Eladle 1

Kaytlin Eladle
GSS 3174
March 9th, 2014
Section 1
Introduction
From 1992 to 1999, the country of Egypt experienced a violent increase in domestic
terrorist attacks. This increase in violence was the result of a jihadist campaign by Al-Gamaa
Al-Islamiyya. This organization which started as a prideful, religiously based student union soon became a dangerous enemy of the secular government and an injury to the Egyptian
economy. This paper will address the whole subject of the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya/ Egyptian
Arab Republic conflict.
Section 2
Parties to Conflict
Parties of conflict involved in the terrorist attacks in Egypt from February 29th, 1992 to
September 6th, 1999 include two prominent groups, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya, better known as
IG, and groups of armed civilians. The two groups mainly clashed over their conflicting views of
appropriate leadership for the country of Egypt. The groups of armed civilians and villagers
lashing out against Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya are groups with little overall organization. Unlike
the IG, these small groups of citizens lack the militant-like coordination and operation standards.
To put it simply, these are batches of concerned citizens who are angered by the injury caused by
Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya and respond by bringing their own attacks against the IG.
According to author Holly Fletcher, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya (IG), is a radical group
that seeks to instill an Islamic regime in place of the secular Egyptian government (2008). The
group often recruited from poor urban neighborhoods and rural areas (Kepel, 1985, p.149). IG
emerged as a major combating arm of the international organization the Muslim Brotherhood, in

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the 1970s. The Brotherhood, up until this time, had been incredibly active in pursuing its own
hostile attacks against the secular government of Egypt. The culmination of these hostilities
occurred in the year of 1954, when the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Gamal Abdel
Nasser, the first president of Egypt following King Farouks abdication in 1952. This
assassination attempt faced widespread national backlash, as Abdel Nasser was deeply admired
by his electorate, and resulted in the imprisonment of many suspected members and heads of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Abdel Nasser and the secular government placed a ban on the Muslim
Brotherhoods participation in Egypts political arena.
Sayyid Qutb, the Chief of Ideologue for the Brotherhood, was jailed for fifteen years by
Nassers ban and executed in 1966 for organizing the assassination attempt. From prison, Qutb
wrote jihadist literature which is often cited for creating the ideological underpinnings for Hamas
and Al-Qaeda. (Fletcher, 2014) Following Nassers ban on the Brotherhood, a sort of power
vacuum ensued. With no outlet for the religious right-wing but fuel for their fire provided by the
Brotherhoods Sayyid Qutb, the IG began to form alongside, and later begin to absorb, jihadist
groups such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Kepel, 1985, p.185). Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
formally invited the Muslim Brotherhood back into the political arena following Gamal Abdel
Nassers death in the 1970s, and until present day Brotherhood members have been sporadically
imprisoned by the Egyptian government (I.d., 2000). Despite Sadats recognition of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the IG and the Brotherhood began to become increasingly anti-Sadat in opposition
to what they called a shameful peace with the Jews following Camp David agreements (I.d.,
1985, p.148). In 1981, the IG assassinated President Anwar Sadat in the wake of his crackdown
on the Brotherhood and the IG for inciting violence against Egypts Coptic Christians. In the
1990s, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya conducted a full campaign against Egypts secular government.

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Lead-Up to Instability
The period of time leading up to the instability was pocked with assassination,
appeasement, and tumult. Even though Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyyas beginnings reaches back into
the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, the IG did not experience rapid expansion until the late
1970s. Nearly a two before their violent campaign in the 1990s, the IG was widely considered
to be a militant student group isolated mainly to college campuses (I.d., 1985, p.129). Gilles
Kepel states that, the group was primarily students [mostly] leftist Nasserists and
Marxists [who] were strongly critical of the new Sadat government, and urged Egypt to fight a
war of revenge against Israel (1985, p.132). By 1977, [IG] was in complete control of the
universities (I.d., 2005, p.129). Agreements made between Israel and Egypt during the Camp
David Accords in 1978 only further angered Egyptian radicals who held tightly to their
nationalistic pride, and felt that President Sadat was taking orders from the United States (I.d.,
1985, 156-166).
The turn of the decade in 1980 was marked by increasing IG violence. Despite Anwar
Sadat enacting a law that handed control of the universities back over to professors and
administrators, Islamists began to saturate the facilities like Asyut University which became the
poster child for non-coed classes, hijab campus policies, and decreasing female enrollment
(Metz, 1991). Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya, now having complete control over most Egyptian
universities, began to enforce their rules by beating those who dared to disobey (Kepel, 1985,
p.151). June 1981, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya began inciting violence against Coptic Christians
claiming that Christian officials provided weapons to Copts for use against Muslims (I.d., 1985,
p.156-166). Ultimately, Copts and Muslims clashed Gilles Kepel illustrates, Men and women
were slaughtered; babies thrown from windows, their bodies crushed on the pavement below;

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there was looting, killing, and arson (1985, p.166). In September, the Egyptians governments
response was to ban the formation of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya cells and arrest group leaders
(I.d., 1985, p.129). In October, the IG assassinated President Sadat in Cairo at the nations annual
Suez Canal victory parade. Seizures of ammunition were in effect at the event so there was to be
no live ammo during the demonstrations for the parade. As the Egyptian Air Force performed a
display above, Army soldiers and troop trucks paraded below. One of the troop trucks hid inside
it the Sadat assassination squad led by Lt. Khalid Islambouli. When Anwar Sadat stood to
receive his salute, Lt. Islambouli threw three grenades towards Sadat - one of which exploded.
Directly after the grenades, the assassination team emerged from the Army truck and began
firing into the crowd around Sadat. President Sadat was taken to a hospital and was operated on
but the damage was too far gone and Sadat died October 6th, 1981. It seems as though the
attention brought on by President Sadats assassination was enough to quell the IGs violence,
but little less than a decade later the group resumed their campaign of violence.
Section 3
Events During Instability
Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya had been considered a radical student organization centered
around mosques and college campuses. Following the assassination of President Sadat the IG
became more organized. By the late 1980s the group had adopted an official motto addressing
the subject jihad and designed a logo very similar to that of its big brother the Muslim
Brotherhood. (Murphy, 2002, p.65) The 1990s brought about a new campaign of violence by
Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya. In their new campaign, the IG targeted influential writers, intellectuals,
and began to attack foreigners and tourists (Kepel, 2002). The three most notable attacks
organized by Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya during their 1990s campaign were: the massacre at
Luxor in 1997, the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak in 1995, and the assassination of

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Farag Foda in 1992.

Farag Foda was an influential professor, author, and human rights activist based in Cairo,
Egypt. Foda was known for his articles and satirical works about Islamic fundamentalism. The
professor often argued that his articles defended Islam against distortion by radicals (Soage,
2007, p.26-33). In the weeks before his assassination, Foda had poked fun at Muslim preachers
comments about sex in paradise in which one man had stated, ...Muslims who enter paradise
would enjoy eternal erections and the company of young boys draped in earrings and necklaces
(Miller, 1997, p.25-26). June 8th, 1992, Foda was shot dead outside his office by two
fundamentalists. Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya claimed responsibility for the assassination, citing a
fatwa (decree) that labeled Farag Foda an enemy of Islam. (de Wal, 2004, p.60)
In June 1995, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak traveled to Ethiopia for a conference of
the Organization of African Unity. Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya joined forced with Egyptian Islamic
Jihad and Sudanese intelligence to make an assassination attempt on the presidents life. The
orchestrator of the assassination was Mustafa Hamza, a senior member of Al-Qaeda and
commander of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya. Planning the attack for more than a year, the assassins
lived and married in Sudan and received their smuggled weapons from Sudanese intelligence
services. (Sageman, 2004, p.45) Fortunately for President Hosni Mubarak, the attack was foiled.
On November 17th, 1997 six gunmen entered the Temple of Hatshepsut, a popular tourist
attraction located in upper Egypt at Luxor. Before entering the temple, the men killed two guards
outside. Fifty-eight people were trapped inside the temple. The armed men systematically killed
every person inside the temple for approximately forty-five minutes. Using firearms and knives,
the men disemboweled and mutilated the bodies of their victims. The gunmen left a note praising
Islam inside one of the disemboweled bodies. (Napoli, 1998, p.47-48) The six men then left the

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temple and hijacked a bus which they used to crash into a tourist police checkpoint and military
forces. Afterward losing a comrade in the ensuing shootout, the remaining five men fled into the
hills where they committed suicide in a cave together (Wright, 2006, p.258).
End to the Instability & Current Status
Holly Fletcher, writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, states that the Al-Gamaa
Al-Islamiyyas campaign in the 1990s specifically targeting tourist put the group on the fringe
of society as the country began to suffer economically from a decrease in tourism (2008). The
BBC reported that analysts estimated that the incident in Luxor cost Egypt 50% of its $3.7
billion revenue in 1998 (2001). Fletcher adds, that it took two years for tourism to rebound to
the pre-Luxor attack numbers (2008). Incidentally, the IG was not only injuring its political and
religious opponents, but also its own members whose livelihoods were now being affected by
the decrease in tourism post-Luxor.
July 1997 saw the cooperation of the secular Egyptian government and Al-Gamaa AlIslamiyya. An Islamic lawyer, Montassir Al-Zayat, helped to negotiate a cease fire between the
Egyptian government and the IG. The following year, the government released two thousand
jailed members of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya. At this point the IG split into two factions: the one
faction, lead by Mustafa Hamza, agreed to the ceasefire; the other faction, led by Rifai Taha
Musa, refused to halt their militant operations. The year after the ceasefire, Taha Musa signed
Osama bin Ladens fatwa of violence against the United States and a year later he went missing.
In 2006, an associate of bin Laden announced that Musas faction of the IG had merged with
Al-Qaeda. (I.d., 2008) In the following section, this paper will explore the quantitative aspects
of the terrorist incidents in Egypt with Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya with the visual aid of graphs.
Section 4
Incidents Over Time

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The number of terrorist incidents that occurred in Egypt from the period of February
29th, 1992 to September 6th, 1999 was 401. The peak year of terrorist activity was 1994. The
lowest year of terrorist activity was 1999. The interesting this about the number of terrorist
incidents is that they peak in 1993, drop steadily with some delaying in 1995 and stopping at the
lowest in 1999.

Incidents by Attack Type

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From 1992 to 1993 there was one Unarmed Assault and one Hijacking; in this time
period there was also 21 Bombing/Explosion incidents, 166 Assassinations, 173 Armed Assaults,
and 32 Facility/Infrastructure Attacks. Armed Assault was the highest occurring terrorist attack
type at 173 incidents. Assassination was the second highest occurring terrorist attack type with a
close 166 incidents. Facility/Infrastructure Attacks were the third most common terrorist attack
type with 32 incidents. Hijackings and Unarmed Assaults tied for the least common terrorist
attack type. Technically unknown attack types cannot be determined from available information,
we will skip over its number of seven incidents. The second lowest occurring attack type was
Bombings/Explosions with 21 incidents.

Incidents by Target Type

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From 1992 to 1999 the majority of the target types were Police with 236 target incidents.
There was also 55 Business, 52 Private Citizens & Property, 17 Transportation, 14 Tourist. six
Terrorists, three Maritime, two Journalists, two Educational Institutions, one Airport/Aircraft,
and one Other target incidents. The most popular target type was the Police with 236 incidents.
The second most popular target type was Businesses with 55 incidents. The third most popular
target type wa Private Citizen and property at 52 incidents. The lowest target type was
Airport/Aircraft and Other tied for one incident. The second lowest target type was Journalists
and Educational Institutions tied for two incidents. The third lowest target type was Maritime
targets with three incidents. Transportation and Tourist Incidents were in the middle with 17 and
14 respectively.
Section 5
Conclusion
In conclusion, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya is a great example of how quickly a lingering
domestic issue can rear its head and cause severe loss, and even economic damage. This incident
ultimately boiled down to the political question of which direction is best for Egypt and its
people. Is it a government instilled with the beliefs of the religious majority? To accompany their

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needs and their way of life? Or is the right direction for Egypt to try and provide equally for all
its people religiously and socially? Its funny because nearly two decades later were asking the
same question.

Works Cited
de Wal, Alex. (2004). Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. C.Hurst & Co. p.
60.
Fletcher, Holly. ( 2008, May 30th). Jamaat al-Islamiyya. Council on Foreign Relations.

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Retreived from: http://www.cfr.org/egypt/jamaat-al-islamiyya/p9156#.

(2014, January 15th). Egypts Muslim Brotherhood. Council on Foreign
Relations. Retrieved from: http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991.
Kepel, Gillies. (1985). Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and The Pharaoh.
University of California Press. p. 149, 132, 151, 185, 166.
(2002). Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam. Harvard University Press.
Metz, Helen Chapin. (1991). Egypt: A Country Study. Library of Congress.
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Murphy, Caryle. (2002). Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: the
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Napoli, James J. (1998). Egyptian Government Continues to Blame West for Ils After
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Sageman, Marc. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. University of Pennsylvania
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Soage, Ana Belen. (2007). Faraj Fawda, or the Cost of Freedom of Expression. Middle
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A. Knopf (US). p. 258.