Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUMRIO
INTRODUO .................................................................................................................3
6. CONCLUSES ..........................................................................................................56
INTRODUO
Blndal, Kraan e Ruffner traam breve retrospecto da evoluo do conceito nos Estados Unidos:
Performance budgeting has a long, if irregular, history on the budget process in the United States,
and previous initiatives regardless of their success have been models for the international community.
However, 40 years of initiatives to better manage programmes and improve budgetary decisionmaking have failed to make a substancial impact on the budget process. The alphabet soup of PPBS,
MBO and ZBB which began in the 1960s and 1970s all failed to last on a government-wide basis ().
BLNDAL, Jn R.; KRAAN, Dirk-Jan; RUFFNER, Michael. Budgeting in the United States. OECD
Journal on Budgeting. Volume 03, n 2, 2003, p. 31/32.
simplicidade
parecem
corresponder
peso
complexidade
Na sntese de Schick, o conceito simples, mas a aplicao, difcil: The concept is simple
objectives, results, and resources should all be linked. The application is difficult. SCHICK, Allen.
Budgeting for Results: recent developments in five industrialized countries. In MILLER, Gerald J.;
HILDRETH, W. Bartley; RABIN, Jack. Performance-based Budgeting. Colorado: Westview Press,
2001, p. 129.
nem se poderia esgotar cada uma das questes e dos problemas que se
apresentam no processo de reforma oramentria.
1. CONCEITUAO E TAXONOMIA
Como demonstram Kristensen, Groszyk e Buhler, Over the last two decades, the focus of public
sector budgeting and management in most OECD member countries has changed from inputs
towards outputs. While important elements of an input-based management approach remain, many
managers are now more often judged by how their programmes perform rather than by how well they
adhere to administrative controls and procedures, or how successful they are in obtaining resources
for their programme. KRISTENSEN, Jens Kromann; GROSZYK, Walter S.; BUHLER, Bernd.
Outcome-focused Management and Budgeting. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2002, p. 6.
4
Como destacam Shah e Shen, performance management is a prerequisite for the success of
performance budgeting. Governments that do not manage for results do not budget for results.
Performance budgeting cannot thrive unless it is built into an overall managerial strategy for
performance. SHAH, Anwar; SHEN, Chunli. Citizen-Centric Performance Budgeting at the Local
Level. In SHAH, Anwar. Local Budgeting. Washington: The World Bank, 2007, p. 160.
BLNDAL, Jn R.; KRAAN, Dirk-Jan; RUFFNER, Michael. Budgeting in the United States. OECD
Journal on Budgeting Volume 3 Nmero 2, 2003, p. 31.
6
Em algumas anlises do Banco Mundial tambm so feitas referncias explcitas ao aumento da
flexibilidade gerencial como elemento constitutivo do modelo, juntamente com a informao sobre
desempenho de rgos e agncias e sua utilizao na tomada de deciso. Conforme destacam Shah
e Shen: The performance budget shifts the focus of discussion from detailed line items to
achievement of specific service delivery objectives and, therefore, facilitates informed budgetary
decision making. Performance budgeting increases managerial flexibility by giving the program or
department manager a fixed lump sum allocation that may be used for various needs to achieve the
agreed-on results in service delivery. Public managers enjoy increased managerial discretion but are
integrante do processo decisrio. por isso que diversos governos afirmam possuir
processos oramentrios orientados para resultados, quando, na verdade, somente
apresentam informaes de desempenho na lei de oramento ou em seus
documentos. Conforme destaca Allen Schick:
razovel que se questione se uma verso por demais ampla do que seria
o Oramento por Resultados pode, efetivamente, receber tal rtulo. De fato, a verso
ampla somente possui um dos dois elementos constitutivos sobre os quais se funda
o conceito de Oramento por Resultados9 (a. integrao de informao sobre o
desempenho de rgos e agncias; e b. sua utilizao no processo decisrio
alocativo). Ademais, ao apenas apresentar a informao de performance nos
documentos oramentrios, no acarretaria mudanas significativas no processo
oramentrio.
SCHICK, Allen. The Performing State: Reflection on an Idea Whose Time Has Come but Whose
Implementation has not. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 3 Nmero 2, 2003, p. 101.
9
Oramento por Resultados e Oramento de Desempenho (performance budgeting) so
nomenclaturas diferentes que procuram exprimir a mesma idia central, qual seja, a integrao de
informaes sobre desempenho e resultados ao processo oramentrio e sua utilizao no processo
de tomada de deciso. Referido entendimento tambm defendido pela OCDE: A variety of terms
and definitions are incorporated under the label of performance budgeting: budgeting for results,
performance-based budgeting and performance funding. These terms are all concerned with
introducing performance information into budget processes OECD. Performance Budgeting in OECD
Countries. OECD Publishing, 2007, p. 20.
10
performance
acompanham
budgeting):
a
pea
nessa
modalidade,
oramentria
ou
indicadores
outros
de
documentos
ii) Oramento por Resultados de alocao indireta OpRAI (Performanceinformed budgeting): nesta verso os resultados so ativa e sistematicamente
utilizados embora de maneira indireta para informar as decises oramentrias.
Em outras palavras: a informao sobre desempenho se constitui em relevante
elemento constitutivo do processo de tomada de deciso embora no determine o
10
A nomenclatura aqui proposta foi cunhada pelo autor, em consonncia com a idia central
apresentada em dois textos da OCDE. A taxonomia proposta procura evidenciar que existem dois
plos: um que confere nfase apresentao da informao sobre desempenho e outro que destaca
a utilizao dessa informao no processo decisrio, que conta com duas subdivises bsicas. Para
a verificao da nomenclatura utilizada pela OCDE que saliente-se difere nos dois textos
pesquisados, consultar: CURRISTINE, Teresa. Performance Information in the Budget Process:
Results of the OECD 2005 Questionnaire. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 5 n 2, 2005, p.
102/103; e OECD. Performance Budgeting in OECD Countries. OECD Publishing, 2007, p. 42/46.
11
Conforme destaca a OCDE, there is no formal mechanism for the systematic integration and use of
performance information at this stage of the budget formulation process. While the spending ministries
can present performance information and it can be part of discussions between the two parties, there
is no expectation of a link between PI [performance information] and resource allocation. OECD.
Performance Budgeting in OECD Countries. OECD Publishing, 2007, p. 42.
11
12
Em outros termos, In OECD countries, when performance information is part of the budget process,
it is most commonly used to inform budget allocations along with other information on political and
fiscal priorities. It is only one factor in the decision-making process. There is no direct or mechanical
link between performance (planned or actual) and funding. The connection is at best indirect ().
Ibid., p. 42.
13
Para a OCDE, In certain sectors however, direct/formula performance budgeting is applied that
directly and explicitly links performance results to funding. This type of formula performance budgeting
requires clear and explicit output measures and information on unit costs, which are not readily
available in many government sectors. The approach is used only to a limited extent in OECD
countries. Ibid., p. 46.
14
SCHICK, Allen. La presupuestacin tiene algn futuro? Serie Gestin Pblica n 21. Traduccin de
Varinia Tromben y revisin final de Ricardo Martner. Naciones Unidas. Instituto Latinoamericano y del
Caribe de Planificacin Econmica y Social (ILPES): Chile, maio/2002, p. 47/48.
12
automtica
ou
mecanicista
da
correlao
entre
recursos
13
2. INFORMAO
SOBRE
DESEMPENHO: OBJETIVOS
DE SUA INTRODUO E
REQUISITOS DE VIABILIDADE
iii)
aumento
da
transparncia
responsabilizao
governamentais
(accountability)
Como destaca Curristine, Performance results are provided in order to support better decision
making, leading to improved performance and/or accountability. If this information is to provide these
benefits, it has to be used in the decision-making process. The key question is whether and how
performance information is used in budgetary and management decision-making process.
CURRISTINE, Teresa, op. cit., p. 88.
14
16
15
18
16
17
20
CURRISTINE, Teresa. Performance Information in the Budget Process: Results of the OECD 2005
Questionnaire. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 5 n 2, 2005, p. 102.
21
DIAMOND, Jack. Do Oramento por Programas para o Oramento de Desempenho: O desafio para
economias de mercado emergentes. In Planejamento e Oramento Governamental Coletnea vol.
2. GIACOMONI, James; PAGNUSSAT, Jos Luiz (orgs.). Braslia: ENAP Escola Nacional de
Administrao Pblica, 2006, p. 97.
18
19
razes utilizadas para sua introduo no processo oramentrio. De fato, sem que
tais informaes sejam efetivamente utilizadas, existiriam poucos incentivos para
maior esmero e ateno na produo dessa informao24.
poder
repercutir
no
financiamento
de
programas
e/ou
de
24
25
Ibid., p. 06/07.
SCHICK, Allen, op. cit., p. 08.
20
26
21
mecanicistas
ou
automticas
entre
desempenho
alocao
oramentria, com vistas, tambm, a evitar posies defensivas por parte dos
agentes envolvidos.
Por vrias razes, tem sido visto como benfico que a maioria dos
pases evite correlaes automticas ou mecnicas entre os
resultados apresentados e as alocaes de despesas que
poderiam resultar em cortes automticos de gastos ou em extino
de programas que apresentam fraco desempenho27. [traduo
nossa].
27
CURRISTINE, Teresa. Performance Information in the Budget Process: Results of the OECD 2005
Questionnaire. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 5 n 2, 2005, p. 111.
22
Como destacam Blndal e Curristine: The following process is used to conduct desk evaluations.
The Ministry of Finance submits a proposal to the Congress with the names of the programmes and
agencies it wishes to evaluate in the coming year. After the programmes have been agreed with the
Congress, external consultants are chosen to conduct the evaluations through a process of
public bidding. () The process is similar for impact evaluations with two notable differences.
Another methodological approach is used and these evaluations are contracted out either to
research institutions or to universities rather than to external consultancies (). Cf. BLONDAL,
Jn R.; CURRISTINE, Teresa. Budgeting in Chile. OECD Journal on Budgeting Volume 04 n 02,
2004, p. 35/36 (grifos nossos).
23
24
30
Ibid., p. 34.
25
31
CURRISTINE, Teresa. Performance Information in the Budget Process: Results of the OECD 2005
Questionnaire. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 5 n 2, 2005, p. 89.
32
Secretaria de Planejamento e Investimentos Estratgicos. Indicadores de Programas Guia
Metodolgico. Braslia: Ministrio do Planejamento, Oramento e Gesto, 2010, p. 21.
26
Como destaca Curristine, there is a tendency for countries at the initial stages of reform to
concentrate on outputs and to develop outcomes at a later stage. CURRISTINE, Teresa, op. cit., p.
89.
34
KRISTENSEN, Jens Kromann; GROSZYK, Walter S.; BUHLER, Bernd. Outcome-focused
Management and Budgeting. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2002, p. 11.
27
35
JANNUZZI, P. M. Consideraes sobre o uso, mau uso e abuso dos indicadores sociais na
formulao e avaliao de polticas pblicas municipais. Braslia: Revista do Servio Pblico, abr/jun,
2005. APUD Secretaria de Planejamento e Investimentos Estratgicos. Indicadores de Programas
Guia Metodolgico. Braslia: Ministrio do Planejamento, Oramento e Gesto, 2010, p. 30
36
Nas palavras de Kristensen, Groszyk e Buhler, Outcomes reflect the intended and unintended
results from government actions and provide the rationale for government interventions.
KRISTENSEN, Jens Kromann; GROSZYK, Walter S.; BUHLER, Bernd, op. cit., p. 10.
28
Mesmo com tais limitaes, Allen Schick considera mais produtivo o foco
nos outputs, como a melhor segunda opo (second best situation). Ou seja, apesar
de se reconhecer os resultados (outcomes) como a dimenso mais importante do
desempenho, tambm se concorda quanto ao fato de que informaes sobre
resultados so frequentemente indisponveis ou caras de serem obtidas e
apresentam uma frgil e problemtica relao de causalidade entre determinada
poltica pblica e as condies sociais. Em suas palavras:
SCHICK, Allen. La presupuestacin tiene algn futuro? Serie Gestin Pblica n 21. Traduccin de
Varinia Tromben y revisin final de Ricardo Martner. Naciones Unidas. Instituto Latinoamericano y del
Caribe de Planificacin Econmica y Social (ILPES): Chile, maio/2002, p. 26/27.
38
KRISTENSEN, Jens Kromann; GROSZYK, Walter S.; BUHLER, Bernd, op. cit., p. 06.
29
SCHICK, Allen. The Performing State: Reflection on an Idea Whose Time Has Come but Whose
Implementation has not. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 3 Nmero 2, 2003, p. 73/74.
40
Como afirma Teresa Curristine Of the countries that developed performance measures, the
majority produce a combination of outputs and outcomes. This combination reflects the difficulty in
following an approach that concentrates solely on either outcomes or outputs. CURRISTINE, Teresa,
op. cit., p. 89/90.
41
A discusso mais ampla, contudo, transcende os limites desse trabalho. Na literatura recente,
debate-se acerca da reverso do paradigma top-down e, em contraposio, da valorizao da
abordagem bottom-up, que questiona a utilizao automtica dos resultados das avaliaes como
baliza do processo decisrio e como ferramenta para a resoluo racional de problemas. Para o
acompanhamento desse debate ver: FARIA, Carlos Aurlio Pimenta de; FILGUEIRAS, Cristina
Almeida Cunha. As Polticas dos Sistemas de Avaliao da Educao Bsica do Chile e do Brasil. In
HOCHMAN, Gilberto; ARRETCHE, Marta; MARQUES, Eduardo (Orgs.). Polticas Pblicas no Brasil.
Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 2007.
30
como
aquela
realizada
com
propsitos
de
acompanhamento
42
31
44
O estudo de Blndal e Curristine evidencia a referida diferenciao: The following process is used
to conduct desk evaluations. The Ministry of Finance submits a proposal to the Congress with the
names of the programmes and agencies it wishes to evaluate in the coming year. After the
programmes have been agreed with the Congress, external consultants are chosen to conduct the
evaluations through a process of public bidding. () The process is similar for impact
evaluations with two notable differences. Another methodological approach is used and these
evaluations are contracted out either to research institutions or to universities rather than to
external consultancies (). Cf. BLONDAL, Jn R.; CURRISTINE, Teresa. Budgeting in Chile. OECD
Journal on Budgeting Volume 04 n 02, 2004, p. 35/36 (grifos nossos).
32
SHEA, Robert J. Performance Budgeting in the United States. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume
08 n 1, 2008, p. 64.
33
46
Como evidenciaram os resultados do questionrio da OCDE, Although evaluations are used more
often to cut expenditure, probably because they provide more information on the underlying causes of
problems, they are still in the majority of cases rarely or never used for this purpose. This does not rule
out the possibility that spending ministries in their own budget formulation processes use performance
information to reallocate resources across programmes CURRISTINE, Teresa. Performance
Information in the Budget Process: Results of the OECD 2005 Questionnaire. OECD Journal on
Budgeting. Volume 5 n 2, 2005, p. 110.
34
4. MECANISMO DE INCENTIVOS
35
responsveis
pela
implementao
do
programa,
por
meio
de
recompensas salariais incorporadas aos seus vencimentos. Pela via inversa, podese aplicar sanes aos programas e agncias que falhem no alcance das metas de
48
36
37
49
SHAH, Anwar; SHEN, Chunli. Citizen-Centric Performance Budgeting at the Local Level. In SHAH,
Anwar. Local Budgeting. Washington: The World Bank, 2007, p. 160.
50
BLNDAL, Jn R.; KRAAN, Dirk-Jan; RUFFNER, Michael. Budgeting in the United States. OECD
Journal on Budgeting Volume 3 Nmero 2, 2003, p. 31.
51
Como destaca Teresa Curristine, In theory, the introduction of performance measures is meant to
be accompanied by a relaxation of input controls. However, in practice in some countries this has not
been the case. There is the view that increased flexibility should be earned by better performance
rather than given at the outset of the reforms. CURRISTINE, Teresa. Performance Information in the
Budget Process: Results of the OECD 2005 Questionnaire. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 5
n 2, 2005, p. 107.
38
prmio conferido quelas entidades e/ou agncias que tivessem alcanado metas
previamente fixadas de desempenho52.
52
Nesse sentido se encontram as observaes feitas pela OCDE: Changes in flexibility can act as an
incentive to improve performance if they can be gained or lost depending on performance results. For
example, achieving a certain percentage of performance targets could be rewarded with greater
spending flexibility during the year and the ability to carry over uspent funds, or it could be linked to
exemptions from regulations or reporting requirements. Cf. OECD. Performance Budgeting in OECD
Countries. OECD Publishing, 2007, p. 51.
53
O balanceamento da flexibilidade e da transparncia e responsabilizao analisado pela OCDE:
In any system of control there are issues about balancing accountability and flexibility. The need for
compliance with regulations and reporting requirements should be balanced against the freedom
managers require to do their jobs. Critics of the traditional system of accountability argue that rules
became ends in themselves, that accountability stressed compliance only, and that hierarchical
structures hindered efficiency and performance. Thus, these critics stressed the need to relax inputs
and controls. There are obvious dangers in relaxing input controls without having adequate financial
and managerial systems in place. With the devolution of responsibilities it is also important that new
policies and practices are well understood by people in line agencies, and that they have the skills,
capacity, resources and authority to implement the initiatives effectively. Ibid., p. 50/51.
39
Feita breve anlise das trs principais categorias de incentivos que podem
ser utilizadas de forma conjugada com a introduo da informao sobre
desempenho ao processo oramentrio, h que se investigar os riscos a que se
encontram sujeitos os incentivos criados para a introduo do Oramento por
Resultados. Como visto, os incentivos so estmulos fornecidos para direcionar o
comportamento dos gestores em determinado sentido. Ao serem inseridos, por meio
de novas regras, afetam o clculo dos atores e, como consequncia, os resultados
das aes. Todavia, caso os incentivos no sejam devidamente desenhados, podese gerar efeitos colaterais que ensejam comportamentos evasivos e defensivos por
parte dos agentes envolvidos no processo oramentrio, em contraposio aos
objetivos visados com a introduo dos incentivos.
40
55
Ibid., p. 06/07.
41
Na mesma linha, Allen Schick destaca que a frgil relao causal entre um
programa e os resultados evidencia a necessidade de no se estruturar um sistema
56
Apesar de uma tendncia crtica adoo da abordagem forte do Oramento por Resultados, h
pases que o adotam, embora sejam a exceo. Exemplo de pas que adota o Oramento por
Resultados de alocao direta ou automtica a Coria. Naquele pas, quando os programas so
classificados como no-efetivos, ocorre, automaticamente, um corte oramentrio de 10% das verbas
que lhe so destinadas. Se por um lado, tal sistemtica envia um claro sinal de que o desempenho
efetivamente considerado, por outro pode levar a posturas defensivas por parte de agncias, gerando
informaes distorcidas ou inverdicas. Cf. OECD. Performance Budgeting in OECD Countries. OECD
Publishing, 2007, p. 50.
57
Ibid., p. 49.
42
SCHICK, Allen. La presupuestacin tiene algn futuro? Serie Gestin Pblica n 21. Traduccin de
Varinia Tromben y revisin final de Ricardo Martner. Naciones Unidas. Instituto Latinoamericano y del
Caribe de Planificacin Econmica y Social (ILPES): Chile, maio/2002, p. 27.
59
O questionrio da OCDE permitiu referida concluso: Performance information performance
measures and evaluation is rarely or never used to eliminate programmes or cut expenditure, or to
reward agency heads. CURRISTINE, Teresa. Performance Information in the Budget Process:
Results of the OECD 2005 Questionnaire. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 5 n 2, 2005, p.
112.
60
Novamente nos termos da concluso extrada do questionrio da OCDE: Although evaluations are
used more often to cut expenditure, probably because they provide more information on the
underlying causes of problems, they are still in the majority of cases rarely or never used for this
purpose. This does not rule out the possibility that spending ministries in their own budget formulation
processes use performance information to reallocate resources across programmes. Ibid., p. 110.
61
Ibid., p. 110/111.
43
62
Nos termos colocados tambm pelo Banco Mundial: Pursuing a direct link between performance
and resource allocation is undesirable, because performance information does not constitute a
sufficient basis on which to make budgetary decisions. At best, performance data serve as one factor
to guide future directions. Cf. SHAH, Anwar; SHEN, Chunli. Citizen-Centric Performance Budgeting at
the Local Level. In SHAH, Anwar. Local Budgeting. Washington: The World Bank, 2007, p. 161.
63
OECD. Performance Budgeting in OECD Countries. OECD Publishing, 2007, p. 42.
44
64
Ibid., p. 51/52.
45
poltica
sobrepujar
consideraes
de
ordem
tcnica,
65
A importncia do comprometimento politico ressaltada por Shah e Shen: Strong and consistent
political support from the legislature is critical for performance budgeting initiatives. Pursuit of internal
rationality and efficiency criteria without regard to the political environment would jeopardize such
initiatives. Legislators should be involved in establishing performance goals, developing performance
indicators, monitoring the performance process, and evaluating performance results. Performance
budgeting is unlikely to succeed if the executive and legislative branches have different ideas about
the need for and objectives of the reform. SHAH, Anwar; SHEN, Chunli. Citizen-Centric Performance
Budgeting at the Local Level. In SHAH, Anwar. Local Budgeting. Washington: The World Bank, 2007,
p. 164/165.
46
66
47
agncias.
Todavia,
dificilmente
polticos
eleitos
decidiro
67
48
objetivos desse modelo fazer com que polticos definam objetivos claros e metas
para as agncias:
69
Ibid., p. 70.
BLONDAL, Jn R.; CURRISTINE, Teresa. Budgeting in Chile. OECD Journal on Budgeting
Volume 04 n 02, 2004, p. 40.
70
49
71
50
72
As experincias internacionais de outros pases auxiliam a lanar luzes sobre tal problemtica.
Como Blndal, Kraan e Ruffner destacam na anlise do processo de reforma nos Estados Unidos, It
is doubtful that the United States Will ever move to a true results-based budget process. It implies
Congress giving up too much certain ex ante power for uncertain results that may not be apparent for
years. Since the only tool legislatures have is the legislative process, this is naturally where they
spend their oversight time. This is especially true in the United States, since it would imply a huge shift
from oversight emphasizing conformity with legislation to oversight emphasizing performance. It would
be a large shift in power to the executive branch as it would require greater managerial discretion over
programme funds. BLNDAL, Jn R.; KRAAN, Dirk-Jan; RUFFNER, Michael. Budgeting in the
United States. OECD Journal on Budgeting. Volume 03, n 2, 2003, p. 28/29.
73
Como destacam Blndal, Kraan e Ruffner, a longa histria de fracassos nas reformas
oramentrias capitaneadas pelo Poder Executivo, nos Estados Unidos, prova de que o Congresso
tem que exercer um ativo papel no processo de mudana. Em suas palavras: (...) the long history of
failure of budget reforms driven by the executive branch is proof that Congress must take an active
role in process change. Ibid., p. 27.
74
A OCDE destaca os principais motivos das reformas e exemplifica com o caso do Reino Unido, em
que a eleio do Partido Trabalhista, em 1997, foi o gatilho da reforma: While the triggers for
introducing reforms vary across countries, the major reform motivators can be summarized as financial
crisis, pressure to reduce public expenditures, and a change in political administration () In the
United Kingdom, a change in political administration was the reform trigger. The 1997 election of the
Labour Party created a shift in the wider political landscape. The new government initiated numerous
51
52
Ibid., p. 49.
Cf. SHEA, Robert J. Performance Budgeting in the United States. OECD Journal on Budgeting.
Volume 08 n 1, 2008, p. 64.
77
53
78
54
Performance and Results Act80. Diversos outros pases tambm seguem a mesma
trilha da introduo da informao sobre desempenho no processo oramentrio e
da procura por mecanismos adequados para a viabilizao de uma correlao
ainda que indireta entre resultados e alocao oramentria. Este primeiro indcio
bastante forte, embora no seja conclusivo.
80
Como destaca Robert Shea ao analisar a introduo do novo marco legal estadunidense, agncias
e programas ainda permaneciam insuficientemente orientados para resultados, alm de as decises
no se basearem na informao sobre desempenho: The Government Performance and Results Act
laid a strong foundation for performance management in the federal government. However, numerous
weaknesses in the implementation of the Act impeded its progress. Many agency and programme
measures were insufficiently outcome-oriented. Neither Congress nor the executive based its
decisions on available performance information. Implementation of the Act was more of an exercise
than a useful process to inform decision makers about and help improve programme performance. Cf.
SHEA, Robert J. Performance Budgeting in the United States. OECD Jounal on Budgeting. Volume 08
n 1, 2008, p. 62.
55
temtica do Oramento por Resultados continuar presente nos debates acerca das
reformas que se pretendem.
56
6. CONCLUSES
57
58
59
60
61
REFERNCIAS BIBLIOGRFICAS
62
KRISTENSEN, Jens Kromann; GROSZYK, Walter S.; BUHLER, Bernd. Outcomefocused Management and Budgeting. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2002.
LANE, Jan-Erik. The Public Sector. Concepts, Models and Approaches. Second
Edition. London: SAGE Publications, 1995.
ORGANISATION
FOR
ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION
AND
DEVELOPMENT
63
SECRETARIA
Indicadores
DE
de
PLANEJAMENTO
Programas
Guia
INVESTIMENTOS
Metodolgico.
ESTRATGICOS.
Braslia:
Ministrio
do
SCHICK, Allen. La presupuestacin tiene algn futuro? Serie Gestin Pblica n 21.
Traduccin de Varinia Tromben y revisin final de Ricardo Martner. Naciones
Unidas. Instituto Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Planificacin Econmica y Social
(ILPES): Chile, maio/2002.
SHAH, Anwar. Local Budgeting. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007.