Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

CASES

Use of altered/falsified evidence

Valencia v. Antiniw (AC Nos. 1302, 1391, 1543) Decision En Banc April 26, 1991; Decision En
Banc June 30, 2008
Adez Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals (GR 100643, Benjamin M. Dacanay) Resolution First
Division August 14, 1992; Resolution En Banc October 30, 1992; Resolution En Banc
December 12, 1995
Sambajon v. Suing (AC No. 7062) Decision Third Division September 26, 2006
Balaoing v. Calderon (AM No. RTJ-90-580); Balaoing v. Maliwanag (AM No. RTJ-676)
Decision En Banc April 27, 1993
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel (GR No. L-27072) Resolution En Banc
January 9, 1970
Villaflor v. Sarita (AC No. CBD No. 471) Resolution En Banc June 10, 1999
Maligaya v. Doronilla (AC No. 6198) Resolution Second Division September 15, 2006

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Valencia v. Antiniw (AC Nos. 1302, 1391, 1543) Decision En Banc April 26, 1991;
Decision En Banc June 30, 2008
EN BANC
1

[A.C. NO. 1302 , A.C. No. 1391 , A.C. No. 1543 : June 30, 2008]
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal for reinstatement to the Bar of respondent Dionisio C. Antiniw.
The record shows that respondent was disbarred and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys on April 26, 1991 in
4
a consolidated Decision of this Court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law, and
his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against Atty. Eduardo
Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
In the aforesaid consolidated Decision, respondent was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of
sale and subsequently introducing the same as evidence for his client in court.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision disbarring him was denied by the Resolution of
5
August 26, 1993. In the same Resolution, the Court also held with respect to respondent's plea for mercy and
compassion that:
x x x the same is merely NOTED until such time as he would have been able to satisfactorily show contrition and
proof of his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession.
6

Subsequently, in a Manifestation dated September 17, 1993, respondent proffered his apologies to the Court for his
shortcomings as a legal practitioner asserting that if there was an offense or oversight committed against the legal
profession, it was due to his sincere belief that he was doing it honestly to protect the interest of his client. He
pleaded that, pending his submission of proof showing that he is again worthy of membership in the Bar, he be
7
permitted to continue with his notarial work. In a Resolution dated October 19, 1993, the Court denied respondent's
plea in the aforesaid Manifestation.
8

On January 4, 1994, respondent filed a Petition dated December 8, 1993 praying for leave to submit proof of his
being again worthy to be re-admitted to the legal profession. Attached to the Petition were testimonials, affidavits and
sworn certifications of known and outstanding members of his community at Urdaneta, Pangasinan, as well as
manifestos and resolutions of groups and associations representing various sectors thereat, all attesting to his
honesty, worthiness, respectability and competency as a lawyer and as an elected Board Member in Pangasinan. In
9
10
a Resolution dated January 27, 1994, the Court denied said petition. A Letter dated February 1, 1995 which was
sent to the Court by Bishop Jesus C. Galang, D.D. of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, pleading for
11
respondent's reinstatement, was noted in the Court's Resolution dated March 14, 1995.
12

Respondent filed an Appeal for Reinstatement dated March 8, 1996, declaring that since his disbarment, he had
embarked on and actively participated in civic and humanitarian activities in the Fifth District of Pangasinan where he
was again elected for the third time as a Provincial Board Member and for which activities he received Plaques of
Appreciation and Recognition, Resolution/Letters, Awards and Commendations from local government officials of
Pangasinan and different groups and associations in the province, all showing that he is worthy to once again
13
practice the legal profession. His appeal, however, was denied by the Resolution dated April 23, 1996.
14

On December 17, 1996, respondent filed a Plea for Re-Admission dated December 8, 1996, reiterating his earlier
15
plea for the lifting of his disbarment. The plea was also denied on January 28, 1997.
On September 1, 1997, respondent again filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to the Bar dated
16
August 30, 1997, submitting in support thereof the favorable indorsements, letters and resolutions from the
Pangasinan Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts
at Lingayen and Urdaneta, Pangasinan; the Provincial Prosecutor's Association of Pangasinan; Eastern Pangasinan
Lawyer's League; the Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club of Urdaneta; and the past National President of
17
the IBP, Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo Jr. The foregoing plea was merely noted by the Court on October 14, 1997.
18

The following year, respondent filed an Appeal dated July 8, 1998, reiterating therein his apologies to the Court and
promising that should he be given back his license to practice law, he will live up to the exacting standards of the
legal profession and abide by the Code of Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's Oath. Among the written proofs

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19

appended to his appeal was the Letter dated June 18, 1998 from Bishop Galang, of the Diocese of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, wherein he reiterated his earlier plea for respondent's reinstatement.
20

In a Letter dated July 13, 1998 received by this Court on July 23, 1998, Bishop Galang withdrew his letter dated
July 10, 1998 recommending respondent's reinstatement for being misled into signing the same.
21

Thereafter, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 1998, wherein he pointed out that
more than seven (7) years had elapsed from the time of his disbarment and that others who were likewise disbarred
22
but for a shorter duration, namely Attys. Benjamin Grecia and Benjamin Dacanay, had already been reinstated to
the law profession. Among the attachments to respondent's Manifestation was Resolution No. 98-7c dated 6 July
1998 issued by the IBP, Pangasinan Chapter, strongly indorsing respondent's plea for judicial clemency and
reinstatement, and the letter dated June 18, 1998 from Bishop Galang supporting his reinstatement to the Bar.
23

In a Resolution dated February 9, 1999, the Court noted (a) the letters dated June 18, 1998 and July 13, 1998 of
Bishop Galang; (b) Appeal dated July 8, 1998 and Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 1998 both filed by
respondent. Respondent was also required to comment on Bishop Galang's letter dated July 13, 1998 within ten days
from notice.
24

In his Comments with Motion dated March 23, 1999, on Bishop Galang's letter dated July 13, 1998, respondent
denied the existence of a letter dated July 10, 1998 of Bishop Galang but acknowledged the existence of the letter
dated June 18, 1998. Respondent averred that if the Bishop was indeed referring to the June 18, 1998 letter, he
never misled or had any intention to mislead the bishop into signing the same. By its Resolution dated June 22,
25
1999, the Court noted the aforesaid Comments with Motion of respondent
An Appeal Reiterating Earlier Petition, Appeal, Pleas and Motion for Reinstatement to the Bar dated August 28,
26
27
1999 was filed by the respondent on September 21, 1999. In a Resolution dated November 16, 1999, the Court
noted said appeal and denied for lack of merit respondent's prayer that his Plea for Judicial Clemency and
Reinstatement dated September 1, 1997 and Manifestation and Motion for Reinstatement dated December 22, 1998
be approved and given due course.
Thereafter, respondent's wife, Manuela A. Antiniw, sent to the Court a Letter of Appeal dated February 7,
28
2000, asking for clemency in behalf of her husband and affirming therein that her husband had for eight (8) years
continuously pleaded for his reinstatement and that he had submitted proof by way of testimonials of (a) his character
and standing prior to his disbarment, (b) his conduct subsequent to his disbarment, and (c) his efficient government
service. Attached to the letter of respondent's wife was a sworn testimonial of one of the complainants in the
consolidated administrative cases, Lydia Bernal, attesting to the respondent's character reformation. The aforesaid
29
letter was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated 28 February 2000.
30

Respondent filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement dated March 19, 2001, therein asserting that the
long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem
himself, and prove once more that he would be able to practice law and at the same time uphold the dignity of the
31
legal profession. The Court, in its Resolution of June 26, 2001, denied the aforesaid plea.
32

By its Indorsement dated September 10, 2001, the Office of the Chief Justice referred to the Bar Confidant the letter
33
dated August 24, 2001 of Assistant Commissioner Jesse J. Caberoy of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
requesting comment on the contention of respondent that the disbarment of a lawyer only prevents him from
practicing his profession and does not operate to divest him of his earned eligibility by passing the Bar examination.
34
In a Letter dated September 20, 2001, respondent cited pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws in support of his aforementioned stand.
The aforesaid Letters dated August 24, 2001 and September 20, 2001, of CSC Assistant Commissioner and
35
respondent, respectively, were noted by the Court's Resolution dated November 20, 2001. Likewise in said
Resolution, the letters were referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
36

In its Report and Recommendation dated January 25, 2002, the OBC opined that the eligibility vested in a
successful bar candidate would not be prejudiced or forfeited by his disbarment and the matter of enjoying first grade eligibility by passing the Bar, in relation to the position of City Administrator, should be determined by the CSC.
Nevertheless, the OBC was of the view that the controversy between the CSC and respondent could not be
considered as already ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the OBC recommended that the CSC, through Assistant
Commissioner Caberoy, and respondent be advised to institute the corresponding legal remedy before the proper
court.
37

In a Resolution dated February 12, 2002, the Court held that it could only resolve actual controversies brought
before it and would thus, refrain from rendering advisory opinions. Accordingly, the Letter dated August 24, 2001 of
Assistant Commissioner Caberoy and Letter dated September 20, 2001 of respondent were merely noted.

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38

Respondent then filed a Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar dated February 28, 2002, stating therein that for the past
ten (10) years since he was disbarred, he had deeply regretted having violated his obligations as a lawyer; that he
realized the gravity of his mistakes; and that because of such disbarment, he even lost his chance to be permanently
appointed as City Administrator of Urdaneta City and/or as City Legal Officer, after his stint as a Provincial Board
Member in Pangasinan for three (3) consecutive terms. In the event his disbarment is lifted, respondent then
promised never to cause dishonor again to the legal profession and to abide by the ideals and canons thereof.
Attached to his Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar were certifications from various civic and religious groups attesting
to his good moral character and to his worthiness to be a member of the legal profession. In a Resolution dated April
39
23, 2002, the Court noted the aforesaid Plea. Subsequently, the Court required the IBP to Comment on the
40
aforesaid respondent's Plea through its Resolution dated July 23, 2002.
In its Comment of September 9, 2002,
following:

41

the IBP, through its Commission on Bar Discipline, recommended the

Considering that the respondent has shown that he has been repentant of what he had done which was a gross
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Canon of Professional Ethics and that he has been completely reformed and
is therefore worthy to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorney's as evidenced by Certifications of different religious and
civic groups, it is recommended that he be allowed to again practice the legal profession.
It is, however recommended that he be placed on probation, meaning that the reinstatement should only be
temporary and that he be placed under observation for one year.
If during the period of one year, he proves that he has completely lived up to the high standards of the legal
42
profession, by then it will be recommended that his reinstatement as a member of the Bar be made permanent.
The aforesaid comment was noted and referred to the IBP Board of Governors for comment and recommendation by
43
the Resolution dated December 3, 2002.
The IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No. XVI-2005-99, dated March 12, 2005

44

resolving as follows:

xxx to approve respondent's Plea for Reinstatement and recommend the reinstatement of Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw as
member of the bar immediately.
On June 6, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution
and recommendation.

45

referring the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for study

On March 23, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation,

46

to wit:

Indeed the high standards of the Bar require an impeccable record but our findings show that respondent has been
sufficiently punished for the last fifteen (15) years of his disbarment and he has sufficiently reformed to be a worthy
member of the Bar. In all candor, he promises the Court that should he be reinstated to practice the legal profession,
he will faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession and by his oath as a lawyer.
xxx
In the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the disbarment of respondent DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from
47
the practice of law be LIFTED and he be allowed to resume the practice of law.
We agree with the foregoing recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors.
48

Respondent was disbarred from the practice of law pursuant to the Decision promulgated on April 26, 1991
pertinently reads, as follows:

which

There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent
introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client. (Santos v. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622) but not at the expense
of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union v. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client
but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano v. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must
advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshall, he is not at liberty to
resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that
a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili v. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment,
therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the

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administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega v. Sison 125 SCRA 293).
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Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of
his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once
again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. During
respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent
in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that
he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an
elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions,
public officials and members of the judiciary.
In Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

50

the disbarment of a lawyer was lifted for the reasons quoted hereunder:

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time
and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is
worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and
repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards
51
the legal profession demands from its practitioners.
Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as
to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of
52
officers of the court. Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in disciplinary proceedings.
Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his contrition
and his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the Court finds that it is now time to lift herein
respondent's disbarment and reinstate him to the august halls of the legal profession, but with the following reminder:
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority
to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well x x x. That is why respect and fidelity to the
53
Court is demanded of its members.
Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, as he is their sworn servant;
and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the
very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
54
and dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore
allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment
SO ORDERED.

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Adez Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals (GR 100643, Benjamin M. Dacanay) Resolution
First Division August 14, 1992; Resolution En Banc October 30, 1992; Resolution En
Banc December 12, 1995
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 100643. August 14, 1992.]
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Morong, Rizal, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong,
Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, Respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL UPON LAPSE OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF APPEAL
AND NO APPEAL PERFECTED. Petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues
presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by
reason of petitioners failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal. It has been
repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no
appeal is perfected. The decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality,
there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a
decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING; PROCEEDING IN REM; PERSONAL NOTICE
NOT REQUIRED TO VEST AUTHORITY TO COURT. As early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, We already
ruled that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to
give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with
power or authority over the res. Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner
when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION THEREOF, SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO VEST COURT JURISDICTION. In
Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication
of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition
has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the
date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a
party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper
publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person
purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to
invalidate the proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CANNOT BE LITIGATED TWICE BY VARYING FORMS OF ACTION. Shorn of
its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as become res
judicata. Verily, petitioners action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier
motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court which reversal
became final and executory due to petitioners failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot,
by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
5. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED
WHEN LAWYER MISREPRESENT CONTENTS OF DECISION. However, the phrase "without notice to the actual
occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review,
is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now
appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a
prima facie case of attempting to mislead [Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved]

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this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyers solemn duty to act at all times in a
manner consistent with truth.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The petition filed on December 28, 1990, by Adez Realty Incorporated before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein
as CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, sought to annul the order of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, dated November 20,
1984, allowing the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12662. The petition likewise sought to set aside in
effect the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 dated July 31, 1990.
On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1 dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On June 26, 1991,
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The respondent court, in dismissing the petition, said that: (a) the
petition is a reiteration of the issues raised before it 2 earlier in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990,
and since no motion for reconsideration or appeal bycertiorari with the Supreme Court was filed, the same became
final and executory, and consequently entered in the judgment book on October 11, 1990; and, (b) the accusedappellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the issue then being one of venue and not of
jurisdiction, which can be waived if not timely objected to in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the
Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner raises four (4) issues which
nevertheless may be simplified into the following: whether the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, may acquire
jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings involving real property situated in Quezon City, and whether publication of
the notice of the petition in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the
accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, is sufficient compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.
Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues presented in
the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392,
which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioners
failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.
It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of
appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had
attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence
that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same. 4 In fact,
in Dueas v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court and the appellate court may have committed an error in the
assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land to the parties in this case, but considering that their judgments are
now final, the error, assuming that one was committed, can no longer be amended or corrected." In Icao v. Apalisok,
6 We ruled that even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify correction of the
judgment after it has become final. We have also declared that, subject to settled exceptions, once a judgment
becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow the Court of amend
or reverse a decision which has attained finality will result in endless litigations. 8 Indeed, every litigation, CA-G.R. CV
No. 21392 included, must come to an end.
Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set aside the questioned order of the trial court when its Motion to
Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of Reconstitution, filed more than a year after the issuance of the questioned order,
was granted by the trial court, however erroneous may be the procedure pursued and the consequently relief
granted. Petitioner then simply failed to maintain vigilance over its perceived rights when it did not file a timely appeal
from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus allowing the said decision to become final.
Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9 We already ruled that land registration proceedings are
proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or
claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. 10 Thus,
while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was
sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. 11 In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, 12 We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever
is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing
the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient
to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the
property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.

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Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as
become res judicata. Verily, petitioners action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its
earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court which
reversal became final and executory due to petitioners failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party
cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of
the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. 13
Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb, as to other matters, the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, the same having
become final and executory. Accordingly, We affirm the assailed decision promulgated April 30, 1992, and resolution
issued June 26, 1991, by respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review filed in behalf of petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., by ATTY.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition, counsel purports to quote, as he does, the questioned
decision when he alleges
"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated November 20, 1984, without notice to
the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, granting the applicants petition for reconstitution in the name of
the deceased Elias Eugenio" (Italics supplied)
However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted
second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice
Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the
decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead 14 this
Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyers solemn duty to act at all times in a manner
consistent with truth.
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773
are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying
its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and
thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Page 8 of 36

EN BANC
G.R. No. 100643 October 30, 1992
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong, Rizal, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUENDO EUGENIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM :
In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner Adez
Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for
1
intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with
the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar.
In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay "humbly prostrates himself before the
Honorable Court and throws himself at its mercy," and explains that
. . . whenever he prepares petitioners either for the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, he
dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to be appealed from have to be
quoted, he simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages of the said decision or
order.
In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on a particular paragraph
noted by the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to explain. He remembers, however, that at
the time he was preparing the petition at bar there were other pleadings necessitating equal if not
preferential attention from him which could perhaps be the reason why his secretary committed a
very grievous mistake, Such mistake though he does not condone and he feel upset at the turn of
2
events.
3

Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex "A" is an Affidavit of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly his Secretary, stating
among others that
3. . . . in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, it was
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the contents of said petition;
4. . . . in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as he is wont to do whenever he prepares a
petition, to copy the particular pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
23773 entitled "Adez Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal, Branch 79 (not 89 as stated is the Affidavit), et al., respondents";
5. . . . when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the Court of Appeals as instructed by
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it was only after our office received the copy of
the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 . . . that Atty. Dacanay confronted me and
asked me where I got that portion which was added to the particular paragraph noted by the
Supreme Court; that it was only then that I realized the mistake I committed;
xxx xxx xxx
7. . . . I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact that ADEZ REALTY, Inc. has so
many cases being handled by the law office that I presume I could have copied or my intention was
distracted by other pleadings atop my table at the time.
Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First Division referred his case en consulta to the Court En
Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the possible sanction that may be imposed on a member of
the Bar.
After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsel's explanation
that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. This "passing-the-buck" stance of counsel was already aptly
4
treated inAdaza v. Barinaga, where the Court observed thus
Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in filing of
pleading, motion and other paper and for the lawyer's dereliction of duty is a common alibi of
practicing lawyer. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal cases, counsel's shifting of the blame to

Page 9 of 36

his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence, incompetence,
indolence and ineptitude.
The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have divined the phrase "without
notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," without counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have
been a providential mistake of the secretary as it was very material, and on which could have hinged the fate of a
litigant's cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which
borders on falsification of a judicial record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary. Indeed, by
no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed the petition.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegation in their pleadings, more particularly the
quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last
word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions
and other documents dictated or prepared by them, type or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing
them with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound the acts
5
of his secretary who merely follow his orders.
The instant case originate from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section 13 of R.A. 26, in
relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner bases one of his causes of action, provides among others
that notice should be given to the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a
material requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phase "without notice to the actual
occupants of the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it highly
improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary a that. All circumstances
herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that
no notice was given to the occupants of subject property when in fact it did not make such a finding is a clear
indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue
advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the
final arbiter of litigations.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual findings of the Court of
6
Appeals are binding upon this Court. The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his
secretary, is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent by,
rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one's oath as member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter
III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved" (Emphasis supplied).
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer's solemn
duty to act at all times in manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false
7
statements or quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, We suspended respondent for six (6)
months for, among other submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing them to the true copies.
In Chavez v. Viola, 8We suspend respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for
Original Registration of Title which contained false statements.
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and far-reaching repercussions. Those
who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal, should be dealt with more severely lest We be made
unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and
fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the
blame on his hapless secretary whose duty is was simply to obey him.
It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said
. . . that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. On of those requirement is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be
gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that
expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer . . . It is essential that
lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that
they are above all . . . sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only
secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interest of their clients. For this reason, he is
9
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of intercalating a material fact
in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and

Page 10 of 36

no other, of misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to the
standards expected of him as a members of the Philippines Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is
hereby DISBARREDeffective immediately from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given address at Mezzanine
Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road, Quezon City, entered upon his personal records, and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, JJ. concur.
Narvasa, C.J. is on leave.

Page 11 of 36

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong
Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a
decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment.
1
Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.
On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of
Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were
written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court
and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would
not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar
2
Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge. But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the
3
motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution.
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old,
has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if
given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion
certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel,
Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM,
Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of
Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge
Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge
4
5
Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City. However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion.
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had
been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and
the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound
regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another
6
chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart."
His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone
what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring
7
her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment.
On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court
reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus
I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it
was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was merely following my
instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it.
Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and
children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute
and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to
which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I
8
swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . .
On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.
On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement

Page 12 of 36

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make
both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I
am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal
9
profession.
On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter.

10

On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court

I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at
the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and
children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the
11
stigma and burden of my punishment.
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time
and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is
worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and
repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards
the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M.
Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members
is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
12
demanded of its members . . .
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore
allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Page 13 of 36

Sambajon v. Suing (AC No. 7062) Decision Third Division September 26, 2006
THIRD DIVISION
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON,
CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN
BACULBAS,Complainants, versus -

A.C. No. 7062

[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
Promulgated:

ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, Respondent.

September 26, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
[1]

Complainants, via a complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought the
disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyers Oath and
[2]
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98, Microplast, Inc.
Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny
Rodil and Manuel Rodil, for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)
and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the
counsel for the
therein respondents. Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No.
00-04-03161-98,
Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al., for Illegal Strike.
[3]

By Decision of August 29, 2001, Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and
declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for lack
of merit.
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty
of Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are
declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are
directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former position with full backwages from date of
dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows:
xxxx
3. CRISANTO CONOS
Backwages:

Basic Wage:
2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.
P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40
10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.
P223.50 x 26 days x 12 =

69, 732.00

11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.

P250.00 x 26 days x 10 =

65,000.00
P239,236.40

th

13 Month Pay:
1/12 of P239,236.40 =

19,936.36

SILP
2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.

Page 14 of 36

P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22

1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.
P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50
1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33
4,053.05

P263,225.81
xxxx
7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON (same as Conos)

Total Backwages

263,225.81
P2,370,674.38

Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages including
the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of
[4]
overtime pay and to pay 10% attorneys fees of all sums owing to complainants. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of
[5]
Execution.
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004
purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor
Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven
[6]
complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004.
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied
having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations
therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his
clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, frustrated the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the
Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with
his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutors Office of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No.
[7]
04-5203.
[8]

In his Report and Recommendation dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who
conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for
negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged
manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who
subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes
an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in
the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a
litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged,
either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his counsel, and, on
the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve his good name and reputation,
we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.

Page 15 of 36

All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due execution of the
questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall,
Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente
Santos, who was supposed to know the identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded by
the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of
person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of
regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory
questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed
[9]
the despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the circumstances. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar
[10]
Discipline of the IBP transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005[11]
226 filed by respondent.
[12]

One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition filed before the OBC, assailed the
IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP
Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only
learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having
transferred from one residence to another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the
petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course.

3-day delay in filing the present

In respondents Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those whom he met face
to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos
[13]
on February 27, 2004.
He hastens to add though that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not
[14]
[15]
attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos. Complainants and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo
[16]
[17]
Capocyan claim otherwise, however. And the Minutes of the proceedings before the National Conciliation
Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute, which minutes
bear respondents and complainants signatures, belie respondents claim that he had not met complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the
request of his clients who told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter
Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and waivers, heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of
ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had
the same responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients interest, especially given the amount allegedly
given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to the clarificatory questions of
Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG: But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the
client would go to the deserving employee?

money of your

ATTY. SUING: I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it
before a precedent in February of 1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight
of the seventeen original complainants, Your Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako
nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a
dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion, well let them do the
settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are involved in a
matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
xx xx
COMM. HABABAG: Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING: I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one, to
witness the signing of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to
them someone as a lawyer will represent them in that proceedings.

Page 16 of 36

COMM. HABABAG: My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given
there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING: I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there
Your Honor.

to you and yet

were no complaints,

COMM. HABABAG: Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a
voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean?
ATTY. SUING: Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties
it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your Honor.

who are talking and

COMM. HABABAG: So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter
Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that
clear?
ATTY. SUING:Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG: [You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended for
the payment of these workers?
ATTY. SUING:I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG:You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the

documents?

ATTY. SUING:As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.

COMM. HABABAG: The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING: Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before

February of 1998.

COMM. HABABAG: When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING: Im referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG: They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim
and Waiver or give us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document,
Your Honor, is only a single document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose
there really, Your Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together and they will identify themselves,
see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the
signing took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [sic] individual, Your Honor, no longer
the document that I prepared when all of the seven will be signing in one document.
COMM. HABABAG: Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?
ATTY. SUING: I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are
[18]
already people there, the seven complainants plus another woman. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
To be sure, respondents client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente
to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there
could only mean that he would exert vigilance to protect his clients interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged
the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING: To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are
properly signed and that these people are properly identified and verified them in front of Arbiter
[19]
Ariel Cadiente Santos.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Page 17 of 36

That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a compromise
agreement with his clients in which he did not participate and from which no problem arose did not excuse him from
carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor Arbiters office that [the complainants] are properly
identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter.
Besides, by respondents own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity
[20]
of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That should have alerted him to especially exercise the
diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients interest. But he was not and he did not.
Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence. A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice
expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm
zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and
ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally
applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the
cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that
extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use
for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that
[21]
degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x x (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the
latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG: May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may
gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL: Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG: Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong
Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL: Si Atty. Suing po.
ATTY. SUING: In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?
COMM. HABABAG: Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang
Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?
MR. RODIL: Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
COMM. HABABAG: Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o
abogado ang gumawa nito?
MR. RODIL: Matagal na ho yan eh.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG: Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente
Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?
MR. RODIL: Si attorney po.
ATTY. SUING: Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala
ng mga dokumento?
MR. RODIL: Yong mga tao.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG: Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang bayad sa
nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL: Kay attorney po.
COMM. HABABAG: Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney?
ATTY. SUING: Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong.
COMM. HABABAG: Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo.

Page 18 of 36

MR. RODIL: Opo.

COMM. HABABAG: Huwag kang tatawa. Im reminding you serious tayo dito.
MR. RODIL: Opo serious po.
COMM. HABABAG:Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
MR. RODIL: Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
MR. RODIL: Atty. Suing po.
COMM. HABABAG: Okay.
ATTY. SUING: Your Honor,
COMM. HABABAG: Pabayaan mo muna. Ill come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang
perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
MR. RODIL: Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.
[22]

xxxx

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent
attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondents claim that the Release Waiver and
Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one presented at the Arbiters Office, as well as his implied
claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of
the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument
to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice
[23]
constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are
nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
[24]
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.
[25]

In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr. the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to
delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of
one month from the practice of law was enough to give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous
path of the legal profession.
While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not
reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondents suspension from the
practice of law for six months is in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Page 19 of 36

Balaoing v. Calderon (AM No. RTJ-90-580); Balaoing v. Maliwanag (AM No. RTJ676) Decision En Banc April 27, 1993
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-90-580. April 27, 1993.
EDUARDO R. BALAOING, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LEOPOLDO CALDERON, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-676. April 27, 1993.
EDUARDO R. BALAOING, complainant,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO MALIWANAG, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; COUNSEL'S WANTON DISREGARD OF COURT'S STERN WARNING NOT TO AGAIN FILE
BASELESS AND FRIVOLOUS ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS AND HIS ADAMANT REFUSAL TO ABIDE BY
CANON 11, RULE 11.03 AND RULE 11.04, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS GROUND FOR
DISBARMENT. Complainant Balaoing went out of bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous administrative
complaints against respondent Judges Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear purpose than to harass
respondent Judges, and thus, exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse judgments against him and his clients.
These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit: CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS . . . Rule 11.03 A lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04 A lawyer
shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. We have
painstakingly reviewed the records of these cases and find the present administrative complaints of Atty. Balaoing
against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as frivolous and
baseless as the previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law
and not on material allegations of fact, substantiated by solid evidence. This We cannot countenance. Complainant
Balaoing's wanton disregard of Our stern warning not to again file baseless and frivolous complaints which only clog
the already full dockets of this Court instead of serve the ends of justice, and his adamant refusal to abide by the
above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a lawyer's conduct in this
jurisdiction, have shown complainant Balaoing's unfitness to hold the license to practice law.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
This is the latest of the several administrative complaints filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against different judges of
Olongapo City and Zambales.
The first complaint was dated February 17, 1989, entitled "Atty. Balaoing vs. Hon. Jaime Dojillo as Judge of Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City, et al." Said complaint was dismissed for lack of merit through this Court's
Resolution dated September 18, 1990. Further, Atty. Balaoing was required to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for having suppressed certain material facts of which he was charged with knowledge, and for
having engaged in forum shopping. On September 26, 1990, Atty. Balaoing submitted his "Explanation and Motion for
Reconsideration." In a Resolution 1 of the Court En Banc, said motion for reconsideration was DENIED, his
explanation was DECLARED UNSATISFACTORY and he was SEVERELY CENSURED for having instituted a
patently unfounded and frivolous administrative action, and WARNED that the commission by him of the same or
similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
The second administrative complaint filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing was against Judge Santiago Maliwanag,
RTC, Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, charging them with grave misconduct for their alleged failure and refusal to issue the
corresponding writ of execution (pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his motion filed in Civil Case No. 983-1
(CA-G.R. No. 01234), entitled "TEOFILO ZABALA, et al. vs. EUGENIO BUENO". The Court was disturbed by
complainant Balaoing's unrestrained use of unsavory, even defamatory and offensive language against respondent
Judge. One glaring example narrates: ". . . It is well to advise Judge Maliwanag not to be wearing his brief (short)
while in his chamber during office hours; it is downright undignified, especially so when his body has traces of fungus,
which was have been afflicted during his 26 years as Assistant City Fiscal of Olongapo City, a dirty city." (This was

Page 20 of 36

vehemently denied by respondent Judge.) The Court, in a Resolution 2 En Banc, dated December 4, 1990, resolved
to:
(1) DISMISS the complaint;
(2) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for one (1) year; and
(3) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), for Violation of the Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning that subsequent similar infractions shall be dealt with more
severely.
Notwithstanding the above warnings, censure and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, Atty. Eduardo
R. Balaoing is again before this Court with more administrative complaints filed against not only one, but two judges,
the Honorable Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and the Honorable Santiago Maliwanag, of Olongapo City and Zambales,
respectively.
On September 25, 1990, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing filed a sworn letter-complaint 3 against Judge Leopoldo T.
Calderon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City, for misconduct, grave abuse of authority and
malicious delay in the administration of justice, allegedly committed as follows:
"Complainant alleges that in the matter of implementing the Supreme Court Circular mandating continuous trial, there
is no way for it to succeed in so far as respondent Judge is concerned since the latter does not follow the Circular and
merely treats it as directory; that at the start of court sessions, it has been the practice of respondent Judge to
automatically grant postponements and deferments of the hearing of cases to a later hour whenever his OIC, Leonor
Maniago, makes a manifestation in open court that a certain lawyer or party called up requesting that his/her case be
postponed or be called later in the day; that respondent Judge drinks a lot with lawyers close to Mayor Gordon and
fraternizes with them openly; that with respect to respondent's personal driver, the latter receives his salary both from
Mayor Gordon as a casual employee and from the Supreme Court as a judicial aide; and, that respondent Judge
sanctions the set up of having his legal researcher, Jaime Dojildo, Jr., to work under the supervision of an OIC who,
according to complainant, is grossly inefficient and a notorious swindler with no background in law.
Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge has been maliciously delaying the disposition of several cases
pending in his sala.
a. Civil Case No. 418-0-88, where complainant is the counsel for the plaintiff, was filed in 1988. Since the respondent
Judge allowed the defendants to keep on postponing the hearings, to date, the case remains pending, without any
hearing, for more than one (1) year;
b. Sp. Proc. No. 285, where complainant is the counsel for the Petitioner, the case was submitted for decision on (sic)
September 1989. To date, no decision has yet been rendered on the case to the prejudice of the petitioner who is
now very old and sickly;
c. In Civil Case No. 157-0-89, where complainant is the plaintiff, respondent Judge in cahoots with his Deputy Sheriff,
unlawfully prevented the implementation of the Writ of Possession;
d. In Civil Case No. 253-0-90, where complainant is the Petitioner, the application for the immediate issuance of
mandatory injunction was filed on April 27, 1990. To date the same has not yet been acted upon by the respondent
Judge." 4
A second letter-complaint 5 dated October 5, 1990, was again filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against the same
Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and his Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Leonor Maniago charging them both with
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in the administration of justice relative to Civil Case No.
201-0-89, entitled "Eduardo R. Balaoing vs. Santiago Maliwanag and Romeo Enriquez." Complainant Balaoing, who
is the plaintiff in both cases, alleges that respondent Judge abused his authority by refusing to declare in default the
defendants in the above-entitled cases despite their repeated failure to attend the pre-trial conferences and to submit
their pre-trial briefs. Complainant further avers that at the scheduled hearing, on October 5, 1990, respondent Judge
did not call complainant's case, and was told only three (3) hours later that the reason was because of the motion
filed by him for respondent Judge's inhibition, which the latter allegedly refused to resolve.
With respect to the other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago, complainant Balaoing alleges that when he came out of
the courtroom, he was castigated by the former for allegedly calling her notorious, swindler, insane, etc.
Respondent Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. filed his Comment 6 on November 13, 1991. He asserts that the
present administrative complaint filed against him by complainant Balaoing was precipitated by incidents in Civil Case
No. 190-0-89 entitled "Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing vs. Eliseo Gavilan, et al." for Damages, wherein defendant Gavilan
defaulted. All the other cases mentioned in the letter-complaint were allegedly included to merely embellish the
charges.

Page 21 of 36

The factual backdrop of the Gavilan case shows that complainant Balaoing won in a foreclosure case against one
Eliseo Gavilan. After the foreclosed properties (a house and lot) were sold in a public auction, where complainant
Balaoing was the highest bidder, a Certificate of Sale was issued and the same was registered. Respondent Judge,
however, allegedly prevented the implementation of the writ of possession, to the prejudice of complainant Balaoing.
In his Comment, respondent Judge explained that the reason why he quashed the writ of possession he earlier
issued in favor of complainant Balaoing was due to the fact that Gavilan's widow, Alice, and her children, were
residing in the foreclosed properties and, more importantly, the period to redeem the said properties had not yet
expired. This action of respondent Judge allegedly infuriated complainant Balaoing, hence, his filing of several suits,
one after the other, against respondent Judge, namely:
"a) a Motion for Inhibition of respondent Judge in the Gavilan case and in the other cases mentioned in his present
administrative complaint, alleging, among other things, that respondent Judge is guilty of "mental dishonesty" and
"grossness of ignorance of the laws;"
b) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, to prevent respondent Judge from further acting in the Gavilan case and to
nullify the Order of the Quashal of the Writ of Possession rendered in his favor;
c) Civil Case No. 425-0-90, entitled "Balaoing vs. Judge Leopoldo Calderon, Jr.," for Damages, the causes of action
of which were anchored on the events that transpired in the Gavilan case; and
d) a Petition to cite respondent Judge in contempt filed with the Court of Appeals for expunging his motion for
inhibition.
When the redemption period in the Gavilan case had expired without the heirs redeeming the property, respondent
Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of complainant Balaoing. But up to the present time, complainant Balaoing
has not yet taken possession of the same, showing thereby his apparent disinterest.
As to the application of complainant Balaoing for a writ of injunction and restraining order in Civil Case No. 253-0-90,
respondent Judge explains that before he could finish hearing the evidence of the parties in support of and in
opposition to the petition for issuance of the ancillary writ prayed for, complainant Balaoing filed another Motion for
Inhibition of respondent Judge to hear his cases. Nevertheless, respondent Judge denied the motion for the issuance
of the writ prayed for failure of complainant Balaoing to show a clear right over the property and that irreparable injury
would visit him if the writ would not be issued.
With regard to the charge of grave misconduct, respondent Judge vehemently denies the same. Thus,
"7.1 The charge that the undersigned drinks "whisky like water" is a canard. The undersigned is not a habitual imbiber
of liquor as he suffers from an occasional high blood pressure and migraine. Since undersigned became a judge, he
never "patronized" with any lawyer.
7.2 The undersigned applies the Mandatory Continuous Trial Scheme in his cases. If there were occasional lapses, it
was because of the abnormal case load which is now more than 500 cases.
7.3 Court Aide Antonio Faustino does not receive any compensation from the City Government. He was, before being
appointed by the Supreme Court to such a position, a casual employee of the City government. Upon his assumption
to his present duty, he ceased to receive compensation from any other source.
xxx xxx xxx
7.5 Atty. Jaime Dojillo was the duly appointed researcher in my sala. When he was promoted as Assistant Clerk of
Court, upon his request, the Executive Judge allowed him to do researches for me. He is now a Trial Attorney in the
PAO.
8. The undersigned has conducted the trial of cases and had disposed of the same consistent with the Rules of Court
and various Supreme Court rulings and circulars . . ." 7
Other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago adopted the allegations in respondent Judge's Comment, and alleged further
that she has "faithfully performed her duties and obligations under the law to administer justice in accordance with her
authority and without any impartiality, (sic) whatsoever." 8
Consolidated with this administrative case is A.M. No. R-676-RTJ, entitled "Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing vs. Hon.
Santiago Maliwanag," wherein the former charges the latter with gross ignorance of the law for allegedly issuing a
patently unjust order.
Respondent Judge Maliwanag, in his Comment dated September 2, 1986, denied the charge and alleged among
others, that his order was issued based on jurisprudence, equity and justice, in order to prevent an unjust and
inequitable execution of the judgment and an injustice perpetrated by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple
from the barrio.

Page 22 of 36

In a Memorandum to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, dated September 12, 1990, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended the dismissal of Atty. Balaoing's complaint against Judge Maliwanag on the ground that
the same failed "to specifically show and prove the facts constituting the charge of gross ignorance of the law. The
allegation of the complainant are not only laconic and general but they are also based on mere and personal,
interpretations of the complainant on the law instead of material allegations of facts." 9
As shown above, complainant Balaoing has a penchant for filing administrative charges against judges, in whose sala
he has pending cases, whenever the latter render decisions or issue orders adverse to him and/or his clients. In
Bagamasbad vs. Judge de Guzman, Jr., 10 We have already admonished lawyers to be more prudent in filing
administrative charges against members of the judiciary. It is true that "The lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability . . . No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty .
. . But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without
the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand for him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client. 11
Here, complainant Balaoing went out of bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous administrative complaints
against respondent Judges Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear purpose than to harass
respondent Judges, and thus, exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse judgments against him and his clients.
These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSISTS ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records of these cases and find the present administrative complaints of Atty.
Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as frivolous
and baseless as the previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are based on his personal interpretation of
the law and not on material allegations of fact, substantiated by solid evidence. This We cannot countenance.
Complainant Balaoing's wanton disregard of Our stern warning not to again file baseless and frivolous complaints
which only clog the already full dockets of this Court instead of serve the ends of justice, and his adamant refusal to
abide by the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a lawyer's
conduct in this jurisdiction, have shown complainant Balaoing's unfitness to hold the license to practice law. The
Philippines abounds in lawyers. But as Justice Malcolm puts it, "the Philippines do not need so-called lawyers who . .
. have no ethical standards, and who are a disgrace to a great and noble profession . . . (F)or what is needed in the
Philippines is not a greater quantity, but a finer quality, of professional men and women, . . . who have a sincere
understanding of the high requirements of the legal profession . . ." 12 Complainant Balaoing has utterly failed to live
up to the duties and responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaints are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Complainant Eduardo R. Balaoing is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the personal records of complainant. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Page 23 of 36

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel (GR No. L-27072) Resolution En

Banc January 9, 1970
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling;
and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the
Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy,
Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken
against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty.
Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and wild
statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Such
efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated
March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the
petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum
Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to
case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum,Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for
Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the
following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to
reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our
upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme
Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner.
(Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment herein was rendered and signed by Vicente L.
Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary
of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered
in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of
July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents"
which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been

Page 24 of 36

caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is
the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a
denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a
wholesome development of the law but only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the
favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the
conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable
Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the
main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the
Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has
greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision
without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation
through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and
Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either
quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the
fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such
thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief
Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily
deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are
the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be
constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness
the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in
contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral
principle involved and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal
case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation
for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of
November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his
exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations
made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the
Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit.
While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but
three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the
comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing
his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of

Page 25 of 36

the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's
upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he
made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the
admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that
Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme
Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and
the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and
that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a
supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case
was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads,
in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he
could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and
referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and
he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the
preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the
court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July
1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his
name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of
absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty.
Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following
paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time
of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which condition is prohibited by the New Rules
of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. ... . only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration
and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four
months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and
Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice
in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation
of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive
or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights
by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and invoking
the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause
within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for
reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to
accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not
know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said
motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved

Page 26 of 36

by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with
the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the
allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente
L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to
show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on
or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and
Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the
contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's
statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day
Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion
for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told
Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he
never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty.
Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the
motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that
MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one.
They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time
handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion,
Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed.
According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that
elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was
with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in
the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate;
that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit
partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a
threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral
argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents
seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He
speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in
a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced
and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this
Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the
vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts
forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that
there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would
be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He
makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be
above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof
should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we
cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which
paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does
not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also

Page 27 of 36

because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes
with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters
that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the
Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After
citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government
officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and
spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the
decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence,
and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly
or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the
President", should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not
limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is
also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The
absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President
and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be
entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this.
But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much
from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines
vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common
place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty
of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving
any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
1
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust
2
in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
3
edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it
been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
4
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A
client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in
perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first
duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
5
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." As rightly observed
by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to
defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
6
incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying
ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that
counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It
may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions.
Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the
orderly administration of
7
justice."

Page 28 of 36

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the
language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section
8
3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus
transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor
General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation".
He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the
petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case
but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a
feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these
statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any
manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should
9
be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
10
charged."
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted
of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of
a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a
chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds'
work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor
ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there
held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in
this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of
this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
11
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto."
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section
3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of
contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included
the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist and
this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of
the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is
exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the
record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt
citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act
of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices;
who may take part. ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in
its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to the court for its consideration
and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all
of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are
taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the
date of submission; however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express
a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of
12
submission.
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

Page 29 of 36

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about the portion left out was
anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid
nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule
quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion
announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in
the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more
than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to
the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and
the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any
move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a
threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge
against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to
have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off
from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for
reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against
the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion,
who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for
his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago
began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not
forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they
proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all
that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his
position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his
knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a]
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer
himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses
and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge
is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of
disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause
before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative
but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur
did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that
"bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company
13
[MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say
that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have
been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:

Page 30 of 36

1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and
fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates
and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of
contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty.
Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may
deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may
deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito
M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.

Page 31 of 36

Villaflor v. Sarita (AC No. CBD No. 471) Resolution En Banc June 10, 1999
EN BANC
[A.C. - CBD No. 471. June 10, 1999]
LT. LAMBERTO P. VILLAFLOR, complainant, vs. ALVIN T. SARITA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
[1]

This administrative case originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint dated 14 March 1997, filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, by Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita for disregarding the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the Court of
[2]
Appeals in relation to the case entitled Lamberto Villaflor vs. Biyaya Corporation, et al. now pending with the same
court.
[3]

Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the counsel of Biyaya Corporation, the plaintiff in the ejectment case filed
against complainant Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53, of Kalookan
City. Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Romanito A. Amatong decided the ejectment case in favor of Biyaya
[4]
Corporation. Complainant appealed this decision to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 131, which
affirmed the decision of the MTC. Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, complainant brought the case on appeal
[5]
before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA G.R No. 50623. Losing no time, complainant also filed with
the Court of Appeals an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the
impending demolition of his family home.
In a Resolution dated 27 December 1996, the Court of Appeals granted the prayer for a TRO, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a restraining order forthwith issue against defendants-appellees including the
public respondent Judge or Sheriff or any person under him from evicting and demolishing the family house of the
movant, pending appeal. x x x
SO ORDERED.
The TRO was specifically addressed to, and personally served on, the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 131,
Kalookan City; the Sheriff/Deputy Sheriff, RTC Branch 131, Kalookan City; Atty. Alvin T. Sarita; and Atty. Romeo F.
[6]
Barza. Despite the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, respondent on 8 January 1997, filed before the MTC an
[7]
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Implementation and/or Enforcement of the Writ of Demolition which had already
been issued by the trial court as early as 12 August 1996. In his motion which is quoted hereunder, respondent
stated the reason why he did not heed the TRO:
1. That last January 7, 1997, plaintiff received a Resolution dated December 27, 1996 from
the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals granting the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO).
2. A close scrutiny of the afore-said Resolution including the Notice of Resolution and the Temporary
Restraining Order show that it was directed to the Honorable Presiding Judge (Honorable Antonio J.
Fineza) of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131 and to the assigned (deputy)
sheriff thereon and NOT to this Honorable Court and its deputy sheriff.
3. The only conclusion therefrom is that the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court is not restrained nor
prohibited from enforcing and/or implementing its judicial process such as the subject writ of
demolition.
XXX
[8]

On 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the motion of respondent and issued an order for the
implementation of the writ of demolition. The demolition order was actually carried out the next day, or on 10 January
[9]
1997, by the deputy sheriff of the lower court.
In response to the situation, complainant filed before the Court of Appeals an action for Indirect Contempt
against respondent, Biyaya Corporation, Judge Amatong, And the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 February 1997, found respondent and his co-defendants, Judge
Amatong and Biyaya Corporation, guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, defendants-appellees Biyaya Corporation and MTC Judge
Ramonito Amatong, and their counsel, Atty. Alvin Sarita are hereby adjudged GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF

Page 32 of 36

COURT as they are hereby fined to pay the amount of P30,000.00 each, as per SC Administrative Circular No. 2295, amending Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Alvin Sarita is likewise REPRIMANDED for his contemptuous or improvident act despite receipt of Our
Restraining Order, without prejudice to any further administrative sanction the injured party may seek in the proper
forum.
Describing the unfortunate behavior of respondent, the Court of Appeals said:
Specifically, the Court is convinced that Atty. Alvin Sarita should answer for contempt of court for misleading if not
deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge into doing a precipitate act of implementing the writ of demolition of
appellants family house which is restrained by this Court, or for making false allegations that led his clients to commit
a contemptuous act. (Cu Unjieng vs. Mitchell, 58 Phil. 476.) His misinterpretation of the resolution is no defense
[10]
otherwise, all lawyers can effectively avoid restraining orders of the higher court by arguing around the bush.
The Court of Appeals also granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
ordered Biyaya Corporation and Judge Amatong to immediately restore the demolished family house of complainant
or, return to him the estimated value of the same.
Thereafter, complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar
[11]
[12]
Discipline. The commissioner assigned to investigate the case issued an order dated 3 September 1997,
directing respondent to file his answer or comment to the complaint. The period of time allotted to answer the
[13]
complaint lapsed without respondent submitting his comment. On 8 December 1997, an order was issued by the
investigating commissioner requiring the parties to attend the hearing of the case on 10 February 1998. Respondent
[14]
failed to appear therein. The hearing was postponed and reset to 6 March 1998. A notice of hearing was sent to
respondent but again he failed to attend the proceeding. After giving respondent enough opportunity to face the
[15]
charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the case was submitted for resolution on 6 March 1998.
The commissioners report dated 10 September 1998, recommending the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita
stated in part:
As clearly established in the resolution of the Honorable Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in its disquisition
on his culpability, Atty, Sarita is liable not only for deliberately misleading if not deceiving the defendantappellee MTC Judge into violating the appellate courts restraining order, but also for making false allegations that
led his clients to commit a contemptuous act;
As a member of the Bar, Atty. Sarita is mandated by his oath to obey the laws as well as the duly constituted
authorities therein and not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court;
In filing his urgent ex-parte motion to implement the writ of demolition issued against the residence of the
complainant, Atty. Sarita was well-aware that what he was seeking to do was specifically restrained by the court of
Appeals in no uncertain terms. Even if we were inclined, in a gesture of utmost liberality, to hold for Atty. Saritas (sic)
and resolve any doubts in his favor, we are simply overwhelmed by the thought that as a lawyer, Atty. Sarita knew
quite well or must have known quite well that what he was asking for in his motion was violative not only of an order
from the second highest court but more personally was violative of his own oath as a lawyer;
The findings of the Court of Appeals says it all. What all the more moves the undersigned to recommend the ultimate
penalty of disbarment against Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the evident, even palpable disdain, in which he clearly holds this
Office in particular, and the Integrated Bar in general. Nowhere is this disdain more felt than in Atty. Saritas
deliberate and pointed refusal, not only to file an Answer to the complaint against him but also his unjustified refusal
to appear before this Office despite repeated notices. It appears that Atty. Sarita is beyond caring for whatever
sanctions this Office may recommend against him. Surely, he cannot turn his back on the possibility that the
complainants prayer may be granted given the seriousness of his (Saritas) misdeeds. But then, considering that
Atty. Sarita has no compunctions about misleading a judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court into disregarding and
violating an order from the Court of Appeals, it is no surprise that he would ignore the Commission on Bar Discipline;
We recommend for the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita.
In its 4 December 1998 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of the
investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

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The facts and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties as a
member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20 (b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus warranting disciplinary sanction.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, to which he
owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the
[16]
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is
shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.
Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable disservice to the judicial system when he openly defied the
TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. By such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts. He
[17]
neglected his duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers, and to act
[18]
with candor, fairness and good faith to the courts.
Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals was ambiguous in
its phraseology, respondent should have carried out the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather than choose to be
[19]
narrowly technical in interpreting and implementing the same. In De Leon vs. Torres, this Court said:
We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders, however erroneous they may be, must be respected,
especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. Court orders are to be respected not
because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should
be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but
because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system.
Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court of Appeals, he also misled the trial court judge into
issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition which led to the destruction of the family home of
complainant. In doing so, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
in court. Surely, such conduct of respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.
Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless and unfeeling attitude towards the complainant. By
disobeying the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, he inflicted deep physical and moral injury upon complainant and
his family by making them homeless. Obviously, it did not matter to him whether complainant and his family would
still have a place to stay as long as he won the case for his client. We would like to emphasize that a lawyers
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
[20]
motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Respondent failed to live up to this expectation.
We find the complaint against respondent fully substantiated by the evidence. However, we believe that the
penalty of disbarment imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too severe and,
[21]
hereby reduce it to suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of
law and from the enjoyment of all rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine Bar, effective
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Page 34 of 36

Maligaya v. Doronilla (AC No. 6198) Resolution Second Division September 15, 2006
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6198
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, Complainant, - v e r s u s - ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated: September 15, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate Generals Service is before us on a charge of unethical
[1]
conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor
and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla
stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed
before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case
against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired
[2]
and he is now receiving pension. (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory
questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and file the appropriate
[3]
pleading. Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his
averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
[4]
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with misleading the court
[5]
[6]
through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice, was referred to a commissioner for
investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any
[7]
agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence
[8]
and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.
Later he explained in his
memorandum that his main concern was to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to
[9]
trial and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
[10]
lawyers oath.
He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his alleged acts of falsity) had
[11]
no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding
Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
[12]
Responsibility and recommending that he be suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a
[13]
period of three months.
This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30,
[14]
2003.
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the
[15]
dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.
The common caricature
that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common
[16]
reality.
To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla
breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyers oath to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act
infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
[17]
statement of fact or law.
Atty. Doronillas unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the
impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the

Page 35 of 36

untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in
doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth
exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to
evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only
[18]
as a sort of question to complainant regarding a pending proposal to settle the case.
[19]

The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, cannot absolve him. If
anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy
[20]
purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith which
keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of
his avowal that his only aim was to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to
[21]
trial, perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the
misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so,
it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace
among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that
which is not true. A lawyers duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
[22]
honor forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept
as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for
resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part
declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For
this reason, we disagree with the IBPs recommendation for Atty. Doronillas suspension from the government military
service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronillas liability as a member of
the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to
order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyers oath, his suspension from employment in the
Judge Advocate Generals Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well
follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose
it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to
do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBPs recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBPs recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronillas
suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit
for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge
Daways courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating
[23]
circumstance.
And finally, since this is Atty. Doronillas first offense, he is entitled to some measure of
[24]
forbearance.
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere
slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to
recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice
of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO
MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate Generals Service.
SO ORDERED.

Page 36 of 36