REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

CASES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1.) G. R. No. 195002

January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law
authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to
annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered
by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the
appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of
Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for
the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999
and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue
Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with
the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return
of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856
dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for
the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed
to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA
the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express
obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the
purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said
amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less
attorneys fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty."
Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend
the pre-trial and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1,
paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of
Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense
was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment,
accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to
Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum,
reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas in the pleadings and court
issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treas", under which he was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution
dated 2 July 2008.8
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January
2011.11
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari12
before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court
granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED
PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show
that P 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place
where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was
signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is
that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated
there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption
that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time
Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored
by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness
failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when
such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming
there was misappropriation, it was actually she not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus, the latters
demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even

assuming that the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of
P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner.
The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioners.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the
latters Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an
additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated
12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an
additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that
petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to him,
and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim
that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as
he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the
prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to
great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case
here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not raised in the
lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants
alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of
petitioners signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his
advanced age and failing health.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings
of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In
many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the
offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are
grounded on conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was
committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is
convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he
could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains
tax and documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of
P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the
fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the
aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated
documents.15
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its
findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution.
Accused Treas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now
that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the
assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in
Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja
in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because
it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records
show that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake
documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears
emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present any evidence
on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo
City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been
overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the
credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.17
The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip
v. People,18 this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if
the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the
identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove
that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money
to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within
the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal
cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He
was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn
statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of
the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the
subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991,
P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there
proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum
scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in
Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been
committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that
with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative
of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu
agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that
as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's
house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to
part with his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of
estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the
judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of
jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article
315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA
the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the
Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was
committed. It provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of
P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex "B",
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of
aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary
stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the
Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum
given to him less the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net
sum of P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same
was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove
that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation
or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended
party to the offender.22
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where the offense, or
any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no
mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to and she will work for the Deed of
Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to
identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit "B". This
appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court
what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treas issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened
next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such
dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which
even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an
objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may
be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver
or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed
by law.26
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the
ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the
court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides
that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This
fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different
court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case,
where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to
present his defense in the charges against him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction
over the case.29
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates
against the petitioners conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.1wphi1
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others
kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money
was spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does
not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand.32
His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.33 It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment.34
In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the
funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount
of P 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
2.) G.R. No. 203696

June 2, 2014

JESSE
PHILIP
B.
EIJANSANTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, represented by ATTY. ALLAN U. VENTURA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Questioned in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the May 18, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA). which affirmed the July 10, 2006 Decision,2 the December 29, 2009 Order3 and the September 24, 2012
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)4 regarding an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct which paved the way for a defraudation of the government in the amount of at least P867,680.00.
The Facts
Records show that Special Presidential Task Force 156 (SPTF 156) conducted an investigation against some public
officials of the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (Center)of the Department of
Finance (DOF),namely:
1. Asuncion M. Magdaet
2. Mark A. Binsol
3. Annabelle J. Dino
4. Jane U. Aranas (Aranas)
5. Sylviana F. Daguimol
6. Gemma O. Abara
7. Gregoria C. Evangelio
8. Charmelle P. Recoter
9. Merose L. Tordesillas
10. Jesse Philip B. Eijansantos (Eijansantos)
11. Rowena P. Malonzo
The above-named public officials were the evaluators and examiners of the Center who were investigated for possible
grave misconduct in connection with the anomalous issuance of thirty four (34) Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs
)amounting to at least 110,194,158.00.
SPTF 156 was created by former President Joseph Estrada in October 1999 to review, investigate and gather evidence
necessary to prosecute the commission of irregularities in the various offices and agencies of the DOF. The life of SPTF
156 was extended by former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in October 2001. SPTF 156 was further mandated to
investigate the irregularities committed at the Center and to recover and collect lost revenues. Pursuant to this
mandate, Atty. Gerville Abanilla Reyes (Atty. Reyes),SPTF 156 lawyer-consultant, conducted an independent
investigation on the alleged anomalous issuances of TCCs to Evergreen Weaving Mills, Inc (Evergreen).
The Center acted as the implementing/issuing body for tax credits in coordination with the Board of Investment
(BOI),Bureau of Customs (BOC) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)for incentives, entitlements/availments
subject to certain terms and conditions outlined by the aforesaid agencies. In compliance with the approved Manual
of Operations in filing an application for issuance of tax credits, Evergreen submitted to the Center the following
initial documental requirements: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)Registration Certificate, Articles of
Incorporation, Treasurers Affidavit, BOI Registration Certificate, and the Terms and Conditions of Registration.
From the documents submitted, Evergreen claimed to be a legitimate business corporation and was given the
privilege of registering as a new producer of spun yarn and woven fabrics under BOI Registration No. EP 89-727. By
virtue of its BOI registration, Evergreen was entitled to a package of incentives such as tax credits on capital
equipment purchased and on raw materials used in the manufacture, processing or production of export products
and access to bonded manufacturing/trading warehouse system provided under the Omnibus Investment Code of
1987. Evergreen represented that it made local purchases for the purpose of manufacturing spun yarn and woven
fabrics, which were allegedly sold to direct exporters through a common bonded warehouse, namely, Filipino Hand
Common Bonded Corporation (FHCBC).It submitted proofs of local purchases in the form of sales invoices and
delivery receipts of the eight (8) supposed suppliers, namely: Cleveland Textile Mills, Filsyn Corporation Indo Phil.,
Cotton Mills, Inc., Tangos General Merchandise, Homa Enterprise, Litton Mills, Inc., Intertech Ventures Corporation,
and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. Evergreen also submitted certificates of delivery and receipts attesting to the sales
made to direct exporters. These certificates represented the bases of Evergreens claims under the Advanced Tax
Credit Scheme (ATCS), otherwise known as Constructive Exportation.
Later, Evergreens application or claims for tax credit were examined at three (3) levels performed and conducted by
the evaluator, reviewer and recommending officer from the Center. From January 1994 to June 1998, a total of thirty

four (34) TCCs worth at least P110,194,158.00 were issued to Evergreen. These TCCs were utilized either through
own use or transfer to other companies.
Based on the Investigation Report, dated March 16, 2004, submitted by Atty. Reyes, it appeared that Evergreens
existence was questionable. The suppliers and buyers were in existent or could no longer be found. The sales invoices
and delivery receipts which were used as bases of the tax credit claims of Evergreen were fake and the TCC transfers
were fictitious.
For said reason, SPTF 156 Executive Director Atty. Alan A. Ventura, through a complaint-affidavit,5filed criminal
charges for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, as amended, and Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents, against those involved in the aforesaid anomalous transactions, and likewise administrative charges for
grave misconduct against the public officials abovementioned.
On July 10, 2006, the Prosecution and Monitoring Bureau (PAMB)of the Ombudsman rendered a decision, 6finding
Asuncion M. Magdaet (Magdaet),Mark A. Binsol, Annabelle J. Dino, Aranas, Sylviana F. Daguimol, Gemma O.
Abara,Gregoria C. Evangelio, Charmelle P. Recoter, Merose L. Tordesillas, Eijansantos, and Rowena P. Malonzo guilty
of grave misconduct with the penalty of dismissal from the service including all its accessory penalties and without
prejudice to criminal prosecution.
The PAMB stated, among others, that there was substantial evidence on record that warranted a finding of grave
misconduct against the said public officials; that there was enough proof shown that the fraudulent release of the
subject TCCs in favor of Evergreen and its consequent transfer to at least four (4) corporations, namely: Filsyn
Corporation, Indo Phil Cotton, Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, took place
because of the negligence committed by the said public officials in the TCC application process; that the spurious and
questionable documents submitted by Evergreen in support of its claim for tax credit could have been discovered
right away if proper verification was conducted and the examinations relative to the authenticity of the supporting
documents were not deliberately disregarded; that the respective positions of the said public officials were not purely
ministerial in nature because they were expected to examine the records and/or documents submitted before them;
that the highest authority and/or final approving authority of the TCC applications primarily relied on their supposed
expertise in checking and examining the supporting documents submitted before them; that as responsible public
employees, they should have acted with reasonable caution on all matters entrusted to them in order to avoid undue
damage and prejudice to the government; that it could be assumed that the said public officials participated in the
grand tax scam by simply accepting the documents submitted before them as authentic and without flaws and not
further verifying the entries made therein; and that the act of entering into fraudulent transactions in the
performance of ones duty constituted the grave offense of grave misconduct punishable under Section 52, Rule IV of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. Magdaet and Eijansantos filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but they were denied in the PAMB Order,7dated December 29, 2009.
Subsequently, Eijansantos filed a petition for review before the CA assailing the decision and order of the
Ombudsman. He argued, among others, that he could not be held guilty of grave misconduct as he dutifully
performed his responsibilities as evaluator; that his duties and responsibilities basically involved the preparation of an
evaluation report submitted to his immediate superior, Aranas; that he was not privy to the process by which the TCC
was issued because its approval and release were an altogether different duty which he did not exercise; that he
performed his duties based on the directives and manner taught to him in the Center; and that the documents
submitted by Evergreen appeared to be authentic without any hint of falsity which he had no reason to doubt.
On May 18, 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of the Ombudsman. The pertinent portion of the
decision reads as follows:
There is no question that one of EVERGREENS 34 TCCs is TCC No. 020829 which went through petitioners evaluation.
In his own words, his duties as evaluator included the physical verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant
facilities. To perform this task, petitioner must go beyond the documents that reached his desk. He must not content
himself with what appeared to be regular or authentic on the face of these documents. Surely, his specific duty to
physically verify and inspect manufacturing and plant facilities requires him to go out of his office and personally
proceed to these facilities. The question is: did he do what was required of him in this case? He himself admits that he
made his evaluation based alone on EVERGREENS documents that were forwarded to him. This means he did not
bother to go to the manufacturing and plant facilities for physical verification/inspection, albeit it was explicitly
required of him as first level evaluator. The end result was he did not discover that EVERGREEN, in fact, had no
legitimate operations or even a place of business. He gave a positive evaluation to EVERGREEN, despite the absence
of veritable data which he was required to obtain first hand through his physical verification/inspection of
EVERGREENS supposed manufacturing and plant facilities. He was, therefore, being deliberately dishonest when he
came out with a positive evaluation of EVERGREEN, notwithstanding he was not armed with the complete data which
he was duty bound to obtain and verify. If this is not grave misconduct, what is? At any rate, petitioners culpability
was sealed when he did not notice that EVERGREENS specific place of business and secretarys certificate authorizing
a certain Emerson Go to represent it, were actually nowhere to be found in the documents that he supposedly
evaluated.
The Supreme Court has aptly emphasized the highest standard of service required of revenue officers vested with the
duty to guard and ensure the flow of blood in the veins of government, precisely because this countrys survival lies in
their hands, thus:
x x x.
Indeed, if only petitioner did what was legally required of him, i.e., among them, physical verification/inspection of
manufacturing and plant facilities, he would have easily discovered that EVERGREENS supporting documents were all
fictitious and it had no legitimate transactions or operations to merit the issuance of a tax credit certificate in its
favor. Petitioner would have correctly evaluated and promptly determined EVERGREENS lack of capacity and

fraudulent machinations to deceive the government. If only he did his job in accord with his job description, he would
have saved the government from losing P867, 680.00, and more, in other transactions.

Unsatisfied, Eijansantos filed this petition for review on certiorari based on the following
GROUNDS
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED [IN] ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
PETITIONER EIJANSANTOS ISNOT GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT AS HE DUTIFULLY PERFORMED HIS DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES.
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT DULY ESTABLISHED AS AGAINST PETITIONER EIJANSANTOS.8
The petitioner basically argues that he cannot be held administratively liable for grave misconduct in the performance
of his official duties and responsibilities because he was just an evaluator and not the approving authority of
Evergreens tax credit application. He claims that his duties and functions as an evaluator were only limited, based on
his job description a well as the directives and instructions of his superiors at the Center. He explains that, in
processing tax credit applications, he was trained and instructed by the Center to require the applicant to submit
import and export documents. He would then prepare an evaluation report, which contained information or data on
the applicant, and a computation and recommendation for approval of the amount of tax credit applied.
Subsequently, he would submit the evaluation report to his immediate superior, Aranas, for her review and
recommendation.
The petitioner further avers that Aranas either approved, denied or approved with corrections his evaluation report;
and that upon the submission of the final evaluation report, his participation as an evaluator of the tax credit
application ends. He likewise claims that he was just a newly hired employee at the time he processed Evergreens tax
credit application in November 1993 and that his designated duties for physical verification/inspection of
manufacturing facilities and plant inspections were only included and required sometime in 1995.
The petitioner asserts that he acted in good faith when he relied on the documents submitted to him which appeared
to comply with the proper requirements for the processing of tax credit applications. He claims that he was not
negligent of his duties and neither was there any proof shown that he was involved in a grand tax scam conspiracy to
defraud the government.
Position of the OSG
The OSG counters that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to sustain a finding of fact is
merely substantial evidence; that there was substantial evidence shown that the petitioner was administratively liable
for gross misconduct; that the petitioner as evaluator and/or reviewer was not a mere stamping personnel; that his
position was not purely ministerial in nature for he was expected to examine the records and/or the documents
submitted before him; that by signing the documents, he gave an imprimatur of approval to such applications; that by
simply accepting the documents as authentic and without flaws and not further verifying the entries made therein, it
can be deduced that the petitioner took part in allowing the grand tax scam to happen; that as an evaluator or
examiner, it was his duty to guard against tampering of documents and padding of fictitious invoices and delivery
receipts; that the petitioners act was an essential ingredient in the commission of fraud against the government; that
his ignorance cannot erase his liability because he disregarded established practice rules; that he was grossly
negligent for his failure to review or verify the authenticity of the documents which involved millions of pesos; and
that he ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service and must at all times
be above suspicion. Finally, the OSG argues that the findings of the Ombudsman deserve great weight and must be
accorded full respect and credit.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The long standing policy of the Court is non-interference in the powers given by no less than the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman. Except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers on complaints filed against erring public
officials and employees. Its findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded
due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Generally, in reviewing administrative decisions,
it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It
is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties evidence all over again except when there is serious
ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.9The recent case of Conrado Casing vs.
Hon. Ombudsman10is enlightening:
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees.
Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is basically
its call.
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and
prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which,
"beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."
While the Ombudsmans findings as to whether probable cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court,
where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsmans act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under
the Courts own constitutional power and duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsmans exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner - which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention. The petitioner failed to
show the existence of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that there was no error committed by the Ombudsman. The record
shows that there is enough evidence on record warranting the finding of guilt for grave misconduct against the
petitioner.
Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. It is defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a
rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. A misconduct is grave where the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present.11
In the case at bench, the petitioner does not dispute that his duties and responsibilities as an evaluator for the
wearable/textile division are the following:
a) check listing of tax credit claims;
b) preparation of evaluation reports and the computation of tax credit claims;
c) preparation of correspondence and other communication letters to exporters/claimants;
d) attending to inquiries and assistance on specific cases; and
e) physical verification/inspection of manufacturing facilities and plant inspections
The petitioner did not deny that he evaluated and processed Evergreens tax credit application which was filed and
accepted by the Center on November 26, 1993 and subsequently approved on January 5, 1994, and that TCC No.
020829 was subsequently issued to Evergreen.
He, however, claimed that he properly followed the procedure adopted by the Center in the processing of tax credit
applications by 1] requiring the applicant to submit complete import documents (bills of lading, commercial invoices,
import entry internal revenue declaration and BOC official receipts) and export documents (bills of lading, invoices,
bank credit memo and export declaration); 2] preparing an evaluation report which would include pertinent
information/data on the applicant, computation of the amount of tax credit applied for; 3] submitting of the
evaluation report to the immediate supervisor recommending either the approval or denial of the particular tax credit
claim; and 4+ submitting of the final evaluation report to the immediate supervisor for further action after the latters
approval or after the necessary corrections had been made by the latter.
He stressed that his participation as an evaluator ended after the approval of his evaluation report by his superiors.
He added that the procedure for approval and release of the TCC to the applicant was already beyond his function
and duty as an evaluator.
In other words, the petitioner is trying to tell us that his duties and responsibilities as an evaluator were just limited
and that he performed the same based on the directives given by the Center and the instructions given to him by his
superiors. Accordingly, he could not be considered negligent in his duties and be adjudged guilty of grave misconduct
for the alleged tax credit scam.
The Court is not convinced.
The petitioner apparently failed in one of his duties and responsibilities as an evaluator which was to conduct a
physical verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant facilities. While he followed the instructions and training
given to him by his superiors at the Center, he neither conducted a physical verification/inspection on the actual
office premises and the manufacturing and plant facilities of Evergreen, nor did he conduct such verification or
inspection on Evergreens suppliers and exporters. Definitely, as a Senior Tax Specialist, the petitioner ought to know
that there was a necessity to thoroughly verify the authenticity of tax credit applications before processing the same.
It was not just enough for the petitioner to require a tax credit applicant to submit import and export documents and
evaluate the particular application based merely on the form and substance of the documents submitted. He should
have conducted a physical verification/inspection relating to all important information stated therein such as the
exact address and physical location of the applicant companys business office including the true names, background
and exact addresses of the applicants key officers, as well as those of the suppliers and exporters. The petitioner
should have left no stone unturned, so to speak, in verifying such vital information. He should not have been satisfied
with his own judgment that the documents submitted to him appeared to be correct and regular on its face. He
should have dug deeper instead of just looking at the surface in finding out the genuineness of the documents before
processing tax credit applications and finally submitting the same to his superiors.
There were numerous TCCs issued to Evergreen worth several millions of pesos. Based on the "Summary of TCCs
Issued to Evergreen" on record,12 there were several evaluators that were assigned to handle the processing of
Evergreens TCCs. The petitioner was one of the evaluators who handled TCC No. 020829. It was also established that
from January 1994 to June 1998, a total of thirty four (34) TCCs worth 110,194,158.00 were issued to Evergreen. None
of the evaluators, not even the reviewers and approving authorities, were able to prevent the tax credit fraud from
happening. All of them had the same lame excuse that the documents submitted to them for evaluation appeared
to be regular and correct and that they never conducted a physical verification/inspection of offices, manufacturing
and plant facilities.
There is no doubt that the petitioner, together with the other evaluators, committed a deliberate disregard of
established rules which can only be considered as grave misconduct.
Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been demonstrated,
among others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule; in the repeated voluntary
disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies; in the practice of illegally collecting fees more than
1wphi1

what is prescribed for delayed registration of marriages; when several violations or disregard of regulations governing
the collection of government funds were committed; and when the employee arrogated unto herself responsibilities
that were clearly beyond her given duties. The common denominator in these cases was the employees propensity
to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.13
The Court finds unacceptable petitioners belated explanation that his designated duty for physical
verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant facilities was only included and required sometime in 1995.
Curiously, he never mentioned this in his pleadings - his counter-affidavit,14 motion for reconsideration,15supplemental
motion for reconsideration,16 and even his petition before the CA. Moreover, the petitioner did not substantiate this
argument by showing any written official memo, policy or circular from the Center. Clearly, the petitioners argument
was just a plain afterthought.
Substantial
evidence
is
the
only
quantum
of
evidence
needed
in administrative proceedings
The OSG correctly argued that in an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at
hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support
affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies. Because administrative liability attaches so
long as there is some evidence adequate to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense
have been performed (or have not been performed), reasonable doubt does not ipso facto result in exoneration
unlike in criminal proceedings where guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.17
In this case, there is ample substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the petitioner committed an act
constitutive of grave misconduct. It need not be emphasized that from January 1994 to June 1998, a total of thirty
four (34) TCCs worth at least P110,194,158.00 were issued to Evergreen. These TCCs were utilized either through own
use by Evergreen or transfer to other companies. Had the petitioner exercised due care and caution, he could have
discovered that Evergreen, its suppliers and buyers did not exist or could no longer be found. The sales invoices and
delivery receipts which were used as bases of tax credit claims of Evergreen were fake and the TCCs were transferred
fictitiously. All these anomalies resulted due to the gross negligence committed by the petitioner and his coevaluators in handling the tax credit applications. The petitioner, to repeat, failed to faithfully comply with his duty
and responsibility to conduct a physical verification/inspection of manufacturing and plant facilities, which enabled
Evergreen to succeed in deceiving the government in the amount of P867, 680.00 to its damage and prejudice.
The Court agrees with the CA and the Ombudsman that the tax credit anomaly could have been avoided if the
petitioner and his co-evaluators followed to the letter their duty and responsibility to conduct a physical
verification/inspection of Evergreen' s manufacturing and plant facilities together with the facilities of its alleged
suppliers and exporters. A mere documentary verification should not have sufficed but, instead, an ocular verification
on the applicant's offices and manufacturing plants and facilities should have been necessarily done. Although it is not
a high policy making position, an evaluator is, nonetheless, a very essential and sensitive one because his superior
relies on the result of his evaluation.
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and
employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is
a public trust and must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.18
In fine, the entire act of petitioner clearly points to a deliberate disregard of established rules constitutive of grave
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
3.) G.R. No. 143591

May 5, 2010

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON,
BENJAMIN
DE
LEON,
DELFIN
C.
GONZALES,
JR.,
and
BEN
YU
LIM,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Bago City, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in its Decision1 dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49666, is correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr.,
Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and
Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683,
6684, 6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and
expenses, damages, and attorneys fees2 against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Atty.
Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract of Agency3 allegedly entered into with the petitioners,
wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully
occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss4 arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the
following documents: 1) a Letter5 dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter 6 dated 7
December 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a Letter7 dated 9 December 1994 addressed to
Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum8dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique
Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by
ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit9 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and
employees of ISCI.11 Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they
were falsified.
In a Resolution12 dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of
petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the
documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part
of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to
dismiss, and then adopted in their answer and in their Pre-Trial Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding
Informations14 were filed with the MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685,
and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants15 for the arrest of the petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation.16 Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the
proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they
were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since no such counter-affidavit
and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit
and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court.
Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused,
i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a director of Urban Bank, contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners posited
that the criminal cases should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case
is a prejudicial question.
In an Order17 dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that
preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level
court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they
already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question,
and, thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the
Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants
of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion.18 They, likewise, questioned the courts conclusion that
by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrants of arrest.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.19 Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by
the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating prosecutor
dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the complainant be
sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?
C.
Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of
probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very
least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of
probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?20

On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the petitioners had already become moot and
academic when the latter posted bail and were already arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO21 enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any manner with
Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is pending before, or until further
orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were already
arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as
they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal
Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is
true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections
thereto.22
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:23
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to
modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon.
The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because
precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative
statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a
general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of
their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court
rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behoved
the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners petition for certiorari and her motion for
partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she
waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the
respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish
her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does,
his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish
the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the
same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving
their right to question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their
plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a
quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the
same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert
their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which we
have returned in People v. Red25 stated:
x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island and Province of
Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were no
court sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may
properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention,
and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary examination of the case before their detention.
That they had no intention of waiving this right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which
they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their
arrest for lack of the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No.
33708, page 8), and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13, General
Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which are: (1) the procedural aspect, i.e.,
whether the prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the required procedure in the instant case, and, (2)
the substantive aspect, which is whether there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.
The procedural aspect:
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their counter-affidavits and
were not accorded the right to a preliminary investigation. Considering that the complaint of Atty. Pea was filed in
September 1998, the rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112,
to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
1avvphi1

Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the
following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public,
who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure
outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits
and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. (underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized under second paragraph of Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who,
with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or
in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1
day.26 The next lower in degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period which translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months27 of imprisonment. Since the
crime committed is not covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure,28 the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the first level courts but applying the ordinary rules. In such instance, preliminary investigation as defined in
Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section covers only crimes
cognizable by the RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in court, the
prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In
the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright
the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution
and file the corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after
having been sworn in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional Trial Court of Bago City entitled "Atty. Magdaleno
M. Pea v. Urban Bank, et al" Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan,
Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo
Manuel.(underlining ours)
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank, Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the "bank") in ridding
a certain parcel of land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified true copy of the Complaint in the said case
is hereto attached as Annex "A".
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true copy of which is attached as Annex "B"), Answer
dated 28 October 1996 (Annex "C"), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex "D") filed by the bank and the
respondent members of the board, the said respondents used as evidence the following documents:
a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar
Company (ISC) (a copy of which is attached as Annex "E"), which states:
December
19,
1994
Urban
Bank
Urban
Avenue,
Makati
Metro Manila
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City which you purchased from Isabela
Sugar Company under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 1, 1994.
In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to deliver to you the full and actual
possession and control of said property, free from tenants, occupants or squatters and from any obstruction or
impediment to the free use and occupancy of the property and to prevent the former tenants or occupants from
entering or returning to the premises. In view of the transfer of ownership of the property to Urban Bank, it may be
necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Pea likewise as its authorized representative for purposes of

holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property and to represent Urban Bank in any court action that
may be instituted for the abovementioned purposes.
It is understood that any attorneys fees, cost of litigation and any other charges or expenses that may be incurred
relative to the exercise by Atty. Pea of his abovementioned duties shall be for the account of Isabela Sugar Company
and any loss or damage that may be incurred to third parties shall be answerable by Isabela Sugar Company.
Very truly yours,
Isabela Sugar Company
By:
HERMAN
PONCE
JULIE ABAD
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of
which is hereto attached as annex "F", which states:
December 7, 1994
To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
From: MARILYN G. ONG
RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc. to take charge of inspecting the
tenants would like to request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new owners. Can you please issue
something like this today as he (unreadable) this.
b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "G", which states:
December 9, 1994
Atty.
Ted
Borlongan
URBAN
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA
Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan
Dear Mr. Borlongan
I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached immediately as the tenants are questioning
authority of the people who are helping us to take possession of the property.
Marilyn Ong
c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as annex "H", which states:
MEMORANDUM
To:
Atty.
Magadaleno
M.
Pea
Director
From:
Enrique
C.
Montilla
III
President
Date: 20 November 1994
You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the corporation situated at Roxas
Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately upon the expiration of the
contract of lease over the said property on 29 November 1994. For this purpose, you are authorized to engage the
services of security guards to protect the property against intruders. You may also engage the services of a lawyer in
case there is a need to go to court to protect the said property of the corporation. In addition, you may take whatever
steps or measures are necessary to ensure our continued possession of the property.
ENRIQUE
C.
MONTILLA
III
President
4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced the aforestated documents as evidence in
the civil case knowing that the same are falsified. They used thae said documents to justify their refusal to pay my
agents fees, to my damage and prejudice.
5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex E") is a falsified document, in that the person who supposedly executed the
letter on behalf of ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix their signatures on the document.
The execution of the letter was merely simulated by making it appear that Ponce and Abad executed the letter on
behalf of ISC when they did not in fact do so.
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever stockholders, officers, employees or
representatives of ISC. In the letter, Herman Ponce was represented to be the President of ISC and Julie Abad, the
Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19 December 1994, the real President of plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and
Cristina Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A copy of the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year 1994,
during which Montilla, et al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex "I". On the otherhand, a list of the
stockholders of ISC on or about the time of the transaction is attached as Annex "J".
7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 and athe letter dated 9 December
1994 allegedly written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was ever a stockholder of ISC.
8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique Montilla, III his signature thereon was merely
forged by respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his signature on any such document.
9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E.
Manuel, Delfin C. Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the crime of use of falsified
documents under Artilce 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.(underlining ours)
10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEA

It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent merely introduced and identified
"the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric
Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr." However, in the accusatory portion of the complaint which
is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among those charged with the crime of use of falsified
documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not
intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board. And there
was no explanation in the Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was included.
Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the complaint and the specific averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was
never mentioned.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were inconsistencies
which ought to have been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation.
It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in the
administration of justice. It should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal charge, it
brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to
weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing
the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.29
Atty. Pea, in his Second Manifestation30 dated 16 June 1999, averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.,
were already estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a member of the board of directors of
Urban Bank, as the latter participated and appeared through counsel in Civil Case No. 754 without raising any
opposition. However, this does not detract from the fact that the City Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not
carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Pea, which did not charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners, including,
Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation raising among others the issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of the board of
directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert that an innocent person may have been included in
the complaint. In the Order31 dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion to quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled
that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do
not appear on the face of the information because said motion is hypothethical admission of the facts alleged in the
information x x x. (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since it was at the expense of liberty. This
cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the judge to personally determine the
existence of probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
(a) x x x.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. If the complaint or information is filed directly with the
Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the judge
finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized."32 Interpreting the words
"personal determination," we said in Soliven v. Makasiar33 that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to
conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to
unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to
the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the
report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's
certification. Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to
be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest

issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. 34 He should
even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances
warrant.35
An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which
ought not to be intruded by the State.36
Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here a clear abdication of the judicial
function and a clear indication that the judge blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners. The careless inclusion
of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the bone of contention of petitioners that the instant case is
a matter of persecution rather than prosecution.37 On this ground, this Court may enjoin the criminal cases against
petitioners. As a general rule, criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there are recognized exceptions
which, as summarized in Brocka v. Enrile,38 are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;39
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;40
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;41
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;42
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;43
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;44
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;45
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;46
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;47 and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied.48
The substantive aspect:
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code or Introduction of Falsified
Document in a judicial proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.49
The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the offense. The
Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of
respondent Atty. Pea, attached to which were the documents contained in the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also included as attachments to the complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the
alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during the election of the Board of Directors and the
list of ISCI Stockholders.50 Based on these documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City Prosecutor
concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the strength of the same documents,
the trial court issued the warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without
restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires
less than evidence that would justify conviction.51
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,52 the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is
first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate
from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.53
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by respondent in his complaint-affidavit were
falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Pea stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of
the questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures therein; and that they were not actually officers or
stockholders of ISCI.54 He further claimed that Enrique Montillas signature appearing in another memorandum
addressed to respondent was forged.55 These averments are mere assertions which are insufficient to warrant the
filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of warrants of arrest. These averments cannot be considered as
proceeding from the personal knowledge of herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was present at
the time of the execution of the documents. Neither was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit that herein
respondent was familiar with the signatures of the mentioned signatories to be able to conclude that they were
forged. What Atty. Pea actually stated were but sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of ISCI
and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the corporation. Again, there is no indication
that the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge is to guard against hearsay
evidence. A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or
read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what
he has learned.56 Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.57

The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied considering that herein petitioners were
not given the opportunity to rebut the complainants allegation through counter-affidavits.
Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad, neither of the
two made the representation that they were the president or secretary of ISCI. It was only Atty. Pea who asserted
that the two made such representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a stockholder of ISCI but he did not
present the stock and transfer book of ISCI. And, there was neither allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong was not
connected to ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn Ong was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not
prove that the documents she signed were falsified.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutors function
without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings.58 Considering, however, that the
prosecution and the court a quo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this Court therefore
annuls their findings.
Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez59 as reiterated in Baltazar v. People is apropos:
It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule
for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in
given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of
reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to
uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating constitutional
rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the prosecutor as well
as the court a quo as to the existence of probable cause. The criminal complaint against the petitioners should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made
permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City, is
hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686.
SO ORDERED.
lawphil

4.) G.R. No. 196735

May 5, 2014

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT
MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel should feel safest. After
all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully nurtured and debated.
Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse brotherhood for these
hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in a senseless death whose justice is now
the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are
credible witnesses who present themselves courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles.
The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions. They must do so for there is an
individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family. Excruciating grief for them will
never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma
Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of
them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against several members of the
Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag,
Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219. The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead

pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and clubbing him on
different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis
supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,3 and Leandro Lachica,4 and the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members Mervin Natalicio5 and Amel Fortes.6 Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict
Guerrero, remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix Tumaneng,7 and Cesar
Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m.,
they were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.8 Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina shouted, and
he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.10 The men were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their
heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts.11 Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking
him, hitting him with their lead pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.15 Just before reaching it, he looked back and saw
Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion was.16Both of
them did not have their masks on.17 He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because he often saw them in
the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his friend.18 The attack lasted about
thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds.19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina
shouted.20 He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks, running toward them.21 He
was stunned, and he started running.22 He stumbled over the protruding roots of a tree.23 He got up, but the attackers
came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell down.24 While he was parrying the
blows, he recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not
wearing any masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men coming toward him,
led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group also beat him up.28 He did not move until another group of masked men beat
him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.30 Several bystanders brought him to the U.P. Infirmary
where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures.31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when Venturina shouted and saw a
group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of cloth around their heads.32He ran when
they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead
pipes.33 While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette
Fajardo because their masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library.35 He then
decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House.36There, he saw
Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E.
Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.38 When they saw him, they went toward his direction.39 They were about to hit him
when somebody shouted that policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could bring Venturina to the
U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought the car over, other people, presumably bystanders, were already loading
Venturina into another vehicle.42 They followed that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where they saw Natalicio.43 He stayed
at the infirmary until the following morning.44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard someone shout,
"Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball bats.46 Most of them had
pieces of cloth covering their faces.47 He was about to run when two (2) of the attackers approached him.48 One struck
him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the blows
from the lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm.50
He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House Canteen and
saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano.52 He decided to go back to the canteen to help his
fraternity brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who
attacked them.54 He ended up going to their hang-out instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers.55 They then
proceeded to the College of Law where the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident.56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of attackers coming toward
them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina.58 He was also able to see Warren Zingapan
and George Morano at the scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to the College of Law
to wait for their other fraternity brothers.60 One of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that he received
information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in SM
North.61 Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.62

When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63 Lachica saw Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan.64 They had no choice but to get away from the mall and proceed
instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a meeting.65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their complaints with the
National Bureau of Investigation.66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the victims would be
giving their statements before the National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies of their
statements. In the meantime, Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8,
1994. He died on December 10, 1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the cadaver of Dennis
Venturina.68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, found that Venturina
had "several contusions located at the back of the upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both hands,"69 "two
(2) lacerated wounds at the back of the head,70 generalized hematoma on the skull,"71"several fractures on the
head,"72 and "inter-cranial hemorrhage."73 The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard
blunt object.74 Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their respective
affidavits76 before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal examinations77 with their
medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated
wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees; contusion
on the left leg and thigh,"78 all of which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required
medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.79
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg which could have been caused
by a blunt instrument."80 These injuries required hospitalization for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from
date of infliction.81 He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the left forearm which could
possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard surface and would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical
attention."82 He found on Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound
on the infra scapular area, left side."83 On Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior chest,
left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands; contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and
lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the demurrer to
evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the prosecution's witnesses and
that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the prosecution.85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol with another member of the U.P.
Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the College of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when
he vaguely heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place where the alleged rumble was happening
and saw injured men being helped by bystanders. They helped an injured person board the service vehicle of the
Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name was, and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When he asked
Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead told him that his attackers were wearing masks.
Oscar Salvador87 corroborated his testimony.
Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of the attackers
were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted that he did not see the attack; he just saw a man
sprawled on the ground at the time of the incident.
Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor located nearby.
From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten (10) men, wearing either masks of red and black
bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He also saw three (3) men being hit
with lead pipes by the masked men. Two (2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to
help him, but the attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping those
who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later found out to be Amel
Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban,90 testified that she and her friends were
in line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to
eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask fall off. Her sorority sister and
another U.P. student, Luz Perez,91 corroborated her story that the masked men were unrecognizable because of their
masks. Perez, however, admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified on substantially the same matters as Panganiban and Perez. She
also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked
men. She also stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while some were wearing white t-shirts as
masks. She did not see any mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in Pampanga to visit
his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son went to Pampanga before lunch that day and
visited the school where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not been feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that he
could not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was absent even from work. He also testified that
he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified by Leandro Lachica. He also stated that
he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a school project on
December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the rumble as he had an injury affecting his
balance. The injury was caused by an incident in August 1994 when he was struck in the head by an unknown

assailant. His testimony was corroborated by Jose Victor Santos96 who stated that after lunch that day, Medalla played
darts with him and, afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and another friend in
Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight to their fraternity
hang-out where he was told that there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met several Sigma Rhoans
acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-out. They were also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to
the Sigma Rhoans and just go home. Anna Cabahug,98 his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed to have gone to SM
North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He also alleged that some Sigma Rhoans
attacked them in SM North that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision100 with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.101 The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George
Morano, and Raymund Narag.102 The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension.103 The trial court, m evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused, some were
sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous images during the
pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers etching an indelible
impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers
rush towards them wielding deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and
pounce on their hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the scene of the crime during
the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not
one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply
bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and every single
accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure that no one else would escape conviction.
Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who
delivered the blows against them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court on automatic
appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal,105 the case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals.106 In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several Times107 before it was eventually assigned to
Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed108 the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring109 an one (1) dissenting.110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the issue may be further refined,
thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information against them contained the
aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks
fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that
accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
I
An
information
is
sufficient
when
the
accused
is
fully
apprised
of
the
charge
against
him
to
enable
him
to
prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the prosecution should not have
included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they were presenting
testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law."111 This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and "to be informed of
the nature and accusation against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with
the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for
his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.114

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information.
Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.115 It was,
therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial
court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain
anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but
the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.116 What is important
in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the
commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of
their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of
all."117 This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence
later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. All
that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been alleged and that there
are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.
II
Findings
of
the
trial
court,
when
affirmed
by
the
appellate
court,
are
entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight
and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel Quijada,118 as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the
heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an
oath, the carriage and mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias,120 this court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable assumption that it is in a
better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal much of
themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception that makes the rule is where such findings arc clearly
arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they
were reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision.121 (Emphasis
supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is always in favor of innocence. It
is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the defense were put
on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted
five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said that the trial court acted arbitrarily or
that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without a judicious and exhaustive study of all the
evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is also nothing that precludes this
court from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of the facts and the evidence on record.
The
accused
were
sufficiently
identified
by
the
witnesses
for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be
credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not one
testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on
convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and every accused as a
participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure no one would escape conviction. Instead, each
eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the
blows against them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have seen it all but
they could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he did not have the opportunity
to see and identify the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two-inch cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead
pipe but he did not see who did it. Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized, was severely beaten by

three waves of attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that he would
be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but he
stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay, Denoista, and Penalosa during the
onslaught. Gaston could have named any of the accused as the one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and
stabbed him but he frankly said their faces were covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several
groups but did not name any of the accused as one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified were those
leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing while he
was running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during the attack but did not know then their
names.122 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident,"123 there would be slight inconsistencies
in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,124 it was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there
may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact,
jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their
testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.125 (Emphasis supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla;126
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva;127 and Fortes was able to identify Feliciano, Medalla, and
Zingapan.128 Their positive identification was due to the fact that they either wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to
identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended. It has also been
previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory.129
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks. It had been testified
by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of cloth or a handkerchief and that
Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133 had masks on at first but their masks fell off and hung around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-examination who observed that some
of the attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the Beach House Canteen, and then
running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind to take a look at their
assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, must be
upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence while Gaston's testimony was
found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris members
identified by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of Mangrobang was an
absolute fabrication."135 The court went on to state that they "were exonerated merely because they were accorded
the benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were
[sic] not corroborated and their alibis, not refuted."136 There was, therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was not
credible; it was only that the evidence presented was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy"137 by the trial court only with regard to his identification
of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with Zingapan moving and Morano
staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano were running after him. Lachica also
testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the trial court found
that there was doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano.
Despite this, the court still did not" impute doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was brought about only upon a
thorough examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the victims but that these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch inconsistencies, and
even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses."'138
Evidence
as
part
of
the
res
gestae
may
be
admissible
but
have
little
persuasive
value
in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139 when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the
bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued,
could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, x x x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence.

The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is
part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part
of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part of res
gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a particular
litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule
on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of
the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence,
they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference. Therefore, almost
always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a
crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different impressions and recollections of the
same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the bystanders could
have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of
the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some
remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the
incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack
occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The
belated
identification
by
the
victims
do
not
detract
from
their
positive
identification
of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon City Police
but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident gives doubt
as to the credibility of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the victims who
all told him they could not recognize the attackers because they were all wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr.
Mislang147 testified to the effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio answered that he did not
know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While this court does not
condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are certain practices that are
unique to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose it
without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho
after the incident, which showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in SM North. Because of the
tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong
fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the police officer
or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be forgotten that the victims actually
witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying
secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident also does not affect
their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them were well
enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order to give their statements.

Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their legal counsel
that they executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the
incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police was the call of
their legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of Investigation more equipped to handle the
investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely following the
legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better equipped than the U.P. Police to
handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their station is located in front of the
College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and property, enforce
basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and Regulations including policies and standards;
and to perform such other functions relative to the general safety and security of the students, employees, and
residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. x x x.148 (Emphasis supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security. They are by no means an actual
police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternity-related violence in U.P. has also
increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that would
prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their investigations. The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of
Investigation, therefore, is understandable.
III
Alibi
cannot
prevail
over
the
positive
identification
of
the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim.149 In People v.
Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the defense of alibi
and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the
courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is
not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in
law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-appellants merely offered
alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both the trial court and the appellate
court while giving little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants
were
correctly
charged
with
murder,
and
there
was
treachery
in
the
commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants were correctly charged
with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball bats attacked Dennis
Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina was
committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The appellate
court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim

no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.154 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to the findings of the
trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the attack was sudden and
unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see them"155 and that "there was a
possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the victims."156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place
where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry
the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for
them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend
themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The
presence
of
conspiracy
makes
all
of
the
accusedappellants
liable
for
murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina
and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal
Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty
of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the
attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting harm to
them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring
them."158 It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an intent to
kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants160and the
appellate court sustainedthis finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of
participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or
crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case
where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close
and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common
agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ...
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the
scene of the crime. x x x.162 (Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the accused-appellants were
armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the
victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers.
The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accusedappellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is
relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical injuries. It would
be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only
Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill
was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to
kill.
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted
murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
1wphi1

It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives whose once bright
futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There is now more honor for them to accept
their responsibility and serve the consequences of their actions. There is, however, nothing that they can do to bring
back Dennis Venturina or fully compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case and many
cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which valorizes courage, sacrifice and
honor in more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It colors the stories of many who
choose to expend their energy in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an
immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at
dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is AFFIRMED
insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan,
and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q9561133 with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal
Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.

5.) G.R. No. 179497

January 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur; PENDATUM AMPUAN, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur; Appellants,
BAGINDA PALAO (at large) Alias "Abdul Wahid Sultan", Accused.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is the center of this controversy. The well-known
rule, though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses are matters best left to the trial court. Hence, "[u]nless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial courts assessment must be
respected."1
Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00196 which affirmed with modification the July 19, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan
City, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting Renandang Mamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and Pendatum
Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder.
On February 9, 1996, the following Information4 for murder was filed against Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao
(Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan.5
That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, except for others whose cases are still under preliminary investigation, conspiring with
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with deadly weapon, to wit: a caliber .45
pistol, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot and wound one Baudelio R. Batoon, thereby inflicting upon him the
following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardio respiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock
Multiple gunshot wound
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.
Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled arraignment on May 20, 1996. Their co-accused,
Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large. Appellants pleaded not guilty6 and trial proceeded
against them.

Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its brief and substantiated by
the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings, are as follows:
Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a certain "Nito"
were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoons auto repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod,
Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum
Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his two (2) companions wore Philippine Army
tropical green fatigues. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was
serving it against Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palaos group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop their work and
observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the matter after he [Batoon]
[finishes] tuning-up an engine he had been working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victims stomach and pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon
then tried to grab Palaos gun, causing the two of them to grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for
control of the gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind Batoons right
thigh with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was also standing behind Baudelio Batoon,
followed up by shooting Batoons left arm pit with a .45 cal. *homemade+ pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the
ground and Baginda Palao finished [him off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito Gepayo and Richard
Batoon saw the entire scene, stunned and unable to do anything. From their vantage points three (3) to four (4)
meters away, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then Commanding Officer of the Iligan City PNP Mobile Force
Company, was riding a civilian car along the highway, heading towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied
by his driver, SPO3 William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They heard the gunshots emanating from the auto
repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to stop the car. They alighted and
proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three (3) men in camouflage gear with
guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares group shouted at the
camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were doing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing
that they (Mijares group) were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back. During the exchange of
gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran
towards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee
likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and Ampuan were then captured by the
policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Palao; but he escaped.
Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were
eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was brought to the hospital by his wife; but he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination of the victims body, Dr. Leonardo Labanen established that the three (3)
gunshot wounds found on the body of Baudelio Batoon (i.e., at the right thigh, left armpit and back) were
inflicted at close range due to the presence, or at least traces, of gunpowder burns.7
Only appellants testified for their defense. Their testimonies, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows:
Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 34 years old, married, carpenter and a resident of Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1, 1996, he was in Marawi City. He decided to come down to Iligan
City to see a movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arrival at the Tambacan terminal in Iligan City, he
went to the house of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind about going to a movie and returned to the
Tambacan terminal in order to go back to Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., Abdul Wahid Sultan arrived with
Pendatum Ampuan on board a car driven by Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to go with them because he will
collect some money and afterwards they will have some enjoyment. He agreed and sat at the rear seat behind
the driver. Abdul Wahid was at the front seat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They drove to Baraas.
They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and Pendatum Ampuan alighted. Before walking away, Abdul

Wahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver with instructions to remain in the car and [keep] watch. At first
he refused but Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted the gun. Abdul Wahid and Pendatum walked to the shop
leaving the rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heard three gunshots. He moved to the rear seat
where the door was open and saw policemen, who arrived and surrounded the car. He placed the gun on the
seat and raised his hands as a sign of surrender. Then with his right hand, he closed the car door. Just as the
door closed, the policemen shot him on the forearm and chest below the right nipple. He lost consciousness and
regained it only at the hospital.
He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend. He is also known as Baginda Palao. Pendatum
Ampuan is not known as Abdul Wahid Sultan.
He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo that only Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan
entered the shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true and that the testimony of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot
the victim is not true. He denied any part in the shooting to death of Baudelio Batoon.
Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 years old, single, student and a resident of Piagapo, Lanao del
Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he left Marawi City for Iligan City on board a passenger Armak
jeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind the Gaisano Superstore and at exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the
store and went to the upper storey to shop. When he came out, he met a friend name[d] Bessah. Together they
walked to the Maharlika Theater but then Bessah expressed the intention to go home to Marawi City. He
accompanied Bessah to the Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded to the house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This
is a place North of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan which is South of the city). He arrived there
at noon. He stayed overnight at his Uncle Alis house. At about 9:00 a.m., the following day, February 1, 1996, he
left the house of his uncle. Outside, he met Baginda Palao, who was looking for a certain Baser, a policeman. He
wanted the latter to help him collect a debt. They went to the terminal at the back of Gaisano store but did not
find Baser. Baginda told him to wait while he will look for Baser inside the Gaisano store. Baginda returned
without having found Baser and once again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car. A little later,
Baginda returned on board a car driven by one Aminola Basar. They went to the Tambacan terminal but again
did not find Baser. Instead, they saw Renandang Mamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to
Baraas to collect a debt. Renandang entered the car and they proceeded to Baraas. The car stopped at a place
near a shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain in the car because he was going out to collect the
debt. Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About ten minutes later, he heard shouting followed by gunfire.
He stepped out of the car to verify and saw Baginda Palao [shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the
police led by Capt. Mijares arrived. They confiscated the car key and arrested them except Baginda Palao who
escaped. They were taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, the sustained wounds when mauled by the
children of the victim but in another breath he admitted that his injury was a gunshot wound when he was
caught in the cross fire as the police shot Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside the car when he was hit. He
further admitted that Baginda Palao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied shooting Baudelio Batoon.8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC debunked appellants defense of denial and held them guilty as principals by direct participation in the
killing of Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith and credence to the evidence of the prosecution especially
on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, without the presence of any other aggravating circumstances and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the corresponding accessory
penalties attached thereto by law and to indemnify the Heirs of Baudelio Batoon the sums of:
P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;
P66,904.00 for and as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
P100,000.00 for and as moral damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.

Having been under preventive detention since February 1, 1996, the period of such detention shall be credited
in full in favor of said accused in the service of their respective sentences.
SO ORDERED.9
In view of the Notice of Appeal10 filed by the appellants, the RTC forwarded the records of the case to this
Court. By Resolution11 dated January 31, 2000, the Court resolved to accept the appeal. In view thereof,
appellants were required to file their brief.12 Appellants thus filed their brief on November 20, 200013 while the
OSG submitted the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee14 on May 2, 2001. Later, however, consonant with this
Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo15 the case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision17 promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed with modification the RTC Decision.
Said court ruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies pointed out by the appellants
pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative weight of said testimonies.
Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuans name in the Information, the court went on to hold
that such error was only a formal defect and the proper correction of which was duly made without any
objection on the part of the defense. The CA likewise held that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Judgment dated July 19,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and
Pendatum Ampuan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The appellants are to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Baudelio Batoon the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P66,904.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in view of their Notice of Appeal19 from the Decision of
the CA.
By Resolution20 dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. In their respective manifestations, the parties opted to adopt
the briefs they earlier filed as their supplemental briefs.21
In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:
That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when they should have been acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; and
The information filed before the trial court was substantially defective.22
The basic thrust of appellants first assignment of error is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants
contend that the trial court anchored its finding and conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses Juanito Gepayo
(Gepayo), Richard Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp. Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who appear to be inconsistent in
their stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable. They question the prosecution witnesses identification
of Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person and aver that the same only leads to the logical conclusion
that said witnesses were perjured witnesses. They argue that Ampuan failed to grasp the information read to
him as he was arraigned as "Abdul Wahid Sultan alias Pendatum Ampuan".
On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision, opines that inconsistencies
on minor and collateral matters in the testimony of a prosecution eyewitness do not affect his credibility. It also
contends that whatever defect the information subject of appellant Ampuans arraignment has had been cured
with the latters consent during the trial.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to cast doubt on the credibility of witness Gepayo
anchored on the following grounds: (1) there was serious inconsistency in his testimony on whether he knew
Ampuan before the incident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incident without giving any assistance to his
fallen employer as well as his immediate return to work thereafter is contrary to human nature and experience;
(3) while he testified that appellant Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspects during the encounter, he
failed to identify him in court; and, (4) in his affidavit, he identified Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same
person but later on testified to the contrary.
Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies.
The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even before the incident is inconsequential as
to discredit the credibility of Gepayos testimony. The inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to
collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effect on the nature of the offense. In fact, it even signifies
that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand. What matters is that there is no
inconsistency in Gepayos complete and vivid narration as far as the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of Ampuan as one of the principal assailants are concerned.23 "The Court has held that although
there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their
credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailant."24
It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place during the shooting incident and did not render
assistance to his wounded employer. To appellants, this reaction is contrary to human nature. We believe
otherwise. This imputed omission, to our mind, does not necessarily diminish the plausibility of Gepayos story
let alone destroy his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds of expected human behavior. Surely, he
was afraid that they might kill him because the malefactors were then armed with guns.25 Thus, he would not
dare attempt to stop them and stake his life in the process. At any rate, it is settled "that different people react
differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an unusual
experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of
behavior can be drawn."26
The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does not bolster appellants cause. As the CA correctly
pointed out:
x x x We agree with the prosecutions observation that although he did not positively identify appellant
Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was however, able to point out that there was a third person who
accompanied assailants Palao and Ampuan in approaching the victim during the incident. This is also bolstered
by Insp. Mijares*+ testimony that he saw three assailants pointing their guns at the victim who was already lying
prostrate on the ground.27
In any event, even without Gepayos identification of Mamaruncas, the unrebutted testimony of another
prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points to Mamaruncas as one of the assailants. Thus:
Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together with two companions, presented the warrant of
arrest to your father, what happened thereafter?
A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.
Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your father?
A: Abdul Wahid, Sir
Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed [at] your father?
A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul Wahid, Sir.
Q: What happened after?
A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.
Q: Who [first shot] your father?
A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x x x his name[,] he answered that he is Renandang
Mamaruncas)

xxxx
Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father, what happened thereafter?
A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness pointing to a person sitting at the bench inside the
Courtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, he answered that he is Pendatum [Ampuan].)28
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on material details are straightforward and
consistent with each other. They personally saw appellants at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Their combined declarations established beyond reasonable doubt the identities of both appellants,
along with their co-accused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime.
As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan as one and the same
person in his affidavit29 and yet later on testified to the contrary, this Court finds the same inconsequential and
will not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recent case,30 this Court reiterated that as
between an affidavit executed outside the court and a testimony given in open court, the latter almost always
prevails. It emphasized therein that:
Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an
accused. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are often
incomplete. They do not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the
affiant. Thus, our rulings generally consider sworn statements taken out of court to be inferior to in court
testimony (citation omitted).
The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it was the police officers who supplied the names of the
suspects in Gepayos affidavit.31
Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.
Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the Information filed before the trial court was
substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person when in fact
they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to comprehend the Information read to
him.
The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is well to note that appellants failed to raise the issue of the
defective Information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the
information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to a
waiver of the defect in the Information. "Objections as to matters of form or substance in the [I]nformation
cannot be made for the first time on appeal."32 Records even show that the Information was accordingly
amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not comment thereon, viz:
FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:
Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the Information be amended from [Renandang] Mamaruncas
and the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and the alias Pendatum Ampuan be
erased as corrected.
COURT:
Any comment from the accused.
ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:
No comment, Your Honor.33
Treachery correctly appreciated.
From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the facts sufficiently
prove that treachery was employed by appellants. The attack on Baudelio was so swift and unexpected,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. As ruled by
the trial court:

In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist. More so in this case when the victim was completely
without any weapon from the inception of the assault. At the moment when Pendatum Ampuan and Renandang
Mamaruncas shot him, Baudelio Batoon was not in any position to defend himself. And when Abdul Wahid shot
him while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly defenseless.34
Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty of murder in view of the presence of treachery.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists "when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary x x x [as it] may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest."35
In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three accused entered the shop of Baudelio at the same time.
Ampuan shot Baudelio from behind, hitting the latter at his left armpit while Mamaruncas shot Baudelio on the
thigh. When Baudelio fell to the ground face down, Abdul shot him at the back. These consecutive acts
undoubtedly showed appellants unanimity in design, intent and execution. They performed specific acts with
such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design in the commission
of the crime.
The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA considering that they are
based on existing evidence and reasonable
conclusions drawn therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions
based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the
evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.36 Though the rule is subject to exceptions,
no such exceptional grounds obtain in this case.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants could only muster mere denial. As ruled
in various cases by the Court, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is inherently a weak
defense as it is negative and self-serving. "As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand,
and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail."37
The Penalty
Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the attending aggravating circumstance of treachery.
Murder, as defined under Article 24838 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, is the unlawful killing of a
person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery, inter alia, attended the killing. The
presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid Article is enough to qualify a killing
as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. Since only the qualifying circumstance of treachery is found to be present, both the RTC and the CA
properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934639 provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore not eligible for parole.
Awards of Damages
The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,40 said award is increased to P75,000.00. Anent the award of moral damages, the CA correctly
imposed the amount of P50,000.00.41 These "awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other
than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide."42
Anent the award of actual damages, the victims widow testified that the family spent a total of P66,904.00
relative to the wake and burial of the victim. However, the claim for said amount is supported merely by a list of
expenses43 personally prepared by the widow instead of official receipts. To be entitled to an award of actual

damages, "it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable x x x."44 "A list of expenses cannot replace receipts
when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business transactions."45 Thus the Court
deletes the lower courts award of actual damages. Nonetheless, since entitlement of the same is shown under
the facts of the case, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.0046 should be awarded in lieu of actual
damages to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which provides that temperate
damages "may be recovered when the court finds that pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."
The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning capacity awarded by the trial court.lawphi1 Such
indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either selfemployed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim was earning a monthly income of P20,000.00 and
P90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a six-wheeler truck operator, respectively. The trial court made a
conservative estimate of P500.00 a day as the net income from the truck alone after making reasonable
deductions from its operation. Thus, ranged against the daily minimum wage then prevailing in Region X which is
P137.00 per day pursuant to Wage Order No. RX-03, this case undoubtedly does not fall under the exceptions
where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given despite the lack of documentary evidence.
The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in view of the proven qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The CA however awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P25,000.00. To
conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases this amount to P30,000.00.47
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00196 which found appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;
3. The award of P66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted;
4. P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of actual damages;
5. The award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and
6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
6.) G.R. No. 202122

January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEOANRDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness
meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556-CFM and 041557-CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The Informations for the
three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04-15 5 6-CFM

That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the
common law spouse of the minor victims mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA3], a minor 13 years
of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the
stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04-1558-CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common
law spouse of minor victims mother by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape against the person of minor, [AAA],
a13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where she was sleeping, putting off her
skirt, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason
other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victims mother who confronted
the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of
said minor complainant as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him.7 After the
completion of the pre-trial conference on September 16, 2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on three
(3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAAs parents separated when she was *only eight years old9+. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who,
by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11)
and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place *i+n December 2003 *the December 2003 incident+. AAAs mother was not in the
house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep,
placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then
started to suck the breasts of *AAA+. Not satisfied, *Pareja+ likewise inserted his penis into AAAs anus. Because
of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear that
[Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to AAA, in
February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same
circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her half-siblings
were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed
[her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 *the March 2004 incident+, it was AAAs mother who saw
*Pareja+ in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAAs mother
immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the
barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General
Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional Medico-Legal
Report Number 2004-03-0091. Her medico-legal report stated the following conclusion:

Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 oclock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic
xxxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAAs mother then filed a
complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his defense.
He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-in partner and that they
all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAAs allegations, *Pareja+ averred that it would have been impossible that the alleged incidents
happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that there was no way
that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10) meters, and
was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house is
located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to
sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about with
his plan without AAAs siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He
contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for
being the reason behind her parents separation.10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the
crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. The
dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of attempted rape
in Crim. Case No. 04-1558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is meted out the
penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of
prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the
prosecutions evidence as against Parejas baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the
failure of the prosecution to present AAAs mother to testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the
RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence. The
RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAAs testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had no personal
knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on January 19, 2012,
affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556 and 04-1557, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and, consequently,
DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-1556 to 04-1557 are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.14
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following errors as he did before
the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING *PAREJA+ BASED SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION WITNESS
TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:
The private complainants actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was raped.18
Parejas main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA in convicting him
for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent.
Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Parejas conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAAs testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that have
overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering
its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial
court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no significant
facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left
to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the
witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."21 While there are recognized
exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the
trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAAs credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally expected.22 As this Court
stated in People v. Saludo23:
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous
to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which

causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her
conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically
keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation
omitted.)
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has
never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja
are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned.
The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAAs
ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it creates
serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of
conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy
and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime."26
Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings therein
are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Parejas
case. In particular, the main factor for Ladrillos acquittal in that case was because his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Information against him
only stated that the crime was committed "on or about the year 1992." We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court which
requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the
information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on which the criminal act is
alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of 1992 but includes the
years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to virtually account
for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the
commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the
offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his
defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish his
place of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly
committed the rape.
xxxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused-appellant raped
complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as alleged was based
merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of
evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not specified, the
period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike "on or about the year 1992." Moreover, Ladrillo
was able to prove that he had only moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore
negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in Ladrillo contributed to his
eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not enough to reverse Ladrillos conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness testimony that militates heavily against its
being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the defects might not
suffice to overturn the trial courts judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in
relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion
towards reversal of the assailed judgment.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime charged against him to
exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together with the other evidence, produced reasonable
doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations against him
and even imputed ill motive on AAA.

As regards Parejas concern about AAAs lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction,
if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to
convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape
case.32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAAs sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their house was so
small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was
sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Parejas living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his beastly
desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were not always
committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and space. In
People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families
living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons around
them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick
and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under
the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not
impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual
assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups
and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellants
contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can
be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of time and place," and
rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He said that "the
ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to thwart any attempt to
besmirch her honor and blemish her purity." Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such
that any commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus, giving AAA the
perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her
mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes. AAAs belated
confession, he claimed, "cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her credibility."37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the victim
for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut
behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim
to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to
the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the
rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAAs lack of resistance was brought about by her fear
that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not enough to
discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance
with societys expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational
experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as
it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to
say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to
cope with different circumstances.39
Likewise, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is insignificant and does
not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her if she told
anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we explained why a rape victims deferral in reporting the crime
does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report
the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and
that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is
not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the
rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the
offenders making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma
upon examination of AAAs hymen, "cannot be given any significance, as it failed to indicate how and when the
said signs of physical trauma were inflicted." Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAAs hymen sustained
trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in December, was
not by penetration of the vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony
of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and
not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAAs anus at the time she was
examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAAs claim of being
raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution
failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of
rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full
credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed
to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.
(Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and convicted of the
crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a
womans organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to cover gender-free rape. "The
transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of
rape by sexual assault as differentiated from the traditional rape through carnal knowledge or rape through
sexual intercourse."44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal
Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or "penile
rape."45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.46
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object rape," or "genderfree rape."47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of
paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party may be a
man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second is committed
by inserting the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or
anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is "by any
person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person."
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her anus. While she
may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal
sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other
words, her testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal knowledge,
Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the
material differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault
when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance doctrine
embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included
in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of
either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisin
correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were sufficiently
established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal
knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional
rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of the Philippines, as
represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the Information, which contains the
charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done55 to
the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are
vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and defective Information, such
as that in Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the offended party, and even
the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is accurate and
appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution against Pareja,
especially AAAs testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAAs declaration on the rape in the December 2003
incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above.
However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the
prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 041556-CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAAs confusion as to whether or not she was
actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Parejas favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking her
breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give a clear and convincing
account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what
followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in
her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus,
because of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004
incident. Nonetheless, Parejas acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts in the
February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the attribution of ill motive
against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him because she was angry that he caused her
parents separation. Pareja added that these cases were initiated by AAAs father, as revenge against him.57

Such contention is untenable. "AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill
motives.1wphi1 It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives
or grudge."58 Furthermore, motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from
giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim.59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to
seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are
given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisin correccional in its full
range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken
from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree,62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1
day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper penalty64 that
could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisin correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows: P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count of acts of
lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts
of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is
sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2
months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of
lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
7.) G.R. No. 189297

June 5, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO LOMAQUE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For review is the July 30, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03163 affirming the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Guillermo
Lomaque (appellant) guilty of seven counts of Rape by Sexual Intercourse, one count of Rape by Sexual Assault,
and one count of Acts of Lasciviousness.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged under separate Informations for 13 counts of Rape by Sexual Intercourse allegedly
committed against his stepdaughter "AAA"3 on June 5, 1999 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96389), February 11, 1999
(Criminal Case No. Q-00-96390), second week of January 1999 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96391), last week of
December 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392),
November 2, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96393), October 24, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96394),
September 13, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96395), April 27, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96396), April 17,
1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96397), January 2, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96398), September 20, 1996
(Criminal Case No. Q-00-96399), March 17, 1999 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96400), and September 16, 1996
(Criminal Case No. Q-00-96401).4 Except as to the aforementioned dates of occurrence and the age of "AAA" at

the time of the commission of the crimes, the accusatory portions in the Informations are similarly worded as
the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-00-96389 which reads:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint of "AAA" accuses GUILLERMO LOMAQUE of the crime of RAPE
(Paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 in relation to Section 5 of RA
7610) committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of June 1999 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault upon the
person of one "AAA" his own stepdaughter a minor 14 years of age by then and there removing her shorts and
inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
In addition, appellant was also charged with Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7610,6 as amended, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402, the accusatory portion of which reads:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint of "AAA" accuses GUILLERMO LOMAQUE of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO SECTION 5 OF R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of May 1993 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lewdness upon the person of
one "AAA" his own stepdaughter a minor 8 years of age by then and there caressing her breast, and her vagina,
smelling her private parts and inserting his finger inside her vagina, which are acts prejudicial to the childs
psychological and emotional development, debase, demean and degrade the intrinsic worth and dignity of said
"AAA" as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the Informations. Soon the cases were set for PreTrial where only the minority of "AAA" was stipulated upon. Accordingly, the joint trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The CA summarized the evidence for the prosecution based on the Decision of the RTC and the records of the
case as follows:
AAA was born on September 15, 1985 to BBB by her first husband. She was about eight (8) years old at the time
Lomaque started abusing/molesting her.
The first act of molestation happened on May 8, 1993 when Lomaque asked AAA to remove his growing
mustache and take out white hair from his head. Lomaque, while lying on AAAs lap, started to smell and sniff
her private parts, and thereafter inserted his finger inside her vagina.
At that time, she did not understand what Lomaque did to her. But to avert any further incident, she decided to
sleep more often in the house of her aunt DDD. When her mother, BBB, inquired why she often slept in her
Aunts house, AAA told her mother that accused-appellant touched her private parts. BBB confronted Lomaque
and they quarreled. For a while, Lomaque stopped molesting her so AAA returned to their house to sleep there
again. In the evening of September 16, 1996, while almost everybody was asleep, AAA was awakened by
Lomaque who embraced her and slowly removed her shorts, and immediately inserted his penis into her vagina.
She was then only 11 years old.
On September 20, 1996, when everybody in the room was already asleep, Lomaque again embraced AAA, slowly
removed her shorts, and against her will, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina while her back was against him.
On January 2, 1998, when BBB was in the hospital, Lomaque again sexually abused AAA, this time removing all
the clothes of AAA, and thereafter inserting his penis into her vagina. AAA could not shout as Lomaque, with a
gun, threatened to kill her and her mother if she reported the incident.
Again, on April 17, 1998, while everyone was watching the television, Lomaque positioned himself at the back of
AAA, and pinned AAAs thigh with his own legs. Lomaque slowly removed AAAs shorts and inserted his penis
into her vagina. AAA could not do anything as she recalled Lomaques threat to kill her and her mother if she
reported the matter to BBB.

On April 27, 1998, while they were watching TV in their house, Lomaque touched and held AAAs vagina. Again,
she could not do anything as she was scared.
In the evening of September 13, 1998, accused-appellant again sexually abused AAA, while everyone was asleep.
He laid beside AAA, embraced her, lowered her shorts, and then inserted his penis into her vagina.
Another incident happened on October 24, 1998. This time, while AAA was embracing her mother BBB
apologizing for something she did earlier, Lomaque positioned himself at the back of AAA, and initially held
BBBs breasts, he then lowered his hand towards AAAs waist, and slowly removed AAAs shorts. Lomaque then
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina.
During the last week of December 1998, Lomaque, while clad only with towel, summoned AAA to go upstairs. He
asked AAA to hold his penis, had it inserted into AAAs mouth, and also rubbed his penis against her lips.
On February 11, 1999, while AAA was about to sleep, Lomaque went on top of her, and inserted his penis into
her vagina while kissing her.
AAAs harrowing experience with Lomaque continued and she eventually became pregnant. It was during the
last week of November 1999, when Lomaque asked BBB to bring AAA to the doctor for medical check-up, that
BBB discovered that AAA was pregnant.
BBB inquired who the father was and AAA told her that it was Lomaque, a matter which Lomaque admitted.
However, when BBB became hysterical, Lomaque retracted and concocted a story that somebody else caused
the pregnancy of AAA.
After giving birth, AAA returned to their house. There she saw Lomaque kissing her younger sister, CCC. Afraid
that CCC might suffer the same fate she had, she decided to file a complaint against Lomaque with the help of
Bantay-Bata 163.
On June 19, 2000, AAA with her aunt DDD went to Bantay-Bata 163 to seek assistance. There, AAA disclosed to
social worker Liwayway Ilao, what Lomaque did to her. Ilao conducted further interview and counseling on AAA
and her sister CCC; submitted AAA for medico-legal examination; and assisted AAA in filing a complaint before
the Women and Children Concern Office at Camp Crame, among others.
Dr. Jaime Rodrigo Leal ("Dr. Leal"), the medico-legal officer who conducted the physical examination on AAA,
testified that AAA had an attenuated hymen and deep healed lacerations, indicating chronic penetration. While
the same was consistent with vaginal delivery, Dr. Leal however explained that his findings validate the fact that
AAA was indeed sexually abused several times, and that she gave birth on April 1, 2000.8
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied his complicity in the crimes charged by alleging alibi. His testimony was synthesized by the CA
in this wise:
Lomaque testified that he started to live with BBB in 1993, bringing with him his own set of children by his first
marriage.
He denied that he sexually abused AAA, claiming that he could not have committed the crimes charged because
as a bio-medical technician, he was deployed all over the country to repair hospital equipment. He offered
several plane tickets in support of this allegation. These place tickets were dated: June 2, 1992; February 21,
1994; March 5, 1994; August 14, 1994; August 25, 1994; November 9, 1994; November 27 (year illegible); and
January 7, 1997. He likewise testified that his parents-in-law and sister-in-law were living with them.9
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC found "AAA" to be a credible witness and rejected the defense of denial and alibi proffered
by the appellant. Consequently, it rendered a Decision10 dated October 23, 2007 which declared appellant
guilty of seven counts of rape by sexual intercourse (Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395,
Q-00-96397, Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-96401), one count of rape by sexual assault (Criminal Case No.
Q-00-96392) and one count of Acts of Lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402). Accordingly, the RTC
sentenced appellant to imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Guillermo Lomaque:

1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96389, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with costs de-officio.
2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96390, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the offended party "AAA" the sum of P75,000;
moral damages in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the costs.
3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96391, NOT GUILTY of the crime of Rape on ground of reasonable doubt.
4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96392, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and sentences accused with the
indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccionalin its medium
period as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum.
5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96393, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with costs de-officio.
6) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96394, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and sentences accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the offended party ("AAA") the sum of P75,000; to pay moral damages in
the sum of P50,000 and to pay the costs.
7) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96395, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the offended party ("AAA") the sum of P75,000; to
pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
8) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96396, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with costs de-officio.
9) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96397, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnity the offended party ("AAA") the sum of P75,000; to pay moral
damages in the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
10) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96398, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the offended party ("AAA") the sum of P75,000; to
pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
11) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96399, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnity the offended party ("AAA") the sum of P75,000; to
pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
12) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96400, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with costs de-officio.
13) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96401, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnity the offended party ("AAA") the sum of P75,000; to
pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
14) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-[96402], GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal in its medium period as maximum;
to indemnify the offended party ("AAA") the sum of P50,000; to pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000; and
to pay the costs.
To credit the accused the full period of his detention in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.11
Appellant thus assailed his conviction before the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his Brief,12 appellant faulted the trial court in giving full weight and credence to "AAAs" testimony and in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for
the plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, on the other hand prayed for the affirmance of the assailed
Judgment contending that "AAAs" testimony is clear, candid and straightforward. It contended that appellants
culpability was established beyond reasonable doubt.

The CA, however, was not impressed with the arguments of the appellant, and hence rendered the questioned
Decision13 dated July 30, 2009 affirming the Decision of the RTC.
Still not satisfied, appellant is now before us insisting on his innocence.
In the Resolution14 dated February 8, 2010, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs
if they so desire.15 Appellant manifested that he was no longer filing a supplemental brief and was instead
adopting the Appellants Brief filed before the CA.16 The OSG took the same recourse by praying that its
Appellees Brief be considered as its supplemental brief.17 Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision
on the basis of the parties respective briefs filed with the CA.
Issue
Simply stated, the principal issue for resolution is whether the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of appellant for the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. Basically, appellant assails the credibility
of "AAA." Thus, the resolution of the issue rests upon the credibility of the testimony of the offended party.
Our Ruling
We affirm.
The RTC and the CAs finding of
appellants guilt must be
sustained.
It is now too well-settled to require extensive documentation that where the issue is the extent of credence to
be properly given to the declaration made by witnesses, the findings of the trial court are accorded great weight
and respect. Such findings can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the records that the trial court
overlooked, ignored or disregarded some facts or circumstances of weight or significance which if considered
would have altered the result.18
Here, we find no plausible ground to disturb the findings of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, respecting the
credibility of "AAA." Her testimony indeed bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity which contains details only
a real victim could remember and reveal. "AAA" was really positive and firm in pointing an accusing finger on
appellant as the very person who sexually assaulted her on different dates.
In his attempt to discredit "AAA," appellant contends that "AAAs" silence and failure to divulge her alleged
horrifying ordeal to immediate relatives despite the claim that it happened for several times run counter to the
natural reaction of an outraged maiden despoiled of her honor.
We are not persuaded. "AAAs" momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her credibility. "The filing of
complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission may or may not dent the credibility of witness
and of testimony, depending on the circumstances attendant thereto."19 "It does not diminish the
complainants credibility or undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of
fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, specially by one who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim."20
In this case, not long after the initial rape, appellant threatened "AAA" that he would kill her and her mother if
ever she would tell anyone about what happened. At that time, "AAA" was only 11 years old and was living
under the same roof with the latter whom she treated as a father. Obviously, the threat "AAA" received from
appellant, coupled with his moral ascendancy, is enough to cow and intimidate "AAA." Being young and
inexperienced, it instilled tremendous fear in her mind. In People v. Domingo,21 we ruled that the effect of fear
and intimidation instilled in the victims mind cannot be measured against any given hard-and-fast rule such that
it is viewed in the context of the victims perception and judgment not only at the time of the commission of the
crime but also at the time immediately thereafter. In any event, "the failure of the victim to immediately report
the rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge."22
Neither the failure of "AAA" to struggle nor at least offer resistance during the rape incidents would tarnish her
credibility. "Physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and
the latter submits herself out of fear. As has been held, the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not
make voluntary the victims submission to the criminal acts of the accused."23 Rape is subjective and not
everyone responds in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend. Although an older person may have shouted
for help under similar circumstances, a young victim such as "AAA" is easily overcome by fear and may not be
able to cry for help.

Also, the fact that "AAA" resumed her normal life after the commission of the alleged rapes cannot be taken
against her. We have consistently ruled that "no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim
following her defilement, particularly a child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an
adult. People react differently to emotional stress and rape victims are no different from them."24
Moreover, appellant contends that it challenges human credulity that he was able to sexually abuse "AAA"
despite the many people around them. Such contention deserves scant consideration. This is not the first time
that our attention was called upon to rule on this matter. As has been repeatedly ruled, rape can be committed
even when the rapist and the victim are not alone. "Lust is no respecter of time and place."25 "Rape is not
impossible even if committed in the same room while the rapists spouse is sleeping or in a small room where
other family members also sleep."26
"AAA" having positively identified the assailant to be the appellant and no other, the latters proffered defense
of denial must fail. "Denial could not prevail over the victims direct, positive and categorical assertion."27 As to
his alibi, appellant failed to substantiate the same with clear and convincing evidence. The plane tickets he
submitted in evidence to show that he was in other places during the incidents are irrelevant. As correctly
observed by the RTC, the tickets were all issued in 1994 while the incidents subject of the Informations charging
appellant with rape transpired from 1996 to 1999. Thus, appellants alibi being uncorroborated and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and deserves no weight in law.
In fine, "AAAs" woeful tale of her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant is impressively clear,
definite and convincing.1wphi1 Her detailed narration of the incidents, given in a spontaneous and frank
manner and without any fanfare, were beyond cavil well-founded. We therefore sustain the RTCs and the CAs
findings of appellants guilt.
However, the rapes committed in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395, Q-00- 96397, Q-0096398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-96401 are simple and not qualified since the relationship between appellant and
the victim was not proven.
The guilt of appellant having been established and following the settled rule that in a criminal case an appeal
throws the whole case open for review,28 we will now determine the sufficiency of evidence respecting the
presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. This is considering that it was under this
context that the CA based its affirmance of appellants guilt for qualified rape as shown by its declaration that
the proper imposable penalty for the seven counts of rape at that time is death.29
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape is qualified and the penalty of death is imposed when
the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. To
justify the imposition of the death penalty, however, it is required that the special qualifying circumstances of
minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant be properly alleged in the Information and duly
proved during the trial. Needless to say, these two circumstances must concur.
Based on our meticulous review, we find that the courts below erred in finding appellant guilty of rape in its
qualified form. Indeed, the subject Informations clearly aver the special qualifying circumstances of minority of
"AAA" and her filiation (stepdaughter) to the appellant. While the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove
"AAAs" minority through the latters testimony during the trial and by the presentation of her Certificate of Live
Birth30 showing that she was born on September 15, 1985, it however, failed to prove the fact of relationship
between her and the appellant (stepfather-stepdaughter). Notably, said alleged relationship was not even made
the subject of stipulation of facts during the pre-trial.31 As held in People v. Hermocilla,32 "a stepdaughter is a
daughter of ones spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a
marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken is the offspring." The allegation that "AAA" is the
stepdaughter of appellant requires competent proof and should not be easily accepted as factually true. The
bare testimony of appellant that he was married to "BBB" ("AAAs" mother) is not enough. Neither does "AAAs"
reference to appellant as her stepfather during her testimony would suffice. As ruled in People v. Agustin,33
"the relationship of the accused to the victim cannot be established by mere testimony or even by the accuseds
very own admission of such relationship." In this case, save for the testimony of appellant that he was married
to "BBB," the record is bereft of any evidence to show that appellant and "BBB" were indeed legally married.
The prosecution could have presented the marriage contract, the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage
but it did not. As aptly observed in People v. Abello:34
This modifying circumstance, however, was not duly proven in the present case due to the prosecutions failure
to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAAs mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the
evidence at all, it was via an admission by Abello of his marriage to AAAs mother. This admission, however, is

inconclusive evidence to prove the marriage to AAAs mother, as the marriage contract still remains the best
evidence to prove the fact of marriage. This stricter requirement is only proper as relationship is an aggravating
circumstance that increases the imposable penalty and hence must be proven by competent evidence.
Following Abello, "AAA" cannot be considered as appellants stepdaughter and conversely, appellant as "AAAs"
stepfather. Appellant, therefore, should only be convicted of simple rape in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q00-96394, Q-00-96395, Q-00-96397, Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-96401 where the proper penalty for the
same under Article 266-B35 of the RPC is reclusion perpetua. Incidentally, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
the same penalty which would have been imposable even if he were guilty of qualified rape pursuant to RA
9346.36
There is variance in the mode of the commission of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. Q-00- 96392 as
alleged in the Information and as proven during trial. Nevertheless, appellants conviction for rape by sexual
assault stands.
However, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392, we observe that the courts below overlooked a glaring variance
between what was alleged in the Information and what was proven during trial respecting the mode of
committing the offense. While the Information in this case clearly states that the crime was committed by
appellants insertion of his penis inside "AAAs" vagina, the latter solemnly testified on the witness stand that
appellant merely put his penis in her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant failed to register any objection that the
Information alleged a different mode of the commission of the crime of rape. As ruled in People v. Abello38 and
People v. Corpuz,39 a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails
to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. Thus,
appellants conviction for rape by sexual assault must be sustained, the variance notwithstanding.
Appellants conviction for Acts of Lasciviousness is likewise sustained.
In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402, appellant was charged with having inserted his finger inside "AAAs" vagina
under Article 336 (Acts of Lasciviousness) of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. The
elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 are:
1. That the offender commits any acts of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a) By using force or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c) When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
To obtain conviction for the same, the prosecution is also bound to establish the elements of sexual abuse under
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610, to wit:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2(H) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610 as "a
crime committed through the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with the intention to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, among others."40 In this case, it is undisputed that appellant committed
lascivious conduct when he smelled "AAAs" genital area and inserted his finger inside her vagina to gratify or
arouse his sexual desire. At the time this happened on May 8, 1993, "AAA" was barely eight years old as
established through her birth certificate. Without a doubt, all the afore-stated elements are obtaining in this
case. We thus likewise sustain the finding that appellant is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness as defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
The Penalty and Proper Indemnity

Having declared appellant guilty of simple rape only in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395,
Q-00-96397, Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-000-96401, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua under
Article 266-B of the RPC. We, therefore, sustain the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on the appellant not
by reason of RA 9346 but because that is the penalty provided for by the law for simple rape.
With regard to civil indemnity, we uphold the award of the same in line with prevailing jurisprudence that "civil
indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape."41 However, since the proper imposable penalty for
simple rape is reclusion perpetua, the amount of civil indemnity awarded to the private complainant should
correspondingly be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each count, in line with current jurisprudence.
In like manner, case law requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof
because from the nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to
such award. Thus, we find the award of moral damages by the CA in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of
rape proper. In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded in view of the
proven circumstance of minority.
In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392, rape by sexual assault in Article 266-A(2) of the RPC is punishable under Article
266-B by prision mayor, the duration of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The
latter article also provides that if the rape is committed with any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances
therein enumerated, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years.1wphi1
As ruled by the Court in previous cases, the 10 attendant circumstances partake the nature of special qualifying
circumstances. Under the first circumstance,42 the minority of the victim and the relationship of the offender to
the victim must both be alleged in the Information and duly proved clearly and indubitably as the crime itself.
They must be lumped together and their concurrence constitutes only one special qualifying circumstance.
However, in this particular case, while the special qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and proved,
the circumstance of relationship of "AAA" was not clearly established. Accordingly, appellant should be meted
the penalty of prision mayor. Nonetheless, in People v. Bayya,43 People v. Esperanza,44 People v. Hermocilla,45
and the recent case of People v. Soria,46 the Court held that when one of the qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the Information and proved by the
evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Conformably with such ruling, "AAAs" minority
may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty shall be within the full range of the penalty that is one degree lower than prision
mayor, that is prision correccional, the range of which shall be from six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty however shall be within
the maximum period of prision mayor in view of the proven aggravating circumstance of minority. Thus, an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as maximum, is imposed upon appellant.
"AAA" is likewise entitled to P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages for rape through
sexual assault. Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is also awarded pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.
In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402, appellant is found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610. The imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period since the victim was
under 12 years of age at the time the crime was committed. Since the minority of the victim is considered an
aggravating circumstance,47 the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period that ranges from sixteen (16)
years, five (5) months and ten (10) days to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is reclusion temporal in its minimum period with
a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, the proper
indeterminate penalty is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. "AAA is entitled to P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P15,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 30, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03163 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395, Q-00-96397, Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-0096401, appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ORDERED to pay "AAA" the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
an additional amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392, appellant is found GUILTY of Rape by Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2)
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum,
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is likewise ORDERED to pay "AAA" the amount of
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402, appellant is found GUILTY of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and is meted to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
as maximum. He is ORDERED to pay "AAA" the amounts ofP20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

8.) G.R. No. 181658

August 7, 2013

LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER,

vs.
CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision2 and the January 31, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August 15, 2003 and November 5,
2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion5 for the exclusion of a
private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for
Reconsideration6 of the said order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.
The facts follow:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated
with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting
Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings,
including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioners siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took over and
barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory employees
were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503
to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and
respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City.7
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretarys Certificate8 issued by Virginia Lee on even
date) caused the filing of a verified Petition9 for the Issuance of an Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 23223810 which covers a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC
Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said
court an Affidavit of Loss11 stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI, he had in his custody
and possession the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2)
that said owners copy of TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he discovered
such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found and is
already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the
payment of any obligation with any person, credit or banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support
of the foregoing averments during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order12 dated September 17, 1999, the RTC
granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.

Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others, that the
September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in
possession of the said Owners Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital
documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title because he
planned to mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its
September 17, 1999 Order.13
In a Complaint-Affidavit14 dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila, respondent alleged the
following:
1. I am a stockholder, Board Member, and duly elected treasurer of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), which
corporation is duly organized and existing under Philippine laws.
2. As duly elected treasurer of CHI, I was tasked with the custody and safekeeping of all vital financial documents
including bank accounts, securities, and land titles.
3. Among the land titles in my custody was the Owners Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
232238 registered in the name of CHI.
4. On June 14, 1999, Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, filed a VERIFIED PETITION for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of the aforementioned certificate claiming under oath that said duplicate copy was in his custody
but was lost.
xxxx
5. Paul Lee likewise executed an affidavit of loss stating the same fact of loss, which affidavit he used and
presented as exhibit "D".
xxxx
6. On August 18, 1999, Paul Lee testified under oath that TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost and misplaced
from his files.
xxxx
7. Paul Lee made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony,
as he perfectly knew that I was in possession of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee and even produced in open court the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila, dated November 12, 1999, x x x.
9. I and Paul Lee are involved in an intra-corporate dispute, which dispute is now pending with the SEC.
10. Paul Lee needed to have a new owners duplicate of the aforementioned TCT so that he could mortgage the
property covered thereby with the Planters Development Bank, even without my knowledge and consent as well
as the consent and knowledge of my brother Nixon Lee who is likewise a shareholder, board member and officer
of CHI.
11. If not for the timely discovery of the petition of Paul Lee, with his perjurious misrepresentation, a new
owners duplicate could have been issued.
x x x x15 (Italics supplied.)
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit16 to clarify that she was accusing petitioner of
perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the
contents in his petition filed with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his
possession but was lost; (2) by declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by
testifying under oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.
The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in the Review Resolution17
dated December 1, 2000 issued by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla, the recommendation to

dismiss the case was set aside. Thereafter, said City Prosecutor filed the Informations18 docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 352270-71 CR for perjury, punishable under Article 18319 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
against petitioner before the MeTC of Manila, Branch 28.
At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private prosecutor with the
consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. After the prosecutions presentation of
its first witness in the person of Atty. Ronaldo Viesca, Jr.,20 a lawyer from the Land Registration Authority,
petitioners counsel moved in open court that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from
participating in the case since perjury is a public offense. Said motion was vehemently opposed by Atty.
Macam.21 In its Order22 dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC gave both the defense and the prosecution the
opportunity to submit their motion and comment respectively as regards the issue raised by petitioners
counsel.
Complying with the MeTCs directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned Omnibus Motion23 asserting that in
the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of
any private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case.
Petitioner argued that perjury is a crime against public interest as provided under Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV,
Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where the offended party is the State alone. Petitioner posited
that there being no allegation of damage to private interests, a private prosecutor is not needed. On the other
hand, the Prosecution filed its Opposition24 to petitioners Omnibus Motion.
The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order25 dated August 15, 2003, as follows:
[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor,
however, an offended party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or by attorney, especially in cases of
offenses which cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. The only exception to this
rule is when the offended party waives his right to [file the] civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute
it after the termination of the case, in which case he loses his right to intervene upon the theory that he is
deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. And, in any event, whenever an offended party intervenes in
the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197).
Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in nature and those that can only be
prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. In either case, the law gives to the offended party the right to
intervene, personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of such right only when he waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute one. Such is not the situation in this case. The case at bar involves a public crime
and the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.26
The MeTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.27
Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition28 for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner prayed, among others, for the CA to enjoin
the MeTC and respondent from enforcing the MeTC Orders dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003, and
likewise to enjoin the MeTC and respondent from further allowing the private prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings below while the instant case is pending.
By Decision29 dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the presence of the private
prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal proceedings
of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the
perjury cases as she is the private complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved party.30 Reiterating the MeTCs
invocation of our ruling in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco31 as cited by former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz
D. Regalado in his Remedial Law Compendium,32 the CA ruled that "the offended party, who has neither
reserved, waived, nor instituted the civil action may intervene, and such right to intervene exists even when no
civil liability is involved."33
Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA declared that respondents property rights and
interests as the treasurer and a stockholder of CHI were disturbed and/or threatened by the alleged acts of
petitioner. Further, the CA opined that petitioners right to a fair trial is not violated because the presence of the
private prosecutor in these cases does not exclude the presence of the public prosecutor who remains to have
the prosecuting authority, subjecting the private prosecutor to his control and supervision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but the CA denied it under Resolution35 dated January 31, 2008.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME
OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT, AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO
INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION
WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.36
Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend any private party but
is a crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly administration of laws. He opines that
perjury is a felony where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender because there are no damages to be
compensated and that there is no private person injured by the crime.
Petitioner argues that the CAs invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by Justice Regalado in
his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a civil interest in the criminal case in order to
intervene through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner points out that said case involved
the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the crime
of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of
right, may still intervene because he was one of the offended parties.
Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent respondent in this case
despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any damage as she herself did not
allege nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any damage that
may be satisfied through restitution,37 reparation for the damage caused38 and indemnification for
consequential damages.39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper offended party that may
intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI. Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or any
private prosecutor for that matter be excluded from the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all
proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam intervened be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the
public prosecutor alone.40
On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the
perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a
stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that pursuant to
our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case.41
The petition has no merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very
person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that
when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act
or omission.43
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under
Section 16 of Rule 110:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in
the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as "the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,44
this Court rejected petitioners theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like
bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to
assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the
offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended
party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or
property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that
corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who
has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under
the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the
accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy,
subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHIs property and its
loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondents personal
credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board
Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the courtordered issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondents timely
discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court
declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private
crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by
counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene
in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of
intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.48
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent who is also the
corporations Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholders
Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondents
testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the
ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and
ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and
ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC
ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private prosecutors to actively
participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the
law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not
intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has
violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious
because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it
caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral
duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral

part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability
arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to
Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor
institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors
can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any
damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that
since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors,
who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed
and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from
the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it
adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if
there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries
suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a
separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil
liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through
the private prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed no grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos.
352270-71 CR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31, 2007 and the
Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
9.) G.R. No. 161075

July 15, 2013

RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question
to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This
is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
granted the writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove
M Dumayas, Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside
the assailed order issued on November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City

deferring the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon
his motion on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending between him and
the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans
totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage
constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its
option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an
additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was
really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property
had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had
been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for
injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the
P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document
against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutors Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of
a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an
information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00120), which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of
existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25,
2001, Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency
of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecutions
motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and upholding the RTCs questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be
held liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in
both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal
case show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer
Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the
dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondents culpability for the questioned
transactions is identical in all the proceedings.

As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the
criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed
of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case,
in view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory
power to take judicial notice of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to
prevent multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private
respondents arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712
was an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil
Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against
Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch
21 (Cavite criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the
RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consings motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712),
seeking to enjoin his arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19,
2001, and later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing petition for certiorari and setting
aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the
arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of
the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No.
148193, and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive
Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of
the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the
sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be
held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case
No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case
for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not
be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the
return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of
estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI
should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the
criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in
the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without
consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel
mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial

question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court
denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the
order of the trial court and ruled that:
the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the
fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate,
Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and
encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of
argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the
information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence
both the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil
Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders
referred to in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the
CA, citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present
a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming
that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that
would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the States motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193
was not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the
complainant in the Makati criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final
and executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied
upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be held personally
liable under a contract that had involved property belonging to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193,
and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the documents involved;
the issue of the respondents culpability for the questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings;
and it deals with the same parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment
on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders,
Inc. is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of
the Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and
March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is
hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through the second assailed
resolution of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.G.R. No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He

posits that in arriving at its amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case
(Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil action
would include the issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the
resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case
as an independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a
manner fully authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA
correctly took cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision that the
Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33
of the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of
Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any
prejudicial question, because the sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had
any obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapitals Makati civil case were not
intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such resolution; and that such
civil cases could be validly considered determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect
that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was an
independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do
considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his
case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This
was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had
acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale,
a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title."22 As such, the action was one that
could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states
as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of a criminal case.23 This was precisely the Courts thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in
the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case
with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus

Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were
undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil
Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case
that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consings being a mere agent of his mother who should
not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged to his mother as
principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive
Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of
the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the
sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be
held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case
No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case
for estafa through falsification of public document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
10.) G.R. No. 201860

January 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI,* AccusedAppellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a Decision1 dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and Alfemio Malogsi,
which affirmed with modifications the Decision2 dated January 31, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon, Branch 11 that convicted appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi
(deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi for the felony of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in Criminal Case No. 93-1272.
The genesis of this court case can be traced to the charge of murder against the appellants in the trial court via
an Information3 dated July 16, 1993. The accusatory portion of said indictment reads:
That on or about the 11th day of July 1993, at 7:30 in the evening more or less at barangay Salucot, municipality
of Talakag, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack,
assault and sho[o]t PIONIO YACAPIN, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that cause[d] his death
thereafter.
To the damage and prejudice [of] the heirs of the deceased PIONIO YACAPIN in such sum they are entitled under
the law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
On September 27, 1993, the appellants were arraigned. All four (4) accused pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the charge
leveled against them.4
The factual backdrop of this case as condensed in the trial courts assailed January 31, 2005 judgment and
adopted by the Court of Appeals in its similarly assailed May 16, 2011 Decision is reproduced hereunder:

Evidence for the Prosecution

Prosecutions first witness, Ronie Dacion, a 14-year old stepson of the victim, Pionio Yacapin, testified that on
July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi
and [A]lfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim,
Pionio Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon.
The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12-year old stepson of the victim,
corroborates the testimony of his older brother Ronie Dacion.
Prosecutions third witness, Nenita Yacapin, the widow of the victim, also corroborates the testimony of the
prosecutions first and second witness. The said witness further testified that she suffered civil and moral
damages [due to] the death of her husband.
Prosecutions fourth witness, Bernandino Signawan, testified that at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of July
11, 1993, Ronie and Edgar Dacion reached to [sic] his house and related to him that their stepfather was killed
by accused Eddie Malogsi, [A]lfemio Malogsi, Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao. Witness Signawan further
testified that on the following morning, he and the other people in Ticalaan including the barangay captain,
Ronie and Edgar Dacion returned to the house of the victim and found the latter already dead and in the
surrounding [area] of the house were recovered empty shells of firearms.
Prosecutions fifth witness, SPO2 Nestor Aznar, testified that he was the one who prepared the sketch of the hut
where the incident happened and further testified that the four accused were in the custody of the government
and in the following morning of the incident, he was at the scene of the crime and found in the yard of the hut
eight (8) garand empty shells caliber 30m[m].
The prosecution presented its sixth and last witness, Modesto Libyocan, who testified that on the evening of July
11, 1993, at Barangay Salucot, he saw in the house of the victim, Pionio Yacapin, lights caused by flashlights and
heard several gunshots from the house of the victim, and that the family left their house on that evening and
went to Ticalaan where they learned that Pionio Yacapin was killed in his house and that early the following
morning, July 12, 1993, he was with some companions, barangay officials of Ticalaan in the house of the victim
where they found him dead and sustaining gunshot wounds.
Evidence for the Defense
Defenses first witness, Police Inspector Vicente Armada, testified that on July 30, 1993, at 11:00 in the morning,
he conducted an examination for paraffin test on all four accused with the findings that they yielded negative
result x x x.
The defense presented Eddie Malogsi, one of the accused, as its second witness, who testified that on July 11,
1993 at 7:30 in the evening, he was at the farm of a certain Boyle together with his brother, [A]lfemio Malogsi,
one of the accused herein, being a worker of that farm. He further testified that on the said date and time, he
never fired a gun.
Defenses third witness, [A]lfemio Malogsi, another accused in this case, corroborates the testimony of his
brother and co-accused, Eddie Malogsi, that on the said date and time above-mentioned, he was at the farm of
a certain Boyle with his brother and that they heard several gunshots. He further testified that he never owned a
garand rifle.
Another accused, Antonio Sulindao, defenses fourth witness, testified that on the date and time abovementioned, he was at Salucot together with his family and at 7:30 x x x in the evening, he heard some gun shots.
He further testified among others, that he has no grudge x x x with the victim prior to the incident.
The testimony of defenses fifth witness, Fernandez Saplina, *was to+ establish the defense of denial and alibi in
so far as accused Marcelino Dadao, that on the whole evening of July 11, 1993, accused Marcelino Dadao was all
the time at his house in San Fernandez, Salucot, Talacag, Bukidnon, and there was no occasion that said accused
went outside or left his house on the said date and time. The said witness further testified that he visited the
accused at the municipal jail of Talakag, Bukidnon, where he was detained for having been the suspect in the
killing of Pionio Yacapin.
The defense presented its sixth witness, Camilo Dumalig, who corroborates the testimony of Fernandez Saplina
to the effect that accused Marcelino Dadao has been residing at San Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon at
the time of the incident on July 11, 1993 which place is about 7 kilometers from the place of the incident.

Defenses seventh witness, Venancio Payonda, father-in-law of accused Antonio Sulindao, testified that the
latter was in his house the whole day of July 11, 1993.
The defense presented as its last witness, accused Marcelino Dadao, who testified that three (3) months prior to
July 11, 1993, he had been staying at the house of one Fernandez Saplina at Sitio San Fernandez, Salucot,
Talakag, Bukidnon, which is about 7 kilometers away from the house of the victim. He further testified that on
July 11, 1993, he did not leave the house of Fernandez Saplina until the following morning.5
After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin. The assailed January 31, 2005 Decision disposed of the case in
this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused, EDDIE MALOGSI, [A]LFEMIO MALOGSI, ANTONIO
SULINDAO and MARCELINO DADAO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the said four accused are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and are ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, the amount of
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as moral damages and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
as exemplary damages and to pay the cost of the suit. Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 292, dated January 20, 1992, the bailbonds of all four accused are hereby ordered cancelled and the latter are
ordered detained, pending resolution of any Appeal that may be pursued in this case.6
Appellants elevated their case to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court
acted on a Manifestation filed by Rogelio Tampil, bondsman for Eddie Malogsi, who sought the cancellation of
the memorandum of encumbrance that was reflected in his land title (Original Certificate of Title No. P-13825,
Entry No. 165683) for the reason that Eddie Malogsi had already died on August 25, 2003. Thus, on February 11,
2008, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting Tampils request.7 Subsequently, after considering the
pleadings and memoranda of the parties, the Court of Appeals issued its May 16, 2011 Decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification the
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded in addition to the moral
and exemplary damages already awarded by the lower court.8
Hence, appellants, through counsel, seek final recourse with the Court and reiterate the following assignment of
errors from their Appellants Brief filed with the Court of Appeals:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.9
The foregoing arguments were later on amplified by appellants Supplemental Brief.10
Appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution were afflicted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus, making them of
doubtful veracity. Furthermore, appellants faulted the trial court for disbelieving their alibis and for disregarding
the fact that the paraffin test which all of them were subjected to produced a negative result. Appellants also
underscored the fact that they did not take flight despite the knowledge that they were made suspects in the
murder of Pionio Yacapin. Lastly, appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength should not have been appreciated as it was not alleged in the criminal information filed against them.
The petition is without merit.

In fine, the pivotal issue raised by appellants in questioning the validity of their conviction for the crime of
murder is whether or not the eyewitness testimonies presented by the prosecution, specifically that of the two
stepsons (Ronie and Edgar Dacion) and the widow (Nenita Yacapin) of the deceased victim, Pionio Yacapin, are
credible enough to be worthy of belief.
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question is best left to the sound
judgment of the trial court and that, absent any misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, the
findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In People v. De la Rosa,11 we yet again expounded on this
principle in this wise:
[T]he issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of [the] witness, which is best addressed by the
trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court
on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. x x x.
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated
by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.12 In the case at bar, no imputation of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses was ever
made by appellants.
Furthermore, appellants contend that the prosecution witnesses made inconsistent and improbable statements
in court which supposedly impair their credibility, such as whether or not the stepsons of the victim left for
Ticalaan together to report the incident, whether the accused were still firing at the victim when they left or not,
and whether or not the accused went after the stepsons after shooting the victim. We have reviewed the
relevant portions of the transcripts pointed out by the appellants and have confidently arrived at the conclusion
that these are matters involving minor inconsistencies pertaining to details of immaterial nature that do not
tend to diminish the probative value of the testimonies at issue. We elucidated on this subject in Avelino v.
People,13 to wit:
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of a given
incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative
value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material
and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness. (Emphasis omitted.)
Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details, Ronie, Edgar and Nenita positively identified
appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly crime of murder committed on the victim which they
categorically and consistently claimed to have personally witnessed.
In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the defense of alibi which
necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive
identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.14 Hence, it
must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.15
An examination of the record would indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a
corroborating witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by a certain Boyle on the
date and time of Pionio Yacapins murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the
respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the
disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence.
With regard to appellants assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were conducted on their
persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only declare that such a statement is
misguided considering that it has been established in jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof
that a person has not fired a gun.16 It should also be noted that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and
Alfemio Malogsi held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao
and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter two tested
negative for powder burns because they were never accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence
on record has established that all four accused shared a community of criminal design. By their concerted
action, it is evident that they conspired with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the

same criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which
delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.
In People v. Nelmida,17 we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this
manner:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit
the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made
criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the
agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or
inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As
such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability,
because the act of one is the act of all. (Citation and emphasis omitted.)
As to appellants argument that their act of bravely reporting to the police station to answer the serious charge
of murder against them instead of fleeing militates against a finding of any criminal liability on their part
especially in light of the dubious evidence presented by the prosecution, we can only dismiss this as a hollow
line of reasoning considering that human experience as observed in jurisprudence instructs us that non-flight
does not necessarily connote innocence. Consequently, we have held:
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even
erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee a circumstance strongly
illustrative of guilt while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity,
thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community.18
Contrary to appellants claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was used by the
trial court to qualify the act of killing committed by appellants to murder despite it not having been alleged in
the criminal information filed against them, the text of the assailed January 31, 2005 Decision of the trial court
clearly shows that, even though abuse of superior strength was discussed as present in the commission of the
crime, it was not appreciated as either a qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery, which was alleged in the
information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to murder. This is proper considering
that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or
aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.19
Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.20 Furthermore, we have also held that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape.21 In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried
all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. We quote with approval the following discussion of the Court of
Appeals on this matter, to wit:
Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution.1wphi1 The Court notes,
in particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was making a fire in the
kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the bamboo split walling of their house.
Exhibit "B", the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel, shows the relative
location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. The chart indicates that the victim was shot from
behind. Clearly, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.22
(Citations omitted.)
After reviewing the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
we declare that the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellants is correct and should be
upheld. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.23
Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the following
may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages;

(3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.24
Thus, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.0025 is proper. Likewise, the award of temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of P25,000.0026 is warranted considering that the death of
the victim definitely caused his heirs some expenses for his wake and burial though they were not able to
present proof.
However, we must modify the amounts of moral and exemplary damages already awarded in order to conform
to existing jurisprudence. Therefore, the exemplary damages awarded should be increased from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00.27 Moreover, there being no aggravating circumstance present in this case, the award of moral
damages in the amount of P75,000.00 should be decreased to P50,000.00.28 Lastly, the interest rate of 6% per
annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this ruling until fully paid.29
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the effect of the death of Eddie Malogsi during the
pendency of this case. Considering that no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his
death, whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that he
did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy, our ruling in People v. Bayotas.30 Therefore, the
present criminal case should be dismissed with respect only to the deceased Eddie Malogsi.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 00364 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The amount of exemplary damages to be paid by appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio
Malogsi is increased from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
(2) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio
Malogsi is decreased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
(3) Appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi are ordered to pay the private offended
party interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment; and
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-1272 is DISMISSED with respect to Eddie Malogsi in view of his death during the
pendency of this case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
11.) G.R. No. 166836

September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS,
STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R.
AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision
lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution
for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The
administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on nondelivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty.

Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque, containing a
total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied
in three separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully
delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565
square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel
Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under
the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989
pursuant to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed
a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City (OCP Las Pias) charging respondent
directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39,
both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No.
REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent directors and officers of BF Homes
refuted San Miguel Properties assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties claim was not legally
demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his
having been replaced as BF Homes rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale
conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to
the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all
claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free
from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and
(e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily
stripping the OCP Las Pias of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Pias,8 citing
the pendency of BF Homes receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the
motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes receivership on September 12,
2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes comment/opposition
coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the intervening termination of
the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Pias rendered its resolution,10 dismissing San Miguel Properties criminal
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a
receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a
prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to
administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents
for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Pias denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration filed on
November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery
of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendains
actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the
HLURB directing it to deliver the titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pias to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the
DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor
concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the
Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where the

HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in
question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled that the
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This is
reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29,
1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving
the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said
transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles.
In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall
have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration.13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJs resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their
appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183
presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008,14 the CA dismissed San
Miguel Properties petition, holding and ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally applies
to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an
issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which,
consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the rule on
prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial question
when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of private
respondents building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was
considered a prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding
of a plebiscite on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts can
suspend action in one case pending determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he applied the rule
on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale
transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported criminal
culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the
titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioners theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the
criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume
that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and
contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-delivery of

certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government as
represented by herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under
no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient
evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The
Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005.16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED
PETITIONERS CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO
INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:
THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS
MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME
PER ITS DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES, INC.".
A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT
TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL
DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.
IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE
LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT
CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NONDELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURBS RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.
NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONERS CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17
It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and damages that
San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to
suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendains authority to enter into the
transactions in BF Homes behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the
determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiters decision,
holding that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other
administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of the
administrative proceeding in the interest of good order.18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), arguing that
the HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB Boards
ruling, holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree (PD)
957 "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective."

As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as successor agency
of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344, the real estate
trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases "involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman," the HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and apply
contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever
appropriate."
Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURBs decision to await for some forum to decide if ever one is
forthcoming the issue on the authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves
the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the respective position papers
and the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the
usual dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and
applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the
finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions.19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising
as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty.
Orendains authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes behalf, and rule on
the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly suspended
the proceedings until the SEC resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.
The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had
jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties complaint. It affirmed the OPs decision and ordered the remand of the
case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within the HLURBs
competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:
[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from
contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision
developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondents complaint because it pertains to matters within the
HLURBs competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.
While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition of
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is to
remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence.21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San Miguel
Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for
reason of a prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs
could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
1.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial
question BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar

or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the
prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section
2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an
action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the
action was exclusive and original.25
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested
on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the
issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution
of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination
of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific
form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.26
Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should
not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As
presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of
Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to
reciprocal obligations, such that a partys breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that
entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative
remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or
the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances.
Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the
procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of
violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or
not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did
not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the
SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence
of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of
evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on

the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a noncriminal suit.30
2.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court
of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in
nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of
these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the
judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such
agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation
of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function
exercisable only by the regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special
competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the
courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief
must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not
call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the
competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed
within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute.
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative
body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential
to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is
proper.33
3.
Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted
It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes directors and officers by
the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act
or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an
absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed,
the procedural law must always be given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its application.35
Hence, a literal application of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application
would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a
reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action
for specific performance or the criminal action.1wphi1 It contends that the defense of a prejudicial question
arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise
the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought
not to distinguish.36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
12.) G.R. No. 190569

April 25, 2012

P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner,

vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman; BERNABE D. DUSABAN,
Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo; EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy. Capt., Brgy. Lanjagan,
Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This case pertains to the criminal charge filed by Private Inspector Ariel S. Artillero (petitioner) against Barangay
Captain Edito Aguillon (Aguillon) for violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 18661 as amended by Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 8249.
Petitioner is the Chief of Police of the Municipal Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Ajuy, Iloilo.2
According to him, on 6 August 2008, at about 6:45 in the evening, the municipal station received information
that successive gun fires had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy Iloilo. Thus, petitioner, together with Police
Inspector Idel Hermoso (Hermoso), and Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Arial Lanaque (Lanaque), immediately went
to the area to investigate.3
Upon arriving, they saw Paquito Panisales, Jr. (Paquito)4 standing beside the road, wearing a black sweat shirt
with a "Barangay Tanod" print.5 They asked Paquito if he had heard the alleged gunshots, but he answered in
the negative.
Petitioner, Hermoso, and Lanaque decided to investigate further, but before they could proceed, they saw that
Paquito had "turned his back from us that seems like bragging his firearm to us flagrantly displayed/tucked in his
waist whom we observed to be under the influence of intoxicating odor."6 Then, they frisked him to "verify the
firearm and its supporting documents."7 Paquito then presented his Firearm License Card and a Permit to Carry
Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR).
Thereafter, they spotted two persons walking towards them, wobbling and visibly drunk. They further noticed
that one of them, Aguillon, was openly carrying a rifle, and that its barrel touched the concrete road at times.8
Petitioner and Hermoso disarmed Aguillon. The rifle was a Caliber 5.56 M16 rifle with Serial Number 101365 and
with 20 live ammunitions in its magazine.
According to petitioner and Hermoso, although Aguillon was able to present his Firearm License Card, he was
not able to present a PTCFOR.
Petitioner arrested Paquito, Aguillon and his companion Aldan Padilla, and brought them to the Ajuy Municipal
Police Station.9
Paquito was released on the same night, because he was deemed to have been able to comply with the
requirements to possess and carry firearm.10 Thereafter, Aguillon was detained at the police station, but was
released from custody the next day, 7 August 2008, after he posted a cash bond in the amount of P 80,000. The
present Petition does not state under what circumstances or when Padilla was released.
On 12 August 2008, petitioner and Hermoso executed a Joint Affidavit11 alleging the foregoing facts in support
of the filing of a case for illegal possession of firearm against Aguillon. Petitioner also endorsed the filing of a
Complaint against Aguillon through a letter12 sent to the Provincial Prosecutor on 12 August 2008.
For his part, Aguillon executed an Affidavit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully arrested and detained him
for illegal possession of firearm, even though the former had every right to carry the rifle as evidenced by the
license he had surrendered to petitioner. Aguillon further claims that he was duly authorized by law to carry his
firearm within his barangay. 13
According to petitioner, he never received a copy of the Counter-Affidavit Aguillon had filed and was thus unable
to give the necessary reply.14

In a Resolution15 dated 10 September 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City recommended
the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo P. Camacho (Asst.
Prosecutor) found that there was no sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that Aguillon was
probably guilty of the offense charged. The Asst. Prosecutor also recommended that the rifle, which was then
under the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory, be returned to Aguillon. Petitioner claims that he never
received a copy of this Resolution.
Thereafter, Provincial Prosecutor Bernabe D. Dusaban (Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban) forwarded to the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman the 10 September 2008 Resolution recommending the approval thereof.16
In a Resolution17 dated 17 February 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro), approved the recommendation of Provincial Prosectuor
Dusaban to dismiss the case. It ruled that the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the crime
of illegal possession of firearm since he has a license for his rifle. Petitioner claims that he never received a copy
of this Resolution either.18
On 13 April 2009, Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban received a letter from petitioner requesting a copy of the
following documents:
1. Copy of the Referral letter and the resolution if there is any which was the subject of the said referral to the
Office of the Ombudsman, Iloilo City; and
2. Copy of the counter affidavit of respondent, Edito Aguillon and/or his witnesses considering that I was not
furnished a copy of the pleadings filed by said respondent.19
On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR)20 of the 17 February 2009 Resolution, but
it was denied through an Order dated 23 July 2009.21 Thus, on 8 December 2009, he filed the present Petition
for Certiorari22 via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
According to petitioner, he was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of Aguillons
Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutors 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the 17 February 2009 Resolution of
the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner also argues that public respondents act of dismissing the criminal
Complaint against Aguillon, based solely on insufficiency of evidence, was contrary to the provisions of P.D. 1866
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).23 He thus claims that the assailed Resolutions were issued
"contrary to law, and/or jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."24
The present Petition contains the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, premises considered petitioner most respectfully prays:
1. That this Petition for Certiorari be given due course;
2. That a Decision be rendered granting the petition by issuing the following:
a. Writ of Certiorari nullifying and setting aside the Order dated July 23, 2009 and dated February 17, 2009 both
of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB V-08-0406-J and the Resolution dated September 10, 2008 of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo in I.S. No. 2008-1281 (Annexes A, C and D, respectively);
b. To reverse and set aside said Orders and Resolution (Annexes A, C and D, respectively) finding PROBABLE
CAUSE of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294 and other applicable
laws and to direct the immediate filing of the information in Court against private respondent EDITO AGUILLON.
Such other relief just and equitable are likewise prayed for.25 (Emphasis in the original.)
In his Comment,26 Aguillon submits that the present Petition should not be given due course based on the
following grounds:
a. The Deputy Ombudsman found that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution for violation
of P.D. No. 1866 as amended;
b. The present Petition is "frivolous and manifestly prosecuted for delay;"27

c. The allegations raised are too unsubstantial to merit consideration, because "Petitioner failed to specifically
allege the manner in which the alleged Grave Abuse was committed by Respondent Deputy Ombudsman;"28
and
d. The Deputy Ombudsmans findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioner claims that Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban should have given him a copy of Aguillons Counteraffidavit. In support of this claim, petitioner cites Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which reads:
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as
provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The
respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
Petitioner faults the Asst. Prosecutor and the Office of the Ombudsman for supposedly committing grave abuse
of discretion when they failed to send him a copy of the 10 September 2008 and 17 February 2009 Resolutions.
A perusal of the records reveal that in both the 10 September 2008 and 17 February 2009 Resolutions, the PNP
Crime Laboratory and petitioner were included in the list of those who were furnished copies of the foregoing
Resolutions.29 Even though his name was listed in the "copy furnished" section, petitioner never signed to
signify receipt thereof. Thus, none of herein respondents raise this fact as a defense. In fact, they do not even
deny the allegation of petitioner that he never received a copy of these documents.
Aguillon does not deny that he never sent a copy of his counter-affidavit to petitioner. For his part, Provincial
Prosecutor Dusaban explained in his Comment,30 that he was not able to give petitioner a copy of Aguillons
Counter-affidavit and the 10 September 2008 Resolution, because "when petitioner was asking for them, the
record of the case, including the subject Resolution, was sent to the Office of the Ombudsman for the required
approval."31
As further proof that petitioner was not sent a copy of the 10 September 2008 Resolution, it can be seen from
the document itself that one Atty. Jehiel Cosa signed in a "care of" capacity to signify his receipt thereof on
behalf of petitioner, only on 23 June 2009 or after the latters 12 April 2009 letter-request to Provincial
Prosecutor Dusaban.
Nevertheless, the provincial prosecutor is of the opinion that petitioner was never deprived of his due process
rights, to wit:
8. Even granting that private respondent Edito Aguillion failed to furnish the petitioner with a copy of his
counter-affidavit as required of him by the Rules, petitioner was never deprived of anything. As aptly said by the
Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman in its Order dated 23 July 2009, "Complainant added that he was never
furnished copies of the Counter-Affidavit of respondent nor of the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Posecutor, Iloilo City."
"Anent the claim of the complainant that he was not furnished with a copy of the Resolution dated 10
September 2008 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Iloilo City, said Resolution did not attain finality until
approved by the Office of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, complainant was not deprived of due process, he can
still avail to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which he did, to refute respondents defense."32
We agree.
Petitioner insists that Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, was created "in order
not to deprive party litigants of their basic constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them."33
Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro contradicts the claim of petitioner and argues that the latter was not deprived of
due process, just because he was not able to file his Reply to the Counter-affidavit. The constitutional right to
due process according to the Deputy Ombudsman, is guaranteed to the accused, and not to the complainant.34
Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal
offense without due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.35 This is a right that cannot be invoked by
petitioner, because he is not the accused in this case.

The law is vigilant in protecting the rights of an accused. Yet, notwithstanding the primacy put on the rights of an
accused in a criminal case, even they cannot claim unbridled rights in Preliminary Investigations. In Lozada v.
Hernandez,36 we explained the nature of a Preliminary Investigation in relation to the rights of an accused, to
wit:
It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part thereof but is
merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. (U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209; People vs.
Badilla, 48 Phil. 716). The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution.
At most, it is statutory. (II Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 673). And rights conferred upon accused persons
to participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which
such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of law". (U.S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122).37
It is therefore clear that because a preliminary investigation is not a proper trial, the rights of parties therein
depend on the rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights they believe they
are entitled to or those that may be derived from the phrase "due process of law."
A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a Replythis right should be
granted to him by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or
requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit. To illustrate the
non-mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the
prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz:
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten
(10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban correctly claims that it is discretionary on his part to require or allow the filing or
submission of reply-affidavits.38
Furthermore, we agree with Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban that there was no need to send a copy of the 10
September 2008 Resolution to petitioner, since it did not attain finality until it was approved by the Office of the
Ombudsman. It must be noted that the rules do not state that petitioner, as complainant, was entitled to a copy
of this recommendation. The only obligation of the prosecutor, as detailed in Section 4 of Rule 112, was to
forward the record of the case to the proper officer within five days from the issuance of his Resolution, to wit:
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant
and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he
shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days
from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy.
Even though petitioner was indeed entitled to receive a copy of the Counter-affidavit filed by Aguillon, whatever
procedural defects this case suffered from in its initial stages were cured when the former filed an MR. In fact,
all of the supposed defenses of petitioner in this case have already been raised in his MR and adequately
considered and acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."39 We have said that
where a party has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latters motion for reconsideration there
is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.40

At this point, this Court finds it important to stress that even though the filing of the MR cured whatever
procedural defect may have been present in this case, this does not change the fact that Provincial Prosecutor
Dusaban had the duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillons Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, grants a complainant this right, and the Provincial Prosecutor has the duty
to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in the cases presented before it. That the
requirements of due process are deemed complied with in the present case because of the filing of an MR by
Complainant was simply a fortunate turn of events for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
It is submitted by petitioner that in dismissing Aguillons Complaint, public respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion by failing to consider Memorandum Circular No. 2000-016, which was supposedly the IRR issued by
the PNP for P.D. 1866.41
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court.
The original IRR42 of P.D. 1866 was issued by then Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Fidel V. Ramos on 28 October 1983. The IRR provides that, except when specifically authorized by the
Chief of Constabulary, lawful holders of firearms are prohibited from carrying them outside their residences, to
wit:
SECTION 3. Authority of Private Individuals to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence.
a. As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration
or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence.
b. However, the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such
conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearm outside of residence.
c. Except as otherwise provided in Secs. 4 and 5 hereof, the carrying of firearm outside of residence or official
station in pursuance of an official mission or duty shall have the prior approval of the Chief of Constabulary.
By virtue of R.A. 6975,43 the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary. Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded
the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing authority.44
On 31 January 2003, PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane issued Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the
Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence (Guidelines). In these Guidelines, the PNP Chief revoked all PTCFOR
previously issued, thereby prohibiting holders of licensed firearms from carrying these outside their residences,
to wit:
4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:
a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may reapply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed.
b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms outside
their residence except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by competent
authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall pertain only to organic and
regular employees.
Section 4 of the IRR lists the following persons as those authorized to carry their duty-issued firearms outside
their residences, even without a PTCFOR, whenever they are on duty:
SECTION 4. Authority of Personnel of Certain Civilian Government Entities and Guards of Private Security
Agencies, Company Guard Forces and Government Guard Forces to Carry Firearms. The personnel of the
following civilian agencies commanding guards of private security agencies, company guard forces and
government guard forces are authorized to carry their duty issued firearms whenever they are on duty detail
subject to the specific guidelines provided in Sec. 6 hereof:
a. Guards of the National Bureau of Prisons, Provincial and City Jails;
b. Members of the Bureau of Customs Police, Philippine Ports Authority Security Force, and Export Processing
Zones Authority Police Force; and x
c. Guards of private security agencies, company guard forces, and government guard forces.

Section 5 of the guidelines, on the other hand, enumerates persons who have the authority to carry firearms
outside their residences, viz:
5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence.
a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that the persons and security
of those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and profession are
under imminent danger.
b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their respective agencies so
authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the
duration of the official mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10) days.
c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security agencies so authorized
pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration.
d. Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice
and competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded with ammunition and secured
in an appropriate box or case detached from the person.
e. Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps.
It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not one of those authorized to carry firearms
outside their residences unless armed with the appropriate PTCFOR under the Guidelines.45
However, we find merit in respondents contention that the authority of Aguillon to carry his firearm outside his
residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the authority given
to him by Local Government Code (LGC).
In People v. Monton,46 the house of Mariano Montonthe Barrio Captain of Bacao, General Trias, Cavitewas
raided, and an automatic carbine with one long magazine containing several rounds of ammunition was found
hidden under a pillow covered with a mat. He was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm, but
this Court acquitted him on the basis of Section 88(3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337(B.P. 337), the LGC of 1983,
which reads:
In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry
the necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction subject to existing rules and regulations on the
possession and carrying of firearms.
Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, repealed B.P. 337. It retained the foregoing provision as reflected in its
Section 389 (b), viz:
CHAPTER 3 - THE PUNONG BARANGAY
SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and
carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations.
Provincial Prosecutor Dusabans standpoint on this matter is correct. All the guidelines and rules cited in the
instant Petition "refers to civilian agents, private security guards, company guard forces and government guard
forces." These rules and guidelines should not be applied to Aguillon, as he is neither an agent nor a guard. As
barangay captain, he is the head of a local government unit; as such, his powers and responsibilities are properly
outlined in the LGC. This law specifically gives him, by virtue of his position, the authority to carry the necessary
firearm within his territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner does not deny that when he found Aguillon "openly carrying
a rifle," the latter was within his territorial jurisdiction as the captain of the barangay.
In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, this Court will give credence to the finding and determination
of probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary investigation.47

This Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's
investigatory powers.48 It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in
order to warrant this Courts reversal of the Ombudsmans findings.49 This, petitioner has failed to do.
The Court hereby rules that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in finding that there was no probable cause to hold respondent Aguillon for trial.
The Dissent contends that probable cause was already established by facts of this case, which show that Aguillon
was found carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence without a PTCFOR. Thus, Deputy Ombudsman
Casimiro committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal Complaint. However, even though
Aguillon did not possess a PTCFOR, he had the "legal authority" to carry his firearm outside his residence, as
required by P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294. This authority was granted to him by Section 389 (b) of the LGC
of 1991, which specifically carved out an exception to P.D. 1866.
Following the suggestion of the Dissent, prosecutors have the authority to disregard existing exemptions, as long
as the requirements of the general rule apply. This should not be the case. Although the Dissent correctly
declared that the prosecutor cannot peremptorily apply a statutory exception without weighing it against the
facts and evidence before him, we find that the facts of the case prove that there is no probable cause to charge
Aguillon with the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
In interpreting Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, the Dissent found that the factual circumstances of the
present case show that the conditions set forth in the law have not been met. Thus, the exemption should not
apply.
Contrary to the allegation of the dissent, there is no question as to the fact that Aguillon was within his
territorial jurisdiction when he was found in possession of his rifle.
The authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their territorial jurisdiction is
necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within the barangays. Owing to the similar
functions, that is, to keep peace and order, this Court deems that, like police officers, punong barangays have a
duty as a peace officer that must be discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer, a barangay captain may be
called by his constituents, at any time, to assist in maintaining the peace and security of his barangay.50 As long
as Aguillon is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong barangayto maintain
peace and order.
As to the last phrase in Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, stating that the exception it carved out is subject to
"appropriate rules and regulations," suffice it to say that although P.D. 1866 was not repealed, it was modified
by the LGC by specifically adding to the exceptions found in the former. Even the IRR of P.D. 1866 was modified
by Section 389 (b) of the LGC as the latter provision already existed when Congress enacted the LGC. Thus,
Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991 added to the list found in Section 3 of the IRR of P.D. 1866, which
enumerated the persons given the authority to carry firearms outside of residence without an issued permit.
The phrase "subject to appropriate rules and regulations" found in the LGC refers to those found in the IRR of
the LGC itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866 and not those that it has already amended.
Indeed, petitioners mere allegation does not establish the fact that Aguillon was drunk at the time of his
arrest.1wphi1 This Court, however, is alarmed at the idea that government officials, who are not only
particularly charged with the responsibility to maintain peace and order within their barangays but are also
given the authority to carry any form of firearm necessary to perform their duty, could be the very same person
who would put their barangays in danger by carelessly carrying high-powered firearms especially when they are
not in full control of their senses.
While this Court does not condone the acts of Aguillon, it cannot order the prosecutor to file a case against him
since there is no law that penalizes a local chief executive for imbibing liquor while carrying his firearm. Neither
is there any law that restricts the kind of firearms that punong barangays may carry in the performance of their
peace and order functions. Unfortunately, it also appears that the term "peace and order function" has not been
adequately defined by law or appropriate regulations.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
dated 10 September 2008, as well as the Resolution and the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 17
February 2009 and 23 July 2009, respectively.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for whatever appropriate action they may deem warranted by the statements in this Decision
regarding the adequacy of laws governing the carrying of firearms by local chief executives.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
13.) G.R. No. 188526

November 11, 2013

CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO., MING SENG CHINESE DRUGSTORE, XIANG JIAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, TEK
SAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, SIM SIM CHINESE DRUG STORE, BAN SHIONG TAY CHINESE DRUG STORE and/or
WILCENDO TAN MENDEZ, SHUANG YING CHINESE DRUGSTORE, and BACLARAN CHINESE DRUG STORE,
Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March
31, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88952 and the Resolution2 dated July 2, 2009, which denied
reconsideration thereof. The CA reversed the Order3 dated September 25, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 143, Makati City, quashing Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025,
05-042 and 05-043, and the Order4 dated March 7, 2007 denying reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style Worldwide Pharmacy,5 is the sole distributor
and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap as shown by
Certificate of Registration 4-2000-009881 issued to her by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) for a period of
ten years from August 24, 2003.6 On November 7, 2005, her representative, Ping Na Lau, (Ping) wrote a letter7
addressed to National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, through Atty. Jose Justo Yap and
Agent Joseph G. Furing (Agent Furing), requesting assistance for an investigation on several drugstores which
were selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the general appearance of their products.
Agent Furing was assigned to the case and he executed an affidavit8 stating that: he conducted his own
investigation, and on November 9 and 10, 2005, he, together with Junayd Esmael (Esmael), were able to buy
whitening soaps bearing the trademark "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" with corresponding receipts
from a list of drugstores which included herein petitioners Century Chinese Medicine Co., Min Seng Chinese
Drugstore, Xiang Jiang Chinese Drug Store, Tek San Chinese Drug Store, Sim Sim Chinese Drug Store, Ban Shiong
Tay Drugstore, Shuang Ying Chinese Drugstore, and Baclaran Chinese Drug Store; while conducting the
investigation and test buys, he was able to confirm Ping's complaint to be true as he personally saw commercial
quantities of whitening soap bearing the said trademarks being displayed and offered for sale at the said
drugstores; he and Esmael took the purchased items to the NBI, and Ping, as the authorized representative and
expert of Worldwide Pharmacy in determining counterfeit and unauthorized reproductions of its products,
personally examined the purchased samples, and issued a Certification9 dated November 18, 2005 wherein he
confirmed that, indeed, the whitening soaps bearing the trademarks "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF"
from the subject drugstores were counterfeit.
Esmael also executed an affidavit10 corroborating Agent Furing's statement. Ping's affidavit11 stated that upon
his personal examination of the whitening soaps purchased from petitioners bearing the subject trademark, he
found that the whitening soaps were different from the genuine quality of their original whitening soaps with
the trademarks "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" and certified that they were all counterfeit.
On November 21, 2005, Agent Furing applied for the issuance of search warrants before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 143, Makati City, against petitioners and other establishments for violations of Sections 168 and
155, both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines. Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition; while Section 155,
in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement.
On November 23, 2005, after conducting searching questions upon Agent Furing and his witnesses, the RTC
granted the applications and issued Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, and 05-038 for unfair competition
and Search Warrants Nos. 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042 and 05-043 for trademark infringement against
petitioners.

On December 5, 2005, Agent Furing filed his Consolidated Return of Search Warrants.12
On December 8, 2005, petitioners collectively filed their Motion to Quash13 the Search Warrants contending
that their issuances violated the rule against forum shopping; that Benjamin Yu (Yu) is the sole owner and
distributor of the product known as "TOP-GEL"; and there was a prejudicial question posed in Civil Case No. 0554747 entitled Zenna Chemical Industry v. Ling Na Lau, et al., pending in Branch 93 of the RTC of Quezon City,
which is a case filed by Yu against respondent for damages due to infringement of trademark/tradename, unfair
competition with prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
prohibitory injunction.
On January 9, 2006, respondent filed her Comment/Opposition14 thereto arguing the non-existence of forum
shopping; that Yu is not a party- respondent in these cases and the pendency of the civil case filed by him is
immaterial and irrelevant; and that Yu cannot be considered the sole owner and distributor of "TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF." The motion was then submitted for resolution in an Order dated January 30, 2006. During
the pendency of the case, respondent, on April 20, 2006, filed a Submission15 in relation to the Motion to Quash
attaching an Order16 dated March 21, 2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001 filed by respondent
against Yu, doing business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, proprietor of
South Ocean Chinese Drug Stores for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition and damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction. The Order approved therein the parties' Joint Motion To Approve Compromise
Agreement filed on March 8, 2006. We quote in its entirety the Order as follows:
The Compromise Agreement between the herein complainant and respondents provides as follows:
1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A
LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on August 24,
2003.
2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of Complainant as the
exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA
DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M" ISSUED " OVER THE
LETTER "CA") as registered under Registration No. 4-1996-109957 issued on November 17, 2000, as well as the
assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant of said mark for use on papaya whitening soap.
3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid but after having realized that
Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP GEL
T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid tradename
and trademark and further undertake not to manufacture, sell, distribute, and otherwise compete with
Complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening soap using or bearing a mark or name
identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of, the tradename and trademark TOP
GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.
4. Respondents further undertake to withdraw and/or dismiss their counterclaim and petition to cancel and/or
revoke Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued to Complainant. Respondents also further undertake to pull out
within 45 days from approval of the Compromise Agreement all their products bearing a mark or name identical
or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of, the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA &
MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, from the market nationwide.
5. Respondents finally agree and undertake to pay Complainant liquidated damages in the amount of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (Php500,000.00) PESOS for every breach or violation of any of the foregoing undertakings
which complainant may enforce by securing a writ of execution from this Office, under this case.
6. Complainant, on the other hand, agrees to waive all her claim for damages against Respondents as alleged in
her complaint filed in the Intellectual Property Office only.
7. The Parties hereby agree to submit this Compromise Agreement for Approval of this Office and pray for
issuance of a decision on the basis thereof.
Finding the Compromise Agreement to have been duly executed and signed by the parties and/or their
representatives/counsels and the terms and conditions thereof to be in conformity with the law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is
DISMISSED as all issues raised concerning herein parties have been rendered MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.17

On September 25, 2006, the RTC issued its Order18 sustaining the Motion to Quash the Search Warrants, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the issuance of the questioned search warrants were not supported by probable
cause, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED. Search warrants nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025,
05-042, 05-043 are ordered lifted and recalled.
The NBI Officers who effected the search warrants are hereby ordered to return the seized items to herein
respondents within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
So Ordered.19
In quashing the search warrants, the RTC applied the Rules on Search and Seizure for Civil Action in Infringement
of Intellectual Property Rights.20 It found the existence of a prejudicial question which was pending before
Branch 93 of RTC Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-54747, on the determination as to who between
respondent and Yu is the rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF; and there was also a case for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition filed by
respondent against Yu before the IPO which was pending at the time of the application for the search warrants.
It is clear, therefore, that at the time of the filing of the application for the search warrants, there is yet no
determination of the alleged right of respondent over the subject trademark/tradename. Also, the RTC found
that petitioners relied heavily on Yu's representation that he is the sole owner/distributor of the Top Gel
whitening soap, as the latter even presented Registration No. 4-1996-109957 from the IPO for a term of 20 years
from November 17, 2000 covering the same product. There too was the notarized certification from Zenna
Chemical Industry of Taiwan, owner of Top Gel MCA, with the caveat that the sale, production or representation
of any imitated products under its trademark and tradename shall be dealt with appropriate legal action.
The RTC further said that in the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or
not an offense exists to justify the issuance of a search warrant or the quashal of the one already issued. In this
case, respondent failed to prove the existence of probable cause, which warranted the quashal of the
questioned search warrants.
On November 13, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Release of Seized
Evidence.21
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order22 dated March 7, 2007.
Respondent then filed her appeal with the CA. After respondent filed her appellant's brief and petitioners their
appellee's brief, the case was submitted for decision.
On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the appeal filed
in this case and SETTING ASIDE the Order dated March 7, 2007 issued by Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati City in the case involving Search Warrants Nos. 05030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042, 05-043.23
In reversing the RTC's quashal of the search warrants, the CA found that the search warrants were applied for
and issued for violations of Sections 155 and 168, in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code
and that the applications for the search warrants were in anticipation of criminal actions which are to be
instituted against petitioners; thus, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable. It also ruled that
the basis for the applications for issuance of the search warrants on grounds of trademarks infringement and
unfair competition was the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; that respondent was the registered
owner of the said trademark, which gave her the right to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights
over it by seeking assistance from the NBI.
The CA did not agree with the RTC that there existed a prejudicial question, since Civil Case No. 05-54747 was
already dismissed on June 10, 2005, i.e., long before the search warrants subject of this appeal were applied for;
and that Yu's motion for reconsideration was denied on September 15, 2005 with no appeal having been filed
thereon as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued by the said court.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 2, 2009. Hence, this
petition filed by petitioners raising the issue that:

(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND HELD THAT THE LATTER APPLIED THE RULES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CIVIL
ACTIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.24
(B) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT BASED ITS RULING ON THE
ARGUMENT WHICH WAS BROUGHT UP FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RESPONDENT LING NA LAU'S APPELLANT'S
BRIEF.25
Petitioners contend that the products seized from their respective stores cannot be the subject of the search
warrants and seizure as those Top Gel products are not fruits of any crime, infringed product nor intended to be
used in any crime; that they are legitimate distributors who are authorized to sell the same, since those genuine
top gel products bore the original trademark/tradename of TOP GEL MCA, owned and distributed by Yu.
Petitioners also claim that despite the RTC's order to release the seized TOP GEL products, not one had been
returned; that one or two samples from each petitioners' drugstore would have sufficed in case there is a need
to present them in a criminal prosecution, and that confiscation of thousands of these products was an overkill.
Petitioners also argue that the issue that the RTC erred in applying the rules on search and seizure in
anticipation of a civil action was never raised in the RTC.
The issue for resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search
warrants.
We find no merit in the petition.
The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of Sections 155 and 168,
both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code
of the Philippines. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement; while Section 168,
in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition, to wit:
Sec 155. Remedies; Infringement. Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered
mark:
155.1 Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the
same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
While
Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.
xxxx
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the
following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are
contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to
influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the
actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the
public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any
vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
And
SEC. 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing
any of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Subsection 169.1
[False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].

Thus, we agree with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which provides for the Rules on the Issuance of the Search
and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, is not applicable in this case as the
search warrants were not applied based thereon, but in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of
intellectual property rights under RA 8293. It was established that respondent had asked the NBI for assistance
to conduct investigation and search warrant implementation for possible apprehension of several drugstore
owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his
affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing stated that "the
items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that are likely to be instituted."
Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies.
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs the issuance of the assailed Search Warrants, provides, to
wit:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. - A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with
the affidavits submitted.
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence
of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched."26 And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known
to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is
deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.27 The
determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.28 As implied by the words themselves, "probable
cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at
this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,29
not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.30
The RTC quashed the search warrants, saying that (1) there exists a prejudicial question pending before Branch
93 of the RTC of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-54747, i.e., the determination as to who between
respondent and Yu is the rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF; and there was also a case for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition filed by
respondent against Yu pending before the IPO, docketed as IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001; and (2) Yu's
representation that he is the sole distributor of the Top Gel whitening soap, as the latter even presented
Registration No. 4-1996-109957 issued by the IPO to Zenna Chemical Industry as the registered owner of the
trademark TOP GEL MCA & DEVICE MCA for a term of 20 years from November 17, 2000 covering the same
product.
We do not agree. We affirm the CA's reversal of the RTC Order quashing the search warrants.
The affidavits of NBI Agent Furing and his witnesses, Esmael and Ling, clearly showed that they are seeking
protection for the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF" registered to respondent under Certificate
of Registration 4-2000-009881 issued by the IPO on August 24, 2003, and no other. While petitioners claim that
the product they are distributing was owned by Yu with the trademark TOP GEL MCA and MCA DEVISE under
Certificate of Registration 4-1996-109957, it was different from the trademark TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A
LEAF subject of the application. We agree with the CA's finding in this wise:

x x x It bears stressing that the basis for the applications for issuances of the search warrants on grounds of
trademark infringement and unfair competition is the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Private
complainant-appellant was issued a Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881 of said trademark on August
24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office, and is thus considered the lawful holder of the said trademark.
Being the registrant and the holder of the same, private complainant-appellant had the authority to enforce and
protect her intellectual property rights over it. This prompted her to request for assistance from the agents of
the NBI, who thereafter conducted a series of investigation, test buys and inspection regarding the alleged
trademark infringement by herein respondents-appellees. Subsequently, Ping Na Lau, private complainantappellants representative, issued a certification with the finding that the examined goods were counterfeit. This
prompted the NBI agents to apply for the issuances of search warrants against the respondents-appellees. Said
applications for the search warrants were granted after by Judge Laguilles after examining under oath the
applicant Agent Furing of the NBI and his witnesses Ping Na Lau and Junayd R. Ismael.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the search warrants had been complied
with and that there is probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense were in the places to be searched. The offense pertains to the alleged
violations committed by respondents-appellees upon the intellectual property rights of herein private
complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF under Certificate of
Registration No. 4-2000-009881, issued on August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office.31
Notably, at the time the applications for the issuance of the search warrants were filed on November 21, 2005,
as the CA correctly found, Civil Case No. Q-05-54747, which the RTC found to be where a prejudicial question
was raised, was already dismissed on June 10, 2005,32 because of the pendency of a case involving the same
issues and parties before the IPO. Yu's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order33 dated September
15, 2005. In fact, a Certificate of Finality34 was issued by the RTC on January 4, 2007.
Moreover, the IPO case for trademark infringement and unfair competition and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction filed by respondent against Yu and Heidi Cua, docketed as IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001,
would not also be a basis for quashing the warrants.1avvphi1 In fact, prior to the applications for the issuance of
the assailed search warrants on November 21, 2005, the IPO had issued an Order35 dated October 20, 2005
granting a writ of preliminary injunction against Yu and Cua, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby issued against Respondent, Benjamin Yu, doing
business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, Proprietor of South Ocean Chinese
Drug Store, and their agents, representatives, dealers and distributors and all persons acting in their behalf, to
cease and desist using the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF" or any colorable imitation thereof on
Papaya whitening soaps they manufacture, sell, and/or offer for sale, and otherwise, from packing their Papaya
Whitening Soaps in boxes with the same general appearance as those of complainant's boxes within a period of
NINETY (90) DAYS, effective upon the receipt of respondent of the copy of the COMPLIANCE filed with this Office
by the Complainant stating that it has posted a CASH BOND in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Php100,000.00) together with the corresponding Official Receipt Number and date thereof. Consequently,
complainant is directed to inform this Office of actual date of receipt by Respondent of the aforementioned
COMPLIANCE.36
To inform the public of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, respondent's counsel had the
dispositive portion of the Order published in The Philippine Star newspaper on October 30, 2005.37 Thus, it was
clearly stated that Yu, doing business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing, his agents,
representatives, dealers and distributors and all persons acting in his behalf, were to cease and desist from using
the trademark "TOP GEL & DEVICE OF A LEAF" or any colorable imitation thereof on Papaya Whitening soaps
they manufacture, sell and/or offer for sale. Petitioners, who admitted having derived their TOP GEL products
from Yu, are, therefore, notified of such injunction and were enjoined from selling the same.
Notwithstanding, at the time of the application of the search warrants on November 21, 2005, and while the
injunction was in effect, petitioners were still selling the alleged counterfeit products bearing the trademark TOP
GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. There exists a probable cause for violation of respondent's intellectual property
rights, which entitles her as the registered owner of the trademark TOP GEL and DEVICE OF A LEAF to be
protected by the issuance of the search warrants.
More importantly, during the pendency of petitioners' motion to quash in the RTC, respondent submitted the
Order dated March 8, 2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001, where the writ of preliminary injunction
was earlier issued, approving the compromise agreement entered into by respondent with Yu and Cua where it
was stated, among others, that:

1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A
LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on August 24,
2003.
2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of Complainant as the
exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA
DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M" OVER THE LETTER
"CA") as registered under Registration No 4-1996-109957 issued on November 17, 2000, as well as the
assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant of said mark for use on papaya whitening soap.
3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid, but after having realized that
Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP GEL
T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid tradename
and trademark, and further undertake not to manufacture, sell and distribute and otherwise compete with
complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening soap using or bearing a mark or name
identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of the tradename and trademark TOP GEL
MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.38
Hence, it appears that there is no more controversy as to who is the rightful holder of the trademark TOP GEL
T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Therefore, respondent, as owner of such registered trademark has the right to the
issuance of the search warrants.
Anent petitioners' claim that one or two samples of the Top Gel products from each of them, instead of
confiscating thousands of the products, would have sufficed for the purpose of an anticipated criminal action,
citing our ruling in Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals,39 is not meritorious.
We do not agree.
The factual milieu of the two cases are different. In Summerville, the object of the violation of Summerville's
intellectual property rights, as assignee of Royal playing cards and Royal brand playing cards case, was limited to
the design of Summerville's Royal plastic container case which encased and wrapped the Crown brand playing
cards. In the application for the search warrant which the RTC subsequently issued, one of the items to be seized
were the Crown brand playing cards using the copyright plastic and Joker of Royal brand. Thus, numerous boxes
containing Crown playing cards were seized and upon the RTC's instruction were turned over to Summerville,
subject to the condition that the key to the said warehouse be turned over to the court sheriff. Respondents
moved for the quashal of the search warrant and for the return of the seized properties. The RTC partially
granted the motion by ordering the release of the seized Crown brand playing cards and the printing machines;
thus, only the Royal plastic container cases of the playing cards were left in the custody of Summerville. The CA
sustained the RTC order. On petition with us, we affirmed the CA. We found therein that the Crown brand
playing cards are not the subject of the offense as they are genuine and the Crown trademark was registered to
therein respondents names; that it was the design of the plastic container/case that is alleged to have been
utilized by respondents to deceive the public into believing that the Crown brand playing cards are the same as
those manufactured by Summerville. We then said that assuming that the Crown playing cards could be
considered subject of the offense, a sample or two are more than enough to retain should there have been a
need to examine them along with the plastic container/case; and that there was no need to hold the hundreds
of articles seized. We said so in the context that since what was in dispute was the design of the Royal plastic
cases/containers of playing cards and not the playing card per se, a small number of Crown brand playing cards
would suffice to examine them with the Royal plastic cases/containers. And the return of the playing cards
would better serve the purposes of justice and expediency. However, in this case, the object of the violation of
respondent's intellectual property right is the alleged counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya
whitening soap being sold by petitioners, so there is a need to confiscate all these articles to protect
respondent's right as the registered owner of such trademark.
Petitioners next contend that the CA's ruling on the applicability of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that the search
warrants were issued in anticipation of a criminal action was only based on respondent's claim which was only
brought for the first time in her appellant's brief.
We are not persuaded.
We find worth quoting respondent's argument addressing this issue in its Comment, thus:
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that the Rule correctly applicable to the subject search
warrants was Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners fault the appellate court for ruling that the Regional
Trial Court incorrectly applied the Rules on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual

Property Rights on the basis of an argument that private respondent brought up for the first time in her
Appellant's Brief.
A cursory perusal of the Appellant's Brief shows that the following issues/errors were raised, that: (1) the
Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that the "Rules on Search and Seizure for Infringement of Intellectual
Property Rights" apply to the search warrants at bar; (2) x x x.
It must be remembered that there was no trial on the merits to speak of in the trial court, and the matter of the
application of the wrong set of Rules only arose in the Order dated 25th September 2006 which sustained the
Motion to Quash. A thorough examination of the Appellee's Brief filed by petitioners (respondents-appellees in
the Court of Appeals) reveals, however, that petitioners NEVER assailed the first issue/error on the ground that
the same was raised for the first time on appeal. It is only now, after the appellate court rendered a Decision
and Resolution unfavorable to them, that petitioners questioned the alleged procedural error. Petitioners
should now be considered in estoppel to question the same.40
Indeed, perusing the appellee's (herein petitioners) brief filed with the CA, the matter of the non-applicability of
the rules on search and seizure in civil action for infringement of intellectual property rights was never objected
as being raised for the first time. On the contrary, petitioners had squarely faced respondent's argument in this
wise:
Appellant (herein respondent) contends that the rule (SC Adm. Memo 1-06, No. 02-1-06, Rule on Search and
Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights) does [not] apply to the search warrants
in the [case] at bar, for the reason that the search warrants themselves reveal that the same were applied for
and issued for violations of "Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293" and violations of "Section 168 in
relation to Section 170 of RA 8293," and that a perusal of the records would show that there is no mention of a
civil action or anticipation thereof, upon which the search warrants are applied for.
Appellees (herein petitioners) cannot agree with the contention of the appellant.1wphi1 Complainant NBI
Agent Joseph G. Furing, who applied for the search warrants, violated the very rule on search and seizure for
infringement of Intellectual Property Rights. The search warrants applied for by the complainants cannot be
considered a criminal action. There was no criminal case yet to speak of when complainants applied for issuance
of the search warrants. There is distinction here because the search applied for is civil in nature and no criminal
case had been filed. The complaint is an afterthought after the respondents-appellees filed their Motion to
Quash Search Warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24. The grounds enumerated in the rule
must be complied with in order to protect the constitutional mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life
liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law."
Clearly, the application of the search warrants for violation of unfair competition and infringement is in the
nature of a civil action.41
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated March 31, 2009 and the Resolution dated
July 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 88952, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
14.) G.R. No. 182130

June 19, 2013

IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA,
JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 182132
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, and IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE
EVANGELISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 assailing the January 11, 2008 Decision2
and March 13, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97863 which revoked the
December 11, 2006 Resolution4 and December 22, 2006 Amended Resolution5 (DOJ Resolutions) issued by then
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzalez (DOJ Secretary) directing the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City to file charges of Rape,6 in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 76107 (RA 7610), Serious
Illegal Detention8 and Forcible Abduction with Rape9 against respondents.
The Facts
As culled from the assailed CA decision, the diametrically-opposed versions of the relevant incidents in this case
are as follows:
A. Incidents of December 28, 2001
Petitioners alleged that at around midnight of December 28, 2001, respondent Gil Anthony Calianga (Gil) called
petitioner Iris Kristine Alberto (Iris), then sixteen (16) years old,10 informing her that he was at their garage with
some food and drinks. For fear of being scolded, Iris refused to see Gil. But due to his insistence, Iris finally went
out to meet Gil and thereafter, took the food and drinks which he brought. Eventually, while they were talking,
Iris felt weak and dizzy and thus, tried to return to her room. Gil assisted Iris and when they reached the room,
he laid her on the bed. A little later, Gil started kissing Iris which prompted her to scream. Consequently, Gil
covered Iris mouth with a pillow and soon after, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Before
leaving, Gil warned Iris not to tell anyone about what happened or else he would kill her.11
By way of rebuttal, respondents averred that Gil and Iris met at the Mormon Church in Muntinlupa City and
became sweethearts in 2001. They eventually developed an amorous physical relationship and on the evening of
December 28, 2001, secretly slept together for the first time in Iris own bedroom.12
B. Incidents of April 23 to 24, 2002
As for the second set of incidents, petitioners claimed that on April 23, 2002, Gil called Iris, then seventeen (17)
years old,13 telling her that he would pick her up for them to go to church in order to play volleyball. They met
at about 5:30 in the afternoon in South Green Heights and proceeded to Camella to meet Gils sister, respondent
Jessebel Calianga (Jessebel), and her friend, respondent Grace Evangelista (Grace). At around 6:30 in the
evening, Gil and Iris boarded a tricycle. At the outset, Iris thought they would be going to church for volleyball
practice; but instead, Gil, while poking a knife at Iris side, told her that they were headed to a different
destination. Eventually, they reached a McDonalds restaurant located in San Pedro, Laguna where they
transferred to a car driven by Graces common law husband. They then returned to Camella and stayed with a
relative of Grace where they had dinner. While having dinner, Iris overheard respondent Atty. Rodrigo Reyna
(Atty. Reyna) giving instructions to Jessebel to take Iris to Marikina City. When they finished their dinner, Atty.
Reyna called again and told Iris not to go out as her relatives were around the area, on board several cars. Iris
pleaded Gil to let her go, but her pleas were ignored. A little later, Jessebel and Grace led Gil and Iris to a tree
house where Gil forced her to enter a room. She tried to resist but he threatened to kill her if she did not
accede. Left with no option, Iris entered the room where Gil, holding her at knifepoint, succeeded in once again
having sexual intercourse with her.14
The following day, or on April 24, 2002, at around 6:00 in the morning, Atty. Reyna arrived and instructed Iris to
tell her relatives, who had been worriedly looking for her, that she voluntarily went with Gil; that she was
treated with kindness; and that everything that happened was to her own liking because of her love for Gil. Atty.
Reyna then asked Iris to go home but she refused because she did not know her way back. Because of Iris
refusal, Atty. Reyna called up her Auntie Vilma and Uncle Albert and agreed to meet at Chowking-Poblacion
where Iris was finally released to her grandfather, petitioner Benjamin Balois (Benjamin).15
In defense, respondents maintained that on April 23, 2002, Iris brother, Eldon Alberto (Eldon), caught Gil inside
Iris bedroom where he had spent the night. Fearing the consequences of having been caught, Gil and Iris eloped
and stayed at the house of Graces grandfather. When Benjamin realized that Iris was missing, he sought the
help of Atty. Reyna, since he was a family friend from their church. Iris relatives also suspected that she might
be with Gil after learning from the entries in her journal that Iris loved Gil very much. Coincidentally, Gil was the
nephew of Atty. Reynas wife and so they were hoping that Atty. Reyna would have some information as to Gils
whereabouts. Atty. Reyna and the Balois family searched together for Iris that night. In the course thereof, Atty.
Reyna called Jessebel and Grace to ask if they knew where Gil was. Both stated that they were in Marikina but
denied having any knowledge about Gils location. Later, the party tried to search Gils house as well as Graces
place (the latter being referred to as the "tree house"). However, both yielded negative results.

In the morning of April 24, 2002, Atty. Reyna proceeded to look for Grace and again asked where Gil and Iris
were. Eventually, Grace admitted that the two were at her grandfathers house, which was only around 30
minutes away from her place. They proceeded accordingly and there, found Iris and Gil who were both surprised
to see Atty. Reyna. Subsequently, Atty. Reyna asked Iris why she left home and she answered that it was
because of her brother Eldons warning that her family knew everything about her relationship with Gil. Atty.
Reyna confirmed the veracity of Eldons statement and went on to advise Iris to just tell the truth. Iris heeded
Atty. Reynas advice, allowing him to contact the Baloises and arrange for her return. As it turned out, they
agreed to meet at Chowking-Poblacion for such purpose.16
In view of the incidents that transpired on December 28, 2001 and April 23 to 24, 2002, Benjamin filed a criminal
complaint for Rape, Serious Illegal Detention and Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 against
Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa (Muntinlupa Pros.
Office), docketed as I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22.17
C. Incidents of June 23 to November 9, 2003
Finally, as for the third set of incidents, petitioners asserted that on June 23, 2003, Iris was abducted in front of
Assumption College. This time, Gil conspired with Atty. Reyna and respondent Arturo Calianga (Arturo), to take
Iris in order to prevent her from appearing at the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22 scheduled
on June 25, 2003. In the afternoon of the same day, Iris family brought Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER) agents to Arturos house. Upon their arrival, Grace told them that Gil left with some clothes
and that he and Iris eloped and would proceed to Cagayan de Oro City. Soon after the abduction on June 23,
2003, Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo started their psychological manipulation of Iris.18
On June 27, 2003, Gil, with the help of two men, brought Iris to Cagayan de Oro City and there, held her captive
in a small room with a small mat, near a pigpen. They controlled her movements, such as when she would eat,
sleep, bathe or use the toilet. Gil raped her almost every day even during her menstrual period and would beat
her up whenever she resisted. Also, Gil often told Iris that he would have her entire family killed by his Moslem
relatives.19
Disputing petitioners allegations, respondents denied that Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo abducted Iris and instead,
claimed that Gil and Iris eloped for the second time, after visiting the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City where Iris declared that the charges against respondents were all fabricated by her grandfather, Benjamin,
and that she wanted them dismissed. Respondents claimed that Iris was quite prepared during her second
elopement with Gil as she brought with her three bags containing several personal effects and other relevant
documents. Eventually, Iris family would discover that the reason for her elopement with Gil was because she
was being maltreated and physically abused by her grandfather, Benjamin. Moreover, Iris could no longer
stomach the lies Benjamin wanted her to say about Gil.20
Subsequently, Benjamin filed a second complaint against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
(Makati Pros. Office), docketed as I.S. No. 03-G-14072-75.21
On July 9, 2003, the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed the charges against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel
and Grace for Rape and Serious Illegal Detention in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22 for insufficiency of evidence.
However, having found that he had sexual intercourse with a minor, Gil was charged for Child Abuse.
Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against Gil.22
Determined to face the charges against him, Gil, together with Iris, returned from Cagayan de Oro City to Manila
where he posted bail for the Child Abuse case.23
On August 6, 2003, Iris executed an affidavit (August 6, 2003 affidavit), sworn before Makati Assistant City
Prosecutor George de Joya (Pros. de Joya), denying that she was kidnapped, detained or raped by Gil. She also
affirmed that she loved Gil and eloped with him.24
On August 13, 2003, Iris and Gil appeared together on the GMA-7 television networks Frontpage news segment
"Magkasintahan Pala" where Iris publicly declared that she loved Gil and that she went with him freely.25
On August 19, 2003, Iris appeared before the 9th Division of the CA in the hearing of the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Benjamin in view of her second elopement on June 23, 2003.26 During the said hearing, Iris
declared that she was never kidnapped, detained or raped and that she loved Gil who was her boyfriend since
December 2001. She also confirmed that she executed the August 6, 2003 affidavit before Pros. de Joya and that
she appeared in "Magkasintahan Pala" on August 13, 2003. She also testified that she visited the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa asking for the dismissal of the erroneous charges filed by Benjamin. When the CA

Justices asked with whom she wanted to go home, she said that she wanted to go with Gil and his family. She
added that she did not want her grandfather to visit her. Hence, in line with her decision during the foregoing
proceedings, Iris and Gil freely cohabited beginning August 19, 2003 and were seen in public, freely roaming
around the city. They regularly went to church together, underwent counseling and even planned to have their
relationship bonded by marriage as soon as they got the required parental consent.27
On November 9, 2003, Benjamin forcibly took Iris away from Gil as the two were going to church. He
subsequently kept Iris incommunicado for days and then had her declare through radio, newspaper and
television that she was kidnapped and raped by Gil and his family. While in the company of her relatives, Iris was
able to sneak out text messages to Gil using the cellular phone of her grandfather, expressing her deep love and
concern for him and warning his family about Benjamins plans against them.28
On December 15, 2003, Iris, assisted by members of the groups Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and
Gabriela, proceeded to the DOJ Task Force on Women and Children Protection (DOJ Task Force) and filed a third
complaint against Gil for Forcible Abduction with Rape and Obstruction of Justice, punished under Presidential
Decree No. 1829,29 docketed as I.S. No. 2004-127.30
Disposition of the Criminal Complaints
The three (3) criminal complaints filed by Iris and Benjamin against respondents were disposed as follows:
First, in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, State Prosecutor II Lilian Doris S. Alejo (Pros. Alejo) of the Muntinlupa Pros.
Office issued the Resolution dated July 9, 2003,31 dismissing the charges for Serious Illegal Detention and Rape
against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace for insufficiency of evidence. In gist, Pros. Alejo found that the
pieces of evidence showed that Gil and Iris were sweethearts and the sexual intercourse that transpired
between them was consensual. Likewise, she observed that the story narrated by Iris was farfetched and, to a
certain degree, unacceptable and unimaginable, intimating that it was unbelievable that Iris would still go to
volleyball practice with Gil after the first rape he allegedly committed against her.32
Nonetheless, Pros. Alejo recommended the filing of informations for Child Abuse against Gil for having sexual
intercourse with Iris on December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2003 by taking advantage of her minority and his moral
influence as a pastor of their church.33 Accordingly, Gil was charged under the following amended criminal
informations,34 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-549 and 03-551:
Criminal Case No. 03-551
That on December 28, 2001, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by taking advantage of his influence as Mormon priest of the church of which
herein victim, seventeen (17) year[s] old IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO y BALOIS is a member, and through moral
compulsion, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engaged in sexual intercourse with said
minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Muntinlupa City, July 9, 2003.
Criminal Case No. 03-549
That on April 23, 2002, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by taking advantage of his influence as Mormon priest of the church of which herein
victim, seventeen (17) year old IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO y BALOIS is a member, and through moral compulsion,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engaged in sexual intercourse with said minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Muntinlupa City, July 9, 2003.
Second, in I.S. No. 03-G-14027-75, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Henry M. Salazar (Pros. Salazar) of the Makati
Pros. Office issued a Resolution dated March 5, 2004,35 equally dismissing the charges for Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention, Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for lack
of merit and/or insufficiency of evidence. Anent the Kidnapping charge, Pros. Salazar found that no evidence
was submitted which would prove that Iris was forcibly taken away and deprived of her liberty.36 Similarly, he
observed that there was no evidence or any particular allegation of facts in the complaint-affidavit constituting

the acts which were claimed as coercive.37In the same vein, he found no evidence or any sufficient allegation to
support the charge of Obstruction of Justice.38
Pros. Salazar further noted that aside from the insufficiency of the complainants39 evidence, the affidavit of Iris
dated August 5, 2003, the news package entitled "Magkasintahan Pala," and the transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearing on August 19, 2003 of the petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316 all support the
dismissal of the foregoing charges.40 He also observed that the complainant moved for the suspension of the
preliminary investigation due to the need to have Iris mentally examined, alleging certain doubts on the
voluntariness of her August 6, 2003 affidavit. However, no mental examination report was submitted to verify
such doubts. In addition, Pros. Salazar took cognizance of the fact that while Iris was "rescued" on November 9,
2003, Benjamin only asked for the revival of the preliminary investigation of the case on January 22, 2004.41
Finally, the counter-charge of Perjury was dismissed, also for lack of merit.42
Dissatisfied, Benjamin moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated July 30,
2004.43
Third, in I.S. No. 2004-127, State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim (Pros. Lim) of the DOJ Task Force issued a Resolution
dated November 8, 2004,44 also dismissing the third case for Forcible Abduction with Rape and Obstruction of
Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
In addition to the above-stated incidents, complainant45 averred that Atty. Reyna and Arturo also raped her in
the month of August 2003. She alleged that Atty. Reyna gave her a drink laced with some kind of chemical
substance which made her dizzy and weak and thereafter, succeeded to have sexual intercourse with her. Iris
averred that Arturo also did the same thing to her. She likewise claimed that Atty. Reyna and Arturo sexually
molested her every time they went to Taytay, while Gil continually raped her. After the habeas corpus
proceedings in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316, Gil brought her to Atty. Reynas house in Putatan, Muntinlupa where she
was repeatedly raped by Gil and Atty. Reyna. According to Iris, Atty. Reyna also brought her to an apartment in
Camella Homes, Muntinlupa where Arturo raped her. She stayed at Atty. Reynas Putatan residence for three (3)
months and the latter would bring her to the Camella Homes apartment whenever his wife sensed what they
were doing to her.46
Pros. Lim found no probable cause for the crimes charged, holding that Iris was not a credible witness because
of her flip-flopping testimonies and the serious contradictions therein. She observed that the fact that Iris
admitted that she went back to school and even got exemplary grades confirmed that she was of sound mind
and acted with volition when she went away with Gil on June 23, 2003. Her mental condition was also adjudged
to be normal by the CA justices who observed her personal demeanor during the August 19, 2003 hearing in CAG.R. S.P. No. 78316. Further, the fact that Iris was not abducted but acted with free will was attested to by
Gemma Cachuela (Cachuela), a staff of the Muntinlupa Prosecutors Office, stating that Iris went to their office
on June 23, 2003 to withdraw her complaint. Pros. Lim added that Cachuela had no reason or motive to
fabricate her statement. Likewise, she noted that the fact that the presentation of the news program
"Magkasintahan Pala" and Iris text messages to Gil as evidence were suppressed meant that they were adverse
to Iris cause. She also found the assertion that Iris was made to undergo a mock trial twice a week to script her
testimony for the first habeas corpus proceedings to be untrue as Iris herself admitted that respondents
received the subpoena only on August 17, 2003, or two (2) days before the August 19, 2003 hearing. Further,
she deemed that it was incredible that respondents would use a color-coding vehicle on the day of Iris
purported abduction. Complainants sweeping statements against Atty. Reyna and Arturo were also found to be
inadequate to establish their guilt, observing that if Iris were indeed drugged for the first time and raped, she
should not have acceded to drink the same substance for a second time. Moreover, if she was indeed molested
by Atty. Reyna and Arturo, she should have declared such fact during the proceedings in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316.
Yet, on the contrary, Iris even praised Atty. Reyna and Arturo for being "mabubuting tao" (good people).47 In
closing, Pros. Lim held that no abduction with rape took place but rather, the rule on two (2) consenting adults
giving free reign to their emotions prevailed in this case.48
Finally, anent the charge of Obstruction of Justice, Pros. Lim dismissed the same, also for lack of sufficient
evidence.49
Aggrieved, Iris and Benjamin appealed the dismissal of all the foregoing charges to the DOJ.50
Proceedings Before the DOJ
On December 11, 2006, the DOJ Secretary issued the first assailed Resolution of even date51 which he later
modified through an Amended Resolution dated December 22, 2006 (Amended Resolution).52 In the Amended
Resolution, the DOJ Secretary resolved the consolidated petitions in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, I.S. No. 03-G-14027-

75 and I.S. No. 2004-127, finding probable cause to charge: (a) Gil for Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610, on account of the December 28, 2001 incidents; (b) Gil, Jessebel, Atty. Reyna and Grace for one (1)
count each of Serious Illegal Detention and Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, on account of
the April 23 to 24, 2002 incidents; and (c) Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for one (1) count each of Forcible
Abduction with Rape on account of the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents.53
In granting the consolidated petitions, the DOJ Secretary observed, among others, that Gil merely interposed the
sweetheart defense, which in itself was doubtful in view of Iris positive identification of him as the culprit of the
December 28, 2001 incident. He further held that it was error to have dismissed the charges against
respondents on the basis of the dismissal of the two (2) habeas corpus cases considering that the causes of
action therein were different and that the CA did not make any finding on the criminal liability of the
respondents. Also, he noted that Iris family reported to the authorities that she had been abducted. Moreover,
he found that respondents conspired with one another in the abduction and consequent raping of Iris.54
On January 18, 2007, respondents moved for the reconsideration of the Amended Resolution.55
Meanwhile, on February 5, 2007, two (2) separate criminal Informations were filed for Forcible Abduction with
Rape against Gil, Arturo, and Atty. Reyna, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-122, and for Serious Illegal
Detention with Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel, and Grace, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-128:
Criminal Case No. 07-12256
The undersigned Acting City Prosecutor upon sworn complaint duly attached and made an integral part hereof
and marked as Annex "A," executed on December 15, 2003 before the Violence Against Women and Children
Division (VAWCD) of the National Bureau of Investigation by the offended party, IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO Y
BALOIS, then eighteen (18) years old, accuses RODRIGO A. REYNA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA and ARTURO S.
CALIANGA of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 342 and Article 266
paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and committed in relation to the incidents that occurred between
June 23, 2003 until November 9, 2003 as follows:
That on June 23, 2003, in Makati City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, all the
above-named accused mutually helping, conspiring and confederating with each other, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abducted the private complainant, Iris Kristine Alberto y Balois, against her will with
the aid of two armed men in front of Assumption College in Makati City using a Tamaraw FX vehicle with plate
number TRP-871, with lewd and unchaste designs and for the purpose of preventing the private complainant
from pursuing her earlier complaint for rape, serious illegal detention and violation of Republic Act No. 7610 in
I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22 before the Muntinlupa City Prosecutors Office against accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga,
Rodrigo A. Reyna and several other persons, and that thereafter the private complainant was taken to the house
of accused Rodrigo A. Reyna at Unit 17, Dona Segundina Townhomes, Muntinlupa City, where she was detained
against her will for two days, and later transferred to a house in San Pedro, Laguna where she was also detained
against her will until June 27, 2003;
That on or about June 27, 2003, all the above-named accused, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously decided to hide the private complainant in Mindanao and, with the help of armed men and with
threat, force and intimidation, accused Gil Anthony Calianga brought the private complainant to Cagayan de Oro
where she was held captive in a house until about August 5, 2003 and where accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga
had carnal knowledge of her repeatedly against her will, by means of threat, force, violence and intimidation
and by making her take drinks laced with drugs;
That on or about August 5, 2003, accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga, with the aid or several unknown persons,
brought the private complainant back to Metro Manila and thereafter, together with accused Rodrigo A. Reyna
and Arturo S. Calianga, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain the private complainant in a house in Taytay,
Rizal until she was transferred to the house of accused Rodrigo A. Reyna in Muntinlupa City where the three
accused continued to hold her against her will, at which different places the three accused willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of threat, force, violence, intimidation and psychological manipulation, and through
the use of drugs, took turns in repeatedly having carnal knowledge of the private complainant against her will
until she was rescued on November 9, 2003 by her relatives and NBI agents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, January 30, 2007.
Criminal Case No. 07-12857

The undersigned Acting City Prosecutor, upon sworn complaint duly attached and made an integral part hereof
and marked as Annex "A", executed on July 4, 2002 before the Womens Desk, Muntinlupa City Police Station by
the offended party, IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO Y BALOIS, then seventeen (17) years old, assisted by her grandfather
Benjamin D. Balois, accuses RODRIGO A. REYNA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JEZIBEL CALIANGA, GRACE
EVANGELISTA confederating and mutually helping each other in the crime of SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION and
Rape of a minor as defined under Article 267, paragraph 1(4) and paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That at about 5:30 [sic] in the afternoon of April 23, 2002, in the City of Muntinlupa and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, through fraudulent misrepresentation, by means of
force, threat and intimidation and by taking advantage of his influence as priest of the Mormon Church of which
the private complainant Iris Kristine [Balois Alberto], female, then a minor, seventeen (17) years of age, was also
a member, then and there, and with lewd and unchaste design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
carry away Iris Kristine Balois Alberto against her will and without legal cause, from South Green Heights in
Muntinlupa City and brought her to a tree house located at Camella Homes, Muntinlupa City where said
accused, by means of threat, force, violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of the private complainant against her will in the evening of the said date and detained her until the
morning of April 24, 2002; that said accused Gil Anthony Calianga would not have succeeded in detaining her
until the morning of April 24, 2002 and in having carnal knowledge of her against her will on the night of April
23, 2002 without the indispensable cooperation of accused JEZIBEL CALIANGA and GRACE EVANGELISTA who
padlocked the tree house from the outside while the private complainant was detained inside, and the
indispensable cooperation of accused Atty. RODRIGO A. REYNA, a high priest of the Mormon church, a close
friend and associate of private complainants grandfather and a member of the legal profession, who, taking
advantage of his ascendancy and moral persuasion, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously aided, abetted and
cooperated with accused Gil Anthony Calianga, Jezibel Calianga and Grace Evangelista by giving them
instructions through cellular phone and by misleading and actively misrepresenting to the private complainants
family her whereabouts. Without such cooperation and unity in effort on the part of the above named accused,
Iris Kristine Balois Alberto, a minor at that time, would not have been detained and raped on April 23 to 24,
2002.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, January 30, 2007.
For alleged reasons of extreme urgency, respondents filed a petition for certiorari58 with the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 97863, while the resolution of their January 18, 2007 Joint Motion for Reconsideration was still
pending.
In the interim, a warrant of arrest59 was issued on February 23, 2007, by Presiding Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo of
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 207 against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-128. Later, on January 14,
2008, Acting Presiding Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva of the RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 issued a warrant of
arrest60 against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-122.
The CA Ruling
The CA gave due course to respondents petition for certiorari and on January 11, 2008 rendered its Decision61
which revoked the DOJ Resolutions.
It ruled that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in reversing the resolutions of no less than three (3)
investigative bodies which all found lack of probable cause and in disregarding the overwhelming, credible and
convincing evidence which negated the charges filed against respondents.62 Of particular note to the CA were
the inconsistent and inherently improbable testimony of Iris, the existence of love letters and text messages of
love and concern between Iris and Gil, and the hiatus of evidence that would show that Atty. Reyna, Arturo,
Jessebel and Grace conspired to rape or illegally detain Iris.63
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,64 essentially arguing that the CA erroneously assumed the
function of public prosecutor when it determined the non-existence of probable cause. The said motion was,
however, denied in a Resolution dated March 13, 2008.65
Issue Before The Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the CA erred in revoking the
DOJ Resolutions based on grave abuse of discretion.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.
It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ
on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such
findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale
behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of
probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception
hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances,66 whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of
certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."67
In the case of Callo-Caridad v. Esteban,68 citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III,69 the Court held:
In reviewing the findings of the public prosecutor on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice
performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents
was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination of probable cause only
through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense
like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the
requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear
demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. As
the Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their
own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The
settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In the context of filing criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where the determination of
probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. The
abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.70 In this regard, case law
states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.71 As held in PCGG v. Jacobi:72
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by law. This error or abuse alone,
however, does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner
must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to establish
that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action
may be obtained. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To note, probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.73 As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.:74
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What
is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been

committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In order to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is
probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present.
This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the
most, no criminal offense.75
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds as follows:
First, the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime of
Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo.
Under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the elements of Rape are: (a) that the
offender is a man; (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (c) that such act is accomplished
by using force or intimidation.76
In particular, with respect to Gil, Iris averred that on December 28, 2001, Gil drugged her and thereafter,
through force and intimidation, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She also claimed that on April
23, 2002, Gil, again through force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her in the tree house. Likewise,
beginning June 27, 2003, Gil raped her almost every day up until her rescue on November 9 of the same year.
In defense, records show that Gil never denied any of the above-stated sexual encounters, but merely
maintained the he and Iris were sweethearts, as shown by several love letters and text messages between them.
Ruling on the matter, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary, as the
elements of rape, more likely than not, appear to be present.
The first and second elements of the crime are beyond dispute as Gil does not deny having carnal knowledge
with Iris. Anent the third element of force and intimidation, Iriss version of the facts, as well as Gils sole
reliance on the sweetheart defense, leads the Court to believe that the said element, in all reasonable
likelihood, appears to be present, considering that: (a) mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
a witness;77 (b) the sweetheart theory does not, by and of itself, negate the commission of rape;78 and (c) the
fact that Iris was a minor during the foregoing incidents casts serious doubt on the efficacy of the consent
purportedly given by her,79 especially in view of Gils esteemed position of being a priest of the same
congregation of which Iris belongs to.
Moreover, a perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes of the January 14, 2004 hearing in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
80624 (January 14, 2004 TSN) shows that Iris retracted her previous testimony during the August 19, 2003
hearing in the first habeas corpus case, i.e., CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316, to the effect that her statements that Gil
never raped her and that she went with him on her own volition were merely "scripted" and conjured only upon
the instruction of Atty. Reyna.80 While case law holds that recantations do not necessarily cancel out an earlier
declaration, ultimately, it should still be treated like any other testimony and as such, its credibility must be
tested during trial.81
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court finds reasonable bases to sustain the DOJ Secretarys finding of
probable cause for Rape against Gil in connection with all three (3) incidents of December 28, 2001, April 23,
2002 and June 23 to November 9, 2003. In this respect, the DOJ Secretary committed no grave abuse of
discretion.
Similarly, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ Secretarys finding of probable cause for Rape
against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, but only insofar as the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents are concerned.
The January 14, 2004 TSN reveals that Iris categorically declared in open court that she was raped by Atty. Reyna
and Arturo during the aforesaid five month period.82 It is a standing rule that due to the nature of the
commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused, provided
that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.83 Applying the same, the Court deems it prudent to test the credibility of Iriss testimony during trial, in
which her demeanor and deportment would be properly observable,84 and likewise be subject to crossexamination.85
On the contrary, there appears to be no ample justification to support the finding of probable cause against
Atty. Reyna and Arturo, with respect to the rape incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002, as well as
against Jessebel and Grace for all three (3) incidents.

As may be gleaned from the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary indicted Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and
Grace for these incidents only by reason of conspiracy. Yet, other than his general imputation thereof, the DOJ
Secretary never provided any rational explanation for his finding of conspiracy against the aforementioned
respondents. The rule is that conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
offense itself. It can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.86 In this case, the Amended
Resolution is bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of the foregoing respondents figured into the
common design of raping Iris and as such, the Court finds no reason to charge them for the same.
Therefore, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the following respects, the Court upholds the DOJ Secretarys
finding of probable cause for the crime of Rape against Gil for all three (3) rape incidents and against Atty. Reyna
and Arturo for the incidents of June 23 to November 9, 2003.
At this juncture, the Court observes that the DOJ charged Gil for Rape in relation to Child Abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of RA 761087 on account of the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents. Existing
jurisprudence, however, proscribes charging an accused for both crimes, rather, he may be charged only for
either. As held in People v. Pangilinan:88
If the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced.
A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be
complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex
crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by
a special law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this light, while the Court also finds that probable cause exists for the crime of Child Abuse against Gil for the
same rape incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 in view of the substantial identity of its
elements89 with that of Rape, he cannot be charged for both. Records disclose that there are standing charges
against Gil for Child Abuse in Criminal Case Nos. 03-551 and 03-549,90 respectively on account of the same
occurrences. Thus, so as not to violate his right against double jeopardy, the Court finds it proper to dismiss the
charges of Rape against Gil with respect to the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents considering the
subsisting charges of Child Abuse as herein discussed.
Notably, Gil, as well as Atty. Reyna and Arturo, cannot be charged for Child Abuse with respect to the June 23 to
November 9, 2003 incidents since Iris had ceased to be a minor by that time.91 Likewise, Atty. Reyna and Arturo
cannot be indicted for Child Abuse in connection with the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents as
there appears to be no sufficient bases to support the DOJ Secretarys finding of conspiracy.
Second, the Court further holds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in finding that probable
cause exists for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention.
The elements of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the RPC are: (a) that the offender is a
private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c)
that the act of detention is illegal, not being ordered by any competent authority nor allowed by law; and (d)
that any of the following circumstances is present: (1) that the detention lasts for more than five days; or (2)
that it is committed by simulating public authority; or (3) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) that the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer.92
Based on the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary charges all the respondents for Serious Illegal Detention
for the incidents of April 23 to 24, 2002 and June 23 until November 9, 2003. Related to this, records show that
Iris retracted her previous testimony wherein she stated that she voluntarily went with Gil.93 She also stated
that she was abducted on June 23, 2003 and brought to various places, such as Cagayan De Oro, Taytay and San
Pedro, within a period of five (5) months.94
Aside from Iriss bare allegations, records are bereft of any evidence to support a finding that Iris was illegally
detained or restrained of her movement. On the contrary, based on Pros. Lims Resolution dated November 8,
2004, several disinterested witnesses had testified to the fact that Iris was seen freely roaming in public with
Gil,95 negating the quintessential element of deprivation of liberty.96
Towards the same end, the Court equally observes that the inherent inconsistencies in Iriss statements are too
dire to ignore even only at the prosecutors level. Anent the April 23, 2002 incidents, the Court finds it contrary

to both reason and logic that Gil would stop-over at a McDonalds restaurant, a place widely open to the public
eye, in the process of kidnapping Iris. Similarly, with respect to the June 23, 2003 incidents, if Iris was indeed
abducted and detained during that time, then it is highly incredible that she would be voluntarily let go by her
captors in order to attend a habeas corpus hearing before justices of the CA.
It is well to note that while the Court had given substantial weight to Iriss uncorroborated testimony to sustain
the DOJ Secretarys finding of probable cause for the crime of Rape, the same treatment cannot be applied to
the crime of Serious Illegal Detention. Comparing the two, Rape is an offense of secrecy97 which, more often
than not, happens in a private setting involving only the accused and the victim; likewise, the degree of
humiliation and disgrace befalling a rape victim who decides to come forward must be taken into
consideration.98 For these reasons, the testimony of the latter, even if uncorroborated, can lead to a conviction.
On the other hand, in Serious Illegal Detention, the victim is usually taken from one place and transferred to
another which is in fact what has been alleged in this case - making the commission of the offense susceptible
to public view. Unfortunately, petitioners never presented any evidence to show that Iris was restrained of her
liberty at any point in time during the period of her alleged captivity.
All told, given the clear absence of probable cause for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention, the Court finds that
the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in charging respondents for the same.
Third, the DOJ Secretary also committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for the crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape.
The elements of Forcible Abduction under Article 342 of the RPC are: (a) that the person abducted is any
woman, regardless of her age or reputation; (b) that the abduction must be against her will; and (c) that the
abduction must be with lewd designs.99 As this crime is complexed with the crime of Rape pursuant to Article
48 of the RPC, the elements of the latter offense must also concur. Further, owing to its nature as a complex
crime proper,100 the Forcible Abduction must be shown to be a necessary means for committing the crime of
Rape.
As earlier discussed, there lies no evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty during the period of
her captivity from June 23 to November 9, 2003 thus, denying the element of abduction. More importantly,
even if it is assumed that there was some form of abduction, it has not been shown nor even sufficiently
alleged that the taking was done with lewd designs. Lust or lewd design is an element that characterizes all
crimes against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the offender.1wphi1 As such, the said
element must be always present in order that they may be so considered as a crime of chastity in contemplation
of law.101
Moreover, the Court observes that even if it is assumed that all of the elements of Forcible Abduction were
present, it was not shown nor sufficiently alleged how the said abduction constituted a necessary means for
committing the crime of Rape. As earlier discussed, records disclose that there lies probable cause to indict Gil,
Atty. Reyna and Arturo only for the component crime of Rape. In this accord, the charge of the complex crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape was improper and, hence, there was grave abuse of discretion.
In sum, the Court finds probable cause for Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo in connection with the June
23 to November 9, 2003 Incidents. Consequently, the DOJ Secretary is ordered to direct the City State
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa or any of its subordinates to file such charge. Meanwhile, the charges of Child Abuse
against Gil in Criminal Case Nos. 03-551 and 03-549 are deemed to subsist. Aside from the foregoing, all other
charges are hereby nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, in order to conform with
the pronouncements made herein, the DOJ Secretary is directed to drop (a) any subsisting charges against
Jessebel and Grace in connection with this case; (b) the charge of Rape, in relation to Section 5(b ), Article III of
RA 7610, for the incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo; and (c)
the charges of Serious Illegal Detention and Forcible Abduction with Rape against all respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 11, 2008 and March 13, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97863 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to issue the proper resolution in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
15.) G.R. No. 155996
CGG CHAIRMAN MAGDANGAL B. ELMA and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Petitioners,

-versus -

REINER JACOBI, CRISPIN REYES, MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, in her capacity as Undersecretary of the
Department of Justice,
Respondents.

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 27, 2012

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and its former Chairman Magdangal Elma[1] (petitioners) questioning the resolutions,
dated July 17, 2002[2] and September 20, 2002,[3] of then Undersecretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez. The assailed resolutions dismissed the petitioners petition for review, denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration and ultimately ruled that no probable cause for falsification and use of falsified document
existed against Atty. Crispin Reyes and Reiner Jacobi (respondents).
ANTECEDENTS
The records show that on two occasions - evidenced by the December 22, 1988 and May 6, 1991 letters[4]
- then PCGG Commissioner, and later Chairman, David M. Castro, purportedly acting for the PCGG, agreed to pay
Jacobi a fee of ten percent (10%) of any amount actually recovered and legally turned over to the Republic of
the Philippines from the ill-gotten wealth of Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his family, associates, subordinates and
cronies, based on the information and evidence that Jacobi would furnish the PCGG. Chairman Castro sent
another letter dated December 19, 1991 to Jacobi confirming that actual recovery *of+ the Kloten gold account
managed by Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) subject of *Jacobis+ information and other efforts done will be
properly compensated as previously committed.*5+ We shall collectively refer to these letters as PCGG
letters.
A few years later, a similar letter dated August 27, 1998 (De Guzman letter) was sent by the new PCGG
Chairman, Felix M. de Guzman, to Jacobi, confirming the PCGGs promise (as contained in the PCGG letters) to
pay Jacobi and his intelligence group a 10% fee for the US$13.2 billion ill-gotten wealth of Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, trustee or fronts in UBS still/now being claimed and recovered by the Philippine
Government. The De Guzman letter reads in full:[6]
27 August 1998
Mr. Reiner Jacobi
c/o Business Center

JW Marriott Hotel, Hong Kong

Care: Counsel Crispin T. Reyes
Dear Mr. Jacobi:
I refer to the letters dated 22 December 1988, 6 May 1991 and 19 December 1991 addressed to you from Mr.
David M. Castro, former Chairman of the PCGG, copy (sic) for ready reference.
I hereby confirm the agreement of the PCGG to pay you/your group a ten (10%) percent fee of the US$13.2
Billions ill-gotten wealth, unexplained or hidden deposits/assets of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
family, trustees or fronts in Union Bank of Switzerland, still/now being claimed and recovered by the Philippine
government which is being assisted/facilitated/realized by their identification as a result of the findings,
information and evidence supplied by you/your group to the PCGG that is otherwise not known to the
Commission from other sources nor previously and voluntarily disclosed by the Marcoses, their trustees,
associates or cronies.

Very truly yours,

FOR THE COMMISSION:

[Signed]
FELIX M. DE GUZMAN [Countersigned by Director Danilo Daniel]
Chairman
FMG/lai[7]
d01[8]

a.

The Sandiganbayan petition

On March 8, 1999, the respondents filed with the Sandiganbayan a verified Petition for Mandamus, Prohibition
and Certiorari (with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction)[9] (Sandiganbayan
petition) against the petitioners (docketed as Civil Case No. 006). Atty. Reyes acted as Jacobis counsel. Jacobi
did not sign or verify the petition.
The contents of the PCGG letters and the De Guzman letter, among others, were substantially reproduced in the
Sandiganbayan petition and were attached as annexes. (The De Guzman letter was attached as Annex E).
Likewise attached (as Annex G), was a June 24, 1998 letter from PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo
(Gunigundo letter), seeking judicial assistance from the Swiss Ministry of Justice and the Police of Switzerland
regarding Marcos-related accounts in UBS.[10]
The Sandiganbayan petition began with the alleged commitment of the PCGG to Jacobi (and his group, including
Atty. Reyes[11]) - as contained in the PCGG letters and the De Guzman letter. It also cited the reports[12]
submitted by Jacobis group to the PCGG detailing their ill-gotten- wealth-recovery efforts and services, as well
as their follow-up letters[13] to the government to press for the UBS account. They alleged that due to their
persistence, the PCGG (through Chairman Gunigundo and Chairman De Guzman) made an official request[14] to
the Swiss Ministry of Justice to freeze the US$13.2 billion UBS account (as of August 25, 1998[15]) in the name of
Irene Marcos Araneta, alias I. Araneta (UBS account).*16+ They claimed that the UBS itself admitted the
existence of this account, and only denied that the account is owned in any way by the Marcoses.[17]
The Sandiganbayan petition also strongly questioned*18+ Chairman Elmas appointment and reappointment of
two Swiss Trojan Horses lawyers (Peter Cosandey and Martin Kurer) who had been allegedly blocking the
governments efforts to recover the UBS account by secretly working for the UBS.[19] It alleged that Chairman
Elma was working with these Swiss lawyers to frustrate the PCGG and its recovery efforts. Specifically, it alleged
that:
In not revoking the re-appointment of Martin Kurer as PCGG lawyer despite the honest and sincere suggestions,
pleadings and demands by [Atty. Reyes]; in not pursuing the great efforts of the Philippine government through
Ambassador Tomas T. Syquia to have the account frozen; in appointing, allowing and in fact abetting Martin
Kurer who is associated (sic) and conspiring with Peter Cosandey in blocking the recovery of said account;
[Chairman Elma] has shown beyond reasonable doubt that he has a personal agenda and is unusually interested
in protecting [the UBS account] for another person or persons, other than the Filipino people.[20]

The Sandiganbayan petition prayed:

AFTER NOTICE AND HEARING, to declare the re-appointment of Swiss lawyer Martin Kurer and Peter
Cosandey as having been issued in grave abuse of discretion and highly prejudicial to the interests of the
Philippine Government and the Filipino people and therefore null and void; to order [Chairman Elma and PCGG]
to perform their mandated duty to recover [the UBS account] for the Filipino people; and to sentence [Chairman
Elma] to pay [Atty. Reyes and Jacobi] actual damages that may be proved during the trial; xxx
On March 15, 1999, Atty. Reyes, through the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. (AGLP), filed a complaint
with a similar thrust against Chairman Elma with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman complaint).[21]
Atty. Reyes attached the Sandiganbayan petition (together with its annexes) to this complaint.[22] Atty. Reyes
alleged that Chairman Elmas (i) reappointment of Martin Kurer, despite official information that he had been
secretly working for UBS, and (ii) failure to follow-up the PCGGs previous official requests to the Swiss
authorities were obvious violations of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.[23]
Later, Atty. Reyes filed an Urgent Manifestation[24] with the Sandiganbayan, withdrawing the De Guzman
letter and the Gunigundo letter as annexes of the Sandiganbayan petition. A similar manifestation was filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the Ombudsman complaint.[25] Atty. Reyes explained that he had been
prompted to withdraw these letters after he learned of reports questioning the authenticity of these
documents. Atty. Reyes asserted that Jacobi had nothing to do with the preparation nor with the attachment of
these letters to the Sandiganbayan petition and to the Ombudsman complaint; thus Annex E of the *Sandiganbayan Petition+ is *the De Guzman letter+ which was previously shown to
[Chairman de Guzman] by [Atty. Reyes] before it was used as an annex and he stated that the statements
therein appear to be in the document he has signed. xxx
*Jacobi+ had absolutely nothing to do about this Annex E
xxx
At any rate, this questionable document is merely a restatement of PCGG Chairman Castros commitment
to Mr. Jacobi which is still perfectly binding and enforceable xxx and, further, it is absolutely immaterial to the
main issue in this case.
Hence, this document marked Annex E of the *Sandiganbayan Petition+ should be withdrawn, as it is
now hereby withdrawn xxx, from the records of this case.
Further, *Atty.+ Reyes has also carefully examined Annex G of the [Sandiganbayan] Petition. He asked
first for a copy of this document sent to Ambassador Syquia in Switzerland but he was informed that there is no
copy in PCGG records. Afterwards, a copy of the document was provided by a PCGG insider and this is now
marked as Annex G Again, *Jacobi+ had nothing to do with this document marked as Annex G.
[Atty.] Reyes has also carefully examined this document and found that while the statements therein
appear authentic, however, upon closer examination, it seems that the signature thereunder is not the signature
in the original signed by [Chairman Gunigundo] xxx.
Hence, this Annex G should be likewise withdrawn
xxx
If [respondents], particularly counsel Reyes, had known from the very beginning that these documents are
questionable and not trustworthy, of course, they will never use them in this case for purposes of recovering
Marcos UBS account of $13.2 Billions (sic) by PCGG for the people of the Philippines.
And whenever there is anything wrong or questionable, [respondents] will not hesitate to and will
immediately inform the [Sandiganbayan] accordingly, as, in fact, they are doing now, and it is their desire to deal
with all candor, fairly and honestly, with [the Sandiganbayan] and all courts of the land. [italics in the original]
b.

The PCGGs reaction

The attachment, as annexes, of the De Guzman letter to the Sandiganbayan petition and to the Ombudsman
complaint elicited a legal response from the PCGG. Based on the affidavits executed by Chairman De Guzman,
Director Danilo Daniel[26] of the Finance and Administration Department of the PCGG,[27] and Lilia Yanga,[28]
what appears as their signatures and initials at the bottom of the De Guzman letter actually pertain to their
signatures and initials affixed to another letter (dated August 25, 1998) sent by Chairman De Guzman to the
Philippine Ambassador to Switzerland, Tomas Syquia.[29] This August 25, 1998 letter, however, had nothing to
do with any contingency agreement with Jacobi and/or Atty. Reyes. Lourdes Magno,[30] a Records Officer, and
Sisa Lopez[31] also executed affidavits stating that the PCGG has no record of the De Guzman letter. All of these
affiants were then PCGG employees.
In a March 17, 1999 resolution (PCGG resolution),[32] the PCGG stated that the De Guzman letter does not exist
in its records.[33] Chairman De Guzman himself denied any participation in the preparation of this letter, and
said:[34]
In connection with Civil Case No. 006 xxx the declaration of Director Danilo R.B. Daniel that the contents [of the
De Guzman letter] is not authentic is hereby confirmed it appearing that the records of the PCGG bearing on the
alleged letter indicates that the signature of the undersigned and the initials of Dir. Daniel written thereof refers
to a letter addressed to Ambassador Tomas Syquia dated August 25, 1998 and not to the [De Guzman letter
addressed] to Mr. Jacobi. [emphasis added]
The PCGG resolution also stated that a Swiss official[35] already denied the existence of the US$13.2 billion UBS
account claimed by Jacobi. Ultimately, the PCGG resolved to (i) declare Jacobis arrangement with then
Chairman Castro as non-binding and inexistent, and (ii) authorize Chairman Elma to file appropriate civil and
criminal charges against the respondents.[36]
In a March 16, 1999 report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the latter confirmed that the De
Guzman letter was a falsified document as the questioned signatures and entries therein were lifted/extracted
probably from the original and/or xerox copy*37+ of the August 25, 1998 letter addressed to Ambassador
Syquia.
c.

Criminal Complaint

On March 22, 1999, Chairman Elma filed an affidavit-complaint[38] with the Department of Justice (DOJ),
charging the respondents with falsification and with use of falsified document (under Article 171, paragraph 2
and Article 172, paragraphs. 1 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code). The petitioners attached to the complaint the
NBI report and the affidavits of the PCGG employees.[39]
On April 5, 1999,[40] Atty. Reyes and the AGLP filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against Director Daniel (Daniel Complaint) for his alleged traitorous mission for *UBS+ and *the+ Marcoses
against the interest of the Philippine government.*41+ The complaint stated the following particulars
surrounding the Gunigundo letter and the De Guzman letter:
Atty. Reyes also informed [Dir. Daniel] that [Atty. Reyes] requested [the] PCGG record section for a copy of [the
Gunigundo letter+ but he was told they had no copy in their records.
And regarding the missing [De Guzman] letter, the statement in the affidavits of [the PCGG employees] that
there is neither a copy of Chairman de Guzmans letter is not surprising and confirms [that] important
documents are usually missing.
xxx
Further, about middle of September, 1998, Atty. Reyes again visited [Dir. Daniel] xxx and xxx inquired about
*the+ Gunigundo letter and the *De Guzman+ letter to Reiner Jacobi [which] merely restated what former
PCGG Chairman David Castro committed to Reiner Jacobi. The PCGG record section said it has no copy. And xxx
[Dir. Daniel] said that he will check his records and give copies if available in his file.
Some days thereafter, again [Atty. Reyes] visited [Dir.] Daniel and he gave me xerox copy of [the] Gunigundo
letter (marked Annex G *of the Sandiganbayan+ Petition) xxx and *Chairman+ De Guzmans letter (marked
Annex E *of the Sandiganbayan+ Petition...
I never knew then that xxx [Dir.] Daniel has been working for the Marcoses and UBS in conspiracy with Swiss
Trojan Horse Martin Kurer

against the Philippine government. And I learned about it only recently. Hence, before I did not bother to check
the trustworthiness of these documents which he gave me and which I believed all along to be authentic until
my attention was called by negative press reports on this [De Guzman letter].
But, on the very day I read negative press reports on the authenticity of *Chairman+ De Guzmans letter xxx, I
realized that the two documents (Gunigundos letter of June 24th and De Guzmans letter of Aug. 27th) given to
me by [Dir.] Daniel must have been falsified. xxx
Accordingly, on the same day, Atty. Reyes formally withdrew these two documents marked Annexes E and G
of the PETITION in Sandiganbayan Case No. 006 xxx from the record of the case.[42]
Atty. Reyes imputed the falsification to Director Daniel and claimed good faith in annexing the De Guzman letter
to the Sandiganbayan petition; thus [Dir. Daniel] had the means and opportunity to create the [De Guzman letter] which confirmed
PCGGs contingency fee agreement with Jacobi. *Dir.+ Daniel had initialed the letter dated August 25, 1998. It has
subsequently been discovered by the NBI that the signatures and initialing of the genuine letter dated 25 August
1998 have been transposed onto the forged [De Guzman] letter.
Because [Dir.] Daniel had access to the letter dated 25 August 1998, he was in the best position to
forge the *De Guzman+ letter. The NBI has stated that the *De Guzman+ letter was a very crude forgery. Indeed,
it is now clear that this was such a crude forgery that it was designed to be discovered. Likewise, [Dir.] Daniel
had access to Gunigundos letter of June 19, 1996, hence, he was also in the best position to forge said
[Gunigundo] letter of June 24, 1998 which is also a crude forgery.
xxxx
In contrast, Jacobi and Reyes have no motive in creating a forged contingency fee agreement
because Jacobi already has a binding agreement with the Philippine government. Indeed, their subsequent
conduct contradicts any suggestion of guilty knowledge. In good faith, they attached the [De Guzman letter] in
their Petition filed against Chairman Elma and the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan wherein recovery of $13.2
Billion from UBS is the main issue. It is ludicrous to suggest that Jacobi and Reyes would create a crude forgery
and then produce it in contentious court proceedings when such a forgery is unnecessary to their case and is
easily discoverable. Verily, the obvious forger is [Dir.] Daniel of the PCGG.[43]

Atty. Reyes filed his counter-affidavit,[44] adopting the explanation and allegations contained in his Urgent
Manifestation and in the Daniel Complaint in pleading for the dismissal of the criminal case.
For his part, Jacobi, through Atty. Cynthia Pealosa, denied any participation in the falsification of the De
Guzman letter. He explained:
8. I was informed by [Atty. Reyes] at the time that I received a copy of [the De Guzman letter] that that letter
had been given to [him] by [Dir.] Daniel. The obvious forger is no other than PCGG insider [Dir.] Daniel xxx.[45]

Jacobi added that he and Atty. Reyes have no reason or motive to forge the letter since he already had an
existing contingency fee agreement with the PCGG/Philippine government. Jacobi attached an affidavit of
Chairman Castro confirming the veracity of the PCGG letters.*46+ Jacobi stated that the petitioners complaint
ignored his work history with the PCGG and the consistency of his conduct with the agreement he entered into
with the Philippine government.
Chairman Elma and the PCGG countered that the respondents withdrawal of the falsified letter cannot
extinguish the offenses already committed. The petitioners refuted the respondents allegation that Director
Daniel was the source of the De Guzman letter per Director Daniels affidavit, to wit:
I am not in a position to give [Atty. Reyes] the falsified [De Guzman] letter xxx to Reiner Jacobi as I do not
have a copy of said letter.
I strongly dispute Jacobis statement that the obvious forger is no other that (sic) the PCGG insider
Danilo Daniel who furnished Attorney Crispin T. Reyes the letter in question. This is absolutely false and
baseless. As I have stated above, I had no participation at all in this spurious letter. If I participated in this
proceeding, why do I need to falsify it. Why not just give them a genuine copy of the letter.[47] (underlining
added)

d.

The DOJs initial finding: existence of probable cause

In a June 25, 1999 resolution (first resolution), Senior State Prosecutor Jude Romano found probable cause
against the respondents on the basis of two legal presumptions - that (i) the possessor and user of a falsified
document is the forger; and (ii) whoever stands to benefit from the forgery is the author thereof - which the
respondents failed to overthrow. Thus, he recommended the filing of the corresponding information whose
dispositive portion stated;[48] thus WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that informations for Falsification and
Use of Falsified Documents under Article 172 (1) in relation to Article 171(2) and Article 172 par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively, be filed against respondents xxx and another information for Use of Falsified
Document under Article 172 par. 3 xxx be filed against [Atty. Reyes].

Prosecutor Romano rejected Jacobis claim (that he had nothing to do with the forged letter or with its
attachment as annex to the Sandiganbayan petition), on the ground that the act of Atty. Reyes, as Jacobis
counsel in the Sandiganbayan petition, bound him as client.[49]
Atty. Reyes seasonably moved for reconsideration of the first resolution,[50] alleging that neither of the
presumptions relied upon by Prosecutor Romano applies.[51] Jacobi, through Atty. Pealosa, received his copy
of the first resolution on June 30, 1999.[52]
d1. The procedural complications.
On July 13, 1999,[53] the Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar and Asuncion law firm (Padilla law firm) filed its Entry of
Appearance with Omnibus Motion[54] for Jacobi, requesting for additional time to file an appropriate
pleading.[55] The Entry of Appearance attached the June 29, 1999 letter of Jacobi to Atty. Alexander Padilla
(Padilla letter) of the Padilla law firm, retaining the latter as his attorney to deal with the DOJ.*56+ The Padilla
letter stated that Jacobi has attached a copy of his June 29, 1999 letter to Atty. Pealosa (Pealosa letter). Jacobi
did not state the contents of the Pealosa letter and neither was a copy of the Pealosa letter actually attached
to the Entry of Appearance.
On July 15, 1999 - the last day to avail of a remedy from the first resolution - Jacobi, through Atty. Pealosa, filed
an unverified petition for review[57] with the DOJ Secretary. With this development, the petitioners opposed
the Padilla law firms earlier request for additional period (to file appropriate pleading).*58+ The petitioners
opposition notwithstanding, Prosecutor Romano granted the Padilla law firms requests in the interest of
justice in a July 15, 1999 order.*59+ Accordingly, on July 29, 1999,*60+ Jacobi (through the Padilla law firm)
moved for the reconsideration of the first resolution (first MR).[61]
Meanwhile, in a July 19, 1999 manifestation, Jacobi, through the Padilla law firm, stated that only *the Padilla
law firm is] authorized to represent [Jacobi] and that any and all other pleadings and documentations filed or
submitted by any other person and counsel, purportedly in and for his behalf, are manifestly not
authorized.*62+
In a January 25, 2000 order (second resolution), Prosecutor Romano resolved*63+ to deny Jacobis first MR,
reasoning as follows:
Records show that on July 13, 1999, [Atty. Padilla] filed an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion
manifesting that he is entering his appearance as counsel for [Jacobi]. xxx
Subsequently, on July 29, 1999, Atty. Padilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration. A perusal of the records
however reveal[s] that a Petition for Review was filed before the Secretary of Justice by Atty. Cynthia Pealosa
in behalf of [Jacobi] on July 15, 1999. It further appears that no withdrawal of appearance as counsel or a
withdrawal of the Petition was ever filed by said counsel. Thus, Atty. Pealosa remains to be a counsel on record
of [Jacobi] with Atty. Padilla as co-counsel.
Considering that the respondent has filed a Petition for Review of the [first resolution] that is the subject of the
Motion for Reconsideration, the undersigned in deference to the Secretary of Justice is constrained to deny the
Motion for Reconsideration. [emphases added]

Earlier however (or on January 10, 2000), then Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas also resolved to dismiss
Jacobis unverified petition for review (Cuevas resolution) for Jacobis failure to submit a verification of the
petition signed by *Jacobi+ himself.*64+
On March 7, 2000,[65] the Sanidad Abaya Te Viterbo Enriquez and Tan law firm (Sanidad law firm) filed an Entry
of Appearance as sole and principal counsel*66+ for Jacobi. The Sanidad law firm attached two facsimile letters
of Jacobi: one is dated March 3, 2000,[67] addressed to Prosecutor Romano/Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
Zuo; and the other is dated June 29, 1999[68] (which is actually the Pealosa letter, supposedly attached to the
Padilla law firms Entry of Appearance) addressed to Atty. Pealosa. Both letters attest to the lack of authority
of Atty. Pealosa to represent and take action *for Jacobi+ as of *June 29, 1999+*69+ or before the unverified
petition for review was filed. These facsimile letters do not bear the actual date of their transmission.[70]
The Sanidad law firm moved for the reconsideration[71] (second MR) of the second resolution, arguing
that Prosecutor Romano erred in refusing to recognize that Atty. Pealosa had already been validly discharged
upon the subsequent unqualified appearance of the Padilla law firm well before the unverified petition for
review was filed. It cites in support the Padilla law firms July 19, 1999 Manifestation.*72+
In a March 6, 2001 resolution (third resolution), Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo (i) approved the
recommendation of Prosecutor Romano to grant Jacobis second MR and Atty. Reyes pending motion for
reconsideration, and (ii) dismissed the complaint against the respondents.[73] Since both the second resolution
(denying Jacobis first MR) and the Cuevas resolution (denying Jacobis unverified petition for review) were not
based on the merits, the prosecutors considered Jacobis second MR in the interest of justice. The prosecutors
observed:
*The De Guzman letter+ merely confirms the agreement between the PCGG and Jacobis group. The *De
Guzman letter+ was annexed to *the Sandiganbayan petition+ *which+ specifically prayed for the revocation of
the re-appointment of Swiss lawyers and representatives in Switzerland x x x and to continue, push through and
follow up the previous government efforts and take such appropriate actions called for. xxx
As can be gleaned from the above, the subject letter is not necessary for the successful resolution of the case. As
explained, its annexation to the petition is a surplusage for even without it, the action was sufficient. There is no
logical reason for the respondents to falsify the subject letter knowing fully well that no benefit would accrue in
their favor. It would be different if the action filed was for the collection of the stipulated 10% fee. The subject
letter then becomes very material as it serves as proof of their right to the fees.[74]
In the meantime, Atty. Pealosa withdrew*75+ as Jacobis counsel. She attached to her Notice of
Withdrawal her letters-explanation to Jacobi, disproving her alleged lack of authority to file the unverified
petition for review. In one of her letters, Atty. Pealosa explained:
You *referring to Jacobi+ know that despite the *Pealosa letter+ (which was faxed to me after I received a copy
of the adverse DOJ Resolution) You repeatedly requested me to proceed and to immediately inform *Atty.
Padilla] that it was [you who gave] me authority to prepare/submit the necessary papers. I then informed [Atty.
Padilla+ of your decision. Nevertheless I told *Atty. Padilla that+ I could withdraw from *the+ case so he can
enter his appearance and make the necessary legal moves. [Atty. Padilla] said [that] he did not know about your
DOJ case and that he was busy and that I just go ahead with your request that I proceed with the
preparation/submission of the papers.
xxxx
On July 15, 1999 which was the last day for the filing of the petition [for review with the DOJ], I asked you again
if we were to proceed and your decision [was] that I file it. Even Dr. David Chaikin, your lawyer, who was with
you at that time and whom you consulted, advised me to proceed. So, the petition was filed.[76] (Emphases
added)

The petitioners moved for reconsideration[77] of the third resolution but its motion was denied in a January 9,
2002 resolution.*78+ Prosecutors Romano and Zuo rejected the petitioners argument that the dismissal of
Atty. Pealosas petition for review bars a reconsideration of the second resolution.
It should be noted that the *third resolution+ treats, not only of *Jacobis+ motion for reconsideration, but
likewise that of [Atty. Reyes] which was [seasonably] filed. xxx
Therefore, insofar as the Motion for Reconsideration filed by [Atty. Reyes] is concerned, the same is still pending
and had to be resolved. It is of record that [Atty. Reyes] never filed a petition for review of the [first resolution].

Hence the [Cuevas petition] dismissing on a mere technicality the Petition for review filed by Atty. Pealosa,
alleged counsel [of Jacobi], did not affect the pending Motion for Reconsideration filed by [Atty. Reyes] and did
not bar the undersigned from acting thereon.
Insofar as the Motion for Reconsideration filed by [Jacobi] is concerned, the same had to be resolved principally
in the interest of justice xxx.
This case involves the same facts and the same issues for both [Jacobi and Atty. Reyes] such that injustice could
occur should there be two different decisions. xxx
xxx [the] dismissal [of the petition for review] never affected the Motion for reconsideration filed by [Atty.
Reyes] then pending with the undersigned for resolution. Certainly, the resolution of this motion was within the
jurisdiction/authority of the undersigned and the Chief State Prosecutor whose resolution is subject of
reconsideration. xxx[79] [emphasis supplied]

e.

The DOJs present finding: No probable cause

On April 29, 2002, the PCGG filed a petition for review[80] with the DOJ Secretary.[81] Usec. Gutierrez,
acting for the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, denied the petition for review on the ground that no prima
facie case exists against the respondents. With the denial*82+ of the petitioners motion for reconsideration,*83+
the petitioners went directly to this Court on a petition for certiorari.
THE PETITIONERS POSITION
The petitioners claim that Usec. Gutierrez gravely abused her discretion when she sustained the
impropriety of (i) Jacobis simultaneous resort to two different remedies filing a petition for review and a
motion for reconsideration through two different counsels[84] and (ii) filing a second motion for
reconsideration of an adverse resolution through another counsel.*85+ Jacobis first and second MRs were
purposely devised to make it appear that Atty. Pealosa was not authorized to file the unverified petition for
review.*86+
The petitioners also claim that the alleged termination of Atty. Pealosas services surfaced only when - as late
as March 2000 - the Sanidad law firm attached to Jacobis second MR a copy of the Pealosa letter. The
petitioners argue that nothing in the records of the case would show that Jacobi terminated Atty. Pealosas
services at any time before she filed the unverified petition for review. The Padilla law firms (i) Entry of
Appearance and (ii) July 19, 1999 manifestation, as well as the Padilla letter attached to these, are silent about
the alleged termination of Atty. Pealosa. These documents do not contain the Pealosa letter which
supposedly evidences Jacobis termination of Atty. Pealosas services.*87+ At any rate, the Padilla and the
Pealosa letters are of dubious authenticity because they do not contain the actual date of transmittal by Jacobi
to their addressees, as would normally appear at the top edge of a faxed document.[88]
The petitioners assert that Atty. Pealosa was Jacobis counsel at the time she filed the unverified petition for
review, citing Prosecutor Romanos observation in the second resolution and Atty. Pealosas lettersexplanation, attached to her Notice of Withdrawal.[89] The petitioners likewise claim that since Atty. Pealosa
remained Jacobis counsel at the time she filed the petition for review, then the filing of the first and second
MRs by the Padilla law firm and by the Sanidad law firm, respectively, is highly improper.
The petitioners add that Usec. Gutierrez gravely abused her discretion when she sustained Prosecutor Romano
and Prosecutor Zuos grant of Jacobis second MR, which effectively (albeit without authority) overturned the
Cuevas resolution,[90] instead of maintaining respect to the appellate authority of then Secretary Cuevas.
On the issue of probable cause, the petitioners reiterate the findings in the first resolution that the
respondents defense of lack of knowledge *of the forgery+ is self-serving and is better ventilated in a full blown
trial.*91+ Relying on the presumption that the holder of a forged document is presumed to be the forger
thereof, the petitioners assert that the respondents failed to rebut this presumption with credible evidence.
Since the Sandiganbayan petition seeks to compel the petitioners (as respondents in Civil Case No. 006) to
recover the UBS account, the Sandiganbayan petition was actually an action to compel recognition of the
respondents alleged 10% finders fee as confirmed in the De Guzman letter.*92+
Citing Choa v. Judge Chiongson,[93] the petitioners add that the withdrawal of the` De Guzman letter from
the Sandiganbayan petition and the Ombudsman complaint cannot negate the criminal liability that the
respondents had already incurred. Criminal liability for knowingly introducing a falsified document in court is
incurred once the document is submitted to the court through its attachment to the complaint.[94] The

respondents cannot likewise claim good faith in withdrawing the De Guzman letter since the withdrawal was
made after Chairman De Guzman denied any participation in the forged letter and after the NBI confirmed the
falsification.[95]
THE RESPONDENTS POSITION
The respondents question the propriety of the petitioners resort to a certiorari petition instead of a petition for
review under Rule 43;[96] they posit that even assuming the remedy of certiorari is proper, the petition is
insufficient in form and substance due to the petitioners failure to (i) implead the DOJ in their petition[97] and
(ii) to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.[98]
Contrary to the petitioners remonstration, the assailed resolutions of Usec. Gutierrez were actually issued for
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, and therefore, Usec. Gutierrez did not reverse the Cuevas resolution.[99]
The respondents assert that the petitioners cannot compel the prosecutor to proceed with the case after finding
that no probable cause exists against the respondents since the determination of probable cause involves an
exercise of discretion.[100]
The respondents add that the petitioners failure to present the original of the allegedly forged document is fatal
to their accusations of forgery. At any rate, the presumption of authorship, relied upon by the petitioners, is
inapplicable to and rebutted by Jacobi and Atty. Reyes, respectively: first, the presumption cannot apply to
Jacobi, who was never in possession of the De Guzman letter; he had no participation in the preparation of the
Sandiganbayan petition and he did not even verify it; and second, Atty. Reyes sufficiently explained how he
came into possession of the De Guzman letter.[101]
ISSUES

1.
Whether certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the DOJs determination of probable
cause.
a. If it is, where should the petition be filed.
2. Whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion.
a. In effectively allowing Jacobi to (i) simultaneously avail of the remedy of a petition for review and a motion
for reconsideration, and (ii) file a second motion for reconsideration.
b.
In finding that no probable cause for falsification and use of falsified document exists against the
respondents?

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Before going into the substance of the petition, we shall first resolve the procedural questions the respondents
raised.
I.

Procedural aspects

a.
Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the DOJs determination of the presence or absence of probable
cause
The respondents claim that a petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy in questioning the
assailed DOJ resolutions.
The respondents are mistaken.
By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties in a preliminary investigation and by making an
independent assessment thereof, an investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions of a quasijudicial nature in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, since he does not make a determination
of the rights of any party in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondents guilt or innocence (thus limiting his
action to the determination of probable cause to file an information in court),*102+ an investigating prosecutors
function still lacks the element of adjudication[103] essential to an appeal under Rule 43.

Additionally, there is a compelling reason to conclude that the DOJs exclusion from the enumeration of
quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is deliberate. In Orosa v. Roa,[104] we observed:

There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in
consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments,
bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the
power of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of
the Cabinet and heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is subject to
review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President,
instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. x x x. Notably,
Section 1 x x x of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby
accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that
office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to. [citations omitted, emphasis ours]

However, Memorandum Circular No. 58[105] of the Office of the President bars an appeal from the
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases via a
petition for review, except for those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.[106]
Therefore, a party aggrieved by the DOJs resolution - affirming or reversing the finding of the investigating
prosecutor in a preliminary investigation involving an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death cannot appeal to the Office of the President and is left without any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. This leaves a certiorari petition as the only remedial avenue left.[107] However, the
petitioner must allege and show that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the
petition for review.
We also reject the respondents allegation that the present petition suffers from a fatal procedural defect
for failure to implead the DOJ (or its appropriate official) as an indispensable party.
Unlike a Rule 45 petition, one filed under Rule 65 petition requires the petitioner to implead as public
respondent the official or agency[108] whose exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function is allegedly tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.*109+ Contrary to the respondents assertion, the petition for certiorari filed by
the petitioners with the Court impleaded Usec. Gutierrez, who, as then Justice Undersecretary, issued the
assailed resolutions for the Secretary of Justice. While the DOJ did not formally enter its appearance in this
case, or file any comment or memoranda, the records show that the Court issued resolutions, addressed to the
DOJ as a party, to submit the appropriate responsive pleadings.[110] As an extraordinary remedy, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court does not require that summons be issued to the respondent; the service upon him of an order to
file its Comment or Memorandum is sufficient.[111]
b. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts not inflexible

Conceding the remedial propriety of the present petition, the respondents nevertheless assert that under
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the present petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA),
which has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to issue the extra-ordinary writ of certiorari.
We agree with the respondents.
In Vergara, Sr. v. Judge Suelto,[112] the Court laid down the judicial policy expressly disallowing a direct
recourse to this Court because it is a court of last resort. The Court stressed that *w+here the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of [another court], it [must be in that court] that the specific
action for the writs procurement must be presented. The rationale behind the policy arises from the necessity
of preventing (i) inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and (ii) further overcrowding of the Court's docket.[113]
People v. Cuaresma[114] and subsequent jurisprudence later reaffirmed this policy, stating that a direct
invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction may be allowed only if there are special and important reasons
clearly and specifically set out in the petition or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.[115]

In the present case, the petitioners have not advanced any special and important reason or reasons why direct
recourse to this Court should be allowed, considering the availability of a certiorari petition with the CA; nor do
we find exceptional and compelling circumstances in the present petition to apply the exception to the judicial
policy.[116] However, if only to avoid further delay by leniently reading the petition, and assuming import to,
the allegation that the respondents falsified a document that forms part of the PCGGs official records of its
correspondence with a Philippine diplomatic official we deem it of practical necessity to resolve the case on its
merits.[117]
c. Grave abuse of discretion: procedural aspect of the DOJs determination of
lack of probable cause

The petitioners argue that since Atty. Pealosa was still Jacobis counsel of record at the time she filed the
unverified petition for review, Jacobi could not disown the act of his counsel by simply availing of another
remedy through another counsel. Consequently, the dismissal of Jacobis unverified petition for review - albeit
on a technical ground - rendered the first resolution as the final determination of the existence of probable
cause against the respondents.
The mere filing of a notice of appearance of a new counsel does not automatically give rise to the presumption
that the present counsel of record has already been substituted or that his authority has been withdrawn.
Therefore, absent a formal withdrawal of appearance filed by Atty. Pealosa, the Padilla law firm is considered
merely as a collaborating counsel and its entry of appearance does remove from Atty. Pealosa the authority to
file, when she did, the petition for review with the DOJ.[118] Even Jacobi impliedly admitted that Atty. Pealosa
was still his counsel at the time she filed the petition for review by not addressing the issue of her authority to
file it and by conveniently choosing to keep silent (thus impliedly agreeing with) regarding her account of the
filing of the petition.
Contrary to the petitioners claim, records bear out that the Padilla law firm had attached the Pealosa letter to
its July 19, 1999 manifestation, showing that Jacobi already terminated Atty. Pealosas services as of June 29,
1999 (or before the unverified petition for review was filed). However, since this Manifestation was filed with
the DOJ only on July 20, 1999,*119+ Atty. Pealosas earlier filing of the petition for review cannot be considered
unauthorized. While the filing of this July 19, 1999 manifestation would have the effect of discharging Atty.
Pealosa,[120] it cannot undo her act which was valid and effective at the time it was done.[121]
All things considered, the factual peculiarities of this case do not lead us to adopt the petitioners position.
Under Department Circular No. 70 of the DOJ,[122] an aggrieved party may appeal the resolution of the city or
provincial prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice upon receipt either of the questioned resolution or of the denial
of a motion for reconsideration of the questioned resolution. Logically, the filing of a petition for review is
deemed a waiver of the more expedient remedy of asking for reconsideration from the investigating prosecutor.
Notwithstanding the irregularity that would result in availing two remedies in succession, Prosecutor Romano
granted Jacobis request (through the Padilla law firm) for an additional period within which to file an
appropriate pleading, glossing over the petition for review filed on the same date (July 15, 1999) with the
Secretary of Justice. Accordingly, Jacobi filed his first MR on July 29, 1999, through the Padilla law firm.
Upon discovery of Jacobis previously filed petition for review, Prosecutor Romano refused to entertain Jacobis
first MR in deference to the Secretary of Justice.*123+ (Unfortunately, the then Secretary of Justice
subsequently denied Jacobis petition for review based solely on a procedural defect, i.e., Jacobi failed to verify
the petition).
A significant point that should be appreciated at this juncture is that Atty. Reyes himself had a validly filed
motion for reconsideration since he had been alleged to be not only a lawyer, but a co-conspirator of Jacobi in
the offenses sought to be charged. It must be considered, too, that the petitioners accusations against the
respondents arose from the same set of disputed (and undisputed) facts whose resolution, for purposes of
determination of probable cause, could not be considered independently of one another. The prosecutors
apparently forgot about Atty. Reyes motion for reconsideration when they recognized the petition for review
Jacobi earlier filed and in ruling on Jacobis first MR.
From this perspective, Prosecutor Zuos March 6, 2001 ruling on Jacobis second MR and on Atty. Reyes first
MR cannot be appreciated as grave abuse of discretion. While it seemingly violated established rules of
procedure, it provided ample justification therefor the avoidance of possibility of two conflicting rulings on
two motions treating of the same inseparable subject matter.

We remind the petitioners that when the technical rules of procedure desert its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes a great hindrance to the attainment of justice, its invocation deserves the least consideration from
this Court. Rules of procedure must yield, when proper and under justifiable causes and/or circumstances (as
what has been done in the present case), in the interest of substantial justice.
In these lights, we cannot likewise agree with the petitioners remonstrations that Usec. Gutierrez
improperly overruled the resolution of former Secretary Cuevas. As the respondents pointedly countered, the
assailed resolutions were issued by Usec. Gutierrez for the Secretary of Justice, who at the time was no longer
Secretary Cuevas.[124] Absent any allegation and proof of any acquired vested right, the discretion exercised by
a former alter-ego cannot tie the hands of his successor in office since cabinet secretaries are mere projections
of the Chief Executive himself.[125]

With the procedural issues cleared, we now resolve the ultimate issue of whether probable cause exists to
charge the respondents with falsification and use of falsified documents.
II.
a.

Substantive aspect
Determination of probable cause, an executive function

The necessary component of the Executives power to faithfully execute the laws of the land is the States selfpreserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws. This responsibility is primarily lodged with the DOJ, as
the principal law agency of the government.[126] The prosecutor has the discretionary authority to determine
whether facts and circumstances exist meriting reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime. The
question of whether or not to dismiss a criminal complaint is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of
the investigating prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary (or Undersecretary acting for the Secretary) of
Justice.[127+ Who to charge with what crime or none at all is basically the prosecutors call.
Accordingly, the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.[128] Courts cannot order the prosecution of
one against whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too, cannot substitute their
own judgment for that of the Executive.[129]
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by law. This error or abuse alone,
however, does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive,[130] the
petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner
to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,[131] before judicial relief from a discretionary
prosecutorial action may be obtained. All these, the petitioner failed to establish.
b.

Lack of probable cause for falsification

For purposes of filing an information in court, probable cause refers to facts and circumstances sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondents probably committed
it. To guide the prosecutors determination, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused; the quantum
of proof to establish its existence is less than the evidence that would justify conviction, but it demands more
than bare suspicion.[132]
No definitive basis to determine probable cause has been established, except to consider the attendant facts
and circumstances according to the prosecutors best lights.*133+ No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is
determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.[134] In going through the process, the
prosecutor should carefully calibrate the issues of facts presented to him to the end that his finding would
always be consistent with the clear dictates of reason.[135]
In the present case, the petitioners rely on the jurisprudential presumption that a holder of a forged document
is himself the forger, and should be charged under Article 171, paragraph 2[136] and Article 172, paragraphs 1
and 3[137] of the Revised Penal Code.

I.
The presumptions roots in
jurisprudence
In the 1906 case of U.S. v. Castillo,[138] the Court laid down the rule that the utterance or use of a forged
instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence tending to establish that the user himself (or herself) either
forged the instrument or caused it to be forged. In this case, the accused merely denied ever presenting the
forged check to the complainant or receiving the amount it represented; the Court found no merit in these
denials. In People v. De Lara[139] (a 1924 case), the Court again applied the presumption after finding the
explanation of the accused on how he came into possession of checks that were subsequently encashed to
be unusual and unreasonable as to carry conviction.*140+
In People v. Domingo (1926),[141] the Court applied the presumption because a few days after the certificate of
title (over a property) was loaned to the accused, a forged deed of sale covering the property was executed by
two alleged vendors. The Court ruled that the failure of the accused to explain what she did with the certificate
of title loaned to her could only lead to the inference that she placed the certificate of title in the hands of her
confederates as without the certificate, the forgery could not have been accomplished.
In People v. Astudillo (1934),[142] the Court clarified[143] that for the presumption to apply, the use of the
forged document must be accompanied by these circumstances: the use is so closely connected in time with the
forgery,[144] or the user may be proved to have the capacity to undertake the forgery, or such close connection
with the forgers to create a reasonable link. These additional circumstances have been loosely applied in
subsequent cases.
In Alarcon v. Court of Appeals (1967),*145+ the Court applied the presumption after considering the patent
irregularity in the transaction*146+ and the extraordinary interest of the accused in the property covered by
the forged document/s in holding that no reasonable and fair*-]minded man would say that the accused had
no knowledge of the falsification. Sarep v. Sandiganbayan (1989 case),[147] gave occasion for the ruling that
since the accused was the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his
possession, the presumption of authorship of the falsification applies in the absence of contrary convincing
proof by the accused.[148]
In the more recent (1992) Caubang v. People,[149] the accused - who claimed to have the authority to transact
(in behalf of an entity) with a government agency in Manila - attempted to overthrow the presumption of
authorship against him by alleging intervening circumstances from the time he arrived in Manila until the
transaction with the government agency was made. The accused claimed the he did not carry the forged
document when he arrived in Manila and that third persons (including a fixer) actually transacted with the
government. Allegedly, these claims disproved that he had any knowledge or inference in the making of the
submitted forged document. Rejecting this claim, the Court ruled that:
[U]tilizing a fixer as part of the scenario becomes a convenient ploy to divert the mind of the court from the
more plausible inference that the accused-petitioner engineered the spurious [document].
xxxx
Even if the allegation that some other person [did the transaction] was true, the accused-petitioner would still
be subjected to the same conclusion.
xxxx
Having been the one responsible for the filing of the registration papers, including the means he felt necessary
to accomplish the registration, the accused must likewise be accountable therefor. As the authorized
representative, he is deemed to have been the one in custody or possession, or at least the one who has gotten
hold even for a short while, of the papers which included the [falsified document]. That he knew of the
execution of the statement is a possibility not too difficult to imagine under the circumstances.
xxxx
The [submission] of the previously inexistent document [with the government] subjects the accused-petitioner
to the inference that he used it as part of the registration papers. In the absence of a credible and satisfactory
explanation of how the document came into being and then filed with the [government agency], the accused is
presumed to be the forger [.][150] (italics supplied)

In Dava v. People (1991),[151+ involving an accused who misrepresented to his friend that he had no drivers
license and thereafter induced his friend to deal with fixers so that he could have a drivers license, the Court
ruled that the patent irregularity*152+ that attended the procurement of the license cannot escape the
conclusion that the accused knew that the license he obtained was fake and that he acted as a principal by
inducement in the falsification of the license.
The above case law instructs us that if a person had in his possession (actual or constructive) a falsified
document and made use of it, taking advantage of it and/or profiting from such use, the presumption that he
authored the falsification also applies.[153]
These cited cases, however, already involve a determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused, requiring
the application of the rigid standard of moral certainty. In a preliminary investigation that merely inquires into
the probability of guilt of a respondent, no reason exists why the same presumption cannot apply mutatis
mutandis, taking into account the different level of certainty demanded.
Where the evidence before the investigating prosecutor jibes with the factual premises[154] necessary for the
application of the presumption of authorship, a prima facie[155] case for falsification under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code is created. Correspondingly, the legal presumption gives rise to the necessity for the
presentation of contrary evidence by the party (against whom the presumption applies) to overcome the prima
facie case established;[156] otherwise, the existence of probable cause cannot be disputed.[157]
Based on these standards, the twin-issue we confront is whether the presumption applies and whether the facts
giving rise to it have been adequately rebutted by the respondents.
ii.

The legal presumption does not apply to Jacobi

Jacobi argues that the presumption of authorship does not apply to him because he never became a possessor
or holder of the De Guzman letter.
The De Guzman letter shows that Jacobi was its intended addressee although it was sent in care of Jacobis
then counsel, Atty. Reyes. Unlike the PCGG letters, whose authenticity the petitioners do not dispute, the De
Guzman letter recognized Atty. Reyes as Jacobis counsel in his dealing with the PCGG. The petitioners do not
dispute, too, Atty. Reyes representation to the PCGG as Jacobis counsel in several correspondences he had
sent, confirming that he had been acting in such capacity.
The relation of an attorney and a client is in many respects one of agency and the general rules of ordinary
agency apply. The extent of authority of a lawyer, when acting on behalf of his client outside of court, is
measured by the same test applied to an ordinary agent.*158+ Accordingly, even if we go by Atty. Reyes account
of how the De Guzman letter surfaced, Jacobi, at least, had constructive possession of the De Guzman letter.
Being a mere extension of the personality of the principal (client), the agents (lawyers) possession is considered
that of the principals.*159+
However, possession of the falsified letter is not enough to trigger the application of the presumption of
authorship; the use of the document[160] and the existence of any of the circumstances previously discussed is
still necessary.
In the present case, Jacobis use of the De Guzman letter is placed in doubt considering (i) that he was not in the
country when the Sandiganbayan petition - containing the De Guzman letter - was filed, and (ii) the absence of
his signature in the Sandiganbayan petition and in its verification. There is also a seven-month interval between
the date of the De Guzman letter and the filing of the Sandiganbayan petition. Cognizant of these facts, the
petitioners theorized that Jacobi and Atty. Reyes acted in conspiracy in coming up with a falsified De Guzman
letter.*161+ The petitioners claim that the attachment of the De Guzman letter to the respondents
Sandiganbayan petition was precisely aimed at compelling the PCGG to recognize Jacobis (and his groups) 10%
contingent fee arrangement with the PCGG and, ultimately, recovering it in the same action.
The petitioners claim fails to persuade us. The petitioners ignore the professional relationship existing between
Jacobi and Atty. Reyes at the time the Sandiganbayan petition was filed. The existence of this relationship
necessarily calls for a different appreciation of the facts established during the preliminary investigation than it
would if no such relationship existed. Under Rule 138[162] of the Rules of Court, matters of ordinary judicial
procedure are within the exclusive authority of the attorney. These include such questions as what action or
pleading to file, what should be the theory of the case, and how the claim (or defense) may be proved and those
affecting the sufficiency, relevancy and materiality of certain pieces of evidence.[163] The annexation of the De
Guzman letter in the Sandiganbayan petition and the Ombudsman complaint falls within these matters. Even
Atty. Reyes himself explained that Jacobi had no participation in the preparation of the Sandiganbayan petition,
much less in the attachment as annex of the De Guzman letter.[164]

Without determining the validity of Jacobis supposed arrangement with the PCGG, a reading of the
Sandiganbayan petition does not support the petitioners theory of conspiracy. In filing the Sandiganbayan
petition, the respondents seek to compel the petitioners to perform their duty to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses. With or without the agreement, the performance of this duty is a tasked imposed by law on
the PCGG; the performance of this duty is what the Sandiganbayan petition speaks of in plain terms.
Then, too, the DOJ found nothing to support the petitioners allegation of conspiracy or of inducement on
Jacobis part. Likewise, the Court cannot find any reason why the respondents should file the Sandiganbayan
petition to compel the petitioners to recognize their alleged contingent fee arrangement. To begin with, the
records do not show that the petitioners ever disputed the validity of this arrangement - as evidenced likewise
by the PCGG letters, which[165] are of similar import as the De Guzman letter and whose authenticity the
petitioners impliedly admitted at the time the respondents filed the Sandiganbayan petition.
Yet again, the existence of several letters and reports made by the respondents to the PCGG, regarding the UBS
account and the respondents activities in connection therewith, shows that the PCGG was at least aware of the
respondents efforts to assist in the recovery efforts of the government, in general, and of the PCGG, in
particular. Therefore, forging a letter that would simply be evidence of an implied agreement for those services
hardly makes any sense.[166]
Considering the inapplicability of the presumption of authorship and the dearth of evidence to support the
allegation of conspiracy, much less of evidence directly imputing the forgery of the De Guzman letter to Jacobi,
we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in absolving him.
iii.

The presumption in forgery was sufficiently explained by Atty. Reyes

Atty. Reyes does not seriously dispute the application of the presumption of authorship[167] as to him since he
was in possession, and made use, of the forged De Guzman letter, but offers an explanation on the
circumstances of such possession and use. On the other hand, the petitioners dispute the adequacy of his
explanation and impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of Usec. Gutierrez for surmising that the De
Guzman letter must have been doctored in the PCGG.*168+
What constitutes satisfactory explanation from the possessor and user of a forged document must be adjudged
on a case to case basis, consistent with the twin-purposes of a preliminary investigation[169] - viz: first, to
protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials; and second, to protect the respondent
from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial, unless a competent officer
shall have first ascertained the probability of his guilt.[170] Since the determination of probable cause lies within
the prosecutors discretion, the soundness of the explanation (to rebut the prima facie case created by the
presumption of authorship) is likewise left to the prosecutors discretion. Unless his determination amounted to
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, courts
must defer to the prosecutors finding.
We do not find grave abuse of discretion in the present case. By capitalizing on Usec. Gutierrezs assumption
that the questioned letter must have been doctored in the PCGG, the petitioners turned a blind eye to the
assumptions factual premise. We quote Usec. Gutierrezs discussion on this point, thus We have perused the NBI report; and our attention is caught by the statement therein that the typewritten
name and signature of FELIX M. DE GUZMAN, the typewritten entries Chairman, FMG/lai, dol, and the
handwritten entries 5c Records, 8/27 were lifted/extracted probably from the original and/or xerox copy from
the original of a typewritten letter addressed to the Hon. Tomas L. Syquia, Philippine Ambassador to Switzerland
dated 25 August 1998.
Since it is the PCGG that has the only copy of Chairman De Guzmans letter to Ambassador Syquia (except of
course the Ambassador) in its files bearing the same distinguishing entries from where the [De Guzman] letter
was lifted/extracted, we cannot see our way clear how the falsification can be attributed to respondent Reyes.
It is more credible that the questioned letter must have been doctored in the PCGG, which is the repository of
all official communications of former Chairman De Guzman, and passed to [Atty. Reyes] who accepted the same
not knowing its falsity.[171] (Emphasis added.)
In short, Usec. Gutierrez simply found Atty. Reyes explanation that the De Guzman letter was handed to
him by Director Daniel consistent with the premise of her assumption and sufficient to disregard the DOJs
previous finding of probable cause.
Additionally, we observe that along with the De Guzman letter, Atty. Reyes also withdrew the Gunigundo letter
from the Sandiganbayan petition because of the questionable authenticity of the signature it carried. When

Atty. Reyes tried to obtain a copy of this letter from the PCGG, he was informed that the PCGG had no copy of
this letter. Interestingly, the absence of a copy of the De Guzman letter in the PCGGs records was the core of
the statements in the affidavits of the PCGG employees, attached to support the petitioners complaint.*172+
The petitioners place too much reliance on the findings contained in the first resolution, blurring their
view of the function of a motion for reconsideration. It is precisely the office of a motion for
reconsideration[173] to give an agency making a quasi-judicial determination an opportunity to correct any
error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence,[174]
leading to a reversible conclusion at the administrative level. The petitioners have not shown that in arriving at
the assailed resolutions (which sustained the prosecutors reversal of the first and second resolutions), Usec.
Gutierrez gravely abused her discretion which would warrant a corrective action from the Court.
c.

Lack of probable cause for knowingly introducing a falsified document

Neither does probable cause exist against the respondents for the crime of introducing a falsified document in a
judicial proceeding, punished under the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The accuseds
knowledge of the falsity of the document, which he introduced in a judicial proceeding, is one of the
elements[175] of this crime. In the present case, not an iota of evidence was presented to show the
respondents knowledge of the falsity of the De Guzman letter at the time it was annexed to the Sandiganbayan
petition. On this point alone, the petitioners reliance on Choa v. Judge Chiongson*176+ is misplaced.
Given all the extant circumstances of the case, coupled with the immediate withdrawal of the De Guzman
letter, the resulting credit given by Usec. Gutierrez to the respondents defense-explanations must be respected.
d.

The PCGGs role in the governmental scheme vis--vis the Courts general policy of non-interference

As a final observation, we draw attention to the fact that the PCGG is a unique legal creature with a unique
mandate. It was created by President Corazon Aquino pursuant to her extraordinary legislative powers after she
declared a revolutionary government. The PCGGs charter, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, was the very first
executive order she issued. E.O. No.1 created the PCGG and charged it with the task of assisting the President in
the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. To
accomplish its gigantic task of recovering the plundered wealth of the nation,*177+ E.O. No. 1 granted the
PCGG ample powers and authority.[178]
In no time, the President issued E.O. No. 2,*179+ authorizing the PCGG to request and appeal to foreign
governments where the ill-gotten wealth might be found to freeze them and otherwise prevent their
transfer, conveyance, encumbrance, concealment or liquidation in the meantime that the legality of their
acquisition was determined. Indeed, the recovery of this ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
relatives and cronies is not only a matter of right but the paramount duty of the government.
Viewed from the uniqueness of the PCGGs creation and role, on one hand, and the general policy of the Courts
not to interfere with the prosecutors evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence that would establish probable
cause, on the other hand, we find it unfortunate, if not disturbing, how the respondents documented efforts to
assist the PCGG in the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth (given the staggering amount involved particularly in the
UBS account) and how the concerns they raised that allegedly hamper the governments efforts, would end up
as a legal warfare between two camps supposedly on the same side.
The seriousness of Atty. Reyes allegations of irregularities*180+ should have served as a warning signal to the
PCGG which carries a critical role in our peoples remedial efforts in addressing the causes that gave rise to the
EDSA revolution. The PCGGs success, if any and if at all, cannot be downplayed. To be sure, the PCGGs silence
in the face of these accusations (except to characterize the respondents defensive assaults as an undeserved
gibe*181+) raises a lot of unanswered questions and appears to justify the allegations of political motivation
behind the criminal charges against the respondents.
In sum, under the circumstances and the other observations made, the Court cannot but rule that the
petitioners failed to establish the existence of grave abuse of discretion justifying judicial interference.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition.
16.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011 August 7, 2006
[formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2083-RTJ]
IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.

JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR. Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The facts that gave rise to the filing of the present administrative case, as culled from the rollo, follow:
Following the death in Cebu City of one Mark James Enriquez on July 21, 2003, Cebu City Prosecutor Jesus P.
Feliciano filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu on July 23, 2003 an Information 1 charging Sherwin
Que a.k.a. Bungol, a certain Junjun, and nine Does with Murder.
Warrants for the arrest 2 of Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe, Richard Doe, Arnold Doe,
Dexter Doe, James Doe, Robert Doe, and Arthur Doe were thereupon issued by the Executive Judge of the Cebu
RTC.
On the invitation 3 of the 7th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group Unit (CIDGU) at Camp Sotero
Cabahug in Cebu City, Anthony John Apura (Apura), accompanied by his father, repaired to said office on August
1, 2003.
An "Inquest Investigation" of Apura was conducted on August 2, 2003, a Saturday, by a prosecutor who
recommended the impleading of Apura as co-accused in the case. A warrant for Apuras arrest was on even date
issued by Judge Apolinario Taypin, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Cebu RTC, who was on duty that day. 4
Apura was immediately arrested and detained.
Apura assailed the legality of his arrest via a "Motion to Dismiss" the Information, which he filed on August 5,
2003 before Branch 24 of the Cebu RTC to which the case was raffled.
By Order of August 13, 2003, Branch 24 Presiding Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., herein respondent,
"believ[ing] that there [wa]s lack of preliminary investigation," ordered the remand of the case against Apura to
the Cebu City Prosecutors Office for preliminary investigation, and ordered Apuras release from custody on a
bail of P20,000. Respondents said Order reads:
Accused-movant Anthony John Apura alleged in his Motion to Dismiss that his arrest was illegal because he
[went] to the police station upon invitation but immediately thereafter he was placed under custody of the
police. His arrest does not fall under a warrantless arrest nor it is within the purview of "hot pursuit" concept,
considering that the subject incident happened on July 19, 2003 and he was placed under arrest on August 2,
2003.
The Court believes that there is lack of preliminary investigation on the part of accused Anthony John Apura. The
warrant of arrest issued on July 24, 2003 on the basis of the original information filed on July 24, 2003 cannot be
made as valid basis for the arrest of the accused Anthony John Apura on August 2, 2003. The court notes that
accused Anthony John Apura is not the certain "Junjun" mentioned in the original Information.
What appalled the Court is the manner by which the accused was placed under custody. The actuation wherein
a person is invited to the police station for investigation and to place said person under detention when his
appearance therein was only to explain his side thereof, is foreboding.
WHEREFORE, short of declaring the arrest of movant illegal, and acting on the Motion to Dismiss, remand this
case to the Cebu City Prosecution Office for Prosecutor Jesus Feliciano to conduct preliminary investigation on
Anthony John Apura and said accused is ordered released from custody, being admitted to bail in the amount of
PhP 20,000.000 in cash, pending preliminary investigation, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 112.
Furnish parties and counsels copy of this Order and Prosecutor Feliciano, who is directed to submit his
preliminary investigation report sixty (60) days from today. 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint filed on September 7, 2004 by petitioner Imelda S. Enriquez,
the mother of the deceased Mark James Enriquez, against respondent for knowingly rendering an unjust order
and gross ignorance of the law and procedure for ordering the release of Apura on bail without first conducting
a hearing for the purpose.
To the complaint, respondent gives the following comment:

Respondent judge was trying to check the abuse committed by the State through its law enforcement agency
upon the rights of an accused person guaranteed to him by no less than the Constitution. The inquest
proceedings which followed . . . the "invitation" was [sic] highly irregular. The prosecutors knew this fact, which
is why, during the hearing on the "Motion to Dismiss", they agreed for [sic] the remand of the record for
preliminary investigation.
Had he granted the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Apura because of the illegal arrest, accused would be released just the same. Yet, to strike a balance
of the possible abuse on the rights of accused and the effort of the police at prosecution of crimes, respondent
did not categorically declare the arrest illegal but allowed the accused to post cash bail bond with an
accompanying "hold-departure" order. At least, to get hold of the accused while preliminary investigation is
conducted. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Report dated October 4, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), finding that respondent violated
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reading:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution,
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P21,000 for gross ignorance of the law. 7
By Resolution 8 dated December 14, 2005, this Court ordered the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, within ten days from
notice. Respondent responded in the affirmative in a Manifestation 9 received on January 27, 2006 to which he
attached additional papers in support of his case. On petitioners part, she also responded in the affirmative by
Manifestation 10 received on January 31, 2006.
An application to bail from Murder, for which Apura was indicted on August 2, 2003 when it was a capital
offense, 11 now punishable by reclusion perpetua, calls for a hearing, as called for under Section 8 of Rule 114
reading:
SEC. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody of the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court
may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise
unable to testify. (Italics in the original),
in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. 12
In the case at bar, respondent ordered Apura to be released on bail, without conducting a prior hearing.
The lack of preliminary investigation, in light of the finding that Apura was not lawfully arrested without
warrant, he having gone to the CIDGU in response to its invitation, did not justify respondents disregard of the
mandatory procedure governing the grant of bail.
Indeed, a preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the filing of the Amended Information. A
preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." 13 An inquest is "a
summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a
person was based on probable cause." 14
Where the penalty prescribed by law for an offense is at least four years, two months and one day of
imprisonment without regard to the fine, a preliminary investigation must be conducted before the filing of a
complaint or information for such offense. 15 The conduct of an inquest investigation does not fulfill the
requirement for the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of an information or complaint
involving any such offenses, except when the accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant. 16
In the case at bar, the accused was not even arrested. He repaired to the CIDGU on its invitation. He should thus
have been subjected to a preliminary investigation, not a mere inquest investigation. 17

An Amended Information was subsequently filed, however, upon which a Warrant of Arrest was issued against
Apura by Judge Taypin. By so issuing a warrant, Judge Taypin is presumed to have , before issuing the warrant,
previously regularly discharged his duty to personally determine the existence of probable cause against the
accused, as mandated by Section 6 of Rule 112, which provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing
of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
At all events, the absence of a preliminary investigation did not justify Apuras release, the defect not having
nullified the information and the warrant of arrest against him. Thus this Court held in Larranaga v. CA: 18
We hold, therefore, that petitioners detention at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center is legal in view of the
information and the warrant of arrest against him. The absence of a preliminary investigation will not justify
petitioners release because such defect did not nullify the information and the warrant of arrest against him.
We ruled in Sanciangco, Jr. v. People: 19
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence,
the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so
that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. (Citation omitted)
In fine, respondents release on bail of Apura, without priorly conducting a hearing for the purpose, betrays his
gross ignorance of the law, it being settled that where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
observance thereof constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 20
Gross ignorance of the law may be punished with dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40.000. 21
This Court, however, appreciates as mitigating in respondents favor his issuance of a hold-departure order
against the accused. 22 It is in this light that it reduces the recommended penalty of fine to P15,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is
FINED Fifteen Thousand (P15,000) Pesos, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

17.) A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817

March 12, 2013

(Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.

HON. ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and
MR. REYNALDO S. TEVES, Branch Clerk of Court, same court, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The administrative matter stemmed from the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Audit Team
which conducted the judicial audit on June 16 to 28, 2008 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City, pursuant to Travel Order No. 45-2008 dated May 28, 2008, series of 2008.1
The team examined the records of 5,120 cases consisting of 4,466 criminal and 654 civil cases. The examination
yielded the following results:2
STATUS/STAGES OF PROCEEDINGS
CRIMINAL CASES
CIVIL CASES
TOTAL
For Promulgation
12
0
12
Submitted/Due for Decision
120
89
209
With Pending Incidents for Resolution
172
63
235
No Initial Action since Filing of Case
220
3
223
No Further Action for Considerable Length of Time3,179
312
3,491
With Warrant of Arrest/Summons
33
70
103
For Arraignment
82
82
For Setting
5
5
For Preliminary Conference/Pre-trial
58
18
76
For Compliance
38
8
46
With Pending Motions
5
2
7
On Trial/For Initial Trial
288
23
311
Suspended Proceedings
24
3
27
Archived
131
1
132
Decided/Dismissed/Disposed
99
62
161
TOTAL
4,466
654
5,120
The Presiding Judge of the subject court is Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Judge Tormis), while the Clerk of Court is
Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves (Mr. Teves).3 Judge Tormis took her oath and assumed office on June 22, 1999. Her
service was, however, interrupted because of the following administrative cases wherein she was either
suspended or preventively suspended, to wit:
1. Decision dated September 20, 2005 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 (Abuse of Authority) wherein Judge Tormis was
suspended from service for six (6) months. In a subsequent resolution dated July 12, 2006, she was directed to
resume office immediately upon receipt of notice;
2. Resolution dated July 10, 2007 in A.M. No. 07-1691 (Judicial Audit on Solemnization of Marriages) wherein
she was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately. The suspension was lifted per Resolution
dated December 11, 2007; and
3. Resolution dated November 28, 2007 in A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692 (Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct) wherein
she was suspended for six (6) months.4
During the absence of Judge Tormis, Judge Carlos C. Fernando (Judge Fernando) of the MTCC, Branch 2,
Mandaue City was designated as Acting Presiding Judge pursuant to Administrative Order Nos. 110-2007 and 22008 dated July 9, 2007 and January 7, 2008, respectively.5
The report revealed that Branch 4 does not maintain a docket book or any similar system of record-keeping and
monitoring.6 Specifically, the Audit Team found the following irregularities committed by Branch 4:
(1) There were decisions/judgments in eleven (11) criminal cases rendered by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis which
have not been promulgated despite the lapse of considerable length of time;
(2) There were two (2) inherited cases which remained undecided for about ten (10) years or more;
(3) There were one hundred twelve (112) criminal and eighty-three (83) civil cases submitted for decision before
Judge Tormis which have remained undecided beyond the reglementary period to decide the same;
(4) There are six (6) criminal and six (6) civil undecided cases submitted for decision before then Acting Presiding
Judge Carlos C. Fernando;

(5) There are one hundred seventy-two (172) criminal and sixty-three (63) civil cases that are with pending
incidents for resolution;
(6) Of the 172 criminal cases referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, one hundred forty-five (145)
cases involve violation of city ordinances/traffic rules with pending motions to archive. The court therefore
failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated June 21, 1993 relative to the guidelines in the
Archiving of Cases;
(7) There are two hundred twenty (220) criminal and three (3) civil cases that have no initial action/proceeding
since their filing in court;
(8) There are three thousand one hundred seventy-nine (3,179) criminal and three hundred twelve (312) civil
cases without further action or proceedings for a considerable length of time;
(9) There was an unreasonable delay in deciding Criminal Case No. 111373-R entitled People vs. Roel Ricardel
[Ricardel case] for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Double Homicide, since the trial ended on August 29, 2003
and yet it was decided only on April 18, 2008 not by Judge Tormis but by Acting Presiding Judge Fernando;
(10) It has been the practice of MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City not to promulgate judgments in criminal cases in
blatant violation of Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(11) It appears that the Decision dated June 4, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 72880-R to 83-R and 85346-R to 53-R
entitled People vs. Evangeline Datan [Datan case] for Violation of BP 22, was actually rendered by Judge Tormis
at the time when she was already suspended by the Court sometime in July 2007 and said decision has not been
promulgated; and
(12) In Criminal Case No. 126542R to 49-R entitled People vs. Jasmin L. Librando [Librando case] for Violation of
BP 22 which is a case falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Tormis ordered the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.7
In a Resolution dated March 18, 2009, the Court directed Judge Tormis to promulgate the decisions/judgments
that have not been promulgated; decide with dispatch the two (2) inherited cases that have remained
undecided for ten years or more; decide within a non-extendible period of four (4) months criminal and civil
cases which are already beyond the reglementary period to decide cases; to resolve within a non-extendible
period of four (4) months the pending incidents/motions in criminal and civil cases which are beyond the
reglementary period within which to resolve the incidents; to immediately take appropriate action on 145
criminal cases pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 7-92-A; to immediately take appropriate action on
criminal and civil cases which have no initial action since their filing in court and those which have no further
action for a considerable length of time; explain why she failed to comply with her duty to conduct actual
semestral physical inventory of case records thereby submitting to the Court inaccurate reports; explain the
delay in deciding the Ricardel case; explain why she allowed the practice of not promulgating
decisions/judgments in criminal cases in violation of Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Section 17 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; explain why she rendered the decision
dated June 4, 2007 in the Datan case at the time when she was already suspended by the Court; explain why in
Librando case, she ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure; and submit to the Court her compliance with the foregoing directives.8
In the same resolution, the Court directed Mr. Teves to explain why he failed to comply with his duty to conduct
actual semestral physical inventory of case records thereby submitting inaccurate reports of cases; explain why
he failed to keep a General Docket Book pursuant to Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court; to explain why he
allowed the practice in their court of not promulgating decisions/judgments in criminal cases in violation of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; and to submit to the Court a report of
compliance of the foregoing directives.9
In compliance with the Courts directive, Judge Tormis explained the irregularities that she allegedly committed.
She claimed that she faithfully conducted semestral physical inventory of case records except during the period
comprising her three suspensions as she was then denied access to her courtroom and case records.10 She
likewise cited the foregoing suspensions as the causes of the delay in the disposition of cases then pending in
her court.11 She also alleged that the delay in the disposition of the Ricardel case was brought about by the
parties request for time to negotiate on the civil aspect of the case.12 She also denied the alleged practice of
her court of not promulgating judgments in criminal cases. She specifically cited the Datan case and explained
that she rendered the decision prior to her preventive suspension and she filed it with Mr. Teves for the latter to
calendar it for promulgation, but instead of following her directive, Mr. Teves sent copies of the decision to the

parties of the case.13 Insofar as the Librando case is concerned, while admitting having issued the warrant of
arrest, she supposedly did so only because the accused failed to appear during the arraignment despite
notice.14 Finally, she claimed that she had satisfactorily complied with the directive to decide the cases
submitted for decision although beyond the period to decide; she had resolved the incidents due for resolution
and had archived all the cases due for archiving; and, she had either disposed of or archived the inactive
cases.151wphi1
For his part, Mr. Teves explained that the alleged error in his reports can be attributed to the discrepancy in
procedure or appreciation in the preparation of the reports.16 He claimed that their court indeed does not
maintain a general docket book, because they have not been provided by the Court with the needed supplies.17
Lastly, on the alleged practice of non-promulgation of judgments, he claimed that the Rules are not applicable
because most of their cases were resolved based on compromise agreement, plea of guilt and dismissal by
reason of affidavit of desistance, failure to prosecute, or violation of the right to speedy trial.18
Conclusions and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator
While recognizing the suspensions of Judge Tormis as one of the reasons for the delay in the disposition of
cases, the OCA observed that several of the cases had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to her
suspension. As such, she should be held liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order, a violation of
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Considering that said offense is a less serious charge, and taking into
account the number of unresolved cases pending in her sala, the OCA recommended that Judge Tormis be
meted the penalty of fine of P80,000.00.19 For failure to comply with her duty to provide efficient court
management system in her court, which includes the preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly
report of cases as tools thereof, the OCA also found Judge Tormis guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars, another less serious charge, warranting the penalty of fine of P20,000.00.20 The OCA,
however, exonerated Judge Tormis of the alleged practice of non-promulgation of decisions/judgments as the
same was just misunderstood.21 Finally, in ordering the arrest of the accused even before the latter was
apprised of the charges against her, the OCA found Judge Tormis liable for gross ignorance of the law, a serious
charge warranting the imposition of the penalty of fine of P20,000.00.22
As to Mr. Teves, the OCA found him guilty of mismanagement of the case records leading to the courts failure
to dispose of many pending cases to the prejudice of the litigants concerned. As such, he was found to be liable
for simple neglect of duty.23 Mr. Teves is likewise guilty of another simple neglect of duty in failing to set for
promulgation the decision in the Datan case.24 As such, the OCA recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine
in the amount equivalent to two (2) months of his salary.25
The OCAs recommendation is quoted hereunder for easy reference:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. The instant matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter against Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presiding Judge, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court;
2. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis be found GUILTY OF (a) undue delay in rendering a decision or order; (b) violation
of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars resulting in the mismanagement of the court; and (c) gross
ignorance of the law for ordering the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 126542R to 49-R entitled
People vs. Jasmin L. Librando without the accused having been informed yet of the charge against her and
accordingly be FINED in the amounts of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), respectively, with the warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely;
3. Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and be FINED in the amount equivalent to
his two (2) months salary with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely; and
4. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves be DIRECTED to hereceforth (a) submit accurate
monthly reports of cases and docket inventory reports; (b) strictly monitor the movement of all pending cases
that are active, being tried and until decided, dismissed or archived, as may be warranted; (c) improve the
system of serving court processes including the return or proof of service; and (d) maintain a general docket
book pursuant to Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.26
The Courts Ruling
1wphi1

The present administrative case refers to not just one but several acts allegedly committed by Judge Tormis and
Mr. Teves said to be violative of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court rules, regulations and directives. Judge
Tormis is hereby accused of committing the following irregularities:
(1) undue delay in the disposition of cases; (2) mismanagement of the court and case records; (3) nonpromulgation of decisions; and (4) issuing a warrant of arrest without first apprising the accused of the charge
against him. For his part, Mr. Teves is here charged with (1) mismanagement of case records; and (2) failure to
set case for promulgation.
Undue Delay in the Disposition of Cases
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the
reglementary period of ninety (90) days.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under
the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch
and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of
cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.27
In this case, Judge Tormis had been remiss in her duty to dispose of cases within the mandatory period to do so.
Two of such cases had in fact remained undecided for ten (10) years; a total of one hundred ninety-five (195)
cases had yet to be decided despite having been submitted for decision for more than ninety (90) days; ninety
(90) cases had been submitted for resolution beyond the mandatory period but were yet to be resolved; two
hundred twenty-three (223) cases had been filed in court, but Judge Tormis failed to make even just the initial
action for a considerable period; and three thousand four hundred ninety-one (3,491) cases had no further
action for a considerable length of time. When asked to explain such delay, Judge Tormis claimed that it was the
consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as she was suspended for an aggregate period of
almost one year and six months. Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases
(that will be discussed below) wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of the Bench. She
cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice.
Even if we allow her to use such an excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed to
dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to her suspension. Hence, she cannot be
absolved from liability for her inaction. This notwithstanding her later compliance with the Courts resolution
thereby making the appropriate action on said cases.
The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions
rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved.28 The delay in deciding a case within the
reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with promptness.29 Judge Tormis is thus liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period.
Mismanagement of Court
As held by the Court in In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 45,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan:30
An orderly and efficient case management system is no doubt essential in the expeditious disposition of judicial
caseloads, because only thereby can the judges, branch clerks of courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the civil and
criminal dockets ensure that the court records, which will be the bases for rendering the judgments and
dispositions, and the review of the judgments and dispositions on appeal, if any, are intact, complete, updated,
and current. Such a system necessarily includes the regular and continuing physical inventory of cases to enable
the judge to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in
proper order. In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack of periodic inventory definitely cause
unwanted delays in litigations and inflict unnecessary expenses on the parties and the State.31
Here, the OCA found the courts failure to maintain a general docket book. Although the duty is vested with Mr.
Teves, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of her staff perform their duties. This failure
contributed to their inability to keep track of the number of cases assigned as well as to account for all the cases
and records assigned to the court. The OCA likewise found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted inaccurate
reports as to the actual number of cases pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt
an efficient system of monitoring their cases. Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the

OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the
status of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper order. If the same was conducted,
she would have discovered that Mr. Teves had been committing a mistake in the inventory of cases. As found by
the OCA, Judge Tormis is guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to
comply with her duty of providing an efficient court management system in her court which includes the
preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof.
As for Mr. Teves, he admitted that:
He kept the records of dormant cases inside the storage room. Most of these cases are violations of city
ordinances, resisting arrest, vagrancy and collection of sum of money with replevin filed by lending institutions
and covered by the Rule on Summary Proceudre. If there are no returns, or the returns were not duly served as
when the accused could not be found in the given address, and no party makes any follow-up, they remain in
the storage room. According to him, "(they) cannot immediately act on these records unless a motion was filed
either by the public prosecutor or interested complainants, confer to this court and make a follow-up on their
cases." Thus, unless there is a follow up, he will not act on the case. Further, he admitted that "except those
with proper returns, hundreds of these returns were not attached to the records because the respective clerkin-charge cannot cope up with over laden work."32
Moreover, Mr. Teves himself admitted that he failed to comply with Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
wherein he is mandated to keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for
receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in the order in
which they were received, and, under the heading of each case and a complete title thereof, the date of each
paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by
reference to a single page the history of the case may be seen.
With these infractions, Mr. Teves shall be liable for simple neglect of duty.
Non-promulgation of Judgment
The alleged practice of Branch 4, Cebu City of not promulgating judgments in criminal cases was not
substantiated except for the Datan case wherein Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for promulgation, just
gave the accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when
Judge Tormis was serving her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or
outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty.1wphi1 It is his duty to calendar the
case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in fact,
served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated first and at the
time when the judge who rendered the decision was serving her suspension. This negligence on the part of Mr.
Teves, does not, however, wholly exempt Judge Tormis from administrative liability even if the same took place
at the time when she was prohibited access to her court. The Court cannot fathom how she failed to find out
Mr. Teves negligence. When she resumed her position, it was incumbent upon her to check the status of the
cases she left prior to her suspension. A judge cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of her court personnel, for the latter are not the guardians of the formers responsibility.33
Unless the reins of control and supervision over the administrative aspect of the adjudicatory process are
tightened, the swift and efficient delivery of justice will be impeded and rendered illusory.34
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest Without
Apprising the Accused of the Charge
Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure,35 the general rule is that the court shall not
order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required.36 In this case, Judge Tormis
claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the Librando case was justified because
of the accuseds failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly found by the OCA,
Judge Tormis order requiring the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses
within ten days from receipt of the order was not yet served upon the accused when she issued the warrant. In
doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the

accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counteraffidavits and other countervailing evidence.37
As held in Tan v. Casuga-Tabin:38
While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision they
render, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent, abusive and arbitrary in their prerogatives. If
judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will not only be confusion in the administration
of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process. While there appears to be no
malicious intent on the part of respondent, such lack of intent, however, cannot completely free her from
liability. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to her office to know and simply apply it.39
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a
substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every
judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law
is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.40
Proper Penalty
on Judge Tormis
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation
of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges
with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.41
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis work history which reflects how
she performed her judicial functions.42 We find that there are several administrative cases already filed against
her, most of the cases have been decided against her, the others have been dismissed and some are still
pending in Court. These cases show her inability to properly discharge her judicial duties.43 Her suspensions had
in fact been used by her as a defense in her failure to resolve and decide cases and incidents pending in her
court.
In Judge Navarro v. Judge Tormis,44 Judge Tormis was found guilty of improper conduct for trying to influence
the course of litigation in
Criminal case No. 99796-12 pending with another court and was thus reprimanded for the same with a warning
that a repetition thereof shall be dealt with more severely. She was, likewise, admonished for conduct
unbecoming of a judge.
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu,45 Judge Tormis was found
guilty of gross violation of Section 17, Rule 114 for having approved the bail posted by the accused in Criminal
Cases No. CEB-BRL-783 and 922 pending before RTC Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, considering that there was no
showing of the unavailability of all twenty-two RTC judges in Cebu City. With this infraction, she was fined in the
amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Lachica v. Judge Tormis,46 Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross misconduct for (1) having abused her
judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused; and (2) for deliberately
making untruthful statements in her comment and during the investigation of the instant administrative case
with intent to mislead the Court. Here, it was established that the accused was released from confinement after
Judge Tormis called the police station informing the officer of the receipt of the cash bail bond but without the
issuance of the Release Order. In determining the proper penalty, the Court took into account Judge Tormis
past infractions and concluded that she was not reformed despite being chastised thrice. She was thus
suspended from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits, and sternly warned that a repetition
of the same and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. On motion of Judge Tormis, the Court47 ordered
a reinvestigation of the case and to allow her to present additional evidence. Said order was later clarified in a

Resolution dated July 12, 2006 wherein she was directed to resume office immediately upon receipt of the
resolution and directed the Financial Management Office of the OCA to immediately release all the salaries and
benefits which were withheld from her. However, after reinvestigation, on August 13, 2008, she was severely
reprimanded for the unauthorized receipt of cash bond and keeping the same in her house.
In Antonina Y. Luib v. Hon. Rosabella Tormis,48 Judge Tormis was admonished and reminded to be more
circumspect in granting postponements.
In Visbal v. Tormis,49 Judge Tormis was found liable for gross misconduct for her repeated defiance of the
Courts Order to furnish complainant (in another administrative case) of her comment and/or to submit to the
Court proof of such service. She was thus suspended for six (6) months without salary, with a stern warning that
another repetition of a similar act will be dealt with most severely. In imposing the penalty, the Court took into
consideration eight other administrative cases filed against her.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judges Anatalio S. Necesario, Br. 2, et al.,50 Judge Tormis was one of the
judges investigated, relative to the irregularities in the solemnization of marriages. For this, she was preventively
suspended. Although the same was lifted in a Resolution dated December 11, 2007, she was prohibited from
solemnizing marriages until further orders from the Court.
The Court also notes that although dismissed by the Court, Judge Tormis was involved in four other
administrative cases. At present, there are still two pending cases against her. Judge Tormis conduct as a repeat
offender exhibits her unworthiness to don the judicial robes and merits a sanction heavier than what is provided
by our rules and jurisprudence.51
Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she committed in this
present case and as held by the Court in Inoturan v. Limsiaco, Jr.,52 Judge Tormis should be dismissed from the
service.
On Mr. Teves
As discussed above, Mr. Teves is here guilty of two counts of simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is
defined as the "failure of an employee to give one's attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard
of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.53 Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension for one month
and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second.54
In the determination of the proper penalty, we look into Mr. Teves past administrative cases. In Ramos v.
Teves,55 Mr. Teves was charged with arrogance and discourtesy in refusing to receive a motion that allegedly
does not conform with the requirements of the Rules of Court. In deciding the case against Mr. Teves, the Court
pointed out that clerks of court have no authority to pass upon the substantive or formal correctness of
pleadings and motions that parties file with the court. Thus, in refusing to receive the motion filed by
complainant, the Court found Mr. Teves discourteous, and in view of his past administrative cases, he was
meted the penalty of a thirty-day suspension, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely. In the same case, the Court noted Mr. Teves past infractions:
The record shows that Teves had previously been administratively charged with grave abuse of authority and
gross discourtesy in OCA-IPI 08-2981-P. Although the Court dismissed the charge for lack of merit on November
18, 2009, it reminded him to be more circumspect in dealing with litigants and their counsel.
In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave misconduct and immorality and the other for
insubordination, the Court meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months in its resolution of
October 5, 2011. x x x.56
Obviously, with his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves has not reformed. It seems that he has remained undeterred in disregarding
the law and he appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received.57 Mr. Teves
repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper public service58 which the Court can no
longer tolerate. Thus, the penalty of dismissal from the service is proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find respondent Judge Rosabella M. Tormis GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency,
Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars and Gross Ignorance of the Law. She is ordered
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations.

Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves is likewise found GUILTY of two counts of Simple Neglect of Duty, and in view of his past
infractions, he is meted the supreme penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
18.) G.R. No. 190318

November 27, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO VELASCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
We resolve the present appeal from the Decision1 dated August 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 03315, entitled People of the Philippines v. Roberto Velasco which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 dated March 5, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13 in Criminal Cases
No. 3579-M-2002, 3580-M-2002, 3581-M-2002 and 145-M-2003. The trial court found appellant Roberto
Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of three counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code as charged in Criminal Cases No. 3579-M-2002, 3580-M-2002 and 3581-M-2002. The trial court also
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 145M-2003.
The pertinent portions of the three Informations charging appellant with one count each of the felony of rape in
Criminal Cases No. 3580-M-2002, 3581-M-2002 and 145-M-2003 read as follows:
[Criminal Case No. 3580-M-2002]
That on or about the 27th day of December 2001, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the stepfather
of [Lisa3], a minor 14 years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his stepdaughter [Lisa] against her will and without her consent.4
[Criminal Case No. 3581-M-2002]
That on or about the 28th day of December, 2001, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the stepfather
of [Lisa], a minor 14 yrs. of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his stepdaughter [Lisa] against her will and without her consent.5
[Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003]
That on or about the 29th day of December, 2001, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the stepfather
of [Lisa], a minor 14 years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his stepdaughter [Lisa] against her will and without her consent.6
On the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information charging appellant with the felony of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 stated:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of
his moral ascendancy and influence over his stepdaughter [Lisa], a 15-year old child, with lewd designs, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation kiss and touch the private parts
of complainant against her will and consent.7
Appellant was arraigned for the two charges of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 3580-M-2002 and 3581-M-2002; and
one charge of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 on February 3, 2003 to which he entered
a plea of not guilty on all charges.8 He was later arraigned on March 12, 2003 for the third charge of rape in
Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003 to which he likewise pleaded "not guilty."9

After pre-trial, the cases were consolidated and the trial court conducted joint hearings on the merits. The
prosecution intended to present the victim "Lisa" and Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, the medico-legal officer who
examined her. However, after "Lisa" completed her testimony, the presentation of Dr. Viray was dispensed with
upon the defenses admission of the due execution of the medical certificate and the stipulation of the
prosecution that the cause of the victims non-virgin state was not determined by Dr. Viray.10 The defense, in
turn, presented appellant and his nephew, Roderick Palconet.
The material facts according to the prosecution and restated in the Appellees Brief are:
Appellant is the live-in partner of [AAA], the mother of private complainant [Lisa]. [Lisa] stayed with them in
their house in x x x, Malolos, Bulacan since she was fourteen (14) years old.
On December 27, 2001, at around 11:00 oclock in the morning, *Lisa+ was at the sala watching television.
Momentarily, appellant approached her and thereafter, removed his shorts and underwear as well as that of
*Lisas+. He then mounted *Lisa+ and inserted his penis into her vagina. He warned her not to report the incident
to anybody, otherwise, he will kill both [Lisa] and her mother. After satisfying his lust, appellant left without
saying a word. At the time of the incident, *Lisa+ and *appellant+ were alone in the house as *Lisas+ brother and
mother were out for work.
The following day, or on December 28, 2001, appellant again approached [Lisa] and removed both their shorts
and underwear. He went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She was again threatened not to
tell anyone of the incident. The incident took place outside the familys bedroom at around 11:00 oclock in the
morning while *Lisas+ mother and brother were not in the house.
The next day, or on December 29, 2001, also at around 11:00 oclock in the morning, *Lisa+ was raped for the
third consecutive time by appellant while they were alone in the house. [Lisa] testified that white fluid came out
of appellants penis. Like in previous incidents, she was threatened not to tell anyone of the incident.
A year thereafter, or on December 21, 2002, at midnight, when the other members of the family were asleep,
appellant attempted to insert his penis into [Lisas+ vagina while the latter was sleeping on her folding bed. This
time, *Lisa+ cried. Although appellant succeeded in touching and kissing *Lisas+ private parts, he did not push
through with his intention of raping her for fear of getting caught by the other family members who were
sleeping just a few feet away from them. The medico legal report submitted by public physician Richard Ivan
Viray states that [Lisa] is in a non-virgin state; that she had shallow healed hymenal lacerations at 2 and 3 oclock
positions and deep healed lacerations at 6 and 7 oclock positions.11 (Citations omitted.)
Conversely, the defense offered a different version of events which was retold in the Appellants Brief in this
wise:
For six (6) days a week in December 2001 and December 2002, [appellant] was working as a mason in Barangay
Caingin, Malolos, Bulacan. He leaves their house at 7:00 oclock in the morning to go to work and arrives at 5:30
in the afternoon.
He was [the] live-in partner of *Lisas+ mother. He was at work on the 27th, 28th and 29th of December 2001
with his nephew Roderick Palconet while he was at home on the 21st of December 2002. The accusations
against him were instigated by *Lisas+ father who was mad at him for having a live-in relationship with [Lisas+
mother.
RODERICK PALCONET, the *appellants+ nephew and co-worker at Caingin, Malolos, Bulacan, averred that from
8:00 oclock in the morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of the 27th, 28th and 29th of December 2001, he
was with [appellant].12 (Citations omitted.)
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted appellant on all the charges leveled against him. The
dispositive portion of the March 5, 2008 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, given the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape on three (3) counts as charged in Crim. Case Nos. 3579-M-02, 3580-M-02, and 3581-M-02 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count (total: three reclusion perpetua).
The Court likewise finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
Crim. Case No. 145-M-03, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum.

The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P150,000.00.13
Appellant elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which denied his appeal and affirmed with modification the
trial court judgment in a Decision dated August 25, 2009, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 3579-M-02, 3580-M-02 and 3581-M-02, appellant Roberto Velasco is held liable to pay
the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 moral damages; and P25,000.00 exemplary damages for
each count of rape in addition to the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 145-M-03, appellant Roberto Velasco is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum for
the act of lasciviousness. He is also held liable to pay the victim P30,000.00 moral damages and P20,000.00 civil
indemnity.14
Hence, appellant resorted to the present appeal, putting forward the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
AS ILLEGAL.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.15
The petition is without merit.
Appellant essentially focuses his defense on two issues: first, the preliminary issue surrounding the validity of his
warrantless arrest; and, second, the substantive issue concerning the evidence used to convict him for three
counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness.
With regard to purported irregularities that attended appellants warrantless arrest, we are of the same
persuasion as the Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too late in the day to be worthy of
consideration.
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise
this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus,
any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.16
Nevertheless, even if appellants warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still
not provide salvation to appellants cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a
trial free from error.17
Having disposed of the issue concerning appellants warrantless arrest, we now undertake to resolve the more
crucial issue involving the weight and sufficiency of the evidence used to convict appellant of the felonies he was
charged with in these consolidated cases.

Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously gave probative weight and credence to the alleged victims
incredible and uniform testimony which casts doubt on her truthfulness. He also contends that the medico-legal
reports conclusion which states that the "subject is in a non-virgin state physically" did not prove that the victim
was indeed raped. Moreover, he claims that the alleged victims failure to resist or to wake her brother and
mother immediately after the alleged sexual molestation on December 21, 2002 or to shout for help from their
neighbors who were in close proximity to their house negated the credibility of her accusations.
Appellant also reasons that the alleged victims willingness to live in the same house with him despite what he
allegedly did to her, taken together with her failure to immediately report the alleged sexual assaults to the
authorities, further eroded the reliability of the victims statements. Finally, he points out that he could not have
possibly committed the crimes attributed to him because, during the times and dates the alleged criminal acts
took place, he claims to be somewhere else.
In short, appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However,
after a careful review of the records of this case, we can safely conclude that such an assertion of innocence
cannot be upheld.
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of
the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.18 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the
testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better
position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who
among them is telling the truth.19 Lastly, in order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a
witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the
crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor
inconsistencies in her testimony.20
In the case at bar, we are in full agreement with the Court of Appeals that no fact or circumstance exists to
warrant a reversal of the trial courts assessment that the victims testimony is credible and worthy of belief. We
also concur with the findings of the appellate court that the testimony of the victim was made in a candid and
straightforward manner, even on extensive cross-examination. In sum, the alleged discrepancies in the victims
testimony were not significant enough to successfully tilt the scales of justice in favor of appellant.
With regard to appellants argument that the findings of the medico-legal report do not support the allegation
that the victim was indeed raped, we cannot give any credit to such claim in light of established jurisprudence
holding that a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.21
We have also recently reiterated that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and the
victims lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the offender into submission does not signify
voluntariness or consent.22 Furthermore, it is doctrinally settled that "delay in reporting rape incidents, in the
face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim"23 because "delay in reporting an
incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility
of the complainant."24 It is likewise settled in jurisprudence that human reactions vary and are unpredictable
when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault, thus, not all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.25
Thus, on the basis of the foregoing doctrines, we cannot uphold appellants assertion that the victims lack of
resistance; delay in reporting the rape incidents; and continued residence in appellants place of dwelling even
after she was raped numerous times militates against a finding that the allegations of rape are true.
We likewise conclude that the lower courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each charge of
rape was proper, notwithstanding the mention in the Informations of the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship. As the Court of Appeals noted, the appellants relationship to the victim, as her stepfather, was
not proven since there was no evidence of a valid marriage between appellant and the victims mother.
Anent the charge of one count of acts of lasciviousness, we declare that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
prove that appellant did commit the same.
The elements of this crime under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex.26

Furthermore, there is jurisprudence which says that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.27
In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals finding that the testimony of the victim was made in a
straightforward and convincing manner.1wphi1 Her testimony in this regard detailed how she was forced and
intimidated by appellant on December 21, 2002 and how appellant succeeded in molesting her by kissing and
touching her private parts, thus, satisfying the required elements of the crime charged.
As his principal defense against all these criminal charges, appellant provided an alibi. He maintains that, at the
time of the three rape incidents as well as the one instance of acts of lasciviousness, he was working at a
construction site in Barangay Caingin, Malolos City, Bulacan with his nephew Roderick Palconet who was the
only witness he presented in court in order to corroborate his alibi.
Time and again, we have repeated the legal doctrine that for alibi to prosper, it must be proved that during the
commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene.28 Furthermore, we have also established in jurisprudence that, in order for a corroboration of
an alibi to be considered credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses.29
In the case at bar, the testimony of appellants sole corroborating witness reveals that the distance between the
construction site and the appellants house where the instances of rape and acts of lasciviousness occurred is
relatively short and can be covered by a mere five-minute travel by motor vehicle. The relevant portion of said
testimony reads as follows:
[FISCAL JOSON]
Q When you said Caingin, it was a barangay of Malolos City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can reach Barangay Caingin from the place of the house of Mr. Velasco up to Brgy. Caingin, it will take
only five (5) minutes ride?
A It can be if there is no traffic, sir.30
Moreover, the testimony of appellants nephew, which is undoubtedly coming from a close relative, cannot, in
any way, be described as disinterested and unbiased. Therefore, considering these factual circumstances,
appellants defense of alibi certainly cannot prosper.
In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant for three counts of the felony of simple
rape and for one count of the felony of acts of lasciviousness. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of simple rape is correct in addition to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. However, the award of exemplary damages for each count of simple rape shall be increased to
P30,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.31 The award of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00
as moral damages for acts of lasciviousness is proper in addition to the penalty of an indeterminate prison term
of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum.
However, before we conclude, we clarify an oversight in the assignment of case numbers to the corresponding
felonies charged which was committed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its March 5, 2008 Decision
and repeated by the Court of Appeals in its August 25, 2009 Decision. In both rulings, the criminal charge of acts
of lasciviousness was erroneously attributed to Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003 when, in fact, the Information
filed for said case explicitly indicated the criminal charge of rape. On the other hand, the corresponding
Information as well as the evidence presented in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 clearly points to a criminal
charge of acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the correct attribution of criminal cases vis a vis crimes charged should be
Criminal Case Nos. 3580-M-2002, 3581-M-2002 and 145-M-2003 were for rape; and Criminal Case No. 3579-M2002 was for acts of lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 03315, finding appellant Roberto Velasco GUILTY in Criminal Case Nos. 3580-M-2002, 3581-M-2002 and
145-M-2003 for a total of three (3) counts of rape for which he is to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count, as well as, in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 for one count of acts of lasciviousness for which he is
to suffer the indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years of
prision correccional as maximum, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:

(1) The exemplary damages to be paid by appellant Roberto Velasco for each count of simple rape is increased
from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
(2) Appellant Roberto Velasco is ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all damages awarded at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
19.) G.R. No. 192898

January 31, 2011

SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA TRINIDAD, Petitioners,

vs.
VICTOR ANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner spouses Alexander Trinidad and Cecilia Trinidad
(petitioners) to challenge our Resolution of September 29, 2010. Our Resolution denied the petition for review
on certiorari for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of the order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 44, Masbate City, and of filing the motion for reconsideration, in violation of Sections 4(b)2 and 5,3 Rule
45, in relation to Section 5(d),4 Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
Antecedent Facts
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. On October 10, 2007,
the petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging this Resolution.
On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth
Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners.
As the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their
counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said order.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance
the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest5 praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of
the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ.
The MTCC, in its Order6 dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, "subject x x x to paragraph c[,] Section 11,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order,
and set the petitioners arraignment on September 10, 2009.7
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, docketed as SCA No. 05-2009. The RTC, in its
decision8 of January 6, 2010, denied this petition. The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC
denied their motion in its order9 dated July 5, 2010.
The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of one
(1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases
cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After
the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of
arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review with the DOJ.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day limit
on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. They cited several cases to show that the arraignment of an
accused should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of the assailed RTC
order and of filing the motion for reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration

In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that the date of receipt of the assailed RTC
order was stated in the petition. The petitioners further state that they filed the motion for reconsideration on
January 2, 2010.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review on certiorari.
A careful examination of the petition reveals that it stated the date when the petitioners received a copy of the
RTCs assailed order. In addition, the petitioners failure to state the material date of filing the motion for
reconsideration is only a formal requirement that warrants the relaxation of the rules in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice.
Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petition for its failure to show any reversible error in the challenged RTC
order.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in
the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order
his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the
Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway,10 the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of
60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the
RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This
period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How,11 Roberts, Jr. v. CA,12
and Dimatulac v. Villon13 were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no
60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) GRANT the present motion for reconsideration, and REINSTATE the petition for review on certiorari; and
(2) DENY the said petition for petitioners failure to show any reversible error in the challenged RTC order.
SO ORDERED.

20.) G.R. No. 191566

July 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing
the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's
motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married
Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with
Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondents petition and declared his
marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In
the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondents previous
marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married
to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which
second/subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to
support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for
the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy;
and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondents Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that
the facts alleged in the information that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and
without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon
constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the
ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not
one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied in an Order15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court16 before
the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with
Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27,
Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioners motion to quash and
resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that there is cogent basis in
looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage
was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court
further held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine,

considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity
of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against
him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents motion to
quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER
17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010
DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS
CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENTS FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT
EXTINGUISH RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montaez v. Cipriano,24 Teves v.
People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montaez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage
on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May
14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the
quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already
been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on
December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage
with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital
obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually
convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent
contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first
marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed
an information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone
and Montaez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the
offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity
of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however,
reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is
whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be
considered.27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on
its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information
be filed30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.31

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations
therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article
34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2)
that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. Respondents evidence showing the courts declaration that his marriage to Modina is null
and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to
establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time
he contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be
raised in a motion to quash.34 It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the
benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the
prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document
presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which
destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission
thereof.
Respondents motion to quash was founded on the trial courts declaration that his marriage with Modina is null
and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the
allegations in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree
extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Courts pronouncement in
Morigo v. People36 where the accused therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were
incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the
marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when
the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1wphi1 A declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondents line of defense
and the CAs ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he
obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again,
we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends
to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information
is material only for determining prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only
after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that
the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale,
neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the
established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be
raised only during the presentation of evidence.43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to
support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
21.) G.R. Nos. 174507-30

August 3, 2011

ATTY. EMELITA H. GARAYBLAS and ATTY. RENATO G. DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. GREGORY ONG, HON. JOSE HERNANDEZ and HON. RODOLFO PONFERRADA, as Chairman & Members,
respectively, 4th Division, Sandiganbayan; and People of the Philippines, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Order1 of the 4th
Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB 4th Division) dated June 14, 2006, holding petitioners liable for their nonappearance in the scheduled pre-trial conferences, and the Resolution2 dated August 10, 2006, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set aside.
The records reveal the following antecedent facts.
Petitioner Atty. Emelita H. Garayblas (Atty. Garayblas) is the principal legal counsel, with petitioner Atty. Renato
G. De la Cruz (Atty. De la Cruz) as collaborating counsel, for Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal who is facing charges for
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before several divisions
of the Sandiganbayan. Criminal Case Nos. 25741 and 25742 are pending before the Second Division, while
Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 are pending in the Fourth Division.3
Accused Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal was arraigned on February 20, 2006, and the SB 4th Division set the pre-trial for
April 6, 2006 in Davao City. On February 28, 2006, the Office of the Clerk of Court of the SB 4th Division sent a
Notice of Hearing to all the parties, informing them of the cancellation of the April 6, 2006 pre-trial hearing and
the resetting to April 27, 2006 in Davao City. Petitioner Atty. Garayblas, opposing the resetting to April 27, 2006,
filed a Motion to Reset. On March 23, 2006, the SB 4th Division issued an Order4 denying said motion to reset,
stating that "Atty. Garayblas and Associates must adjust their schedule to suit all the other accused and their
counsels, who are available for the pre-trial hearing in Davao City on April 27, 2006."
Petitioners failed to appear for pre-trial on April 27, 2006 in Davao City; hence, public respondents ordered
petitioners to explain why they should not be held in contempt.5 Atty. Garayblas filed a
Compliance/Manifestation dated June 5, 2006, explaining as follows:
On the morning of April 26, 2006, she went home from her office in view of her severe headache, body
weakness and sluggishness. She gave a call to her doctor/diabetologist who instructed her to get her sugar count
and blood pressure. The blood sugar taken revealed that her sugar count was 420 and the blood pressure, was
170/140, a very precarious condition.
She was advised to enter the hospital but the undersigned [Atty. Garayblas] opted to stay home and just follow
the instruction given by her doctor, Dr. Graciella Garayblas-Gonzaga of UST Hospital. She was requested to
administer her insulin injection every six (6) hours x x x. She was also advised to stay on (sic) bed until her sugar
count and blood pressure normalize.

Till the evening of the said date, the undersigned [Atty. Garayblas] continued to suffer the recurrent headaches,
sluggishness and body weakness. Her condition did not disappear. Due to this continuous discomforts and pains,
and apprehensive that she might lose her consciousness, she was unable to attend the above numbered criminal
cases scheduled for pre-trial hearings on April 27, 2006.6
Atty. De la Cruz also filed his Explanation7 dated June 3, 2006, stating that he did not attend the pre-trial of the
cases on April 27, 2006 in Davao City because he had to appear before the Second Division of the SB in Criminal
Case No. 25741 involving the same accused, attaching a certificate of appearance from the Second Division as
proof of his explanation.
On June 14, 2006, the SB 4th Division issued the first assailed Order, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
After reading and considering the respective submissions of Attys. De la Cruz and Habacon-Garayblas for their
absence in the scheduled pre-trial proceedings of the above-entitled cases in Davao City on April 27, 2006, which
caused the cancellation thereof, the Court finds them not quite satisfactory. It appears that they belong to the
same law office and, therefore, one or the other should have appeared or made the necessary arrangement to
let one of their associates or colleagues appear in the pre-trial conference knowing as they do of the Davao City
(out of town) schedule and the corresponding expenses thereof. Atty. De la Cruz should have been more
prudent in the scheduling of his cases in order to avoid his alleged conflict of schedule. Moreover, in case of
conflict, he should [have given] precedence or priority to the out of town schedule of this Court considering the
additional expenses for such out of town hearings.
On the other hand, the Court commiserates with the alleged plight and/or adverse medical condition of Atty.
Habacon-Garayblas (at that time) but, with the advance or modern means of communication at her disposal, she
should have made the necessary arrangement with her co-counsel Atty. De la Cruz or the other members of her
law office. Besides, the Court notes the absence of a medical certificate attesting to such medical condition of
Atty. Habacon-Garayblas.
Under these circumstances, the Court is constrained to hold Attys. De la Cruz and Habacon-Garayblas liable for
their absence or non-appearance which caused the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial conference and thus
wasted the time of the Court. Hence, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Court hereby orders them to pay the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) each as sanction or penalty
and to partially answer the traveling and other expenses of the Court in holding the subject pre-trial conference
in Davao City, within ten (10) days from receipt of this order.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.8
From the above-quoted Order, petitioners moved for reconsideration.
Atty. Garayblas reasoned that: (1) she had no intention whatsoever of disregarding the scheduled pre-trial but
her health and physical condition prevented her from attending the same, and records would show that except
for her non-appearance at the pre-trial, she had never been absent in all the proceedings for subject criminal
cases before the SB 4th Division; (2) her failure to submit a medical certificate was purely out of inadvertence;
(3) her non-appearance was not the only reason for the cancellation of the pre-trial as the records show that all
the accused failed to submit their respective pre-trial briefs; (4) while the Court has the duty to act on cases with
promptness, it should also act with understanding and compassion; (5) just so there would be a lawyer to attend
the proceedings scheduled on the same date in both the Second Division and the Fourth Division, they agreed
that Atty. De la Cruz would be the one to appear before the Second Division, while she (Atty. Garayblas) would
be the one to attend the pre-trial in Davao City before the Fourth Division; and (6) there were no other lawyers
from their law office who could attend the pre-trial in Davao City, as one had already resigned and another
member, Atty. Rafaelito Garayblas, just suffered from acute myocardial infraction complicated by diabetes.9
Atty. De la Cruz, for his part, reiterated Atty. Garayblas' explanation that he did not appear before the SB 4th
Division because they agreed that it was the latter who would appear for their client at the pre-trial in Davao
City.10
On August 10, 2006, the SB 4th Division promulgated the Resolution denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration, stating that even if the Court is inclined to believe Atty. Garayblas' illness, the Court still
expected her to make the necessary arrangement for co-counsel or any other colleague to attend the pre-trial. It
was also reiterated in said Resolution that Atty. De la Cruz should have given priority to the pre-trial hearing in
Davao City.11

Aggrieved by the foregoing disposition of the SB 4th Division, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari,
alleging that the SB 4th Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in not finding their explanation satisfactory and ordering them to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
each and to partially answer the traveling and other expenses of the Court in holding the subject pre-trial
conference in Davao City.
The Court finds some merit in the petition.
Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Non-appearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not
appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court
may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following
concur: (1) counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference AND (2) counsel does not offer an acceptable
excuse. There is no cavil that petitioners failed to appear at the pre-trial conference in Davao City on April 27,
2006. The crux of the matter in this case then is, did petitioners present an acceptable or valid excuse for said
non-appearance?
The SB 4th Division already said it believed Atty. Garayblas' claim that a day before the scheculed pre-trial
conference in Davao City, she started suffering from hyperglycemia (high blood sugar) and hypertension, and
she felt the symptoms thereof until the day of the pre-trial itself. This incapacitated her from traveling to Davao
City to appear at the proceedings. Note that symptoms of hypertension include confusion, ear noise or buzzing,
fatigue, headache, irregular heartbeat, and vision changes.12 As for hyperglycemia, a person suffering
therefrom experiences headaches, increased thirst, difficulty concentrating, blurred vision, frequent urinating,
and fatigue, among others.13 Verily, the Court can understand that a person suffering from confusion, difficulty
in concentrating, blurred vision, fatigue, and others, would be hard put to attend a hearing, much less have the
clarity of mind to think or worry about finding another lawyer to substitute for her. Indeed, it would not be
reasonable to expect her to have been able to make the necessary arrangements for another lawyer to attend in
her stead.
Consider, further, the importance of having counsel who is the most well-versed on the facts of the case, to be
the one attending a pre-trial conference. In Bayas v. Sandiganbayan,14 the Court expounded on the role of
lawyers in pre-trials, to wit:
Pre-trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. x x x .
x x x during pre-trial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the
trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing
litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial x
x x15
This being so, it is not quite prudent to send in a new lawyer, who has not had ample time to fully familiarize
himself or herself with the facts and issues involved in the case, to attend a pre-trial conference. Sending to the
pre-trial conference a new lawyer who is not very knowledgeable about the case would most probably lead to
such careless preparation which the Court abhors.
Moreover, respondents do not refute Atty. Garayblas' claim that before the pre-trial conference, she had never
been absent for a hearing before the SB 4th Division. This circumstance should be taken in her favor, as it shows
that she is not in the habit of feigning illness to deliberately delay the proceedings.
However, Atty. Garayblas should have at least sent word to the SB 4th Division and to her co-counsel, Atty. De la
Cruz, when she began feeling the symptoms of hypertension and hyperglycemia, that she would be unable to
attend said pre-trial conference. This would have been the courteous thing to do.
With regard to Atty. De la Cruz, his non-appearance at the pre-trial conference was also excusable. There were
hearings for their client's case in two separate divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the very same date in two
distant locations. To ensure representation for their client at the hearings in both divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioners agreed that Atty. De la Cruz would attend the one before the Second division, while
Atty. Garayblas would attend the one before the SB 4th Division in Davao City. It appears that Atty. De la Cruz
was not fully apprised of the fact that his co-counsel would not be able to attend the pre-trial conference. It is
understandable why Atty. De la Cruz could not have abandoned the hearing before the Second Division so he
could attend the pre-trial in Davao City. It was already too late in the day for Atty. De la Cruz to change plans and

to notify the Second Division that he would be absent so he could attend the pre-trial in Davao City instead of
the hearing at the Second Division.1avvphi1
The Court finds respondents' directive for petitioners to pay part of the travel expenses of court personnel in
holding the hearing in Davao City to be unwarranted. There is nothing on record to show that the proceedings
were being held in Davao City mainly because of the cases being handled by petitioners. In fact, the SB 4th
Division does not deny Atty. Garayblas' asseveration that the cancellation of the hearing on April 27, 2006 in
Davao City was caused not only by her and her co-counsel's failure to attend the pre-trial, but also because of all
the other accused's failure to submit their respective pre-trial briefs. The Minutes of the Session held on April
27, 2006,16 also shows that hearings/arraignment of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 25144 and 25143
(which are cases different from the ones being handled by petitioners) were held on that day for the Davao City
sessions of the SB 4th Division. Hence, the SB 4th Division's time and effort in holding sessions in Davao City
were not entirely wasted due to petitioners' inability to attend the pre-trial conference.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court deems imposing a fine on petitioners and ordering them to answer part of
the court personnels' travel expenses to be too harsh. In Inonog v. Ibay,17 the Court reiterated that:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well
as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise.
Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with
utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, not for retaliation or vindication. x x x18
Petitioner Atty. De la Cruz has presented a valid and acceptable excuse, for which he should not be found liable
under Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, petitioner Atty.
Garayblas showed some lapse in judgment, not to mention discourteous behavior, in not informing the SB 4th
Division at the earliest possible time of her illness and inability to attend said pre-trial conference.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan 4th Division's Order dated June 14, 2006
and its Resolution dated August 10, 2006 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122, 25125-29, 25133, 25135, 25137-38, are
hereby MODIFIED by DELETING the fine and the order for both petitioners to pay part of the traveling expenses
of the court. Instead, petitioner Atty. Garayblas is hereby given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
22.) G.R. Nos.195011-19

September 30, 2013

GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (3RD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court, and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. This Petition for Certiorari Ad
Cautelam1 seeks to set aside the August 5, 2010 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 2629726305,denying petitioner Gregorio Singian, Jr.'s Demurrer to Evidence3 and the November 18, 2010 Resolution4
denying reconsideration thereof.
Antecedents
The criminal cases involved in the present Petition have been the subject of a previous disposition of the Court,
specifically Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.5 In said case, the Court made the following recital of facts:
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador was Presidential Commission On Good Government Consultant on detail with the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). He was also the coordinator of the Technical
Working Group composed of officers and employees of government financing institutions to examine and study
the reports and recommendations of the Asset Privatization Trust relating to loan accounts in all government

financing institutions. Among the accounts acted upon by the Committee were the loans granted to Integrated
Shoe, Inc. (ISI) by the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
It would appear that on 18 January 1972, ISI applied for a five-year confirmed irrevocable deferred letter of
credit amounting to US$2,500,000.00 (P16,287,500.00) to finance its purchase of a complete line of machinery
and equipment. The letter of credit was recommended to the PNB Board of Directors by then Senior Vice[]President, Mr. Constantino Bautista.
On 27 January 1972, the PNB approved the loan, subject to certain stipulations. The said letter of credit was to
be secured by the following collaterals: a) a second mortgage on a 10,367-square meter lot under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 218999 with improvements, machinery and equipment; b) machinery and equipment to
be imported under the subject letter of credit; and c) assignment of US$0.50 per pair of shoes of ISIs export
sales. It was further subjected to the following pertinent conditions: a) that the letter of credit be subject to joint
and several signatures of Mr. Francisco J. Teodoro, Mrs. Leticia T. Teodoro, Marfina T. Singian, Tomas Teodoro,
and Gregorio Singian, Jr.; b) that ISI, which has a paid-up capital amounting to P1,098,750.00 as of January1972,
shall increase its authorized capital to P5,000,000.00, and in the event that cash receipts do not come up to the
projections, or as may be required by the bank, ISI will further increase its capitalization and the present
stockholders will subscribe to their present holdings; and c) that ISI shall submit other collaterals incase the
appraised value of the new machinery and equipment be insufficient.
ISI was further extended the following subsequent loan accommodations:
1. P1,500,000.00 on 10 February 1972 for the purchase of raw materials;
2. P1,000,000.00 on 18 January 1973 as export advance;
3. P1,500,000.00 on 21 March 1973 as export advance;
4. P600,000.00 on 06 March 1974 as credit line;
5. P2,500,000.00 renewed on 15 December 1976;
6. P5,000,000.00 on 19 November 1978 as export advance;
7. P1,500,000.00 on 04 August 1980 as export advance; and
8. P7,000,000.00 on 15 December 1980 also as an export advance.
The Committee found that the loans extended to ISI bore characteristics of behest loans specifically for not
having been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue haste.
As a result, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint dated 20 March
1996, for violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against the
following: Panfilo Domingo, former PNB President, Constantino Bautista, former PNB Senior Vice-President,
Domingo Ingco, former member of the PNB Board of Directors, John Does, former members of the PNB Board of
Directors, Francisco Teodoro, President of ISI, Leticia Teodoro, Vice-President of ISI, Marfina Singian,
Incorporator of ISI, Tomas Teodoro, General Manager of ISI, and Gregorio Singian, Jr., Executive Vice-President
of ISI. The complaint, docketed as OMB-0-96-0967, was assigned to Graft Investigation Officer I Atty. Edgar R.
Navales (Investigator Navales) of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) for investigation.
xxxx
Hence, the corresponding eighteen (18) Informations against petitioner and his co-accused for violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of Rep. Act No. 3019,docketed as Criminal Cases No. 26297 to No. 26314, were filed before
the Sandiganbayan and were raffled to the Third Division thereof. The eighteen (18)Informations correspond to
the nine (9) loan accommodations granted to ISI, each loan being the subject of two informations alleging
violations of both paragraphs of Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 3019.6
Thus, herein petitioner was charged with nine counts of violation of Section 3(e),7 and another nine counts of
violation of Section 3(g),8 of Republic Act No.3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26314, the cases involved the purported granting of behest loans by the
governments Philippine National Bank (PNB) to Integrated Shoes, Inc. (ISI), in various amounts and on different
dates as above-enumerated.

The Informations9 covering Section 3(e) charged that Panfilo Domingo(Domingo), then PNB
Director/President/Vice-President (Europe); Domingo C. Ingco (Ingco), then PNB Director; and Constantino
Bautista (Bautista), then PNB Senior Executive Vice-President, while in the performance of their official functions
and taking advantage of their official positions, conspired with private individuals, specifically officers of ISI,
including petitioner, who was ISIs Executive Vice-President, in willfully, unlawfully and criminally causing undue
injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to ISI by accommodating
and granting several loans and advances to the latter, despite knowing that it lacked sufficient capitalization, or
failed to give adequate collateral or raise its working capital to secure the governments interest in case it failed
to pay said loans, as in fact it failed to pay these loans.
On the other hand, the Informations10 covering Section 3(g) charged the above individuals, including petitioner,
with conspiring, confederating, and willfully, unlawfully and criminally entering into the above-mentioned loan
transactions which are grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, for lack of sufficient
capitalization or adequate collateral, and for failure of ISI to raise its working capital to secure the governments
interest in case it failed to pay said loans, which indeed ISI failed to pay.
On January 27, 2004, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on all counts. All the other accused were arraigned
as well, except for Bautista, who passed away prior to his scheduled arraignment.
On April 29, 2005, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case Nos.26306-26314.11 On October 6, 2007, the
accused Ingco passed away; as a result, the cases against him were dismissed as well. Accused Domingo likewise
passed away on June 26, 2008 resulting in an October 29, 2008 Resolution wherein the Sandiganbayan dropped
the cases against him.
Trial with respect to the remaining cases ensued. For its testimonial evidence, the prosecution called to the
stand nine witnesses:
1. Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Coordinator of the Technical Working Group on Behest Loans (TWG) and
Director of the Research Division of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), who testified on
the investigation conducted by the TWG of the ISI account and on various documents relative thereto, including
the Fourteenth (14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans12 (Ad Hoc
Committee) dated July15, 1993 which he drafted, and which characterized the ISI account as a behest loan;13
2. Atty. Reginald Bacolor from the Legal Department, Privatization Management Office of the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT), who testified on the deeds, documents and titles covering the foreclosed properties offered as
collaterals in the ISI account and thereafter sold by the government through the APT;14
3. Atty. Edwin Flor V. Barroga, then Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal, who testified on the
property offered as collateral by ISI, which was the subject of a prior encumbrance to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS);15
4. Atty. Cinderella Benitez, Securities Counsel II of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), who testified
on ISIs SEC documents, specifically its capitalization and financial status. She identified certified copies of ISIs
Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, Amended Articles of Incorporation, Certificates of Increase of Capital Stock,
etc.;16
5. Atty. Mary Ann B. Morales, SEC Securities Counsel III from its Registration and Monitoring Department, who
likewise testified on ISIs SEC documents. She identified ISIs General Information Sheets, Schedule of
Stockholders, Subscribed and Paid-Up Capital, Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information, etc. She testified,
among others, that as of 1973, ISIs subscribed capital stock was only P1.6 million, while its paid-up capital was
merelyP1,298,750.00;17
6. Cesar Luis Pargas, of the Privatization Management Office, APT, custodian of ISIs loan documents, who
testified on and brought with him the loan documents, deeds, titles, notes, etc. covering the ISI account;18
7. Claro Bernardino, Senior Manager of PNBs Human Resource Group, who brought the personnel
records/certificates of employment of the accused Domingo and Ingco;19
8. Ramonchito Bustamante, Manager of the Loans and Implementing Services Division of PNB, expert witness on
banking policy and PNBs loan policies, as well as ISIs loan data; and20
9. Stephen Tanchuling, Chief Administrative Officer of the Records Division of the Research Department of the
PCGG, custodian of documents turned over to PCGG by the Ad Hoc Committee. He testified that his function was
to authenticate documents in his custody, which consisted of records transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by

different government agencies. He identified as well the Executive Summary21 of the ISI account; the
Fourteenth (14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans dated July 15, 1993;
the Executive Summary of the Ad Hoc Committee Findings; and other relevant documents.22
For its documentary evidence, the prosecution presented the following, among others:
1) Photocopy of the Fourteenth (14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans23
which listed ISI as among the corporations with loans obtained from the government or government banks (in
this case, PNB)which were found to possess the characteristics of a behest loan;
2) Photocopy of an Executive Summary of Findings of the Ad Hoc Committee,24 detailing the particulars of the
ISI account;
3) Photocopy of the certified true copy of the January 10, 1972 Memorandum25 from Bautista to the PNB Board
of Directors, detailing Bautistas findings and recommendations regarding ISIs application for a $2.5
million(P16,287,500.00) letter of credit for the purpose of purchasing machinery and equipment for a new shoe
factory then being built in Bataan.
4) Certified photocopy of a Deed of Undertaking and Conformity to Bank Conditions26 (Deed of Undertaking)
dated March 24, 1972 executed by ISI in favor of PNB;
5) Certified photocopy of a Deed of Assignment27 dated March 24, 1972,assigning $0.50 per pair of shoes of all
export sales of ISI in favor of PNB;
6) Certified photocopy of Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney28 executed by ISI in favor of PNB;
7) Certified true copy of Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock29 issued by the SEC dated
February 6, 1974, showing that ISI increased its authorized capital stock from P3 million to P7 million; and
8) Certified true copy of the By-Laws of Integrated Pacific, Inc. (ISIs predecessor corporation).30
After the presentation of its testimonial and documentary evidence, the prosecution rested its case and filed its
Formal Offer of Exhibits.31 The respondent court admitted in toto the States documentary exhibits.
Petitioners Demurrer to Evidence
On February 17, 2010, petitioner, with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence32 anchored on the following
grounds: (1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the contracts with PNB contained provisions
that are beneficial, and not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous, to the government; (3)the loans could not
be characterized as behest loans because they were secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI increased its
capitalization; and (4) assuming the loans are behest loans, petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any
participation.33
In particular, petitioner claimed that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence of conspiracy to defraud the
government because his co-accused from PNB had no power to approve the alleged behest loans; that if a
theory of conspiracy were to be pursued, then all the members of the PNBs Board of Directors at the time the
loans and credit accommodations to ISI were approved, and not only Domingo and Ingco, should have been
impleaded as they were the ones who directed PNBs affairs; that the prosecution failed to show that he
exercised any kind of influence over PNBs Board of Directors in order to ensure the grant of the loans and
accommodations applied for; and for failure to present evidence that the accused colluded with each other in
entering into the loan agreements and accommodations.
Petitioner contended further that the contracts and agreements entered into by and between PNB and ISI were
standard contracts used by PNB in its dealings with its clients; that the terms thereof were couched in words and
fashioned in a manner that favored the bank; that the agreements guaranteed repayment of the loan and the
putting up of sufficient collateral, and provided for interest and penalties in the event of breach, and thus were
not grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Next, petitioner argued that the subject loans were not undercollateralized; that ISI was not undercapitalized as
the corresponding increase in its authorized capital stock and paid-up capital was timely made; and that the
loans could not have been characterized as behest loans considering the following stipulations: a) the assets
intended for acquisition through the letter of credit would serve as the collateral therefor; b) the officers and
majority stockholders of ISI were made jointly and severally liable for its obligations; c) ISI may not declare
dividends while the loans are subsisting; d) PNB is given the right to designate its Comptroller in ISI; and e) even

if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the subject loans were undercollateralized, this fact standing
alone does not make for a behest loan, as the presence of at least two (2) criteria out of the eight enumerated
in Presidential Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992is required to characterize the loans as
behest loans.
Assuming that the loan agreements are behest loans, petitioner claimed that he may not be held liable because
his indictment was based solely on the Deed of Undertaking which was altered such that his name was stricken
out and instead the name "Gregorio T. Teodoro" was inserted; that the accountee-mortgagor-assignor under
said deed was ISI; that the obligations were assumed by ISI; that ISI had already fully complied with all its
obligations under the deed; and that he was not a member of ISIs Board of Directors, which alone was tasked
as ISIs governing body with the observance of the obligations set forth under the deed; nor may he seek to
compel action thereon at a stockholders meeting, as he is not a shareholder of ISI either.
Finally, petitioner claimed that the Ad Hoc Committee documents specifically the Executive Summary and
Fourteenth (14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans are inadmissible for
not being photocopies of the originals, but mere copies of photocopies in the custody of the PCGG; and that
they were prepared and issued by individuals who have no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
which transpired during the proceedings adverted to.
Petitioner thus prayed that as against him, Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26305 be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
Prosecutions Opposition
In its Opposition,34 the prosecution insisted that conspiracy may be inferred from the following pattern of
events:
a. The frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at which they were granted;
b. The quantity of the loans granted;
c. The failure of PNB to verify and to take any action on ISIs failure to put up additional capitalization and
additional collaterals; and d. The eventual absence of any action by PNB to collect full payment from ISI.35
The prosecution noted that without ISI putting up additional capitalization or collateral, PNB kept granting loans
to it, such that in 1973, its in debtedness already rose to P16,360,000.00 while its capital stock stood at only P7
million; that petitioner is intimately connected with the incorporators and officers of ISI Leticia Teodoro is his
mother-in-law, while Francisco Teodoro is his father-in-law; and Marfina Teodoro-Singian is his wife; that as of
1983, ISIs debt to PNB amounted to P71,847,217.00, as a result of the undercapitalized and undercollateralized
loans extended to it; and that as signatory to the Deed of Undertaking, petitioner assumed the obligations of a
surety.
Finally, the prosecution noted that petitioners arguments in his Demurrer to Evidence constitute matters of
defense which should be passed upon only after trial on the merits.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On August 5, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed Resolution, which decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, this Court DENIES the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused
Gregorio Singian, Jr. as the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established the essential elements of the
offense charged and overcame the presumption of innocence in favor of said accused.
SO ORDERED.36
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration37 having been denied on November 18, 2010 by the respondent court,
he filed the present Petition for Certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSEOF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS XX X CONSIDERING THAT:

I.
THE FIRST ELEMENT OF SECTION 3(G) OF R.A. 3019 IS NOT PRESENTBECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY IS
NEGATED BY THEFACT THAT THE PUBLIC OFFICERS WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR GRANTING THE LOANS IN
QUESTION WERE NEVER CHARGED, ACCUSED OR INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATIONS SUBJECT OFTHESE CASES.
II.
EVEN IF IT IS PRESUMED, PURELY IN GRATIA ARGUMENT IS, THAT ACONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE GRANT OF THE
QUESTIONED LOANSTO ISI, THERE IS, NEVERTHELESS, NO OVERT ACT ATTRIBUTABLETO THE PETITIONER THAT
EVEN REMOTELY JUSTIFIES HISINCLUSION IN THE PROSECUTIONS CONSPIRACY DRAGNET.
III.
THE PROSECUTIONS EXHIBITS "C" (ALSO MARKED AS EXHIBIT"RR") AND "QQ" WHICH THE PROSECUTION
FOISTED TO MAKE ITAPPEAR THAT THE CREDIT ACCOMMODATIONS SUBJECT OF THECRIMINAL CASES BELOW
ARE BEHEST LOANS, DO NOT HAVE ANYPROBATIVE VALUE AND ARE COMPLETELY INADMISSIBLEBECAUSE THEY
ARE UNDISPUTABLY AND BLATANTLYHEARSAY.38
Petitioners Arguments
Essentially, petitioner reiterates all his arguments in his Demurrer to Evidence and Motion for Reconsideration
of the respondent courts denial thereof. He emphasizes, however, that he had nothing to do with the
application and grant of the questioned loans, since he was never a member of ISIs Board of Directors which,
under the law and ISI by-laws, had the sole power and authority to approve and obtain loans and give collaterals
to secure the same; nor is he a stockholder of ISI. Nor has it been shown from the testimonial and documentary
evidence that as Executive Vice-President, he participated in ISIs loan and credit transactions, or that he actively
participated in the commission of the crimes of which he is charged. Without such proof, petitioner believes that
he may not be charged with conspiracy.
Petitioner adds that no evidence was presented as well to show that he had any participation in PNBs failure to
verify and take action against ISI to compel it to put up additional capital and collaterals, or that he was
responsible for PNBs failure to collect or secure full payment of the ISI credit.
Finally, petitioner justifies his resort to certiorari on the argument that the collective acts of the prosecution and
the respondent court constitute a denial of his constitutional right to due process, which gives ground for the
availment of the extraordinary remedy.39
Respondents Arguments
In its Comment,40 the prosecution asserts that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying the Demurrer to Evidence arguing that in petitioners case, all the elements under Section 3(g) exist
to hold petitioner liable. It adds that petitioner was part of the conspiracy to defraud the government, as
evidenced by his participation and signature in the Deed of Undertaking, the terms of which ISI violated and PNB
failed to enforce.
On the other hand, the PCGG in its Comment41 adopts the arguments of the prosecution and asserts that the
respondent court arrived at its conclusion after careful examination of the record and the evidence, which
justify a finding sustaining petitioners indictment. It adds that all the elements of the crime under Section 3(g)
have been proved, which thus justifies a denial of petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
Our Ruling
The Court dismisses the Petition.
Demurrer to evidence
"A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court,
in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt."42

"Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or
amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be
considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise
degree of participation therein by the accused."43
Elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019
For one to be successfully prosecuted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements must be proven: "1)
the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government."44 However, private persons may likewise be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if
they conspired with the public officer. Thus, "if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held
liable together with the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which is to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto."45
The Sandiganbayan found competent
or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt for violation of Section 3(g), RA 3019
The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution presented sufficient or competent evidence to establish the
three material elements of Section 3(g) of RA3019. First, although petitioner is a private person, he was shown
to have connived with his co-accused. Second, ISI and PNB entered into several loan transactions and credit
accommodations. Finally, the loan transactions proved disadvantageous to the government.
There is no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan in
denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence
At the outset, we emphasize that "the resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of
sound judicial discretion. A lower courts order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will
not review the prosecutions evidence and precipitately decide whether such evidence has established the guilt
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been
gravely abused, there by amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not
suffice."46
"Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility."47
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan abused,
much more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. We agree with the
PCGGs observation that the Sandiganbayan arrived at its conclusion after a careful and deliberate examination
and assessment of all the evidence submitted. A closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show
that the Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution.48 It was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence presented did the respondent court
lay down its findings and conclusions.49
Based on the evidence presented, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that all three elements of Section 3(g), RA
3019 were satisfactorily established. It found that PNB and ISI entered into several contracts or loan
transactions. The Sandiganbayan also assessed that petitioner conspired with his co-accused in defrauding the
government considering "(1) the frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at which they were granted;
(2) the quantity of the loans granted; (3) the failure of the bank to verify and to take any action on the failure of
ISI to put up additional capitalization and additional collaterals; and (4) the eventual absence of any action by
the Bank to collect full payment from ISI."50 The Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that
x x x the loans subject of this case refer to not just one but several loans. The first two loans were granted in a
span of two months x x x The first loan was in the amount of P16,287,500.00 when the capital stock of ISI
amounted to onlyP1,000,000.00. This was followed by two additional loans in January and March 1973 x x x then

another loan x x x in the following year x x x. Two years later x x x ISI obtained another loan x x x which was
succeeded by an additional loan x x x. Still, ISI was granted two more loans x x x.
xxxx
However, all loans subject of this case were granted despite failure of ISI to raise its working capital, and to put
up additional collateral. The Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation and the Amended Articles
of Incorporation likewise show that ISI last increased its authorized capital stock toP7,000,000.00 on April 27,
1973, when the indebtedness of the corporation was already P16,360,000.00. Indeed, it would appear that
inaction on the part of the PNB to notify ISI to further increase its capital and the corresponding inaction on the
part of ISI to comply with its undertaking indicate conspiracy between the accused.
Accused-movant further negates his liability by asserting that his name does not appear in the Deed of
Undertaking, and neither has he signed the same. A cursory examination of the Deed, however, reveals
otherwise. It also bears stressing at this point that as he has never denied his position as Executive VicePresident of ISI, he would undeniably have participation in its transactions, especially where loan
accommodations of the corporation are concerned.51
The Sandiganbayan also found that the loan transactions were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. Based on the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, it noted that ISI was
undercapitalized while the loans were undercollateralized. It also noted that the government was only able to
foreclose properties amounting to P3 million whereas ISIs indebtedness stood at more than P71 million.
Based on the foregoing, we find no showing that "the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency
of the evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, were manifestly mistaken."52 The
Sandiganbayan did not exercise its judgment in a whimsical or capricious manner.1wphi1 As we aptly held:
Given the sufficiency of the testimonial and documentary evidence against petitioner, it would, therefore, be
premature at this stage of the proceedings to conclude that the prosecutions evidence failed to establish
petitioners participation in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime. Likewise, the Court cannot, at this point,
make a categorical pronouncement that the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. As there is competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime charged, it
behooves petitioner to adduce evidence on his behalf to controvert the asseverations of the prosecution.
Withal, respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found that there was a prima facie case
against petitioner warranting his having to go forward with his defensive evidence.
The determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution as to
establish a prima facie case against an accused is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial courts denial
of a motion to dismiss or a demurrer to evidence may not be disturbed.53
Similarly, we have also ruled that:
When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy. Rather, the appropriate
recourse from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after which the
accused may file an appeal from the judgment of the lower court rendered after such trial. In the present case,
we are not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioners
demurrer to evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecutions evidence satisfactorily established the
elements of the crime charged. Correspondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the pleadings
of petitioner that would show otherwise.54
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the issues raised herein are almost the same as those raised by
petitioner before the Court when he questioned the Sandiganbayans denial of his Motion for Re-determination
of Existence of Probable Cause.55 In resolving petitioners contention that he should not be made liable for ISIs
failure to put up additional capitalization and collaterals because he is not a member of the Board of Directors,
the Court declared that:
True, the power to increase capitalization and to offer or give collateral to secure indebtedness are lodged with
the corporations Board of Directors. However, this does not mean that the officers of the corporation other
than the Board of Directors cannot be made criminally liable for their criminal acts if it can be proven that they
participated therein. In the instant case, there is evidence that petitioners participated in the loan transactions
when he signed the undertaking. x x x56

Anent the issue regarding the sufficiency of ISIs collateral, we also declared the same to be "a matter of defense
which should be best ventilated in a full-blown trial."57 Moreover, we declared that
Fifth. It is petitioner's view that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that he took part in any conspiracy
relative to the grant of the loan transactions. Suffice it to state that the alleged absence of any conspiracy
among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.58
In fine, we hold that "the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits," and "the validity and merits of
a party's defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper."59 Petitioner's claims and defenses in his Demurrer to Evidence can best be tackled during trial. In
the presentation of his defense, he shall have the opportunity to explain or show why he should not be made
liable. For example, if there is any truth to the allegation in his Demurrer of Evidence that the Deed of
Undertaking was altered, or that the signature therein affixed is not his own, such that there arise serious
doubts as to his participation in the execution of said document, this can be resolved only upon proof presented
during trial. Petitioner must present evidence regarding such claim, the truth of which he can demonstrate
during trial. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, there is no way that this issue can be resolved by this Court at
this stage of he proceedings.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence; it was done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
23.) G.R. No. 171513

February 6, 2012

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA and HON. EFREN N. DE LA CRUZ, in their
official capacities as Presiding Justice and Associate Justices, respectively, of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, and NIERNA S. DOLLER, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 190963
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions assailing the rulings of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27963,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arnold James M. Ysidoro."
G.R. No. 171513 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) filed by
petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro to annul the resolutions, dated July 6, 20051 and January 25, 2006,2 of the
Sandiganbayan granting the "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite."
G.R. No. 190963, on the other hand, is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the People of the
Philippines through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (People) to annul and set aside the decision,3 dated
October 1, 2009, and the resolution,4 dated December 9, 2009, of the Sandiganbayan which acquitted Ysidoro
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts), as amended.
The Antecedents
Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, with the following
information:

That during the period from June 2001 to December 2001 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Leyte, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality
and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, withhold and fail to give to Nierna
S. Doller, Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, without any legal basis,
her RATA for the months of August, September, October, November and December, all in the year 2001, in the
total amount of TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS (P22,125.00), Philippine
Currency, and her Productivity Pay in the year 2000, in the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00),
Philippine Currency, and despite demands made upon accused to release and pay her the amount of P22,125.00
and P2,000.00, accused failed to do so, thus accused in the course of the performance of his official functions
had deprived the complainant of her RATA and Productivity Pay, to the damage and injury of Nierna S. Doller
and detriment of public service.5
Ysidoro filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and, in the alternative, for judicial determination of
probable cause,6 which were both denied by the Sandiganbayan. In due course, Ysidoro was arraigned and he
pleaded not guilty.
The Sandiganbayan Preventively Suspends Ysidoro
On motion of the prosecution,7 the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for ninety (90) days in
accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states:
Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Ysidoro filed a motion for reconsideration, and questioned the necessity and the duration of the preventive
suspension. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration, ruling that Clearly, by well established jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 make[s] it mandatory
for the Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer who has been
validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
any offense involving fraud upon government of public funds or property.8
Ysidoro assailed the validity of these Sandiganbayan rulings in his petition (G.R. No. 171513) before the Court.
Meanwhile, trial on the merits in the principal case continued before the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution and
the defense presented their respective evidence.
The prosecution presented Nierna S. Doller as its sole witness. According to Doller, she is the Municipal Social
Welfare Development Officer of Leyte. She claimed that Ysidoro ordered her name to be deleted in the payroll
because her husband transferred his political affiliation and sided with Ysidoros opponent. After her name was
deleted from the payroll, Doller did not receive her representation and transportation allowance (RATA) for the
period of August 2001 to December 2001. Doller also related that she failed to receive her productivity bonus
for the year 2000 (notwithstanding her performance rating of "VS") because Ysidoro failed to sign her
Performance Evaluation Report. Doller asserted that she made several attempts to claim her RATA and
productivity bonus, and made representations with Ysidoro, but he did not act on her requests. Doller related
that her family failed to meet their financial obligations as a result of Ysidoros actions.
To corroborate Dollers testimony, the prosecution presented documentary evidence in the form of
disbursement vouchers, request for obligation of allotment, letters, excerpts from the police blotter,
memorandum, telegram, certification, order, resolution, and the decision of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman absolving her of the charges.9
On the other hand, the defense presented seven (7) witnesses,10 including Ysidoro, and documentary evidence.
The defense showed that the withholding of Dollers RATA was due to the investigation conducted by the Office
of the Mayor on the anomalies allegedly committed by Doller. For this reason, Ysidoro ordered the padlocking of
Dollers office, and ordered Doller and her staff to hold office at the Office of the Mayor for the close monitoring
and evaluation of their functions. Doller was also prohibited from outside travel without Ysidoros approval.
The Sandiganbayan Acquits Ysidoro

In a decision dated October 1, 2009,11 the Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held that the second element
of the offense that there be malice, ill-motive or bad faith was not present. The Sandiganbayan pronounced:
This Court acknowledges the fact that Doller was entitled to RATA. However, the antecedent facts and
circumstances did not show any indicia of bad faith on the part of *Ysidoro+ in withholding the release of Dollers
RATA.
In fact, this Court believes that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith and in honest belief that Doller was not entitled to
her RATA based on the opinion of the COA resident Auditor and Section 317 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual.
It may be an erroneous interpretation of the law, nonetheless, *Ysidoros+ reliance to the same was a clear basis
of good faith on his part in withholding Dollers RATA.
With regard to the Productivity Incentive Bonus, Doller was aware that the non-submission of the Performance
Evaluation Form is a ground for an employees non-eligibility to receive the Productivity Incentive Bonus:
a) Employees disqualification for performance-based personnel actions which would require the rating for the
given period such as promotion, training or scholarship grants, and productivity incentive bonus if the failure of
the submission of the report form is the fault of the employees.
Doller even admitted in her testimonies that she failed to submit her Performance Evaluation Report to
[Ysidoro] for signature.
There being no malice, ill-motive or taint of bad faith, *Ysidoro+ had the legal basis to withhold Dollers RATA and
Productivity pay.12 (italics supplied)
In a resolution dated December 9, 2009,13 the Sandiganbayan denied the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration, reasoning that It must be stressed that this Court acquitted [Ysidoro] for two reasons: firstly, the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden of proving that accused Ysidoro acted in bad faith as stated in paragraph 1 above; and secondly, the
exculpatory proof of good faith xxx.
Needless to state, paragraph 1 alone would be enough ground for the acquittal of accused Ysidoro. Hence, the
COA Resident Auditor need not be presented in court to prove that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith. This is based
on the legal precept that "when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf." 14 (italics supplied)
Supervening events occurred after the filing of Ysidoros petition which rendered the issue in G.R. No. 171513
i.e., the propriety of his preventive suspension moot and academic. First, Ysidoro is no longer the incumbent
Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte as his term of office expired in 2007. Second, the prosecution completed its
presentation of evidence and had rested its case before the Sandiganbayan. And third, the Sandiganbayan
issued its decision acquitting Ysidoro of the crime charged.
In light of these events, what is left to resolve is the petition for certiorari filed by the People on the validity of
the judgment acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.
The Peoples Petition
The People posits that the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 have been duly established by the evidence,
in that:
First. *Ysidoro+ was the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte when he ordered the deletion of private complainants
name in the payroll for RATA and productivity pay.
Second. He caused undue injury to [Doller] when he ordered the withholding of her RATA and productivity pay.
It is noteworthy that complainant was the only official in the municipality who did not receive her RATA and
productivity pay even if the same were already included in the budget for that year. x x x
Consequently, [Doller] testified that her family suffered actual and moral damages due to the withholding of her
benefits namely: a) the disconnection of electricity in their residence; x x x b) demand letters from their
creditors; x x x c) her son was dropped from school because they were not able to pay for his final exams; x x x d)

[h]er children did not want to go to school anymore because they were embarrassed that collectors were
running after them.
Third. Accused clearly acted in evident bad faith as he used his position to deprive [Doller] of her RATA and
productivity pay for the period mentioned to harass her due to the transfer of political affiliation of her
husband.15 (emphasis supplied)
The People argues16 that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and exceeded its, or acted without,
jurisdiction in not finding Ysidoro in bad faith when he withheld Dollers RATA and deprived her of her
productivity bonus. The Sandiganbayan failed to take into account that: first, the Commission on Audit (COA)
resident auditor was never presented in court; second, the documentary evidence showed that Doller
continuously discharged the functions of her office even if she had been prevented from outside travel by
Ysidoro; third, Ysidoro refused to release Dollers RATA and productivity bonus notwithstanding the dismissal by
the Ombudsman of the cases against her for alleged anomalies committed in office; and fourth, Ysidoro caused
Dollers name to be dropped from the payroll without justifiable cause, and he refused to sign the disbursement
vouchers and the request for obligation of allotment so that Doller could claim her RATA and her productivity
bonus.
In the same manner, the People asserts that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that
Doller was not eligible to receive the productivity bonus for her failure to submit her Performance Evaluation
Report. The Sandiganbayan disregarded the evidence showing the strained relationship and the maneuverings
made by Ysidoro so that he could deny her this incentive.
In his Comment,17 Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for procedural and substantive infirmities.
First, he claims that the petition was filed out of time considering the belated filing of the Peoples motion for
reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan. He argues that by reason of the late filing of the motion for
reconsideration, the present petition was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Ysidoro also argues that
the 60-day reglementary period should have been counted from the Peoples receipt of the Sandiganbayans
decision since no motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed. Second, Ysidoro claims that the
Sandiganbayans ruling was in accord with the evidence and the prosecution was not denied due process to
properly avail of the remedy of a writ of certiorari. And third, Ysidoro insists that he can no longer be prosecuted
for the same criminal charge without violating the rule against double jeopardy.
The Issue Raised
The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its,
or acted without, jurisdiction when it acquitted Ysidoro of the crime charged.
The Courts Ruling
We first resolve the preliminary issue raised by Ysidoro on the timeliness of the Peoples petition for certiorari.
The records show that the motion for reconsideration was filed by the People before the Sandiganbayan on the
last day of the 15-day reglementary period to file the motion which fell on October 16, 2009, a Friday. Although
the date originally appearing in the notice of hearing on the motion was September 22, 2009 (which later on was
corrected to October 22, 2009), the error in designating the month was unmistakably obvious considering the
date when the motion was filed. In any case, the error cannot detract from the circumstance that the motion for
reconsideration was filed within the 15-day reglementary period. We consider, too, that Ysidoro was not
deprived of due process and was given the opportunity to be heard on the motion. Accordingly, the above error
cannot be considered fatal to the right of the People to file its motion for reconsideration. The counting of the
60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition for certiorari will be reckoned from the receipt of
the People of the denial of its motion for reconsideration, or on December 10, 2009. As the last day of the 60day reglementary period fell on February 8, 2010, the petition which was filed on February 5, 2010 was
filed on time.
Nevertheless, we dismiss the petitions for being procedurally and substantially infirm.
A Review of a Judgment of Acquittal
Generally, the Rules provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to appeal a decision of a trial
court in a criminal case before this Court. The first is by ordinary appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second is by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules. And the third is by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is
unique and provides for a different mode of review. In addition, each procedural remedy may only be availed of
depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be reviewed.

A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal issues. Issues which have not been properly raised by the
parties but are, nevertheless, material in the resolution of the case are also resolved in this mode of review. In
contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule 45 petition is generally limited to the review of legal issues; the
Court only resolves questions of law which have been properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the
petition. Under this mode, the Court determines whether a proper application of the law was made in a given
set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the propriety of the
trial courts jurisdiction whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the exercise of its
jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition is considered an
intrinsically valid, albeit erroneous, judgment, a judgment assailed under Rule 65 is characterized as an invalid
judgment because of defect in the trial courts authority to rule. Also, an ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition
tackle errors committed by the trial court in the appreciation of the evidence and/or the application of law. In
contrast, a Rule 65 petition resolves jurisdictional errors committed in the proceedings in the principal case. In
other words, errors of judgment are the proper subjects of an ordinary appeal and in a Rule 45 petition; errors
of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65 petition.
As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65 petition, only judgments of
conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition. As we explained in People v. Nazareno,18
the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal
through the remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition, thus:
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby
conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed
by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred
because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendants
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the
defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but
also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its
disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the
government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt
while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments
power and resources are once again employed against the defendants individual means. That the second
opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason,
justice and conscience.19 (emphases supplied)
However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two
(2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the
court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process.20 The rule against double jeopardy does
not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits
in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the
evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence.21 It does not include an inquiry on the
correctness of the evaluation of the evidence.22 A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there
has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct.23 In other
words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.24
Applying these legal concepts to this case, we find that while the People was procedurally correct in filing its
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not raise any jurisdictional error committed by the
Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what is clear is the obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence in the
case reviewed by the Court under the guise of a Rule 65 petition. This much can be deduced by examining the
petition itself which does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith committed by the Sandiganbayan in its
proceedings. The petition does not also raise any denial of the Peoples due process in the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan.
We observe, too, that the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of judgment which are more
appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition. The grounds cited in the petition call for the
Courts own appreciation of the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the Peoples
evidence in proving the element of bad faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity bonus to
Doller.
The Merits of the Case

Our consideration of the imputed errors fails to establish grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction committed by the Sandiganbayan. As a rule, misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous
conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave
abuse of discretion.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/168982.htm - _ftn25 That an
abuse itself must be "grave" must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less, will be
affected.26 We have previously held that the mere fact, too, that a court erroneously decides a case does not
necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/168982.htm _ftn27
Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.28
Under this definition, the People bears the burden of convincingly demonstrating that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in the appreciation of the evidence. We find that the People failed in this regard.
We find no indication from the records that the Sandiganbayan acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in
arriving at its verdict of acquittal. The settled rule is that conviction ensues only if every element of the crime
was alleged and proved.29 In this case, Ysidoro was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for two reasons: first, his
bad faith (an element of the crime charged) was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution evidence; and
second, there was exculpatory evidence of his good faith.
As bad faith is a state of mind, the prosecution must present evidence of the overt acts or omissions committed
by Ysidoro showing that he deliberately intended to do wrong or cause damage to Doller by withholding her
RATA. However, save from the testimony of Doller of the strained relationship between her and Ysidoro, no
other evidence was presented to support Ysidoros bad faith against her. We note that Doller even disproved
Ysidoros bad faith when she admitted that several cases had been actually filed against her before the Office of
the Ombudsman. It bears stressing that these purported anomalies were allegedly committed in office which
Ysidoro cited to justify the withholding of Dollers RATA.
The records also show other acts that tend to negate Ysidoros bad faith under the circumstances. First, the
investigation of the alleged anomalies by Ysidoro was corroborated by the physical transfer of Doller and her
subordinates to the Office of the Mayor and the prohibition against outside travel imposed on Doller. Second,
the existence of the Ombudsmans cases against Doller. And third, Ysidoros act of seeking an opinion from the
COA Auditor on the proper interpretation of Section 317 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual
before he withheld the RATA. This section provides:
An official/employee who was wrongly removed or prevented from performing his duties is entitled to back
salaries but not RATA. The rationale for the grant of RATA is to provide the official concerned additional fund to
meet necessary expenses incidental to and connected with the exercise or the discharge of the functions of an
office. If he is out of office, [voluntarily] or involuntarily, it necessarily follows that the functions of the office
remain undischarged (COA, Dec. 1602, October 23, 1990). And if the duties of the office are not discharged, the
official does not and is not supposed to incur expenses. There being no expenses incurred[,] there is nothing to
be reimbursed (COA, Dec. 2121 dated June 28, 1979).30
Although the above provision was erroneously interpreted by Ysidoro and the COA Auditor, the totality of the
evidence, to our mind, provides sufficient grounds to create reasonable doubt on Ysidoros bad faith. As we have
held before, bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong or a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or
intent, or ill-will to partake the nature of fraud.31 An erroneous interpretation of a provision of law, absent any
showing of some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not necessarily amount to bad
faith.32
Similarly, we find no inference of bad faith when Doller failed to receive the productivity bonus. Doller does not
dispute that the receipt of the productivity bonus was premised on the submission by the employee of his/her
Performance Evaluation Report. In this case, Doller admitted that she did not submit her Performance
Evaluation Report; hence, she could not have reasonably expected to receive any productivity bonus. Further,
we cannot agree with her self-serving claim that it was Ysidoros refusal that led to her failure to receive her
productivity bonus given that no other hard evidence supported this claim. We certainly cannot rely on Dollers
assertion of the alleged statement made by one Leo Apacible (Ysidoros secretary) who was not presented in

court. The alleged statement made by Leo Apacible that "the mayor will get angry with him and he might be laid
off,"33 in addition to being hearsay, did not even establish the actual existence of an order from Ysidoro or of
his alleged maneuverings to deprive Doller of her RATA and productivity bonus.
In light of these considerations, we resolve to dismiss the Peoples petition.1avvphi1 We cannot review a verdict
of acquittal which does not impute or show any jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:
1. DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171513, filed by Arnold James M.
Ysidoro for being moot and academic.
2. DISMISS the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190963, filed by the People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
24.) G.R. No. 191532

August 15, 2012

MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
PEREZ,*
REYES,**
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the November 26, 2009 Decision 1 and
the March 9, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957, which affirmed the
September 1, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City, (RTC) in Criminal Case No ..
C-73029, finding petitioner Margarita Ambre y Cayuni (Ambre) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
THE FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against Ambre, and co-accused, Bernie Castro (Castro) and Kaycee
Mendoza (Mendoza), before the RTC charging them with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia docketed as
Criminal Case No. C-73028, and illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu,
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73029. The Informations indicting the accused read:
Criminal Case No. C-73028
That on or about 20th day of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) unsealed transparent plastic
sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1)
rolled aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) folded aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance,
(METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) and two (2) disposable plastic lighters, knowing the same are
paraphernalias instruments apparatus fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or
introducing dangerous drug (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) into the body.
Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. C-73029
That on or about the 20th of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another,
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and sniff

Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of
the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.5
When arraigned, Castro and Mendoza pleaded guilty to both charges. Consequently, they were meted the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months and a fine of
P25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-73028. For their conviction in Criminal Case No. C-73029, the RTC ordered
their confinement at the Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents (CUREDD) for a period of six
(6) months.6
Ambre, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.7 Trial on the merits ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), PO1 Ronald Allan Mateo
(PO1 Mateo), PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), and P/Insp. Jessie dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa), it appeared
that on April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust
operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp
(Aderp) were engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that the
buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao (Tagoranao); that Sultan ran
away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that
in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, the police
operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre, in particular, was caught
sniffing what was suspected to be shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while
PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
The items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory examination.
Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05 stated that the urine samples taken from Ambre and her
coaccused were positive for the presence of shabu while Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 showed that the
items seized from them were all found positive for traces of shabu.8
The Version of the Defense
Ambre vehemently denied the charges against her. Through the testimonies of Ambre, Mendoza and Lily Rosete
(Rosete), the defense claimed that on the afternoon of April 20, 2005, Ambre was inside the residential
compound in Caloocan to buy malong; that her mother asked Rosete to accompany her because Rosetes
daughter-in-law, Nancy Buban (Buban), was a resident of Phase 12, Caloocan City, an area inhabited by Muslims;
that when they failed to buy malong, Rosete and Buban left her inside the residential compound to look for
other vendors; that ten minutes later, the policemen barged inside the compound and arrested her; that she
was detained at the Caloocan City Jail where she met Castro, Mendoza and Tagoranao; and that she was not
brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for drug testing.
Rosete further testified that after she had left Ambre inside the compound to find other malong vendors, she
returned fifteen minutes later and learned that the policemen had arrested people inside the compound
including Ambre.
Mendoza, who was convicted in Criminal Case No. C-73029, claimed that no pot session took place on the
afternoon of April 20, 2005. She averred that she and Ambre were merely inside the residential compound,
when policemen suddenly came in and pointed guns at them.9
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 1, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with
certitude the guilt of Ambre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of Section 15,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however, acquitted her of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove with particularity the drug paraphernalia found in her
possession. The trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. C- 73028, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI not guilty of the crime of Violation
of Section 12, Article II, RA 9165;

2)In Crim. Case No. C-73029, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. II RA 9165 and hereby sentences her to be confined and rehabilitated at
the government rehabilitation center in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for a period of six (6) months. The six (6)
month period of rehabilitation shall commence only from the time that she is brought inside the rehabilitation
center and its promulgation by this court for which the accused shall be notified.
The shabu subject of these cases is hereby confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with the rules governing the same.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.10
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, Ambre appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA professing her innocence of the crime.
On November 26, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 1, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Ambre's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its March 9, 2010 Resolution. Hence, she filed this
petition
THE ISSUES
Ambre raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER ON APRIL 20, 2005
(THAT YIELDED ALLEGED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA) CONFORMED WITH THE MANDATED LEGAL PROCEDURES IN
CONDUCTING A BUY-BUST OPERATION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER WERE PART AND
PARCEL OF THE DISMISSED AND DISCREDITED BUY-BUST OPERATIONS OF THE POLICE AND/OR "FRUITS OF THE
POISONOUS TREE" AND HENCE, WERE ILLEGAL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE THAT WERE SEIZED DURING THE ILLEGAL BUY-BUST
OPERATION ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXCLUSION OR DISREGARD OF THE FAVORABLE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER'S
WITNESS, HER CO-ACCUSED, KAYCEE MENDOZA, ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER EARLIER PLED GUILTY TO
SUCH ILLEGAL USE, HAD VIOLATED THE RULE ON INTER ALIOS ACTA UNDER SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S PENALTY OF SIX (6) MONTHS REHABILITATION IN A GOVERNMENT
CENTER IS A NULLITY GIVEN THE LACK OF CONFIRMATORY TEST AS REQUIRED UNDER R.A. 9165
("COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002").12
A perusal of the pleadings filed by the parties leads the Court to conclude that the case revolves on the following
core issues:
1.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid; and
2.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence.
Essentially, Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal because no
offense was being committed at the time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to
enter the dwelling of Sultan. She argues that the alleged "hot pursuit" on Sultan which ended in the latter's
house, where she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found having a pot session, was more imaginary than
real. In this regard, Ambre cites the April 29, 2005 Resolution of the Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City
dismissing the case against Aderp and Sultan for insufficiency of evidence because the April 20, 2005 buy-bust
operation was highly suspicious and doubtful. She posits that the items allegedly seized from her were

inadmissible in evidence being fruits of a poisonous tree. She claims that the omission of the apprehending team
to observe the procedure outlined in R.A. No. 9165 for the seizure of evidence in drugs cases significantly
impairs the prosecutions case. Lastly, Ambre maintains that she was not subjected to a confirmatory test and,
hence, the imposition of the penalty of six months rehabilitation was not justified.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges this Court to affirm the challenged decision for
failure of Ambre to show that the RTC committed any error in convicting her of illegal use of shabu. The OSG
insists that Ambre was lawfully arrested in accordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It is of the
opinion that the credible and compelling evidence of the prosecution could not be displaced by the empty
denial offered by Ambre.
THE COURT'S RULING
The conviction of Ambre stands.
Section 2, Article III13 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on
the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.14
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception
established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest.15 In this exception, the law requires that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c)
arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.16
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using
shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing
suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.17 Ambre, however, made much of the fact that
there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in
flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present
in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with
Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only
authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

To write finis to the issue of validity and irregularity in her warrantless arrest, the Court holds that Ambre is
deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising them before entering her plea.18
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her
person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer
with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense.19
Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Ambre, together
with Castro and Mendoza, were illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken from them were found positive
for the presence of shabu, as indicated in Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05. It was likewise
found that the items seized from the three were all positive for traces of shabu as contained in Physical Science
Report No. D-149-05 dated April 21, 2005. These findings were unrebutted.
Ambre's assertion that her conviction was incorrect, because the evidence against her was obtained in violation
of the procedure laid down in R.A. No. 9165, is untenable.
While ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.20 This Court, however, has consistently held that the
most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.21 In this
case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug
paraphernalia had not been compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the
physical inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu, this will not render Ambre's
arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible.
Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza, the following items were confiscated
from them: one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) strip of rolled up aluminum foil with
traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded piece of aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also
believed to be shabu; and two (2) yellow disposable lighters. Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran
turned over the seized items to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the former. All
the pieces of evidence were placed inside an improvised envelope marked as "SAID-SOU EVIDENCE 04-20-05."
With the Request for Laboratory Examination, PO2 Hipolito brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory and delivered them to P/Insp. dela Rosa, a forensic chemist, who found all the items, except the
disposable lighters, positive for traces of shabu. Verily, the prosecution had adduced ample evidence to account
for the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized items.
Even if the Court strikes down the seized drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu as inadmissible, Ambre will
not be exculpated from criminal liability. First, let it be underscored that proof of the existence and possession
by the accused of drug paraphernalia is not a condition sine qua non for conviction of illegal use of dangerous
drugs. The law merely considers possession of drug paraphernalia as prima facie evidence that the possessor has
smoked, ingested or used a dangerous drug and creates a presumption that he has violated Section 15 of R.A.
No. 9165.22
Secondly, the testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral certainty the
commission of the crime charged in the information and the identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. At this
juncture, the Court affirms the RTC's finding that the police officers' testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
Appellate courts, generally, will not disturb the trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility unless certain
material facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.23 The Court finds no reason
to deviate from this rule in this case.
Likewise, the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption
remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not
properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. The presumption was not
overcome as there was no showing that PO3 Moran, PO1 Mateo, PO2 Hipolito, and P/Insp. dela Rosa were
impelled with improper motive to falsely impute such offense against Ambre.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the defense of denial offered by Ambre must
simply fail. Bare denials cannot prevail over positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses.24
Besides, this Court has held in a catena of cases that the defense of denial or frame-up has been viewed with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.25

Finally, Ambre contends that the penalty of six months of rehabilitation in a government center imposed on her
was a nullity, in view of the alleged lack of confirmatory test. The Court is not persuaded.
It must be emphasized that in no instance did Ambre challenge, at the RTC, the supposed absence of
confirmatory drug test conducted on her. Ambre only questioned the alleged omission when she appealed her
conviction before the CA. It was too late in the day for her to do so. Wellentrenched is the rule that litigants
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and
justice.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed November 26, 2009 Decision and the March 9, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
25.) G.R. No. 190889

January 10, 2011

ELENITA C. FAJARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the
February 10, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, finding petitioner guilty of violating
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.
The facts:
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo,
Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit
or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody
and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.]
M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35)
pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were
confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial
Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant
No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.3
When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.4 During pre-trial, they
agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;
2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this case who is a resident of
Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not live
therein;
4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;
5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the morning of August 28, 2002; and
6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon the arrival of the military
personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in possession of a firearm in the evening of August
27, 2002.5

As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA,6 these are the chain of events that led to the
filing of the information:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG)
were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond
to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision,
Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were
indiscriminately firing guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area.
Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in different directions. The
responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the
house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after
which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners house but, in order to
deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further
instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for
the pull-out of the police troops. No agreement materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who
was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw
something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside the compound of a
neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio
announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1
US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1
Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and
members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found
and was able to confiscate the following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the confiscated
firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective
because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal
knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the application:
That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial Director, Police Supt.
Edgardo Mendoza.7
They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was inside the
house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but was
instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding
team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine
Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding team arrived. She
averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped
hanging blouse.8

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already denied in the Orders
dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and
Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not appealed and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled
that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest since they participated in the
trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively waived such
irregularities and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Army prior
to his separation from his service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). With his military background, it is
safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable about different types of firearms and
ammunitions. As a former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an armory or arsenal which
are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and
ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a
government property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store those items. The
logical explanation is that those items are stolen property.
xxxx
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What
the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to ones control and management. This has to be so if the manifest
intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes
exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the
object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent.
xxxx
To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2)
essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm ammunition or
explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no license
or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may be established by the
testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no
license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit G).
The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license on the two (2) receivers of caliber
.45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces
live M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and
recovered from their possession during the search conducted by members of the PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial
Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.9
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and explosives, punishable
under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed
by the person arrested.

Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated
October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held that
the search warrant was void based on the following observations:
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal knowledge of the
fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as required by law. For one, he failed to make a
categorical statement on that point during the application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a
certification to that effect from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this
certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license or permit to possess a
firearm. There was also no explanation given why said certification was not presented, or even deemed no
longer necessary, during the application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply ignored.10
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared inadmissible in
evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the
warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a firearm, punishable under
paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three
(3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of
prision correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated December 3,
2009.12 Hence, the present recourse.
At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and Valerio charged duplicitous
offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles confiscated from Valerio
and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294.13 Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live
M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under
paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed
by the person arrested.14
On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with
SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which
states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or
instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.15
This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the kinds
of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A.

No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above
classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind
of firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
(Emphasis ours.)
By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now particularly refer to the
paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified, and should there be numerous guns
confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No.
8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and
state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as in the instant case,16 because different penalties are
imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.
Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed to
raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver, and they could be convicted of as many
offenses as there were charged in the information.17 This accords propriety to the diverse convictions handed
down by the courts a quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the search warrant that led to their confiscation, is
now beyond the province of our review since, by virtue of the CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been
effectively acquitted from the said charges. The present review is consequently only with regard to the
conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.
The Issues
Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the
purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was
adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing
that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in
the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had
knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence,
admissible.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a
warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of

evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.18
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.19 It applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.20
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside
petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises
was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols
before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of
petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the
house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on
top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio
holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband
items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when subsequently
recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.
The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating:
Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they doing?
A They were cordoning the house.
Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What did he tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun.
Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police officers were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following day.
Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where were you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.
Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?

A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.
Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something outside the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.
COURT: (to witness)
Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
xxxx
PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if any?
A I shouted to seek cover.
xxxx
Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, "take cover?"
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on the place where
something was thrown.
Q What did you see if any?
A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.
xxxx
Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall another unusual
incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And can you tell us what was that incident?
A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the roof of another
house.
Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that person?

A Zaldy Valerio again.

xxxx
Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?
A I was on the road in front of the house.
Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?
A He was on top of the house.
xxxx
Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.
xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.
xxxx
Q What did you do if any?
A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.
xxxx
Q Who opened the fence for you?
A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.
Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)21
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was
indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to
be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. The liability for their
possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.1avvphil
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of a
firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the following disquisitions in
People v. De Gracia22 are instructive:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What
the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest
intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes
exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the
object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.

But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession
of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes
significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law,
in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit
the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended
to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate
the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must
still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent
to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have
harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an
offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if
such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree
No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is
absent, there is no offense committed.23
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.24
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were
thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in
actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any evidence pointing to
petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of the receivers.
Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the assumption
that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.
Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.25 The quantum
of proof required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient particularity; as such, it
is impossible to match the same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that
he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not
unlikely then that the receivers later on discarded were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in committing
illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence indubitably proving that petitioner participated in the
decision to commit the criminal act committed by Valerio.
Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the evidence adduced by the
prosecution.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the corresponding license for it.26
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must yield these requisites:
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and
(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to which the seized
part/component corresponds.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings "United States Property" and the other
bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also
identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio discarded them.27 His testimony was
corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.28
Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is not a
duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of firearms.29 To substantiate his statement,
he submitted a certification30 to that effect and identified the same in court.31 The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or
the certification, would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.