Part V C

C.
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Supreme Court, is said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by Congress)
nor the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the
State governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and as the
Constitutional Court of the nation.
To maintain the independence of the judiciary, the Constitution provides for
certain limitations (Cruz);
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor
may its membership or the manner of its meetings be changed by mere

legislation
2. The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment
within ninety days from the submission of the list. (Section 9, Art
VIII)
3. Members of the Supreme Court may only be removed via impeachment.
The xxx Members of the Supreme Court, xxx may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust xxx. (Art XI Section 2)
4. Minimum original and appellate jurisdiction
The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof. (Section 2, Art VIII)
5. The appellate jurisdiction
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice
and concurrence. (Section 30, Art VI)
6. Administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel
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Constitutional Law 1
Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all

courts and the personnel thereof. (Section 6. , Art VIII)
7. Exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted in thereon. (Art VII Section 11)
8. Security of tenure
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court
shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. (Art VII Section 11)
9. To not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative function.( Art VIII, Section 12.)
10. Salaries of judges may not be reduced
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased. (Art VIII, Sec 10)
11. Fiscal autonomy
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released. (Sec 3, Art VII)
12. Rules of Court
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
2. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.xxx (Section 5, Art VIII)
i.
Temporary detail of judges

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1. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as

public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall
not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned. xxx(Section 5, Art VIII)
ii.
Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary

3. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. xxx(Section 5, Art VIII)
1. The Supreme Court

a. Composition
Section 4.
1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court
en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with
the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When
the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
a. Composition and mode of sitting

A Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members
There is but ONE SUPREME COURT of the Philippine Islands. It is the
jurisdiction of this Supreme Court which cannot be diminished. The Supreme
Court remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions. Although it may
have two divisions, it is but a single court. Actions considered in any one of
these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same
Tribunal. G.R. No. L-32723
October 15, 1930 THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs.HERMENEGILDO TRIA
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CIRCULAR NO. 2-89 February 7, 1989

SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES AND RULES IN THE REFERRAL TO THE COURT EN
BANC OF CASES ASSIGNED TO A DIVISION.
1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in Divisions of three, five or seven
Members (Sec. 4[1],Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At present the Court has three
Divisions of five Members each.
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority
of its Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3]. Article VIII,
1987 Constitution).
3. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a
Division may be appealed.
4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or
resolutions of a Division may refer the case en consulta to the Court en banc which,
after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such referral may return the
case to the Division or accept the case for decision or resolution.
4a. Paragraph [f] of the Resolution of this Court of 23 February 1984 in
Bar Matter No. 205 [formerly item 6, en banc Resolution dated 29
September 1977], enumerating the cases considered as en
banc cases, states:
f. Cases assigned to a division including motions for
reconsideration which in the opinion of at least three (3)
members merit the attention of the Court en banc and are
acceptable by a majority vote if the actual membership of
the Court en banc.
5. A resolution of the Division denying a party's motion for referral to the Court en
banc of any Division case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc.
6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court en banc, the
latter may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take
cognizance of the same, in which case, the decision or resolution shall be returned
to the referring Division.
7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take
cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained.
8. This Circular shall take effect on March 1, 1989.
February 7, 1989.
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Rule: Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

explicitly provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except
by the Court sitting en banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness,
economy, judicial time, and interests of litigants, as well as the peace and
order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final
judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be
no question that such reasons apply with greater force to final judgments of
the highest Court of the land. G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745 September 17,
2009 CITY GOVENMENT OF TAGAYTAY, vs.HON. ELEUTERIO F.
GUERRERO
Rule: There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to
the Court en banc. What is in question in the present case is the
constitutionality of respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and not the
constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement
Section 4 (par. 2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon. G.R. No. 138965 March 5, 2007
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC.,vs.MAGDANGAL B. ELMA
Case: This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these
consolidated cases, which the Third Division decided on September 2, 1999.
The motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioners, Republic
of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as
amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
. . ., the following are considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death
penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
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6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,

officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine
exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3)
members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are
acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the courten banc;
and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En
Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without
implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair
justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases
calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that
the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely
guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of
its actual membership that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient
importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of
course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the land are
always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the
germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court
to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be
observed.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let
alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as
government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their
pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En
Banc. G.R. No. 127022
June 28, 2000 FIRESTONE CERAMICS, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
b. Appointment and qualifications
Section 7No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court

or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (.Art
VIII)
Section 8, (5) The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the principal
function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise
such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Art VIII)
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
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For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within
ninety days from the submission of the list. (Art VIII)
Administrative Matter: On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President
transmitted to the Supreme Court the appointments of Court Appeals (CA)
Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul
L. Hernando and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.
The respective appointment papers of Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr.,
Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela bore the following dates and bar code
numbers:
Name of Associate
Date of Appointment
Justice
Justice Fernandez
February 16, 2010
Justice Peralta, Jr.
February 16, 2010
Justice Hernando
February 16, 2010
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela
February 24, 2010
Bar Code No.

55466
55467
55468
55465
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela disagreed insisted that she is the most senior

among the four newly appointed CA Associate Justices pursuant to Section
1, Rule 2 of the 2009 IRCA which provides that seniority of the Associate
Justices shall be determined "according to the order of their appointments as
transmitted to the Supreme Court." She argued that "the final act in the
process of appointing a member of the Judiciary is the transmittal of the
appointment to the Supreme Court." She also took "serious exception" to the
statement of the CA Committee on Rules that "the foregoing interpretation of
the Rule on precedence and seniority should only apply to the above named
Associate Justices, in view of the peculiar circumstances which attended the
issuance/transmission of their appointment papers." According to her, there
was nothing novel or peculiar about the circumstances attending the
issuance and transmission of the four newly appointed members of the
CA.1avvphi1
Who is the most senior?
Rule: For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the
commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing
on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will
determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection
with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other
words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more
senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when the
appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of
issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This
provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by
RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives
premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules
implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to the law
they seek to implement.
In view of the foregoing, the CA en banc acted correctly when it adopted the
view of the CA Rules Committee insofar as the reckoning of the seniority of
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CA Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela is

concerned but erred when it declared that the CA Rules Committees
interpretation applies only to the case of the four aforementioned Justices.
A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC September 28, 2010 RE: Seniority Among the Four
(4) Most Recent Apppointments to the Position of Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals.
Case: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010.. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits
the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety?
Rule: As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department,
and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the
President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections
14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1)
and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the
President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the
JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
In this connection, PHILCONSA's urging of a revisit and a review of
Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the
express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article
VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in
Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable
conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative.
As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an
interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief
Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in
the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should
not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It will not
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do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be

reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed.
Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of
the unworthy and forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela. Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as
well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one
of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII
was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing
Chief Executive
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the
prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers
did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination
and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be
midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold
of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing
Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to
subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the
appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would
not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing of
candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the
ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of
ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for
the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of the
statute," i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with
reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to
carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to
the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming
presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience
from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for
judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President
could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of
the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and
pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to
de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the
Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the
Aytona midnight appointment.
As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to
appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate
Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss
the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of xxx
appointments" to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential
elections. He assured that "on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission's
records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of
Appeals
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration
to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it
relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
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To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to

appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from
the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the
Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political
leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the
wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent
President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure
judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to
the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent
President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence,
precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. G.R. No. 191002
March 17, 2010 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, .
Case (Motions for Reconsideration) Judicial decisions assume the same
authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control
the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of
those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. 3 In a hierarchical judicial
system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but
the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest
court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule
according to its best lights. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may
be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with
a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it
determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy
we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were
appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting
to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the
merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and
condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of
the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it
has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members
composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade
ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements
were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the
Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements
within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with.
So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the
controversy.G.R. No. 191002
April 20, 2010
ARTURO M. DE
CASTRO, , vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, .
c. Salary
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
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fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased. (Art VIII)
Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the VicePresident, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two
hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the
House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two
hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos
each. (art XVIII)
SEC. 9, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution then provided that. The
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold
office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office . Until the Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos.
Case: The salaries of judges were not subject to income tax, for
such would be a diminution of their salary, in contravention of the
Constitution Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves
an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that
salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not
relevant. As in the United States during the second period, we must
hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income"
taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law
was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not
include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here;
and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention
approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges'
compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on
judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs.
Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the inference is not
illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation
the Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of the
same. G.R. No. L-2348
February 27, 1950 GREGORIO
PERFECTO, vs. BIBIANO MEER
Case: RA 590., was passed which provided that the Constitutional
provision against the diminution of salaries of members of the
judiciary should not be construed as an exemption from income
tax
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Rule: Under our system of constitutional government, the

Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact
laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of
carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation
and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial
department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws
extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine
whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent
portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have
to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO.
590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
n conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case
of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of
income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands
of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially
when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs. G.R.
No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953 PASTOR M. ENDENCIA vs.
SATURNINO DAVID
Article XV, Section 6 of the 1973 Constitution however provides that No

salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
The said provision of the 1973 Constitution is not found in the 1987
Constitution. Hence, are the salaries of judges except again from income
tax, in reversion of the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David?
Case: In a nutshell, Petitioners submit that "any tax withheld from
their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
"(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
12 | P a g e
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent

judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Under the 1973 Constitution,it was provided that;:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall
be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. ...
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to
Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason,
petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the
original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
Rule: The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention. The
debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by
the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable
We accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit
that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should share the burden of
general income taxation equitably. G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
d. Security of Tenure
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the
lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach
the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal
by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon. (Art VIII)
Section 2 xxx No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary
when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. (Art VIII)
Read: G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982 GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA
vs MANUEL ALBA
e. Removal
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of
13 | P a g e
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted in thereon. (Art VIII)
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Art. XI)
Administrative Matter: It is important to underscore the rule of constitution
law here involved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the
following terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be
a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him
and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be
charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence
which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service
of which would amount to removal from office.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members
or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to
immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is
saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be
observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member
of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus
terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally
or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or
misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence
and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial
independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of
the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants
or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might
seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should
forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of
this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file
impeachment proceedings. A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988 IN RE
FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED
16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B.
FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
f.
Fiscal Autonomy
14 | P a g e
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for

the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released. (Art VIII)
Administrative Matter: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize
their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates
of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of
the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court
says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters
and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the
autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially
as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In
the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to
constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of
autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. A.M. No. 01-1-04SC-PHILJA January 31, 2006 Re: Clarifying and Strengthening The
Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-Up of the Philippine
Judicial Academy
g. Jurisdiction
Case: Due to the imposition of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, Respondent
wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in
the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as a
consequence of which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for
qualified and interested applicants.
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was the Municipal Revised Revenue Code."
The Code contained a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the
imposition of goodwill fees
for stalls. The same Code authorized
respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and
incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the
municipal public market.
This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders
at the municipal public market, to file before the RTC a Petition for
15 | P a g e
Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining

Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent.
The RTC ruled for the respondents
Upon the appeal of the losing party, The Court of Appeals held that
petitioners resort to a petition for prohibition was improper, since
respondents acts in question herein did not involve the exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required under Section 2, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC was premature, as they failed to
exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto.
Rule:
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to
preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the
jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly
constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the
interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of
judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such
lower courts the Legislature may establish.
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they
still need to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the
RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01
was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a
public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure
question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to
resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly
establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes
the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Emphases ours.)
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the
Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of
constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in
the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative
16 | P a g e
policy. G.R. No. 182065 October 27, 2009 EVELYN ONGSUCO and
ANTONIA SALAYA, vs HON. MARIANO M. MALONES,
Case: Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was
aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right
to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be
elected to occupy the highest government post in the land. G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR. vs.The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE
(a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
(1)
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Scope of Judicial Power;
1. Settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable,
2. Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government
(2)

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
17 | P a g e
3.
4.
5.
6.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall
not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage
of justice.
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Case: On January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs
registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural
communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
MU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive
Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National AntiPoverty Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City
The RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et als motion for partial
reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction. Still,
the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being
a valid State act.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and
constitutional.
Rule: Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 310 has been raised and amply argued before this Court, it
would serve no useful purpose to have the case remanded to the CA
Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further proceedings.
Ultimately, the issue of constitutionality of the Proclamation in question will
come to this Court however the courts below decide it. Consequently, the
Court should, to avoid delay and multiplicity of suits, now resolve the
same.
18 | P a g e
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the
highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this
case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast
tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation
which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the
claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To
our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for
educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a
gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to
the DARAB.
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or
Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that "property rights
within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested" upon its
effectivity "shall be recognized and respected." In this case, ownership
over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958.
Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples
around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, xxx and DECLARES
Presidential Proclamation 310 as null and void for being contrary to law
and public policy. G.R. No. 184869 September 21, 2010 CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
Case: This case is about the right of a discharged police officer to
reinstatement, back salaries, allowances, and other benefits after being
absolved of a serious crime filed against him before a regular court.
Respondent Reynaldo Roaquin was a member of the NP who was
charged with murder, but subsequently absolved of the same several
years after.
He asked and was granted reinstatement thereafter. The reinstatement
was however ever nullified as purportedly Roaquin could not be entitled
to reinstatement since he failed to file a motion for reconsideration within
10 days of being notified of his discharge.
Rule: An issue of fact exists when what is in question is the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts, whereas an issue of law exists when what is in
question is what the law is on a certain state of facts. The test, therefore,
for determining whether an issue is one of law or of fact, is whether the CA
could adjudicate it without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is an issue of law; otherwise, it is an issue of fact.
Here the CA needed only to review the records, more particularly, the
pleadings of the parties and their annexes to determine what law applied
to Roaquin, Section 45 or Section 48 of R.A. 6975. Such question does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence of the
parties since the essential facts of the case are not in dispute. As
Roaquins superior officers appeal involves only questions of law, they
erred in taking recourse to the CA by notice of appeal. Hence, the CA
correctly dismissed their appeal. G.R. No. 159588 September 15, 2010
P/CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT ROBERTO L. CALINISAN, vs. SPO2
REYNALDO ROAQUIN y LADERAS
19 | P a g e
Case: The issues presented in this case involve questions of fact which
are not reviewable in a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court is not
a trier of facts. Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that "[t]he petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."
A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts while a question of law exists if the doubt centers on
what the law is on a certain set of facts. There is a question of fact if the
issue requires a review of the evidence presented or requires the reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses. However, if the issue raised is
capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
the evidence, the question is one of law.
All the issues raised by petitioner require a review of the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the evidence presented. G.R. No. 171982
August 18, 2010 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK
Case: It is a well-established doctrine that in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions
of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. This
Court defined a question of law, as distinguished from a question of fact,
to wit:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. G.R. No.
160219
July 21, 2008 VECTOR SHIPPING CORPORATION vs.
ADELFO B. MACASA,
Case: For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration..
It is the submission of public respondents that:
The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching
on that sphere of executive authority;
Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law
looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable
20 | P a g e
Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial

review.
Rule: The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for
our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of
execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded
the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to
make them conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section 6 of
Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the
spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained
temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time
to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged
by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not
restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999 LEO ECHEGARAY, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
ET AL.
(3)
Section 18. xxx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
(4)
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose. (Art VII, sec 4, par 7)
Case: On July 23, 2004, the protestant filed this protest with this
Tribunal praying for the annulment of the protestee's proclamation as
the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.
The great public interest at stake behooves the Tribunal to exercise its
power and render judgment free from public pressure and
uninterrupted by the parties' penchant for media mileage. Therefore,
in view of the foregoing reports where press statements of both
parties appeared as an attempt to influence the proceedings, convince
the public of their version of facts, and create bias, prejudice and
sympathies, the Tribunal resolves to WARN both parties and counsels
from making public comments on all matters that are sub judice.
P.E.T. Case No. 003 January 18, 2008 LOREN B. LEGARDA,
protestant, vs.NOLI L. DE CASTRO,
21 | P a g e
Case: In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634. Petitioners Tecson,

et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to
instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission
in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be
the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has
constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as "not (being)
justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-PresidentElect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form
of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly
affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an election
protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies,
would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule
13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would
support this premise
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of
an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President
or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for
quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for
President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
22 | P a g e
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined
by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections
are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et
al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 MARIA JEANETTE C.
TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
Case: Santiago and Ramos were contenders to the Presidential
Election on the year 1992. Ramos emerged winner, hence the protest
of Santiago, In the interim, Santiago ran and won as senator in the
1995 elections.
Rule: The Tribunal, nonetheless, confirmed its power to dismiss an
electoral case on technical grounds. the Rules of the Tribunal
allow summary dismissal of election protests even for less important
grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the Tribunal or the
annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or the filing fees and
cash deposits were not filed within the periods fixed in the Rules, 27and
the additional provision for dismissal under Rule 61.
It must be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless
of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the
following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and
15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these
Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid
within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with
the Tribunal are not clearly legible BANC P.E.T. Case No. 001
23 | P a g e
February 13, 1996 MIRIAM DEFENSOR- vs. FIDEL VALDEZ

RAMOS
(5)
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all

its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Art IX, A)
h. Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.. (Art VIII)
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and concurrence. (art VI)
Case: In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was
declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without
its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like
the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the
subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman -G.R. No. 133715 February
23, 2000 DOUGLAS R. VILLAVERT, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
i. Administrative powers
(1)
Supervision over lower courts
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision

over all courts and the personnel thereof. (Art VIII)
24 | P a g e
(2)
Temporarily assign judges to other stations in the public interest

xxx
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned. (Art VIII)
(3)
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice

xxx
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. (Art VIII)
(4)
Discipline of lower court judges
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted in thereon. (Art VIII)
(5)
Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary

xxx
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. (Art VIII)
A. Rule Making
Section 5, (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Article VIII)
Section 14, (2) The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law (Art XII)
Section 18, (3) The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
25 | P a g e
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon

within thirty days from its filing. (Art VII)
Rule: The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial. G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO
ECHEGARAY, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.
B. No Quasi Judicial work for judges
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative function. (Art VIII)
Case: Manzano was was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice.
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that
Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform
administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
26 | P a g e
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative

agency by the organic law of its existence
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions,
will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request. A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988 IN RE: DESIGNATION
OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS
NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
C. Report on the Judiciary

Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the
opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary. (Art VIII)
D. Manner of Sitting and Votes Required

Section 4.
1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Section 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en
banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation
no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall
be dismissed, in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from
shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied. (Rule 57, Rules of Court)
27 | P a g e
Section 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. When the Supreme

Court en banc is equally divided in opinion or the necessary majority
cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the case shall again be
deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the
judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the
accused acquitted. (Rule 125), Rules of Court
En Banc Cases (Under the Constitution):

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law, w
Those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations,
all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required
to be heard en banc
Cases or matters heard by a division when the required
number is not obtained,
When a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in
a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
by the court sitting en banc.
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
purpose.
Case:In Re: Balanga v. Court of Appeals, we emphatically held:

x x x. While it is true that Section 78 of Act. 496 on which the petition is
based provides that upon the failure of the judgment-debtor to redeem the
property sold at public auction the purchaser of the land may be granted a
new certificate of title, the exercise of such function is qualified by the
provision that "at any time prior to the entry of a new certificate the
registered owner may pursue all his lawful remedies to impeach or annul
proceedings under executions or to enforce liens of any description." The
right, therefore, to petition for a new certificate under said section is not
absolute but subject to the determination of any objection that may be
interposed relative to the validity of the proceedings leading to the transfer
of the land subject thereof which should be threshed out in a separate
appropriate action. This is the situation that obtains herein. Teopista
Balanga, the judgment-debtor, is trying to impeach or annul the execution
and sale of the properties in question by alleging that they are conjugal in
nature and the house erected on the land has been constituted as a family
home which under the law is exempt from execution. These questions
should first be determined by the court in an ordinary action before entry
of a new certificate may be decreed.
28 | P a g e
This pronouncement is also in line with the interpretation we have placed on

Section 112 of the same Act to the effect that although cadastral courts are
empowered to order the cancellation of a certificate of title and the issuance of
a new one in favor of the purchaser of the land covered by it, such relief can
only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or no serious objection
is interposed by a party in interest. As this Court has aptly said: "While this
section, (112) among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the
court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title x x x and
apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted
if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case
where the incident properly belongs" (Angeles v. Razon, G.R. No. L-13679,
October 26, 1959, and cases cited therein). x x x.
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that petitions under Section 75 and
Section 108 of P.D. 1529 (formerly Sec. 78 and Sec. 112 of Act 496) can be
taken cognizance of by the RTC sitting as a land registration or cadastral
court. Relief under said sections can only be granted if there is unanimity
among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and
should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident
properly belongs.
The foregoing ponencia is now the controlling precedent on the matters being
raised anew by petitioners. We can no longer digress from such ruling. The
determination of the questions of fact and of law by this Court in G.R. No.
106812 already attained finality, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by
a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation between the
same parties and their privies over the same subject matter.
Furthermore, Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by
the Court sitting en banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness,
economy, judicial time, and interests of litigants, as well as the peace and
order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final
judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no
question that such reasons apply with greater force to final judgments of the
highest Court of the land. G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745 September 17, 2009
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY, vs. HON. ELEUTERIO F.
GUERRERO
E. Requirement as to decisions
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted
to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case assigned to a Member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or
dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the
reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower
collegiate court.
29 | P a g e
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without

expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor.
Case: In its decision, public respondent practically adopted the factual findings
of the trial court, and explicitly declared that the latter simply acted "in
accordance with the provisions of the rules of court" and committed no
reversible error "in declaring the defendents (sic) in default, in allowing plaintiff
to adduce evidence ex parte, and in finding the defendants-appellants grossly
and inexcusably negligent (sic)" in view of the latter's failure to make a timely
motion for reconsideration of the order of default; appear in court on 16 July
1984 when petitioner was scheduled to present his evidence ex parte; and
furnish the trial court with a copy of their petition for certiorari filed with the
appellate court within a reasonable time. Its was only on 6 August 1984
long after the case had been submitted for decision that the same was filed.
Rule: The challenged decision leaves much to be desired. What was filed
before the public respondent was an ordinary appeal from a judgment by
default. This necessitated a full-blown decision taking into account the five (5)
assigned errors which touch on both substantive and procedural matters.
Accordingly, public respondent promulgated its 30 January 1989 decision
following a meticulous review of the proceedings had before the trial court and
careful re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before it. Thus, that decision
faithfully complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the law on which it is based. Now, if
such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified
decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal
foundation relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside from being required by
the Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a sudden change of
course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn
conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case,
the public respondent miserably failed to do so; this is reflected in the quoted
resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo the trial court's challenged
decision because it is not the latter which is reserved but rather the public
respondent's own decision of 30 January 1989. Public respondent simply
restore the parties to the status quo obtaining prior to 30 January 1989.
Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the appeal proper or on the merits
of the decision of the trial court would be in order.
There is more to the confusion. Public respondent ordered the remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings, thereby placing the latter in a
quandary as to what it was supposed to do. The trial court would not know
what "further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified the
order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former
would be hard pet at finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented
for its resolution. G.R. No. 88954
October 29, 1992
DATU SAMAD
MANGELEN, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO
HABALAYUS and HABALAYUS ENTERPRISES, INC
30 | P a g e
Rule:: This brings into focus the question of whether BOI rendered a decision
within the meaning of its own rules which requires that the decision in a
contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. It reads.
Sec. 4.
Contents of Decision. The orders, resolutions and
decision determining the merits of the case shall be in writing and shall
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
It is readily evident that the issues raised and arguments proffered by
petitioner in asking for reconsideration were weighty enough to deserve a full
length decision as prescribed by the rules.
The manner by which BOI brushed off petitioners reiterative protests did not
amount to a decision within the mandate of its own rules, nor that contained in
the Administrative Code of 1987 which similarly provides as follows:
SEC. 14.
Decision. Every decision rendered by the agency in a
contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
We have occasion to rule that the constitutional and statutory mandate that
"no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based applies
as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. (Sec 12,
ART. VIII, CONSTITUTION, Sec. 1, Rule 36, RULES OF COURT; Naguiat vs.
NLRC 269 SCRA 564,577 (1997).)
In Malinao vs. Reyes we held that the voting in the Sanggunian in which the
majority found the respondent official guilty of the administrative charge was
not a decision contemplated in the law, and had no legal effect as such.
In the context of what the law and its own rules prescribe, as well as our
applicable pronouncements, the BOI Resolution of May 10, 1990, as well as its
Letters of August 1, 1990 and March 11, 1991 did not qualify as "decision,"
absent a clear and distinct statement of the facts and the law to support the
action.
Lacking the essential attribute of a decision, the acts in question were at best
interlocutory orders that did not attain finality nor acquire the effects of a final
judgment despite the lapse of the statutory period of appeal. G.R. No. 105014
December 18, 2001 PILIPINAS KAO, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS
Rule: The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat
Enterprises actually managed, supervised and controlled employment terms of
the taxi drivers, making it their indirect employer. As adverted to earlier, factual
findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding upon the court in the absence of a
showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for holding
Naguiat Enterprises and its officers jointly and severally liable in discharging
CFTI's liability for payment of separation pay. We again remind those
concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must distinctly and
clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are based. This rule
applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. G.R.
31 | P a g e
No. 116123 March 13, 1997

Sergio F. Naguiat, et al. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.
However, note the case of Padua vs Ranada
Rule: Petitioner Zialcita faults the TRB for not stating the facts and the law
on which Resolution No. 2001-89 is based. Petitioner is wrong. Suffice it to
state that while Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based," this rule
applies only to a decision of a court of justice, not TRB G.R. No. 141949
October 14, 2002 CEFERINO PADUA, vs.HON. SANTIAGO RANADA
Issue: In the present petition, petitioner contends that: THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
THAT NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT
EXPRESSING CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT IS BASED.
Rule: We are not persuaded. The assailed resolution is not the "decision"
contemplated under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The mandate
embodied in this constitutional provision is applicable only in "cases submitted
for decision" i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda
and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due
course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the court,
after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due
course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there
is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the present case, the Court
of Appeals denied due course and outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by herein petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had
already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in
agreement with the findings of the labor arbiter, the same are binding and
conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; and that the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these legal bases in conformity
with the requirements of the Constitution.
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative
writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the court may dismiss a petition for
certiorari if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly
for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows
that the main issue raised is factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC
that respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his employment.
Petitioner brought up issues the resolution of which necessarily involves a
review of the evidence presented by both parties. It is settled that resort to a
judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the rendering
tribunal, board or office. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of
the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor official or officer in
32 | P a g e
determining his conclusion. It is not for the appellate court to reexamine

conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses nor substitute the
findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its
specialized field. Considering that the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be accorded
due respect and finality. G.R. No. 156810 November 25, 2004 GERMAN
MACHINERIES CORPORATION, vs.EDDIE D. ENDAYA
Rule: We cannot close our eyes to the failure of the RTC decision to measure
up to the standard set by Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution, as well
as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, that a decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of
the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is
based. Our Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988 reiterates this
requirement and stresses that judges should make complete findings of facts
in their decisions, scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of
the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized:
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and
fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know
why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors
of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of
passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision.
The RTC decision did not distinctly and clearly set forth, nor substantiate, the
factual and legal bases for its affirmance of the MCTC decision. It contained
no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions. Judges must inform the parties to a case of the legal
basis for their decision so that if a party appeals, it can point out to the
appellate court the points of law to which it disagrees. Judge Apostol should
have known the exacting standard imposed on courts by the Constitution and
should not have sacrificed the constitutional standard for brevitys sake. Had
he thoroughly read the body of the MCTC decision, he would have clearly
noted that the "proportion of 1:3," stated in the penultimate paragraph of the
decision, meant that the petitioner was entitled to one-fourth, while the
33 | P a g e
respondents were entitled to three-fourths, of the subject property. G.R. No.

158929 August 3, 2010
Rosario P. Tan vs. Artemio G. Ramirez, et
al.
Case: The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former
Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the
Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel
Rolando N. Abadilla ("Abadilla"), who was ambushed in broad daylight while
driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. The accused in were
indicted for Murder. Their Motion for Reconsideration was denied and ordered
the immediate transmittal of the records of these cases to the Honorable
Supreme Court for automatic review. The trial Court convicted the accused.
The same was affirmed by the CA.
Appellants assail the wholesale adoption, if not verbatim copying, by the CA of
the factual narration, as well as the arguments for and disposition of the merits
of the case from the Consolidated Brief for the Appellees, which in turn is
based on the memorandum submitted by the private prosecutors to the trial
court. This anomaly, according to the appellants, which was aggravated by the
insufficient findings of fact and absence of actual discussion of the assignment
of errors raised by each appellant before the CA, resulted in the failure of
intermediate review without any independent findings and resolution of
important issues of the case, thus rendering the CA decision void. Hence,
appellants seek not just to overturn or reverse the CA decision but also to
declare it null and void, by way of "radical relief" from this Court.
Rule: The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based." Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in
their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light
of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and
form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced.
Section 2, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
likewise provides:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in
the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed
by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved
or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
xxx
xxx
x x x [emphasis supplied.]
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or

sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction, notwithstanding the
laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if "there (was
left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and
comprehensibility," provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law
on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the
offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the
participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or
discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged
in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the
corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecutions
34 | P a g e
memorandum, but made their own findings and assessment of evidence,

before finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the case.
In the same vein, we have expressed concern over the possible denial of due
process when an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it
rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair opportunity to be
heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more
ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are
at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being. The parties to a
litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera, we held that though it is not a
good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely
copying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision
clearly and distinctly states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they
are based. In another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum
decisions, we nevertheless took occasion to remind judges that it is still
desirable for an appellate judge to endeavor to make the issues clearer and
use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in
discovering the law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in
laying down his judgment.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally
infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and
while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by
appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how
the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The
principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court
actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations
of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances
qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court.
What appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not
only the facts narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the
legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the
Office of the Solicitor Generals position, as well as the trial courts insufficient
findings of fact, appellants anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review
by the CA. G.R. No. 182555 September 7, 2010 LENIDO LUMANOG and
AUGUSTO SANTOS, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Voting
A) En banc
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and
all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
35 | P a g e
other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the

Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon
-
The quorum of fifteen being eight, the lowest possible votes for a
concurrence is thus that of five members. This increases as the number of
those who actually participated likewise increases.
Members who abstained is deemed to have voted, as abstention is a form

of vote casting
B) In divisions
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except
by the court sitting en banc.
-
In a division of 7 members, the majority is
In a division of 5 members, the majority is
4 if all are present,

if 6 are present, the majority is 4
if 5 are present, the majority is 3
if 4 are present, he majority is 3
if 3 are present, there is no quorum
3 votes are required, although all, or 4 or 3 are present
In a division of 3 members,
All the 3 must vote
Note that in no case shall a decision be without the concurrence of at least

three of such Members
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc
F. Mandatory Period for Deciding on Cases

Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date
of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three months for all other lower courts.
36 | P a g e
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or

resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to
this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall
forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification
shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or
issued within said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the
court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been
incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further
delay.
Section 18. , par 3 The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Art. VII,)
Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the
ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the
Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this
Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies.
Section 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this
Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution
of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the courts,
shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable.
Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of
Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed
before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable
period lapses after such ratification.
Case: The administrative case at bar arose from a sworn letter-complaint
dated May 31, 2001 filed with the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) by Esterlina
Acuzar, complainant, charging Judge Gaydifredo T. Ocampo of the Municipal
Trial Court, Tupi, South Cotabato, with gross misconduct, bias and partiality.
Allegedly, according to complainant, since November 4, 1998, when Civil Case
No. 412 was filed, up to the filing of this administrative complaint on May 31,
2001, respondent has not taken any action on the case because his wife is the
relative of defendant Cruz. In fact, the latter told her (complainant) that he
would just give the amount involved to respondent judge in order to obtain a
favorable judgment.
Respondent explained that the trial of Civil Case No. 412 had long begun and
it is now the turn of the defendant to present his evidence. Although there was
delay, it was due to the motions for postponement of either or both opposing
counsel. He granted those motions in order to avoid any possible "charge of
denial of due process." He further alleged that defendant Cruz is a very distant
relative of his deceased first wife, not even within the sixth civil degree.
37 | P a g e
For our resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent judge is guilty of
undue delay in rendering a decision punishable under Section 9 (1) and
Section 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, on
Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
Rule: Respondent is Guilty.
In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Reinato G. Quilala, et al. we
held that the noble office of a judge is to render justice not only impartially, but
expeditiously as well, for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it
into disrepute. Thus, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) (2), Article VIII of the
Constitution, that is, three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. This requirement of the fundamental law is designed to prevent
delay in the administration of justice for obviously, justice delayed is justice
denied.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess these traits, delay in the
disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly,
judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice.
We agree with the Court Administrator in holding that a period of a little less
than three years to dispose of a simple case for a sum of money (P20,000.00)
is an inordinate delay "indicative of inefficiency." However, we cannot go along
with his recommendation that respondent be merely warned sternly for his
administrative offense. Under Sections 9 and 11 (B) of Rule 140 of the same
Rules, undue delay in rendering a decision is a less serious charge punishable
by (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1396 March
15, 2004 ESTERLINA ACUZAR, vs.JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO,
Case: Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in
People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.. She claimed that the respondent
Judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a
decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an
extension of time from this Court. She alleged that the prosecution filed its
Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the
respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated
on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended
party nor the handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
Respondent explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the
Prosecution - was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case
submitted for resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent
further explained that the Decision dated December 12, 2005 was
promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official leave from
December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the United States.
38 | P a g e
Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity in

the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the
handling prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He
reasoned that the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation
as she is neither the private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution
was duly represented during the promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre
who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed out that the court had
already set the schedule of the promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal
opted not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him
Rule: Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge
exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in
the discharge of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to
decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for
all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(Emphasis ours)
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as
follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition
of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory.
The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order
to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued
our courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief,
deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only
does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the
Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the
case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the
decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005.
However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more
than four months after the case had been submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code
of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580
within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask
the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it. In this case, granting
that it was for a justifiable reason to render a decision or resolve a matter
beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have sought additional
time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not
avail of such relief.
39 | P a g e
Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering
the decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the
parties' memoranda before the case may be considered submitted for
decision. He, thus, would want the Court to consider his Order dated
September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring the
case submitted for resolution as the starting point of the 90-day period for
deciding the case and not on August 10, 2005, the date when the last pleading
was filed.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding
the submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly
provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run
from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court
requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision
upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to
do so, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he
was still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, the Court held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit
memoranda within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a
justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of
the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable
pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended
to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and
evidence - which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the
judges personal notes and the records of the case - non-submission thereof
has invariably been considered a waiver of the privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the
prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting
a disciplinary sanction.
Under Section 9(1) Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the
Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule,
the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of
more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
In a case, we held the respondent judge administratively liable for gross
inefficiency for delay in the disposition of cases and fined him P20,000.00
considering that he failed to act promptly and decide eight (8) cases within the
time prescribed by law and it was not the first time that an administrative case
was filed against said judge.
In another, the respondent judge failed to decide three (3) cases and resolve
eleven (11) motions within the reglementary period. Considering that it was the
judge's first offense, the Court imposed a fine of P15,000.00.
For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 200010-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating
40 | P a g e
circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent must also be penalized
for violation of P.D. No. 26 because he filed his Rejoinder to this administrative
case taking advantage of the franking privilege. Although such privilege is
extended to judges, the same refers only to official communications and
papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings which shall
be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in mailing his
Rejoinder, made it appear that the same is an official court process as the
envelope used bears his station and the words "FREE FROM POSTAGE". We
concur with the OCA that respondent be admonished for such violation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found
GUILTY of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and
for which he is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise
found GUILTY of violation of Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he is
ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of the
decision be attached to his personal record.
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027
February 27, 2009 MARIETTA DUQUE, vs. JUDGE CRISOSTOMO L.
GARRIDO,
2. Lower Courts
a. Qualifications and Appointment
Section 7.
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least
forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a
judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower
courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he
is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. (Art VIII)
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Art VIII)
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
41 | P a g e
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment
within ninety days from the submission of the list. . (Art VIII)
b. Salary
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall
be fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased. . (Art VIII)
c. Congressional Power to Organize and Security of Tenure
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.(Section 2, Par 2,
Art VIII)
d. Removal
e. Jurisdiction
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Art VIII)
f. Requirements as to Preparations of Decisions

Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
42 | P a g e
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon
the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have
been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve
the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay. (Art VIII)
g. Mandatory Period for Deciding

Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon
the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have
been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve
the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay. (Art VIII)
Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the
ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in
the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of
this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Art VIII)
Section 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of
this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or
resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by
the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as
practicable. (Art VIII)
43 | P a g e
Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of

Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters
filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the
applicable period lapses after such ratification. (Art VIII)
3. The Judicial and Bar Council

Section 8.
1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed,
the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years,
the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two
years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio
of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.
5. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. (Art VIII)
Composition
Ex-Officio
Regular
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,

the Secretary of Justice, and
a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar,

a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.
Secretary ex-officio [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(3)]

Clerk of the SC, who shall keep a record of its proceedings
4. Automatic Release of Appropriations for the Judiciary

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations
for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the
44 | P a g e
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall
be automatically and regularly released.
5. Court Martial
Case: Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City an Information charging Dionisio (a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) )with the crime of homicide allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable
motive, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO, by then and there
shooting the latter with the use of a gun, .45 caliber pistol, thereby
inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his neck and on his
thorax, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO
SADANG Y MACABEO in such amount as may be awarded to
them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and
not the Regional Trial Court, has jurisdiction over the case
Issue: Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that "criminal cases
involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular courts." The principal issue in this case is whether the term
"regular courts" includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it
does not while the respondent Judge and the intervenor-respondent hold
otherwise.
The resolution of the principal issue hinges on the interpretation of the
term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 which, in turn, requires
an inquiry into the legislative intent and purpose of the law.
There can be no doubt that the provisions of R.A. No. 6975 on the PNP
are intended to implement Section 6, Article XVI (General Provisions) of
the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force,
which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law.
Sec. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
courts:Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850
shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate
actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise
known as the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as
the Manual for Courts-Martial:Provided, further, That criminal cases against PC-INP members
who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.
1
45 | P a g e
Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 1987

Constitution against the martial law regime 22 and the militarization of the
police forces prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and
maintenance of one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character. This civilian character is unqualified and
unconditional and is, therefore, all-embracing. The Declaration of Policy
(Section 2) of R.A. No. 6975 faithfully carried out this mandate when it
declared therein that:
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the
performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character
shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor
shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
That civilian character refers to its orientation and structure.
It is thus evident that the mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 is to
divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP
members and to return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts.
The term regular courts was finally carried into the reconciled bill, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a
Reorganization Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for
Other Purposes," and incorporated in the Conference Committee Report
received by the Office of the Secretary of the Senate on 19 November
1990. Section 46 of the proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill
No. 23614, with further modifications and amendments. The reconciled bill
was approved by such both House of Congress and became R.A. No.
6975.
The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms civil
courts and regular courts were used interchangeably or were considered
as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular
courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There could have
been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to
remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within our judicial system,
i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from courts-martial, are
the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system; they pertain to the executive department of the
government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power.
Otherwise stated, courts-martial are not regular courts.
Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government,
namely, the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established
by law. Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is
thus included in the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975.
In the light then of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
would be without jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 if the
information therein would show that the offense of homicide charged was
committed by the accused (private respondent) in relation to his office.
The information has failed to do so. The pleadings of the parties are of
little help. We can only speculate therefrom that the crime charged might
46 | P a g e
have been committed while the private respondent was in the pursuit of
his mission. Under the sub-heading in the petition entitled "Relevant
Antecedents," the petitioner merely states:
There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that
he was shot by the private respondent in the course of the latter's mission.
On the other hand, the private respondent asserts in his Comment that he
"shot Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in lawful
defense of his life." Petitioner ignored this claim in its Reply to the
Comment. This claim is an anticipatory defense yet to be proved and its
assertion in the Comment does not cure the deficiency, pointed out earlier,
of the information. It would appear to us that with respect to the issue of
jurisdiction, the parties only took into account the prescribed penalty,
relying upon Deloso vs. Domingo, for which reason they did not consider
important and relevant the issue of whether the offense charged was
committed by the private respondent in relation to his office
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent
Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this
Decision, a preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to
determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private
respondent in relation to his office, G.R. No. L-108208 March 11, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C.
ASUNCION
47 | P a g e

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C.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

may its membership or the manner of its meetings be changed by mere

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all

Temporary detail of judges

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

1. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as

Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary

1. The Supreme Court

a. Composition and mode of sitting

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

CIRCULAR NO. 2-89 February 7, 1989

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Rule: Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,

Section 7No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Bar Code No.

Justice Antonio-Valenzuela disagreed insisted that she is the most senior

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

CA Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela is

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Rule: Under our system of constitutional government, the

Article XV, Section 6 of the 1973 Constitution however provides that No

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

Case: On January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial

Section 18. xxx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Case: In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634. Petitioners Tecson,

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

February 13, 1996 MIRIAM DEFENSOR- vs. FIDEL VALDEZ

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all

h. Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Supervision over lower courts

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Temporarily assign judges to other stations in the public interest

Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice