Regime Change by the Book:

Constitutional Tools
to Preserve Democracy

Theodore J. Piccone, Editor

Alexander S. Kirshner, Project Director

Corey Whiting, Project Assistant
Siham Nurhussein, Project Assistant

Supported by a grant from the Open Society Institute.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECALL/VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE

IMPEACHMENT

12

SUCCESSION

15

CRIMINALIZING COUPS

19

SLIDES

23

PRESIDENTIAL RECALL:
THE CASE OF VENEZUELA

28

PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT:
THE CASE OF KOREA

43

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA

56

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

69

ARGENTINA

69

CANADA

76

KOREA

83

NIGERIA

89

ROMANIA

96

RUSSIA

104

SOUTH AFRICA

113

SPAIN

121

THAILAND

129

VENEZUELA

138

APPENDIX
ABOUT THE DEMOCRACY COALITION
PROJECT

148

LIST OF REVIEWERS

151

Regime Change by the Book

Finally Nigeria, Argentina and Venezuela offer mixed systems

under certain circumstances the successor is permanent and under other
circumstances new elections are held. Under both the Nigerian and
Argentine constitutions, when the president is no longer able to serve, a vice
president assumes the presidency and serves out the term with the full
panoply of powers. If there is no vice president or he or she is unable to
serve, then an interim president is named. In Nigeria, the interim president
is the president of the senate and elections are held within three months. In
Argentina, the Congress determines who assumes power, whether the
interim president will fill out the full term, and when the next election will
take place. In Venezuela, if the president becomes unable to serve out the
term during the first four years of his six-year term, the vice president (who
is handpicked by the president) serves for no more than thirty days; new
elections must be held by the end of this period. However, if the presidency
is vacated during the last two years of the term, the unelected vice president
serves out the remainder of the two years.
Recommendations
1) Succession provisions in democratic constitutions should clearly
specify at least two successors and delineate a process for choosing
the next in line for succession. When a chief executive leaves office
before his or her term expires, the identity of a replacement should be
clear and predictable. This applies even in temporary instances when the
constitution establishes a short period before a permanent successor is
chosen. In Venezuela, Russia, Thailand, and Canada, either only the
first successor is determined or the succession is handled according to
internal party rules. This situation could lend itself to ad hoc solutions
manipulable by whomever has the most power at the time of the crisis,
rather than being driven by a consensus among the larger body politic.
Further, there are frequently occasions when the first in line is unable or
unwilling to serve. To account for these circumstances, clear rules for
designating the next chief executive should be articulated in order to
respond with a minimum amount of confusion and maximum amount of
democratic legitimacy.
2) Constitutions should mandate that positions in the line of succession
be filled when they become vacant and outline a procedure for doing
so that comports with democratic practice. One institutional cause of
the Argentine game of presidential hot-potato that was played in 20012002 is that the Argentine constitution neither insists that the vice
asefad

17

Regime Change by the Book

Presidential

Argentina

Constitutional
Monarchy/
Parliamentary

Canada

Presidential

Nigeria

Mixed

Romania

Presidential 1

Russia

Parliamentary

South
Africa

Presidential

South
Korea

Transfers of Executive Power

System of
Government

Impeachment
Provisions3

Recall
Provisions /
Motion of No
Confidence
for Chief
Executives2

Succession
Provision4

Constitutional
Monarchy/
Parliamentary

Spain

Constitutional
Monarchy/
Parliamentary

Thailand

Presidential

Venezuela

X
X

1 The Russian system of government has elements of a mixed system, but in practice is considered a presidential system.
2 The Argentine, Russian, South Korean and Venezuelan constitutions all include some features in their presidential systems that serve the function of a minino confidence motion, for example, allowing the legislature to remove at least one member of the presidents administration on a motion of no confidence.
3 While Canada and Spain allow prosecution of their prime ministers for criminal violations, the only means to remove the prime minister from office is a vote
of no confidence.
4 Canada and Thailand do not have constitutional provisions to identify an immediate successor to act as interim prime minister, though they do have
processes to choose a new permanent prime minister. Spains succession provisions can be found in the basic law of government, rather than the
constitution.

23

Democracy Coalition Project

Constitutional
Monarchy/Parl

Canada

Motion of No
Confidence

Mixed

Romania

Motion of No
Confidence

Parliamentary

South Africa

Motion of No
Confidence

Constitutional
Monarchy/Parl

Spain

Motion of No
Confidence

Constitutional
Monarchy/Parl

Thailand

Recall

Presidential

Venezuela

Presidential Recall / Parliamentary Motion of No Confidence

System of
Government

Motion of No
Confidence

A petition may be
filed once during a
term in office.

Total number of
votes cast must be
25% of the total
number of
registered voters.

More votes must be

cast to remove than
were initially cast to
elect the president.

20% of registered
voters must sign
petition for a
referendum.

Must occur after the

3rd year of
presidents term.

Mechanism

No confidence
motions proposed
due to alleged
impeachable offenses
must be referred to
the Senate for
impeachment first.

If vote does not pass,

the members who
proposed the motion
may not do so again
in same
parliamentary
session.

Majority of all
members of the
House required for
passage.

Motion must be
proposed by 40% of
the House of
Representatives. It
must also include a
candidate to replace
the prime minister.

Vote of confidence
in Cabinet may be
inclusive or
exclusive of the
president.

If motion does not

pass, a new one
may not be held in
same parliamentary
session.

Majority of all
members required
for passage.

Five-day waiting
period required
before vote.

Motion must be
proposed by 25% of
the total number of
deputies and
senators.
Debate begins three
days after motion
initiated.
Majority of all
deputies and
senators required for
passage.

If confidence is
withdrawn and the
Assembly cannot
choose a new
president within 30
days, new
parliamentary
elections are called.

Majority of
members of the
National Assembly
required for
passage.

Majority vote of the

House of Commons
required for
passage (by
custom).
Parliamentary
elections may or
may not be called if
confidence
withdrawn.

Motion must by
proposed by 10% of
the Congress. It
must also include a
candidate to
replace the prime
minister.

Requirements

New parliamentary
elections are not
called if confidence
withdrawn, unless a
new prime minister
cannot be agreed
upon within 60 days.
If vote does not pass,
a new one may not
be held in same
parliamentary
session.

24

Regime Change by the Book

No

No

Two-thirds
of both the
House of
Deputies
and the
Senate

Misconduct
or crimes

Argentina

Impeachment

Scope of
Activities that
Can Trigger
Impeachment

Legislative
Action
Required

Action
Required by
nonLegislative
Body

Prohibitions
on Seeking
Office

Canada

Criminal
violations

No
confidence
motion
required to
remove

Standard
criminal
investigation

No

Nigeria

Grave
violation or
breach of
the
constitution,
or gross
misconduct

1/3 of the
members of
the
Assembly to
initiate
2/3 of both
houses to
investigate
2/3 of both
houses to
remove the
president on
findings of
investigation

Chief
Justice must
name
independent
panel to
investigate
allegations

No

Romania*

Grave
infringement
s of the
constitution

High
treason

One-third of
members of
parliament
to initiate
Majority of
MPs to
suspend
from office

Two-thirds
of MPs to
impeach

Referendum
within 30
days of
suspension
to remove
Trial before
Supreme
Court of
Justice
No
Yes

High
treason or
grave
crimes

Russia

South Africa

An act
violating the
constitution

South Korea

Spain

Thailand

Venezuela

Yes
(five-year
ban)

NCCC
investigatio
n upon
initiation of
process

50,000
signatures
may also
initiate

Commission
(NCCC)
investigation

Three-fifths
of the
Senate to
remove
upon
National
Counter
Corruption

One-fourth
of the
House to
initiate

Failure to
comply with
or enforce
the
constitution,
or breaking
laws

Trial before
criminal
section of the
Supreme
Court

No confidence
motion
required to
remove

Absolute
majority of
Congress to
pass

One-fourth of
Congress
required to
initiate
investigation
of treason,
etc.

Wealth
indicative
of
corruption
or
intentionall
y violating
the
constitution
or law

Constitution
al Court
must
adjudicate
impeachme
nt

No

Yes

Trial before
STJ

Attorney
General

independent

by

Charges filed

Legislature
may stop
the
Supreme
Tribunal of
Justice
(STJ) from
considering
an
impeachme
nt charge

Criminal
violations,
including
treason or
other offenses
against the
security of the
State

May appeal
to
Constitution
al Court to
adjudicate
the process

No

Two-thirds
of the
National
Assembly

Yes

Two-thirds
of the
National
Assembly

Serious
violations of
constitution
or law,
serious
misconduct,
or inability to
perform
functions of
the office

Approval of
Duma
commission
Two-thirds
of both
Duma and
Federation
Council

Supreme
Court to
verify crime
Constitution
al Court to
certify
appropriate
procedure

No

*Romania has two separate processes to impeach its president, which are listed here. Its prime minister can be prosecuted for criminal offences upon the request of the
president, the Chamber of Deputies, or the Senate. However, only a no confidence motion can remove him or her from office.

25

Democracy Coalition Project

Nigeria

Romania

Russia

South
Africa

South
Korea

Spain

Thailand

Executive
Vice
President

Venezuela

Canada

Successor
chosen by
King

Argentina

First Vice
President
Member of
the Cabinet

Prime
Minister
Member of
the State
Council

If within 1st
four years of
presidents
term, new
elections
within
30 days

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

N/A

Deputy
President
Member of
the Cabinet

N/A

Yes

Assembly
Speaker

No

Prime
Minister

For PM:
Interim PM
chosen by
President
Yes
For
President:
New
elections
within
3 months

No

Vice
President

Vice
President
Successor
formally
chosen by
Governor
General;
party in
power
designates
new leader

Yes

Senate
President

Subsequen
t
successors
chosen by
the
legislature

N/A

For
President:
Senate
President
Chamber of
Deputies
President

Yes

Succession

Line of
Succession

First in Line
Elected?
If vice
president,
remainder of
presidents
term.
If vice
president,
remainder of
presidents
term.

No

N/A

Until new
Government
is chosen

Yes

N/A

New
elections
within
60 days

Yes

Yes

Assembly
must
choose new
president
within
30 days

No

Yes

New
elections
within
3 months

No

Yes

For PM:
Until new
Government
is formed

Yes

Yes

If Senate
President,
elections
held within 3
months.

N/A

Yes

Length of
Interim Chief
Executives
Term

By custom,
Gov.
General
appoints
acting PM
who serves
until
replacement
chosen by
majority
party

Yes

N/A

If after the
fourth year,
successor
serves out
remainder of
presidents
term

Interim Chief
Executive
Wields Full
Power

Yes

Other
successors
can fulfill the
term or
serve until
the
legislature
declares
new
elections.

Interim Chief
Executive is
Eligible to
run for the
Position in
Next
Elections

26

Regime Change by the Book

Nigeria

No

Criminalize
s not
informing
about coup
plots

No

Criminalize
s not
informing
about coup
plots

Canada

Criminalizing Coups

Constitution
Criminalizes
Coups

Argentina

Criminal
Code
Criminalizes
Coups

No

Right to
Resist
Nonconstitutio
nal Acts

Whistleblo
wer
Protection

Prohibitions
on Convicted
Coup
Participants
Holding
Public Office
Laws that
Encourage
Resistance to
Coups
(e.g.
denunciation
of plots and
nonparticipation
in illegitimate
government)

Romania

X
Yes

Russia

X
No

South
Africa

X
No

South
Korea

X
No

Spain

Thailand

Venezuela

No

X
N/A

N/A

Yes

Right to
Resist
Nonconstitutio
nal Acts

Criminalize
s not
resisting
coups

27

Regime Change by the Book

procedures for counting the vote, the role of international observers, and
whether President Chavez could run again in the election if he were
removed from office.
In the predawn hours of August 16, with initial results projecting a
big 58-42 percent win, President Chavez appeared before thousands of
partisans gathered at the presidential palace to declare victory. Leaders of
the opposition coalition cried foul, claiming this was massive fraud.48
According to news reports, gunmen fired on an opposition demonstration
later the same day, wounding seven people including a woman who later
died.49 Former President Carter and Secretary General Gaviria quickly
announced that their own quick count had confirmed the official results and
urged the National Electoral Council to allow a transparent audit and to
examine any credible concerns raised by the opposition. After two rounds
of audits, and no credible evidence of electoral fraud, the Carter Center
called on all parties to work together to solve the pressing problems of the
country.50
Conclusions
1. Venezuelas popular recall mechanism offers a novel constitutional
avenue for removing an unpopular president. However, the complexity of
any recall process and the strain placed on Venezuelas political discourse
and political institutions may outweigh its advantages.
The Venezuelan constitutions unusual recall mechanism (article
72) has the potential to act as a popular counterbalance to the broad powers
granted to the chief executive. It offers something like a parliamentary
motion of no confidence but is instead directly controlled, in theory, by the
voters. At the same time, article 72s requirement that a recall cannot occur
until halfway through an officials term in office and thresholds for voter
turnout and winning majorities protect against frivolous attempts to
destabilize an elected government. The mechanism has provided both sides
an imperfect, but important, incentive to follow the rule of law to settle their
disputes
48

US Withholds Judgement on Venezuelan referendum, Urges Probe of Fraud Claims,

Agence France Presse, 17 August 2004.
49
For example Venezuela to Hold Partial Audit of Recall, The Associated Press, 18
August 2004.
50
For a definitive account of the recall process and investigation of the oppositions claims
of fraud, see Jennifer McCoy, What really happened in Venezuela?, The Economist, 2
September 2004; available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3157671

39

Regime Change by the Book

Within fourteen days of the presentation of the notice, the National

Assembly must decide whether the allegation should be investigated.
Investigation requires approval of two-thirds of each house in the
Assembly.180
Within seven days of a National Assembly decision to investigate
the charges, the Chief Justice of Nigeria must appoint a non-partisan, sevenperson panel to conduct the investigation. The panel must report its findings
within three months of its appointment. If the panel concludes that the
charges have not been proven, impeachment proceedings cease. If the panel
finds grounds for impeachment, then the National Assembly has fourteen
days to adopt the report, with the approval of two-thirds of the members of
each house. If adopted, the president is immediately removed from office.
There is no right of appeal.181
Nigerias impeachment provision has been tested several times
since the adoption of its latest constitution. The National Assembly has
threatened to impeach President Obasanjo three times since his election in
1999.182 The most recent and most serious of the cases occurred from
August to November 2002. It began when the House of Representatives
gave Obasanjo an ultimatum to resign or face impeachment proceedings on
charges of inadequacies, ineptitudes, persistent disregard for the rule of law,
and the obvious corruption being perpetrated in the presidency.183 At the
end of the two weeks, the House and the Senate each drew up a list of
allegations of constitutional violations.184 Much brinksmanship and
political infighting within Obasanjos own party ensued. The situation grew
so heated that, given Nigerias history of military coups, some became
concerned the confrontation could lead to another military takeover, despite
a pledge by the countrys top military leader that the armed forces were
dfg
180

Ibid: Article 143

Ibid
182
See Obasanjos Impeachment Threat Provokes Uproar in Parliament, Panafrica News
Agency, 19 April 2000, and Nigerias Senate Seeks to Impeach President, Xinhua News
Agency, 7 June 2002.
183
Nigerian Parliament Threatens to Impeach President Obasanjo, Xinhua News Agency,
13 August 2002.
184
The majority of the allegations in the last two impeachment efforts seemed to have arisen
over the 2002 budget process and accused the president of not implementing the 1999, 2000,
2001, and 2002 budget acts. This latest effort, however, adds a more serious charge of
ordering the massacre of innocent civilians to the list of impeachable offenses. See Nigerian
Senate Joins Plot to Impeach Obasanjo, Panafrican News Agency, 27 August 2002, and
Nigerian Lawmakers Accuse Obasanjo of Ordering Army Massacres, Associated Press, 4
September 2002.
181

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Democracy Coalition Project

designate a candidate for prime minister in consultation with the parties in

the parliament.207 New parliamentary elections are not called.
The government may also initiate a vote of confidence by assuming
responsibility for a program, general policy statement, or bill presented
before a joint session of the parliament. Upon such a presentation, the
parliament has three days to initiate a motion of censure. If passed, the
government is dismissed. If the motion is not passed, the bill before the
parliament is considered passed or the program or general policy statement
becomes binding on the government.208
The only time the parliament can be dismissed is when it has failed
to grant confidence to a new government within 60 days after the first
proposed government was presented and at least two requests for investiture
have been made. In such instances, the president, after consultation with the
presidents of both chambers of the parliament and the leaders of
parliamentary groups, may dissolve the parliament and call new elections
within three months.209 The parliament cannot be dissolved more than once
in the same year, during the last six months of the presidents term in office,
or during a state of emergency or siege.210
Impeachment
The President
There are two constitutional provisions authorizing the parliament
to remove the president from office. The first provision is used in cases
where the president is accused of grave infringements of the constitution.
The president may be suspended from office for such acts by a majority vote
of deputies and senators after they have consulted with the Constitutional
Court.211 At least one third of the members of parliament must initiate a
motion for the presidents suspension and he or she may explain his or her
actions before the parliament. If the motion to suspend the president passes,
a referendum must be held within 30 days, allowing the public to determine
whether to remove the president permanently.212
207

Ibid: Article 110(3)

Ibid: Article 114
209
Ibid: Article 89(1) and 63(2)
210
Ibid: Article 89(2) and (3)
211
Accordingly, in Article 146 the Constitutional Court is authorized, inter alia, to give
advisory opinion on the proposal to suspend the President of Romania from office.
212
Ibid: Article 95
208

98

Regime Change by the Book

since the generals had ordered their troops to stay in the barracks, they had
not forced Chavez to resign. The majority portrayed the generals actions as
simply that of filling a power vacuum created by the resignation of the
president. The court, however, did not address the generals active
participation in undermining the constitution, with respect to the
appointment of Carmona and the dissolution of Venezuelas political
institutions, throughout the crisis. Following this ruling, the Attorney
General, Isaias Rodriguez, ended investigations into sixteen other military
officials who had taken part in the coup.
Possibly encouraged by the STJs ruling, members of the military
have taken aggressive public positions against the government in the months
following that decision. In November 2002, a group of military officers,
labeling themselves Comacates, publicly threatened pro-Chavez military
officers. Around the same time, 14 senior officers peacefully assumed
control of a public square and called for the resignation of President Chavez.
The ranks of those who occupy the square include some who took part in
the April coup. The officers have argued that their actions amount to
neither rebellion nor insubordination. They assert under Article 350 of the
constitution that their actions are legitimate.358
Instead of prosecuting anyone directly involved in the coup, in at
least two instances, Venezuelan authorities have stretched the laws aimed at
deterring seizures of power to target members of the opposition. For
example, two leaders of the massive anti-Chavez strikes of 2002-2003,
Carlos Fernandez, leader of the business association Fedecamaras, and
Carlos Ortega, president of the countrys largest labor union, were indicted
on charges of treason, rebellion, and inciting violence for their participation
in the economically-crippling strike.359 Pending an appeal of his case,
Fernandez fled to the United States. Similarly, Ortega has spent a
controversial tenure as a political refugee in Costa Rica. While the STJ
affirmed the indictments of rebellion and instigation of violence, both men
remain abroad.
Conclusion
The Venezuelan constitution has ushered in novel forms of direct
democracy which Chavez has effectively manipulated to centralize power.
It is poorly drafted and vaguely worded, with obscure provisions and
358

Joseph Contreras and Phil Gunson, Division in the Ranks, Newsweek, 4 November
2002.
359
Judge Orders House Arrest for Chavez Foe, Associated Press, 23 February 2003.

145

Democracy Coalition Project

THE DEMOCRACY COALITION PROJECT

The Democracy Coalition Project is an independent nongovernmental
organization that conducts research and advocacy relating to democracy
promotion policies at the national, regional and global levels. Begun in June
2001 as an initiative of the Open Society Institute, the Democracy Coalition
Project relies on an international network of civil society organizations,
scholars, foreign policy experts and politicians committed to democracy
promotion as an essential element of international peace and human
development.
The Projects policy agenda covers such areas as:
Improving international responses to democratic crises
Encouraging the donor community to support emerging democracies
Promoting reform of the UN through greater collaboration among
democratic governments
The Democracy Coalition Project also plays a leadership role in encouraging
a more transparent and active Community of Democracies, an association of
democratic states established in 2000 to promote and protect democracy. Its
flagship publication, Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign
Policy Trends 1992-2002, which Foreign Policy magazine called one of the
most comprehensive research and evaluation tools available on democracy,
examines the democracy promotion records of forty governments.
The Democracy Coalition Project was inspired by the inaugural meeting of
the Community of Democracies in Warsaw, Poland in June 2000, in which
over 100 governments participated. In an effort to advance their common
commitment to democratic principles, they endorsed the Warsaw Declaration,
which commits them to build an association of democratic states dedicated to
strengthening democratic values and institutions at home and abroad.
The Democracy Coalition Project is a strategic partner of the Club of
Madrid, an independent organization dedicated to strengthening democracy
around the world by drawing on the unique experience and resources of its
Members - democratic former heads of state and government. In partnership
with other organizations and governments that share its democracypromotion goals, the Club of Madrid provides peer to peer counsel, strategic

148

Regime Change by the Book

support and technical advice to leaders and institutions working towards

democratic transition and consolidation.
Ted Piccone, who designed and edited the report, is Executive Director and
Co-Founder of the Democracy Coalition Project. A lawyer and international
relations expert, he has written and edited books and articles on democracy,
human rights and foreign policy.

Democracy Coalition Project

International Advisory Board
Asma Jahangir Pakistan, Co-Founder of the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan and the Women's Action Forum.
Aung San Suu Kyi Burma, Secretary-General of the National League for
Democracy in Burma. In 1991 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
recognition of her tireless effort in the struggle for democracy in Burma.
Bronislaw Geremek Poland, Member of the European Parliament, former
Foreign Minister of Poland and a former Member of the Polish Parliament.
Emeka Anyaoku Nigeria, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the London
School of Economics' Centre for the Study of Global Governance. Mr.
Anyaoku is the former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth (1990-2000).
Emma Bonino Italy, Member of the European Parliament and the former
European Commissioner of Humanitarian Affairs and Fisheries.
Frene Ginwala South Africa, Speaker of the National Assembly of the
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa since 1994.
George Soros United States, Chairman of the Open Society Institute and the
founder of a network of philanthropic organizations that are active in more
than 50 countries.
John Lewis United States, Member of the U.S. Congress since 1986.

149

Democracy Coalition Project

Jose Ramos-Horta East Timor, Foreign Minister of the newly independent

Timor Leste. In 1996 Mr. Ramos-Horta was awarded the Nobel Price for
Peace in honor of his efforts against the oppressive Indonesian control of his
homeland.
Madeleine Albright United States, Chairman of the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs. She previously served as Secretary of State
of the United States and as the United States Permanent Representative to the
United Nations.
Michel Rocard France, Member of the European Parliament and former
Prime Minister of France from 1988-1991.
Mohamed Sahnoun Algeria, is a Special Advisor to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. Previously Mr. Sahnoun was Co-chair of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
Pavol Demes Slovakia, Director for Central and Eastern Europe of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States based in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Samira A.S. Omar Kuwait, an environmental activist and advocate for
women's rights.
Sergey Kovalev Russia, Member of the Russian Duma. In 1993 he was
elected as national ombudsman by the Russian Parliament. He is the former
Chairman of the President's Human Rights Commission.
Sonia Picado Sotela Costa Rica, President of the Inter-American Institute
of Human Rights. She was the first woman judge on the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and served as its Vice-President from 1992-1994.
Surin Pitsuwan Thailand, Member of the Parliament of Thailand and former
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Valentin Paniagua Peru, the interim President of Peru after the collapse of
the Fujimori regime. He was first elected to Parliament in 1963.
Wangari Maathai Kenya, founder of the Green Belt Movement and
currently Kenya's Deputy Environment Minister. In 2004, she received the
Nobel Prize for Peace.

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Regime Change by the Book

LIST OF EXPERT REVIEWERS

*Affiliation for identification purposes only
Diego Hidalgo, President, Fundacion par las Relaciones Internacionales y el
Dialogo Exterior, Spain
Jorge Dominguez, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs,
Harvard University, United States
Kim Campbell, Secretary General, Club of Madrid, Canada
James Klein, Thailand and Laos Representative, The Asia Foundation,
United States
Thomas Remington, Professor and Chair of the Political Science
Department, Emory University, United States
Yuri Dzhibladze, President, Center for the Development of Democracy and
Human Rights, Russia
Rotimi Suberu, Professor of Politics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria
Rut Diamint, Professor of Political Science, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella,
Argentina
Jack Greenberg, Professor of Law, Columbia University, United States
Robert Mattes, Director, Democracy in Africa Research Unit, University of
Cape Town, South Africa
Christina Murray, Professor of Law, University of Cape Town, South
Africa
Daniel Berzosa Lopez, Adjunct Professor of Law, Universidad Complutense
de Madrid, Spain
Joseph Tulchin, Director, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, United States

151

Democracy Coalition Project

Steven Levitsky, Associate Professor of Government and Social Studies,

Harvard University, United States
Gabriel Negretto, Research Professor, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia
Econmicas, Mexico
George Rogers, Attorney, Inter-American Development Bank, United States
Debora Benchoam, Principal Specialist, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, United States
Sook-Jong Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute, Republic of Korea
Jeong-Ho Roh, Director, Center for Korean Legal Studies, Columbia
University, United States
Derek Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia Project, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, United States
Christopher Sabatini, Senior Program Officer, Latin America and the
Caribbean, National Endowment for Democracy, United States
Peter Quilter, former Senior Advisor, Organization of American States,
United States
Ruben Perina, Coordinator, Unit for Promotion of Democracy, Organization
of American States, United States
Pedro Villagra Delgado, Coordinator for Strategic Projects, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Argentina
Enrique Ter Horst, former United Nations Deputy High Commissioner of
Human Rights, Venezuela
Richard Simeon, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada
Elizabeth Clark, Associate, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,
Georgetown University, United States
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Acting President, Romanian Academic Society,
Romania

152

Regime Change by the Book

Sergey Kovalev, Member of the Russian Duma, Russia

Margaret Crahan, Dorothy Epstein Professor of Latin American History at
Hunter College, City University of New York, United States
Charles Sampford, Director, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and
Governance, Griffith University, Australia
Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Indonesia
Yossi Beilin, former Minister of Justice, Israel
Morton Halperin, Director, Open Society Policy Center, United States

153