ONG

CHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having
failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of
C.A. No. 473, 7 and to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he
failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that
since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it
had been fully published, with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance
with 7.

1. there should be more than one circumstance;

2. the facts from which the inference are derived are proven
and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the following are the guidelines in appreciating
circumstantial evidence:
1. it should be acted upon with caution;
2. all the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt;
3. the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and
4. the facts must establish such certainty of guilt as to
convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused is the one who committed the offense.
Measured against these guidelines, the conviction cannot
stand for the following reasons:
1. the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw
accused fleeing from the crime scene is doubtful;
2. the gun surrendered by the accused does not appear to
be the same gun presented during trial;
3. if the gun is not the same, it is uncertain where the slug
taken from the head of the victim came from;
4. the dying declaration which mentioned only the "Adors"
can refer to anyone with that family name; and
5. scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a
paraffin test is not conclusive.
Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused
committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt
of the accused was not established with moral certainty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its
appelants brief without having been presented and formally
offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of of the
Trial Courts decision.

HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition
was denied.

RATIO:
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization

cases

defeat

petitioners

argument

of

substantial compliance with the requirement under the

Revised Naturalization Law.

[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of

evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the
opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to
object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State.

People v. Ador 432 SCRA 1

People v. Ador
432 SCRA 1
June 14, 2004
Second Division: Puno, J.
Facts:
In convicting accused of murder, the trial court relied on the
circumstances, namely:
1. that he was seen fleeing from the crime scene,
2. that he allegedly surrendered a handgun,
3. that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fired
from the gun he surrendered,
4. that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him,
and
5. that paraffin test showed that he was positive for gun
powder.
Issue:
Is the conviction proper?
Held:
No. For circumstantial evidence to suffice,

All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial

court, we cannot rest easy in convicting the two (2) accused
based on circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the
said circumstantial evidence presented do not inexorably
lead to the conclusion that they are guilty.[83] The prosecution
witness failed to identify the accused in court. A cloud of
doubt continues to hover over the gun used and the slug
recovered. The dying declaration and paraffin examination
remain unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled admissions
including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence. And,
the supposed motive of the accused is simply
insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the inference that
the
accused
committed
the
crime
were
not
proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot be
established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when
evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is
much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case
and not on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction
must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.[84]
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been
reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and speculations. It
is hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can
never be the basis of conviction in a criminal case.[85] Courts
must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly
on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of
passion and prejudice.[86] If the alleged inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence is not adequate to support conviction. [87] The court
must acquit the accused because the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to
support a judgment of conviction.[88] Conviction must rest on
nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the
accused.[89] The overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [90] It is thus
apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt
the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of
innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. Accordingly,
we have to acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases Nos. 976815 and 97-6816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accusedappellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder and
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and their IMMEDIATE
RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are being held
for some other legal cause.

Domingcil

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally

convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Manny
Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The quantity of marijuana involved is more than 750 grams;
hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided for in Sec.
4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay the costs.
Hence, the present appeal.

All told, the presumption of regularity in the

performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by
evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is
bolstered by the fact that the prosecutions evidence fully
shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there
exists no cogent reason to reverse or even modify the
findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of
the prosecution.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch
16, in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.

not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative,

corroborative or impeaching.
As additional support to their motion for new trial,
petitioners also claim that they were denied due process
because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by
counsel. We are not persuaded. The records will bear out
that petitioners were ably represented by Atty. Rodolfo U.
Jimenez during the trial and when the case was elevated to
this Court. An experienced lawyer in criminal cases, Atty.
Jimenez vigorously defended the petitioners cause
throughout the entire proceedings. The records show that
the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses
and exhibits during the trial. After the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision, Atty. Jimenez filed a petition for review
with this Court, invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit
the petitioners. When the Court denied the petition for
review, he again filed a motion for reconsideration
exhausting his deep reservoir of legal talent. We therefore
find
petitioners
claim
to
be
unblushingly
unsubstantiated. We note that they did not allege any
specific facts in their present motion to show that Atty.
Jimenez had been remiss in his duties as counsel.
Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of
their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The
general rule is that the client is bound by the action of his
counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to
complain that the result of the litigation might have been
different had his counsel proceeded differently.[26] We held
in People vs. Umali:[27]

Custodio vs Sandigangbayan

Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the re-opening of

the case:
Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not
available during the second trial of the above-entitled cases which
could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan,
specifically:
A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false
forensic claims that led to the unjust conviction of the
petitioners-movants.
B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr.
II
There was a grave violation of due process by reason
of:
A)

Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;

B)

Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;

C)

Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress;

D)

Willful suppression of evidence;

In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that

the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made in the
conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result of the
ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not
furnish a ground for a new trial.
If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases,
there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could
be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.
So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency
of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or
immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the
burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial; and in
general the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the
conduct of his case, and can not be heard to complain that the
result of the litigation might have been different had counsel
proceeded differently. (citations omitted)
Finally, we are not moved by petitioners assertion that
the forensic evidence may have been manipulated and
misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners
did not allege concrete facts to support their crass
claim. Hence, we find the same to be unfounded and purely
speculative.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.

E)

Use of false forensic evidence that led to the

unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants.
III

There was serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the

Sandiganbayan based on false forensic evidence, which entitles
petitioners-movants to a re-trial.[6

The Sandiganbayan, however, did not give weight to

their account as it found the testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona more
credible. Quijano and Barcelona testified that they saw the
soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway aim and fire a
gun on the latters nape. As earlier quoted, the
Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more
consistent with the physical evidence. SPO4 Cantimbuhans
testimony will not in any way alter the courts decision in
view of the eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona,
taken together with the physical evidence presented during
the trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the
new evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted.[25] Also, new trial will

SO ORDERED.

Ppl vs Domingcil
Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the
appellant. He assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the
poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos, SPO2 Warlito
Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto
Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie Agustin, all assigned at the
Investigation Section of the Laoag Police Station as backup. The marked buy-money consisting of one P500-bill
bearing Serial No. G-242745 was recorded in the police
blotter in accordance with standard operating procedure.[4
All told, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by
evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is
bolstered by the fact that the prosecutions evidence fully
shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there
exists no cogent reason to reverse or even modify the
findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of
the prosecution.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch
16, in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.