Country Assessments Invitation Process For CD-2004

Country Assessments
Invitation Process for the

Community of Democracies
December 2004
Prepared by the Democracy Coalition Project, in collaboration with Freedom House
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .
RECOMMENDATIONS
CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION .
SURVEY METHODOLOGY ...
COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
1. Algeria
2. Afghanistan
3. Armenia .
4. Azerbaijan .
5. Bahrain .
6. Burkina-Faso .
7. Cote dIvoire .
8. Egypt
9. Fiji ...
10. Georgia ..
11. Haiti ..
12. Jordan ......................................................................................
13. Kenya .
14. Kuwait .
15. Lebanon
16. Madagascar .
17. Malaysia
18. Moldova
19. Morocco ..
20. Nepal
21. Oman ..
22. Qatar
23. Russia
24. Sierra Leone ...
25. Singapore
26. Tunisia
27. Uganda
28. Ukraine
29. Venezuela .
30. Yemen ..
9
12
15
18
21
26
28
30
32
33
36
39
41
43
45
48
50
52
54
57
61
62
64
73
75
78
81
83
88
93
ADDENDUM:
Letter from Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and
accompanying submission recommending Taiwan be
invited as a Participant to the Community of Democracies
Santiago Ministerial Meeting 97
-1-.
INTRODUCTION
The Community of Democracies is an association of democratic states dedicated to
strengthening democratic values and institutions at home and abroad. Over 100
governments participated in a landmark international political event in Warsaw, Poland
in June 2000 where in an effort to further consolidate their commitment to democratic
principles, they agreed to endorse the Warsaw Declaration, which committed them to
building a community of democracies. A Convening Group, composed of Chile, Czech
Republic, India, Mali, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, and United
States, was formed to coordinate the Community of Democracies policies and activities.
A second ministerial meeting was held in Seoul, Korea in November 2002 to decide how
to deepen and sustain the commitments made in Warsaw. For the purpose of
determining which states to invite to the second ministerial, the Convening Group relied
on a Criteria for Participation paper and created a new category of observer states.
The third Community of Democracies is scheduled to be held in Santiago, Chile in May
2005.
In Seoul, all the member states of the Community of Democracies decided that - In
accordance with the principles articulated in the Warsaw Declaration, the Community of
Democracies, through as wide consultations as possible with its participants, will not
include those countries where there is currently a disruption of constitutional rule or
severe persistent erosion of or lack of essential elements of democracy. The Seoul Plan
of Action further defines the essential elements of representative democracy are:
respect for human rights civil, political, economic, social and cultural including freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion and conscience; access to and free
exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; the holding of periodic free and fair elections
based on secret balloting and universal suffrage monitored by independent election authorities;
freedom of association including the right to form independent political parties; separation of
powers, especially an independent judiciary; and constitutional subordination of all state
institutions, including the military, to the legally-constituted civilian authority.
Chile, as chair of the Convening Group, has indicated that invitations to the Third CD
Ministerial meeting will be reviewed de novo, meaning that no country is automatically
invited on grounds they were invited to prior meetings. In addition, the Convening
Group is expected to continue the practice of inviting governments as full participants or
as observers. The Convening Group confirmed that they will be using the 27 September
2002 Criteria for Participation and Procedures when issuing invitations to Santiago.1
This report examines events in thirty states over the last two years in order to determine
whether each state meets the standards adopted by the Community of Democracies in
Warsaw and Seoul for participation in the Community.
1
In September, 2002 the Community of Democracies Convening Group determined that states need to
respect certain democratic standards in order to participate in the Community of Democracies; see
http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/CD_participation_criteria.pdf
-2-.
RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SANTIAGO MINISTERIAL MEETING INVITATIONS
Country
Algeria
Warsaw Meeting
(2000)
Participant
Seoul Meeting
(2002)
Observer
Santiago Meeting
(2005)
Observer
Afghanistan
Not Invited
Observer
Observer
Armenia
Participant
Observer
Non-invitee
Azerbaijan
Participant
Observer
Non-Invitee
Bahrain
Not Invited
Participant
Observer
Burkina-Faso
Not Invited
Observer
Observer
Cote DIvoire
Not Invited
Observer
Non-invitee
Egypt
Participant
Observer
Observer
Fiji
Not Invited
Observer
Observer
Georgia
Participant
Observer
Participant
Haiti
Participant
Observer
Observer
Jordan
Participant
Participant
Observer
Kenya
Participant
Not Invited
Participant
Kuwait
Participant
Observer
Non-invitee
Lebanon
Invited
Observer
Non-invitee
Madagascar
Participant
Observer
Participant
Malaysia
Not Invited
Observer
Observer
Moldova
Participant
Participant
Observer
Morocco
Participant
Participant
Observer
Nepal
Participant
Participant
Non-invitee
Oman
Not Invited
Observer
Non-invitee
Qatar
Participant
Observer
Observer
Russia
Participant
Participant
Non-invitee
Sierra Leone
Not Invited
Observer
Observer
Singapore
Not Invited
Observer
Non-invitee
Tunisia
Participant
Observer
Non-invitee
Uganda
Not Invited
Not Invited
Non-invitee
Ukraine
Participant
Observer
Participant
Venezuela
Participant
Participant
Observer
Yemen
Participant
Observer
Observer
-3-.
LIST OF NON-INVITEES
The follow countries should not be considered for an invitation as an Observer or
Participant to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting in May 2004
Angola
Nepal*
Armenia*
North Korea
Azerbaijan*
Oman*
Belarus
Pakistan
Bhutan
Russia*
Brunei
Rwanda
Burma (Myanmar)
Saudi Arabia
Cambodia
Singapore*
Cameroon
Somalia
Central African Republic
Sudan
Chad
Swaziland
China
Syria
Congo (Kinshasa)
Tajikistan
Cote DIvoire*
Togo
Cuba
Tunisia*
Eritrea
Turkmenistan
Equatorial Guinea
Uganda*
Guinea
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Iran
Uzbekistan
Iraq
Vietnam
Kazakhstan
Zimbabwe
Kuwait*
Kyrgyzstanh
Laos
Lebanon*
Liberia
Libya
Maldives
Mauritania
* For an in-depth analysis of these countries

please refer to the Country Assessments
section of this report.
h Parliamentary elections are scheduled for
February 2005. If they are conducted in a free
and fair manner and democratic reforms
continue, Kyrgyzstans status should be
reevaluated.
-4-.
CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION

The following report evaluates the performance of a number of countries since the 2002
Seoul Ministerial Meeting using the criteria set down by the Community of Democracies
Convening Group. At their meeting of 12 September 2000, the Foreign Ministers of the
Community of Democracies Convening Group agreed to direct senior officials to
prepare proposals that would allow for the establishment of basic criteria for
participation in the Community.2 The Foreign Ministers felt that the Final Warsaw
Declaration provides a reasonable approach to the definition of criteria for participation
and that the criteria should reflect a clear linkage between participation and the
observance of internationally accepted fundamental democratic principles, values and
standards in the countries concerned.
The criteria should also reflect a balance between the Community of Democracies aim to
promote and strengthen democracy and the acknowledgement that its current
participants are at differing stages in their democratic development. The following
criteria for participation were agreed to:
PARTICIPATION CRITERIA
The Final Warsaw Declaration draws on major principles of international law
and international standards codified namely in the UN Charter, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
The Warsaw Declaration recognized the interdependence between peace,
development, human rights and democracy, as well as the universality of
democratic values. The Community of Democracies should be a privileged
forum for the defense and promotion of this comprehensive concept of
democracy.
In this sense, States willing to participate in the Community of Democracies
should respect democratic standards as follows:
Free, fair and periodic elections, by universal and equal suffrage, conducted
by secret ballot
Multipartidarism, the freedom to form democratic political parties that can

participate in elections
Guaranteeing that everyone can exercise his or her right to take part in the
government of his or her country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives
The Rule of Law
See http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/CD_participation_criteria.pdf
-5-.
The obligation of an elected government to protect and defend the

constitution, refraining from extra-constitutional actions and to relinquish
power when its legal mandate ends
Ensuring equality before the law and equal protection under the law,
including equal access to the law
Separation of powers, separation of the judiciary, legislative and executive

independence of the judiciary from the political or any other power
Ensuring that the military remains accountable to democratically elected

civilian
government
The respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the inherent dignity
of the human being, notably
-
Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, belief, peaceful assembly and

association, freedom of speech, of opinion and of expression, including to
exchange and receive ideas and information through any media,
regardless of frontiers: free, independent and pluralistic media
The right of every person to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention

from torture or any other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment
The right to a fair trial, including to be presumed innocent until proven

guilty and to be sentenced proportionally to the crime, free from cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment
The right to full and non-discriminatory participation, regardless of

gender, race, color, language, religion or belief, in the political,
economical and cultural life
The promotion of gender equality
The rights of children, elderly and persons with disabilities
The rights of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, including

the right to freely express, preserve and develop their identity
The right of individuals to shape their own destiny free from any
illegitimate constraint
Governments are to defend and to protect all of these rights and to provide the
appropriate legislation for this purpose.
The observance of international law as well as of internationally accepted
democratic principles and values.
Respect for universally accepted labor standards.
-6-.
CRITERIA FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

The Convening Group (CG) will draft the list of participants and observers, not
based on participation in the Warsaw meeting but rather on a state's adherence
to main requisites. In subsequent years the CG will review each participant's,
observer's, and non-participant's compliance with the requisites to determine
participation.
If any state fails to comply, for a reasonable period of time, with one or several of
these main requisites, it will not be invited to participate in any events of the
Community of Democracies, for a limited time and as long as deemed necessary.
Alternatively, a state may be invited as an observer for as long as is determined
appropriate. Invitations to attend as an observer will be issued to countries that
fail to meet international standards of democracy and human rights if they are in
a transition process and have given concrete steps along the lines of the
participation criteria set out above.
The fact that countries find themselves at different stages in their democratic
development is to be considered. Nevertheless situations that raise a question
regarding their commitment to democratic values will be evaluated by the CG.
Different stages of democratic consolidation does not mean different criteria are
used to assess whether a country should be invited to participate
.
-7-.
SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The countries examined in this survey have been identified using the following criteria:
1.
Countries that experienced a change in their classification as between the Warsaw

Ministerial Meeting in 2000 and the Seoul Ministerial Meeting in 2002
2.
Countries that have witnessed a recent decline in their democracy and good
governance rankings/ ratings, having regard to the major international indices
3.
Countries that were invited to the previous Community of Democracies Ministerial

Meeting, but rank/ rate below the median on the major democracy and good
governance indices; and
4.
Countries where recent events warrant closer scrutiny
The main democracy and good governance indicators consulted in order to identify the
countries of concern were: World Bank Institute Governance Research Indicators 2002
(WBI Governance Indicators); Freedom House Freedom in the World Ratings 200204 (FH Rankings); Polity IV Project Composite Indicators of Democracy 2002
(Polity Score); Bertlesmann Transformation Index Political Transformation 2003
(BTI); and the Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database. A broad cross-section of
indices has been selected in order to ameliorate any ideological bias that would be
present if a narrower selection of indices were used.
In recognition of the fact democracy and governance indicators are not a precise tool and
are only as up to date as at the time of publication, they were used in the preliminary
stages of analysis to identify countries of interest. However, the survey then turned to
qualitative research when making recommendations about the countries of concern.
The main sources relied upon when undertaking the qualitative analysis were media
reporting, accounts and reports from international and regional organizations, civil
society reports and input and analysis of political development by local experts. A draft
version of the report was circulated for comment to all those participating in the Nongovernmental Process of the Community of Democracies. We acknowledge that our
qualitative analysis has been limited to English language materials.
-8-.
1.
ALGERIA
1.1
BACKGROUND
Algeria was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Observer at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting.
Since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Algeria conducted presidential elections, which
were only the third such elections since the country returned to civilian rule in 1996.
International observers noted several improvements in the 8 April 2004 presidential poll,
in which the incumbent, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was returned for another five-year term
with 85 percent of the vote.3 This election was free of the usual overt military
interference that had become customary in Algerian elections recently,4 although some
believe the militarys neutrality was due more to confidence in its continued influence
over civilian government than any genuine willingness to accept an opposition
candidate. There was generally a marked improvement from the 1999 presidential
elections, which was boycotted by all of the opposition parties on the eve of the poll5 on
the grounds that they believed there was widespread fraud.
President Bouteflika has been credited with taming the 12-year old Islamic insurgency
which has left approximately 100,000 people dead.6 He campaigned on his track record,
claiming that his policy of national reconciliation has led to a reduction in political
violence. The president introduced a Civil Harmony law after the past presidential
elections, which granted amnesty or leniency to rebels who renounced violence.7 The
opposition advocated a tougher approach to the Islamists,8 but it appears as if the public
voted for the most likely guarantor of stability.9
Despite the generally positive assessment by international observers, as reported in the
international media, the local independent media10 and opposition groups have
Election World database (accessed 5 October 2004); available at

http://www.electionworld.org/algeria.htm
4 Algerias next move After the voting, International Herald Tribune 17 April 2004 (accessed 4
October 2004); available at http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=2610&1=1
5 Algeria leader seeks second term, BBC News 19 February 2004 (accessed 5 October 2004); available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3503425.stm
6 Tension as Algeria counts votes, BBC News, 9 April 2004 (accessed 4 October 2004); available
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3612867.stm
7 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003 Country Reports: Algeria (New York: Freedom House,
2003), 47.
8 Q&A: Algerias presidential election, BBC News 9 April 2004 (accessed 5 October 2004); available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3511254.stm
9 Algerias next move After the voting, International Herald Tribune 17 April 2004 (accessed 4
October 2004); available at http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=2610&1=1
10 Algeria press aghast at election result, BBC News, 10 April 2004 (accessed 5 October 2004);
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3616461.stm
3
-9-.
criticized the elections once again, claiming that there has been massive fraud and
irregularities.11 They argue the government used tactics to limit an open and fair
competition, including:
Bouteflika-aligned Constitutional Council rejecting Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimis

candidacy on account of him not securing the requisite number of signatures to
run. Ibrahimi was a former minister with close ties to the Islamic Salvation Front
party and considered a strong challenger.
Algerias state television provided favorable coverage to the incumbent in the

lead up to the presidential elections, in contravention of regulations concerning
the use of state resources for political purposes; and
Representatives of the opposition were unable to verify the accuracy of the voter
list before voter registration had closed, prompting claims that electoral
authorities had manipulated the list in favor of the incumbent.12
Furthermore, in the wake of the elections the independent press has raised concerns that
Bouteflikas government may be attempting to silence its critics. Since the presidential
elections Mohamed Benchicou, editor of the Le Matin newspaper, was imprisoned for
two years and fined the equivalent of $US 280,000 on 14 June for financial irregularities.
Meanwhile, Hafnaoui Ghoul, a journalist and human rights activist received a two
month prison sentence for defaming a retired general. Ali Djerri, the editor of another
leading daily newspaper, El-Khabar, in his absence was given a two month sentence for
defamation.13 Reporters Without Borders echoes the concerns of the local press, noting
that since the last presidential elections in April . we have witnessed a growing
authoritarian tendency in a bid to bring the privately owned Algerian press into line.14
Over the past decade, Algeria has led the world in "disappearances" with Algerian
security forces disappearing at least 7,000 persons.15 Notably, however, since the last
Ministerial Meeting there were no new confirmed abduction cases or disappearances,
although security forces continued to make arrests in a manner that violated Algerian
law and put detainees at greater risk of "disappearing."16
A victory for the status quo, BBC News 9 April 2004 (accessed 5 October 2004); available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/afric/3615071.stm; and Observers praise Algerian voting,
BBC News, 10 April 2004 (accessed 5 October 2004); available at http://newsvote
12 Steven A. Cook, Algerias Elections: No Democratic Turning Point, Arab Reform Bulletin 20 April
2004; available at
http://www.cfr.org/pub6952/steven_a_cook/algerias_elections_no_democratic_turning_point.php
13 Algerian press decries journalists jailing, BBC News, 24 June 2004 (accessed 4 October 2004);
available http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3837039.stm
14 Reporters Without Borders urges French foreign minister to raise press freedom issues with
Algerian authorities, Reporters Without Borders, 12 July 2004 (accessed 4 October 2004); available
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10948
15 Algeria Led World in Forced Disappearances:, Human Rights Watch Media Release, February 27,
2003, available at http://hrw.org/press/2003/02/algeria022703.htm
16Human Rights Watch World Report 2003, Algeria Profile, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast1.html
11
-10-.
1.2
ANALYSIS
Irrespective of the suspicions of fraud, reports from western diplomats and by

international observers in the international media17 indicate the presidential elections
were free and fair and were a marked improvement from the 1991 military coup, which
invalidated that years electoral results. The accusations by opposition groups that the
government used tactics to limit an open and fair competition and continuing reports of
intimidation and harassment of the media are worrisome. Such actions have a chilling
effect on democracy and run contrary to the criteria set down for determining which
countries are able to participate in the Community of Democracies and right of citizens
to freely choose their leaders.
Democracy is more than just free and fair elections though. The indicators suggest
Algeria continues to lag behind the rest of the Community of Democracies in its attempt
to consolidate democracy. Of particular concern are Algerias FH Rankings, which have
remained static at Not Free since 1996; the low Voice and Accountability assessment in
the WBI Governance Indicators, which only improved marginally from 2000 through to
2002; and Algerias poor ranking for Institutional Stability conferred by the BTI. While
the trend in Algeria, as demonstrated by the 2004 elections is encouraging, other
indicators of democracy are not as impressive. Indeed, in the realm of human rights,
while there was a noticeable decline in reports of violations, in actuality this change may
be due to a decrease in overall political violence throughout the country rather than a
proactive decision by the government to institute safeguards.18
1.3
RECOMMENDATION
Algeria should be invited as an Observer to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting, but

could be considered for full participation if demonstrable progress on issues of press
freedom, military neutrality in politics, and freedom of assembly is made in the future.
If the governments authoritarian tendencies continue or worsen, then Algerias status of
Observer should be reevaluated.
1.4
STATISTICS
WORLD BANK INSTITUTE: GOVERNANCE RESEARCH INDICATORS 2002

Range: -2.5 to 2.5 (higher is better)
Year
2002
2000
Voice and
Accountability
-0.96
-1.31
Political
Stability
-1.54
-1.70
Government
Effectiveness
-0.59
-0.75
17
Regulatory
Quality
-0.54
-0.80
Rule of
Law
-0.54
-0.79
Control of
Corruption
-0.70
-0.65
Tension as Algeria counts votes, BBC News, 9 April 2004 (accessed 4 October 2004); available
18 Human Rights Watch World Report 2003, Algeria Profile available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast1.html#developments
-11-.
FREEDOM HOUSE: FREEDOM IN THE WORLD RATINGS 2004

Range: 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free category
Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Not Free
POLITY IV PROJECT: COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY 2002

Range:
DEMOC and AUTOC = 0 to 10 (higher is better)
POLITY = -10 to 10 (-10 is high autocracy and 10 is high democracy)
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
1
1
4
4
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-3
-3
BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 2003

Range: 1 to 5 (higher is better)
Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
2.
AFGHANISTAN
2.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
1.8
Afghanistan was not invited to the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting, but after the fall of the
Taliban government, attended the Seoul Ministerial Meeting as an Observer.
Since the Seoul meeting, Afghanistan has seen a dramatic turnaround as it moves
towards political consolidation. After more than two decades of war and repressive
authoritarian regimes, the countrys infrastructure and institutions have been all but
destroyed. This destruction is compounded by a precarious security situation, which
makes access to a substantial portion of the country extremely difficult.
2.2
ANALYSIS
Following the ousting of the Taliban, the Bonn Agreement was signed in December
2001, which created a provisional government to oversee the reconstruction efforts and
lay the groundwork for democratic government. The ratification of Afghanistans new
constitution took place in January 2004 after months of deliberating and consulting with
the public and was essential to creating a legitimate framework. Indeed, this constitution
-12-.
is an important step forward for Afghanistans democratic prospects as it establishes a

transparent political system that establishes equal rights for men and women and
endorses the basic rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.19
Afghanistans presidential elections, which were held in October 2004, were a significant
benchmark towards building a genuine democracy.
There were more than ten political parties that participated in the electionsall of
whom in theory were given equal opportunity to campaign but many of whom
encountered frequent threats and harassment after speaking openly about political
issues. In addition, the fragile security situation and pressure from military factions
inhibited campaign efforts outside of Kabul.20
Despite an inflated percentage of registered voters (over 100 percent) and an initial
debacle with the indelible ink used to ensure citizens voted only once, reports from
international observers endorsed the elections as fairly democratic and notably free of
violence.21 The issue of the ink and the potential for fraudulent voting was seized upon
by opposition candidates who called for a boycott of the elections. However,
international and Afghan election officials agreed to create an independent commission
to probe opposition charges of fraud. The EU envoy commented that despite some
irregularities and flaws, the outcome of the vote had not been compromised.
In spite of the judicial reform commission, which was created in November 2002, the
existing legal system is not yet viable. Courts lack legitimacy as there is a perception
among the people that the judicial system is unable to properly serve the interests of
justice and there arent a sufficient number of trained lawyers and judges.22
Furthermore, there are significant problems with pre-trial detention; defendants are
often denied a fair trial. In general, the rule of law remains extremely weak, a problem
that is exacerbated by the destabilizing effects of the expanding opium economy23 as
well as the numerous armed factions that consistently refuse to comply with the law.
The situation for women in Afghanistan has changed enormously with the fall of the
Taliban. In 2003, Afghanistan took a major step forward by ensuring that both boys and
girls had access to education. Several women have also been appointed or elected to
19 Karlekar, Karin Deutsch, Afghanistan Country Report 2004 in Countries at the Crossroads 2004:A
Survey of Democratic Governance, Christopher Walker and Sarah Repucci, Eds, Freedom House,
Washington, D.C. 2004.
20 The Rule of the Gun Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-up to Afghanistans
Presidential Election, Human Rights Watch Report, September 2004, available at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan0904/1.htm#_Toc83879534
21 Observers approve Afghan election, October 10, 2004, BBC news, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3731746.stm
22 Afghanistan: Re-Establishing the Rule of Law, Amnesty International, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/afghanistan/document.do?id=19AF42AF45403E5380256D80004
6B18A
23 Rubin, Barnett R. Road to Ruin: Afghanistans Booming Opium Industry, Center for American
Progress, October 7, 2004, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7D/ROADTORUIN.PDF
-13-.
important political roles and over 200 women participated in the Loya Jirga (Grand
Council). Currently there is also a female minister of public health, a female minister of
womens affairs and a female heading the human rights commission. However, the
Constitution, while notably better than the one written in 1964, makes no specific
reference to women's rights, referring more vaguely to the rights of citizens.24
Although human rights violations have decreased substantially with the departure of
the Taliban, the situation remains tenuous. In a recent report by Human Rights Watch,
researchers found evidence of government involvement or complicity in abuses in
virtually every district in the southeast.25 In 2003, the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC) investigated and registered 634 cases of violations and
continues to be deeply concerned with the situation of prisons, presence of private jails,
arbitrary detention, and increasing violations in the country.26 Many of the victims are
women and children.
In general, civil society organizations and the media enjoyed a rebirth after the fall of the
Taliban but still have many challenges to overcome. There are several hundred
newspapers in the country, but many publications, especially outside of Kabul, are run
by political factions and do not contain objective news. In addition, international human
rights organizations have documented numerous attacks on the media.27
2.3
RECOMMENDATIONS
Afghanistan has made real progress since the last Ministerial meeting but still has a long
way to go to demonstrate progress in the rule of law and respect for human rights. If
the post-election review demonstrates that the process was free and fair, and
parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2005 are improved, Afghanistan should be
invited to attend the upcoming Ministerial Meeting as an Observer.
Afghan Women Would Accept an Islamic State which Provides Equality for Women, Argues the
Afghan Women's Network, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown
University, November 2003, available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isim/pages/Human%20Rights%20Forum%20Pages/Afgha
mWomen.html
25 Killing You is a Very Easy Thing For Us:
Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch Report, July 2003, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/index.htm
26 See Your House is Not Yours, Dont Insist Otherwise You Will be Jailed and Tortured, Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) available at http://www.aihrc.org.af/reports.htm
27 Killing You is a Very Easy Thing For Us:
Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch Report, July 2003, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/index.htm
24
-14-.
2.4
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-1.31
-1.76
-2.21
-2.44
-1.39
-1.30
-1.82
-3.57
-1.61
-2.31
-1.35
-1.59
FREEDOM HOUSE: FREEDOM IN THE WORLD RATINGS 2004Range: 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free category
Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
6
6
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Not Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
2002*
-66
-66
-66
2001*
-66
-66
-66
*These numbers are outside the traditional Polity IV equation because of the presence of a foreign
occupation.
Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
3.
ARMENIA
3.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
1
OVERALL
FOR
RESULT
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
0.8
Armenias democratic political system faces difficulties. Successive governments have

yet to hold elections that have been recognized as free and fair by the international
community, with the government resorting to vote rigging and other forms of electoral
-15-.
fraud in order to cling to power. The rule of law is generally considered inadequate, and
the country is lacking an independent judiciary.
After the most recent parliamentary and two presidential elections, which were held in
2003, the current Armenian administration, led by President Robert Kocharian, faced a
barrage of domestic and international criticism. The opposition refused to accept the
official results of the ballots, which resulted in a second term in office and a loyal
legislature for Kocharian, staging street protests, which resulted in a political standoff.
The entrenched nature of the electoral fraud and the ineffectiveness of the street protests
and political standoff that followed indicate the grim fact that regime change through
elections is practically impossible in Armenia today.
Despite the Armenian authorities stated commitment to the rule of law, there appears to
be little improvement, with Armenia only receiving a score of -0.44 on the WBI
Governance Indicators and a 2 on the BTI. The failure to uphold the rule of law is
particularly visible in economic life, where government connections and influence are
vital to economic success.
The Armenian authorities human rights record is similarly poor. The regime has often
violated constitutional provisions guaranteeing a broad range of individual liberties and
rights. Mistreatment of detainees by law-enforcement officials is the most widespread
form of human rights abuse in Armenia. The government has made no visible efforts to
tackle torture by police and to date no authorities have been held accountable.
Armenias judicial system is riddled with corruption and mistrusted by the population.
It remains susceptible to government influence, not least because the constitution
provides that the president of the republic is the guarantor of the independence of the
judicial bodies. The president has the exclusive authority to appoint and dismiss almost
all judges; therefore, Armenian courts rarely make decisions contrary to the wishes of
the head of state. Court trials are not perceived to be fair, especially when government
interests are involved.
The arrest and imprisonment on trumped-up charges of scores of opposition supporters
during the 2003 presidential race illustrates that Armenian courts are unwilling to make
decisions contradicting the executives wishes. The election crackdown was carried out
under Armenias Soviet-era Code of Administrative Offenses, which fails to guarantee
detainees access to counsel and is often exploited by the authorities. Despite its fairly
low crime rate, Armenia has seen a number of politically motivated killings since
independence.
Freedom of expression suffered a serious blow in April 2002 when the authorities shut
down the A1+ independent television company. A1+ was the only major private
Armenian broadcaster, which was often critical of Kocharian. The dozens of other
private TV channels, mainly owned by pro-government businesspeople, rarely air any
criticism of the president and are often biased against his opponents. Armenias print
media are far more free and diverse, but it is not uncommon for journalists to exercise
self-censorship when covering security agencies or powerful business oligarchs.
-16-.
3.2
RECOMMENDATION
Armenia should not be invited as an Observer or a Participant to the Santiago Ministerial

Meeting.
3.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.42
-0.30
-0.53
-0.73
-0.42
-0.87
+0.13
-0.39
-0.44
-0.51
-0.72
-0.76
Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
4
4
Civil Liberties
4
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
6
6
1
1
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
5
5

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
3
-17-.
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL
FOR
RESULT
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.6
4.
AZERBAIJAN
4.1
BACKGROUND
Azerbaijan was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, presidential elections saw Ilham Aliyev succeed his
father, Heydar Aliyev, as president of Azerbaijan after winning a new five-year term
with 71% of the vote.28 Heydar Aliyev was unable to contest the 15 October 2003
presidential elections because of his ailing health.
However, the elections have generally been criticized because of voter intimidation,
violence, media bias and fraud.29 The OSCE Election Observation Mission found that
the elections failed to meet OSCE commitments and other international standards and
the overall process reflected a lack of sufficient political commitment to implement a
genuine election process.30 The Council of Europe concurred with this assessment,
noting the election failed to meet international standards and the lack of transparency
of the process and the poor performance of the election administration allowed for
the falsification of the election results.31 The pre-election atmosphere was manipulated
to hinder the oppositions ability to campaign and on voting day, the government
carried out a well-organized campaign of fraud throughout the country to ensure a
victory for Ilham Aliyev.32
There were high hopes for the presidential elections after the introduction of the new
unified Election Code on 27 May 2003, which contained safeguards against fraud,
including the use of transparent ballot boxes, numbered ballots and result protocols, and
envelopes for ballots; mandatory posting of precinct-level protocols at constituency
election commissions; and a prohibition of any persons other than voters, commission
members, accredited observers and the police at polling stations on election day.33
However, the promise of this new legislation was tainted when complementary
Election World database (accessed 27 September 2004); available at

http://www.electionworld.org/azerbaijan.htm#1
29 See BBC World Service Country Profile: Azerbaijan (accessed 24 September 2004); available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/default.stm
30 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Republic of Azerbaijan Presidential Election 15
October 2003 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report (Warsaw, OSCE Office of Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, 12 November 2003), 1.
31 Council of Europe, Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Azerbaijan, Report of the Committee on
the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe,
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 10030, 12 January 2004, para.5
32 Human Rights Watch, Crushing Dissent: Repression, Violence and Azerbaijans Elections, Human
Rights Watch Report, 16, no.1(D) (January 2004): 2.
28
-18-.
legislation was adopted the same day installing a Central Election Commission (CEC)
that was biased in favor of the incumbent government.34
The main reasons why international observers concluded the presidential elections were
not free and fair are:
The counting and tabulation of election results were seriously flawed
International observers were not allowed to monitor the post-election activities at

the CEC in the crucial days before the announcement of the final results
The components of the unified Election Code designed to safeguard against

fraud were not universally implemented
An atmosphere of intimidation leading up to the poll gravely undercut public

participation and free campaigning
Serious violence and excessive use of force by police compounded the

atmosphere of intimidation
The State media and private television stations were heavily biased in their news
and reporting in favor of the incumbent party; and
Observers witnessed irregularities during voting and widespread fraudulent

practices, including ballot stuffing and tampering with protocols at both the
precinct and constituency levels.35
Following the election there were protests and a sweeping government crackdown on
the opposition that resulted in hundreds of people being detained around the country,36
in particular opposition leaders, opposition party members, activists, journalists and
election officials were targeted. Those who were detained suffered beatings and were
tortured, including electric shocks and threats of rape.37 In November 2003 the OSCE
Election Observation Mission encouraged the government of Azerbaijan to release the
prisoners and to ensure the intimidation of opposition members and their families
ceased.38
Unfortunately by mid-January still more than a hundred opposition leaders and
supporters remained in detention, facing charges that could lead to twelve years
Ibid: 4.
Ibid: 1-2.
36 The OSCE Election Observation Mission notes that over 600 people were detained: Ibid: 2;
meanwhile Human Rights Watch reports the number somewhere in the vicinity close to 1000 (Human
Rights Watch, Crushing Dissent: Repression, Violence and Azerbaijans Elections, Human Rights
Watch Report, 16, no.1(D) (January 2004): 2.)
37 Human Rights Watch, Crushing Dissent: Repression, Violence and Azerbaijans Elections, Human
Rights Watch Report, 16, no.1(D) (January 2004): 2.
34
35
-19-.
imprisonment.39 That same month the Council of Europe urged Azerbaijan to release
or bring to trial supporters and leaders of the opposition political parties detained in the
post-election period.40
Unfortunately, it appears as if the situation in Azerbaijan has not improved since the
beginning of this year. In their most recent report Human Rights Watch notes that the
government continues to impose harsh restrictions on the media and to target journalists
in order to stifle free speech and the opposition and continues to detain the editor-inchief of the opposition daily newspaper.41
4.2
ANALYSIS
It is clear that since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting the Azerbaijani government failed to:
Facilitate the conduct of free and fair presidential elections
Promote multipartidarism
Ensure equality before the law for all its citizens, including equal access to the
law; and
Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of

expression and freedom of association.42
Azerbaijan continues to rate poorly in all of the democracy indicators. The recent
deterioration of political rights is reflected in the most recent FH Rankings which saw
Freedom House downgrade their assessment of Azerbaijan from Partly Free to Not Free.
In addition Azerbaijan has been awarded an appalling Polity Score, which does not even
take into account the most recent events; it has witnessed a decrease in the Voice and
Accountability score for the WBI Governance Indicators; and Azerbaijan was awarded a
zero ranking for Institutional Stability by the BTI.
Furthermore, the events detailed in the most recent Human Rights Watch report suggest
that not only does Azerbaijan fail to meet a number of criteria for invitation to the
Santiago Ministerial Meeting, but that the Azerbaijani government has no intention of
governing in the spirit of democracy in the near future.
4.3
RECOMMENDATION
Azerbaijan should not be invited to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting as an Observer or

Participant.
Human Rights Watch, Crushing Dissent: Repression, Violence and Azerbaijans Elections, Human
Rights Watch Report, 16, no.1(D), (January 2004), 2.
40 Council of Europe, Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Azerbaijan, Report of the Committee on
the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe,
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 10030, 12 January 2004, para.9.
41 Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Media, the Presidential Elections and the Aftermath, Human
Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 4 August 2004: 7.
42 Article 19 & 21: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976.
39
-20-.
4.4
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
-0.97
-0.81
2002
2000
Political
Stability
-1.13
-0.67
Government
Effectiveness
-0.96
-0.89
Regulatory
Quality
-0.82
-0.30
Rule of
Law
-0.79
-0.98
Control of
Corruption
-1.07
-1.13

Year
2004
2001 -02
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
0
0
7
7
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-7
-7

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
5.
BAHRAIN
5.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
1.8
Bahrain was upgraded from a Non-invitee to the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to a

Participant at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting.
-21-.
Shortly before the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Bahrain conducted elections on 24 and 31
October 2002 for a 40 member parliament, named the Council of Deputies.43 These were
the first such elections in almost 30 years.44
The elections came after a successful referendum on political reform in February 2001
that sought to transform the country from an absolute monarchy, where the Emir,
Shaykh Hamad ibn `Isa Al Khalifah, ruled by decree, into a constitutional monarchy
with an elected lower chamber, an upper chamber called the Consultative Council
appointed by the King, an independent judiciary and universal suffrage.45 Despite the
introduction of these constitutional reforms, King Hamad continues to wield ultimate
political power.46
In preparation for the Council of Deputies elections, eleven political societies under the
supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, along with numerous other
professional, charitable, cultural, and other voluntary organizations were allowed to
form.47 This was a marked step forward for democracy in Bahrain as political parties
have traditionally been, and continue to be, banned from forming.48
The elections were boycotted by the influential Shiite National Accord Society and three
political societies belonging to the traditional opposition on the grounds that granting
equal power to the elected Chamber of Deputies and the appointed Consultative
Council would mean that the Chamber of Deputies could not pass any law without the
approval of the Kings government.49 Although the boycott resulted in a lower
participation rate,50 the government did allow large rallies in the days before the vote.
IPU Parline Database (accessed 27 September 2004); available at http://www.ipu.org/parlinee/parlinesearch.asp

44 See BBC World Service Country Profile: Bahrain (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/default.stm
45 Ibid
46 Polity IV Country Report 2002: Bahrain (accessed 22 September 2004); available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Bah1.htm
47 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Programme on Governance in the Arab
Region (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/bahrain/elections.html
48 Election World database (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://www.electionworld.org/bahrain.htm
49 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Programme on Governance in the Arab
Region (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/bahrain/elections.html. See Polity IV Country Report 2002: Bahrain;
available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Bah1.htm
50 The participation rate for the elections was 53% of eligible voters: United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (accessed 27 September 2004);
available at http://www.pogar.org/countries/bahrain/elections.html.
43
-22-.
Strong participation by female voters at the earlier municipal elections and the
subsequent elections for the Chamber of Deputies was notable.51
Despite the bold steps towards the consolidation of democracy in Bahrain since the 2001
referendum, recently there have been a number of reports from civil society and human
rights groups indicating that the Bahraini government has adopted a regressive
approach to democratic reform.
Earlier this year several political and democracy activists were arrested and detained; in
particular 17 Bahrainis were arrested on 30 April 2004 for collecting signatures for a
petition criticizing the 2002 constitutional amendments and requesting more power be
divested from the monarchy and given to the elected Chamber of Deputies rather than
the appointed Consultative Council.52 Apparently the activists had obtained tens of
thousands of signatures. Following these initial arrests a further five activists were
arrested in their homes on 5-6 May 2004.53
Prosecutor Ahmad Shinaishin stated that they were charged for calling for change to
the political system, provoking hatred and trying to destabilize public security.54 The
pro-democracy activists were charged under the 1976 Penal Code, specifically:
Attempting to overthrow the political system (Article 160)
Encouraging hatred of the State (Article 165)
Using illegal means to try to petition His Majesty King Hamad (Article 160); and
Distributing falseness and rumors (Article 168)55
On their arrest the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR) sought to defend the prodemocracy activists by advocating for their release. The president of BCHR, Nabeel
Rajab, reported to Human Rights Watch that officials in the Public Prosecutors office
requested organizers of the petition pledge not to attempt to obtain any further
signatures, except from those people who were members of the society collecting the
Female voters made up 52% of the voters at the May 2002 municipal elections - U.S. Department of
State, Background Note: Bahrain, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2004), 3 (accessed 21
September 2004); available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414pf.htm
52 Human Rights Watch, Press Release (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/17/bahrai8588_txt.htm; Front Line Defenders of Human Rights
Defenders, News Archive (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/news/1190; and International Federation for Human Rights
(FIDH), Urgent Action (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://www.fidh.org/article_print.php3?id_article=1072
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Urgent Action (accessed 27 September 2004);
available at http://www.fidh.org/article_print.php3?id_article=1072
51
-23-.
signatures before the petition was started. If the pro-democracy activists were to give
this pledge the government agreed to drop the charges against the detainees.56
In response to their attempts to free the activists from detention the BCHR received a
letter from the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs demanding they cease their political
agenda, which the Minister claimed contravenes Law 21 of 1989 on Societies prohibiting
societies or organizations conducting political activities. They threaten that if BCHR
fails to end their unspecified political activities their license will be revoked.57
Bahrain does not permit political parties, but the government has until recently
permitted limited political activity by several societies, such as the Shiite National
Accord Society.58 However, a draft Societies Law aims to govern the formation and
activities of all societies, including the BCHR. Only societies that agree with the 2002
constitution will be allowed to function and those who breach the law will face strict jail
sentences of up to life imprisonment.59 This proposed new law poses a direct threat to
Bahrains four main opposition societies, which openly oppose the constitution60 as well
as to pro-democracy societies that support any type of reform to make the system more
open and accountable.
In a startling development and illustrative of the new restrictive approach the Bahraini
government has to freedom of speech and association, the Executive Director of BCHR,
Mr Abdul-Hadi Al-Khawaja, was arrested on 26 September 2004 and charged with
encouraging hate of the state and distributing falseness and rumors under the 1976
Penal Code for a paper he presented at a symposium on Combating Poverty in Bahrain.61
He denies the allegations. During his presentation Mr. Al-Khawaja criticized
government policy and called for the government to address the contradiction between
the deteriorating standards of living and the strong state economy, unequal
distribution of wealth and financial corruption.62 In addition the government has
dissolved the BCHR.63 Mr. Al-Khawaja was tried and convicted of inciting hatred of the
Human Rights Watch, Press Release (accessed 27 September 2004); available at

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/17/bahrai8588_txt.htm
57 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Urgent Action (accessed 27 September 2004);
available at http://www.fidh.org/article_print.php3?id_article=1072
58 Human Rights Watch, Press Release (accessed 27 September 2004); available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/17/bahrai8588_txt.htm
59 Societies worried by draft law, Gulf Daily News The Voice of Bahrain, 22 September 2004 (accessed
24 September 2004); available at http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/printnews.asp?Article=92293
60 Ibid
61 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Head of Bahrain Centre for Human Rights in
Detention (accessed 27 September 2004); available at http://www.fidh.org/article.php3?id_article=1938
62 Ibid
63 Bahraini Human Rights Centre Dissolved, Al Jazeera, 29 September 2004 (accessed 29 September
2004); available at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/E3D6EEA3-909A-489F-904C31D497328738.htm; also see Bahrain: Concern over the detention of human rights defender and
closure of human rights centre, Amnesty International Public Statement, 29 September 2004 (accessed 30
September 2004); available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE110032004
56
-24-.
state and sentenced to one year in jail on 21 November 2004. The King swiftly pardoned
the human rights activist and ordered the release of 13 other people who had protested
in his support.64 However, the Kings decree appears only to be a suspension of the
remainder of his sentence rather than a pardon of the charges. Furthermore, there has
been no indication that the laws which resulted in Mr. Al-Khawajas imprisonment and
the dissolution of the BCHR will be repealed or amended to allow for human rights and
political associations to freely operate and to guarantee Bahrainis freedom of expression.
5.2
ANALYSIS
While Bahrain has taken important steps toward democracy since the Warsaw meeting,
its democracy indicators continue to languish. The Voice and Accountability measure in
the WBI Governance Indicators did improve in 2002 from 2000; however, recent events
suggest that forthcoming figures will once again see a decrease. Bahrains FH Ranking
has remained static at Partly Free and its Polity Score rates in the lower end of the range.
Since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting the Bahraini government has failed to:
Promote multipartidarism, instead actively discouraging it by seeking to prohibit

the formation of democratic political parties and associations that oppose or
criticize the present government; and
Respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and the inherent dignity of human
beings, notably freedom of assembly, association, opinion and expression and
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.65
The introduction of the new draft Societies Law into parliament, detention of prodemocracy activists and the suppression of freedom of expression and association in
Bahrain indicate the Bahraini government is not committed to implementing and
protecting these essential components of democracy.
5.3
RECOMMENDATION
Bahrain should be downgraded from a Participant at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting to an

Observer at the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
5.4
STATISTICS

Year
2002
2000
Voice and
Accountability
-0.74
-1.17
Political
Stability
+0.31
+0.05
Government
Effectiveness
+0.78
+0.76
64
Regulatory
Quality
+0.96
+1.00
Rule of
Law
+0.92
+0.78
Control of
Corruption
+0.95
+0.36
Bahrain activist pardoned by king, BBC News, 21 November 2004 (accessed 22 November 2004);
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4029919.stm
65 Article 21, 22, 19 & 9: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976
-25-.

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
5
6
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Not Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
0
0
-7
-8
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-7
-8

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
6.
BURKINA-FASO
6.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
1.8
Burkina Faso was upgraded to an observer at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting from a noninvitee at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting.
In the intervening period since the last Ministerial Meeting, the political crisis in
neighboring Cote DIvoire caused many to fear that the situation would have
backsliding implications for Burkina Faso. However, the countrys 2002 National
Assembly elections were considered to be the most free and fair ever held in the
countrys history. In addition, they allowed for many opposition candidates to be
elected to Parliament while still enabling President Compaore to maintain power.66
Notably, in the past opposition parties that have represented a significant challenge to
the Presidents political hegemony have been subjected to political harassment.67
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Burkina Faso Country Report,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/57/32411965.pdf
67 Polity IV Country Report 2002: Burkina Faso, available at
66
-26-.
Nonetheless, while these elections calmed growing civil unrest, 2003 saw increased
political instability as the leader of a major opposition party was arrested in connection
with an alleged coup plot. Some international organizations, however, remain
suspicious of the coups veracity and wonder whether it may, in reality, have been a bid
by Compaores government to instill fear in the opposition.68
In the realm of human rights, the governments record remains poor. While there have
been some improvements, serious problems still exist. Indeed, security forces were
responsible for numerous killings of criminal suspects and there was continued abuse of
detainees, which at times resulted in death. In addition, prison conditions remained
harsh; arbitrary arrest, detention, and impunity were problems. Furthermore, the
president is almost completely dominant over the judiciary, particularly when it comes
to political cases.69
6.2
RECOMMENDATION
Given the ambiguous nature of the supposed coup in October 2003, the lack of an
impartial judiciary and continued state-sanctioned human rights violations, Burkina
Faso should remain an Observer at the upcoming meeting.
6.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.27
-0.31
-0.10
-0.33
-0.69
-0.09
-0.21
-0.04
-0.55
-0.64
-0.04
-0.72

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
4
4
Civil Liberties
4
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Bfo1.htm
Freedom House Burkina Faso Country Report 2004, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/Burkina.htm
69 Canadian International Development Agency, Burkina Faso Programming Framework,
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/VLUDocEn/BurkinaFasoProgrammingFramework#2
68
-27-.
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
2
2
2
2
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
0
0

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
7.
COTE DIVOIRE
7.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
2
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.6
Cote DIvoire was upgraded to an Observer at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting from a Noninvitee at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting.
In the intervening period since the last Ministerial Meeting, Cote DIvoire has seen
repeated political violence and unrest since the failed coup in September 2002. Despite
multiple attempts to implement a peace accord and the creation of a strong political
framework that embraces the separation of powers, a smooth transition to a true power
sharing government has yet to occur. Indeed, in March 2004 a peace march held by
various political parties was forcibly suppressed by the authorities and resulted in the
killing of over one hundred civilians.70 An April 29, 2004 United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights report found these killings occurred under the
direction and responsibility of the highest authorities of the State.71
Press freedom, which had improved since the last Ministerial Meeting, suffered a major
setback in 2003 with the death of a correspondent who worked for a state-run press
agency. Some journalists have been forced to leave the country and an anti-French
campaign has lead to attacks on French journalists.72
In other arenas, efforts at democratization have also stagnated. The judiciary remains
extremely susceptible to outside influences and has been characterized as a weak system
US Department of State, available at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm

Letter dated 12 May 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, 13 May 2004, S/2004/384 available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/unscciv-13may.pdf
72 Freedom House 2004 Cote DIvoire Country Report, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/cotedivoire.htm
70
71
-28-.
unable to protect the rights of disenfranchised groups, or to hold perpetrators

accountable.73 The Ivorian Constitution guarantees religious freedom and the right not
to be discriminated against, but in practice neither are respected. Furthermore, women
suffer widespread prejudice and gender-based violence is common.74
7.2
RECOMMENDATION
Ongoing hostilities following the most recent ceasefire, state-sponsored human rights
violations, increased media censorship, and a lack of judicial independence are just some
of the numerous issues that need to be dealt with so the country can begin building its
democratic foundation. Accordingly Cote DIvoire should not be invited as a
Participant or an Observer to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
7.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-1.25
-1.31
-2.04
-0.88
-0.89
-0.85
-0.36
-0.18
-1.21
-0.53
-0.86
-0.63

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
5
6
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Not Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
5
5
1
1
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
4
4
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Cte d'Ivoire submitted pursuant
to Security Council resolution 1514 (2003), 13 November 2003, S/2004/3/Add.1 available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/efcf54d87b05d1a485256e4600762f0b?OpenDocument
74 Amnesty International Report 2004: Cote DIvoire available at
http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Cote_d'Ivoire/amnesty.pdf
73
-29-.

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
8.
EGYPT
8.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
2
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.0
Egypt was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who has never allowed contested elections for
president and continues to rule by emergency decree, publicly addressed the need for
political reform at a conference of his ruling party in September 2004. While no
legislative changes were introduced, President Mubarak encouraged greater
democratization in his closing speech and recognized the need to ease restrictions on
political parties, a notable comment after 26 years of repressive single party rule.75
Nonetheless, while the Egyptian government has begun to tolerate more open public
discussion than in years past, the overall political environment in Egypt continues to be
restrictive. Indeed, while liberalization has become a priority for the country, in
aftermath of September 11th and the war in Iraq, most of its efforts have been tied to
economic policies, not political ones.
Freedom of the press and the right to assemble remain heavily restricted, which has
resulted in weak political opposition. Under the Mubarak government, the courts have
demonstrated increasing independence, and the principles of due process and judicial
review have gained greater respect.76 Since the last Ministerial Meeting, however, the
government changed the penal code and gave prosecutors the power to detain
individuals for up to six months without chargea decision previously determined by
the courts.
According to international human rights organizations, torture in Egypt is widespread
and persistent. Such abuse is used to suppress political dissent, obtain information from
civilians about their relatives, discipline street children, and perpetuate social
marginalization of certain groups. 77 Notably, Egypts media is comprised of many
national, party, independent, and opposition publications although the government
alternates between increased repression and comparative openness.
Murphy, Dan Egyptians Talk Democratic Reform, Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 2004
US Department of State, 2004 Country Reports http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm
77 Egypts Torture Epidemic, Human Rights Watch, February 2004, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/25/egypt7658.htm
75
76
-30-.
8.2
RECOMMENDATION
Despite the ruling partys recent endorsement of greater political freedom in Egypt, it
has yet to move forward with related legislation. While Egypt should be commended for
this step towards democratic reform, it should remain an Observer at the Santiago
Ministerial Meeting.
8.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.87
-0.81
-0.35
+0.05
-0.32
+0.35
-0.45
+0.10
+0.09
+0.23
-0.29
-0.19

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
6
6
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Not Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
0
0
6
6
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-6
-6

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
0
-31-.
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
POLITICAL
FOR
TRANSFORMATION
1.8
9.
FIJI
9.1
BACKGROUND
Fiji was upgraded to an Observer at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting from a Non-invitee at
the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting.
In the interim period since the last Ministerial Meeting, Fiji continues to recover from an
attempted coup that underscored the country's deep ethnic divisions. In 2003, the
Supreme Court, generally recognized as impartial, upheld a proportionality clause in the
constitution that obligated Prime Minister Qarase to reform his cabinet to include
members of the opposition party.78 The Courts landmark decision calls into question the
current governments constitutionality as the Prime Ministers exclusionary practices
clearly breached the constitution (Article 99). Despite a promise to abide by the courts
decision, the Prime Minister elected to open the new parliament session before the
ruling could be implemented. This act was vehemently criticized by civil society and the
opposition party.
Fijis constitution calls for religious freedom and ethnic tolerance. While most faiths can
worship freely in Fiji, the current government does not necessarily respect divergent
ethnicities. Indeed, genuine acceptance among the two main ethnic groups continues to
be exceedingly low.79 This problem is exacerbated by the governments extensive
censorship of the media. Over the last year, the government has threatened journalists
from reporting negative stories but also by regulating content through draconian
legislation.80 Additionally, the government maintains a television monopoly and is a
major stakeholder is many newspapers.
Civil rights groups are obligated to register with the government and are frequently
denied permits for public meetings, rallies, or protests. The government generally
respects the human rights of its citizens, although there are complaints of repeated
police abuse and violence against women is pervasive.81
9.2
RECOMMENDATION
Despite efforts by the current government to move past the 2000 attempted coup, the
country remains profoundly divided by racea problem that has impacted the
constitutionality of the current administration. Consequently, the country should
remain as an Observer at the upcoming Ministerial Meeting.
78 Fiji crisis: Court orders unity government, July 18, 2003, Pacific Business News, available at
http://pacific.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2003/07/14/daily51.html
79 Madraiwiw, Joni, Ethnic tensions and the rule of law: lessons from Fiji since May 2000, Citizens
Constitutional Forum, September 14, 2004 available at
http://www.ccf.org.fj/artman/publish/article_222.shtml
80 Freedom House 2004 Fiji Country Report, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/fiji.htm
81 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Fiji 2003, available at
http://us.politinfo.com/Information/Human_Rights/country_report_2003_055.html
-32-.
9.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.06
+0.11
+0.18
+0.64
+0.06
-0.28
-0.10
-0.80
-0.39
-0.68
+0.12
+0.51

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
4
4
Civil Liberties
3
3
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
6
6
1
1
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
5
5

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
N/A
N/A
N/A
10.
GEORGIA
10.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
N/A
Political and
Social
Integration
N/A
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
N/A
Georgia was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Observer at the Ministerial Meeting in Seoul.
In the period since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, several important events have altered
Georgias political landscape. In 2003, widespread reports of serious fraud during the
November parliamentary election provoked three weeks of peaceful mass protests that
-33-.
culminated in the storming of the parliament building during the legislature's opening
session. Faced with a popular uprising against his rule, President Eduard Shevardnadze
was forced to step down. The dramatic confrontation -- which also led to the
cancellation of the proportional component of the parliamentary election, and the
scheduling of new presidential and parliamentary elections has been hailed by many
commentators as a non-violent, democratic revolution. A statement by the OSCE
concluded that despite some irregularities, including the lack of a truly competitive
environment given the short time available to organize the vote, the January 2004 and
March 2004 elections represented a significant improvement over previous votes and
brought Georgia closer to meeting international standards for democratic elections.82
In 2003, prior to the Georgian uprising, the governments attitude toward the media
grew more hostile but did not effectively curb media freedom; indeed, media pluralism
actually increased. Independent TV and radio companies dominate the airwaves in the
capital and increasingly compete with state-run broadcasting in the provinces.
Competition from independent broadcasters has forced state-run TV to make its
programming somewhat more pluralistic, but it continues to serve as an outlet for
government propaganda. During the March 2004 elections, State TV failed to provide
balanced coverage of the election campaign.
In the human rights arena, one of the most serious problems in Georgia continues to be
the torture and inhumane treatment of detainees by law-enforcement officials, which is
prohibited under the countrys constitution. Incidences of ill-treatment reportedly take
place most frequently during arrests and in police stations, often for the purposes of
extracting money or confessions from detainees.
As of September 2003, Georgia still had not adopted a law on religion. The resulting lack
of legal status for religious groups other than the Georgian Orthodox Church has made
it difficult for them to conduct certain activities, including opening new places of
worship. A March 2003 pledge by then President Shevardnadze to end religious
violence and punish perpetrators has been honored by the new government as
demonstrated by the significant decline in violent assaults against minority religious
groups and the imprisonment of the leader of Georgian Orthodox extremists.
In the legal domain, despite disruption of the constitutional process during the forced
resignation of the president in 2003, the outlook seems promising as the new
government has identified corruption and law enforcement reforms among the most
important items on their agenda. Prior and after the November 2003 uprising, the
judicial system has undergone greater changes than other elements of law enforcement,
which has led to an increase in the professionalism and independence of courts.
However, the record concerning politically sensitive cases has been mixed. While both
common-law courts and the Constitutional Court have made a number of rulings in
favor of the opposition and individual citizens against the government, in some cases
Georgia: Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections, 28 March 2004. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Report. Warsaw, 23 June 2004
82
-34-.
courts still display a vulnerability to political pressure and public opinion. As the
political fight intensified in 2003, pressure on courts became more blatant. For example,
President Shevardnadze publicly chastised judges who ruled in favor of the oppositions
demands to reimburse pension arrears.
The new generation of leaders that came to power in 2003 are expected to replace the
countrys liberal oligarchic system of governance with genuine democracy. Cracking
down on corruption, reforming law enforcement, decentralizing governance, and
making government more efficient are all recognized as priorities. The resolve of the
new authorities and increased activism in society gives hope that achievements will be
made in these areas. But there are concerns as well: so far, the political groups that have
come to power have not formulated a coherent reform strategy; they may lack the
administrative expertise and human resources to implement them; and while the new
leaders are popular, other political parties are weak with only minor representation in
the new Parliament.
10.2
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the recent democratization trends that included holding of reasonably free
and fair elections, it is appropriate to upgrade Georgia to a Participant at the Santiago
Ministerial Meeting. The new regime in Georgia, however, should be continuously
monitored to ascertain their commitment to and ability to implement the envisioned
democratic reforms.
10.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice
and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Control
Rule of
Law
Control
of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.30
+1.35
-1.90
-0.85
-0.77
-0.65
-0.82
-0.55
-1.17
-0.56
-1.03
-0.73

Range: 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free
YEAR
Political Rights
Civil Liberties
Freedom Rating
2004
Partly Free
-35-.

Range:
POLITY
DEMOC
AUTOC Autocracy
Combined
YEAR Democracy Score
Score
Polity Score83
2002
5
0
5
2001
5
0
5
BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS 2003
Political and
Political
Rule of Institutional
Stateness
Social
Participation
Law
Stability
Integration
2
3
2
2
2
11.
HAITI
11.1
BACKGROUND
Overall Results
For political
transformation
2.2
Haiti was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

In the intervening period, since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Haiti has experienced a
wave of instability and violence, which resulted in President Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
elected for a second non-consecutive term in 2000 amid allegations of election
irregularities, being forced into exile and an interim government coming to power.
The 2000 legislative elections were criticized by international election observers for a
number of irregularities,84 particularly the questionable interpretation of the electoral
law in relation to the results of the senatorial elections,85 with these irregularities
compromising the credibility of the elections.86 International observers were
conspicuously absent for the presidential elections that occurred later that year.
In the wake of the flawed parliamentary election process and the absence of
independent monitors to determine whether the same fraud was prevalent during the
presidential elections, long-standing opposition claims that Aristide and his party
used voter fraud, violence and intimidation to hold onto power became more
Computed by subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC
Organization of American States, The OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Haiti: Chief of Mission
Report to the OAS Permanent Council (Washington D.C.: OAS, 13 July 2000), 3.
85 The Caribbean Community, CARICOM Statement to the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the
Organization of American States on Haiti (Washington D.C.: CARICOM, 4 August 2000), 1 (accessed 28
September 2000); available at http://www.caricom.org/pressreleases/pres104_00.htm
86 Organization of American States, The OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Haiti: Chief of Mission
Report to the OAS Permanent Council (Washington D.C.: OAS, 13 July 2000), 3.
83
84
-36-.
credible.87 Groups opposed to President Aristide continued their campaign to remove

Aristide from power, while government supporters targeted opposition groups with
intimidation and violence.88 Opposition activities culminated in armed insurgents, in
particular the Artibonite Resistance Front, engaging in a brutal armed rebellion against
the government during February and March of 2004.89 On 28 February 2004 a rebel
group led by a former police chief, Guy Philippe, had advanced to within 25 miles of the
capital, Port-au-Prince. In response, President Aristide was forced to submit his
resignation on 29 February 2004 and fled the country.
In accordance with the constitution, the President of Haitis Supreme Court, Boniface
Alexandre, assumed office as interim President upon the resignation of President
Aristide and Gerard Latortue was appointed interim Prime Minister.90 Latortue advised
the Organization of American States (OAS) that a major task of his government is
preparing to hold free, fair, open and democratic elections91 and to that end requested
the assistance of the OAS in holding free and transparent elections in 2005.92 The OAS
confirmed their support and assistance in the lead up to the 2005 elections.93
In the realm of human rights, Haitis record remains extremely poor. Political and civil
officials of the government have been implicated in serious abuses, and according to the
U.S. State Department, there are credible reports of numerous extrajudicial killings by
the Haitian National Police.94 The overall insecure environment and lack of
institutionalized rule of law has given way to recurrent outbreaks of violence between
civilians and the police force. In addition, the high numbers of armed groups
throughout the country continue to repeatedly abuse human rights95 and UN
peacekeepers have had trouble receiving adequate support for controlling the situation.
11.2
ANALYSIS
Polity IV Country Report 2002: Haiti (accessed 22 September 2004); available at

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Hai1.htm
88 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Haiti, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State,
August 2004); available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982pf.htm
89 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary Observations of the IACHR upon
Conclusion of its Visit to Haiti (Washington D.C.: IACHR, 7 September 2004), 1
90 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Haiti, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State,
August 2004); available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982pf.htm
91 Organization of American States, Prime Minister of Haitis Transitional Government Asks for OAS
Election Support (Washington D.C.: OAS, 6 May 2004) (accessed 28 September 2004); available at
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-078/04
92 Organization of American States, Statement of OAS Permanent Council Delegation Following Visit to
Haiti September 9 to 11 (Washington D.C.: OAS, 11 September 2004) (accessed 28 September 2004);
available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=CP-HAITEN
93 Ibid
94 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S State Department, 2003, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27902.htm
95 Haiti: Breaking the cycle of violence: A Last Chance for Haiti, Amnesty International, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/haiti/document.do?id=6C8D72F03D69A0E480256EB30041D1E7
87
-37-.
Haiti does not presently satisfy the criteria set down in the Seoul Plan of Action, in
particular the requirement that everyone in Haiti be able to take part in the government
of Haiti either directly or through freely chosen representatives. This is due primarily to
the fact Haiti is presently governed by a constitutionally legitimate, but appointed
government.
The continued unrest is reflected in the democracy indicators. All measures in the WBI
Governance Indicators, aside from Regulatory Quality, saw an increase since the flawed
2000 legislative elections. Haitis FH Ranking has remained static since the last
Ministerial at Not Free, as has the Polity Score, which was negative two for 2001 and
2002. Haiti also rates poorly on the BTI.
11.3
RECOMMENDATION
Haiti should be maintained as an Observer to the Community of Democracies during its

transition period. If and when free and fair elections are conducted in Haiti in 2005,
leading to the restoration of electoral democracy, Haiti should be invited back to the
Community of Democracies as a full Participant.
11.4
STATISTICS

Year
2002
2000
Voice and
Accountability
-1.11
-0.79
Political
Stability
-1.34
-0.71
Government
Effectiveness
-1.56
-1.45
Regulatory
Quality
-0.95
-1.13
Rule of
Law
-1.76
-1.49
Control of
Corruption
-1.70
-1.02

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
6
6
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Not Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
1
1
3
3
-38-.
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-2
-2

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
12.
JORDAN
12.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
1.8
Jordan was a Participant at both the Warsaw and Seoul Ministerial Meetings.
Following the death of King Hussein, in 2003 Jordan held relatively free and transparent
(but not fair) parliamentary and municipal elections.96 In that same year King Abdullah
II lifted existing restrictions on freedom of expression and welcomed a marked increase
of female participation in the political arena. The King called for turning Jordan into a
modern, democratic country by increasing integrity and transparency in government
to do away with discrimination and nepotism; increasing the participation of young
people and women in government; promoting a culture of democracy with the
participation of different groups; building an independent judiciary and media system
and guaranteeing human rights; and involving the private sector to attract business and
establish social reforms.97
While the country still has a long way to go to implement such reforms, the King
continues to publicly underscore the importance of cooperation between the
government and Parliament with regard to socio-economic and political development
legislation.98 Nonetheless, the King continues to wield full executive powers and may
dissolve the parliament and dismiss the cabinet as he pleases. Laws require the assent of
the upper house of parliament, which is appointed by the King.
The media is Jordan is restricted. Government controls all radio and TV stations and
most major newspapers in the country. Indeed, while the country moves forward with
political reform, the authorities are quick to see the media as a threat.99 In May 2004, the
editor of the weekly Al-Majd newspaper, Fahd Al-Rimawi, was imprisoned on a charge
of damaging relations with Saudi Arabia, and general coverage of the Iraq war was
Freedom House 2004 Jordan Country Report, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/jordan.htm
97 Brahimi,Rym Jordan King Urges More Democracy, CNN, December 1, 2003 available at
www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/01/jordan.democracy
98 Jordan Embassy Media Release Pursuit of democracy should result in progress King, January 7,
2004 available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/01072004001.htm
99 Jordan - Annual report 2004, Reporters without Borders, available at
96
-39-.
cautious. Jordan has agreed to receive external assistance with reforms. For example, in
September 2004, the Minister for Political Development signed a contract with the
United Kingdom to promote political reform and develop civil society.100
12.2
RECOMMENDATION
Jordan should be invited as an Observer to the Santiago Ministerial meeting.
12.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.41
-0.19
-0.44
+0.25
+0.36
+0.43
+0.10
+0.67
+0.33
+0.57
0.00
+0.13

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
5
6
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
2
2
4
4
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-2
-2

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL
FOR
RESULT
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
1.8
Engagement with Jordans Agenda for Reform: Signing of Agreement and Project Launch,
September 19,2004, available at
http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Pag
e&cid=1065718098337
100
-40-.
13.
KENYA
13.1
BACKGROUND
Kenya was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to a Noninvitee at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting.
The December 2002 presidential and legislative elections ushered in a new era in
Kenyas future as a democracy and raised hopes that the new president, Mwai Kibaki,
would consolidate the country politically, economically, and socially.
The 2002 elections themselves were considered to be the first ever genuinely free and
fair elections in Kenya. Following his inauguration, Kibaki and his administration have
repeatedly stressed their willingness to confront and correct many of the problems from
the Moi regime.101
One of the main issues facing the Kibaki administration is endemic corruption.
Historically, Kenyas corruption has been rampant at numerous levels. While Kibaki
pledged in his inauguration speech to augment the governments transparency by
working to fight corruption, critics continue to allege that these reform efforts have only
been half-heartedly implemented. In addition, Kibakis unwavering support of certain
corrupt officials has diluted his credibility. In an attempt to stem corruption the
government recently announced that all wealth declarations by top officials, including
the president, cabinet ministers, members of parliament, top military officials, the
judiciary and central government, will be made public. In addition, the government is
probing all World Bank projects for possible corruption as well as auditing a sample of
the other donor schemes.
Given the heavy influence of the executive branch and the frequency of corruption
under the Moi regime, the judicial system profoundly lacked independence. The
majority of trials were not impartial. In addition, those who ruled against the
government were sometimes transferred to another court or had their contracts
terminated. To combat these problems, in 2003 Kibaki appointed new judges to replace
corrupt ones, encouraged agency transparency, and called for the creation of a justice
and constitutional affairs ministry.
In the realm of human rights, Kenyans now have greater freedom of expression than at
any time in the countrys history. The Kibaki government has vowed to prioritize the
protection of human rights and has established a commission to investigate violations
by the former government.102 Civil society in Kenya is lively and the current
Countries at the Crossroads 2004: A Survey of Democratic Governance Freedom House
Publication available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan016206.pdf
102 Kenya launches new National Human Rights Commission, The Danish Institute for Human
Rights, available at http://www.humanrights.dk/news/KenyaNHRC/
101
-41-.
administration has respected the constitutional rights to freedom of speech and

assembly.
13.2
RECOMMENDATION
Kenyas new government has pursued its goal of political reform and consolidation with
mixed success. Nonetheless, it has demonstrated real progress. Consequently, Kenya
should be upgraded to Participant status for the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
13.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.58
-0.84
-0.86
-1.00
-0.85
-0.71
-0.50
-0.11
-1.04
-1.02
-1.05
-1.08

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
3
4
Civil Liberties
3
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
8
2
0
4
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
8
-2

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
1
-42-.
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.2
14.
KUWAIT
14.1
BACKGROUND
Kuwait was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Kuwait held elections in July 2003 for its 50-member
National Assembly. Pro-government candidates with strong tribal backing did well in
the elections, and candidates aligned with Islamists realized some slight gains. Out of 16
liberal candidates, only 3 managed to win seats, a decline of 4 seats from the previous
National Assembly.
However, the legislative elections failed to meet minimal international standards,
tainted as they were by the exclusion of women from voting and allegations of
widespread government-subsidized vote buying.
Political power ultimately resides in Kuwaits royal family, a hereditary emirate that
largely sets the governments policy agenda. The countrys emir has overriding power in
the political system, appointing the prime minister and cabinet. Under the 1962
constitution, the emir holds executive power and shares legislative power with the
National Assembly, which is elected by a limited popular vote involving only about 15
percent of the countrys 860,000 citizens. The emir has the power to dissolve the
National Assembly at will but must call elections within 60 days. The National
Assembly is granted powers to overturn decrees from the emir issued during a period
when the assembly is not in session, and the assembly has exercised this power in a
number of cases. The National Assembly can veto the appointment of the countrys
prime minister, but then it must choose from three alternates put forward by the emir.
The government bans formal political parties, but it has allowed political groupings such
as parliamentary blocs to emerge. Although the constitution provides men and women
with equal rights, only men aged 21 or over can vote and run for office, according to the
current election law. Women are completely excluded from the political process.
However, the government introduced a bill in May 2004 to give women the right to vote
in parliamentary elections, although the National Assembly, divided over the issue, has
yet to take action on it. In 1999, parliament voted down a similar measure put forth by
the government.103
Kuwait lacks a truly independent judiciary. The emir appoints all judges, and the
executive branch of government approves judicial promotions and renewals of judicial
appointments. According to Kuwaiti law, authorities may detain suspects for four days
without charge. The Ministry of the Interior supervises the main internal security forces,
including the national police, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Kuwait State
Ebtisam Al Kitbi, Womens Political Status in the GCC States, Arab Reform Bulletin, July 2004,
available at http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/ARB-7-19-04.asp?p=1&from=pubdate
103
-43-.
Security. An estimated 80,000 stateless residents, known as bidoon, are considered illegal
residents and do not have full citizenship rights.
The government, which owns all broadcast media, places restrictions on freedom of
expression. Overall, journalists in Kuwait enjoy greater freedom than some of their
regional counterparts do, but the government continues to enforce laws that prohibit
direct criticism of the emir and senior members of the royal family. In June 2003, the
government charged Mohammed Jassem, the editor of Al-Watan newspaper and an
advocate for political reform, with challenging the authority of and uttering abusive
statements about the emir. Irritated by satellite television station Al-Jazeera, the
government closed the stations offices in Kuwait City.
Censorship of the Internet remains a problem. Internet service providers have blocked
access to certain sites, and in May 2003, the Ministry of Communications conducted
raids on numerous Internet cafes on the basis that they were not blocking sites deemed
immoral by Islamic members of the National Assembly. The Ministry of Communication
issued new regulations that require Internet cafe owners to collect the names and civil
identification numbers of customers.
The government restricts freedom of assembly and protest, and public gatherings
require government approval. Furthermore, Kuwaits civil society sector is small.
Workers have the right to join labor unions, but the government restricts freedom of
association by mandating that there only be one union per occupational trade.
Women face discrimination in several areas of society and remain underrepresented in
the workforce, although they have made recent gains. According to recent statistics,
women account for 34 percent of the workforce and receive two-thirds of the bachelors
degrees in Kuwait. Women have been fighting for full political participation for decades,
but have been blocked by conservative male political leaders and Islamist groups.104
14.2
RECOMMENDATION
Given that universal suffrage does not exist in Kuwait as women do not have the right to
vote, Kuwait should not be invited to participate as either an Observer or a Participant at
the Santiago Ministerial Meeting. A sine qua non would be the granting of the right to
vote to women. Other crucial measures that would further democratic consolidation
would be a far-reaching reduction in the level of control exercised by the Emir, the
legitimization of political parties, and steps towards reducing government ownership of
the press.
Freedom House Kuwait Country Report 2004, available at

http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/kuwait.htm
104
-44-.
14.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.29
-0.22
+0.14
+0.73
+0.16
+0.22
+0.30
-0.13
+0.81
+1.19
+1.06
+0.88
Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
4
4
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
0
0
7
7
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-7
-7

Stateness
N/A
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
N/A
N/A
15.
LEBANON
15.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
N/A
Political and
Social
Integration
N/A
OVERALL
FOR
RESULT
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
N/A
Lebanon was an Invitee (but did not participate) at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting and
an Observer at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting.
In the period following the Seoul Ministerial Meeting in 2002, Syria continues to
dominate the Lebanese executive, legislative, and judicial branches, strictly limiting the
capacity of the Lebanese people to choose their own government. In September 2004,
-45-.
Syria successfully pressured the Lebanese parliament to amend the constitution and
extend pro-Syria president Emile Lahouds term by three years. The amendment was
passed despite a recent UN Security Council resolution urging the withdrawal of Syrias
occupation force of about 17,000 troops. Subsequently, Syria re-deployed some 3,000
troops away from Beirut and closer to the Syrian border in an attempt to appease
international critics. In October 2004, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Lahouds rival,
resigned his post, along with his entire cabinet. Hariri had opposed the extension of
Lahouds term but had capitulated under Syrian pressure.105 Lahoud appointed proSyria politician Omar Karami as Hariris replacement.
In April 2003, Damascus appointed the Lebanese cabinet, including former PM Hariri.
The distribution of parliamentary seats is skewed toward pro-Syrian regions (usually
reflective of troop numbers) and election districts are gerrymandered to ensure the
election of pro-Syrian candidates. Elections themselves are rarely free of interference.106
Lebanon has a long tradition of press freedom: five independent television stations and
more than 30 independent radio stations operate in Lebanon, though they are owned by
prominent political and commercial elites. Dozens of independent print publications
reflect a diverse range of views. Internet access is not restricted. However, Lebanese
government actions limit the freedom of the press. A 1991 treaty between Syria and
Lebanon includes an explicit pledge by Lebanon to ban all political and media activity
that might harm Syria. This treaty and associated laws allow judges to censor foreign
publications and to indict journalists for critical reporting on Syria, the Lebanese
military, the security forces, the judiciary, and the presidency. In practice, such laws are
mainly used to pressure the media into exercising self-censorship and rarely result in the
imprisonment of journalists or the closure of media outlets. However, journalists who
persistently violate taboos have been indicted and imprisoned on more serious charges.
The permanent closure of Murr Televisions (MTV) in 2002 generated palpable anxiety
among media owners of all political persuasions. In 2004, Adonis Akra, a professor who
wrote a book about his experience in detention after a crackdown on anti-Syrian
activists, was indicted on charges of tarnishing the reputation of the judiciary and
harming relations with Syria.107
The judiciary is strongly influenced by Syrian political pressure, which affects the
appointments of key prosecutors and investigating magistrates.108 The judicial system
consists of civilian courts, a military court, and a judicial council. International standards
of criminal procedure are not observed in the military court, which consists largely of
military officers with no legal training, and cases are often tried in a matter of minutes.
Lebanese PM and cabinet resign available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3759914.stm
106 Freedom House Lebanon Country Report 2004, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/lebanon.htm
107 Freedom of the Press 2004
108 Freedom House Lebanon Country Report 2004, available at
105
-46-.
In recent years, the nominally independent Beirut Bar Association (BBA) has become
less willing to confront the judiciary, allegedly because of widespread corruption.
Indeed, corruption of all sorts is widespread in Lebanon and the country is considered
to be among the most corrupt in the Arab world.109
Human rights problems abound in Lebanon. Freedom of association and assembly is
restricted: public demonstrations are not permitted without prior approval from the
Interior Ministry, which does not rule according to uniform standards, and security
forces routinely beat and arrest those who demonstrate against the Syrian occupation.
Nearly 350,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are denied citizenship rights and
face restrictions on working, building homes, and purchasing property. Arbitrary arrests
and detentions by Lebanese (and, occasionally, Syrian) security forces are commonplace,
and both have used torture in the past to extract confessions. Because family and
personal status matters are adjudicated by the religious authorities of each sectarian
community, Muslim women are subject to discriminatory laws governing marriage,
divorce, inheritance, and child custody. Women are underrepresented in politics,
holding only three parliamentary seats and no cabinet positions, and do not receive
equal social security provisions and other benefits. Men convicted of so-called honor
crimes against women usually receive lenient sentences.110
15.2
RECOMMENDATION
Lebanon should not be invited as a Participant or an Observer to the Santiago Ministerial

Meeting.
15.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.54
-0.37
-0.59
-0.50
-0.41
-0.21
-0.47
+0.28
-0.27
-0.09
-0.34
-0.53

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Not Free

Range:
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.20.cpi.en.html
Freedom House Lebanon Country Report 2004, available at
109
110
-47-.

Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
2002*
-66
-66
-66
2001*
-66
-66
-66
*These numbers are outside the traditional Polity IV equation because of the presence of foreign
occupying troops.
Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
16.
MADAGASCAR
16.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
2
Political and
Social
Integration
3
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.4
Madagascar was downgraded from a participant at Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

observer at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting.
In the aftermath of the civil unrest that followed Madagascars contested December 2001
election, an April 2002 re-count deemed the election free and fair, and legitimately
yielded the presidency to Marc Ravalomanana. While the United Nations and individual
countries such as the United States and France accepted these results immediately, the
African Union (AU) claimed the transfer of power was not constitutional and banned
the government from participation in the AU summits. However, in July 2003, the
country was re-admitted as a full-fledged member after the regional organization
decided to reverse its policy and accept the re-count as constitutional. The re-admittance
to the AU closed the final chapter in Madagascars political crisis and fully restored the
governments legitimacy.111
In the intervening period since the last Ministerial Meeting, Madagascar also held
legislative and municipal elections in December 2002 and November 2003, respectively.
Both were considered favorable despite a few shortcomings including occasional
incidents of pressure and intimidation.112
MADAGASCAR: Political legitimacy secures readmission to AU, Irin News, July 10, 2003,
available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=35324
112 EU Relations with Madagascar, January 21, 2004, available at
111
-48-.
The dominance of the state prior to the new government of President Ravalomanana
precluded, even discouraged, citizens from involvement in the making and
implementation of public policy.113 Since 2002, however, greater strides have been made
to encourage the development of civil society and the government is regularly
partnering with both local and international organizations.
In an effort to increase transparency and governmental accountability, the government
has also established an anti-corruption national council. The council, created by
presidential decree, requires high-level officials to declare assets and has suspended
judges for corrupt practices. 114 In addition, President Ravalomanana has committed to
numerous reforms designed to consolidate the countrys democratic institutions and
increase the judiciarys autonomy.115
16.2
RECOMMENDATION
Despite some lingering effects from the contested presidential elections of 2001,
Madagascar is no longer in a state of political crisis. As the new President continues to
steer the country towards greater democracy, it is important that the international
community acknowledge these legitimate steps forward. Therefore, Madagascar should
be upgraded to a Participant for the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
16.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.05
+0.25
+0.30
+0.00
-0.38
-0.30
-0.26
-0.10
-0.19
-0.65
+0.14
-0.80

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
3
3
Civil Liberties
3
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=mg&lng=en&status
=new
113 PACT Madagascar Program, available at
http://www.pactworld.org/programs/country/madagascar/madagascar_misonga.htm
114 USAID Madagascar Programs 2004, available at www.usaid.gov/stories/madagascar/
cs_madagascar_corruption.html
115 Freedom House Madagascar Country Report 2004, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/Madagascar.htm
-49-.

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
7
7
0
0
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
7
7

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
17.
MALAYSIA
17.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
4
Political and
Social
Integration
3
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
3.2
Malaysia was upgraded to an Observer at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting from a Noninvitee at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting.
After more than twenty years as prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad stepped down in
2003. He was succeeded by his deputy, Abdullah Badawi, who also won the general
election, in March 2004. Under Mahathir, Malaysias democratic institutions were
stunted, the rule of law weakened, and the press harassed. Badawi, on the other hand,
made clear his reform intentions even before the 2004 election by launching a campaign
against corruption and cronyism that, for the first time in four decades, resulted in the
arrest of cabinet ministers and businessmen with close political ties.116 Critics argue,
however, this reform has not been sufficiently far reaching as the government continues
to control the media, and potential dissenters have difficulty obtaining newspaper
licenses. The Internal Security Act (ISA), a preventive detention law originally enacted in
the early 1960s during a national state of emergency as a temporary measure to fight a
communist rebellion, continues to be used as a tool to stifle peaceful political opposition.
Nevertheless, there have been some signs of change. In late 2003, the government began
permitting protest rallies and also proposed setting up a new, independent media
Elegant, Simon, Malaysia's New Look, Time Magazine, March 8, 2004, available at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040315-598569,00.html
116
-50-.
council to upgrade the quality of journalism in Malaysia.117 Badawis administration has

also made strides towards greater judicial impartiality and advancing rule of law
reforms initiated near the end of Mahathirs reign. Finally, in September 2004, Anwar
Ibrahim, Malaysia's most well-known political prisoner, was released, a symbol of the
judiciarys growing independence and of Malaysias steps towards political
reconciliation.
17.2
RECOMMENDATION
While the 2004 elections in Malaysia were widely hailed as free and fair, other efforts at
reform have moved forward with undue slowness. Furthermore, Prime Minister
Badawis strides to increase his governments transparency and accountability measures
have not gone far enough. Therefore, Malaysias status as an Observer should remain.
17.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.27
-0.27
+0.51
+0.33
+0.92
+0.68
+0.58
+0.35
+0.58
+0.55
+0.38
+0.18

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
5
5
Civil Liberties
4
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
4
4
1
1
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
3
3
Case, William, Malaysia Country Report 2004,Countries at the Crossroads 2004: A Survey of
Democratic Governance, Christopher Walker, and Sarah Repucci, Eds., Freedom House, Washington,
D.C. 2004.
117
-51-.

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
18.
MOLDOVA
18.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
3
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.6
Moldova was a Participant at both the Warsaw and Seoul Ministerial Meetings.
In the intervening period since the last meeting, Moldova has held two rounds of
elections that met international standards but were riddled with problems that did not
meet the level of previous Moldovan elections including bias in state media, misuse of
administrative resources, and the arrests of two opposition mayors. Such actions
represented a grave step back for Moldova.118
While Moldova has historically struggled to balance its relationship with the East and
the West, the country has ranked near the top of the European diplomatic and security
agenda for the last three years as the country has seen an increased re-centralization of
power and a reversal of previous efforts to enhance local governance capacity.119
Indeed, some observers claim that President Voronin and the Communist Party (CPM),
which came to power in 2001, seek to revise the principle of the separation of powers,
compromise the independence of the judiciary, limit freedom of expression and launch
obstruction campaigns against opposition newspapers and movements.120 In addition,
the conflict surrounding the secessionist movement of Transnistria has further stymied
democratic progress as the five-party peace talks were suspended in response to
Transnistrian schools teaching the state language in Latin script.121
Although formal mechanisms are in place to ensure independence of different
governmental branches in Moldova, the actual balance of power is quite fragile.
Freedom House Moldova Country Report 2004, available at

http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/Moldova.htm
119 Scoror, Vladimir, OSCEs Year End Conference Set to Condone Russias Forces in Moldova, ,
Jamestown Foundation, November 04, 2004, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3130&article_id=23688
00
120 Democracy in Moldova: Challenges and Prospects, National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
Forum, 5 June 2003, available at
http://www.ned.org/forum/fellows/presentations/MoldovaPresentationSummary.pdf
118
121
Transdniestrians step up linguistic cleansing with orders to empty Moldovan-language school,

OSCE Website available at http://www.osce.org/news/show_news.php?id=4244
-52-.
Corruption is entrenched and has gotten worse under the CPM,122 impeding the rule of
law.123 In addition, since the CPM has come to power, the judicial branch has been
heavily influenced by the executive. Indeed, 30 percent of the countrys judges have
been replaced with party sympathizers.
In 2003, the government continued to clamp down on the private media and remained
engaged in efforts to marginalize the work of civil society groups. The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe wrote, in 2003, that it is regrettable, for instance,
[that] the newly adopted broadcasting law [in Moldova] provides for many forms of
direct political interference.124 Independent media and NGOs also face a variety of
financial obstacles, such as increased taxes and fines imposed by the state and the
regular denial of foreign assistance to civil society groupsthe largest source of income
for such organizations. The denial of foreign assistance to civil society groups is often
cited as an attempt to weaken NGO independence and sustainability. 125
Elections are slated for early 2005 and given the current situation in Moldova, it is
widely expected that the incumbent President will win. Although opposition parties do
exist, they are profoundly fractured, lack cohesion, and are subject to a high-degree of
in-fighting over significant national issues.
18.2
RECOMMENDATION
Given the increasingly repressive atmosphere in Moldova, the country should be

downgraded to an Observer at the Santiago Ministerial Meeting. A key milestone to
monitor in the months ahead will be the quality of the 2005 elections.
18.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.30
-0.12
-0.63
-0.17
-0.49
-0.89
-0.01
-0.13
-1.06
-1.09
-0.54
-0.87
122
Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index recorded a slip in Moldovas score from 2.3
in 2003 to 2.4 in 2004, reports available at http://www.transparency.md/documents.htm
123
Carascuic, Lilia,Corruption and Quality of Governance: The case of Moldova, Transparency
International, available at http://www.transparency.md/Docs/cor_gov_en.pdf
124
Freedom of expression in the media in Europe, Doc. 9640 revised, 14 January 2003, available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int%2FDocuments%2FWorkingDocs%2Fdoc03
%2FEDOC9640.htm
125
Munteanu, Igor, Moldova Country Report in Nations in Transit 2004: Democratization in East
Central Europe and Eurasia, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, 405.
-53-.

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
3
2
Civil Liberties
4
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
8
8
0
0
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
8
8

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
19.
MOROCCO
19.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
1
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.2
Morocco was a Participant at both the Warsaw and Seoul Ministerial Meetings.
The two elections that have been held since the last meeting, one parliamentary in 2002
and one municipal in 2003, were both turning points in the countrys transition to
democracy. In 2002 political parties were given unprecedented equal access to the media
and the 2003 elections were considered largely free, fair, and transparent. Notably, the
legislative elections brought more than 30 women to Parliament and in October 2003 the
King proposed reforms that would give women the right to initiate a divorce.126
Nonetheless, the King retains final authority and may dissolve parliament, govern by
decree, dismiss cabinet ministers and call new elections at his discretion.
More recently, however, there has been a draconian security crackdown resulting from
the suicide bombings in May 2003 that deeply shook the country. In reaction to the
attacks, Moroccan officials arrested over one thousand individuals, many of which were
Freedom House Morocco Country Report 2004, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/morocco.htm
126
-54-.
allegedly tortured and ill-treated, denied basic due process rights, and subjected to
expedited and unfair trials 127 International human rights organizations are equally
concerned that related trials have been seriously flawed. Despite a constitution that calls
for an independent judiciary, the current system is easily influenced by the government
and subject to corruption.
Press freedom and the right to assemble remain limited; in 2003 the police sentenced
seven journalists to life in prison and violently dispersed numerous peaceful
demonstrations.128 As a result, many individuals regularly practice self-censorship.129
Nonetheless, efforts are underway by local and international non-governmental
organizations to further develop the capacity needed for a more robust civil society.130
A royal pardon in January 2004 included some 20 political prisoners and detainees,
among them activists working on human rights in the Western Sahara. The pardon also
covered six journalists, two of whom had been were sentenced to up to 3 years in jail.
Government prosecution of journalists resumed however, and in April, 2004, Anas
Guennoun, editor of the weekly Al Ahali, was sentenced to 10 months in jail for
defamation. In June, two Norwegian journalists were expelled for attempting to meet a
Western Sahara activist. In September 2004, a court sentenced Anas Tadili, the editor of
the weekly Akhbar al-Ousbouaa to one year in jail for libel, after he wrote about a
government ministers homosexuality.
In December 2003, the king announced the creation of the Equity and Reconciliation
Commission, to document abuses perpetrated under the previous regime, and to
compensate victims. The committee is headed by Driss Benzikri, a former political
prisoner. Most human rights activists welcomed the move, but critics said it did not
provide for bringing to justice past violators. The commission is to investigate and
document disappearances and other abuses that occurred between 1956 and 1999, but it
lacks the authority to take to court alleged perpetrators, and can only provide
information and recommend compensation to the victims or their relatives. It also
cannot compel government institutions to cooperate with it. Further complicating its
mandate is the fact that most of the disappeared are from the Western Sahara, making
it difficult for their relatives to trust an officially appointed body. Nevertheless, the
commission has consulted international experts on truth and reconciliation, and was to
present a record of the cases by April 2005.
In early 2004, Morocco enacted reforms to its personal status law, known as the
Mudawana and based in Islamic law. The new code aimed at rectifying gender
Morocco: Bush Should Criticize Backsliding on Rights, Human Rights Watch News, July 8, 2004,
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/07/morocc9021.htm
128 Warnings for the independent Press, Reporters Without Borders, May 13, 2003, available at
129 US Department of State, Human Rights Report 2003, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27934.htm
130 National Democratic Institute, Morocco Program 2003, available at,
http://www.ndi.org/worldwide/mena/morocco/morocco.asp
127
-55-.
inequality by raising the marriage age to 18, and strengthening women's rights to
divorce.
19.2
RECOMMENDATION
While Morocco has been making notable strides towards becoming a more stable, open
and pluralistic society. Recent legislation and security crackdowns have hampered the
protection of civil liberties and freedoms in Morocco. Given these developments,
Morocco should be invited as an Observer to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
19.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.30
-0.44
-0.14
+0.13
+0.07
+0.08
+0.02
+0.42
+0.11
+0.33
-0.04
+0.36

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
5
5
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
0
0
6
6
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-6
-6

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
0
-56-.
Political and
Social
Integration
3
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.4
20.
NEPAL
20.1
BACKGROUND
Nepal was a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting as well as a Participant at the
Seoul Ministerial Meeting.
In the intervening period, since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Nepal has experienced an
ongoing constitutional crisis stemming from the declaration of a state of emergency on
26 November 2001, by newly crowned King Gyanendra, which suspended many civil
liberties and press freedoms, while conferring extended powers on the military in order
to crush the Maoist rebels.131 The state of emergency was called after four days of
violence, during which more than one hundred people were killed.132
In May 2002, just hours before the start of a parliamentary debate that had been
scheduled to discuss whether the state of emergency should be extended, the King on
the recommendation of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba dissolved parliament and
called elections for later that year.133 The government faced waning support in
parliament for extending the state of emergency, with even some members of the ruling
Nepali Congress party, of which the prime minister was a member, cautious about the
merits of continuing the state of emergency.
On dissolution of parliament, and on the advice of the prime minister, the King reimposed the state of emergency by royal decree.134 The state of emergency was
eventually lifted on 10 September 2002 in the lead up to the parliamentary elections that
were scheduled for 13 November 2002.135
In October 2002 Prime Minister Deuba requested the King postpone elections for one
year out of fear of further attacks by Maoist rebels. Instead of postponing the elections
the King relied upon Article 127 of the constitution to dismiss the prime minister for
failing to arrange the November elections. Article 127 of the constitution provides that if
any difficulty arises in this connection with the implementation of the Constitution, His
Majesty may issue necessary orders to remove such a difficulty and such order shall be
laid before the Parliament."136
Nepal Emergency Declared, BBC News, 26 November 2001 (accessed 29 September 2004);
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1676378.stm
132 Ibid
133 Nepal Parliament Dissolved, BBC News, 22 May 2002 (accessed 29 September 2004); available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2003085.stm
134 Nepal Emergency Re-imposed, BBC News, 27 May 2002 (accessed 29 September 2004); available at
135 Nepal Lifts its Emergency, BBC News, 10 September 2002 (accessed 29 September 2004); available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2220905.stm
136 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990; available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+np0101)
131
-57-.
The King assumed full executive authority and requested the political parties submit
suggestions as to who he could appoint to a non-elected interim government.137 He also
postponed the elections indefinitely138 despite the Election Commission noting shortly
before Prime Minister Deuba was removed that it could hold parliamentary elections in
six phases if there were appropriate security arrangements.139
King Gyanendra appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand as prime minister in October 2002
and asked him to resolve the Maoist conflict and hold elections as soon as possible.140
Prime Minister Chand resigned eight months later after concerted opposition to his
appointment by opposition parties.141 In June 2003 the King once again appointed a
loyalist, named Surya Bahadur Thapa, as prime minister, prompting thousands of
protestors to demonstrate in the streets of Kathmandu142 claiming that the King was
acting unconstitutionally.143
Since the conflict between the government and the Maoists intensified in late 2001,
journalists and media outlets have been targeted by both sides. They have been targeted
as a result of their reporting or because their loyalties have been questioned by both
sides and a number of reporters have been murdered, abducted, or otherwise
intimidated. Conditions for the Nepali press have deteriorated to the point that
UNESCO Director-General, Koichiro Matsuura was prompted to comment that he was
gravely concerned by the conditions faced by journalists in Nepal and called on all
parties concerned to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
enshrines press freedom and freedom of expression as a fundamental human right.144
More journalists were arrested in Nepal than any other country in 2003, with security
forces arresting, detaining in undisclosed locations, torturing or threatening about 100
journalists.145
Nepals King Sacks Government, BBC News, 4 October 2002 (accessed 29 September 2004);
138 Nepal Plunged into Political Crisis, BBC News, 5 October 2002 (accessed 29 September 2004);
139 Center for Human Rights and Democratic Studies, Nepal Report (Katmandu: CHRDS, 2003);
available at http://www.cehurdes.org.np/intro.html
140 Nepal Pushes for Peace with Maoists, BBC News, 19 October 2002 (accessed 29 September 2004);
141 Nepals Prime Minister Resigns, BBC News, 30 May 2003 (accessed 29 September 2004); available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2949404.stm
142 Anti-King Protests in Nepal, BBC News, 5 June 2003 (accessed 29 September 2004); available at
143 Protests Against Nepal King, BBC News, 20 June 2003 (accessed 29 September 2004); available at
144 Nepal: UNESCO chief condemns murder of journalist as attack on all society, UN News Service
(accessed 29 September 2004); available at Http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=11750
145 Reporters Without Borders, Nepal 2004 Annual Report (Paris: RWB, 2004); available at
137
-58-.
In addition, the rate of torture in police custody and unlawful killings by state
authorities skyrocketed over the last few years. The Nepali Human Rights Commission
reports that in the period between 2000 and 2002 the incidence of torture by state
authorities has tripled, with the number of cases where women have been tortured
increasing in proportion to the overall increase.146 The state has also been involved in a
number of unlawful killings, either by shooting or beating civilians to death whilst in
custody.147
Throughout the following months, street protests continued, culminating in a peaceful
march on 4 April 2004 that was organized by the main groups opposed to the
dissolution of parliament; the demonstrators were calling for a return to multi-party
democracy. However, during the march police attacked and injured at least 150
protestors.148
Prime Minister Thapa eventually resigned in May 2004 and the King re-appointed Sher
Bahadur Deuba as his new prime minister. On being sworn in the new prime minister
once again promised to work towards peace and hold elections as soon as possible.149 At
the time of writing parliamentary elections have yet to be held in Nepal and there has
been no let up by the Maoist insurgents.
20.2
ANALYSIS
It is clear that since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting the Nepali government and King
Gyanendra have failed to:
Conduct free, fair and periodic elections even though the Election Commission
advised that it would be able to do so in the security situation
Guarantee that everyone can exercise their right to participate in the government
of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives as the King
continues to hold onto executive authority
Live up to their obligation to protect and defend the constitution, refraining from
extra-constitutional actions and to relinquish power when its legal mandate
ends; and
Respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and the inherent dignity of the
human being.
The recent decline in the state of democracy in Nepal is reflected in the indicators. Most
notably the Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Rule of Law measures have
National Human Rights Commission, Human Rights in Nepal: A Status Report, (Katmandu: NHRC,
2003), 35.
147 Ibid: 36.
148 Nepal: Police Violence Undermines Reform Process, Human Rights News, 4 April 2004; available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/07/nepal8414.htm
149 Nepals New PM Sworn into Office, BBC News, 3 June 2004 (accessed 29 September 2004);
146
-59-.
worsened in the WBI Governance Indicators; in 2004 Freedom House downgraded its
Political Rights rating for Nepal from 4 to 5 and maintained its status as a Party Free
country; and most disturbingly Nepals Polity Score moved from six in 2001 to negative
four in 2002. These indicators support the qualitative assessment above.
20.3
RECOMMENDATION
Until the resumption of multi-party elections and a greater adherence to fundamental

human rights, in particular freedom of speech and association, Nepal should be
downgraded from a Participant to the Seoul Ministerial Meeting to a Non-invitee to the
Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
20.4
STATISTICS

Year
2002
2000
Voice and
Accountability
-0.52
-0.12
Political
Stability
-1.63
-1.02
Government
Effectiveness
-0.51
-0.72
Regulatory
Quality
-0.50
-0.30
Rule of
Law
-0.50
-0.31
Control of
Corruption
-0.30
-0.42

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
5
3
Civil Liberties
4
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
1
7
-5
-1
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-4
6

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
2
-60-.
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2
21.
OMAN
21.1
BACKGROUND
Oman was upgraded from a Non-invitee at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Observer at the Ministerial Meeting in Seoul.
In October 2003, Oman took a small step forward in opening up its political system by
holding the first full election to its 83-member Consultative Council. The Consultative
Council, which is the lower chamber of the bicameral council, has no legislative powers
and may only recommend changes to new laws. Further, political parties continue to be
banned, and no meaningful organized political opposition exists. Nevertheless, this
election marks the first time in history that Oman has given the right to vote to all adult
citizens, both men and women, presenting a modest step in introducing political
reforms.
In the period since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, there have been no major
improvements in press freedom, which Sultan Qaboos continues to restrict. Although
the Basic Charter provides for freedom of the press, government laws and actions tightly
restrict this freedom in practice. For example, criticism of the sultan is prohibited by law
and the government owns and controls all broadcast media outlets. However, in 2003,
the government allowed state television to broadcast sessions in which members of the
Consultative Council questioned government ministers.
The basic law in Oman allows the formation of nongovernmental organizations, but
civic and associational life remains quite limited. For instance, all public gatherings
require government permission. In March 2003, police used moderate force to disperse
public demonstrations against the war in Iraq. Then in April 2003, the government
issued a decree that removed a previous prohibition on strikes.
Although the basic law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, women suffer from
legal and social discrimination. Women must have the permission of a male relative to
travel abroad. They also remain underrepresented in political sphere with only two
women having won seats on the 83-member Consultative Council in the 2003 national
elections.
21.2
RECOMMENDATION
Considering the very limited scope and implementation of political reforms Oman
should not be invited as a participant or an Observer to the Santiago Ministerial
Meeting.
21.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice
and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
-61-.
Regulatory
Control
Rule
Law
of
Control of
Corruption
2002
-0.55
+0.98
+0.69
+0.62
+0.83
+1.03
2000
-0.68
1.01
1.01
0.77
1.25
0.72

Range: 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free
YEAR
Political Rights
Civil Liberties
Freedom Rating
2004
Not Free

Range:
YEAR
DEMOC
Democracy Score
2002
2001
0
0
22.
QATAR
22.1
BACKGROUND
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
POLITY Combined
Polity Score150
8
9
-8
-9
Qatar was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Observer at the Seoul Ministering Meeting.
Qatar is a monarchy governed by a relatively benign autocrat, Sheikh Hamad al-Thani.
While the emir exercises power with few formal or informal restraints, he is not notably
reckless in its use. Unjustified imprisonment and torture are rare; systematic state terror
does not exist. There are, however, continuing instances of questionable detentions.
Public protest is rare. While the emir continues to exercise direct control over the police
and military, these bodies normally refrain from interfering in the political process.
Since the accession to power of the current ruler in 1995, the country has seen significant
political liberalization. Potentially the most important reform is Qatars new
constitution, which was overwhelmingly supported in a 2003 referendum and will enter
into force in 2005. The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, assembly, and
religion and provides for a two-thirds elected advisory body, although ultimate power
remains in the hands of the emir. Other recent reforms include the holding of municipal
council elections in 1999 and 2003, although political parties are not permitted.
150
Computed by subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC
-62-.
In 1999 the emir granted women the right to vote, and in 2003 the emir appointed
Qatars first female minister. The constitution guarantees gender equality, but in practice
some discrimination against women does exist. Honor killings are rare.
The majority of Qataris are Muslims, who generally worship freely. The current emir
has allowed Christian worship, but religious freedom has not been extended to
minorities beyond the Christian community.
Most rights apply only to Qatari citizens. While this is not in itself unusual, some 75
percent of Qatars residents are non-citizens. The result is that the majority of the
population has few political or civil rights.
The state does not determine media content; however, it shapes it. The five leading daily
newspapers are privately owned, but the ruling family has close ties to the owners.
Foreign print media are monitored and most broadcast outlets are government owned
and present the governments position. Domestic politics and policy are either avoided
or presented in a positive light. Even al-Jazeera practices self-censorship when covering
Qatari news.
Qatars judicial system comprises Islamic (Sharia) courts, which implement Islamic law,
and non-Islamic courts. Islamic courts have jurisdiction over only a narrow range of
issuesfamily law and probatebut Sharia judges enjoy a higher status. Most of
Qatars judges are foreign nationals because too few Qataris have adequate legal
training. Serving at the pleasure of the emir, these judges are ill-inclined to challenge
him. Qatar has no constitutional court and no mechanism for constitutional review.
Qatars courts have never served as a check on the ruler, and members of the ruling
family are not prosecuted for wrongdoing. Nevertheless, citizens who have been
arrested generally receive a fair and (usually) public hearing by a competent tribunal.
Presumption of innocence is maintained, and those charged with a criminal offense have
the right to legal representation.
22.2
RECOMMENDATION
Despite recent political reforms, that include appointing a woman to a ministerial

position and holding municipal elections in 2003, Qatar does not yet satisfy the criteria
to be invited as a Participant to Santiago. Nevertheless, Qatar should retain its Observer
status.
22.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.52
-0.66
+0.82
+1.46
+0.69
+0.98
+0.15
+0.51
+0.84
+1.11
+0.92
+0.72
-63-.

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
5
5
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
0
0
10
10
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-10
-10

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
N/A
N/A
N/A
23.
RUSSIA
23.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
N/A
Political and
Social
Integration
N/A
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
N/A
The Russian Federation was a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting as well as
being a Participant at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting.
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
In the intervening period, since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Russia held both
presidential and parliamentary elections. The parliamentary elections conducted on 7
December 2003 were won by the Edinaja Rossija party, which supports President
Vladimir Putin, gaining 222 of the 450 seats available in the Duma.151 With allied
groups, the Edinaja Rossija parliamentary faction controls a constitutional majority of
more than 300 seats allowing the President to have parliamentary support for initiating
changes in the Constitution and constitutional laws. More recently, on 14 March 2004,
President Putin was elected for a second consecutive term as president, winning by a
Election World database (accessed 30 September 2004); available at

http://www.electionworld.org/russia.htm
151
-64-.
landside with around 71 percent of the vote.152 President Putin, therefore, has secured a
second term in government, and faces little opposition in parliament.
However, both elections generally have been criticized for their media bias in favor of
President Putin and the Putin-aligned Edinaja Rossija party.153 The Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Election Observation Mission for the Duma
elections noted that, although the election was generally well-administered, the election
failed to meet a number of OSCE commitments for democratic elections, most notably
those pertaining to: unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis, a
clear separation between the State and political parties, and guarantees to enable
political parties to compete on the basis of equal treatment.154 The main reasons why
the international observers concluded the parliamentary elections failed to meet OSCE
standards were:
The democratic norms of voter access to information and equal conditions for
candidates and parties to convey their message was severely compromised;
That widespread use of State administrative resources blurred the distinction

between Edinaja Rossija and the executive; and
State broadcasters favored Edinaja Rossija.155
The OSCE Election Observation Mission for the Presidential Elections reported that the
presidential elections were similarly flawed. In particular they noted that, although the
election was professionally organized by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), the
process overall did not adequately reflect principles necessary for a healthy democratic
election. The election process failed to meet important commitments concerning
treatment of candidates by the State-controlled media on a non-discriminatory basis,
equal opportunities for all candidates and secrecy of the ballot.156 The main reason why
the international observers concluded the presidential elections failed to meet OSCE
standards was the lack of a vibrant political discourse and meaningful pluralism.157 This
can be attributed to the State-controlled media displaying clear bias in favor of President
Putin in news reporting and coverage of the campaign.158 In addition, a significant
irregularity that was widely observed was the practice of open voting, which was
Ibid
See BBC World Service Country Profile :Russia (accessed 24 September 2004); available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1102275.stm
154 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma 7
December 2003 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report (Warsaw, OSCE Office of Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, 27 January 2004), 1.
155 Ibid.
156 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russian Federation Presidential Elections 14
March 2004 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report (Warsaw, OSCE Office of Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, 2 June 2004), 1.
157 Ibid
158 Ibid
152
153
-65-.
encouraged by the responsible election commission, but which runs contrary to the
principle of a secret vote.159
Systematic Erosion of Democracy
In the period leading up to and subsequent to the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, President
Putins agenda to build controlled democracy and recentralize power has resulted in
the Kremlin exerting greater control over all branches of power, all levels of governance
and various sectors in the society. President Putin has introduced a number of changes
to strengthen the presidency mainly at the expense of elected representatives in the
Duma and the Federation Council,160 but also at the expense of non-governmental
organizations, the independent press, the business community and Russias federalist
system. In particular, in order to centralize power and control, the Kremlin has sought
to implement regressive reforms in the following areas:
Regulation of civil society;
Operation of the independent media and journalists;
Abolition of elections of the Governors of the regions and of single-mandate district elections
to the State Duma;
Reform of the judiciary; and
Restrictions on freedom of association
Civil society. Freedom of Association. Freedom of Assembly.

Article 30 of Chapter 2 of the Russian Constitution 1993 provides that all citizens have the
right to association, including the right to form unions, and that no one can be
constrained from joining or remaining a member of an association.
Of particular concern to civil society organizations in Russia is the adoption of the
federal law No.112 On Combating Extremist Activities on 25 July 2002, which
prohibits the creation and activities of associations whose goals or actions are
considered extremist.161 The law gives a very broad definition of extremist activities,
including other activities, aimed at undermining security of the Russian Federation.
The law on extremist activities and subsequent amendments to the laws on NGOs,
political parties, and the media give executive authorities unprecedented powers to
extra-judicially suspend the activities of an organization both on the grounds of
suspicion of its involvement in the broadly defined extremist activities and for any other
violations, including minor administrative ones. This subjective litmus test for
registration, re-registration, and liquidation does not afford any certainty to associations
Ibid: 2
Country Briefings Russia: Political Forces, The Economist, 10 June 2004 (accessed 27 September
2004); available at http://www.economist.com/countries/Russia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2744857
159
160
161
International Federation for Human Rights and World Organisation Against Torture, International FactFinding Mission Russia: Human rights Defenders faced with the Dictatorship of the Law. (FIDHOMCT, September 2004): 10
-66-.
and can be used by authorities to stifle the operation of legitimate civil society
organizations. This restrictive environment has led one human rights activist to
comment that the period for developing human rights associations is over.162
The state authorities increasingly harass human rights and other independent NGOs.
President Putin and a number of high level officials severely criticized human rights
NGOs in 2004 for their alleged anti-Russian activities, working for foreign interests or
dubious private interests at home, providing assistance to terrorists and criminals and
neglecting real interests and rights of the people. In 2003-2004, a number of human
rights NGOs were suspended or liquidated by court decisions on formal pretexts, in
effect for their human rights activity and criticism of human rights abuses of the state.
Victims of harassment by state authorities include such NGOs as Soldiers Mothers of St
Petersburg, Kazan Human Rights Center, Independent Psychiatric Association,
Novorossiysk School of Peace Foundation, Krasnodar Human Rights Center, etc.163
Other examples of the state establishing control over civil society include changes to the
tax code to restrict funding opportunities, especially from abroad; amendments to the
Law on Political Parties, which is currently being debated in the State Duma and which,
if passed, would make it close to impossible to establish new political parties; and
amendments to the Law on the Organization of Referendum, which was adopted in 2004
and makes it virtually impossible for citizens to initiate a referendum.
A law On gatherings, rallies and demonstrations, adopted by the Duma on 4 June
2004 and signed by the President on 21 June 2004, allows authorities to ban planned
gatherings.164 In order to obtain approval to hold a gathering, a request for
authorization has to be lodged along with an hour by hour program ten days in
advance.165 Furthermore, there is a total ban on demonstrations close to the presidents
residence, to court rooms, and to prisons, while all gatherings must end by 11 p.m.,
thereby precluding overnight or long-term demonstrations or vigils.166 This recent
legislative development constitutes a severe curtailing of the freedom of peaceful
assembly in Russia and runs contrary to the spirit of Article 21 and 22 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,167 which Russia has ratified.168
162
163
Ibid: 10
Alternative NGO Report on the Observance of ICCPR by the Russian Federation, October 2003,
Submitted to the Attention of the UN Human Rights Committee in Connection with the Consideration
of the Fifth Periodical Report of the Russian Federation, available at
http://www.mhg.ru/english/1F24FB3
164 164
International Federation for Human Rights and World Organisation Against Torture, International
Fact-Finding Mission Russia: Human rights Defenders faced with the Dictatorship of the Law. (FIDHOMCT, September 2004): 8
165
Ibid
166
Ibid
167
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976.
168
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website; available at

http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm#reservations
-67-.
These examples represent a trend civil society has witnessed over the last couple of
years as it has become increasingly clear that President Putins government has an
aversion to groups that monitor and counteract their activities in politically sensitive or
economically important areas.169
The Media
Over the last couple of years the independent media in Russia have been severely
curtailed and in some instances stopped from operating altogether. The state has
established control over all national TV channels. The forcible change of management at
the NTV television station, for example, along with the closure of the daily Segodnya
newspaper and weekly Itogi magazine dealt a blow to the free press and freedom of
expression in Russia.
In addition to the closure of the independent private media, Russias politicians sought
to limit public access to information before the 2003 Duma elections and the 2004
presidential elections by passing legislation with harsh media restrictions.170
Most recently, the World Association of Newspapers (WAN) reported that journalists
are being harassed, intimidated, and pressured in Russia. In particular, journalists were
targeted during the September attack against a school in Beslan during which officials
detained or hindered a number of journalists seeking to report on the tragedy. There are
also claims that one reporter and human rights defender were poisoned. Members of
the parliament repeatedly threaten to adopt amendments to the law on mass media
establishing stricter control over print and broadcast media. WAN is concerned that
"there is an ongoing culture of impunity" in Russia toward the murder of journalists,
with the culprits never being brought to justice.171 Notably, two editors have recently
been killed - Paul Khlebnikov, the Editor of the Russian edition of Forbes magazine, and
Payl Peloyan, Editor in Chief of a Russian-language arts magazine.172 Developments in
2003-2004 in Russia have lead Reporters sans Frontieres to downgrade Russia in its annual
worldwide index of press freedom to 140th place out of 167 participants.173
Regional Governments
President Putins attempts to centralize power within the Kremlin were bolstered after
the Beslan hostage tragedy in September 2004. President Putin used the actions of the
Chechen rebels and the events in Beslan to justify his plans to further centralize power.
In line with this objective he has proposed ending the direct election of Russias regional
Nations in Transition: Democratization in East Central and Eurasia 2004, available at

http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm
170
Nations in Transit: Democratization in East Central and Eurasia 2004, available at
169
171
WAN, Press Freedom World Review June November 2004; available at http://www.wanpress.org/article5683.html
172
Ibid
Third annual worldwide index of press freedom, October 2004, Reporters sans Frontieres, available at
173
-68-.
governors. The Russian Duma recently approved Putins proposal to end direct
elections for 89 regional governors and it is expected to pass its two subsequent
readings.174 He has also proposed changes to parliamentary election procedures that
would undermine the ability of independent candidates to run for office.
The Council of Europe has come out against the proposed reforms arguing that the
right to elect governors in accordance with federal law should belong either to the
people of the Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation or to their elected
representatives in the regional assembly.175 There is conjecture as to whether or not
such a move would require a constitutional amendment, although Putin has dismissed
such an amendment as being unnecessary.176 Former Russian president Boris Yeltsin
said that Russia should not move away from the spirit or the letter of the constitution
he introduced in 1993, which was approved in a national referendum.177
The Judiciary and the Rule of Law
The rule of law and the right to a fair trial are consistently undermined by a biased and
unjust judicial system, as evidenced by the trial of Igor Sutiagin, a scientist with the
Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies of the Academy of Sciences who was recently
found guilty of high treason in closed trial in violation of international standards for the
conduct of a fair trial.178 Similarly, the trial of physicist Valentin Danilov, which ended in
November 2004 with a guilty verdict of 14 years in prison for alleged disclosure of state
secrets, caused an outcry among the academic and human rights communities for
numerous violations of international standards and led Russian NGOs to proclaim
Danilov a political prisoner.179 These prominent politically motivated cases are just two
among many so called spy trials that have proliferated in Russia in 2000-2004 against
independent environmentalists, journalists and researchers and are aimed at limiting the
freedom of thought and expression, access to information, the right to freely disseminate
information and contacts with abroad, all in violation of Russias international
Russian Duma backs Putin Reforms, BBC News, 29 October 2004 (accessed 4 November 2004);
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3965845.stm
175 Council of Europe, Statement by Congress President concerned by President Putins proposal to end direct
election of regional governors, 17 September 2004; available at http://www.coe.int/DefaultEN.asp; see also
An Open Letter to the Governments of NATO and the European Union expressing concern about the
state of democracy in Russia, 28 September 2004, (sponsored by former Prime Minister of Sweden,
Carl Bildt; U.S. Senator John McCain; and Senator Joseph Biden); and The Truth About Russia, The
Washington Post, 1 October 2004 (accessed 1 October 2004); available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63829-2004Sep30.html
176 Yeltsin fears for Russia freedoms, BBC News, 16 September 2004 (accessed 1 October 2004);
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3663788.stm
177 Ibid
178 See Joint Statement on the case of Igor Sutiagin by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, the Moscow Helsinki Group, and the Public
Committee for the Protection of Scientists, June 2004,
174
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/russia/2004/igor_statement.htm
179
Valentin Danilov: A New Russian Political Prisoner, Statement by Russian human rights activists,
November 24, 2004, available at http://www.hro.org/actions/danilov/2004/11/24.php
-69-.
obligations.180 Unfortunately, these cases have demonstrated that the Russian judiciary is
under heavy influence of the executive government, especially the security services and
the military.
Indeed, although it was hoped that the unexpected election of Valery Zorkin as
Chairman of the Constitutional Court in 2003 would improve the balance of power
between the various branches of government, it is not clear whether Russias judges, on
the whole, are any more independent.181
The high-profile arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, along with his business partner Platon
Lebedev, on charges of fraud stemming from his position as chief executive of Russias
oil producer Yukos has also raised serious questions about the independence of the
judiciary in Putins Russia. The circumstances surrounding the arrest and prosecution of
leading Yukos executives strongly suggest that they were arbitrarily singled out by
the Russian authorities due to their political motives.182 Khodorkovskys arrest came
soon after his purchase of the rights to publish the prestigious Moskovskiye Novosti
paper, the hiring of a renowned investigative journalist critical of President Putin and
making political donations to liberal opposition parties and civil society organizations.183
Another indication of increasing state control of the judiciary is a new initiative by the
Speaker of the Council of Federations to give the president powers to appoint a majority
of the High Judicial Qualification Collegium.
Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinovs calls in November 2004 for amending Russian
laws to allow the state to take hostage relatives of terrorists contravene fundamental
international standards, Russian Constitution and laws and strongly undermine the rule
of law in the country. It was strongly criticized by the UN experts and Russian NGOs
and media.184
Observation of Fundamental International Human Rights Standards
Russias implementation of its international obligations has deteriorated in recent years
on both global and regional levels. Four UN treaty bodies closely scrutinized in 20022003 Russian Federations observance of major UN conventions, in particular the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on Elimination of
Racial Discrimination and the International Convention Against Torture. In all four
Concluding Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee on the Observance of ICCPR by the
Russian Federation, November 2003, available at
180
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/622c5ddc8c476dc4c1256e0c003c9758?Opendocument
Nations in Transition: Democratization in East Central and Eurasia 2004, available at
181
182
The circumstances surrounding the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos executives. A report by
Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, available at
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?ArtId=97
183
Profile: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, BBC News, 16 June 2004 (accessed 28 November 2004); available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3213505.stm
184
UN Experts Criticize Russian Prosecutor General, http://control.hro.org/okno/pr/2004/11/04.php
-70-.
reviews the UN bodies found Russia in serious breach of its obligations and lacking
consistent measures to make progress towards implementation of international human
rights treaties.185
Moreover, in 2004, Russia blatantly refused to fulfill decisions of the UN Committee on
Human Rights adopted in 2001-2002 on two individual complaints, Gridin v. Russia and
Lantsov v. Russia, ordering Russia to reverse unlawful court decisions and restore
violated rights. This unprecedented refusal caused harsh criticism of the UN Human
Rights Committee at its November 2003 session.186 After the latest visit of the
Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the
delegation concluded that Russia had fulfilled only one out of 25 obligations it
committed to at the time of becoming a member of the Council of Europe.187
23.2
ANALYSIS
It is clearly stated in the Community of Democracies Criteria for Participation188 that

invitations to observe will only be issued to countries that fail to meet international
standards of democracy and human rights, but are in a transition process and have
given concrete steps to meet the criteria to participate.
It is clear that since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting the Russian government has failed to
ensure free and fair elections were universally conducted using a secret ballot.
Furthermore, we have witnessed a systematic erosion of democracy in Russia that has
manifested itself in the clamp down and closure of the independent press, further
centralization of power by the Kremlin, erosion of the rule of law, and adoption of new
laws placing a heavy regulatory burden on civil society organizations that has hampered
their ability to operate. In addition the Russian government has failed to protect
185
Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the
Observance of ICESCR by the Russian Federation, October 2003, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/5192a0b3c292a7ecc1256e12003abf2d?Opendocument
Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the
Observance of ICERD by the Russian Federation, March 2003, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/08a9408084499c9ac1256d01003766d3?Opendocument
Concluding Observations of the UN Committee Against Torture on the Observance of CAT by the
Russian Federation, May 2002, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/4894f60be8af9fbec1256dc1004a3c14?Opendocument
186
187
Report from a press-conference in Moscow on November 7, 2004, of David Atkinson, a rapporteur

on Russia of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
available at http://www.hro.org/editions/2004/11/08.php
188
In September, 2002 the Community of Democracies Convening Group determined that states need
to respect certain democratic standards in order to participate in the Community of Democracies; see
http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/CD_participation_criteria.pdf
-71-.
fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of association, peaceful assembly, speech,

opinion and expression as well as the freedom of the media.189 It is clear that these
actions are not the actions of a government committed to the principles of the Warsaw
Declaration but rather constitute a systematic erosion of democracy in Russia.
The democracy indicators illustrate a mixed picture even before Putin launched the most
recent moves to consolidate power. All measures, aside from Voice and Accountability,
in the WBI Governance Indicators showed a marked improvement from 2000 to 2002
indicating that democracy was strengthening. However, the decrease in the Voice and
Accountability measure over the same period, and the fact Russias FH Ranking is
projected to decline to Not Free in 2004, reflects the restrictions placed on the media, the
shaping of public opinion through state controlled mass media, limits on freedom of
expression, continued pressure on and manipulation of opposition political parties and
independent business leaders. This state of affairs is also reflected in the Stateness
measurement awarded in the BTI. It should be noted that the bulk of President Putins
most recent reforms are too recent to be measured in the indices, but should be reflected
in the rankings when next updated.
23.3
RECOMMENDATION
In light of these recent trends away from democracy, human rights and the rule of law,
Russia should not be invited to participate at the Santiago Ministerial Meeting as either
a Participant or an Observer. An invitation to observe would not be appropriate in
Russias case as it is neither a transitional democracy nor has it taken concrete steps to
fulfill the Warsaw criteria.
23.4
STATISTICS

Year
2002
2000
Voice and
Accountability
-0.52
-0.44
Political
Stability
-0.40
-0.53
Government
Effectiveness
-0.40
-0.61
Regulatory
Quality
-0.30
-1.55
Rule of
Law
-0.78
-0.86
Control of
Corruption
-0.90
-1.05

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
5
5
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Article 18, 19, 20 & 21: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23,
1976.
189
-72-.

Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
7
7
0
0
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
7
7

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
24.
SIERRA LEONE
24.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
3
Political and
Social
Integration
3
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
3.0
Sierra Leone was upgraded from a Non-invitee at Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

In the intervening period since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Sierra Leone has taken
bold steps toward the consolidation of democracy. The presidential elections, held in
May 2002, were considered the countrys fairest since independence in 1961.190
Numerous political parties exist despite the fact that many have a weak following and
lack resources. The constitution guarantees the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
association, all of which are generally respected by the government. Accordingly, nongovernmental organizations and the press operated openly, although the government
has intervened for alleged inaccurate reporting.191
Since the last Ministerial Meeting, a truth commission and hybrid tribunal were
established to address impunity and help citizens reconcile their grievances. In other
judicial realms, Sierra Leones court system has managed to demonstrate independence
despite historical corruption and financial setbacks.192 While the few adjudicated trials
were seemingly impartial, the overwhelming challenges of reforming the system in the
post-conflict environment have led to an extensive backlog of trials. Long-term rule of
Freedom House Sierra Leone 2004 Country Report, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/sierraleone.htm
191 US Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm
192 Reno, William, Sierra Leone Country Report 2004,Countries at the Crossroads 2004: A Survey of
Democratic Governance, Christopher Walker, and Sarah Repucci, Eds., Freedom House, Washington,
D.C. 2004.
190
-73-.
law and institution building needs further attention so that it can be successfully
reformed and strengthened.
24.2
RECOMMENDATION
While Sierra Leone continues to grapple with security issues and needs to further
address cleavages between the rights guaranteed in the constitution and their actual
implementation, the country has made a tremendous turn around since 2002.
Nonetheless, there are concerns among the international community that the
government is not moving forward with its reforms but is instead returning to
traditional ways of governing which are marred by a lack of adherence to the rule of
law and a centralization of power.193 Consequently, Sierra Leone should remain as an
Observer at the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
24.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.57
-1.36
-1.47
-1.34
-1.54
-1.57
-1.31
-1.07
-1.25
-0.77
-0.82
-0.77

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
4
4
Civil Liberties
3
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
2002
5
0
5
2001*
-88
-88
-88
*These numbers are outside Polity IVs traditional equation due to the interim government that
brought the country to elections in May 2002.
Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance, International Crisis Group Africa Report, No.
67, September 2003, available at http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1492&l=1
193
-74-.

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
25.
SINGAPORE
25.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
1
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
1.6
Singapore was upgraded from a Non-invitee at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

In the intervening period, since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, there have been no
parliamentary or presidential elections in Singapore. Parliamentary elections were held
4 November 2001, in which the governing Peoples Action Party (PAP) secured an
overwhelming majority with 90% of the vote.194 There is no independent elections
commission and campaigning is restricted to nine days.
Parliamentary elections are not scheduled to be held again until next year; nonetheless,
on 12 August 2004 a transfer of power took place when Lee Hsien Loong, the eldest son
of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who ruled the island nation from 1965 to 1990,
was sworn in as Singapores new prime minister, replacing Goh Chok Tong.195
Presently the PAP holds 82 of the 84 elected single-seat constituencies. Much of the
success of the PAP can be attributed to the fact that 55 of the 84 seats were
uncontested,196 thereby automatically giving the PAP the majority in parliament.
Opposition figures argue that this is a ridiculous situation which occurs election after
election because nobody dares to come out due to the fear of being sued for libel by
senior PAP members.197 If people speak out against public figures and the public figures
have the resources to sue, they often run afoul of Singapores civil defamation laws
which have been used by government politicians to bankrupt opposition leaders. The
judiciary has shown little to no independence from the executive in such cases, ruling
consistently in favor of the government.
Election World database (accessed 1 October 2004); available at

http://www.electionworld.org/singapore.htm
195 Singapore swears in a new leader, BBC News, 12 August 2004 (accessed 1 October 2004); available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3558444.stm
196 Election World database (accessed 1 October 2004); available at
http://www.electionworld.org/singapore.htm
197 Opposition figure says poll will be no real contest, Reuters, 1 November 2001 (accessed 1 October
2004); available at http://www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/01Pf/reut011101d.html
194
-75-.
The most high profile case presently running was brought by former Prime Minister
Goh Chok Tong and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew against a prominent opposition
politician, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, for his suggestion in the run-up to the 2001
parliamentary elections that $S17 billion in taxpayer money had been lent to former
Indonesian President Suharto.198 Dr Chee has since been found guilty of defamation and
is waiting for the damages to be fixed. Dr Chee was forced to represent himself before
the High Court, despite offers of legal assistance by the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights. The High Court has continuously turned down applications by overseas legal
counsel to act on Dr Chees behalf,199 fuelling concerns over the impartiality of the
judiciary.
Dr Chees case is just one of many over the last few years that illustrate the way the
ruling party has used strict defamation laws to intimidate and bankrupt its political
rivals. During the period 1971-1993 eleven opposition politicians were bankrupted,
predominantly in libel cases brought by the PAP.200 The most notorious was the case of
opposition politician J B Jeyaretnam, who after years of defending legal cases brought
against him by the PAP, was left bankrupt and therefore stripped of his seat in
parliament. Despite the governments claim that these were purely legal and criminal
matters, they nevertheless have the effect of intimidating the opposition and restricting
free speech.201 Throughout 2003 the threat of potentially ruinous civil defamation
suits against opponents of the PAP continued to inhibit political life and engendered a
climate of self-censorship.202
Aside from the faade of openly contested parliamentary elections and the curbing of
freedom of expression through strict defamation laws, draconian regulations also inhibit
fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of association. The Public Entertainments
Act prohibits people assembling for a public political meeting without a permit. Issuing
of the permit is at the discretion of the police and has been applied in an arbitrary
manner. Appeals may be made to the judiciary, which many consider too biased to
render a fair judgment. Opposition politicians have been in and out of jail several times
for organizing peaceful meetings and rallies, but in the process the suppression of
freedom of association continues to stifle opposition politicians ability to garner support
and to provide an alternate voice.203
Ibid
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Singapore: Opposition Politician appeals Defamation Charges, 12
February 2003 (accessed 1 October 2003); available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2003_alerts/0212.htm
200 Singapores Electoral Faade, The Morning Star, November 2001 (accessed 1 October 2004);
available at http://www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/02Pf/mornstar02.html
201 Ibid
202 Amnesty International, Singapore Country Report Covering events from January to December 2003;
available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web/nsf/print/2004-sgp-summary-eng
203 Singapore: Government Continues to Use Judicial System to Stifle Political Opposition, Human Rights
First Media Alert, 12 November 2002 (accessed 1 October 2004); available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2002_alerts/1112a.htm
198
199
-76-.
Singapores government exercises direct ownership and/or influence over all media
outlets. Under the Internal Security Act, the government may prosecute publishers who
broadcast material that might threaten national interests, national security or the public
order. In October 2003, Reporters Without Borders ranked Singapore 144 out of 166
countries in a survey of press freedom.204 In November 2004, Singapores ranking
slipped further to 147 for its continued suppression of free speech and the media.
While there have been no recent documented cases of extra-judicial killings or torture by
security personnel, the government has wide powers to limit citizens' rights and to
handicap political opposition. Caning, which constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment, remains mandatory for some 30 crimes, including attempted murder, rape,
armed robbery, drugs trafficking, illegal immigration offences and vandalism.205 In
addition, authorities rely on preventive detention to deal with espionage, terrorism,
organized crime, and narcotics.206
25.2
ANALYSIS
It is clear that since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting the Singapore government has failed
to respect human rights and freedoms, in particular the government has not protected
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. The stifling
effect that restrictions of these freedoms have on participation in government and the
promotion of multipartidism cannot be underestimated. Regulatory restrictions that
inhibit the political space in which Singaporeans operate directly undermine democracy
in Singapore and act as a barrier to Singapore fulfilling its potential as an open
democratic society.
A majority of the measures in the WBI Governance Indicators show that Singapores
rankings, compared to other countries, have slipped; the FH Ranking has been
maintained at Partly Free; and most concerning is the Polity Score of negative two. The
conditions described above are directly reflected in the BTI where Singapore was rated
as five for the Stateness measure, indicating the governments authoritarian structure,
while being rated zero for the Institutional Stability measure which assesses democratic
institutions.
25.3
RECOMMENDATION
Until the government of Singapore lifts its regulatory regime that inhibits freedom of
association and of the press and stops using defamation laws as a tool of political
repression, it should remain as a Non-invitee.
25.4
STATISTICS
Second World Press Freedom Ranking (October 2003), Reporters Without Borders,
205 Amnesty International Report, 2003, Singapore Country Profile, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/sgp-summary-eng
206 U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Singapore Country Profile,
2003, available at
204
-77-.

Year
Voice and
Accountability
+0.51
-0.05
2002
2000
Political
Stability
+1.28
+1.53
Government
Effectiveness
+2.26
+2.48
Regulatory
Quality
+1.89
+2.27
Rule of
Law
+1.75
+2.12
Control of
Corruption
+2.30
+2.50

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
5
5
Civil Liberties
4
5
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
2
2
4
4
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-2
-2

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
26.
TUNISIA
26.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
3
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.8
Tunisia was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Tunisias October 24 presidential elections were neither free nor fair, and President Zine
El Abidine Ben Ali was re-elected by an artificially overwhelming 95 percent of the
electorate. While Ben Ali ostensibly faced three opposition candidates, the Progressive
-78-.
Democratic Party, the main opposition group, boycotted the election.207 Ben Ali has ruled
for 17 years. A constitutional referendum last year removed the three-term limit on the
presidency and raised the maximum age to become president to 75, which means that the
68 year-old Ben Ali will be eligible to stand again for office in 2009 and could potentially
be president until 2014.
Tunisians cannot change their government democratically. The 1959 constitution
accords the president significant powers, including the right to select the prime minister
and cabinet, to rule by decree when the legislature is not in session, and to appoint the
governors of Tunisias 23 provinces. The legislature, by contrast, serves as a rubber
stamp for the presidents policies and does not provide a check on executive power. As
evidenced by the election on October 25, presidential contests lack any pretense of
competition. Although parliamentary elections are contrived to allow for the appearance
of a multiparty legislature, the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) holds 148
of the 182 seats. Opposition parties play a symbolic role at best. The authorities have
used security concerns as a pretext for repression of political dissent and critical
discourse across the political spectrum.208
Since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, the governments tolerance for dissent continued to
diminish. In 2003, Amnesty International issued a 40-page report that chronicled
Tunisias cycle of injustice and which pointed out a disturbing discrepancy between
laws and practice. According to the report, government opponentsor anyone critical of
the governmentare subjected to arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention (without
access to a lawyer or family), torture, and imprisonment. While certain changes in
Tunisian law provide more human rights guarantees, other legal changes, including a
vague definition of terrorism, undermine basic human rights. In other cases, rights
have improved in law, but are widely violated in practice.209
Freedom of association and assembly are sharply curtailed. After one opposition party,
the Democratic Forum for Labor and Freedom was legalized in 2002eight years after
its formationthe number of authorized political parties in the country increased to
seven. However, several parties continue to be denied authorization. In addition, a
number of politically oriented nongovernmental organizations remain unauthorized.
While Islam is the state religion, the government allows for the free practice of all
religions as long as it does not disturb the public order. The government controls and
subsidizes mosques and pays the salaries of prayer leaders. The 1988 law on mosques
Marmie, Nicolas, Tunisian President Ben Ali wins landslide, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, October 25,
2004, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/apafrica_story.asp?category=1105&slug=Tunisia%20Elections
208 Freedom House Tunisia 2004 Country Report, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/tunisia.htm
209 Tunisia: The cycle of injustice, Amnesty International, June 10, 2003, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engMDE300012003
207
-79-.
stipulates that only those appointed by the government may lead activities in the
mosques, which are required to remain closed except during prayer times.210
Tunisias press freedoms are highly restrictive. The government controls domestic
broadcasting, as well as the circulation of both domestic and foreign publications. In
addition, the government uses newsprint subsidies and control over public advertising
revenues as a means for indirect censorship. Since President Zine el-Abidine Ben Alis
ascent to power, Tunisian journalists who are critical of the regime have been harassed,
threatened, imprisoned, physically attacked, and censored. Two Tunisian journalists,
Zouhair Yahyaoui and Hamadi Jebali, are currently in prison. Internet access is tightly
controlled, and the government will at times intervene to block access to opposition Web
sites.211
There is no independent judiciary in Tunisia, with the government using the courts to
convict and imprison critics. Amnesty International has documented a pattern of
executive interference in the administration of justice. At all stages of criminal
proceedings, guarantees for a free trial under Tunisian and international law are
disregarded. Defendants files at times are confiscated or tampered with at trials, and
political prisoners are subjected to harsh prison conditions, including solitary
confinement. Arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention occur with frequency, and
torture is often used to coerce confessions. Numerous political trials failed to comply
with international standards for a fair trial.212
26.2
RECOMMENDATION
Tunisia is ruled by an authoritarian government that greatly restricts the political and
civil rights of its citizens. While the relative stability and economic success of Tunisia has
led to the portrayal of the country as a model for its Middle Eastern neighbors, such a
characterization does not apply to its democratic development. Tunisia should not be
invited as a participant or an observer to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
26.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.83
-0.71
+0.24
+0.86
+0.65
+1.32
-0.02
+0.65
+0.27
+0.48
+0.35
+0.70
Freedom House Tunisia 2004 Country Report, available at

http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/Tunisia.htm
211 Freedom of the Press 2004
212 Freedom House Tunisia 2004 Country Report, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/Tunisia.htm
210
-80-.

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
6
6
Civil Liberties
5
5
Freedom Rating
Not Free
Not Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
1
1
5
4
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-4
-3

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
27.
UGANDA
27.1
BACKGROUND
of
Institutional
Stability
0
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
1.6
Uganda was not invited to participate in either the Warsaw or Seoul Ministerial
Meetings.
Since the last Ministerial Meeting in Seoul, Uganda, has been under substantial donor
pressure to open up its political system. Up until recently political parties were banned
from contesting elections. However, in March 2003 the Constitutional Court overturned
the results of the 2000 referendum, which rejected multi-party politics in favor of
Musevenis no-party system213 In response to the courts decision Museveni claimed
that the judges had usurped the power of the people and appealed to the Supreme
Court, where in September 2004, it reversed the lower courts decision.
In order to appease the donor community President Museveni called for another
referendum to determine whether Uganda should open up to a multi-party political
213
Uganda Referendum Appeal Set for August 3, AllAfrica News, July 20, 2004
-81-.
system.214 Museveni has sought to include an additional question on the ballot seeking a
constitutional amendment that would allow him to serve beyond the two-term limit
presently provided for in the constitution. If passed, such a revision would enable
President Museveni to run for a third term in 2006. However, the need to conduct the
referendum has abated with a recent decision by the Constitutional Court nullifying
restrictive sections of the Political Parties and Organizations Act (PPOA) on the grounds
that the provisions violated freedom on assembly and association. As a result of the
court decision, political parties have six months to register for the upcoming 2006
elections and are free to open branches throughout the country, to hold public rallies
and contest elections.215 Up until now only Musevenis movement system had been
permitted to take part in elections. At the time of writing the government has not
responded and it is unclear whether they will appeal the decision. Recent claims by
opposition groups that Museveni is failing to ensure a peaceful transition by proceeding
with a parliamentary discussion on the constitutional amendments suggest that he will
proceed with the referendum nevertheless.
In addition to these issues, corruption is relatively entrenched in Ugandas institutions.
There have been minor victories in combating corruption though, including the creation
of an auditor-general post and the ministry of ethics and integrity. Nonetheless, such
corruption impedes official efforts to uphold the rule of law and governments
encouragement of accountability. In 2004, Transparency International rated Uganda
113th out of 133 countries and noted that impunity remains widespread.216
In the human rights arena, the use of torture as an interrogation tool by Ugandan
security and military forces has been increasingly documented since at least 2001.
Numerous security agencies created outside the institutional framework have defied the
laws that regulate arrest and detention with few consequences. Furthermore, the reemergence of safe houses during the last election provided these forces with ample
opportunities for torture and abuse.217
27.2
RECOMMENDATION
President Musevenis attempt to revise the constitution so he can extend his term in
office, coupled with ongoing delays in allowing political parties to compete for power,
demonstrate that Uganda still lacks many of the essential elements of a representative
democracy. In addition, the increased incidents of torture are a reversal of Ugandas
previous improvements in the human rights arena and demonstrate an acceptance of
Uganda 'ready for rival parties', BBC News, 29 September 2004,

215 Uganda: Political Parties Win Freedom, Monitor, 18 November 2004, available at
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news/news11183.php
216 Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2004, Uganda Profile, available at
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2004/11_Country_reports_L_Z.pdf
217 State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, Human Rights Watch Report, March 2004, Vol. 16, No. 4 (A)
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uganda0404/3.htm#_Toc67373878
214
-82-.
state-sanctioned abuse. Therefore, Uganda should not be invited as a Participant or an

Observer to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
27.3
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of
Law
Control of
Corruption
2002
2000
-0.77
N/A
-1.46
N/A
-0.41
N/A
-0.01
N/A
-0.84
N/A
-0.92
N/A

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
3
4
Civil Liberties
3
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
0
0
4
4
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-4
-4

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
2
-83-.
Political and
Social
Integration
2
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.2
28.
UKRAINE
28.1
BACKGROUND
Ukraine was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Since the Ukraine Country Assessment was first written, dramatic events have unfolded
in Ukraine, which warrants a revision of the initial country assessment for Ukraine.
Ukraine held a re-run of the second round presidential elections on 26 December 2004.
The re-run was scheduled after the Ukrainian Supreme Courts 3 December 2004
decision overriding the 21 November decision of the Central Election Commission
(CEC), which declared Yanukovych the winner. The CEC declaration was reversed on
the basis of significant legal violations in the election process making it impossible to
determine the true will of the people.
Although the short period between the initial second round election and the re-run was
too short to correct some of the problems exhibited in the first two rounds, such as errors
on the voter lists, and despite some incidents of irregularities,218 the election process was
generally considered to be substantially closer to meeting the OSCE election
commitments and Council of Europe and other European standards.219 Importantly, the
re-composed electoral commission administered the elections in a much more
transparent manner, there was a significant reduction in reports of people being coerced
to vote for a particular candidate, there was a reduction in the misuse of state resources
during the campaign and there was more even-handed media coverage of the
campaign.220
Recently, the Supreme Court rejected Viktor Yanukovychs complaint against the
Electoral Commissions conduct of the poll. The unofficial results of the vote indicate
Viktor Yushchenko won by a decisive two million votes.221 Mr Yanukovych still has one
more chance to appeal against the outcome and until all avenues of appeal have been
exhausted the electoral commission is unable to declare a winner.
Nevertheless, the conduct of the Supreme Court over the last month runs counter to the
earlier criticisms of the judicial system and the strength of the rule of law in Ukraine.
Furthermore, the negotiated and peaceful settlement of the electoral disputes within the
bounds of the constitution herald a marked improvement in the conduct of democratic
affairs in Ukraine. These developments, coupled with the progress made in the
Please refer to the Committee of Voters Ukraine homepage; available at

http://www.cvu.org.ua/?lang=eng
219 International Election Observation Mission, Presidential Election (Repeat Second Round),
Ukraine Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (Kyiv, 27 December 2004), 1
220
Ibid.
221 Court Rejects Yanukovychs Appeal BBC News; available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4152737.stm
218
-84-.
December 26 elections, warrant upgrading Ukraine to full participant status for the
Santiago Ministerial.
Events Leading up to the Re-run of the Second Round Presidential Elections
Ukraine held the first round of presidential elections at the end of October 2004 and the
run-off ballot was conducted on 21 November 2004. In the run-up to both rounds of the
election, there was substantial domestic and international criticism as to the fairness of
the electoral process. According to the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU), an
independent election monitoring organization, the number and seriousness of the
violations committed during the 21 November ballot and vote tabulation have been
unprecedented for a Ukrainian election.222 The most serious violations included:
Mass voting of organized absentee voters
Unusually high percentage of voters who cast their votes at home
Abnormally high turnover in the eastern regions of the Ukraine; and
Criminal interference in the electoral process accompanied by violence against

observers, journalists and attacks on individuals at polling stations223
The International Election Observation Mission in Ukraine (IEOM), conducted jointly by

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europes Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, concurred with the CVUs assessment commenting that the
Ukrainian executive authorities and the Central Election Commission (CEC) displayed
a lack of will to conduct a genuine democratic election process.224 In addition to the
electoral violations noted above, the IEOM found that the second round of voting was
compromised by these additional significant shortcomings:
Abuse of State resources in favor of the Prime Minister
Large number of Territorial Election Commissions (TEC) that were unwilling to

or unable to provide observers with data on the number of voters registered
before 21 November election day
Last minute dismissal by TECs of hundreds of Polling Station Commission

members appointed by the opposition, lessened transparency; and
Overt bias in the State-funded media225
Presidential election runoff: election course statement, Committee of Voters for Ukraine
(accessed 23 November 2004); available at
222
http://www.cvu.org.ua/?menu=fp&po=doc&lang=eng&date_end=&date_beg=&id=695 ,
223 Ibid
224 International Election Observation Mission for the second round of the Ukrainian presidential
election, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (Kyiv, 22 November 2004), 1.
225
Ibid
-85-.
Many of these criticisms of the most recent election process echo the shortcomings from
the first round of the presidential elections, which observers noted needed to be
remedied if the election was to be free and fair. At the time of writing the outcome from
the elections are uncertain, however, the process was deeply flawed.
In addition to the concerns centering on the electoral process, since the Seoul Meeting,
there has been an overall increase in authoritarian policies, further restrictions on the
political opposition, and an erosion of the rule of law.
Prior to the 2002 elections and in the two years following, the government flagrantly
violated press freedoms and censored the media without regard for constitutional
guarantees.226 There have been numerous attacks on the press, particularly on journalists
who report on corruption or criticize the government, and a marked increase in the
number of media worker deaths. In addition, in March 2003, the government released
coercive reporting guidelines to all media outlets.227 Repercussions for non-compliance
have included tax audits, license cancellation, arbitrary libel suits, demotions, and pay
cuts. Nevertheless, despite harassment there are major independent newspapers with
large circulations, independent cable TV stations, and some independent radio
broadcasters.
In the legal arena, recent rulings of the Constitutional Court have caused concern as to
the vulnerability of the judiciary and its ability to make impartial decisions.228 Indeed,
lower level courts appear to lack requisite independence as judges are increasingly
punished for independent decision-making. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence
of a regularized interference by the executive branch.229 Corruption in the judiciary is
also a major problem.
Human rights problems in Ukraine persist with politically motivated killings and poor
treatment (and some instances of torture) of criminal prisoners. A 2002 report from the
Council of Europes Committee for the Prevention of Torture criticized police for their
harsh interrogation methods that could be construed as torture.230 The prison system is
overcrowded, lacking adequate facilities, and extended detentions are common.
28.2
ANALYSIS
The recent repeat second round of presidential elections was a marked improvement on
the previous elections and is a positive move towards Ukraine meeting the essential
criteria to participate in the Community of Democracies. In addition to undertaking
substantially fairer election processes, the commitment to constitutionalism, the rule of
Committee to Protect Journalists, http://www.cpj.org/attacks02/europe02/ukraine.html
Ukraine: Informal Political Censorship, Human Rights Watch, March 17, 2003, available at
http://hrw.org/press/2003/03/ukraine031703.htm
228 Political Crisis in Ukraine, Resolution 1364 (2004), Parliamentary Assembly, available at
http://assembly.coe.int
229 Freedom House Ukraine Country Report 2004, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/ukraine.htm
230 Council of Europe Press Release, available at http://press.coe.int/cp/2002/479a(2002).htm
226
227
-86-.
law and the responsiveness of the government to the demands of a divided public show
a commitment to democratic principles that were not prevalent leading up to the run off
presidential election.
28.3
RECOMMENDATION
Ukraine should be invited as a Participant to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
28.4
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
2002
2000
-0.59
-0.39
+0.14
-0.51
-0.74
-0.78
-0.62
-1.19
Rule
of
Law
-0.79
-0.71
Control of
Corruption
-0.96
-0.98

Year
2004
2002
Political Rights
4
4
Civil Liberties
4
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
7
7
0
0
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
7
7

Stateness
Political
Participation
Rule
Law
of
Institutional
Stability
3
-87-.
Political and
Social
Integration
3
OVERALL RESULT
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
3.2
29.
VENEZUELA
29.1
BACKGROUND
Venezuela was a Participant at both the Warsaw and Seoul Ministerial Meetings.
In the intervening period, since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Chavez has continued his
controversial political, social and economic reforms. In doing so, the political crisis,
symbolized by the unsuccessful coup attempt in April 2002, has grown worse. While the
August 2004 recall referendum was ultimately governed within the framework of the
constitution, and both the government and opposition signed commitments to a
peaceful and democratic process, Chavezs clear victory has not resolved the ongoing
political conflict in the country. The OAS, the OSCE, Carter Center, International Crisis
Group, Human Rights Watch, and the Reporters Sans Frontieres are among some of the
many international observers voicing concern about the political and institutional
upheaval, violent social unrest, and deterioration of the rule of law in Venezuela over
the last several years.
Chavez first won elections in 1998 with unequivocal popular support. He ran on a
platform of revolutionary social and political reform, in which he promised to restore
peoples faith in the political system and democratic institutions, abolish corruption and
government inefficiency, and use the countrys vast oil wealth to reduce poverty and
empower the poor majority. However, despite strong support for his sweeping
constitutional reforms, the appeal of his neo-populist government, and overwhelming
public outcry during his brief overthrow in 2002, Chavez began to alienate even some
traditional supporters with his increasingly authoritarian rule.
Venezuelas new constitution greatly expanded Chavezs powers as president, including
extending his term to six years and allowing immediate re-election. Venezuelas bicameral legislature was replaced by a unicameral body. In addition to the existing
executive, legislative and judicial branches, the new constitution created two new
government branches the Moral Republican Council and the National Electoral
Council. Chavez removed prohibitions against the militarys involvement in politics,
gave the armed forces autonomy in arms procurement, and appointed a number of
officers to key posts. Furthermore, the new constitution creates an unusually expansive
justification for action that potentially threatens democratic governance.which
members of the military and other factions have used to justify armed disobedience to
the government.231
The new constitution sets forth a unique provision allowing for popular recall of any
elected official after the mid-point of his or her term. After elements of the opposition
failed to dislodge Chavez through a coup in 2002 and prolonged strikes, a broader
movement coalesced around pursuit of a recall petition. The rules surrounding the
231
Regime Change by the Book: Constitutional Tools to Preserve Democracy, ed. Theodore J. Piccone,
Democracy Coalition Project (2004) p. 144. available at
http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/REGIME_CHANGE_summary.pdf
-88-.
referendum, however, were skewed in Chavezs favor. In addition, Chavez asserted

that he would immediately run again even if he lost the recall petition. To ensure this
result, Chavezs allies expanded the size of the STJ [Supreme Tribunal of Justice] and
lowered the threshold needed for Assembly approval of his candidates to the bench just
weeks before the referendum ultimately stacking the judicial deck to assure his
electoral eligibility, and thereby in effect, leaving voters with no real choice on
referendum day.232
Despite reports from the OAS and Carter Center election monitors that the August
referendum was clean, the recall process that began in early 2003 was certainly flawed
and fraught with difficulties. Citizens attempting to collect signatures for the recall
petition, or even sign themselves, were subject to obstructionist tactics and
administrative harassment. Moreover, the four criteria that governed the petition
process at the beginning were later changed and the petition document evaluated on
more than twenty criteria.
There have been a number of recent reforms that call into question the degree of
independence enjoyed by the Venezuelan judiciary, and validate allegations of a
corrupt and politicized justice system. In 2004 Chavez introduced the Organic
Law of the Supreme Court, a measure that allows the President to limit the
independence of the Court. Chavez has already done so by suspending a tenure
program for judges, dismissing judges who defy the government, expanding the
number of Supreme Court justices and decreasing the number of votes needed in
parliament for their appointment.233 Recently Human Rights Watch reported
that several judges were fired after ruling against the government in politically
controversial cases. Miguel Luna, Petra Jimnez and Maria Trastoy all received
notices from the Supreme Court President Ivan Rincn Urdaneta informing them
that the Supreme Courts Judicial Commission had decided that morning to
nullify their appointments due to observations that were presented before this
office. However, the notices did not reveal what the observations had been, or
why they might have warranted their dismissal.234
Human Rights Watch goes on to assert that depriving judges of the security of tenure
and allowing them to be summarily fired or prevented from exercising their due process
rights violates basic principles of the Venezuelan constitution and international human
rights law.
Since the Seoul Ministerial, there has been a steady decline in press freedom. In July of
2004, a new law was introduced to regulate the work of journalists. However, this law
Ibid, 142
Crackdown in Venezuela: Red tide rising, The Economist, November 6, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3353734
234 Rigging the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela, Human Rights
Watch, June 2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/venezuela0604/index.htm
232
233
-89-.
provides for compulsory registration with the national journalism association, and
punishes illegal journalistic activity with prison sentences, both of which are provisions
that run contrary to all internationally accepted principles of freedom of expression.235
Under Articles 148, 149, and 150 of the Venezuelan Criminal Code, people can be
imprisoned for insulting or showing "lack of respect in any other way" to the president,
the vice-president, the president of the legislature, the chief justice, and numerous other
judiciary, cabinet and government officials.236 The Supreme Court recently upheld these
censorship laws and ruled that protecting public authorities and institutions from
insulting criticism was constitutional.
In addition to harassment, tax penalties, and administration and legal restrictions,
journalists in Venezuela are subject to violence and physical attacks. In their 2004
Annual Report, Reporters Sans Frontieres reported 75 attacks in 2003.237 While the
majority of physical attacks against the independent press were perpetrated by security
forces while the media covered demonstrations and anti-government action, there were
problems elsewhere. In May 2004, military intelligence agents assaulted journalist Felix
Carmona and photographer Jorge Santos of the daily El Universal, while they were
covering a search operation.238 Furthermore, on September 8, 2004 RSF issued a press
release about the murder of journalist Mauro Marcano who had been covering political
and corporate corruption and drug trafficking.239
It is important to note, however, that although the independent media has been the
subject of numerous attacks and restrictions, it is undoubtedly biased and clearly a
partisan player with a role in Venezuelas political conflict. The politicization of the
media and the harsh rhetoric used by both government and opposition in Venezuela, are
two phenomena that conflict resolution experts such as William Ury cite as symptomatic
of escalating conflict and impending civil war. 240
Despite Chavez paying lip service to citizen power, civil rights have also been a target
for increased restriction over the last few years. Opposition protesters have been subject
to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and the excessive use of force while participating
in peaceful protests and demonstrations. In early 2004 during the political
demonstrations by anti-Chavez protestors calling for his ouster, Amnesty International
235
New law a threat to journalists' rights, Press Release, Reporters Sans Frontieres, July 30,
2004, available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11056
236 Attacks on the Press Venezuela 2003 Report, Committee to Protect Journalists, available at
http://cpj.org/attacks03/americas03/ven.html
237Venezuela Annual Report RSF Annual Report 2004, 3/5/2004, available at
http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=10240
238 Two journalists beaten up by military intelligence agents, Press Release, Reporters Sans
Frontieres, May 13, 2004, available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10386
239 Journalist's murder causes great concern, Press Release, Reporters Sans Frontieres,
September 8, 2004, available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11355
240 Wilpert, Georgory, A Third Side for Venezuelas Conflict, Venezuela Views, News and
Analysis, March 2003, available at: http://venezuelanalysis.com/print.php?artno=1094
-90-.
reported that at least 14 people died in circumstances that have yet to be clarified. Over
200 were wounded, and many of those detained were severely ill treated or tortured by
members of the security forces. Subsequent investigations to establish the facts around
these alleged abuses have been slow and inadequate. 241
The Venezuelan government added another cause for concern when the Supreme Court
decided in the fall of 2004 to prosecute the leaders of Sumate, a civic organization that
organized the collection of signatures for the recall petition, on charges of treason for
accepting international funding.242 Even more disturbing is the Venezuelan
governments proposed legislation to criminalize receipt of international democracy
assistance by Venezuelan NGOs. Such action would not only violate the principles of
international human rights Venezuela has agreed to under international law, but also
directly contravenes the exact principle upon which the Community of Democracies was
founded the commitment to assist member countries in promoting and defending
democracy through regional and international cooperation.
29.2
ANALYSIS
Since the Seoul Ministerial, the Venezuelan government has failed to respect certain
fundamental human rights and freedoms, in particular those of freedom of expression,
freedom of the press, and freedom of association. The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights published a report in March 2004, stating Venezuela has fallen into a
vicious cycle of impunity and violence and is failing to bring human rights violators to
justice. Indeed, though the trend began several years earlier, the period between 2002
and 2004 can be characterized by a systematic politicization of Venezuelas democratic
institutions including the judiciary and constitution. While maintaining an important
element of democratic legitimacy through the electoral process, Venezuela now faces
higher levels of corruption, political and economic instability, and weaker commitment
to the rule of law than it did when Chavez took office in 1998.
The indicators referenced below support this assessment. Five out of the six WBI
Governance Indicators demonstrate an undeniable drop in ratings between 2000 and
2002. Moreover, examination over a longer period - 1998-2002 further underlines the
steady decline in accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law,
and control of corruption in Venezuela. The most recent Corruption Perception Index
241
Venezuelan Security Forces Contributed to Violence Through Excessive Use of Force, Torture
During Demonstrations, Amnesty International Charges, press release, Amnesty International,
May 12, 2004, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/venezuela/document.do?id=B9D986135729041885256E920
051F703
242 International Coalition Expresses Concern for Democracy in Venezuela, press release,
National Endowment for Democracy, November 11, 2004, available at:
http://www.ned.org/press/pr1111104.html
-91-.
released by Transparency International shows that Venezuela has slipped to one of the
last places on the list.243
Although the overall Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores given by Freedom House
were maintained in the Partly Free category, the qualitative assessment of Venezuela
observes the same decline in democracy and human rights.244
29.3
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the marked and steady decline in respect for basic democratic principles and
practices, Venezuela should be downgraded from a Participant at the Seoul Ministerial
meeting, to an Observer at the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
29.4
STATISTICS

Year
2002
2000
Voice and
Accountability
-0.41
-0.33
Political
Stability
-1.20
-0.48
Government
Effectiveness
-1.14
-0.82
Regulatory
Quality
-0.54
-0.54
Rule of
Law
-1.04
-0.81
Control of
Corruption
-0.94
-0.64

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
3
3
Civil Liberties
4
4
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Partly Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC Democracy
Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
7
7
0
0
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
7
7

Stateness
Political
Rule
of
Institutional
243
Political and
OVERALL RESULT
2004 Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International, available at

http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.20.cpi.en.html
244
Venezuela Country Report 2004, Freedom in the World 2004, Freedom House, available at
http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/venezuela.htm
-92-.
Participation
Law
Stability
30.
YEMEN
30.1
BACKGROUND
Social
Integration
3
FOR
POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
2.8
Yemen was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

In the intervening period, since the Seoul Ministerial Meeting, Yemen held its third
parliamentary elections since unification in 1990 on 27 April 2003. The most recent
parliamentary elections were an improvement on the 2001 local elections, conducted just
prior to the last Community of Democracies Ministerial Meeting, which saw 29 people
killed in election-related violence.245 Despite serious concerns over pre-election violence,
coercion of potential candidates, and irregularities at the polling booth, international
observers generally applauded the political leaders commitment to achieving
pluralistic political competition, womens full participation in the political process, and
democratic governance.246 However, in light of the above concerns, international
observers concluded that the election process was only mostly free and fair, but
commended Yemen for the advances that had been made in electoral administration
since the 1997 parliamentary elections.247
Reforms leading up to the latest round of elections helped produce an environment
conducive to free and fair elections. The adoption of the General Elections and Referendum
Law by referendum in February 2001 marked a step forward in providing the framework
for free and fair elections.248 In addition, the recently instituted Supreme Commission
for Elections and Referenda (SCER), which was established for the 2003 elections, was
praised for its technical and administrative steps in administering the 2003
United Nations Development Programme, Parliamentary Poll makes Yemen Model for the Region, 21
May 2003 (accessed 4 October 2004); available at
http://www.undp.org/dpa/frontpagearchive/2003/may/21may03/
246 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, The April 27, 2003 Parliamentary Elections in
The Republic of Yemen (Washington D.C.: NDI 2003), 33.
247 Parliamentary Elections in Yemen and Constitutional Referendum in Qatar, U.S. Department of State
Press Release, 30 April 2003 (accessed 4 October 2004); available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/20086.htm; German Federal Foreign Office, Yemen:
Government and Politics, December 2003 (accessed 4 October 2004); available at
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_html?type_id=10&land_id=70; and National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, The April 27, 2003 Parliamentary Elections in The Republic
of Yemen (Washington D.C.: NDI 2003), 1.
248 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, The April 27, 2003 Parliamentary Elections in
The Republic of Yemen (Washington D.C.: NDI 2003), 8.
245
-93-.
parliamentary elections.249 These reforms created an environment that facilitated

nineteen political parties fielding candidates, and an almost 100 % increase in the
participation rate for women.250 Furthermore, the transparency of the process can be
attributed to the willingness of the Yemeni government to allow international observers
to monitor the election process.
The main concerns international observers raised with respect to the parliamentary
elections were:
Removal of ballot boxes from the view of observers
Incidents of underage voting
Marking of ballots by commissioners
Interference in the voting process by security
Presence of unauthorized people in the voting centers; and
Intimidation of voters and the refusal to allow voting.251
Despite these flaws the election was generally heralded as an improvement on the last
parliamentary elections and mark progress towards the consolidation of democracy in
Yemen.
Although there have been improvements in the conduct of democratic elections,
concerns about Yemens human rights record persist. In the aftermath of September 11th,
human rights violations in Yemen were more salient despite previous efforts by the
government to curtail such abuse. Indeed, since the last Ministerial Meeting, national
security forces have carried out mass arrests in the name of counter-terrorism, targeting
Yemeni and foreign nationals, including women and children as young as 12 years of
age.252 In addition, despite presidential commitment to remove anything that
contradicts [human rights] and all forms of discrimination, oppression and exploitation
Ibid; and United Nations Development Programme, Parliamentary Poll makes Yemen Model for the
Region, 21 May 2003 (accessed 4 October 2004); available at
http://www.undp.org/dpa/frontpagearchive/2003/may/21may03/
250 The number of women registered to vote increased from 1.8 million in 1997 to 3.4 million for the
2003 elections. Women presently make up 42 per cent of registered voters and made up 41 per cent of
votes on Election Day: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, The April 27, 2003
Parliamentary Elections in The Republic of Yemen (Washington D.C.: NDI 2003), 1.
251 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Yemen April 27 Elections were a significant
step forward; however, sustained and forceful efforts must be undertaken to remedy critical flaws in the
countrys election and political processes, NDI Press Release, 29 April 2003; available at www.ndi.org; and
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Preliminary Statement of the NDI International
Election Observer Delegation to Yemens April 27 Legislative Elections (Washington D.C.: NDI 2003).
252 Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security, Amnesty International, (Washington D.C. AI
2003)
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/yemen/document.do?id=F71C226B2BDDD19D80256D7B001042
66
249
-94-.
for human beings and [their] rights, 253 the government routinely monitors citizens'
activities, searches homes, detains citizens for questioning, and mistreats detainees.254
Furthermore, prolonged pretrial detention, judicial corruption, and executive
interference undermine due process.
30.2
ANALYSIS
Although the most recent parliamentary elections were not as free and fair as they could
have been, there has been a noticeable improvement in the conduct of elections over the
last couple of years that, arguably, is deserving of recognition. Yemen is by no means a
mature democracy, but there has been a recent trend towards consolidating democracy.
This is reflected in Freedom Houses assessment of Political Rights, which improved
from six in 2003 to five in 2004. Furthermore, unlike its neighbors, Yemen is a party to
all the principal human rights treaties255 and, despite lingering concerns over
government actions and human rights violations, nevertheless appears to have made
some inroads into ensuring the rights of minority groups, and in particular women,
have been promoted and protected.
30.3
RECOMMENDATION
In light of its recent efforts to consolidate democracy Yemen should be invited as

Observer to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting.
30.4
STATISTICS

Year
2002
2000
Voice and
Accountability
-0.88
-0.72
Political
Stability
-1.36
-1.19
Government
Effectiveness
-0.87
-0.65
Regulatory
Quality
-0.60
-0.42
Rule of
Law
-1.23
-0.89
Control of
Corruption
-0.69
-0.70

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
5
6
Civil Liberties
5
6
Freedom Rating
Partly Free
Not Free

Range: DEMOC and AUTOC = 0 to 10 (higher is better)
http://www.yemenembassy.org/issues/democracy/President_speech_Conference.htm
U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Yemen Country Profile, 2003,
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27942.htm
255 Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, Status of Ratification of Principal International
Human Rights Treaties (Geneva: OHCHR October 2004) (accessed 4 October 2004); available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf
253
254
-95-.

Year
DEMOC
Democracy Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
2002
2001
1
1
3
3
-96-.
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
-2
-2
ADDENDUM:
Ted Piccone
Executive Director
Democracy Coalition Project
1120 19th Street, NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
United States
November 2004
Dear Mr. Piccone,
As a regional actor in the non-governmental process for the Community of Democracies, I write to call on
your attention to the issue of Taiwan's participation in the next Ministerial Meeting of the Community of
Democracies that will be held in Santiago, Chile in May, 2005. Your organization has been at the forefront
of the effort to develop this initiative into a significant force for global democracy.
I believe you would certainly agree that Taiwan is a basically successful democracy. Therefore, it is
regrettable to see that Taiwan has been left out of relevant country recommendations up until now, such as
the recently circulated paper "Country Assessments: Invitation Process for the Community of
Democracies," prepared by your organization in collaboration with Freedom House, and the fact that it has
not been invited was not noted in the table of invitations for the Warsaw and Seoul ministerial meetings.
Unfortunately, the reason for our non-invitation was not because Taiwan failed to meet any of the Criteria
for Participation, but based on the political considerations of some governments. Although these
considerations are excruciatingly well known to us here in Taiwan, they are antithetical to the letter and
spirit of the Community of Democracies. Indeed, Taiwans continued exclusion is an embarrassing
reminder of all the hypocrisy that has undermined numerous international efforts to protect and promote
democracy and human rights the very stumbling block civil society actors struggle to overcome. I believe
that non-governmental actors concerned with the Community of Democracies should work to ensure that
the Community and Democracies truly lives up to its name and becomes a legitimate forum for all
democracies.
The Community of Democracies was established to make a difference. I hope you can help make such a
difference by putting before the Convening Governments a recommendation for Taiwan to be invited to the
2005 Ministerial Meeting as a Participant. As you may know, Taiwan in recent years has been trying to
do its part to strengthen and promote democracy around the world. The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy
(TFD) was established last year to serve this purpose. It is the first democracy assistance foundation in
Asia, and among other projects, just last month the TFD hosted the Asian Regional Workshop of the CD
Non-Governmental Process, establishing a solid working relationship both with the Asian network partners
as well as with the Executive Secretariat in Chile. I am enclosing the report from that event for your
reference.
Therefore we earnestly call upon the Community of Democracies to invite Taiwan to participate in the
Ministerial Meeting in Santiago, Chile next year. I hope you can offer your support, and please do not
hesitate to let me know if you have any practical advice for my country in this regard.
Sincerely yours,
Michael Y. M. Kau, Ph.D.

President, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy
-97-.
Country Assessments
Invitation Process for the Community of

Democracies
Taiwan Assessment
November 2004
Prepared by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy
-98-.
METHODOLOGY
The countries examined in the Country Assessment survey were identified using the
following criteria:
1. Countries that experienced a change in their classification as between the Warsaw
Ministerial Meeting in 2000 and the Seoul Ministerial Meeting in 2002
2. Countries that have witnessed a recent decline in their democracy and good governance
rankings/ ratings, having regard to the major international indices
3. Countries that were invited to the previous Community of Democracies Ministerial
Meeting, but rank/ rate below the median on the major democracy and good governance
indices; and
4. Countries where recent events warrant closer scrutiny
Taiwan does not fit directly into any of these categories, but makes up a separate category
in itself, in that it has not been invited for either the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting or the
Seoul Ministerial Meeting, despite ranking/rating above the median on the major
democracy and good governance indices.
In the analysis below, the same democracy and good governance indicators consulted in
order to identify the countries of concern were consulted with reference to Taiwan: World
Bank Institute Governance Research Indicators 2002 (WBI Governance Indicators);
Freedom House Freedom in the World Ratings 2002-04 (FH Rankings); Polity IV Project
Composite Indicators of Democracy 2002 (Polity Score); Bertlesmann Transformation
Index Political Transformation 2003 (BTI). Only the Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline
Database has been left out, since it does not include Taiwan. A broad cross-section of indices
has been selected in order to ameliorate any ideological bias that would be present if a
narrower selection of indices were used.
In recognition of the fact democracy and governance indicators are not a precise tool and are
only as up to date as at the time of publication, they were used in the preliminary stages of
analysis to identify the general trend, and they indicate as noted above that Taiwan ranks
above the median on the indices in which it is included.
This addendum includes a brief qualitative analysis.
It is hoped that this addendum can be included in the draft Country Assessments report
when it is distributed internationally to organizations and individuals with an interest in the
Community of Democracies. The objective, as with the report as a whole, is to develop a
consensus position on the invitation process to submit to the Convening Group prior to their
meeting.
A.1
BACKGROUND
Taiwan was a Non-invitee at both the Warsaw and Seoul Ministerial Meetings.
Taiwans democratization took off in the late 1980s, with the lifting of martial law after 38
years, the lifting of the ban on opposition parties and independent media, and the
restoration of most constitutional rights. It accelerated throughout the 1990s, with the first
- 99 -
complete election for the Legislative Yuan (parliament) in 1992, and the first direct elections
for president in 1996. It reached a watershed in 2000, when the opposition candidate Chen
Shui-bian won the presidency, bringing about the first peaceful transfer of power.
The transition has further strengthened the independence of the judiciary and the state
administration. However, both the ruling and opposition parties have struggled to adjust to
their new roles. A series of political controversies have erupted, from the cancellation of the
Fourth Nuclear Power Plant in 2001, to the passage of the Referendum Law in 2003, to the
dramatic assassination attempt on the president the day before his re-election. These have
led to political polarization, especially to gridlock between the executive branch and the
Legislative Yuan, which remains controlled by the opposition. This situation is widely
considered to have lowered the effectiveness of legislation and policymaking. 256
On the other hand, political competition remains if anything even more vibrant than before,
as evidenced in legislative elections in 2001, local government elections in 2001 and 2002,
and finally in the third direct presidential election in 2004. The latter was coupled with
Taiwans first-ever referendum, although this generated further political controversy. The
media are more independent than ever before, and civil society organizations are
increasingly effective and well organized, notably labor unions, which have been free to
function independently since the transition.
Taiwan has also made tentative steps to contribute to international democracy promotion.
With multi-partisan support, the government has established the Taiwan Foundation for
Democracy, taking inspiration from the US National Endowment for Democracy, the
Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and other similar organizations around the world.
As the first such foundation in Asia, the Foundations focus is on expanding and
consolidating democracy in Asian countries. 257
A.2
ANALYSIS
Despite the mutual suspicions arising from the dramatic shooting incident on the eve of the
presidential election, and subsequent accusations of fraud by members of the opposition,
reports from international observers258 indicate the presidential elections were generally
smooth, in line with those in 2000. Two election-related lawsuits brought by the opposition
are being handled by the judicial system, marking a milestone in the maturing of the rule of
law. Nonetheless, the repeated accusations of interference with electoral mechanisms and
the judicial process are worrisome. Such statements could have the effect of reducing the
currently relatively high level of public faith in and commitment to democracy.
In addition, it is worth noting that Taiwans FH Rankings, which had rapidly risen
throughout the 1990s, peaked at 1 for political rights and 2 for civil rights in 2001. In 2002,
the political rights figure retreated one notch to 2. This may be a result of the increasingly
polarized political environment.
256
See, for example, the 2004 Taiwan White Paper of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei
http://amcham.com.tw/dl/2004WP_Overview.pdf, p. 12.
257
For further information about the Foundation, see its website: www.tfd.org.tw.
258
Charles Snyder, Observers praise poll, calm after shooting, Taipei Times, March 21 2004, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/03/21/2003107212.
- 100 -
A.3
RECOMMENDATION
Taiwan should be invited as a Participant to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting. The warning
signs visible in the past year are by no means serious enough at present to warrant
consideration of the status of Observer.
A.4
STATISTICS

Year
Voice and
Accountability
+0.89
+0.81
2002
2000
Political
Stability
+0.71
+0.71
Government
Effectiveness
+1.00
+1.08
Regulatory
Quality
+1.06
+0.93
Rule of
Law
+0.95
+0.87
Control of
Corruption
+0.81
+0.72

Year
2004
2001-02
Political Rights
2
1
Civil Liberties
2
2
Freedom Rating
Free
Free

Range:
Year
DEMOC
Democracy Score
AUTOC Autocracy
Score
1997-2002
(no change)
POLITY
Combined Polity
Score computed by
subtracting AUTOC
from DEMOC
9

Stateness
Political
Participation
5
Rule of
Law
Institutional
Stability
- 101 -
Political and
Social
Integration
5
OVERALL RESULT
FOR POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION
4.6

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Country Assessments

Invitation Process for the

Prepared by the Democracy Coalition Project, in collaboration with Freedom House

CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION .

SURVEY METHODOLOGY ...

Central African Republic

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

* For an in-depth analysis of these countries

CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION

Multipartidarism, the freedom to form democratic political parties that can

The Rule of Law

The obligation of an elected government to protect and defend the

Separation of powers, separation of the judiciary, legislative and executive

Ensuring that the military remains accountable to democratically elected

Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, belief, peaceful assembly and

The right of every person to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention

The right to a fair trial, including to be presumed innocent until proven

The right to full and non-discriminatory participation, regardless of

The promotion of gender equality

The rights of children, elderly and persons with disabilities

The rights of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, including

CRITERIA FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

Countries that experienced a change in their classification as between the Warsaw

Countries that were invited to the previous Community of Democracies Ministerial

Countries where recent events warrant closer scrutiny

Algeria was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Election World database (accessed 5 October 2004); available at

Bouteflika-aligned Constitutional Council rejecting Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimis

Algerias state television provided favorable coverage to the incumbent in the

Irrespective of the suspicions of fraud, reports from western diplomats and by

Algeria should be invited as an Observer to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting, but

WORLD BANK INSTITUTE: GOVERNANCE RESEARCH INDICATORS 2002

FREEDOM HOUSE: FREEDOM IN THE WORLD RATINGS 2004

POLITY IV PROJECT: COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY 2002

BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 2003

is an important step forward for Afghanistans democratic prospects as it establishes a

WORLD BANK INSTITUTE: GOVERNANCE RESEARCH INDICATORS 2002

POLITY IV PROJECT: COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY 2002

Armenias democratic political system faces difficulties. Successive governments have

Armenia should not be invited as an Observer or a Participant to the Santiago Ministerial

WORLD BANK INSTITUTE: GOVERNANCE RESEARCH INDICATORS 2002

POLITY IV PROJECT: COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY 2002

BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 2003

Azerbaijan was downgraded from a Participant at the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to an

Election World database (accessed 27 September 2004); available at

The counting and tabulation of election results were seriously flawed

International observers were not allowed to monitor the post-election activities at

The components of the unified Election Code designed to safeguard against

An atmosphere of intimidation leading up to the poll gravely undercut public

Serious violence and excessive use of force by police compounded the

Observers witnessed irregularities during voting and widespread fraudulent

Facilitate the conduct of free and fair presidential elections

Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular freedom of

Azerbaijan should not be invited to the Santiago Ministerial Meeting as an Observer or

WORLD BANK INSTITUTE: GOVERNANCE RESEARCH INDICATORS 2002

FREEDOM HOUSE: FREEDOM IN THE WORLD RATINGS 2004

POLITY IV PROJECT: COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY 2002

BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 2003

Bahrain was upgraded from a Non-invitee to the Warsaw Ministerial Meeting to a

IPU Parline Database (accessed 27 September 2004); available at http://www.ipu.org/parlinee/parlinesearch.asp

Attempting to overthrow the political system (Article 160)

Encouraging hatred of the State (Article 165)

Distributing falseness and rumors (Article 168)55