[G.R. No. 10550. December 3, 1915.

]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUANA DE LOS SANTOS, Defendant-Appellant.
Romualdo Floresca for Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Zaragoza for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PERJURY; EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES. Held: That in the light of all the facts as set forth in the
opinion, the penalty imposed by the trial judge upon conviction of the appellant of the crime of perjury was
excessive, and should be substantially reduced.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

Juana de los Santos, the appellant in this case, was convicted in the court below of the crime of perjury, and
Sentenced to three months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100.
It was proven at the trial that this poor woman filed a complaint in the court of a justice of the peace, which
she was required to make under oath, charging her husband with assault and battery and criminal threats,
in that he had maltreated her, kicked her violently, and threatened her with a knife; but that when the case
came on for trial a week later she attempted to withdraw her complaint and declared under oath that she
had never been maltreated by her husband, and that it was not true that he had threatened her with a
knife.
The guilt of the accused of the crime of perjury with which she is charged in the information is conclusively
established; but we do not think that this is a case calling or exemplary punishment.
It appears that this wretched, ignorant woman had given birth to a child not long before the date of the
filing of her complaint in the court of the justice of the peace; that she had in fact been maltreated by her
husband; and that while the offense was still fresh in her mind she complained to the local authorities; but
that later, at the trial, and when she had time to think of the consequences, she denied the truth of her
charges in an effort to shield her husband from the consequences of his misconduct, and forgave him for
what he had done, rather than have him sentenced to imprisonment upon her testimony.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of perjury is imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of
not more than P2,000.
The wide range of discretion thus allowed the courts in this regard clearly discloses the legislative intent that
the courts should take into consideration all the attendant circumstances in each case in imposing the
penalty; and we are of opinion that the attendant circumstances in the case at bar demand and justify the
imposition of a penalty not much in excess of the minimum prescribed by law.
We must not be understood as condoning the commission of the crime of perjury in any case, but it will not
be doubted that the false testimony of this woman, given in the hope of saving her husband from
punishment because of his ill-treatment of herself, calls for a far different penalty from that which should be
imposed upon one who falsely swears away the life or the liberty of another, or upon one who gives false
testimony in a court of law in the hope of securing a judgment favorable to himself upon some disputed
question of civil rights.
We think that the ends of justice will be subserved by substituting a penalty of five days imprisonment and
a fine of P5 for so much of the sentence of the court below as imposes a penalty of three months
imprisonment and a fine of P100, and that thus modified the judgment convicting and sentencing the
appellant should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

August 10, 1927

G.R. No. 26867
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE LEON, defendants-appellants.
Fernando Gorospe for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on or about the 16th day of August, 1926, a complaint
was presented against the defendant in the court of the justice of the peace of the
municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, by the mother of the offended person,
accusing the defendant of the crime of rape. Upon that complaint the defendant was
arrested and given a preliminary examination, at the close of which the justice of the
peace found that there was probable cause for believing the defendant was guilty of
the crime charged, and held him for trial in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Rizal.
On the 26th day of August, 1926, the prosecuting attorney of said province presented
a complaint against the defendant, accusing him of the crime of rape. The complaint
alleged:
Que o hacia el dia 6 de julio de 1926, en el Municipio de Malabon, Provincia de Rizal,
Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado, el referido acusado, Jose de
Leon, siendo padrastro de una llamada Cecilia Galang, con grave abuso de confianza
y empleando medios engaosos y haciendo representaciones falsas, consiguio ilevar a
esta a una casa denominada "Country Home" y mediante fuerza, violencia e
intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y tuvo acceso carnal con la
citada Cecilia Galang, una doncella menor de 15 aos de edad contra la voluntad de
esta.

Con infraccion de la Ley.

Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned, tried, found guilty of the
crime charged in the complaint, with aggravating circumstance therein mentioned, and
sentenced by the Honorable Emilio Mapa, judge, to be imprisoned for a period of
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory
penalties of the law, to maintain the child, if any should be born, by virtue of said
illicit relation, and to pay the costs of the trial. The lower court further ordered that the
time which he has already suffered in prison. From that sentence the defendant
appealed. The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not
absolving him from all liability under the complaint and in finding him guilty of the
crime of rape. A question of fact only is presented by the appellant.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not absolving him
from all liability under the complaint and in finding him guilty of the crime of rape. A
question of fact only is presented by the appellant.
After a careful examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, we
are fully persuaded that the evidence sustains the findings of the lower court beyond a
reasonable doubt. The facts, as stated in its decision, are:
El acusado, un chofer del Rosenberg Garage en Manila, es padrastro de la ofendida,
de unos 15 aos de edad, y hacia la epoca en que ocurrieron los hechos alegados en la
querella vivia con ella y su madre y Valeriana Tamayo y su espos en una casa en el
Municipio de Pasay. La ofendida, ademas, es muda, por lo que a peticion del
Ministerio Fiscal, el Juzgado se constituyo en el mismo sitio en que segun se alega en
la querella se cometio el delito imputado al acusado, recibiendose el testimonio de
aquella en presencia del acusado y su abogado mediante interpretacion de una maestra
de la Escuela de Sordomudos.
Hacia el 6 de julio de 1926, estando ausente la madre de la ofendida, por haber ido a
pasar una temporada a un pueblo de la Provincia de la Laguna por motivos de salud,
como a las 9 de la maana, el acusado aparecio en su casa en Pasay y saco a la
ofendida. El acusado ya no volvio mas, y Cecilia Galang volvio varias semanas

despues, ya con su madre, que la habia sacado de la casa de su madrina Eufemia

Santos, en Santa Mesa, Manila. Segun Valeriana Tamayo, cuando el acusado llego a
su casa aquella maana, invito a su hijastra a la casa de su madrina, por medio de
seas, y ademas dijo a la testigo que alla la iba a llevar; al principio la ofendida se
negaba, pero creyendo Valeriana Tamayo que su madrina estaba enferma, como le
habia significado el acusado, persuadio a Cecilia Galang a que le siguiera.
La casa en que segun se alega en la querella fue violada Cecilia Galang, es baja y de
un solo piso, situada entre una arboleda espesa, lejos de la carretera principal, en el
barrio de Tinajeros del Municipio de Malabon, con una cantina en el primer
compartimiento desde la entrada principal, y detras, a ambos lados de un corredor,
varias habitacione desocupadas. Estando en la cantina, la ofendida, por medio de
gestos, significo que a aquella parte de la casa fue primero llevada por el acusado en
una ocasion en que alla habia una mujer. Preguntada entonces a donde se fue despues,
ella entro en el corredor detras de la cantina y se dirigio primero a un cuarto al
extremo opuesto del corredor, indicando que el acusado la invito a entrar en aquel
cuarto, pero ella se nego por no conocer nadie en aquella casa ni estar con ella su
madre, e inmediatamente indico otro cuarto del lado opuesto donde, segun ella, el
acusado la hizo entrar empujandola. En este cuarto, donde habia una cama, la
ofendida relato por medio de gestos, sonidos inarticulados, movimientos y cambios de
posicion, y trasladandose de un sitio a otro dentro del cuarto, lo que el acusado la
habia hecho, como sigue:
P. Quien le invitaba a usted? R. (La testigo indica al acusado.) Este me invitaba a
entrar, y como me invitara otra vez pero yo no queria entrar, entonces el acusado me
empujo hacia dentro. El acusado me invitaba a acostarme a la cama, pero yo me negue
y llore.
FISCAL. Deseamos hacer constar que la testigo esta llorando en este momento.
JUZGADO. Hagase constar.

FISCAL. Y se acosto usted en la cama o no? R. Yo le dije que voy a avisarle a

mi pariente (la testigo hace una sea o gesto consistente en un beso que la propia
testigo da a su mano).
INTERPRETE. Deseo hacer constar que no se puede determinar que clase de
parentesco se refiere la testigo con el gesto que acaba de hacer.
P. Llego usted a acostarse en la cama? R. El me invitaba otra vez, y como no
queria, lo que hizo fue quitarme los zapatos y los puso en un rincon del cuarto y
despues me empujo hacia la cama, y como yo no queria, yo apretaba mis ropas entre
mis piernas para defenderme, y quise pasar al otro lado de la cama, pero el me siguio
y quiso ponerme otra vez en la cama y despues me puse debajo de la cama. Entonces
el me estiro de debajo de la cama hacia afuera y me invito otra vez. Yo no queria y
trate de amedrentarle dandole un puetazo y me coloque aqui al lado de la cama cerca
de unos pilateres. Entonces el me ofrecio bebida pero yo no quise tomarlo, y la bedida
fue sacada de afuera y lo trajeron aqui. Me invito otra vez a acostar pero yo no queria
y trato de quitarme los zapatos.
P. Llego usted a acostarse en le cama? R. Entonces yo saque la palangana que
habia en el rincon y trate de pegarle. El me invito otra vez a acostarme, pero como yo
no queria, me agarro las piernas y me coloco en la cama a la fuerza. Yo protestaba
porque no queria. Despues ya de colocada en la cama me levante otra vez pero el me
sujeto y me empujo de nuevo para acostarme y me pego en la cara. Entonces yo
gritaba, pero el me apreto el cuello y al mismo tiempo me pego en los ojos. El
entonces me levanto el vestido y el camison y tuvo acceso carnal conmigo.
P. Que paso despues? R. Despues de eso el quiso acostarse conmigo, pero yo me
levante y me puse al otro lado de la cama y trate de saltar por la ventana y daba
vueltas alrededor de la cama para saltar por la ventana, pero el me estiro y cerro la
ventana. Entonces saque algo de mi pecho y trate de pegarle para defenderme, pero
agarro mi brazo derecho y trato de sacar lo que habia agarrado. Me invito otra vez,
pero yo me negue y entonces me sente en el borde de la cama, y el me ofrecio algo
que comer que el habia cortado, pero no quise aceptarlo. El estaba aqui a mi lado,

pero yo estaba llorando porque mi pariente no estaba aqui (la testigo besa de nuevo su
propia mano), y el me pregunto si queria que nos acostaramos los dos, pero yo me
negue y le dije: Usted es esposo de mi pariente (besando de nuevo su propia mano). El
entonces me dijo: Nosotros dos, porque yo ya no quiero a aquella otra. El me invito
otra vez, pero yo le conteste que el tiene una compaera, pero el me dijo que no, que
aquella no valia porque estaba enferma. Ese (indica al acusado) me saco la cadenita
del cuello y los pendientes de la oreja y los puso debajo de la almohada aqui en la
cama; tambien trato de quitarme las horquillas y ponerlas debajo de la almohada. Yo
entonces empece a tocar esta puerta. Yo me acerque a la puerta y empece a tocarla y
pegue tambien el muro, y el acusado me dijo que pare yo de tocar o pegar el muro o
tabique y que tuviese verguenza (la testigo cierra la puerta con el gancho). Yo le dije
que queria salir sola dejandole aqui pero el no me permitio. Yo me levante al lado de
la pared, cerca de la puerta, y el me invito otra vez a acostarme, pero como me
negaba, el me arrastro aqui en el suelo (la testigo indica una distancia de 2 metros mas
o menos). Entonces me derribo al suelo y trate de defenderme con las manos, pero no
podia porque las puso debajo de mis espaldas (la testigo se acuesta medio de costado
en el suelo con las piernas dobladas y encogidas( y me empezo a pegar los muslos.
Despues de haberme pegado en los muslos, el me alzaba la ropa y yo procuraba
tambien bajarla hasta que se rompio, y como me habia cogido o tenia cogidas mis
manos por detras, yo estaba gritando procurando desasirme de el. Entonces el se puso
el pantalon y la americana. Yo tenia el pelo desgreado con el taco del zapato roto.
Me dijo que me pusiera las medias y mientras me los ponia vi que estaban rotas, y
entonces el acusado se echo a reir haciendo muecas. Entonces el me entrego la
cadenita, los pendientes y las horquillas y me los puse, y mientras tanto el acusado
estaba riendo. Yo estaba aqui dentro del cuatro cerca de la puerta y una mujer gruesa
vino mientras el acusado estaba en la puerta; despues nos fuimos hacia la puerta
trasera del edifico y montamos en un vehiculo y despues salimos.
The defendant attempted to exculpate himself by attempting to show that the
complaint was presented against him as a matter of vengeance and that the complaint
and the evidence adduced against him were pure fabrication. We find nothing in the
record that justifies his contention. The evidence clearly supports the allegations of
the complaint and shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed

the acts described in the complaint at the time and place and in the manner and form
therein described. The evidence shows that the offended person is young girl, 15 years
old; that she is a deaf and dumb person and is the step-daughter of the appellant. The
evidence further shows that the appellant is guilty of fraud and deceit in inducing his
step-daughter to accompany him to the place where the crime was committed. (U.
S. vs. Iglesia and Valdez, 21 Phil., 55). There should also be considered against the
appellant the aggravating circumstance of kinship, the appellant being the step-father
of the offended person. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, July 26, 1877, 1
Viada p. 249.)
In addition to that part of the sentence of the lower court which requires the appellant
to maintain the child, if any should be born by virtue of said illicit relation, he should
be required to pay to said offended person the sum of P500 in accordance with the
provisions of article 449 of the Penal Code.
With that modification of the sentence of the lower court, the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.
February 9, 1924
G.R. No. 21074
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BUDA SINGH, ET AL., defendants.
BUDA SINGH, appellant.
Alejandro de Guzman and Antonio Gonzales for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
Early in the morning of the 19th day of March, 1921, Santa Singh, an East Indian, was
found dead on the sidewalk in front of his tienda in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. There
were three knife wounds on the body, one of them necessarily mortal. Several articles

of woman's wear were lying nearby and, at first, it was thought that the deceased had
been killed by a woman, but investigations based upon that theory proved fruitless.
Some time in the month of May of the same year, the accused Buda Singh confessed
to a friend of his, Ram Singh, that he had killed Santa Singh and related the details of
the crime, implicating five other East Indians in its commission. On a subsequent
occasion Ram Singh thought that Buda Singh looked at him with "malos ojos."
Suspecting that Buda Singh regretted having made the confession and contemplated
killing him, Ram Singh reported the matter to the authorities and the present action
was instituted against Buda Singh and his five alleged companions.
On motion of the fiscal the case was dismissed against all of the defendants except
Buda Singh. Upon trial, the court below found Buda Singh guilty of homicide and
sentenced him to suffer seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided for in article 59 of the Penal Code, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay one-sixth of the
costs. From this sentence the defendant appeals.
The appellant presents eight assignments of error. The first four, as well as the eighth,
relate only to questions of fact in regard to which we see no sufficient reason to
disturb the findings of the trial judge who, in his decision, analyzes the evidence very
carefully and whose conclusions appear to be well founded.
The appellant had strong reasons for committing the crime. It is not disputed that the
deceased had secured his conviction of the crime of estafa and that in consequence
thereof, he assaulted and wounded said deceased with a knife. This led to his
conviction of lesiones, which naturally increased his resentment. In the light of these
circumstances, there is nothing improbable in the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution. It would be too much to expect that their statements should agree in
every particular, but there is no reason to doubt that they substantially told the truth
and, if so, there can be no question as to the appellant's guilt.
The fifth and sixth assignments of error relate to the failure of the trial court to rule
out the testimony of Ram Singh in regard to the appellant's confession. It appears that
after this testimony had been received without objection, counsel for the defendant
moved that it be stricken from the record on the ground that it had not been shown

affirmatively by direct evidence that the confession had been made freely and
voluntarily. The court took the motion under advisement and counsel asserts that it
has never been ruled upon and that this has resulted to the defendant's prejudice,
inasmuch as he has had no opportunity to rebut the evidence of the confession.
There is no merit in this contention. The evidence was clearly admissible. Act No.
619, upon which the argument of counsel is evidently based, has been repealed by the
Administrative Code and evidence of a confession may now be received without
direct affirmative evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. (U.S.
vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308.) The fact that the court, in its decision, takes the confession
into consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it from the
record and if the defendant desired to introduce further evidence in rebuttal, the matter
should have been brought to the attention of that court through the appropriate motion.
No such motion having been presented, this court will not now reopen the case for a
new trial.
The seventh assignment of error merits no discussion.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
January 15, 1988
G.R. No. L-49396
JUAN A. GOCHANGCO, HON. FELINO GARCIA, as Presiding Judge of the
City Court of Bacolod, Branch I, and DEPUTY PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
JOSUE DE JOSE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH
IV, SY HO and MILAGROS MINORIA, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:

Narvasa, J.:
Application of no more than quite elementary principles governing the modes of
acquisition of jurisdiction by a court over the person of a defendant, default,
substitution of parties plaintiff, judgment on the pleadings, and execution pending
appeal in ejectment cases, is what is chiefly called for in this appeal by certiorari.
These appellate proceedings had their origin in an action of unlawful detainer filed by
C.N. Hodges in the City Court of Bacolod, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No.
2838. Hodges sought the ejectment from certain parcels of land in Bacolod City titled
in his name, of several persons, namely: Basilicio Macanan, Gertrude Nolan,
Alejandro Santiago, Jr., Sy Ho, and Milagros Minoria. 1
Macanan, Nolan and Santiago were duly served with summons. Macanan died
afterwards, and since his heirs could not be located, and hence could not be
substituted in his place, the case against him was eventually dismissed without
prejudice. 2 Santiago and Nolan voluntarily vacated the premises; so, the case was
also dismissed as against them. 3
Summons was also duly served on Minoria. Although she refused to acknowledge
such service, she subsequently filed an answer to the complaint, thru counsel. 4
Sy Ho also appears to have been served with summons, service being evidenced, it is
claimed, by the return to this effect of the Provincial Sheriff. 5 But, as, will shortly be
recounted, Sy Ho would later deny such service.
Plaintiff Hodges died during the pendency of the ejectment suit; and on August
20,1964, the court-appointed Administrator of his estate, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank (PCIB), was substituted as party plaintiff. 6 PCIB thereafter filed
a motion to declare Sy Ho in default for failure to answer the complaint. This was
granted, by Order of the City Court dated February 18, 1967. Sy Ho filed on March 2,
1967, a verified "Opposition to the Motion for Default." He alleged that he had never
received summons; apparently the summons had been served at the place where he
maintained his scrap iron business, which was not his residence and at which he had
no representative authorized to receive court processes and notices; and he prayed that

'he be allowed to present his answer within ten (10) days and that if ever he has been
already declared in default without due service of the notice to him, the said order be
lifted." 7 The City Court overruled his opposition and refused to lift the order of
default against him, these dispositions being contained in an Order dated April 8,
1967. 8 And in a separate Order issued on the same date, the City Court granted
PCIB's motion to require Sy Ho to pay monthly rentals corresponding to the premises
occupied by him directly to it, instead of to his co-defendant, Minoria, who apparently
had therefore been acting as caretaker of the property. 9
At this point all proceedings in this ejectment suit, and another cases involving the
late C. H. Hodges, were for the most part suspended for all intents and purposes by
reason of controversies as regards the administration and hereditary rights over his not
inconsiderable estate. Settlement of these controversies did not come until some 16 or
1 7 years later when, in the decisions of this Court in two (2) cases, dated March 29,
1974, 10 the heirs of C. N. Hodges and their respective counsel were directed "to
work together and conjointly in order to sell and dispose of for adequate
consideration, the real properties composing the intermixed assets of the said estate in
favor of Filipinos ..." Among the estate assets sold pursuant to those decisions were
the lots subject of the ejectment suit at bar. They were sold to Juan A. Gochangco for
P440,000.00 on December 17, 1975, and he obtained titles over them in his name in
due course. 11
Gochangco lost no time in advising Minoria and Sy Ho of his acquisition of the
property and demanding their vacation thereof. 12 He also filed an "Ex-Parte Motion
for Substitution of Plaintiff and Reception of Evidence" dated March 26, 1976, which
the City Court granted by Order dated March 26, 1976. 13 Accordingly, Gochangco
presented evidence ex-parte on March 30, 1976; this, as regards Sy Ho, who had been
declared in default. 14
As regards defendant Minoria, Gochangco filed on March 29, 1976 a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. 15 He contended that Minoria's answer failed to tender
any issue because it admitted the material allegations of the complaint; that her
answer also failed to disclose any privity between her and the late Manuel Moreno,

whom she claimed to be co-owner of the house found on the premises in question, or
any relationship whatever between Moreno, Hodges and herself so as to substantiate
her theory that she had been properly designated caretaker of the house; that her
occupation of the house was thus by tolerance merely, and she was bound by an
implied promise to vacate the same upon demand, and her failure to do so despite
demand rendered her amenable to summary ejectment.
In his turn, Sy Ho filed a motion to set aside order of default on April 5,1976 in which
he also prayed to be allowed to present a written answer to the complaint. 16 To this
motion he attached an "Affidavit of Merits" in which he claimed that his failure to file
answer to the complaint was due to the fault of his counsel who, according to him,
failed to make the "proper follow-up" of the case; and he asked to be excused for his
mistake or negligence for 'depending too much on his lawyer who formerly handled
his case." 17 What the City Court did was to issue subpoenae for the appearance of
Minoria and Sy on May 13, 1976, so that "they might have their day in Court." 18 But
one day before his scheduled appearance, or on May 12, 1976, Sy Ho filed a 15-page
Motion to Dismiss the complaint stating in substance that the complaint stated no
cause of action; the case against him had not been prosecuted for an unreasonably
long span of time; and the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations
under PD No. 20 promulgated on October 12,1972 and G.O. No. 53 promulgated on
August 21, 1975. 19 In the same motion he reiterated that in compliance with the
Order of April 8, 1967, he had been paying rentals regularly and faithfully. 20
There followed various attempts by the parties, mostly on the court's initiative, to
arrive at an amicable settlement. All failed Thereafter the City Court finally rendered
judgment dated February 18, 1977 ordering Sy Ho and Minoria to vacate the premises
within thirty (30) days, and to pay rentals to Gochangco at the rate of P600.00 and
P50.00 a month, respectively, from date of the decision until they shall have left the
property. 21 Motions for reconsideration separately filed by By Ho and Minoria were
denied, as were also, their second motions for reconsideration. 22
On August 29, 1977, Gochangco moved for execution pending appeal. He asserted
that the judgment had become final as against Minoria, no appeal having been

perfected by her within the period therefor prescribed by law. And as regards Sy Ho,
whose second motion for reconsideration was still pending, immediate execution was
proper since the judgment was against a defendant, declared by Section 8, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court to be immediately executory. 23 Over the joint opposition of Sy Ho
and Minoria, the Court granted the motion and issued the writ of execution on
October 19, 1977. 24 In a 'Manifestation' dated October 25, 1975, Sy Ho stated that he
had been "paying a monthly rental of P110.00 monthly directly to the Clerk of Court"
and that "pending the final decision ... all (such payments should be) properly kept by
the Clerk of Court. 25
Sy Ho and Minoria thereupon filed a joint petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction discretion with the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13484. The petition imputed
grave abuse of discretion to the City Court in denying Sy Ho's motion to set aside
order of default and motion to dismiss; in granting Gochangco's ex-parte motion to be
substituted as party plaintiff; in receiving Gochangco's evidence ex parte despite his
having Med a motion for judgment on the pleadings; in authorizing immediate
execution, and in not declaring itself to be without jurisdiction in view of P.D. No. 20
and G.O. No. 53. 26 In the answer filed by him on requirement of the Court,
Gochangco averred that the immediate execution of the judgment was justified by
Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence; that any defect in
the service of summons on Sy Ho had been cured by his voluntary appearance through
submission of various pleadings, that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was
entirely correct because Minorias answer stated no affirmative defense or otherwise
tendered no issue; the declaration of default against Sy Ho was also correct under the
circumstances; that the action for certiorari could not result in an adjudication for the
payment of damages since it is simply meant to cure jurisdictional defects, which are
non-existent in the case; and Sy Ho's situation is not covered by PD No. 20 or G.O.
No. 53 because he was occupying the premises in question not as a dwelling but for
purposes of his scrap iron business. 27
At the pre-trial held on February 21, 1978, Sy Ho admitted, thru counsel, that he had
indeed voluntarily appeared before the City Court and had thereby submitted himself
to its jurisdiction. 28

On August 29, 1978, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance granting
the writ of certiorari and annulling all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2838 of the
City Court of Bacolod. 29 The Court said:
A fundamental tenet of procedural due process has been violated in the case under
review. Was the petitioner Sy Ho properly served with summons and complaint in
Civil Case No. 2838? The 2nd Indorsement dated June 3, 1961 signed by Pat. R.
Bravo of the Bacolod Police Department reads as follows:
Respectfully returned to the Mun. Court copy with all summons and complaint has
delivered personally to Milagros Minoria but however she refused to sign dated 6-261 - 8:30 a.m.
At the bottom of this indorsement a 3rd Indorsement dated June 16, 1961 was made
by Deputy Sheriff Esmalia, which reads:
Respectfully returned to the Municipal Court, Bacolod City, the within summons duly
served as per return of service of the Chief of Police of Bacolod City.
Now, on the basis of this indorsement this Court is not convinced that proper service
was made upon defendant Sy Ho in Civil Case No. 2838. The return of the deputy
sheriff to the effect that summons was duly served is contradicted by the return made
by Pat. R. Bravo which is the basis of the 3rd Indorsement to the effect that summons
and complaint has (sic) delivered personally to Milagros Minoria but however she
refused to sign. There is no showing at all in these endorsements that petitioner Sy Ho
himself was properly served with summons.
If petitioner Sy Ho was not properly served with summons there was no basis at all for
respondent court to declare him in default. By declaring Sy Ho in default under the
circumstances, the court acted with grave abuse of discretion. This is elementary law
too obvious to need any citation of authorities. If the declaration of default was null
and void all proceedings thereafter would be null and void. Triggered by this illegal
declaration of default, the reception of evidence ex partebefore a deputy clerk of court
was null and void, not only because of the previous nullity of the declaration of
default but also because under the doctrinal rule laid down in the recent case of Lim

Tan Hu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 430, promulgated on August 29, 1975, a Clerk of
Court is not legally authorized to receive evidence ex-parte. The decision rendered on
the basis of the evidence received ex parte would logically be a nullity. Hence, if only
upon this ground alone the proceedings in the court below would be fatally flawed. ...
The Trial Court erred. Whatever defect might have existed in the return of the service
of summons on Sy Ho was rendered inconsequential by subsequent events, duly
entered in the record, demonstrating that service of summons had indeed been
effected and Sy Ho had voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the City
Court.
Assuming it to be true, as claimed, that summons addressed to Sy Ho had been served
not at his residence but at the place where he maintained his scrap iron business, and
at which he had no representative authorized to receive court processes and notices,
this would be of no moment. This is valid service. It is expressly authorized by the
Rules. It is substituted service, allowed when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time, in which event, service may be effected by
leaving copies of the summons at defendants dwelling house or residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or at his office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 30 Nor is it
necessary that the person in charge of the defendant's regular place of business be
specially authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in
charge.
Sy Ho's contention that "substituted service is not allowed in ejectment cases" 31 is
absolutely without foundation. Implicit in that contention however is the
acknowledgment that there had in truth been substituted service of summons on him.
Moreover, in the Affidavit of Merits attached to his motion to set a side order of
default filed on April 5, 1976, 32 Sy Ho attributed his failure to the answer seasonably
to the fault of his counsel - who he said had failed to make the "proper follow-up" and asked to be excused for "depending too much on his lawyer." Here is another
clear admission, no less cogent because merely implied, that the reason for his

omission to answer the complaint was not really the failure of service of summons on
him but his lawyer's negligence.
The record also demonstrates that he was indeed correctly declared in default, and he
failed to adduce any tenable grounds for the setting aside of that declaration. He did
fail to answer the complaint within the reglementary period therefor prescribed, and
proof of such failure had in due course been adduced. 33 And even if that failure may
in truth be blamed on his lawyer, there is nothing in the record excusing that
negligence, or showing fraud, accident or mistake warranting the Court's setting aside
of the order of default. 34
In any case, Sy Ho never really pressed the issue of the efficacy of service of
summons on him with vigor or persistence Instead, he submitted himself to the
Court's jurisdiction. His submission to the Court's jurisdiction is necessarily inferred
from his act of request for leave to present his answer to the complaint, 35 of
voluntarily complying with the City Court's Order for the payment of rentals, and
filing various other motions and pleadings. 36 There is, too, his counsel's admission
already adverted to, that Sy Ho had really submitted himself to the City Court's
jurisdiction. 37 There can thus be no debate about the proposition that jurisdiction of
his person had been acquired by the City court by his voluntary appearance and
acquiescence. 38
The record furthermore discloses that the prejudice to Sy Ho occasioned by the
declaration of default against him was nominal and minimal. For his default
notwithstanding, he was in fact able fully and exhaustively to present his side to the
Court. He submitted his defenses to the action to the Court. This he did by filing a
Motion to dismiss setting up said defenses, 39 and presenting two (2) motions for
reconsideration of the City Court's decision, urging and arguing those same defenses.
40 And the record shows that these defenses were duly considered and dealt with in
the judgment of the City Court. 41
Withal, an analysis of those defenses reveals their lack of merit. The assertion, for
instance, that the complaint falls to state a cause of action is incorrect; an examination

of the complaint shows that it does set out the ultimate facts constituting causes of
action for ejectment. 42 The assertion that the action had not been prosecuted for an
unreasonably long period of time is without merit since as shown by the record, the
delay was not due to the fault or negligence of the plaintiff, but to circumstances
beyond control. The claim that the action for ejectment is barred under PD 20 and GO
53 is also untenable, since it is not disputed that Sy Ho is being ejected, not from his
residence but from his place of business. In the light of these considerations, it would
be inutile to set aside the order of default against Sy Ho, assuming there were basis
therefor, to give him opportunity to appropriately plead and present evidence on his
aforesaid defenses which cannot be sustained anyway and are on their face
unmeritorious. 43
The substitution of parties plaintiff effected in this case was also proper. Here, the
original plaintiff died pending trial. He was substituted by the administrator of his
estate, duly appointed by competent judicial authority. This substitution was entirely
correct, mandated in fact by Section 17, in relation to Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. 44 On the other hand, Gochangco's substitution as party plaintiff in place of the
administrator was also appropriate. Gochangco had purchased the property of the
decedent involved in the ejectment suit. He therefore became a real party in interest in
that action, replacing the estate, or the heirs, and his replacement of the latter was
fully justified by Section 2, Rule 3 requiring actions to be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest, and defining a party plaintiff as one "having an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded," 45 as well as Section 20,
of the same rule providing that in case of any transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with
the original party. 46
Also correct was the rendition of judgment on the pleadings as against Minoria.
Minoria's answer admitted the material averments of the complaint and failed to
include allegations establishing her claim for compensation as being, supposedly, the
authorized caretaker of the house. Judgment on the pleadings was therefore properly
rendered on plaintiff's motion. It is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of

court, which provides that "(w)here an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise
admits the material allegations or admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading."
47
The propriety of the order authorizing execution of the ejectment judgment against the
defendants also cannot be gainsaid. The order is squarely within the provisions of
Section 8, Rule 70 which declares that "(i)f judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and
the defendant, to stay execution, files a sufficient bond approved by the justice of the
peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court
of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal
court to exist. ..." 48 There is no showing that Sy Ho had taken these requisite steps to
stay execution of the judgment.
The respondent Court also declared null and void 'the reception of evidence ex
partebefore ... (the) deputy clerk of court." It invoked what it termed 'the doctrinal
rule laid down in the recent case of Lim Tan Hu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 430,
promulgated on August 29, 1975 (inter alia declaring that) a Clerk of Court is not
legally authorized to receive evidence ex-parte. 49
Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and established judicial practice
with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the several explicitly
authorized instances under the Rules where the function of receiving evidence and
even of making recommendatory findings of facts on the basis thereof may be
delegated to commissioners, inclusive of the Clerk of Court. These instances are set
out in Rule 33, treating of presentation of evidence before commissioners, etc., in
particular situations, such as when the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination
of a long account, or when the taking of an account is necessary for the information of
the court, or when issues of fact arise otherwise than upon the pleadings or while
carrying a judgment or order into effect; 50 Rules 67 and 69, dealing with submission

of evidence also before commissioners in special civil actions of eminent domain and
partition, respectively; Rule 86 regarding trials of contested claims in judicial
proceedings for the settlement of a decedent's estate; Rule 136 empowering the clerk
of court, when directed by the judge inter alia to receive evidence relating to the
accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees and receivers, or relative to
the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or
receiverships. In all these instances, the competence of the clerk of court is assumed.
Indeed, there would seem, to be sure, nothing intrinsically wrong in allowing
presentation of evidence ex partebefore a Clerk of Court. 51 Such a Procedure
certainly does not foreclose relief to the party adversely affected who, for valid cause
and upon appropriate and seasonable application, may bring about the undoing thereof
or the elimination of prejudice thereby caused to him; and it is, after all, the Court
itself which is duty bound and has the ultimate responsibility to pass upon the
evidence received in this manner, discarding in the process such proofs as are
incompetent and then declare what facts have thereby been established. in considering
and analyzing the evidence preparatory to rendition of judgment on the merits, it may
not unreasonably be assumed that any serious error in the ex-parte presentation of
evidence, prejudicial to any absent party, will be detected and duly remedied by the
Court, and/or may always, in any event; be drawn to its attention by any interested
party. As observed by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro - 52
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its
clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all the reception of
evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task - the taking down of
the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of documentary
evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence
precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually
called for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to
the admission of the documentary evidence preferred (Wack Wack Golf and country
Club, inc. vs. court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 501). More importantly, the duty to render
judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to
personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported
(Province of Pang vs. Palisoc, 6 SCRA 299).

The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of default is that the defendant's failure to
answer the complaint despite receiving copy thereof together with summons, is
attributable to one of two causes: either (a) to his realization that he has no defenses to
the plaintiffs cause and hence resolves not to oppose the complaint, or, (b) having
good defenses to the suit, to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which
prevented him from seasonably filing an answer setting forth those defenses,. 53 It
does make sense for a defendant without defenses, and who accepts the correctness of
the specific relief prayed for in the complaint, to forego the filing of the answer or any
sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he did intervene, the result would
be the same: since he would be unable to establish any good defense, having none in
fact, judgment would inevitably go against him. And this would be an acceptable
result, if not being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that the judgment did
not go beyond or differ from the specific relief stated in the complaint. 54 It would
moreover spare him from the embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the
indefensible. On the other hand, if he did have good defenses, it would be unnatural
for him not to set them up properly and timely, and if he did not in fact set them up, it
must be presumed that some insuperable cause prevented him from doing so: fraud,
accident, mistake, excusable negligence. In this event, the law will grant him relief,
and the law is in truth quite liberal in the reliefs made available to him: a motion to set
aside the order of default prior to judgment; 55 a motion for new trial to set aside the
default judgment; 56 an appeal from the judgment by default even if no motion to set
aside the order of default or motion for new trial had been previously presented; 57 a
special civil action for certiorari impugning the court's jurisdiction. 58
A defendant in default is not and should not be placed in a situation more favorable
than a defendant who has answered but who fails to appear for trial despite notice. In
the latter case, as in the former, the trial may proceed ex parte, 59 but is not
invalidated by the fact merely that reception of evidence had been undertaken by the
clerk of court on the Court's instructions; this, despite the fact that the judgment that
may be rendered on the basis of such an ex parte trial may award reliefs exceeding the
amount or different from that, prayed for in the complaint, unlike a judgment by
default which cannot differ from or go beyond what is set down in the prayer of the
complaint.

It was therefore error for the Court a quo to have declared the judgment by default to
be fatally flawed by the fact that the plaintiffs evidence had been received not by the
Judge himself but by the clerk of court.
One last word. The City Court and City Sheriff were impleaded as parties petitioners
in the petition at bar. This is incorrect. They are not proper parties. They do not have and should not have - any interest in the subject of the instant proceedings, either in
obtaining any relief in respect thereto of any nature whatsoever, or in the success of
the petitioner. Only Gochangco is the proper party petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of August 29, 1978 is
reversed and set aside, and that of the City Court dated February 18, 1977 reinstated
and affirmed in toto. Costs against private respondents.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
State Prosecutors v Muro
Facts: Judge dismissed 11 cases against Mrs. Marcos for violation of CB Circular 960 or the CB
Foreign Exchange Restrictions. The dismissal was based solely on newspaper reports
concerning the announcement of the president of the Philippines of the lifting of all foreign
exchange restrictions as embodied in the circular. Judge said that the announcement had the
effect of repealing CB 960.
HELD: Matters of judicial notice have 3 requisites: matter of common knowledge; it must be
authoritatively settled; and known to be w/in the limits of jurisdiction of the court. Judicial notice
is not equivalent to judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a
fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial notice cannot be
taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law not yet in force and hence still inexistent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration.

State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19 September 1994)

the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the negative

Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against
respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the
provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges
against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank
Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published
from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the
Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision was founded
on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect
repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case
thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to
take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he
purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the
Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not
to accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby
depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by
taking judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that
has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the
newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot
comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which
is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public
announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter
becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory
requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation
before its effectivity. When the Presidents statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent
admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take
judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the
public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be
disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not
amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where the
court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary
experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court
ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred
in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without
giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of
the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the
case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are
hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts
with caution at all times.
case digest, Philippine law, jurisprudence, SCRA 236 SCRA 505 (19 September 1994),
[G.R. No. 101022. February 27, 1992.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDUARDO ANDASA alias "Eddie",AccusedAppellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Nelson S. Geduspan for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; NOT AFFECTED BY FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE
ACCUSED IN THE POLICE BLOTTER; CASE AT BAR. Appellant capitalizes on the fact that the crime which
took place on 3 May 1987 was reported and entered in the police blotter of the PNP in Alimodian, Iloilo as
having been committed by an unknown person or persons, and that it took more than one (1) month after
the crime was committed before the case was filed in court, naming herein appellant as the assailant of
Martin Andasa. He contends that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they immediately knew the
identity of the accused appellant as the assailant contradicts the police report that the assailant was
unidentified or unknown. Thus, according to him, the theory of the prosecution is not convincing and is
contrary to human nature. This contention of appellant is without merit. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, and we quote: ". . . The reason why the assailant is unidentified in the police blotter is established
by the evidence to be due to the fact that the prosecution witnesses believed that the accused was a
member of the NPA and they were afraid of the reprisal by the NPA." Such initial reaction of the prosecution

witnesses in refusing to identify the assailant whom they believed to be an NPA member is understandable
when we consider the fact that they are simple farmers. Their fear of the NPA is entirely human and quite
expectable and should not detract from their credibility. The fear of the NPA by civilians is a matter of
judicial notice. It is noteworthy, however, that once they (witnesses) were assured that the accused was not
a member of the NPA, they immediately reported the identity of the assailant to the police authorities and
thereafter an information against the appellant was filed with the proper court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE WITNESSES TO THE VICTIM. Accused
appellant argue that the prosecution witnesses are either related to the victim or were his friends. As ruled
by the Court of Appeals, to which we agree: "There is however no evidence that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are biased. "Relationship of the prosecution witnesses to the victim does not
necessarily disqualify them as biased (People v. Legaspi, 151 SCRA 670, 678)."
cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT; RULE AND EXCEPTION. In a long line of cases, this Court
has held that where the issue is on the credibility of witnesses, generally the findings of the court a quo will
not be disturbed on appeal since it was in a better position to decide the question, having heard and
observed the demeanor of the witnesses, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value which, if considered, could affect the result of the case. We find no exception to this rule in this case
that would justify us to overturn the factual and legal conclusions of the lower courts.
4. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED BY WITNESSES. The
bare denial of the accused that he committed the crime is not sufficient to overcome the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses who positively identified the accused as the person who shot Martin Andea on 3 May
1987. Well-settled is the rule that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accuseds denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime.
5. ID.; ID.; MOTIVE TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE; NOT ESSENTIAL WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
BY WITNESSES. Accused-appellants other arguments, that the prosecution witnesses are either related
to the victim or were his friends, that there was no motive for him to kill the victim, are likewise without
merit. As ruled by the Court of Appeals, to which we agree: "Motive is, however, important in cases where
there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the offense (Ebajan v.
Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 178). "The eye-witnesses for the prosecution clearly and positively identified
the accused-appellant as the assailant." In a long line of decided cases, we have ruled that where the
accused is positively identified as the culprit, motive is not essential to conviction.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The
appellate court correctly held that there was treachery in the commission of the crime. "Considering that the
appellant suddenly shot the victim from behind, treachery as defined in Article 248, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code qualified the killing to murder."

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Accused-appellant, Eduardo Andasa, was convicted of the crime of murder in a decision, dated 22 November
1989, of the Regional Court, Branch XXVIII of Iloilo City. 1 He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment, ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Martin Andea, in the amount of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.
The accused appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error
that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder. On 28 June 1991, the Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision 2 affirming the judgment of the court a quo but modifying the penalty
to reclusion perpetua and increasing the civil indemnity from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Considering that
the penalty determined by the Court of Appeals is reclusion perpetua, the case has been referred to us for
final interview. 3

The facts are as follows:

jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of 3 May 1987, while a dance was going on in celebration of the May
Flower Festival at Barangay Bungol, Poblacion Alimodian, Iloilo, Martin Andea was drinking whiskey together
with accused-appellant Eduardo Andasa, Nicanor Cablada, Jr., Adimas Hipalin and Jimmy Quiraos about a
meter outside the dance hall. They were all squatting side by side except accused-appellant who was
squatting behind Martin Andea.
"Accused-appellant who was about less than an arms length behind Martin Andea and without uttering a
word, shot the latter once in his back. As the victim fell to the ground, Accused-appellant put the gun under
his right armpit and walked casually to the dance hall.
"The Chief of the Barangay Tanod of Bungol, Santiago Maganto, and other barangay tanods who witnessed
the shooting of the victim by the appellant did not arrest the latter because they were not armed and
besides, Accused-appellant was reputed to be a member of the N.P.A.
"The incident was immediately reported to the police authorities of Alimodian by Eddie Alipunga but he did
not reveal the identity of the accused for fear of reprisal from the NPA.
"Pat. Angelo Anglacer of the INP of Alimodian conducted an investigation only in June 1987, a month after
the incident was reported by Eduardo Alipunga, because barangay, Bungol, Alimodian, was an NPA infested
area. It was after the Philippine Army cleared the area of NPA that he conducted an "on the spot"
investigation, and also took the sworn statement of Eduardo Alipunga and Nicanor Cablada, Jr. while he told
the other witnesses just to testify in court.
"The post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim conducted by Dra. Maria Winefreda Cainoy, the
Rural Health Physician of Alimodian, Iloilo reveals that the victim sustained a gunshot wound at the back
which penetrated the internal organs piercing through the diaphragm, the lower lobe of the left lung and the
posterior left cardia ventricle.
"Dr. Cainoy testified that the victims assailant was at the back considering that "the wound was straight",
"the character of the wound and the entry of bullet" and the position of the assailant is on the same level of
the victim.
"Accused-appellant Eduardo Andasa testified that between 9:00 and 10:00 in the evening of 3 May 1987, he
went to Brgy. Bungol, Alimodian to attend the dance party. Upon reaching the place, he sat near the stall of
Norma Alipuangan and Fely Ortiz situated near the entrance of the dance hall.
"He saw Martin Andea outside the dance hall roaming around with a glass of whisky on his hand. Martin
Andea offered him a drink and when he was about to receive the whisky, he heard a gunfire coming right in
front of them, and then he saw Martin Andea fall down with his head on Andasas feet. He shoved the head
of Martin Andea aside, and helped his companions gather their goods and accompanied them in going home.
"Accused-appellant denied having a gun during the incident.
"Witness Fely Ortiz testified that on the night of 3 May 1987 she was also at the place where the dance was
held as she peddled and sold her goods beside the dance hall, together with other co-vendors, namely,
Dolores and Norma.
"At around 9:00 in the evening, Accused Eduardo Andasa, whom she knew as a conductor of a jeepney, was
seated and was conversing with them at her stall; while Martin Andea, whom she knew as a caretaker of the
Alimodian cockpit, was drinking liquor together with his other companions, about an arms length away from
her stall.
"A few moments later, she saw Martin Andea stand up in front of Eduardo Andasa and offered the latter a
glass of wine, but before he could hand it over, a shot was fired and Martin Andea fell to the ground
between Dolores and Eduardo Andasa. She saw blood flowing at his back.
"She recalled that after the shot, Eduardo Andasa merely stood up and helped her gather her goods, and
they transferred to a safer place and after which, they all went home while Eduardo Andasa went towards
the garage of his employer at the downhill portion of the Alimodian Public Market.

"Witness Norma Alimpuangan corroborated the testimony of her friend, Fely Ortiz. She testified that it was
not Eduardo Andasa who shot Martin Andea because she did not see the accused commit the act nor was he
armed with a gun when the incident took place. She further testified that she heard the shot coming from
the uphill portion of the dance hall." 4
After carefully deliberating upon the evidence on record, we are fully convinced that the lower court
committed no error in finding the accused Eduardo Andasa guilty as charged. The issue raised by accusedappellant is basically factual and involves essentially the credibility of the witnesses.
Appellant capitalizes on the fact that the crime which took place on 3 may 1987 was reported and entered in
the police blotter of the PNP in Alimodian, Iloilo as having been committed by an unknown person or
persons, and that it took more than one (1) month after the crime was committed before the case was filed
in court, naming herein appellant as the assailant of Martin Andasa. He contends that the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that they immediately knew the identity of the accused appellant as the assailant was
unidentified or unknown. Thus, according to him, the theory of the prosecution is not convincing and is
contrary to human nature. This contention of appellant is without merit.
chan robles law lib rary : red

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, and we quote:

jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

". . . The reason why the assailant is unidentified in the police blotter is established by the evidence to be
due to the fact that the prosecution witnesses believed that the accused was a member of the NPA and they
were afraid of the reprisal by the NPA. (TSN, 10 May 1988, p. 5)." 5
Such initial reaction of the prosecution witnesses in refusing to identify the assailant whom they believed to
be an NPA member is understandable when we consider the fact that they are simple farmers. Their fear of
the NPA is entirely human and quite expectable and should not detract from their credibility. The fear of the
NPA by civilians is a matter of judicial notice. It is noteworthy, however, that once they (witnesses) were
assured that the accused was not a member of the NPA, they immediately reported the identity of the
assailant to the police authorities and thereafter an information against the appellant was filed with the
proper court.
On the other hand, the bare denial of the accused that he committed the crime is not sufficient to overcome
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who positively identified the accused as the person who shot
Martin Andea on 3 May 1987. Well-settled is the rule that greater weight is given to the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accuseds denial and explanation
concerning the commission of the crime. 6
Accused-appellants other arguments, such as, that the prosecution witnesses are neither related to the
victim or were his friends and that there was no motive for him to kill the victim, are likewise without merit.
As ruled by the Court of Appeals, to which we agree:
jgc:chan robles .com.p h

"There is however no evidence that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are biased.
"Relationship of the prosecution witnesses to the victim does not necessarily disqualify them as biased
(People v. Legaspi, 151 SCRA 670, 678)."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

"Motive is, however, important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the
person who committed the offense (Ebajan v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 178).
"The eye-witnesses for the prosecution clearly and positively identified the accused-appellant as the
assailant." 7
In a long line of decided cases, we have ruled that where the accused is positively identified as the culprit,
motive is not essential to conviction. 8
The appellate court correctly held that there was treachery in the commission of the crime.

chan roble s virtualawl ibra ry cha nro bles. com:chan roble s.com. ph

"Considering that the appellant suddenly shot the victim from behind, treachery as defined in Article 248,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code qualified the killing to murder." 9

Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that

"As no aggravating and mitigating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (People v. Norberto Clores y Coral, G.R. No. 82362, 26
April 1990." 10
As aforestated, the issue raised by appellant is one that questions the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that where the issue is on the credibility of witnesses,
generally the findings of the court a quo will not be disturbed on appeal since it was in a better position to
decide the question, having heard and observed the demeanor of the witnesses, unless it has plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, could affect the result of the case. We
find no exception to this rule in this case that would justify us to overturn the factual and legal conclusions
of the lower courts.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court dated June 28, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 133480. March 15, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

AGUILUZ y NUQUE, accused-appellant.

vs. FLORANTE

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

Accused Florante Aguiluz y Nuque appeals from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, Bulacan finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused FLORANTE AGUILUZ y NUQUE
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Conformable with the provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Court
imposes upon the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Court also hereby orders the accused to indemnify the offended party Elizabeth
B. Cruz the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[1]

On November 29, 1995, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emily A. Bajar of

Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, at Malolos, an information
charging FLORANTE AGUILUZ y Nuque with rape committed as follows, to wit:
That on obout the 15th day of October, 1995, in the municipality of Calumpit,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with lewd designs did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of
Elizabeth Cruz, below twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment on January 10, 1996, accused pleaded not guilty. [3] Trial
ensued.
In 1995, Elizabeth Cruz was below 12 years of age.[4] She was a grade VI pupil at
Caniogan Elementary School and lived with her grandparents Romeo and Felicidad
Cruz at Sto. Nio, Calumpit, Bulacan, since the year 1984, when her parents lived
separately.
Accused Florante Aguiluz was 46 years old and married to the sister of
Elizabeths grandfather. He was a caretaker of Francisco Alonzo G Building and
served as lay minister and lector at San Antonio de Padua Church, located at Iba,
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
On October 15, 1995, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, Elizabeth was in the house
of accused Florante Aguiluz watching television with the children of the accused,
namely, Maharlika, Sara and Cherry Flor. After watching television, she went home
which was only about an arms length from the house of the accused. Upon reaching
her house, she saw accused in the living room and there were no other people inside
the house at that time. Accused closed the doors and windows, dragged her towards a
room although she tried to push him. When they were already inside the room,
accused removed Elizabeths t-shirt and pants, including her underwear. She was
forced to lie down on the floor and accused started kissing her. The accused
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina even as she tried to push him. She felt
pain and after he was through (nakaraos), accused went out of the room. Elizabeth
went to the sala and laid down for about an hour because of the pain she felt. Later
on, she went to her friends to ask them to accompany her in the house. Her friends
stayed there for about half an hour until her grandfather arrived. She did not tell him
what happened because she was afraid of the threat made by the accused that she
would be killed if she reported the incident to anybody.[5]
The next day, on October 16, 1995, she told her friends Margie and Michelle
about the incident because she knew they could help her report what happened to her

to their teacher. On October 17, 1995, she told her English teacher, Mrs. Juliet T.
Ortega of Caniogan Elementary School, about the incident who, in turn, reported the
incident to her grandmother. She brought Elizabeth to San Fernando, Pampanga for
physical examination.[6]
On October 18, 1995, Elizabeth was taken to the Jose B. Lingad Memorial
Hospital, San Fernando, Pampanga where Dr. Sylvia Flores Garcia, a resident O.B.
Gynecologist examined her. Dr. Garcias findings are contained in the Medico-legal
report[7] she issued. The report states:
EXTERNAL GENITALIA & PERINEUM:
LABIA MAJORA: well cooptated
LABIA MINORA:
HYMEN: Deep healed laceration at 12 & 6 oclock position; superficial, healed
laceration at 2 oclock position
I.E. FINDINGS: Intoitus admits 2 fingers with ease; cervix closed; uterus small
LABORATORY REQUEST:
Pregnancy test Negative
Smear for Spermatozoa negative for spermatozoa
At the trial, Dr. Garcia testified. After identifying her report, she declared that
there was incomplete laceration involving half of the width of the hymen but did not
go beyond the base of the hymen. Among the possible causes of deep lacerations are
trauma, if there is passage of blood within the hymen, infection, masturbation or
insertion of foreign object inside the vagina and sexual intercourse. Her internal
examination also revealed that the intoitus easily admitted two fingers which meant
that the vagina canal was lax that may be caused by sexual intercourse, trauma or
child bearing, although her cervix was closed and her uterus was small.[8]
Elizabeth executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[9] on October 19, 1995, before PO1
Arsenio Cabral of the PNP, Calumpit, Bulacan. On October 20, 1995, the police filed
a criminal complaint for rape[10] with the Municipal Trial Court, Calumpit, Bulacan
against accused Florante Aguiluz.
In his defense, accused denied sexually molesting Elizabeth. He interposed
an alibi. According to him, on October 15, 1995, he was at San Antonio de Padua
Parish Church and served as layman minister and lector for the 8:00 to 10:00 mass in

the morning and 4:00 to 5:00 mass in the afternoon. [11]Accused likewise presented Fr.
Irineo Cabasal to corroborate his defense but on cross-examination, Fr. Cabasal
testified that on October 15, 1995, there was only one mass, which was at 8:00 in the
morning.[12]
After due trial, on January 6, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting
accused of statutory rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused FLORANTE AGUILUZ y NUQUE
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of
the Revised penal Code.
Conformably with the provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Court
imposes upon the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Court also hereby orders the accused to indemnify the offended party Elizabeth
B. Cruz the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Malolos, Bulacan, January 6, 1998.
(Sgd.)
OSCAR C. HERERRA, JR.
J u d g e
Not satisfied, accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal.[13] He contends that
the trial court gravely erred in finding the testimony of Elizabeth Cruz to be credible
despite inconsistencies when taken together with the testimony of Dr. Garcia
regarding her medico-legal findings on Elizabeth. He insists that the testimony of
Elizabeth that she bled because of the sexual intercourse is inconsistent with the
findings of Dr. Garcia that she found healed lacerations in the hymen of
Elizabeth. Accused-appellant also alleges that the lower court erred in convicting him
of rape notwithstanding the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Article 335 of the Revised penal Code provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force and intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Xxx xxx

xxx.

Under the third paragraph, two elements must be established to hold the accused
guilty of rape, namely: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2)
that the woman is below twelve years of age.[14]
Elizabeth was less than twelve (12) years old when Florante had carnal
knowledge of her on October 15, 1995. She was born on October 21, 1983, per
Certificate of Live Birth.[15] In such case, proof of consent of the woman is
immaterial. Sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve years old is statutory
rape.[16] Her consent to the intercourse is involuntary because she is considered to have
no will of her own.
Accused-appellant harps about the absence of fresh lacerations in Elizabeths
hymen, asserting that the presence of deep healed lacerations belies the allegation
that Elizabeth was raped three days prior to the physical examination conducted on
her. Accused-appellants averments completely overlook the doctrine that the absence
of fresh lacerations in complainants hymen does not negate sexual intercourse and
does not prove that she was not raped.[17]A freshly broken hymen is not an essential
element of rape. Healed lacerations do not negate rape.[18] In fact, rupture of the
hymen is not essential. In rape, complete or full penetration of the complainants
private part is not necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is
fundamental is that the entrance, or at least the introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum, is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into
thelabia majora of the victims genitalia, and not the full penetration of the
complainants private part, consummates the crime.[19] Hence, the touching or
entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the
victims genitalia constitutes consummated rape.[20] In other words, the successful
penetration by the rapist of the females genital organ is not indispensable. Penile
invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia and even the briefest of contacts
without laceration of the hymen is deemed to be rape.[21] If her testimony meets the
test of credibility, that is sufficient to convict the accused.[22]
Contrary to accused-appellants claim, however, the testimony of Elizabeth Cruz,
particularly as regards his identity, was direct, clear and positive.

It is well-settled doctrine that findings of the trial court regarding the credibility
of the witness are to be given great weight and a high degree of respect by the
appellate court.[23] We see no cogent reason to make an exception to this rule.[24]
The accused also alleged that the grandparents of Elizabeth, who harbored ill
feelings against him for having illicit relationship while being married to the sister of
complainants grandfather, concocted the rape charge.
The argument is untenable. The imputation of ill motive against the grandparents
of Elizabeth is not supported by any evidence, except the testimony of the accused. In
fact, the accused has not ascribed any ill motive on her part. [W]here there is no
evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution
witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a crime,
the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[25] Besides, it is not believable that her
grandparents, who nurtured and loved the victim, would expose an innocent girl to the
humiliation and stigma of a rape trial simply to get back at accused-appellant.
We are not persuaded by the appellants defense of alibi. Appellant alleged that
he was no longer residing at Sto. Nio, Calumpit, Bulacan and he was serving as lay
minister at San Antonio de Padua Parish on the date of the incident. Not only was
accused-appellants alibi weak, it also did not rule out the possibility of his having
committed the crime. The trial court observed:
That Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan and Sto. Nio, Calumpit, Bulacan are only four (4) or
five (5) kilometers apart. It would only take five to ten minutes to travel using a
private vehicle from his residence in Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan to Sto. Nio, Calumpit,
Bulacan and about one (1) hour by public transport. As it is, therefore there was no
physical impossibility for accused to be at the scene of the crime in the date and time
in question even if he was then residing at Iba, Hagonoy or even if he was then
performing his duties as lay minister and lector at the San Antonio de Padua Parish
Church. Also belying the alibi of the accused is the testimony of his own witness,
Rev. Fr. Ireneo T. Cabasal, who declared that his Church has only one mass during
Sundays and this is celebrated at 8:00 oclock in the morning. Thus, there was no
occasion for accused to perform his duties as lay minister and lector at said Parish
Church in the afternoon of October 15, 1995 which was a Sunday.[26]
Appellant failed to satisfy the elementary requirements of alibi, that is, accused
must be able to (a) prove his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration
of the offense and (b) demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.[27] Here, it was highly possible for him to be at the scene of the
crime when it was committed.
The evidence having sufficiently established that the rape was committed with a
woman below twelve years of age, the Court finds the imposition of the penalty

of reclusion perpetua to be in accord with Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as

amended by R. A. No. 7659.
In addition to the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages,[28] accused-appellant
must be likewise ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity conformably with
recent pronouncements.[29] The latter is based on different jural foundations and
assessed by courts in the exercise of sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20,
Malolos, in Criminal Case No. 1475-M-95, sentencing accused appellant Florante
Aguiluz y Nuque to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party Elizabeth
B. Cruz in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages is AFFIRMED with
modification that accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay the additional amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victim.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-42608. February 6, 1979.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GAVINO TAMPUS alias JOVEN,DefendantAppellant.
Maximo P. Amurao, Jr. for Appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for Appellee.
SYNOPSIS
Although unwelcome by the thirteen-year old Bella and her two younger brothers because their parents
were not at home, the 29-year-old accused, a neighbor known to the children, one night forced himself into
the house saying he wanted to borrow their fathers saw. After finishing his sawing operations, he refused to
leave the house and slept on the bench in the sala. Twice that night, Bella was raped by the accused. She
could not shout nor struggle herself free from her assailant due to her physical inferiority. The accused
threatened to kill her and all the members of her family if ever she revealed to other persons what he had
done to her. It took Bella twenty-seven days to reveal the outrage because of the threat made by the
accused. Bella and her mother filed a verified complaint for rape. An information for simple rape was then
filed by the fiscal in the Court of First Instance. Accused was convicted. On appeal, he claimed that the trial
court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case and in giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution.
He pleaded the defense of alibi.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and ruled that the filing in the city court of a complaint for rape
before the fiscal by the victim and her mother is sufficient compliance with Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, where such complaint was elevated to the Court of First
Instance as part of the record, even if the information subsequently filed in the Court of First Instance was
signed by the fiscal alone; and that complainants positive, clear and convincing testimony that accused
raped her was not overthrown by the latters unbelievable alibi which his counsel de oficio did not care to
mention at all in his brief.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION FOR RAPE. The filing in the city court of a
complaint for rape signed by and sworn to before the fiscal by the victim and her mother is sufficient
compliance with Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, where
such complaint is elevated to the Court of First Instance as part of the record, even if the information
subsequently filed in the Court of First Instance is signed by the fiscal alone.
2. EVIDENCE; COMPLAINT FORMING PART OF RECORD ELEVATED TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE IS A
MATTER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE. A complaint for rape filed in the city court and elevated to the Court of
First Instance as part of the record of the case should be presented in evidence. However, even if not
offered in evidence, it is a matter of judicial notice.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; DELAY OF VICTIM IN DIVULGING FACT THAT SHE WAS RAPED. The delay of a
thirteen-year old girl in divulging to her mother and the police the fact that she was raped may not be
assigned by the accused as a circumstance casting reasonable doubt on his guilt, because a girl her age
should not be expected to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman who would have the
courage and intelligence to disregard a threat on her life and the members of her family and complain
immediately that she had been forcibly deflowered.
4. ID.; TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS IN RAPE CASE SHOULD NOT BE RECEIVED WITH
PRECIPITATE CREDULITY. In a rape case the testimony of the complainant should not be received with
precipitate credulity; and when conviction depends at any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it
should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. A little insight into human
nature is of most value in judging matters of this kind.
5. ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. Complainants positive, clear, and convincing testimony
that the accused, a neighbor well-known to her, had raped her is sufficient to prove accuseds guilt. It is
unthinkable that a thirteen-year old victim could have fabricated the details and circumstances recited by
her concerning the commission of the rape. The accused did not adduce any reason why she would pretend
that she had been raped and then point to him as the author of that heinous offense. Here, we have a case
of an artless and guililess barrio girl, a mere teenager who was not animated by any mercenary or dishonest
motive in imputing rape to the accused.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Gavino Tampus appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte, and Butuan
City Branch I, convicting him of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay
complainant Bella Flores the sum of P12,000 (Criminal Case No. 386).
The perpetration of the alleged rape was tearfully recounted in court by Bella, the thirteen-year-old victim
who finished the third grade. She testified that at about nine oclock in the evening of June 11, 1972 she
was in her house located in Sitio Mamaylan, Barrio Baan, Butuan City. Her companions were her younger
brothers, two and five years old. Her mother and stepfather were in the hospital taking care of her sick
brother and sister.
When Bella and her brothers were already in bed, she heard Gavino Tampus, 29, married, a tuba gatherer
whose house was around one hundred fifty meters away and who was her nearest neighbor, calling and
asking her to open the door. He said that he wanted to borrow the saw of her stepfather so that he could cut
the bamboo which he was carrying and make containers (sugong) for tuba. Bella did not open the door. She
told Gavino that her parents were not in the house.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

Although Gavino was not welcome, he just the same entered the house by pushing the door made of
bamboo. Its wooden lock was broken. Gavino, who was armed with a scythe, entered the sala. He got the
saw and sawed the bamboo in the sala while Bella and her brothers watched him. He made six tuba
containers.

After Gavino had finished the sawing operation, Bella told him to go home because she was sleepy but he
refused to leave. He said that he was alone in his house because his wife was in the hospital. He slept on the
bench in the sala. Bella placed the lamp near the door of her room. She and her brothers went inside the
bedroom to sleep.
Later, or at about two oclock in the morning (June 12), Bella was awakened because she felt that someone
was on top of her. She knew that. it was two oclock because she heard the bell the Triumph log pond
announcing that hour. She saw Gavino, who was completely naked, moving his buttocks up and down into
her sexual organ. She had no more panties. She did not know when her panties were removed. She tried to
shout but her assailant covered her mouth with his hand. She struggled to free herself from his clutches but
due to her physical inferiority she could not dislodge him.
As Gavino was unable to insert his penis into her organ he poked his two fingers into her vagina. That
insertion caused her much pain. Gavino kissed her and touched her breasts. Thereafter, he was able to have
carnal intercourse with her. She felt excruciating pain when his organ penetrated her private part. When his
organ was inside her vagina, she felt as if there was hot water inside her vagina or that some "hot
substance" was poured into it. After warning her that he would kill her and all the members of her family if
what he did to her was revealed to other persons, Gavino returned to the sala. Bella was scared.
Bella cried until she fell asleep. About two hours later, she again felt that Gavino was on top of her. She had
forgotten to wear her panties. Again, he kissed her and touched her breasts. He was moving his buttocks up
and down (kisikisi). She wiggled and tried to prevent him from abusing her but her efforts were in vain.
When she asked Gavino why he was ravishing her, he told her to keep quiet. After he had consummated the
second assault, he left the house.
It was only on July 8, or twenty-seven days later, after her mother had returned to their home, that she
confided to her parents that Gavino had raped her. It took her a long time to reveal the outrage because of
the threat made by Tampus.
The police medico-legal officer examined Bella on July 27, 1972. He found that her labia majora and labia
minora were coaptated and that there were "old deep hymenal lacerations" in her vagina at the three and
one oclock positions and an old superficial laceration at the eleven oclock position. Her tight vagina
admitted the examiners index finger. The doctor concluded that Bella had lost her virginity long before the
examination.
chanroble s virtual law lib rary

Bellas statement pointing to Gavino Tampus as the rapist was taken by a policeman on July 29, 1972 and
sworn to before the fiscal on August 18, 1972. Her mothers statement was taken by the same policeman on
August 10, 1972 and sworn to before the fiscal on September 4, 1972.
Bella and her mother filed in the city court on September 12, 1972 a verified complaint for rape against
Tampus (p. 4, Record). Gavino Tampus was arrested on September 15, 1972. He did not appear at the
preliminary investigation. The city court elevated the case to the Court of First Instance where on November
22, 1972 the fiscal filed against him an information for simple Rape. As already stated, he was convicted of
rape.
In this appeal, appellants counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over
the case and in giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution.
Appellants first contention is based on the assumption that the criminal action in this case was commenced
by the filing of an information. That assumption is wrong. As stated above, the victim and her mother filed
the complaint for rape. They signed the complaint which was sworn to before the fiscal. That is a sufficient
compliance with article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. That
complaint is a part of the record which was elevated to the Court of First Instance. It should have been
presented in evidence but even if not offered in evidence, it is a matter of judicial notice. (People v.
Savellano, L-31227, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 320, 324).
Appellants insinuation that the information should have been signed and sworn to by the complainant and
her mother is not correct. It is not necessary for the complainant to sign and verify the information for rape
filed by the fiscal. (People v. Cerena, 106 Phil. 570).
Accused Tampus pleaded alibi as a defense. He testified that he was not acquainted with the victim and that

at the time the rape was committed he was in Mainit, Surigao, around ninety kilometers away from Butuan
City. His alibi was corroborated by his younger brother, Felix; his neighbor, Anastacio Narit, and his tuba
customer, Antonia Abenoja.
The trial court in discrediting Gavino Tampus alibi said that the testimonies of Felix Tampus, Narit and
Abenoja do not inspire belief because of certain discrepancies therein Gavino Tampus did not explain why he
was in Mainit, Surigao, on June 12, 1972. The circumstances of his stay in that town were not stated. No
one from Mainit testified that he was really in that town when the rape was committed.
The delay of the complainant in divulging the alleged rape to her mother and the police is assigned by the
appellant as a circumstance casting reasonable doubt on his guilt. The victim explained that she did not
reveal to her mother immediately the grievous outrage committed against her because she was afraid that
the appellant would make good his threat to kill her and the members of her family.
One should not expect a thirteen-year-old girl to act like an adult or a mature and experienced woman who
would have the courage and intelligence to disregard a threat on her life and the members of her family and
complain immediately that she had been forcibly deflowered. The reported cases on rape contain instances
of young girls concealing for sometime the assaults on their virtue because of the rapists threat on their
lives.
Appellants arguments assailing complainants credibility were adequately confuted in the prosecutions brief.
An unbiased appraisal of complainants testimony leads to the conclusion that she had truthfully identified
the appellant as the rapist. He was the neighbor of complainant girl and was well-known to her and her kid
brothers. She had been to his house.
It is unthinkable that the thirteen-year-old victim could have fabricated the details and circumstances
recited above concerning the commission of the rape. It may be asked: if she had not been abused by
appellant Tampus, why would she frame him up, allow her private organ to be examined, leave the rustic
peace and quiet of her barrio, undergo the trouble and shame of a public trial in the city, and answer
embarrassing questions about her harrowing experience of having had an involuntary carnal intercourse?
Tampus did not adduce any reason why the complainant would pretend that she had been raped and then
point to him as the author of that heinous offense.
chanrobles vi rtual lawlib rary

It is true that in a rape case the testimony of the complainant "should not be received with precipitate
credulity; and when the conviction depends at any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should
not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. A little insight into human nature is
of most value in judging matters of this kind" (People v. Fausto, 51 Phil. 852, 856).
"The books disclose too many instances of false charges of rape, attempted rape, and kindred offenses to
permit the courts to enter a judgment of conviction of a crime of this nature without having in mind the
possibility that the complaining witness may have been actuated by some sinister motive in bringing the
charge" (U.S. v. Ramos, 35 Phil. 671, 677).
Those judicious observations are not applicable to this case. Here, we have a case of an artless and guileless
barrio girl, a mere teenager. She was not animated by any mercenary or dishonest motive in imputing rape
to the accused. She had gone to court to bring to justice the satyr whose beastliness was the cause of her
loss of chastity at an early age.
We hold that complainants positive, clear and convincing testimony is sufficient to prove appellants guilt. It
was not overthrown by his alibi which his counsel de oficio did not care to mention at all in his brief. (See
People v. Delfinado, 61 Phil, 694 and People v. Dazo and Tiangzon, 58 Phil. 420.) She testified at four
hearings. She was subjected to a grueling cross-examination. She stuck to her testimony that appellant
Tampus raped her.
The crime alleged and proven in this case is simple rape aggravated by dwelling. The penalty ofreclusion
perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court (Arts. 63 and 335, Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial courts judgment is affirmed. Costs against the Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

March 3, 1922
G.R. No. 18081
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.
MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as
follows: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged
matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the
Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision
of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect marriages consummated by not less
than one hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the Mohammedan faith, the
transcendental importance of the cause can be realized. We proposed to give to the
subject the serious consideration which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on
August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased
was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a
legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in
1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that
she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands,
and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo,
unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after
hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference
to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the
Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the

Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural
child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang
and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora
Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the
Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the
daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial
judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property
of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang,
and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to
the facts, we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. As
to the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error, these
can best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese
marriage; and (2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong
Boo was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twentyfirst year of the Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February
16, 1985, to a young lady named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to
having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in evidence
a document in Chinese which in translation reads as follows:
Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers the
venerable Chiong Ing, father of the bridegroom, accepting
his offer of marriage, and let this document serve as proof
of the acceptance of said marriage which is to be
celebrated during the merry season of the flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to wish for your and the
spouses much happiness, a long life, and prolific issue, as
noble and great as that which you brought forth. I
One hundred years of
consider the marriage of your son Boo with my sister Lit
life and health for both. Chia as a mandate of God and I hope that they treat each

other with great love and mutual courtesy and that both
they and their parents be very happy.
Given during the second moon of the twenty-first year of
the reign of the Emperor Quang Su.
Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his
marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong
Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime
thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910,
Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears
from documents presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands
as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to his native hearth
and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any
further relations with her except once when he sent her P10.
The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of
the claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor
noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother
of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by
overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses
stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China,
he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are not disposed to disturb this
appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration documents only go to show the
relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son
Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the
mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in
which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid
foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before

the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is
then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910]),
16 Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and the
Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to decide, as to the conflicting
claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant, between the descendants of an alleged
Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. The
Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that
the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by the
United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty
years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the
death of the husband and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese
marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of such impediment." Another case in the same category is
that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil., 216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case,
there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twentythree years for forty years and the two cases are the same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an
acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit
of Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo.
But we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on the question, because the
oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo
is fairly complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to
the year 1896. At least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine
Islands. There he was married to the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies

prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest)
Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties
to the marriage, the Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized the marriage, and by
other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the father of the bride, and another, the chief of
the rancheria, now a municipal councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by
giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.
The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of
the father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the
Iman asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was
consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the
Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born
five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with
Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as
his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents.
Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of
registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late
as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom
is prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend,
especially when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that
proof could not be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was contracted by the
Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the ceremonies of the
Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced
in the very beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the
Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections
of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into consideration.

Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either
a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or
minister of the Gospel of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of
the word "priest," and only considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any
denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian
religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the
lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and
considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is
to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc.,
obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest.
"Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A
"denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin
[1892], 35 Neb., 375; In re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441; Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H.
9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and
Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form
for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence
of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and
wife." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable
requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid
marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the
ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance, there
is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent.
While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest
were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the
Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife
and did thereafter live together as husband and wife. (Travers vs.Reinhardt [1907],
205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage
Law which have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law
which, in our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage
heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall
be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or

omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he
had authority and that they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the
legislative intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between
Mohammedans. To quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the
Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages, and it is not to
be presumed that the legislator intended by this law to validate void marriages
celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws which then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing
could be clearer than the language used in section IX. Note for a moment the all
embracing words found in this section:
"No marriage" Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized"
Could any other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase?
"Before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of
such authority" Could stronger language than this be invoked to announce
legislative intention? "Or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission"
Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the
marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the belief of the
parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully
married" What was the purpose of the legislator here, if it was not to legalize the
marriage, if it was celebrated by any person who thought that he had authority to
perform the same, and if either of the parties thought that they had been married? Is
there any word or hint of any word which would restrict the curative provisions of
section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages? By what system of mental
gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such precise language the curious idea
that it was restricted to marriages performed under the Spanish law before the
revolutionary authorities?

In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would
ascertain from other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order
No. 68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the
Philippines has, time and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law,
and executive proclamation. The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that "The
inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on every branch
of the Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That no form of religion and
no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the
Islands; that, upon the other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or
molested in following his calling, and that the separation between state and church
shall be real, entire, and absolute." The notable state paper of President McKinley also
enjoined the Commission, "to bear in mind that the Government which they are
establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of
the Philippine Islands" and that, therefore, "the measures adopted should be made to
conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices. . . . The Philippine
Bill and the Jones Law reproduced the main constitutional provisions establishing
religious toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in
the same path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the
Captain General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government
guaranteed "with all solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free
exercise of their religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it
will also respect their customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of
January 14, 1881.) For instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine Commission, section
3, provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace
deciding civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such

action is deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of the Philippine
Islands, except laws of the United States applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking
into account local laws and customs. . . ." (See further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act
No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the Legislative Council amended and approved
by the Philippine Commission; Cacho vs. Government of the United States [1914], 28
Phil., 616.) Various responsible officials have so oft announced the purpose of the
Government not to interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially their religious
customs, as to make quotation of the same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were
inspired by the governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the marriages
of the Indians, the Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is, that
a marriage between two Indians entered into according to the customs and laws of the
people at a place where such customs and laws are in force, must be recognized as a
valid marriage. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is, that they will be left to their
own customs and that their marriages will be recognized although they use no
solemnization. The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered
into before a proper official by members of that Church competent to contract
marriage constitutes a valid marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.:" (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage. (U. S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son
Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633;
Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to

safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for
denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual
marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can
render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended
to invalidate marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn, 209;
Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution
which will mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction
which will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences,
entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong
Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void,
would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least
one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom.
We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages;
either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them
legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to
advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court
in the cases of United States vs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United
States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these decisions
to be controlling. In the first place, these were criminal actions and two Justice
dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case, the marriage in question was a
tribal marriage of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the marriage had been
performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil. In neither
case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of the
so-called unwritten law, was any consideration given to the provisions of section IX
of General Order No. 68. We are free to admit that, if necessary, we would
unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine announced in the two cases above mentioned.

We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the

Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law
as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is
unnecessary to decide. In resume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved and
that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child, and we
find the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the
widow and the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them under the
law.
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a
partition of the property in accordance with this decision, and for further proceedings
in accordance with law. Without special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.
January 26, 1907
G.R. No. 3191
LADISLAO PATRIARCA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUANA ORATE, defendant-appellant.
Buencamino & Diokno for appellant.
Pedro Concepcion for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
This case having been duly submitted to this court, it appears:
That the plaintiff alleges (1) that he was the lessee of a certain tract of land requiring
3 cavanes of seed to plant, the boundaries of which are described in the complaint, the
land being situated in the barrio of San Juan of the Town of San Francisco de
Malabon, Province of Cavite; (2) that "the improvements upon the said land had been

mortgaged by him to Inocencio Olimpo and his wife Juana Orate, the former having
since died, . . . which said mortgage was for the purpose of securing a loan of 323
pesos;" and (3) that "when he, the plaintiff, attempted to redeem the said land prior to
the death of the said Olimpo, the latter refused to consent to it, making various
pretexts for such refusal."
The defendant answered as follows: (1) "That she admits the first paragraph of the
complaint and alleges that since the year 1860 the lease of the land described in the
complaint was taken from the tenant, Ladislao Patriarca, and given to Inocencio
Olimpo and his wife, the defendant Juan Orate, by the administrator of the hacienda;"
(2) that she denies the second paragraph of the complaint for the reason that the
improvements upon the land held under lease (it is not known what the improvements
were) can not be mortgaged; and (3) that she also denies the allegations contained in
paragraph 3 of the complaint, for the reason that in the deposition referred to in the
complaint as having been made by Inocencio Olimpo on the 22d day of June, 1900,
the latter asserted that he had purchased the improvements on the land in question,
paying to the plaintiff the sum of 323 pesos in consideration thereof, and denied the
existence of the alleged mortgage referred to in the complaint.
It seems that the finding of the contract below upon this point is not altogether in
harmony with the foregoing facts. The court found as follows: "Both parties have
admitted that the land in controversy is within the boundaries of the haciendaof San
Francisco de Malabon, which formerly belonged to the friars, and that the plaintiff,
while a tenant thereof, mortgaged to the defendant and her deceased husband, for the
purpose of securing a loan of 323 pesos, Philippine currency, the land and the
improvements thereon, such as the buildings and crops thereon." (Bill of exceptions,
pp. 12, 13.)
The first part of the foregoing conclusion was, in fact, admitted by both parties, but
not so the latter part thereof. What the defendant contends is, that her husband had
been in possession of the land since 1860 under and by virtue of the contract of lease
made by the administrator of the hacienda, and that the improvements thereon he
acquired by purchase from the plaintiff for 323 pesos. The second error assigned by
the appellant should therefore be sustained.
There should be excluded, therefore, in the consideration of this case, the question as
to the land itself, as the subject of the controversy is the improvements thereon.

What such improvements, thus transferred, either by mortgage or by sale, were, has
not been shown. One of the witnesses for the plaintiff, Melecio Valbuena, was asked:
"Do you know what the improvements consisted of?" He answered: "In the extension,
in the crops, according to my best knowledge and understanding." (Record p. 6.)
According to the judgment, these improvements consisted of buildings and crops
standing upon the land. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 12, 13.) But no evidence has been
introduced upon this point which would enable us to form an opinion as to the nature
of such improvements, and the rights which might arise therefrom. Consequently the
seventh error assigned by the appellant should be sustained.
The defendant has shown by the testimony of Pedro Portugal, Manuel Columna, and
Ignacio Astao, whose statements have not been contradicted, that Olimpo had been
in possession of the land since 1859 or 1860; that the owner of the land was Vicente
Aviles, who was the former owner of the hacienda now belonging to the Augustinian
Friars; that Olimpo was the lessee of the said land, and by the testimony of Quiterio
Olimpo, a man 43 years of age, the defendant proved that the said Quiterio was the
son of Inocencio Olimpo, by his wife Juana Orate (p. 9); that Inocencio Olimpo, the
father, had been in possession of the land since the witness had reached the age of
discretion, and that the land had been sold by the plaintiff to his father (p. 10).
It is evident from the complaint itself, as well as from the evidence of record, that the
property sought to be recovered in the complaint does not consist of land, but of the
improvements thereon alleged to have been transferred by the plaintiff to the deceased
husband of the defendant; that the land which the defendant is required in the
judgment of the court below to return to the plaintiff constitutes a part of
the hacienda which belongs to a third party and consequently is not the property of
either plaintiff or defendant; and that the land referred to in this action had been
occupied by Inocencio Olimpo for about forty years, not by virtue of a sublease of the
same to him by Ladislao Patriarca, but under a lease obtained by him directly from the
owner of the hacienda himself. However that may be, it has not been shown of what
the said improvements consisted, nor how the right thereto arose.
To direct this lessee to deliver to another person the land of which he has been in
possession with the consent of the owner, is equivalent to depriving him of the civil
right which can not be taken from him except by the person who conferred it upon

him. It would be equivalent to disposing of property belonging to one person so that

another might use it and enjoy it, without the knowledge or consent of the owner, and
without giving the latter an opportunity to be heard. The owner would be deprived of
his property as a result of such an order, said order implying a right to dispose of the
property. Such a right appertains exclusively to the owner, who, on the other hand, has
given no cause for such an essential right being abridged or interfered with by the
court. The third and sixth errors assigned by the appellant should therefore be
sustained.
The delivery of property by virtue of a judicial order can only be the result of an
action in rem or an action for possession, while the delivery ordered in the judgment
here appealed from as a consequence of the right to redeem can only be the result of
an action in personam, the consequence of a stipulation, the effects of which can only
affect the legitimate owner of the property who, as in this case, was not a party to such
a stipulation, not a party to the proceedings, and was not affected by the judgment.
This action in personam if it existed at all, and were still enforcible, was not directed
against the immediate successor to the obligation, against whom it should have been
directed, and against whom the judgment rendered in these proceedings in favor of the
mother of such successor can not be enforced. The mother as a coparticipant in the use
of the land can not be bound by the said judgment, as would be the case here if she
waived her entire rights in favor of the plaintiff, as a result of the judgment of the
court below. The direct successor of the obligation which is legally presumed to exist
had nothing to do with the acts imputed to his mother and was not a party either to the
proceedings in this case or to the judgment rendered therein. The result would be that
his rights would be jeopardized without his having first had an opportunity to be heard
and defend such rights. Therefore, the fifth assignment of error should be sustained.
The improvements referred to are considered as having been transferred to Olimpo
under a contract which it may be said constituted a mortgage in so far as it was
intended to secure the performance of an obligation and a contract ofantichresis in so
far as it provided for the delivery of the fruits of the real property. But the mortgage
and antichresisrelate to real property presumed to belong to the debtor, and to be
sufficient in itself or with the products thereof to secure the payment of the debt, and
in the present case the real property which it is sought to recover in the complaint did

not belong to the plaintiff and there is no means of ascertaining what the alleged
improvements thereon were for the purpose of determining whether they could give
rise to an action in rem or a mere action in personam.
However it may be, that contract in regard to the so-called improvements on the land,
different in its effects from those contracts of security mentioned in the present Civil
Code, must depend for its existence upon some local custom, and a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact, which has not been
done in this case, where neither the nature, the effects, nor the extent of that singular
contract was proved. That contract, as has been said before, was neither a mortgage
nor an antichresis, nor a purchase on condition of redemption.
These being the only contracts relating to real property in the nature of contracts of
security, known to the Civil Code, and prior to the promulgation of the Civil Code
there was some similar contract with the same effect mentioned in the judgment of the
court below, different, however, from the contracts of mortgage and purchase and
sale, such contracts could not be enforced at this time, as article 1976 of the Civil
Code repealed all laws, usages and customs which constituted the common civil law
in all matters which are the subject of this code.
For the reasons hereinbefore set out, and not considering errors 1, 4, 8, and 9 set out in
the appeal, the judgment appealed from is reversed, without special provision as to the
costs of this instance. After the expiration of ten days from the entry of final judgment
the case will be remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
October 13, 1917
G.R. No. 10631
MARIA MORTERA DE ECEIZA, accompanied by her husband, MANUEL
ECEIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE WEST OF SCOTLAND INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., represented by
LUTZ & CO., defendant-appellee.

Ramon Sotelo for appellants.

A. J. Burke for appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this case the plaintiffs, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza, her husband,
instituted an action against defendant, The West of Scotland Insurance Office, Ltd., to
recover upon two fire-insurance policies issued by the defendant company in favor of
the plaintiff Maria Mortera de Eceiza for the sum of P5,000 each, one policy
representing insurance upon a house, and the other representing insurance upon the
furniture, personal property, and effects contained therein all of which were alleged
to have been destroyed by fire. At the original hearing the Court of First Instance gave
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P8,500, with interest and costs. This
judgment was entered upon April 24, 1913, and was soon thereafter satisfied in full by
the defendant company.
Upon September the 24, 1913, said company appeared by its attorney and presented a
motion to the effect that the judgment which had been rendered upon April 24
preceding be vacated and that it be granted leave to present an amended answer and
also a counterclaim for relief against the plaintiffs. This motion was supported by
affidavits tending to show that the fire in question had been deliverately set by the
plaintiffs or a person acting upon their procurance, and that as preliminary to the
burning of the house many of the articles of personal property which were covered by
the insurance had been removed. The affidavits also showed that the defendant
company was ignorant of these facts at the time of the original trial, though due
diligence had been used in preparing its defense; that the defendant company
remained in ignorance of such facts until about August 30, 1913; and that it had
thereupon proceeded with diligence in asking for the relief contemplated in this
motion. The court below granted the motion, opened its previous judgment of April
24, 1913, and permitted the defendant to file an amended answer. This answer set up
the matter of defense exhibited in the affidavits mentioned above, and in it was
contained a prayer for affirmative relief asking for judgment for the amount which
had been paid to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the judgment of April 24, 1913. After
answer had been made by the plaintiffs to the prayer for affirmative relief, proof was
taken upon the new issues thus introduced into the case. At the hearing the court in

view of the additional evidence reversed its prior decision and gave judgment in favor
of the defendant for the recovery of the amount paid by it under the original judgment
with interest and costs. From this judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.
The testimony submitted at the second trial in the court below was in our opinion
amply sufficient to justify the reversal of the judgment, as the fraud alleged was fully
proved. In fact the attorney for the appellants does not assign any specific error before
this court upon the point of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence; and the
principal question to be considered here is whether or not the Court of First Instance
had power to allow the case to be opened and reheard upon newly discovered
evidence five months after the original judgment had been entered.
The only provisions in our statutes under which such action can be justified in section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure which states in substance that the court may
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through
"his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect," provided application
therefor made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after such
judgment, order, or proceeding is taken. This section is frequently invoked to relieve a
party from the effect of judgments entered upon default and other orders made during
the course of litigation; and we have no reason to doubt its applicability to the
situation which arose in this case. The defendant appeared in the case from the
beginning and made a defense, it is true, but the real and efficacious defense was not
asserted because the facts constituting the defense were then unknown. The failure to
present this defense was clearly an "excusable neglect," for the defense had its basis in
a secret and felonious act committed by the plaintiffs. Knowledge of such a defense
cannot be imputed to a defendant company; and it can not be properly held that the
company was bound to discover such defense and present the proof of it at the
original trial. All that is required of any party is that when knowledge of such a
defense comes to him he should exert himself with diligence to obtain relief within the
time allowed by law. As has been said by a great American master of the principles of
equity jurisprudence:
It is true that if a party does not use reasonable diligence to obtain testimony
material to his cause, it is a neglect for which he must suffer; and he shall not

be allowed to renew the litigation on pretense of the discovery of new evidence

which he ought to have had before the first trial. But this rule itself has
reasonable limits. The testimony must have been within the knowledge of the
party, or he must have had some clew to guide him in the search, before he can
be said to have neglected the proper steps to obtain it. (Chancellor Desaussure
in Winthropvs. Lane, 3 Desaussure [S. C.], 310.)
Two very instructive American cases have come to our attention which are well
worthy of consideration in this connection. The first of these cases is
Taylor vs. Nashville etc. Railroad Co. (86 Tenn., 228). It appeared there that the
holder of certain bonds issued by the city of Nashville brought suit thereon and
recovered judgment. Later these same bonds were stolen from the records of the court
in which the judgment had been rendered, and an action was instituted upon them a
second time in another court. When the case came up for trial the bonds were
exhibited in court; and as they appeared in every respect regular, and the attorney for
the city knew of no defense, and was ignorant of the fraud which was being practiced,
he permitted judgment to be taken upon them without opposition. It further appeared
that the nominal plaintiff, who pretended to be a resident of a remote state, was a
fictitious personage, as was also the principal attorney of record; and the lawyer who
appeared in court for the plaintiff had only retained that day and was himself
apparently deceived as to the identity of his supposed client. There were present
therefore in this case not only the fraud inherent in the cause of action but a fraud
practiced upon the court in the conduct of the litigation.
The other case is that of Ocean Insurance Co. vs. Field (2 Story, 59; 18 Fed. Cases No.
10406). The facts of this case were remarkably similar to those of the case at bar. A
policy of marine insurance had been issued in favor of the owner of a ship. The vessel
was lost, and the insurance company, suspecting that something was wrong, refused
payment. In an action at law the defense was made that the loss was fraudulent and
that the vessel had been deliberately cast away. Some evidence tending to show this
was submitted, but the court gave judgment for the plaintiff; and that judgment was
paid. Later the insurer obtained information showing that the vessel had been
deliberately wrecked by the insurer by boring holes in her bottom. A bill was
thereupon filed to annul the judgment previously entered upon the policy of insurance
and to recover the amount paid out by the company in satisfaction thereof. Upon

demurrer it was held that the bill stated a good cause of action. In this case Justice
Story said:
Then, as to the main objection, on the ground of the fraudulent casting away of
the vessel, and especially of boring holes in her, it is suggested, that in point of
fact, the defense of fraud was made at the trial, and did not prevail. . . . But the
parties admit, for the sake of the argument, that the point of fraud was made at
the trial; but that it was in effect founded upon circumstances of suspicion, not
sustained by any clear and satisfactory proofs; and that the boring of the holes
was not known or suspected at the trial; and that it was not and could not
therefore, then be a matter of controversy. Now, I agree that mere cumulative
evidence to the fact of fraud, or any other leading fact not discovered since the
trial, will not ordinarily constitute any just ground for the interference of a court
of equity to grant relief, for the solid reason that it is for the public interest and
policy to make an end to litigation, or, as was pointedly said by a great jurist,
that suits may not be immortal while men are mortal; but I do not know that it
has ever been decided, that, in an assignable case, where the defense has been
imperfectly made out at the trial, from the defect of real and substantial proofs,
although there were some circumstances of a doubtful character, or some
presumptions of a loose and indeterminable bearing before the jury, and
afterwards newly-discovered evidence has come out, full, and direct, and
positive, to the very gist of the controversy, a court of equity will not interfere
to grant relief and to sustain a bill to bring forth and try the force and validity of
the new evidence.
In both of these cases it was held that the complaining party was entitled to relief, and
though the proceeding in those cases was by original bill in equity, and not by motion
as in the case at bar, those precedents are of much weight upon the question as to what
constitutes the excusable neglect contemplated in our statute; for it is obvious that no
relief would have been given in those cases if the court had not been convinced that
the failure of the complaining parties to make adequate defense in the original actions
was excusable under the facts there presented.

In exercising the power to relieve a party from a judgment under the authority
contained in section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure , in a case where the motion is
based upon newly discovered evidence, the judges of the Courts of First Instance
should not be unmindful of the necessity of maintaining the principle that litigation
once fairly determined by a lawful judgment should not be touched or set aside
without good reason. It must not only appear that the neglect of the party applying for
relief was an "excusable neglect" but he should be required to show diligence in the
prosecution of his rights after the evidence is discovered. Furthermore, the newly
discovered evidence exhibited in the application must be so controlling in its effect
that it would, if not met, probably induce a different conclusion from that reached at
the original hearing. The finality of litigation and the stability of judicial decision both
require that conclusions once reached as the outcome of legal proceedings should not
be changed except where such step seems necessary in order to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. Motions of this character are, therefore, not to be especially favored by the
courts. One salutary limitation upon the right to obtain a rehearing on the ground of
newly discovered evidence is found in the rule that cumulative evidence relating to
facts that were in issue at the first hearing will not usually suffice. The discovery of
new evidence, or of new witnesses, impeaching witnesses examined upon the original
hearing or tending to show subornation of perjury of such witnesses is not ordinarily
considered sufficient to justify relief. This rule applies with special force where the
credibility of the witnesses in question has been directly attacked in the original suit.
More or less evidence comes to light in every case after a trial and if a cause were
allowed to be reheard on merely cumulative proof, the original hearing would tend to
become a mere preliminary skirmish. Besides too great liberality in allowing causes to
be opened in order to allow the introduction of cumulative evidence would hold out to
the parties the temptation to tamper with witnesses for the purpose of supplying
defects of proof.
The circumstance that the original judgment in this case had been satisfied by the
defendant prior to the time when the motion of September 24 was made does not in
any wise prejudice its right to have the judgment opened and reversed; and upon
reversal it is proper to render judgment against the plaintiffs for that that money. A
party to any action who obtains satisfaction before the cause is finally and irrevocably

determined takes subject to the contingency that, if the judgment is finally reversed,
he must return what he has prematurely received.
From statements contained in the brief of the attorney for the plaintiffs, as well as
from an unauthenticated document which appears among the papers transmitted to
this court, we understand that in the autumn of 1913, the plaintiffs were prosecuted in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila upon a charge of arson, based upon
the burning of the house which was the subject of insurance in this case. In that
prosecution these persons were acquitted. It is therefore now urged in their behalf (1)
that this acquittal in a conclusive determination that they were not guilty; (2) that the
existence of any civil liability consequent upon such act of incendiarism is thereby
made impossible; and (3) that consequently the plaintiffs can not be required to refund
the money paid to them by the defendant. It is, however, unnecessary for us to enter
into discussion of this question, as it is evident that, even if the plaintiffs were correct
upon the point of law involved, they are not in a position to avail themselves of their
acquittal in the criminal proceeding, because they have neither pleaded nor properly
proved that fact in this case. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
acquitting them of the charge of arson I said to have been rendered upon November
19, 1913. The supplemental or amended answer of the defendants, in which is
contained therein counterclaim praying for the recovery of the money which they had
paid, was filed in the present cause upon December 15, 1913; and upon February 9,
1914, the plaintiffs filed their replication thereto. This replication contains a general
denial of the facts alleged by way of counterclaim, and in particular denies the right of
the defendant to recover lawyer's fees; but nothing is said about their acquittal in the
criminal proceeding. Now, whatever may be the law as regards the principle of
liability involved, there can be no question but that this defense derived from acquittal
is new matter no involved in any of the issues raised by the pleadings previously filed
in the cause; and it is clear that such matter must be especially pleaded. This practice
was followed in Almeida Chan Tanco vs. Abarao (8 Phil. Rep., 178), and
inBachrach vs. British American Assurance Co. (17 Phil. Rep., 555); and we think
that, upon well settled principles of procedure, the failure to plead this matter deprives
the plaintiffs of the right to rely upon it.

But assuming that the judgment of acquittal had been properly pleaded, we find in the
record no sufficient competent proof that any such judgment was rendered. The fact of
acquittal in the criminal prosecution was not developed in the oral testimony in the
present case, though we find a number of indirect allusions in the testimony from
which it may be inferred that a criminal case, No. 10921, had been conducted
somewhere in which some of the witnesses in this case had previously given their
testimony. We also find inserted among the papers which have been transmitted to
this court a document which purports to be a copy of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila in the case of United States vs. Manuel Eceiza et al.
This document was not submitted as proof in the Court of First Instance in the present
cause; and it is not accredited as an exhibit introduced with the approval of that court.
It is obvious that this court cannot consider papers of this character as proof; and as
we do not take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of justice in these
Islands, it results that for the purposes of this litigation there is no evidence before us
from which we could find as a fact that the plaintiffs had ever been impleaded in any
criminal action or acquitted of the crime of arson in such a proceeding.
It results from the foregoing opinion that there was no error in the judgment entered in
the Court of First Instance in this cause; and the same should, therefore, be affirmed,
with costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
Ramon Dimen for petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:p

The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of
basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted
by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and
situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed
in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the
herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was
required to vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla
while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa
Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the
same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her
life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do,
and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and
half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was
made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from
his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and
until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and
Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the
Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the
trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the
plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the
ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4,
1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter
indicating that the amount of P600.00the first P300.00 and then another P300.00
as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a
Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and
Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript
of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the
trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.

We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of
Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not
include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by
plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems

to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the
quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were
marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that
time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific
Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if
it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event,
such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."

Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts
and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the
trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be
validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses,
Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in
her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.

Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:

LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan
Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial
notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with
the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the
same judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court

may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record
of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a
part of the record of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the
knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is
clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the
archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not
been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in
Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As
the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him,
leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of
the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because
"the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What
"other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to
wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the
complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its
allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan
Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even
assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who
was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before
1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the
owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many
cases. However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception.
In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact,
the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's
ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land
covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a
claim of ownership. 10

The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject
parcels of land by the respondents and their parents before them for more than 30 years
qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of land. 11

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously
allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes
in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned
with the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America.
That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is
curious that he should have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He
would have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the
land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not
have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why
he did not object when the payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the
owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession
thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid the
realty taxes thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14 He
even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who
acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the private
respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by
Tabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and
even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached
arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and
appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not
been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably
to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case
No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in
violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built
upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim
of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative
laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that
should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO

MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA,defendantsappellants.
SYLLABUS

1.

REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF

THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL;
EXCEPTIONS. - This appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of
witnesses. As this Court has ruled in innumerable cases, the trial court is
best equipped to make the assessment on said issue and therefore, its
factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless the court a
quo is perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted
certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if properly considered,
would affect the result of the case and warrant a reversal of the decision
involved. We do not find in the instant case any such reason to depart
from said general principle. Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial
justice, we shall confront the issues raised herein by the appellants.

2.

ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES ON

MINOR DETAILS. - Inconsistencies or contradictions on minor details do
not have any material bearing on the culpability of the appellants as they
do not in any way refute their positive identification by the two
eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of the holdup. On the contrary, they
reflect the truthfulness of the testimonies of Grace and Glory.

3.

ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED

MADE BY VICTIMS DEPENDS LARGELY ON ATTENDING
CIRCUMSTANCES AND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. Visibility is an important factor in the identification of a criminal offender.
However, its relative weight and significance depends largely on the
attending circumstances and the discretion of the trial court. Another
overriding consideration is the fact that the most natural reaction of victims
of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrator of the
crime and observe the manner in which the crime was being committed.

4.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILING IN THE FACE OF POSITIVE

IDENTIFICATION; CASE AT BAR. - In light of the positive identification of
the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, their alibis are worthless.
Moreover, the defense failed to meet the requisites for alibi to be
considered as a valid defense. It is not enough that the appellants were
somewhere else when the crime transpired. They must likewise duly
establish that they were so far away that it was not physically possible for
them to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at or about
the time of its commission. Balic-balic in Sampaloc, Manila and Aurora
Boulevard inSan Juan, Metro Manila are not very distant from each other
considering the numerous public transportation facilities plying between
said places.

5.

ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; DESCRIPTION OF THE

OFFENSE CONTROLS OVER DESIGNATION THEREOF; CASE AT
BAR. - In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the
designation but the description of the offense charged. Considering the
allegations of the aforequoted Information, appellants herein should be
liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art.
294 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery having been duly established
beyond reasonable doubt by the asportation of thirty pesos from Glory
Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn Zuluetas death was accidental
because it was produced by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The
physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta during the commission of the
crime are absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide.

6.

CRIMINAL LAW; P.D. 532 (HIGHWAY ROBBERY); PURPOSE IS TO

COMMIT ROBBERY INDISCRIMINATELY. - To obtain a conviction for
highway robbery, the prosecution should have proven that the accused, in
the instant case, were organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. There, however, was a total absence of such proof. There
was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the
accused - to show the indiscriminate commission thereof.

7.

ID.; ID.; NUMBER OF PERPETRATORS, NO LONGER AN ELEMENT. Incidentally, it would be relevant to add that the number of perpetrators is
no longer an essential element of the crime of brigandage as defined by
PD. No. 532.

8.

ID.; ID.; NOT EVERY ROBBERY COMMITTED ON HIGHWAYS

COVERED THEREBY. It would be absurd to adopt a literal
interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our
highways would be covered thereby. Hence, in charging a crime under
P.D. No. 532, it is important to consider whether or not the very purpose
for which the law was promulgated has been transgressed. Petty robbery
in public transport vehicles (with or without personal violence and death)
committed against the middle and lower economic classes of society is as
reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale robbery committed
against the economically well-heeled. Nonetheless, the law must be
interpreted not only to bring forth its aim and spirit but also in light of the
basic principle that all doubts are to be resolved liberally in favor of the
accused. As such, appellants may not be held liable under P.D. No. 532
but only under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

9.

ID.; CONSPIRACY; PROVEN BY THE COORDINATED ACTIONS OF

APPELLANTS. - Conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions

of the appellants and their companion of depriving Glory of her money and
injuring both Ramilyn and Grace which resulted in Ramilyns accidental
death.
10. ID.; ID.; THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL. - Since both appellants
took part in the robbery, they shall be liable for the complex crime of
robbery with homicide in the absence of proof that they endeavored to
prevent the accidental killing of Ramilyn.
11. ID.; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; DEATH PENALTY REDUCED
TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. - In view of the prohibition against the
imposition of the death penalty when the crime was committed, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was then the single and indivisible penalty for
robbery with homicide. It shall be imposed on each of the appellants
regardless of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime.
12. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SPIRIT OR INTENT OF THE LAW
SHOULD NOT BE SUBORDINATED TO THE LETTER THEREOF. - It is
an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the
law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear,
we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers
merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and
the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder
form of liability in case of doubt.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for defendants-appellants.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The main question answered in this case is whether the accused should
be convicted of highway robbery with homicide punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532, or of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Appellants Romeo Mendoza and Jaime Rejali were charged on June 17,
1991 before the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila (Branch 156) of
the crime of ROBBERY HOLD-UP (sic) with HOMICIDE (P.D. No. 532, AntiPiracy and Anti-Highwat (sic) Robbery Law of 1974)1 in an Information which
reads as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of May 1991, in the municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused, armed with gun and knives, conspiring and confederating together
with one alias Jack whose true identity and present whereabouts is still unknown, and
mutually helping and aiding one another with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob and divest one Glory Oropeo of cash money amounting to P3 0.00, while the
said victim was aboard a passenger jeep, cruising along Aurora Blvd., San Juan,
Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner thereof, in the aforementioned amount of P30.00; that on the occasion of said
robbery (hold-up) and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away
personal belongings of all passengers in pursuance of their criminal act said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the passengers (sic) of said passenger jeep, one Ramilyn
Zulueta by then and there hitting her head with a gun and kicked (sic) her out of the
passenger jeep which caused her to fall in (sic) the pavement hitting her head on the
ground, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly caused her
death, while Ma. Grace Zulueta, punching her face and hitting her head with a gun, as
a result of which said Ma. Grace Zulueta sustained physical injuries which required
medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated her from
performing her customary labor for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The records show that both accused were assisted by their counsel de
oficio, Atty. Fernando Fernandez of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), when
they pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment on August 9, 1991.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution thereafter established that on May 29, 1991, at
about 9:00 in the evening, 17-year-old Ma. Grace Zulueta and her elder sister,
Ma. Ramilyn, were on their way home from their grandparents house in Altura
Ext., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Cubao
via Aurora Blvd. The jeepney was fully loaded with the driver, his wife and two
children on the front seat and eight passengers on each of the two parallel
back seats.2
The Zulueta sisters were seated near the rear entrance of the
jeepney3 with accused Romeo Mendoza seated beside Grace.4 It was
through Mendoza that Grace handed over their fare to the driver as the

jeepney passed by the SM complex.5 Glory Oropeo (or Lory Europeo6), who
boarded the same jeepney near the Stop and Shop Supermarket, was seated
behind the driver. Accused Jaime Rejali was beside Glory while their
companion named Jack, who has remained at large, was seated across her.7
When the jeepney reached the dark portion of Aurora Blvd. in San Juan,
Metro Manila, near St. Pauls College, just after the bridge and before
Broadway Centrum, someone announced a hold-up8 Both Mendoza and Rejali
had guns while Jack was armed with a knife. It was Rejali who fired his
gun.9 Jack told the Zulueta sisters that they would bring the sisters along. As
the accused appeared drunk, the sisters ignored them. However, a male
passenger jumped off the jeepney and a commotion ensued.
Perplexed (naguluhan) by this turn of events, the accused held Ramilyn who
started kicking, trying to extricate herself from their grasp. This
prompted Mendoza to hit her on the head with his gun. He boxed and kicked
her, causing Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney into the street where she
rolled. 10
Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. As she struggled, Grace
shouted, bitawan mo ako, bitawan mo ako, in an attempt to call the attention
of the drivers of the other vehicles on the road. One of the accused hit Grace
on the head with a gun causing her to lose consciousness.11 (She finally came
to at the St. Lukes Hospital; she was confined there up to June 7, 1991.12)
While all this was happening, Rejali poked his gun at the other passengers.13
From Glory, the accused were able to get the amount of P30.00. She
handed it to the holdupper seated in front of her. When the commotion took
place, the driver slowed down the jeepney but the holduppers told him to keep
on moving. One of them ordered the driver to proceed to J. Ruiz St. and make
several turns until, when they reached Paterno, the culprits alighted and made
their escape.14
Ramon Zulueta, the father of Grace and Ramilyn, learned about the
incident from his other daughter, Joralyn, who was informed that Grace was at
the St. Lukes Hospital. Grace, who was then a student employed at the Pizza
Hut for P3,000.00 a month, was confined in said hospital from May 30 to June
7, 1991 for head trauma; she had contusions and hematomas on the left
temporal region and on the right occipito-parietal and anterior temporal
regions, and abrasions on the supra orbital area as well as elbow.15 Ramon
Zulueta spent around P 19,000.00 for Graces hospitalization.16
Upon learning from Grace that Ramilyn had been with her, Ramon Zulueta
surmised that she might have been brought to the hospital nearer the place of
the incident, the UERM hospital. When he got there, he learned that Ramilyn,

21 years old and a computer management student, had already died of

severe, traumatic head injuries.17 The Zulueta family spent around P
15,000.00 for her interment.18
Two days after the incident, Ramon Zulueta was informed that the jeepney
driver and his wife had surrendered to the police station inSan Juan. The
following day, he went there but the driver was not around. He gave a
statement to the police.19
By fluke of fate, it was Grace herself who brought about the apprehension
of Mendoza. On the morning of June 12, 1991, Grace sawMendoza selling ice
cream along Altura St. She noticed Mendoza staring at her. When she stared
back, Mendoza lowered his gaze and left immediately. That same afternoon,
she saw him again. Considering her poor eyesight, she was instructed by her
cousin to buy ice cream from Mendoza so that she could get near enough to
be sure if he was indeed one of the holduppers. When she approached and
askedMendoza, Mama, kilala kita?, he could not look her in the eyes and
seemed confused. Certain now that he was one of the holduppers, Grace
announced to her brother and the other people present that Mendoza was one
of the holduppers. Mendoza tried to make a run for it, but the people gave
chase and overtook him.20
Mendoza was brought to the police station where he was identified by
Grace in a line-up.21 Rejali was apprehended that same night by police
operatives. According to SPO1 Dalmacio Luces, Lucia Salinas, the wife of
jeepney driver Virgilio Salinas, described one of the suspects to the NBI
cartographer who came out with a sketch of his face.22 However, Luces failed
to get a statement from Lucia.23
Evidence for the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi as defenses. Both of them admitted
knowing each other as they were working as ice cream vendors at the Ana
Maria Ice Cream Factory in 1045 Balic-balic, Sampaloc, Manila where they
also lodged in rooms provided by their employer. Mendoza, 28 years old,
swore that on that fateful day, he sold ice cream from 8:30 a.m. to about 4:00
p.m. From the factory, he went as far as V. Mapa St., passing under the
bridge near the Stop and Shop Supermarket. By 5:30 in the afternoon, he was
back at the factory. He spent the night of May 29, 1991 in his living quarters at
the factory taking care of his child as his wife was pregnant. 24

For his part, 27-year-old Rejali testified that he also sold ice cream on the
date in question, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., along E. Tuazon St. near Balicbalic. He claimed that he had not gone to San Juan as he did not even know
where San Juan was, being new in the vicinity. Once back in the factory, he
prepared ice cream for sale the next day. Then he rested in his room.25
Myrna Balderama, who also stayed in the living quarters within the same
ice cream factory, corroborated the testimonies of the two accused. According
to her, she saw Mendoza enter the compound in the afternoon of May 29,
1991. From outside her room, she could seeMendozas room; on the night in
question, she saw him taking care of his child. As to Rejali, she knew that he
did not leave the premises that evening as she had a conversation with him
up to 10:00 p.m. while he was preparing ice cream.26
On March 10, 1992, the trial court27 rendered the Decision subject of this
appeal. Its dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both accused ROMEO
MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974) and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of
Ramilyn Zulueta in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), to pay
the sum of P23,673.35 by way of reimbursement of the hospitalization, burial and
other related expenses for Ramilyn Zulueta and the further sum of P30,000.00 by way
of moral and exemplary damages; to pay Glory Oropeo the sum of P30.00 by way of
reparation of the stolen cash money; to pay Ma. Grace Zulueta the sum of P6,400.00
by way of reimbursement of her hospitalization expenses, all without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the service of their sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period
of their preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, appellants fault the trial court for giving credence to the
inconsistent, conflicting and contradictory testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Grace Zulueta and Glory Oropeo and for convicting them of the
crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. 28
Although not directly raised by the appellants, we find, - upon a thorough
scrutiny of the facts - that there is yet another question which is of concern to

the bar and the bench: are the facts attendant to this case constitutive of the
crime of highway robbery with homicide under Pres. Decree No. 532 or of the
felony of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code?
The Courts Ruling
This appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of witnesses. As this
Court has ruled in innumerable cases, the trial court is best equipped to make
the assessment on said issue and therefore, its factual findings are generally
not disturbed on appeal unless the court a quo is perceived to have
overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of
weight, which, if properly considered, would affect the result of the case and
warrant a reversal of the decision involved.29 We do not find in the instant case
any such reason to depart from said general principle. Nevertheless, in the
interest of substantial justice, we shall confront the issues raised herein by the
appellants.
Appellants allege the following inconsistent testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses: (a) Grace testified that it was Rejali who shouted
hold-up, pulled out a gun and fired, in contradiction to Glorys testimony that
the man in front of her, referring to Jack, announced the hold-up, and (b) at
the direct examination, Grace pointed out that she was struck behind her right
ear but during cross-examination, she said that she was hit on the left ear.
The first inconsistency may be attributed to the difference in the relative
positions of Grace and Glory inside the jeepney. Grace was seated near the
rear entrance of the jeepney while Glory was behind the driver. Because
Grace was far from both Jack and Rejali who were seated near Glory, this
could have affected her perception of who announced the hold-up. At any
rate, such disparity in their testimonies does not at all derail the sufficiently
established fact that both appellants herein participated in the hold-up. As
regards the injuries sustained by Grace, the certificate issued by her attending
physician, Dr. Sosepatro Aguila, states that she sustained injuries
on both sides of the head,30 clearly showing no contradictions in her
testimony with respect to where she was hit.
Be that as it may, these inconsistencies or contradictions are minor
ones which do not have any material, bearing on the culpability of the
appellants as they do not in any way refute their positive identification by the
two eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of the hold-up.31On the contrary, they
reflect the truthfulness of the testimonies of Grace and Glory. As this Court
said in People vs. Retuta:32

The discrepancy signifies that the two witnesses did not deliberately pervert the truth
in their narrations. The discordance in their testimonies on minor matters heightens
their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed
(People v. Doria, 55 SCRA 425). As this Honorable Court held in People v. Agudu,
137 SCRA 516 to wit:
However, the variance, if any, is on a minor detail which would not destroy the
effectiveness of their testimony. We cannot expect absolute uniformity in every detail
because witnesses react differently to what they see and hear, depending upon their
situation and state of mind. Complete uniformity in details is a badge of
untruthfulness. The light contradictions, on the other hand, strengthens the sincerity of
the testimony of the witnesses.
Thus, far from evidence of falsehood, the minor inconsistency between the
testimonies could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of their good faith.
The strongest part of the defense arguments concerns the identification of
the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime considering the lighting
condition inside the jeepney. Appellants believed that they could not have
been recognized because both Grace and Glory admitted that the place was
dark, and so surmised that it would have been darker inside the jeepney
because the eyewitnesses failed to point out the source of light
therein.33 However, in trying to prove their allegation, appellants unwittingly
brought out details via Graces testimony which demolish their surmise. Thus:
Q. Despite the darkness, you were able to identify the gun?
A.

I did not say it was completely dark. I said in the jeepney it was quite lighted. I
said it was dark outside but in the jeepney, it was quite lighted.34 (Italics supplied.)

It seems, moreover, that appellants only quoted portions of the testimonies

of Grace and Glory to suit their purpose. Had the appellants been candid
enough, they would have retained portions of the same testimonies
evidencing that it was the place where the jeepney was passing through that
was dark but, inside the jeepney, it was medium light. Grace had testified on
cross-examination as follows:
Q. Will you mention again the exact location of the alleged incident?
A.

I am not familiar with the streets, sir. It was after a bridge. After UERM, sir.

Q. What was the condition of the place at that time?

A.

It was moderately dark. Quite lighted. Medium.

Q. How about inside the passenger jeepney? Was it lighted?

A.

Medium, sir. Since it was dark, you cannot have a complete light there.

Q. It was quite dark?

A.

Yes, sir.35

For her part, Glory testified on cross-examination in this wise:

Q. Madam witness, will you mention again the exact location where you said you
were allegedly held up?
A.

San Juan, H. Lozada and J. Ruiz St., sir.

Q. What was the condition of that place at that time?

A.

It was dark because it was already nighttime.

Q. You mean the exact place where you were held-up is a dark place?
A Yes, sir.36 (Italics supplied.)

Visibility is an important factor in the identification of a criminal offender.

However, its relative weight and significance depends largely on the attending
circumstances and the discretion of the trial court.37 Another overriding
consideration is the fact that the most natural reaction of victims of violence is
to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrator of the crime and observe the
manner in which the crime was being committed.38
In the case before us, Graces unrebutted testimony is that the jeepney
was quite lighted x x x medium. Even granting that the light was dim as most
jeepneys have colored or low-wattage bulbs for the passenger area, the
added illumination from the headlights of passing vehicles traveling the
busy Aurora Boulevard would have been sufficient to permit positive
identification of the appellants.39 Moreover, identification of the appellants as
the hold-uppers was facilitated by their physical proximity to the said
eyewitnesses. Grace was seated beside appellant Mendoza while Glory was
beside Rejali. That Grace had poor eyesight does not affect her positive
identification ofMendoza because she was wearing her eyeglasses when the
hold-up took place.40 As stated above, because they were victims of violence,
both Grace and Glory must have had the appellants features indelibly
imprinted in their minds.
In light of the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime, their alibis are worthless.41 Moreover, the defense failed to meet the
requisites for alibi to be considered as a valid defense. It is not enough that
the appellants were somewhere else when the crime transpired. They must
likewise duly establish that they were so far away that it was not physically
possible for them to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at
or
about
the
time
of
its
commission.42 Balic-balic
in
Sampaloc, Manila and Aurora Boulevard inSan Juan, Metro Manila are not

very distant from each other considering the numerous public transportation
facilities plying between said places.
But, while there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to lay culpability on the
appellants for the killing of Ma. Ramilyn Zulueta, the physical injuries
sustained by her sister Grace and the asportation of Glory Oropeos thirty
pesos, we do not agree with the trial court that the crime committed by
appellants is covered by P.D. No. 532.
In its Decision, the trial court curtly said:
The Court finds all the elements of the offense charged, namely, intent to gain,
unlawful taking of property of another, (the P30.00 of Glory Oropeo) violence against
or intimidation of any person, on a Philippine Highway and death of Ramilyn Zulueta
and physical injuries upon Ma. Grace Zulueta, (Section 2, par. 3 and Section 3, par. b,
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, Pres. Decree No. 532) have
been duly proved in the instant case.
Highway Robbery or Robbery with Homicide?
Conviction under P.D. No. 532 requires not only the above elements
mentioned by the court a quo. Highway robbery or brigandage is defined by
Section 2 of said decree as follows:
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. - The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion
or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway.
In People vs. Puno,43 this Court, speaking through the learned Mr. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, explained the purpose of brigandage as follows:
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If
the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band
if there are at least four armed participants. (citing U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422
[1904]) x x x
x x x Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only
acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons
on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against
only a predetermined or particular victim, x x x

Consistent with the above, to obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution should have proven that the accused, in the instant case, were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There,
however, was a total absence of such proof. There was also no evidence of
any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused - to show the
indiscriminate commission thereof.
Incidentally, it would be relevant to add that the number of perpetrators is
no longer an essential element of the crime of brigandage as defined by P.D.
No. 532. Mr. Justice Regalado explained this in Puno:
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307
of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability
to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice
to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require
that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the
presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms
no longer obtains under the decree. x x x44
Under the old doctrine, brigandage was committed by a cuadrilla45 or by
more than three armed persons per the definition of brigands in Article 306
of the Revised Penal Code.46
Even before the Puno holding, however, there had been cases47 where
less than four offenders were held guilty of highway robbery under P.D. No.
532, which just strengthens the view that the number of offenders is not an
essential element in the crime of highway robbery. 48
It is possible that since Aurora Boulevard is a highway within the purview
of P.D. No 532,49 the prosecutors deemed it proper to charge appellants with
violation of said decree. In this regard, the Puno ruling is enlightening. This
Court held:
x x x (i)t would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of
property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary
rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the
elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but
skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in
favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be far-

fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive
criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we
apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the
desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts.
For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gunpoint by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of
the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one where the
subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being
herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the
accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the
explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?50
Hence, in charging a crime under P.D. No. 532, it is important to consider
whether or not the very purpose for which the law was promulgated has been
transgressed. Citing the whereas clauses of P. D. No. 53251 in Puno, the
Court said:
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular
person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another, and which single act of depredation would be capable of stunting the
economic and social progress of the people as to be considered among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries, and would
accordingly constitute an obstacle to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people, such that said isolated act would constitute the
highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would
be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.52
Petty robbery in public transport vehicles (with or without personal
violence and death) committed against the middle and lower economic
classes of society is as reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale
robbery committed against the economically well-heeled. Nonetheless, the
law must be interpreted not only to bring forth its aim and spirit but also in light
of the basic principle that all doubts are to be resolved liberally in favor of the
accused. As such, appellants may not be held liable under P.D. No. 532 but
only under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the designation
but the description of the offense charged.53 Considering the allegations of the
aforequoted Information, appellants herein should be liable for the special

complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, robbery having been duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the
asportation of thirty pesos from Glory Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn
Zuluetas death was accidental because it was produced by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.54 The physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta
during the commission of the crime are absorbed in the crime of robbery with
homicide.55
Conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of the appellants
and their companion56 of depriving Glory of her money and injuring both
Ramilyn and Grace which resulted in Ramilyns accidental death. Since both
appellants took part in the robbery, they shall be liable for the complex crime
of robbery with homicide in the absence of proof that they endeavored to
prevent the accidental killing of Ramilyn.57 In view of the prohibition against the
imposition of the death penalty when the crime was committed, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was then the single and indivisible penalty for robbery
with homicide. It shall be imposed on each of the appellants regardless of the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime.58
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila (Branch 156) in Crim. Case No. 87218 is hereby MODIFIED.
Appellants Romeo Mendoza y Reyes and Jaime Rejali y Lina are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide and accordingly, each of them is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The other portions of the trial courts
decision, including the monetary awards imposed against them, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.