(12) JEAN ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,

versus
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prison, respondent-appellant
GR No. L-6749, July 30, 1965

legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness

should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming
within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority
is not subject to judicial interference.

FACT:

3.
The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or
authority must be distinguished from the judicial process wherein
offenders are brought to the courts of justice for punishment that criminal
law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative
authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former
is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the
latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal
law.

Petitioner-appellee was the attorney-in-fact of Ernest Burt in

the negotiation for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The Senate Special
Committee conducted an investigation to determine whether the
purchase was honest and valid, and whether the price paid was fair and
just. In the investigation conducted, petitioner was asked to whom a part
of the purchase price was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer the
question. The Senate ordered for the imprisonment of petitioner for the
offense of contempt. Despite numerous opportunities offered to the
petitioner, he continued to refuse to reveal the person to whom he
delivered the money and failed to answer pertinent questions relative to
the estate deal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish a
contumacious witness if he committed an offense of contempt against
the legislative body?
HELD:
Yes, it is held that the power to punish for contempt is within
the exercise of its legislative power. The power to punish is founded upon
reason and policy. It is considered to be implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power and is necessary to carry out legislative
functions. Thus, the Senate is allowed, under its coercive power and not
its punitive power, to obtain the disclosure of such knowledge and
information necessary to provide legislative body a basis for its legislation.

****Arnault v Baltazar G.R. No. L-6749 Digest

G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955
Topic: Legislative power
Facts:
1.
The controversy arose out of the Government's purchase of 2
estates, the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates. Petitioner was the
attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase
which was effected. The price paid for both estates was P5, 000,000.
2.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special
Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and whether the
price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation,
petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440, 000,
was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the
Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered
his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines
Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate
or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the
P440, 000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. Petitioner filed
a habeas corpus proceeding.
3.
CFI ruled that the continued detention and confinement of
petitioner pursuant to a Senate Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and that the
Senate committed a clear abuse of discretion in not considering his
answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the
sum of P440,000 was made. Further, on the ground that that petitioner,
by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is consequently
entitled to be released and discharged.
ISSUE: W/N the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt
YES
1.
The Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses. This is implied or incidental or necessary to the
exercise of legislative power. The 1987 Constitution adopted the principle
of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm
of its respective authority; it must have intended each department's
authority to be full and complete, independent of the other's authority
and power.

ISSUE 2: W/N petitioner has already purged himself of contempt

4.
No. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as the person to
whom delivery of the sum of P440, 000 was made. However, the Senate
Committee refused to believe that this is the real name of the person
whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore,
held that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or
reiterated it.
5.
Finally, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued
confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and thereby interfere in
the exercise of the legislative discretion.
***********************************
(18) SALVADOR A. ARANETA, et al, petitioners,
-versusTHE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, et al, respondents
GR Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957
FACTS:
San Miguel is one of the most important fishing area in the
Pacific Sea in Bicol Region. Trawl operators migrated to this region for the
purpose of fishing. The use trawl as fishing devise caused the depletion of
marine resources of the area. Executive orders nos. 22, 66, and 80 were
issued banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel bay. Trawl operators
filed a complaint questioning the validity of the said executive orders
and praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries
from enforcing the executive orders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Orders nos. 22, 66 and 80 banning
the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay issued by the President of the
Philippines were valid and issued in accordance with law.
HELD:
Yes, Executive Orders nos. 22, 66, and 80 restricting and
banning operations of trawl fishing were valid and come in accordance
with the law. Agriculture and Natural Resources is one of the executive
departments placed under the direction and supervision of the
Secretary, wherein under the Fisheries Law, is authorized to promulgate
rules and restrictions on the use of net or fishing device for the protection
of aquatic resources in the land. The Secretary exercises his function
subject to the general direction and control of the President, who is
authorize upon recommendation of the respective department to issue
executive orders, decrees and proclamations relative to the supervision
of the department. The express authority of the President to issue
promulgations is assigned by the Constitution and the Revised
Administrative Code. Hence, such executive orders were in consonance
and strict conformity with the law.
****Araneta v Gatmaitan
Facts:
The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel
Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for
the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal
towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger
of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of
Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said
E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.

2.
Provided that contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative
power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the

Page 1 of 16

Issue:
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.
Held:
VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to
take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes
Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions
as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves
it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing
but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose
of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity
with law.
Distinction bet:
Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law shall
be
Execution of Law authority or discretion as to its execution has to be
exercised under and in pursuance of law.
***********************************************
(27) JOSE AVELINO, petitioner
-versusMARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent
GR No. L-2821, March 4, 1949
FACTS:
Senator Tanada requested for a privilege speech in the
Senate session to formulate charges against petitioner, the then
President of the Senate. His request was approved. During the session
presided by the petitioner, he and his partisans make use of dilatory
tactics to prevent Senator Tanada from delivering his privilege speech.
Because of obvious premeditated plan of the petitioner to muzzle
Senator Tanada, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate
gallery. Petitioner and his followers walked out of the session. Thereafter,
Resolution no. 67 declared vacant the position of the President of the
Senate and designated Senator Cuenco as the acting Senate President.
He took his oath. Petitioner filed a quo warranto proceedings before the
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the quo
warranto proceedings filed by the petitioner.
HELD:
No, in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional
grant to the Senate the power to elect its own president, the judiciary
cannot interfere with such power. The selection of officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them. Hence, if majority of the senators want
petitioner to preside, the remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall and not in
the Supreme Court.

****83 Phil. 17 Political Law The Legislative Department Election of

Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his right to speak
onthe senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb.
21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the
opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by
Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino
was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated
all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his
piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by
Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among
others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn
the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they
requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just
banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately
followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked
that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon
Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized to

deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68)
that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously
approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines
the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino
then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as
the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take
cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not
be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply
to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme
Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the
resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a
continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators
(Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco
et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the
resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital
while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning
session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was
there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced
by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators
considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding
Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of
twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean
all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the
House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of
the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest
of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested,
there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would
have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for
Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take
cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to
the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends
that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected
president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one
being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the
number of senators nor does it change the majority which if
mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13
NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected
unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction
over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its
intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys
pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in
that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the
evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos
election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue
from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by
issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but
to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all
avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that
the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial
justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco
has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is
dismissed.

Page 2 of 16

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of
all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do
business and the fact that said provision was amended in the
Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers
of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or
provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents,
and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from
the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance
of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process
which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment
was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or
for considering the use of the words of all the members as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the
original Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended
by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore,
as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session
of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted
a majority.
****************************************************
(33) BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and
JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the Philippines, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34676, April 30, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner served as congressman for three consecutive terms. During his
second term, R.A. 4134 was enacted fixing the salaries of constitutional
officials of the national government. The salaries of the members of
Congress, senators and congressman, were increased under the said Act
from P7,200 to P32,000 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increase shall take effect after the full term of all members of the
Congress that approved it have expired. After losing in his fourth
consecutive term, he filed a claim for retirement. House of
Representatives issued treasury warrant based on the increased salary of
P32,000 but was disallowed by the Congress Auditor. Hence, petitioner
filed a petition for review of the adverse decision of the Auditor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled for retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of salary increase of P32,000 per annum for members of
Congress under R.A. 4134.
HELD:
No, petitioner is not entitled to retirement gratuity base on the increased
salary of P32,000 provided for the members of Congress under R.A. 4134.
The provision of the said law expressly states that such increase would
become operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members
of Congress when the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved the increase, such as the petitioner, will have expired.
Hence, to grant petitioner retirement gratuity based on the increased
salary would effectively give him the benefits of increased compensation
to which he was not entitled during his term, thereby violating the
constitutional prohibition against increased compensation of legislators
during their term of office.

****56 SCRA 823 Political Law Salaries of Representatives Retirement

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of
the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms
covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of
the national government was enacted into law and took effect on July
1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressmen) were increased under said Act fromP7,200.00
to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said
increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.

Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim

for retirementunder Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as
amended
by
Republic
Act
No.
4968
which
provided
for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective,
with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of
which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of
employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected
officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. The House of
Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then
Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General
then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his
incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative
only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the
time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as
provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per
annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing
his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly
what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as
far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of
office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason
that
a retirement gratuity
or
benefit
is
a
form
of compensationwithin the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting
their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided
by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during
their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in
the similar case of Ligots colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson,
Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to
the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do
indirectly what cannot be done directly.
*****************************************
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, et al, petitioners
-versusHON. SIXTO T.J. DE GUZMAN, JR., Asso. Comm. of the SEC, et al,
respondents
GR No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
FACT:
An election of Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation, a
private corporation, was held. After which, two groups were created
namely, the Puyat Group and the Acero Group. The Acero Group
instituted a quo warranto proceedings before the SEC questioning the
election on the contention that the stockholders votes were not
properly counted. Assembly Fernandez entered as counsel for the Acero
group to which the Puyat group objected on Constitutional prohibition
under Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. As a result, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance. Later, he purchased shares
from IPI and filed a Motion for Intervention in the SEC case alleging legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on
the basis of Assemblyman Fernandez ownership of shares. Hence, the
instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
case as a stockholder of IPI will constitute contravention of the provision
under Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC case falls within
the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The provision prohibits any member of the Batasang
Pambansa to appear as counsel before any administrative body.
Although he would be appearing as owner to protect his shares and not
as a counsel, it has been held that his appearance before the SEC, an
administrative body, would constitute an indirect appearance as

Page 3 of 16

counsel before an administrative body which will enable him to

participate actively in the proceedings. Hence, the intervention is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
****113 SCRA 31 Political Law The Legislative Department
Appearance in Court
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of
the International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently
questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes
were not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto case before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to
Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a
member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the
parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone)
before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared,
Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He
instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for
him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and
as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez
leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can
appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional
provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such
courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the
guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a
stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is
still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation
took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution
he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a
workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to
get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
***************************************
(42) MABANAG VS LOPEZ-VITO
78 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators
were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House
except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the
required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been
considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were
already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they
allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution
amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot
take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the
journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already
stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found
in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did
not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if
one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule
of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and
rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in

conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted

between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater
weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by
both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by
Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . .
. (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives
body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress,
by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or
printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
*******************************
(48) SUANES VS CHIEF OF ACCOUNTANT
The Secretary of the Senate, with the approval of the President of the
Senate issued to petitioner Suanes an appointment as Secretary to
Senator Ramon Diokno with compensation at the rate of P200 per
month
Secretary to Senator Diokno member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
the Chairman of said Tribunal issued an appointment to petitioner as
Secretary to Senator Ramon Diokno, member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, with compensation at the rate of P3,600 per annum, the
appointment
to
take
effect
July
1,
1948.
petitioner
Suanes
presented
for
payment
to
respondents, a general voucher certified by the Secretary of the Senate
Electoral Tribunalat the rate of P300 per month. The respondents refused
to honor said voucher and alleged that they were authorized to pay
petitioner Suanes only the salary fixed in the appointment issued by the
Secretary of the Senate and approved by the President of the Senate,
namely,
at
the
rate
of
P200
per
month.
which of the two appointment should prevail, whether the appointment
issued by the President of the Senate or that issued by the Chairman of
the
Electoral
Tribunal.
the Electoral Tribunals are independent constitutional creations with
specific
powers
and
functions
the employees of an Electoral Tribunal are its own, and not of the Senate
nor of the House of Representatives nor of any other entity, and it stands
to reason that the appointment, the supervision and the control over
said employees rest wholly within the Tribunal itself. The President of the
Senate may have the power to appoint the employees of the Senate,
but there is no existing provisions of law, even in the Appropriation Act,
which vests in him the power to appoint the employees of an Electoral
Tribunal.
The mere fact that the funds of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are to be
taken from the funds of the Senate do not make those funds for the
Senate.
The evident purpose is to maintain the independence of each associate
justice in the performance of his duties as a member of an Electoral
Tribunal.
the appointment issued to petitioner by the Chairman of the Electoral
Tribunal, at the rate of P3,600 per annum,
************************************************

Page 4 of 16

(54) Arnault v Nazareno digest

G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
Topic: Legislative inquiry

unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to

give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority.
The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation,
consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.

Facts:
1. The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates.
Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for
the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the
Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected and the price
paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No.
8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the
purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said
Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the
purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer
this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for
contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the
Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new
Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the
name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions
pertinent thereto.
2. It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single
centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned
by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company and by
virtue of the recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had
an interest in the estate. An intriguing question which the committee
sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent irregularity of the
Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged
interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to
determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating
P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the same occasion he
draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he
transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB,
and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a)
Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power to punish him
for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will
not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer
the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the
legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him
for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which
ended on May 18, 1950.
c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal
the name of the person
ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person
not a member for contempt
YES.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power
to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every
question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to
answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question
that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the
fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the
inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse
of discretion in the exercise of that power.
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter
under inquiry.
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and

The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the

Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case. That power subsists as long as the Senate,
which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative
function involved.
****ARNAULT VS NAZARENO, 87 Phil 29 (1950)
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative
of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal
the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms
and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing
to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to
answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying
out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein
established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness right to due process of law.
******************************
(63) SUMULONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest
SUMULONG vs. COMELEC
73 P.R. 288, 1942
Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657,
Comelec adopted a resolution providing for the appointment of
election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons
named therein. Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party
Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, claims the exclusive right to propose the
appointment of such inspectors. He contends that the resolution of the
Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of
the Nationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for
each of the precincts in each of the 53 legislative districts, contravenes
Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that under that
section the Nationalista Party has the right to propose one, and only one
inspector for each precinct, and that the resolution has the effect of
giving that party two inspectors in each and every precinct within those
legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that the discretion given by
Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Comelec in the Choice
of election inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the provision of the
Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only one
inspector.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel
candidates and free-zone factions of the Nationalista Party the right to
propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of the discretion
granted to it by law.
Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the
Supreme Court. The Comelec is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. It should
be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created free, orderly, and honest elections. The Supreme Court may
not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly
illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere. The Comelec because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts
with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual

Page 5 of 16

experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly

advantageous position to decide complex political questions. Due
regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in
the Constitution requires that the power of the Supreme Court to review
the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly,
but firmly in appropriate cases.
**************************

(COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)

Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional

3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation

for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is
constitutional.

(69) PHILCONSA vs Enriquez

GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994),
was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December
17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain
items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by
the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and
identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as
prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and
declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled
AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction

scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that
appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign
Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under
Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code
of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for
State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road

maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in

compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for

the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of
Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release
of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said
Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel
carriers

5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman,

COA, and CHR, the Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of
the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit

HELD:
Locus Standi
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the
validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in
the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).

Veto of the Provisions

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of
the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning
the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to
repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No.
292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not
in
the
appropriations
law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while
allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing
such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No.
4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Managements Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item
for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not
an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not
alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand,
it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative
and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by

the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the
National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate
provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the
said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486
[1964]).

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the
AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases
of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the
proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto
as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand
can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the

Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored
personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that
impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision
is therefore valid.

Page 6 of 16

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to
augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the

language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that
Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce
the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at
once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not
the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied
and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of
the CAFGUs to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating

to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the
NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President
said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until
the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are
proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the
President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry
into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]).
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

********************************************

Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,

undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
******************************

(86) NIERE VS COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

54 SCRA 165 Political Law Appointments Residual Power to Appoint
La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by Republic Act 4585
in 1965.
In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La Carlota as the
City Engineer.
In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President as the City
Engineer of the same city (La Carlota). Quiambaos appointment was
pursuant to the Decentralization Act (effective January 1968). Sec 4
thereof provides that the position of the city engineer must be filled in by
the appointment of the President. Niere relinquished the office but it was
in protest and so he filed aquo warranto case before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental. Niere lost in that case and so he filed
a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Nieri asserts that the
charter of La Carlota provides that it is the City Mayor who should
appoint the City Engineer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the City Engineer.

(80) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXEC SEC

194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the
Cabinet Singularity of Office EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein.
The Civil Liberties Union(CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by
CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article
7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8
(1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks
to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during
the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the
peoples understanding thereof.

HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did not have a
provision which authorizes the mayor thereof to appoint the city
engineer. In fact, the deliberations in Congress when La Carlotas charter
was being drafted revealed that it was the intention of the lawmakers to
exclude the position of city engineer from among those local officers
whom the mayor can appoint.
Since the city mayor, under La Carlotas charter, is without authority to
appoint the city engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the
President of the Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article 7 of the
[1935] Constitution, shall nominate all other officers of the government
whoseappointments are not herein otherwise provided for; because
when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, the
appointment must be made by the President (residual power of
appointment).
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the
President. Consequently, any diminution in its scope must be clear and
unequivocal.
***********************************
ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO, petitioner,
-versusHON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963
FACTS:
Collector of Customs Ang Ang-co authorized the release of certain Pepsi
Cola commodities even without the necessary release certificate from
the Central Bank. The Commissioner of Customs learned about the
release and filed an administrative case against him for grave neglect of
duty. After investigation and by authority of President Garcia, Executive
Secretary Castiilo rendered a decision removing Ang-co from office. The
latter contends that the action taken by Secretary Castillo deprives his
right to have his case decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service who
has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases
against officers and employees in the classified service. After exhausting
all the administrative remedies, he was removed from office without any
valid cause. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to take direct action on the
administrative case of the petitioner even if he belongs to the classified
service in spite of the provisions in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7,
par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.

Page 7 of 16

HELD:
No, the President has no power to take direct action on the
administrative case of the petitioner, it being contrary to law. The power
of the President to control extends to the power to remove officers and
employees belonging only to the executive department who are
appointed by him but not those belonging to the classified service.
Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal in view
of its constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959
which has exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all
officers and employees in the classified service. Hence, the petitioner
having been deprived of due process in the investigation and disposition
of his case is reinstated to his office.

consider the charges which were being investigated by the Bureau of

Immigration because there was no conviction of a competent court
charging him for the said offense in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code. His motion was denied
and thereupon instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Likewise, his petition was denied. Hence, an appeal before the Supreme
Court was filed.

****Ang-Angco v. Castillo, No.L-17169, SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC

OF THEPHILIPPINES, 9 SCRA 619, February 16, 1960, Argued, November 30,
1963, Decided.

HELD:
Yes, the Board has the power to deport the petitioner. The wordings of
Section 2702 expressly imposes the requisites wherein the power to
deport in case of unlawful deportation is to be exercised. It is not the
intention of the lawmakers that if there is no conviction for a crime of
unlawful importation, the Board may not proceed to investigate and
recommend deportation. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
***************************************

Facts:
The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola
concentrates which were notcovered by any Central Bank release
certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-Angco to
secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the
counsel to secure the releasecertificate from the No-Dollar Import Office.
The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angcowhich stated that
his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take action
onthe request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary
of Finance whoexpressed his approval of the release on the basis of said
certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally releasedthe concentrates. When
Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an administrativecomplaint
against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been
discharging theduties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the
President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the classified
civilservice.
Previous History:
Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of
control over allexecutive departments, bureaus and offices, can take
direct action and dispose of the administrative casein subordinate officers of
the executive branch of the government.
Holding:
The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified
civilservice.
Reasoning:
It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case
of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and
having beendeprived of the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and
disposition of his case, itmay be said that he has been deprived of due process as
guaranteed by said law.The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to
investigate, suspend or removeofficers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees but notwith regard to those officers or
employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherentpower cannot
be exercised.This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress
may by lawvest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts,
or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these
officers whose appointmentsare vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided
by law for a procedure for their removalprecisely in view of this constitutional authority. One
such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Significance:
It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on
theadministrative case of an employee under classified service even with the authority of
the Presidentwithout submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service.
*********************************
TAN TONG alias CHEOGA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee
G.R. No. L-7680, April 30, 1955
FACTS:
Tan Tong was originally charged before the Bureau of Immigration with
being a communist subject to deportation. The Board of Commissioners
found out that he was engaged in smuggling and recommended him
for deportation to China. Tan Tong filed a motion to quash the
proceedings before the Board on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction to

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deportation Board has the power to deport the
petitioner when he is not yet convicted for smuggling or illegal
importation by a competent court in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code.

(114) TANADA VS CUENCO

103 Phil. 1051 Political Law Constitutional Law Political Question
Defined Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate
who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its
members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators
from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since
there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed
to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed this
process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he
deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as
a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election
contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred
that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it
is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Taada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts
but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is
a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court
is not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate.
The issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the
5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note
that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which
does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed
seat of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In
this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed
members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will
come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority
members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the
Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this
provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
****************************

Page 8 of 16

(117) VARGAS VS RILLORAZA

G.R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948 [Composition of the Supreme Court, ]
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act,
Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could
designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in
treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required
constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional
RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any
composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided.
And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of
the members of the Court as in this case are replaced by judges of
first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And
the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act
No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but
positively violative of the organic law.
Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of
the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the
consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be
construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition
of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge
designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he
would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the
appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular
Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a
misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution,
where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate
Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5)
*************************
FEDERICO FERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellant
-versusP. CUERVA and CO/, defendant-appellant
GR No. L-21114, November 28, 1967
FACT:
Plaintiff Fernandez was employed as a salesman by the defendant P.
Cuerva and Company. After the separation from service, plaintiff filed a
claim before the Department of Labor to recover unpaid salaries and
commissions, and separation pay. During the pendency of the said case,
he filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila a similar complaint.
However, the court dismissed the case on the ground that actions had
prescribed and that the court had no jurisdiction over the case. Plaintiff
moved to reconsider the order for dismissal contending that having filed
a similar claim with the Department of Labor had suspended the running
of the prescriptive period for the claim of refund of unauthorized
deductions and withheld commissions concerned. The court denied
plaintiffs motion, hence an appeal was made.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing by the plaintiff of the claim for refund with the
regional office of the Department of Labor suspend the running of the
period of prescription.
HELD:
Yes, it is held that the filing with the Department of Labor suspended the
period of prescription. The Civil Law provides that the prescription of
actions is interrupted when they are filed before the Court. While it is
true that the claim filed before the Department of Labor is not a judicial
demand, such filing had the attributes of a judicial demand because
pursuant to Reorganization Plan no. 20-A the office is vested with original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all case affecting all money claims arising
from violation of labor standards on working condition such as unpaid
wages, underpayment, overtime and separation pay, to the exclusion of
courts. Hence, the plaintiffs action to enforce the claim was not yet

barred by the statute of limitations when he filed his complaint in the

court.
*******************************
(129) DELA LLANA VS ALBA
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners
justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of
tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices
and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the
judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of
the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to
an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be
valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
****112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question
if there is no question of law involved BP 129
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing
its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would
be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such
law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the
security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly
removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is
empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the
basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court
could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a
case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any
intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by
the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and
tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by
this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that
in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts,
the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would

Page 9 of 16

be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of

alternatives between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

may
be
viewed
that
the
proviso
merely
sets
the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribequalifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official
for appointment remains
all
throughout his tenure
or
during his incumbency,
he
may
however
resign
first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionallyattached disqualification before he may be considered fit
forappointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent,
an
elective
official
remains
ineligible
for appointment to
another
public
office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible
forappointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of
SBMA; hence,his appointment thereto cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with
jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid

abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
****************************************

(138) FLORES V DRILON, GR no. 104732

FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge
the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the SBMAprovided that for
the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard
Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of
Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective
official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be
useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing
authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per
diems,allowances and other emoluments which he may have received
pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1)

YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective

official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The
subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what
the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where
a local elective official will work for his appointment in an
executive
position
in
government,
and
thus
neglect his constitutents.

(2)
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA
posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need ofappointment. The phrase shall be
appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3)
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example,
an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post,
may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet
position if specifically authorized by law.
(4)
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the
power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no
choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The
power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the
President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at
the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it

******
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as
the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which
respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the
President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided
that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be
appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of
Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The
petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the
discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional
prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold
multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is
a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other
governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it
cannot limit by providing the condition that inthe first year of the
operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship.
The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to
the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to
exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
**********************************************

(144) FLORES vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FLORES vs. COMELEC
184 SCRA 484
Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers
as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989
elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed
punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However,
his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed
second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed
him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two
votes as stray from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which
affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four
votes cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial,
should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally
between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for

Page 10 of 16

kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by

2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the
ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on
Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to
it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of
fact shall be final and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the
COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in
barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different
and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their
decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section.
Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should
have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC.
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the
decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election
case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
*******************************

(153) Davao City Water District v. CSC and COA, GR No. 95237,
September 13, 1991

FACTS:
The case at bar clarifies conflicting jurisprudence with regard to the
whether PD 198 is a special law (with grant original charters) or a general
legislation and whether such corporations are under the jurisdiction of
CSC and COA. Petitioners claim that in Metro Iloilo Water District v. NLRC,
et al.,PD 198 is a general legislation empowering government agencies
and entities to create water districts and that the PD cannot be
considered a charter in itself creating the water district. Respondents
however site Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton, et al, which state the PD
No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of all water districts in the
country and thus come under the coverage of CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not water districts created under PD 198 are GOCC with
original charters and are thus under the jurisdiction of CSC and COA?
HELD:
Yes, water districts are considered GOCCs with original charters as they
conform to such definition of corporations created by a special law and
not under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. PD198, which is
applicable only to different water districts created pursuant thereto, is a
special law as it pertains to a special purpose which is intended to meet
a particular set of conditions and circumstances.
Thus, water districts are deemed "government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter" and fall under the
jurisdiction of the public respondents CSC and COA.
****DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT vs CSC201 SCRA 593Ponente: MEDIALDEA
FACTS:
Petitioners are among the more than five hundred (500) water districts
existing throughout the countryformed pursuant to the provisions of PD
No. 198, as amended by PDs. 768 and 1479, otherwise known as
the"Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 which was issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos by virtue of hislegislative power. It
authorized the different local legislative bodies to form and create their
respectivewater districts through a resolution they will pass subject to the
guidelines, rules and regulations therein laiddown. The decree further
created and formed the "Local Water Utilities Administration" (LWUA), a
nationalagency attached to the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA), and granted withregulatory power necessary to
optimize public service from water utilities operations.The respondents,

on the other hand, are the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the
Commission on Audit(COA), both government agencies and
represented in this case by the Solicitor General.There exists a
divergence of opinions between COA on one hand, and the (LWUA), on
the other hand, withrespect to the authority of COA to audit the different
water districts.COA opined that the audit of the water districts is simply
an act of discharging the visitorial power vested inthem by lawOn the
other hand, LWUA maintained that only those water districts with
subsidies from the government fallwithin the COA's jurisdiction and only
to the extent of the amount of such subsidies, pursuant to theprovision of
the Government Auditing Code of the Phils.Petitioners' main argument is
that they are private corporations without original charter, hence they
areoutside the jurisdiction of respondents CSC and COA.ISSUE:
Whether or not the Local Water Districts formed and created pursuant to
the provisions of PresidentialDecree No. 198, as amended, are
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations
with
original
charter falling under the Civil Service Law and/or covered by the visitorial
power of the Commission on AuditHELD:After a fair consideration of the
parties' arguments coupled with a careful study of the applicable laws
aswell as the constitutional provisions involved, We rule against the
petitioners and reiterate Our ruling inTanjay case declaring water districts
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations
with
original
charter.Ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute, PD 198 is
a special law applicable only to thedifferent water districts created
pursuant thereto. In all its essential terms, it is obvious that it pertains to
aspecial purpose which is intended to meet a particular set of conditions
and cirmcumstances. The fact thatsaid decree generally applies to all
water districts throughout the country does not change the fact thatPD
198 is a special law.It is clear that what has been excluded from the
coverage of the CSC are those corporations createdpursuant to the
Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the
said code, but onthe contrary, they were created pursuant to a special
law and are governed primarily by its provision
*******************************
(165) ABELLA vs. COMELEC
201 SCRA 253
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to
intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as
Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc
City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the
same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the
Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed
the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered
the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as
governor of Kananga, Leyte.
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote
may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position
was disqualified.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was
originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy
of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the
fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province
of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide
candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief
that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes
were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net
effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate.
******************************

(174) GANZON VS CA
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991
FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension
order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for prohibition
with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders.
Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges
on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

Page 11 of 16

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of
the President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.
RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains
no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise
it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the
power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the
power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in
sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the
Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the
opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively,
and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a
remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make
him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents
and purposes, his suspension permanent.
****200 SCRA 271 Political Law Control Power Local Government
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were
filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office.
TheSecretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders
against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him
hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon
appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order
by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local
autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left
the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the
power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to
the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over
local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however
overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
*********************************
(180)BAYAN VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449

(United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang
Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and
The Public Interest Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, Defense
Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate
President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople,
Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.
Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of
America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among
others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States
military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States
negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On
September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would
have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On
July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine
panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to
exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United
States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides
discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V.
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6,
1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,
the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal
standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are
in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA
involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On
this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where
the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation.
(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under
Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence
under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under
Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is
crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply
with the strict constitutional requirements.
(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal
controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs
purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the
Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of
government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially
conferred to it by law.

****BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed,
among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27,
1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop

Tomas Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan

Page 12 of 16

Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987
constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the

case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution .
. . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
xxx

a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required
by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is
applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of the senate.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section
25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a

treaty means
that
the
other
contracting
party accepts
or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the
VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case.
To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of
section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for
the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain
the valid concurrence of the senate.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA

only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the
VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law,
the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and

permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through

Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations
under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate
of the Constitution.
***********************************

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an

executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty.

****Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

THE FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered
into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The
agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and
was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of
2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter
of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the
constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a)
it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting state.

xxx

xxx

xxx

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner,-versusA. D. WILLIAMS, et al, respondents.

G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940
FACTS:
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission recommended to the
Director of Public Works the adoption of a measure to avoid traffic such
as the prohibition to pass along the Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue of all
animal-drawn vehicles. Pursuant to the authority provided in the
provisions of C.A. no. 548, the Director of Public Works approved the
recommendation. In his capacity as a private citizen and taxpayer,
Calalang brought before the court a Petition for Prohibition against the
respondents. The petitioner contended that the authority to promulgate
given to the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations
relative to the control of traffic on the national roads is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given to the Director of Public Works to
promulgate rules and regulations relative to the control of traffic and use
of national roads and streets constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power.
HELD:
No, the authority does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power considering that it is not a delegation of power to make the law
but merely conferring an authority or discretion upon the Director of
Public Works as to the execution of the law. The authority conferred upon
and under which they promulgated rules and regulations is merely
carrying out the legislative policy to promote safe transit and avoid
obstructions on roads and streets in the interest and convenience of the
public. Hence, the measure adopted is just an exercise of an
administrative function conferred upon the Director of Public Works.

Page 13 of 16

****MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works
and Communications
that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance
of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules a
nd regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the

approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public
Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners
but of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the

constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox
lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preserving.

maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the

interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through
the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema
lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest
good to the greatest number.
********************************
MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner,
-versusATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., Graft Investigation Officer I,et al,
respondents.
G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Camacho is the Dean of College of Education while
respondent Dr. Daleon is a professor. The other respondents are faculty
members of the said university. Several doctor students complained to
the petitioner that there ghost students in the class Dr. Daleon that
were given passing grades without attending the regular class. Petitioner
requested the latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term
papers, and records of attendance of students involved. Dr. Daleon
ignored the request. Consequently, petitioner filed before the
Ombudsman a complaint against Dr. Daleon for gross incompetence,
insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770. Through a resolution, Atty.
Coresis, graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, dismissed the
administrative and criminal complaints against respondents. Hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in exonerating Dr.
Daleon from administrative and criminal liability arising from his giving
passing grades to students without requiring them to attend classes.
HELD:
No, public there is no basis to hold that the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion. According to the
University Code, there is no provision that prohibits a professor from giving
a special program tailored to meet the requirements of a particular
course. Artcile 3 of the University Code states that every member of the
faculty shall enjoy academic freedom encompasses right of the
teacher to determine and choose the methods on how the course shall
be taught. Therefore, the petition lacks merit and ought to dismissed.
Hence, the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman to exonerate Dr.
Daleon from administrative and criminal liability is in order for it accords
with the facts and the law.
*********************************

2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,

nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the

Page 14 of 16

(201) PLDT vs NTC

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of NTC, upon the

following considerations:

G.R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990

1. NTC Jurisdiction
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. [PLDT], petitioner,
vs.

The NTC is the regulatory agency of the national government with

THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND CELLCOM,

jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with

INC., (EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. [ETCI]), respondents.

authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or

authority. In fact, NTC may, on its own initiative, grant such relief even in

EN BANC

the absence of a motion from an applicant.

Facts:

What the NTC granted was such a provisional authority, with a definite
expiry period of eighteen (18) months unless sooner renewed, and which

There are two (2) Orders, namely, Order of 12 December 1988 granting

may be revoked, amended or revised by the NTC. It is also limited to

private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI)

Metro Manila only.

provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile

Telephone System in Metro-Manila (Phase A) in accordance with

What is more, the main proceedings are clearly to continue as stated in

specified conditions; and the Order, dated 8 May 1988, denying

the NTC Order of 8 May 1989.

reconsideration, enacted by the respondent National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) but assailed by petitioner

The provisional authority was issued after due hearing, reception of

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

evidence and evaluation, with the hearings attended by various

oppositors, including PLDT. It was granted only after a prima facie

ETCI filed an application with NTC for the issuance of a Certificate of

showing that ETCI has the necessary legal, financial, and technical

Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, install, establish,

capabilities and that public interest, convenience, and necessity so

operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha

demanded.

Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon

regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate Phase A of its

Hence, the final outcome of the application rests within the exclusive

proposal within Metro Manila.

prerogative of the NTC. Whether or not a CPCN would eventually issue

would depend on the evidence to be presented during the hearings still

But in an Order, dated 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDT's

to be conducted, and only after a full evaluation of the proof thus

Opposition and declared that Rep. Act No. 2090 (1958) should be

presented.

liberally construed as to include among the services under said franchise

the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service.

2. The Coverage of ETCI's Franchise

After evaluating the reconsideration sought by PLDT, the NTC, in October

Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) "the right and privilege of

1988, maintained its ruling that liberally construed, applicant's franchise

constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the entire

carries with it the privilege to operate and maintain a cellular mobile

Philippines radio stations for reception and transmission of messages on

telephone service.

radio stations in the foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and
public base, aeronautical and land mobile stations, ... with the

In a "Motion to Set Aside the Order" granting provisional authority, PLDT

corresponding relay stations for the reception and transmission of

alleged essentially that the interconnection ordered was in violation of

wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony ...." PLDT

due process and that the grant of provisional authority was

maintains that the scope of the franchise is limited to "radio stations" and

jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm.

excludes telephone services such as the establishment of the proposed

Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS). However, in its Order of 12

PLDT urges the Court to annul the NTC Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8

November 1987, the NTC construed the technical term "radiotelephony"

May 1989 and to order ETCI to desist from, suspend, and/or discontinue

liberally as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone

any and all acts intended for its implementation.

system.

Issues:

3. The Status of ETCI Franchise

1. Whether the status and coverage of Rep. Act No. 2090 includes

PLDT alleges that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into nonexistence for

franchise;

failure of the franchise holder to begin and complete construction of the

radio system authorized under the franchise as explicitly required in

2. Whether there is transfer of shares of stock of a corporation in holding a

Section 4 of its franchise, Rep. Act No. 2090.

CPCN; and
More importantly, PLDT's allegation partakes of a Collateral attack on a
3. Whether there is a need to merge principle and procedure of

franchise Rep. Act No. 2090), which is not allowed.

interconnection.
A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without
Held:

due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a

franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited

Page 15 of 16

by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo

common good. Those were the overriding factors which motivated NTC

warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon

in granting provisional authority to ETCI.

complaint or otherwise" (Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court), 2

the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not

Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much-

a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a

desired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public

direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a

utility, to improved technology, fast and handy mobile service, and

franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a

reduced user dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public

concern of Government.

utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly position in view of the

Constitutional proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization

4. ETCI's Stock Transactions

shall be exclusive in character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years.

ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more than

Ruling:

40% of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to the Orbes. In
1968, the Albertos re-acquired the shares they had sold to the Orbes. In

There is no grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of or excess of

1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of their shares to Horacio Yalung.

jurisdiction, on the part of the NTC in issuing its challenged Orders of 12

Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares.

December 1988 and 8 May 1989 in NTC Case No. 87-39, and this Petition

Moreover, in 1964, ETCI had increased its capital stock from P40,000.00 to

is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

***********************

P360,000.00; and in 1987, from P360,000.00 to P40M.

In other words, transfers of shares of a public utility corporation need only
NTC approval, not Congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI
were a series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. But again,
whether ETCI has offended against a provision of its franchise, or has
subjected it to misuse or abuse, may more properly be inquired into in
quo warranto proceedings instituted by the State. It is the condition of
every franchise that it is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
when the common good so requires (1987 Constitution, Article XII,
Section 11).
5. The NTC Interconnection Order
In the provisional authority granted by NTC to ETCI, one of the conditions
imposed was that the latter and PLDT were to enter into an
interconnection agreement to be jointly submitted to NTC for approval.
Rep. Act No. 6849, or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989, approved on
8 February 1990, mandates interconnection providing as it does that "all
domestic telecommunications carriers or utilities ... shall be
interconnected to the public switch telephone network." Such regulation
of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in the
exercise of the plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the
general welfare.
The importance and emphasis given to interconnection dates back to
Ministry Circular No. 82-81, dated 6 December 1982; Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Circular No. 87-188, issued in
1987; The sharing of revenue was an additional feature considered in
DOTC Circular No. 90-248, dated 14 June 1990, laying down the "Policy
on Interconnection and Revenue Sharing by Public Communications
Carriers."
The NTC order to interconnect allows the parties themselves to discuss
and agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection
agreement instead of the NTC itself laying down the standards of
interconnection which it can very well impose. Thus it is that PLDT cannot
justifiably claim denial of clue process. It has been heard. It will continue
to be heard in the main proceedings.
6. Ultimate Considerations
The decisive considerations are public need, public interest, and the

Page 16 of 16