others
that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along
MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit
by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74, driven by
Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. In
due time, the private respondents filed their answer, 2 admitting some allegations and denying
the other allegations of the complaint

Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, on
the ground that the criminal case 4 against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending
in said court, and that Section 3, Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of
the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge granted the
motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case No. 5114. 5
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal Case No. 836,
acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No. 5114 on the
ground that the petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having
been acquitted in the criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motions 8 alleging that their
cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict.
Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued an
order 9 dated April 13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114.
The petitioners moved to reconsider; 10 however, the same was denied by respondent Judge in
his order 11 dated May 30, 1979.
Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the
order of respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law except thru the present petition.
After the private respondents had filed their comment, 12 this Court Resolved to consider the
said comment as answer to the petition, and the case was deemed submitted for decision on
September 3, 1979.
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil
Case No. 5114.
The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 31.When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission
complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the
act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising
from other sources, 13 like quasi delict. 14

In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action
was based upon a quasi delict. 15 Thus, the complaint alleged among others:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4.
That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio Pag-asa, Bo. San
Rafael Tarlac, Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and while riding on a bicycle on his way home
to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a Philippine
Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74 and as result of which he
sustained physical injuries which cause his instantaneous death and the bicycle he was riding
on was damaged and destroyed;
5.
That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and
proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards
to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulations;
6.
That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly defendant
Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro
Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have occurred.
xxx

xxx

xxx

All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or
omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused
by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or
commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. In the case of
Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this Court held that:
... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to receiver damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e),
Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.

The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private
respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict. 17
In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos and De Castillo * JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur and also in the opinion of Justice Aquino. I just like to add that in my view the
proceeding and trial in Civil Case No. 5114 should not have been suspended at all just because
of the filing of the criminal case. Aquino, J., see concurrence below.
I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under
which, according to the Code Commission, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shag not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Article 33 Of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages
since the term "physical in. juries" therein embraces death Dyogi vs. Yateo, 100 Phil 1095).
Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was base on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as
plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 of
the Civil Code which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in
the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law (Garcia
vs. Florida L-35095, August 31, 1973, 52 SCRA 420, 429).

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur and also in the opinion of Justice Aquino. I just like to add that in my view the
proceeding and trial in Civil Case No. 5114 should not have been suspended at all just because
of the filing of the criminal case. A Aquino, J., see concurrence below.
I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under
which, according to the Code Commission, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shag not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Article 33 Of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages
since the term "physical in. juries" therein embraces death Dyogi vs. Yateo, 100 Phil 1095).
Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was base on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as
plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 of
the Civil Code which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation in
the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law (Garcia
vs. Florida L-35095, August 31, 1973, 52 SCRA 420, 429).

PADILLA, et al. v COURT OF APPEALS (Edz)

129 SCRA 558
Acquittal
Facts:
Padilla (P), et al. were found guilty of grave coercion for unlawfully preventing, by means of
threat, force and violence, Vergara (V) and his family from closing their stall at a public market
and for forcibly opening the door of the stall, demolishing and destroying it and the furnitures
therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise.

 Accused allegedly took advantage of their positions: P was the incumbent municipal mayor,
while the rest were policemen except for one civilian.
P, et al. appealed to the CA, claiming that P had the power to order removal of the stall,
which was deemed a nuisance per se under a municipal ordinance. The CA acquitted the
accused on ground of reasonable doubt, but still held them liable for actual damages (P9,600).
Issue: Did the acquittal based on reasonable doubt as to the criminal liability result in the
extinction of the civil liability?
Held: NO.
P, et al. were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against
them. They were acquitted because their acts were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. (Crime of coercion requires
that the violence be employed against the person, not against property)
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively
to civil liability ex delicto under Art. 100, RPC. The civil liability must have arisen from the act
as a crime.
The same punishable act or omission can create 2 kinds of civil liabilities against the accused:
that arising from the act as a crime and that arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either of
these 2 may be enforced against the accused. However, the offended party cannot recover under
both types of liability.
Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly
declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and where the
civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted.
There are no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed sincce the facts to
be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. The accused themselves do
not deny that they caused the destruction of Vs market stall and had its contents carted
away.

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI,
respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
"Doctors are protected by a special law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even
warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishap or unusual consequences.
Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistake of judgment"[1]

The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in
simplest term is the type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has cause bodily harm.[2] In this jurisdiction,
however, such claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code,[3] and in some instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code[4] with which the civil action for damages is impliedly instituted. It is via the latter
type of action that the heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged
imprudence and negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death. The petitioner
and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the
deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide" in
an information which reads:
"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused abovenamed, being then the
attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did then and there, in a negligence (sic),
careless, imprudent, and incompetent manner, and failing to supply or store sufficient
provisions and facilities necessary to meet any and all exigencies apt to arise before, during
and/or after a surgical operation causing by such negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and
incompetence, and causing by such failure, including the lack of preparation and foresight
needed to avert a tragedy, the untimely death of said Lydia Umali on the day following said
surgical operation."[5]
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the abovementioned charge. On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo
City rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for
insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible
for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 months and 1 day
imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs."[6]
The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto
the decision of the MTCC[7] prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals but to no avail. Hence this petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction with
modification that she is further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity
for her death.[8]
In substance, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not
petitioner's conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from
an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

First the antecedent facts.

On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother
to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City,
Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day.[9]
Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma"[10] in her
uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.[11] Rowena and her
mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on
the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.[12] According to Rowena, she noticed that the
clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with.[13] Because of the untidy state of the
clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.[14] The
following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the
petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and
the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she
must be operated on as scheduled.[15]
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside
the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo
went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's
sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this
time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood
Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. After the lapse of a
few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff
then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was
brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with
petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a
person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her
mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply
had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San
Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it
arrived.[16] But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure
dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District
Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined.[17] The transfer to the
San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other
relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to
take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a
tricycle and followed the ambulance.[18]
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating
room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from
the abdominal incision.[19] The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head

of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However,
when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure
was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he
could do to help save the patient.[20] While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the
patient died.[21] Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was
pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.[22]
In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to
conclude that she was indeed negligent in the performance of the operation:
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for
any contingency that might happen during the operation. The manner and the fact that the
patient was brought to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was
something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation. There was no
showing that before the operation, accused Dr. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary
clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It was (sic) said in medical parlance that the
"abdomen of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the
moment it was open (sic) and surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient
(sic) chart which is a public document was not presented because it is only there that we could
determine the condition of the patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in Exh. "F-1"
that the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed
upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died because
of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood
during the operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the
reason why the patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo City District Hospital. As
such, the surgeon should answer for such negligence. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the
anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate that she should be held jointly liable with Dra.
Cruz who actually did the operation."[23]
The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's
declaration of "incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and skill of appellant (herein
petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and after the operation."[24] And likewise
affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself
indicate negligence, it nevertheless shows the absence of due care and supervision over her
subordinate employees. Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating room? Were the
surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have contributed to the
infection of the patient? Only the petitioner could answer these, but she opted not to testify.
This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing good to testify on her defense.
Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the prosecution witness" remains unchallenged
and unrebutted.

Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the following facts: that the accused
asked the patient's relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was already in
progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood for the patient; that
after the surgery, they were again asked to procure more type "A" blood, but such was not
anymore available from the source; that the oxygen given to the patient was empty; and that the
son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of the petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo
City District Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen. All these conclusively show that the
petitioner had not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first
surgery, which was not emergency in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had no
ready antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient
oxygen supply.
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardiopulmonary clearance, or at least a clearance by an internist, which are standard requirements
before a patient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner determine as part of the pre-operative
evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding time and clotting time?
There is no showing that these were done. The petitioner just appears to have been in a hurry
to perform the operation, even as the family wanted the postponement to April 6, 1991.
Obviously, she did not prepare the patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the
operation. Moreover, she did not prepare a medical chart with instructions for the patient's care.
If she did all these, proof thereof should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are
overwhelming evidence of recklessness and imprudence."[25]
This court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or
fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without
malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment
of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members
of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced
state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.[26] In the
recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al.,[27] this Court stated that in
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition
under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is

essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's
conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.[28] Further, inasmuch as the
causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of
scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to
support the conclusion as to causation.[29]
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert
testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing
in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr.
Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only
testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the
matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the
lack of provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient
to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the omission of any form of blood typing
before transfusion; and even the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the
reoperation performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstances
pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the
part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor
conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert
witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and
care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.[30]
The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization
that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating.[31] Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard
of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It
must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant
case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution
and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary
is sufficiently established.[32] This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so
sadly lacking in the case at bench.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the
lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent
transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the
petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent
in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances
caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that
the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the
resulting death of his patient.[33] In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc.,[34] where the
attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant's wife and
newborn baby, this court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the 'injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.' And 'the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.'''[35] (Underscoring supplied.)
Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased summarized his findings as
follows:
"Atty. Cachero:
Q. You mentioned about your Autopsy Report which has been marked as Exh. "A-1-b". There
appears here a signature above the typewritten name Floresto Arizala, Jr., whose signature is
that?
A.

That is my signature, sir.

Q. Do you affirm the truth of all the contents of Exh. "A-1-b"?

A. Only as to the autopsy report no. 91-09, the time and place and everything after the post
mortem findings, sir.
Q. You mentioned on your "Post Mortem Findings" about surgical incision, 14:0 cm.,
infraumbilical area, anterior abdominal area, midline, will you please explain that in your own
language?
A.

There was incision wound (sic) the area just below the navel, sir.

Q. And the last paragraph of the postmortem findings which I read: Uterus, pear-shaped and
pale measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x 5.0 cm, with some surface nodulation of the fundic area posteriorly.
Cut-section shows diffusely pale myometrium with areas of streak induration. The ovaries and

adnexal structures are missing with the raw surfaces patched with clotted blood. Surgical
sutures were noted on the operative site.
Intestines and mesenteries are pale with blood clots noted between the mesentric folds.
Hemoperitonium: 300 s.s.,
right paracolic gutter,
50 c.c., left paracolic gutter
200 c.c., mesentric area,
100 c.c., right pelvic gutter
stomach empty.
Other visceral organs, pale.',
will you please explain that on (sic) your own language or in ordinary
A. There was a uterus which was not attached to the adnexal structures namely ovaries which
were not present and also sign of previous surgical operation and there were (sic) clotted blood,
sir.
Q. How about the ovaries and adnexal structures?
A.

They are missing, sir.

Q. You mean to say there are no ovaries?

A. During that time there are no ovaries, sir.
Q. And there were likewise sign of surgical sutures?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How about the intestines and mesenteries are place (sic) with blood clots noted between the
mesenteric folds, will you please explain on (sic) this?
A. In the peritoneal cavity, they are mostly perritonial blood.
Q. And what could have caused this blood?

A. Well, ordinarily blood is found inside the blood vessel. Blood were (sic) outside as a result
of the injuries which destroyed the integrity of the vessel allowing blood to sip (sic) out, sir.
Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the court the
cause of death?
A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic shock.
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic shock?
A.

Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood loss.

Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?

A.

Unattended hemorrhage, sir.[36] (Underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto Salvador:

"Q. And were you able to determine the cause of death by virtue of the examination of the
specimen submitted by Dr. Arizala?
A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it would be difficult for me to determine the
cause of death, sir.
Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr. Arizala?
A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in connection with your pathology report.
Q. What could have caused the death of the victim?
A.

This pathologic examination are (sic) compatible with the person who died, sir.

Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of hemorrhagic compatible?

A. It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-replacement of
blood and so the victim before she died there was shock of diminish of blood of the circulation.
She died most probably before the actual complete blood loss, sir.
Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood was due on (sic) operation?
A.

Based on my pathology findings, sir.

Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?

A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone surgery. Another may be a blood vessel may be
cut while on operation and this cause (sic) bleeding, or may be set in the course of the operation,
or may be (sic) he died after the operation. Of course there are other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero:
Q.

Especially so doctor when there was no blood replacement?

A. Yes, sir."[37] (Underscoring supplied.)

The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of
death. However, as likewise testified to by the expert witnesses in open court, hemorrhage or
hemorrhagic shock during surgery may be caused by several different factors. Thus, Dr.
Salvador's elaboration on the matter:
"Atty. Pascual:
Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that you mentioned you said that it could be at the
moment of operation when one losses (sic) control of the presence, is that correct? During the
operation there is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of considerable size?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped later on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible also to some clotting defect, is that
correct?
A. May be (sic)."[38] (Underscoring supplied).
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the following expert opinion:
"Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic) would suffer hemorrage what would be the
possible causes of such hemorrage (sic)?

A. Among those would be what we call Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason for
the bleeding, sir, which cannot be prevented by anyone, it will happen to anyone, anytime and
to any persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the operations done in the body?
A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any cutting or operation that I
(sic) have done.
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could be the cause for the
hemorrhage or bleeding in a patient by an operations (sic)?
A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic) and it is possible that the ligature in the
suture was (sic) become (sic) loose, it is (sic) becomes loose if proven.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does not find any untight (sic) clot (sic) blood
vessel or any suture that become (sic) loose the cause of the bleeding could not be attributed to
the fault of the subject?
A. Definitely, sir."[39] (Underscoring supplied.)
According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: (1) the
failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get
out of control; (3) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and
(4) and a clotting defect known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture that the autopsy
conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut
blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie or suture of a cut blood vessel had become
loose thereby causing the hemorrhage.[40] Hence the following pertinent portion of Dr.
Arizala's testimony:
"Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you know whether these were sutured ligature or
plain ligature
A:

Ligature, sir.

Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures were tied by first suturing
it and then tying a knot or the tie was merely placed around the cut structure and tied?
A: I cannot recall, sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because you did not even bothered (sic) to examine, is
that correct?
A:

Well, I bothered enough to know that they were sutured, sir.

Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the cut structures were not
sutured or tied neither were you able to determine whether any loose suture was found in the
peritoneal cavity?
A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir."[41]
On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC
caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a
serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery leaving
raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs.[42] And as testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C.
Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot be prevented, it will happen to anyone, anytime."[43]
He testified further:
"Q. Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be prevented?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)?
A.

Possible, sir.

Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you whether this patient suffered
among such things as DIC?
A.

Well, I did reserve because of the condition of the patient.

Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the deceased Lydia Umali
looking for the chart, the operated (sic) records, the post mortem findings on the histophanic
(sic) examination based on your examination of record, doctor, can you more or less says (sic)
what part are (sic) concerned could have been the caused (sic) of death of this Lydia Umali?
A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the caused (sic) of death is dessimulated (sic)
Intra Vascular Coagulation or the DIC which resulted to hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.

Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is knowing (sic) the doctor would say whether the
doctor her (sic) has been (sic) fault?
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just read the chart as well as the
other record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Precisely based on this examination.
ATTY. MALVEDA:
Not finding, there was no finding made.
COURT:
He is only reading the record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Yes, sir.
A.

No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the surgeon, sir." [44]

This court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution
and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the
cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed
to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was
unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to
the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the
dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the
petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil
liability.[45]
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of
evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the
reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life

has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind.
The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time[46] and
this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of
bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the
award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the
instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
[1] "THE PHYSICIAN'S LIABILITY AND THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE" by Constantino
Nuez, p.1 citing Louis Nizer, My Life in Court, New York: Double Day & Co., 1961 in
Tolentino, Jr., MEDICINE and LAW, Proceedings of the Symposium on Current Issues
Common to Medicine and Law U.P. Law Center, 1980.
[2] Leonila Garcia-Rueda vs. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et. al., G.R. No. 118141, September 5, 1997.
[3] ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
[4] Art. 365. Imprudence and Negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if
it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty, of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and

maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.