1. When falsification is complexed: Gonzales v.

People (2010)
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document. In other words, the
crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. Actually
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. The damage
to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document
2. In using a fictitious name, the damage that must be caused must be to the public interest. If the use of
a fictitious name resulted to the damage of private interest, then it can be estafa through deceit.
3. To commit perjury under Art. 183, the statement or testimony under oath on a material matter must
not be made in a judicial proceeding. An example is a false testimony in Congress, or before any
administrative officer authorized to conduct a hearing (like in the NLRC)
4. Under the old RPC, a person who would procure another to testify falsely would be liable for
subornation of perjury, if the latter would testify in a manner making him liable for perjury. Now, that
act is merely perjury and that person who procured will be the principal by induction.
5. Doctrine of Constructive Possession under the Dangerous Drugs Act (P v. Lagman, 2008)
The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs are the following: 1) the
actual possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug.
[Illegal possession of regulated drugs] is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess
(animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the
drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.
The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular
person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is
sufficient to convict.
Maribel failed to present any convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of knowledge and
possession of the regulated substances and paraphernalia found in her residence. As tenant of the
house, she had full access to, full control of and dominion over the rooms.
6. Chain of Custody
In People v. Sanchez, we held that in case of warrantless seizure (such as a buy-bust operation)
under R.A. No. 9165, the physical inventory and photograph of the item (in the presence of the 1)
accused, 2) his representative or counsel, 3) a representative from media and the 4) DOJ, and any
5) elected public official) shall be made by the buy-bust team, if practicable,at the place they were
seized, considering that such interpretation is more in keeping with the laws intent of preserving the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs The prosecution, in the present case, failed to
1

explain why the required inventory and photographing of the seized items were not practicable and
could not have been done at the place of seizure.
7. Links in Chain of Custody (P v. Kamad, 2009)
the following links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
8. Other notes in DDA
Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended.
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an Offender
Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary,
a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised
Penal Code shall be applicable.
9. Art 204 (knowingly rendering unjust judgment) is not applicable to collegiate courts who reach their
conclusions in consultation. Its only applicable to MTC/MeTC/MuTC and RTC judges.
10. If a judge was bribed to render an unjust judgment, the judge commits two separate offenses of
bribery and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment (Art. 210 provides in addition to)
11. An act or omission by a PO can be prosecuted both under RA 3019 and under the RPC. RA 3019
Section 3 provides that the corrupt practices herein enumerated are in addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law
12. Under RA 3019, a PO includes a government officer/employee, whether appointive or elective, who is
receiving honoraria from the government or nominal compensation
13. Under RA 3019 Section 12, no public officer is allowed to resign or retire a) pending investigation,
criminal or administrative b) pending prosecution against him for any offense under RA 3019 or under
the provisions of the RPC on bribery
14. Art. 208 punishing prevaricacion, (public officer who has duty to cause prosecution or prosecute
offenses, but knowing the commission of a crime, he maliciously does not cause the prosecution or
knowing that a crime is to be committed, he tolerates its commission) is an element of qualified
bribery under Art. 211-A
15. There is no attempted or frustrated indirect bribery.
16. The crime of corruption of PO is attempted if the offer, promise or gift is refused, and consummated if
accepted.
2

17. What crime is committed by a tax collector who, by means of deceit, succeeded in receiving
from the taxpayer a sum larger than that fixed by law? Estafa by means of deceit. This is because
of the deceit employed. However, if the tax collector collected a sum larger than that authorized by
law without deceit, and he spent the same, then hes guilty of illegal exaction and malversation.
18. If a clerk of court appropriated money bills that were received in evidence, then he will be liable for
infidelity in custody of documents (Art. 226, removal, concealment or destruction of documents)
However, if the case already terminated and the money was no longer needed in the case and the
clerk appropriated the same, its malversation under Art. 217.
19. Malversation is not limited to money, as it also extends to public property.
20. Art 223 (infidelity in custody of prisoners: conniving with or consenting to evasion) covers both a
detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment.
21. In Art 229, the revelation of a secret that a PO knows by reason of his official capacity without
justifiable reason/authority must cause damage to the public interest. On the other hand, RA 3019
Sec 3(K) does not require damage to be caused for the PO to be liable.
22. In Art. 230, for it to be consummated, the revelation of the PO of a secret of an individual that he
knows by reason of his office need not cause damage to the private individual.
23. In Art. 235, maltreatment of prisoners can be committed against a detention prisoner and a prisoner
by final judgment.
24. In Art 238 (abandonment of office before resignation is officially accepted), the crime is qualified if the
abandonment has for its purpose the evasion of discharge of duties of preventing, prosecuting or
punishing any of the crimes falling within TITLE 1 BOOK 2 (national security and law of nations:
treason - piracy) and TITLE 3 CHAPTER 1 (crimes against public order: rebellion inciting to
sedition)
25. Usurpation of legislative powers (Art. 239) can only be done by executive/judicial
26. Usurpation of executive functions (Art. 240) can only be done by judges. It includes obstructing
executive authorities from the lawful exercise of their powers
27. Usurpation of judicial functions (Art. 241) can only be done by executive.
28. Art 245 (Abuses against chastity by soliciting or making immoral advances) cannot be committed
against the mother of the person in custody. Art. 245 is consummated by mere proposal.
29. The penalty of RP-death will NOT be imposed when
a) Parricide through NEGLIGENCE (Art. 365)
b) Parricide by mistake (he wanted to kill C, but instead killed A, his father.)
c) Parricide under exceptional circumstances
30. If an illegitimate grandparent or grandson (other ascendant or descendant)or a common law spouse
is killed by the accused, it is not parricide. However, killing ones parents or child, whether legit or
illegitimate, is parricide.
31. If a stranger is in conspiracy with a son who killed his father, the stranger is not liable for parricide, but
only homicide or murder.

32. Art 247 does not define and penalize a felony. A legally married person or parent must surprise
his/her legal spouse or daughter (w/n legitimate) under 18 and living with him in the act of sexual
intercourse.
33. P v. Abarca: The accused caught his wife having sex with another man. The man had a gun, but he
ran away. The accused went to his relatives house to borrow a gun. He then looked for the man and
found him. He fired shots at him and others were hit. The man died. The accused was charged with
murder. The accused was also charged for frustrated murder for the others who were hit in the
crossfire.
1) Is the accused liable for murder?
No. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accusedappellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was
actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by
the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them
or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say
that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse,
and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of
the accused's rage.
2) Is the accused liable for frustrated murder for the bystanders who were hit?
No.
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder
when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is
not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility.
Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot
be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered
warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the
injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we
hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical
injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was
incapacitated for one and one-half months; there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to
the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen
days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.)
34. Unlicensed Firearm (RA 8294)

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

35. Art 251 death in a tumultuous affray

Free for all (where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in
a confused and disorganized manner) + Someone was killed + It cant be ascertained who actually
killed + Person who inflicted serious injuries or who used violence can be identified
In this case, the person/s who will be liable for the death will be the persons who inflicted SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES on the person who was killed (prision mayor)
If it cannot be determined who inflicted serious physical injuries on the deceased, all those who may
have used violence will be held liable (prision correcional)
36. Art 252: Physical Injuries in a Tumultuous affray
Free for all + Serious Physical Injuries were inflicted on the PARTICIPANTS + Person responsible
for the physical injuries cannot be identified
In this case, all those who appeared to have used violence of the person who suffered physical
injuries will be liable.
Free for all + Less Serious Physical Injuries inflicted on the PARTICIPANTS + Person responsible
cannot be identified
In this case, all those who appeared to have used to violence on the person who suffered less serious
physical injuries will be liable, but with a lower penalty (arresto from 5-15 days)
37. The corpus delicti in crimes against persons where the death of the victim consummates the crime is
the fact of death, or the manner of the death of the victim. In all crimes against persons in which the
death of the victim is an element of an offense, there must be satisfactory evidence of the fact of
death and the identity of the victim.
38. A doctor who resorts to euthanasia may be held liable for murder. Its not giving assistance to suicide.
39. A person who commits suicide does not commit a crime. If he injures somebody or damages property
in the course of his suicide or the attempt thereof, hes also not criminally liable.
40. In infanticide (Art. 255), where a person kills a child less than 3 days old (2 days old below + can
sustain an independent life), only the mother of the child and the childs maternal grandparents are
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of concealing dishonor.
41. The stranger who cooperates with the killing in infanticide is guilty of infanticide, but will suffer the
penalty of murder.
42. In, Art 256 (Intentional Abortion), the one who will be held liable is the
a) the person who used any violence upon the person of the woman
b) the person who intentionally caused the abortion by administering drugs or beverages WITHOUT
the womans consent
c) the person who intentionally caused the abortion by administering drugs or beverages WITH the
womans consent
43. The woman who consents to be administered drugs and beverages to cause abortion is NOT liable
under Art. 256, and is instead liable under Art. 258
44. If the fetus could sustain an independent life (intrauterine life of at least 7 months) after it separation
from the maternal womb and it is killed, it is INFANTICIDE and not abortion.
5

45. In Art 257 (UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION) actual physical violence is used on a pregnant woman
without intending abortion and the fetus dies as a result.
46. Unintentional abortion through imprudence: imprudent taxi driver who bumped another car. The
passenger of the taxi was a pregnant woman. As a result of the collision, woman hit the front seat and
had a miscarriage.
47. Person may be held liable for unintentional abortion even if he didnt know woman was pregnant. Art
4(1): punching a pregnant woman and fetus dies, guilty of physical injuries AND unintentional
abortion
48. Complex crime of homicide with unintentional abortion: X hit a pregnant woman. Woman fell to
the ground. When she got up, he punched her again. Woman suffered hemorrhage, resulting to
premature delivery of her baby. Woman eventually died. X liable for complex crime.
49. Complex crime of parricide w/ unintentional abortion: Husband kills his pregnant wife. Fetus thus
also dies. Husband liable for complex crime. (P v. Villanueva)
50. Under Art 258 (abortion practiced by the woman herself or her parents), the intended abortion ca be
committed by:
a) the pregnant woman herself
b) any other person with her consent the person who did it is liable under Art. 256 (intentional
abortion)
c) any of her parents but it should be for the purpose of concealing dishonor. Otherwise, it is
intentional abortion
51. Under Art. 258, only the pregnant woman can claim the mitigating circumstance of wanting to conceal
dishonor
52. Mutilation requires a special intention to clip off the part of the body so as much as to deprive him of
that part. RESULT + PURPOSE is important.
53. Serious physical injuries are committed if a person becomes permanently incapacitated for work in
which he was previously habitually engaged. (in this case, he cant return anymore)
54. Serious physical injuries are committed if a person becomes ill or incapacitated for work in which he
was previously habitually engaged for more than 90 days (in this case, he can still return)
55. Serious physical injuries are committed if a person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor (no need to
have a job at the time of the injury) for 31-90 days. (30 < x < 90)
56. For deformity to be serious physical injuries, it must be a) physical ugliness b) conspicuous and
visible and c) permanent and definite
57. Medical attendance is immaterial in serious physical injuries.
58. In less serious physical injuries, the offended party is incapacitated for labor OR requires medical
attention for for 10-30 days (10 < x < 30) It must not be those mentioned in SERIOUS PHYSICAL
59. In slight physical injuries, the offended party is incapacitated for labor OR requires medical attention
from 1 to 9 nine days.
60. Slight physical includes ill-treatment by deed without causing any injury. If there was intent to insult,
theres a separate crime of slander by deed.

61. Anti Hazing Law

ACCOMPLICE: OWNER OF THE PLACE: The owner of the place where the hazing is
conducted will be liable as accomplice when he has ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE of hazing conducted
in the place + He failed to take any action to prevent it
ACCOMPLICE: SCHOOL AUTHORITIES + FACULTY MEMBERS: When they CONSENT to the
hazing or have ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE thereof and they fail to take any action to prevent it

62. 2 kinds of rape

1) RAPE through sexual intercourse: carnal knowledge of a woman by a man under any of the
following circumstances:
o Force, threat or intimidation
Force does not have to be that great
Moral ascendancy may substitute f,t,i
o Deprived of reason or unconscious
o Fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority
o Under 12 or demented (no force, threat, deprivation of reason, etc required)
Liable even if there is consent
2) RAPE through sexual assault (man or woman)
o Inserting penis into mouth or ass
o Inserting any instrument or object in mouth or ass( includes finger)
These acts must be done under the 4 circumstances above (force, etc)

63. A woman can be held liable for the FIRST MODE of rape if she was charged as a co-principal with
the man (e.g. she assisted the man in raping a girl)
64. Effect of Pardon (Art 266-C)

MARRIAGE: Subsequent valid marriage between offender and offended in rape shall extinguish
the criminal action OR the penalty imposed.
FORGIVENESS: If legal husband is offender, the subsequent forgiveness by wife shall extinguish
action/penalty PROVIDED the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall be abated if the
marriage is void ab initio.
If the victim and accused ARE not married, pardon by victim wont do anything. Its because rape
is now a crime against persons.
Marriage only extinguishes action as to the principal (e.g. husband) and not to the accomplices or
accessories since rape is now a crime against persons

65. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267)

Elements:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Offender is a private individual

He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other matter deprives the latter of his liberty
Act of detention/kidnapping is illegal
Any of the following circumstances are present:
a. Lasts for more than 3 days
b. Committed simulating public authority
c. Any serious physical injuries are inflicted OR threats to kill him are made
d. Victim is a minor, female or public officer (but the accused must not be the parent)

66. If kidnapping or detention is done for ransom (e.g. random is demanded), circumstances in element 4
not required for it to be kidnapping or serious illegal detention.

67. Qualifying Circumstances in Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

When purpose is to extort ransom

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence (SCC of Kidnapping with Homicide or Murder:
regardless of whether or not the killing is sought or was an afterthought)
When the victim is raped (SCC of Kidnapping with Rape)
When the victim is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts

68. Kidnapping with Rape v. Forcible Abduction

Kidnapping with Rape

Forcible Abduction with Rape

Type

Complex crime if woman kidnapped is also

raped

Lewd Design
Character of Rape

At the outset, no lewd design

Rape is qualifying circumstance

Complex under art. 48 if forcible

abduction was necessary means
for committing the rape
At the outset, lewd design
Rape is also a crime

Counts

Only 1 kidnapping with rape, even if multiple

rapes committed

Only one rape complexed, all

other rapes are separate crimes

Where there is
attempted rape

If merely attempted rape: 2 separate crimes:

Kidnapping and Attempted Rape

If merely attempted rape, only

one crime: Forcible Abduction

69. When liability is mitigated for SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION (there is illegal detention or kidnapping,
without the attendant circumstances under Art. 267)

When the following concur:

o A) Offender voluntarily releases the person so kidnapped or detained WITHIN 3 days
from the commencement of the detention +
o B) Purpose intended is not attained +
o C) Criminal charges have not yet been instituted

70. In Art 269 (Unlawful Arrest), a private individual or a public officer who must not be vested with
authority to order the arrest or detain a person ARRESTS or DETAINS another for the purpose of
delivering him to the proper authorities. The ARREST or DETENTION is without legal ground. Here,
the motive of the one arresting is important. The LENGTH of DETENTION is IMMATERIAL.
71. In Art. 272 (Slavery), the purpose of the kidnapping, buying, selling, detaining of a human being must
be to ENSLAVE HIM/HER (e.g. make him work without compensation) However, if the purpose is to
make a woman work as a prostitute, it may be white slave trade under Art. 341.
72. In Art 273 (exploitation of child labor), the retention of a minor to serve the accused under the pretext
of paying a debt incurred by minors ascendant, guardian, or entrusted custodian, must be AGAINST
the will of such minor.
73. In Art 276 (custodian of a child abandons the latter without intent to kill), the minor must be under 7
years old.
74. To commit SIMPLE trespass to dwelling, the entry to the DWELLING must be against the implied or
express prohibition of the owner. Mere lack of consent is not enough to convict. To commit
QUALIFIED, violence/intimidation must be utilized.
75. If the entrance, however, was effected by violence or intimidation used by the offender at any time
before, during or immediately after his entry, there is trespass even if the door was open at the time,

since the occupant wasnt in a position to prohibit entry. Violence can be against persons or force
upon things.
76. Where the accused had no intent to kill anyone when he secretly entered a dwelling house but
committed homicide only when he was discovered inside the house by an occupant who raised an
alarm about his presence, he is guilty of separate crimes of trespass to dwelling and homicide. If
there was intent to kill when he entered, then dwelling will be an AC.
77. Threats (Glenn Tuazon, 2011)
Grave threat

Light threat

Other light threat

Threatens a crime

Threatens a wrong

Threatens a wrong

Must have a condition

Does not have a condition

May or may
condition

not

have

Indications show he persists in

the crime
*qualified if threat made
through a middleman or in
writing

Threat made in the heat of

anger and indications show he
does not intent to persist in the
wrong

78. Threats may be directed to the victim himself, his honor and his property, or his family, their honor
and their property
79. Grave Threats

282(1) CRIME + CONDITION + PURPSOE ATTAINED: I will burn down your house if you dont pay
your loan + loan actually paid
282(2) CRIME + CONDITION: I will burn down your house if you dont pay your loan + loan not paid
282(3) CRIME + NO CONDITION: I will kill you (and the offender goes near the victim with a knife,
adopting an aggressive stance)

80. Light threats

(WRONG + CONDITION + W/N PURPSOE ATTAINED) I will tell testify against you in your case for
adultery if you dont give me PHP5,000.

81. Other light threats

285(1): threatening another with a weapon or drawing a weapon in a quarrel, unless in self-defense
285(2): orally threatening another in the heat of anger with some harm constituting a crime without
persisting on the idea
285(3): orally threatening to do any other harm that is not a crime

82. If the threat included a condition of handing over property of the threatened person and the property
handed over is immediately done, then its robbery with intimidation.
83. If a person is prevented by another from doing something NOT prohibited by law or is COMPELLED
to do something against his will, but without violence or intimidation, its just unjust vexation. When
the element of violence/intimidation is absent in grave coercion, its just unjust vexation.
84. Violence in grave coercion may be employed upon things, instead of it being directed against the
person of the offended party.

85. Grave Coercion

Prevent another with violence, threats and intimidation (VTI) from doing something not prohibited by
law
Compel another, with VTI, to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong

86. In Art 287, theres light coercion (where the offender must be a creditor who seizes his debtors
property by means of violence or intimidation for the payment of the debt) and unjust vexation.
87. Robbery with Homicide

Homicide is used in its generic sense. It includes parricide, murder, infanticide. Treachery (murder),
relationship (parricide) and cruelty (if multiple killings) are only aggravating circumstances, and not
separate offenses. If a policeman was hit and he died, dont think direct assault. Its still robbery with
homicide.
Killing must have a direct connection with the robbery.
If person was KILLED after the robbery, its still robbery with homicide in the following:
o 1) The person defended his property and after being robbed, he was killed
o 2) A person was killed so that he cant be a witness
Specific IF KILLED AFTER ROBBERY:
1) intention must be to defend his property, and after being robbed, he died
2) to kill a potential witness after the robbery
3) to kill so that he can escape

88. Disregard of age, rank and sex is not aggravating in Robbery with Homicide, which is primarily a
crime against property and not against persons.

10