Ukrainians OUN, Jews

Institute of European Studies
Alexander R. Dyukov
The Minor enemy

OUN, UPA and the solution
of the jewish question
Riga Vilnius Tallinn

2010
THE MINOR ENEMY: OUN, UPA AND THE SOLUTION OF

THE JEWISH QUESTION
Copyright Alexander R. Dyukov
All right reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced
in any manner whatsoever without written permission except
in the case of brief quotation embodied in critical articles or
reviews.
First Russian publication in 2008 by

REGNUM
2nd Yuzhnoportoviy pr-d, 20A-4, Moscow, 115088.
Second Russian publication in 2009, expanded and updated, by
HISTORICAL MEMORY FOUNDATION
B.Levshinskiy per., 10/2, Moscow, 119034.
First English publication in 2010 by
INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN STUDIES
52/56 Ropazhu st., Riga, Latvia, LV-1006
ISBN 978-9934-8113-0-2
Conclusion by Yuriy Shevtsov.

Translated from Russian by Marina Smolya.
Printed in Latvia.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CHAPTER 1.
Historiography of the problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CHAPTER 2.
Jewish issue in the OUN pre-war plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
CHAPTER 3.
Extermination starts: the OUN anti-jewish campaigns
in the summer of 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
CHAPTER 4.
Correction of the anti-jewish course of the OUN(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
APPENDIX I.
List of the basic OUN documents, related to the jewish issue . . . . . . . 108
APPENDIX II.
New archive documents on the OUN connection
with the nazi secret service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
APPENDIX III.
New archive documents on the crimes of the OUN and UPA . . . . . . . . 137
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Yuri SHEVTSOV
The UPA cult: amorality in Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Alexander DyukovMinor enemyIntroduction
INTRODUCTION
During three painfully long years, the territory of the Soviet Union
occupied by Nazi, had been the venue of a drama, unique in the world
history. From the very beginning the Nazi treated the war in the East as
a war for extermination. According to Nazi ideas, the Soviet Union was
populated by people of an inferior race, some of whom were to be exterminated and the others turned into slaves. During the closed meetings,
the representatives of the Hitler government were openly announcing the
need to exterminate millions of Soviet people. And these plans were not
only on paper, they were actively and consistently implemented.
The troops of the Red Army at the war theatre and Soviet guerillas
in the rear guard, prevented the implementation of Nazi plans of an impending Holocaust, but whatever the Nazi managed to do was gruesome
enough. Till now we do not know the exact number of civilians, killed
with bullets, fire and famine at the occupied territories. The Soviet historians spoke about 10 billion people, contemporary Russian researches
mention 13,514 billion, 7,5 billion of whom were killed in the course of
counter-insurgency operations, 2.5 billion died in the hard labour camps
in Germany and over 4 billion people died of famine, brought about by
the Nazi Governance.1
Part of the Nazi extermination campaign against the Soviet Union
was the large-scale annihilation of Jews. Jewish people had not the most
number of victims, but they were the first people, against whom the Nazi
started their indiscriminate slaughter. Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian
people under German occupation had a slim chance to survive, that is,
as slaves. The average Jew didnt even have that chance, only a handful
remained of the 3 billion Jewish people at the occupied territories when
the Red Army arrived to liberate the Land.2
However, not all Jews, killed during the Nazi occupation, were victims
of the Nazi. The Final Solution of the Jewish issue had some contribution from the Nationalists in the Baltic Republics and Ukraine, the new
members to the Soviet Union. The massacres arranged by them started
1
Russia and the USSR in the wars of century: Loss of armed forces: statistic research. (Rossiya i SSSR
v voinah XX veka. Poteri vooruzhennih sil. Statisticheskoye issledovanie), oscow, 2001, p. 233, 463;
Population of Russia in century: Historical essays. (Naseleniye Rossii v XX veke. Istoricheskiye
ocherki), oscow, 2001, vol. 2, pp. 50, 5859.
Altman, I. A. Victims of hatred: Holocaust in the USSR, 19411945. (Zhertvi nenavisti: Holokost v
SSSR, 1941-1945), oscow, 2002, p. 454.
right after the Soviet troops left. Jews were beaten to death, shot, burnt
in houses and synagogues, and those who managed to flee were hunted
down by soldiers with allegiance to anti-Soviet nationalist formations.
Extermination of Jews by local nationalists was certainly favoured by
the leaders of Einsatzgruppen, who took this opportunity to show their
crimes as spontaneous campaigns of natural purification. Nowadays we
see the reverse process: the crimes of the nationalists in the Baltics and
Ukraine are every now and again shown as committed by Nazi Einsatzgruppen.
This is especially visible in Ukraine, where members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (the OUN) and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent
Army, Ukrainskaya Povstantcheskaya Armiya UPA) have been hailed
as national heroes. In November 2007, during an official visit to Israel,
the President of Ukraine, Victor Yushenko made a statement that THE
OUN and UPA had nothing to do with anti-Semitic activity, and that the
memorandums of these organizations do not have a single anti-Semitic
provision. No archive today can prove that a counter-insurgency campaign took place with participation of the UPA soldiers or members of
similar organizations the Ukrainian President said. I understand, that
most of the Soviet propaganda has the power of stereotypes, but we have
the right to speak about the other truth, he added.3
The reason for this statement is quite understandable. A new national
identity is being formed in Ukraine, and within this ideology members of
the OUN and UPA are proclaimed national heroes.4 Certainly, national
heroes will never be complicit in crimes against humanity.
The situation is more complicated by the fact that the issue of the OUN
and UPA treatment of Jews has both intra-political and international significance. In the autumn of 2007, the Chief of UPA, Roman Shukhevich
was, posthumously awarded the title of The Hero of Ukraine. Whether
this will affect the relationship between Ukraine and Israel, if Ukrainian
historians fail to prove Shukhevichs non-participation in massacres of
Jews in Lvov on June 30th, 1941, remains to be seen. Will the image of
Ukraine in the Global Forum get defaced, when the intentions of the OUN
3
4
IA Rosbalt, 14-15.11.2007.
For more details see: Yukhnovsky, I. On ideology and politics of Ukrainian national memory Institute
(Ob ideologii i politike Ukrainskogo instituta natsionalnoi pamyati) // Weekly mirror (Zerkalo Nedeli),
Kyiv, 27.10-02.11.2007; Dyukov, . New identity for Ukraine (Novaya identichnost dlya Ukrainy) //
Russian Project (Russki proekt), 15.10.2007.
leaders to solve the Jewish issue and the ways they employ towards those
means become public information is another question that also points to
far more serious implications.
The questions above are also far from rhetorical: in the end of December 2007, the Head of The Simon Wiesenthal Center for International relations, Dr Shimon Samuels, expressed his protest to the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, against honoring Roman
Shukhevich with the title of The Hero of Ukraine. According to Dr Samuels, by giving this title Ukraine had expressly violated its obligations as a
member of the Council of Europe combating racism and the Holocaust.5
It is hard to counter-argue his statement. No matter what Ukrainian
government and their supporting historians say, Ukrainian nationalists
did take part in the extermination of Jews, Polish people and pro-Soviet
Ukrainians. This is a known fact. The subject, however, has not undergone
any significant scientific study yet, which gives way to various speculations.
This monograph is devoted to the participation of the OUN and UPA
in the extermination of Jews. The author had two inter-related goals: first,
to analyze the current Ukrainian and foreign historiography on the subject, and second, based on documents from the Ukrainian and Russian
archives, to study the main issues, related to participation of the OUN
and UPA in the Holocaust. The monograph describes pre-war plans of the
OUN with regard to Jews, participation of UPA soldiers in extermination
of Jews in the summer of 1941, amendments of the OUN programmes on
the Jewish issue, participation of UPA troops in anti-Jewish campaigns,
and the life of Jew soldiers of the UPA.
The appendices to this monograph contain hitherto unpublished documents from the Central Archive of Federal Security Service of Russia,
disclosing the connection of the OUN with the Nazi Secret Service and
the crimes of the OUN and UPA. The above mentioned documents are
not related directly to the subject of the research, but their content gives a
broader view of the activity of the OUN and UPA.
The second edition of the book contains the information on the formation of the attitudes towards the Jewish issue in the official publications
of the OUN in the late twenties and early thirties, the recently emerged
5
SWC urges Council of Europe to condemn Ukrainian for rabid anti-Semitic outburst that defamed Simon Wiesenthal and victims of the Shoah // Wiesenthal.com, 27.12.2007.
information and comments of colleagues-historians are also taken into

consideration in the second edition. However, the author does not consider this monograph comprehensive and final, but firmly believes that,
post-publication it would be impossible to negate the OUN and the UPAs
contribution in the extermination of Jews.
The book could never be published without the support of many people, living in Russia, Canada and Ukraine.
Co-chairman of the Russian Foundation Holocaust, Iliya Altman
(Moscow) has always taken kindly my research, and two years ago suggested writing a few articles on the activity of the OUN and UPA for the
Russian Encyclopedia of Holocaust. This monograph is the direct consequence of his suggestion.
Modest Kolerov, the managing director of REGNUM information
agency (Moscow) took the trouble of issuing the first edition of this book,
and made a number of valuable comments as well.
Ivan Himka, The University of Alberta Professor (Edmonton, Canada)
kindly provided the manuscript of his research work Ethnicity and the
Reporting of Mass Murder: Krakiwski visti, the NKVD Murders of 1941,
and the Vinnytsia Exhumation.
Marko Carynnik, a historian and writer, (Toronto, Canada) provided the
author with some of his publications, which were not available in Moscow.
Vladimir Ischenko (Kiev) kindly provided unpublished documents on
the history of the OUN and UPA, stored in the State Central Archive of
the state authorities of Ukraine and the Central Archive of non-governmental organizations of Ukraine. His help increased the reference base of
the research.
Oleg Rosov, a historian from Dnepropetrovsk took the trouble of reading certain parts of the monograph and made a number of valuable comments. He also provided documents from Ukrainian archives and several
publication of highest bibliographical value.
Igor Gomzyak (Lvov), a representative of the Publishing House
Chronicles of UPA in Ukraine, has been ever kind and prompt in providing me with the documents, published by his office. A special word of
Thanks goes to Mr Gomzyak as his views on the OUN and UPA are very
different from the authors.
Many of my friends in Ukraine, who directly or indirectly contributed, requested their names to be withheld. This is characteristic of todays
Ukraine. They wont do me any harm, but might interfere with my career one of my friends explained. Its not about me, its about my family
here in Ukraine there are so many morons here said another friend.
I do as requested, and remain grateful for all their help.
June 2009.
CHAPTER 1
Historiography of the Problem
10
Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1
CHAPTER 1
Historiography of the Problem
The attitude of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army to Jewish people is one of the most controversial problems in the OUN and UPA historiography. Today the researches
have divided into two opposite groups. One group believes that the OUN
and UPA took an active part in extermination of Jews, and the other group
denies this. Both parties accuse each other of political intentions and usage of propaganda tools, and at times these accusations are justified.
This state of affairs shows not only the complications of the issue, but
also its political significance, and at the same time, a lack of scientific studies on the matter. The reasons for the latter are clear. Up to the archive
revolution of the 90s, the informational resources on this subject were
very limited. Any researcher, willing to study the OUN and UPA attitude
to Jews, could only use reminiscences, few German reports on the situation in the occupied Ukraine, and some of the OUN and UPA documents
of doubtful authenticity, published by emigrants, for their studies.
The contradiction in the memoirs of different people made it even
more complicated. While Jewish and Polish people consistently reaffirmed
the participation of Ukrainian nationalists in massacres and slaughter,
emigrant OUN members begged to differ. Yaroslav Stetsko, one of the
leaders of the OUN(B), stated that the OUN people did not take part in
the massacres of Jews in the summer of 1941. In every settlement along
our way I personally paid attention to opposing German provocations to
anti-Jewish or anti-Polish actions. This was done by all our people, wrote
Stetsko.6
According to the OUN member Bogdan Kazanovsky, anti-Jewish
campaigns were prohibited by the OUN head of the territory Ivan Klimov, known under the name Legenda (the legend). As Kazanovsky
states, once a deputy of the Ukrainian police commissioner approached
Klimov with a question of what should be their attitude towards German
anti-Jewish campaigns. Klimov said in response: We are not interested
in the extermination of Jews, because after them, the turn of Ukrainian
6
Stetsko, Y. 30th of July, 1941. Progoloshennya vidnovlennya derzhavnosti Ukraini (30 1941:
i ), Tornoto; New-York; London, 1967, p. 178.
11
people will come. We helped several Jewish officers from the Ukrainian
Galician Army, doctors and some other professionals, who wanted to join
our organization for covert operations They readily agreed to work for
the OUN, but these are few and far between. I had issued an order for all
OUN members to take no part in anti-Jewish activities. You will shortly
receive written instruction on the issue.7
Nikolay Lebed, ex-head of the OUN Security Service, brought forward
some more arguments to prove there were no anti-Jewish sentiments in
the OUN and UPA. Most of the UPA doctors were Jewish people, saved
by UPA from the Hitlers forces. Jewish doctors were considered equal
citizens of Ukraine and leaders of the Ukrainian army. I should emphasize that all of them were honestly doing their hard duty, helped not only
soldiers but also for the civilians, went around the areas, arranged field
hospitals and hospitals in settlements. They stayed with the army in very
tough circumstances, and even when they had a chance to join the Red
Army. Many of them died as soldiers, fighting for the same ideals as the
whole Ukrainian Nation.8
Emigrated historians-nationalists and memoirists wrote a lot on the
subject of Jewish people in UPA, the most significant of their works being
a booklet, published within the series UPA Chronicles. The booklet is
titled Medical aid in UPA and reveals the reminiscences of Jewish doctors who worked in those troubled times.9
It was impossible to make out to what extent the statements of the
OUN memoirists were true. All archive documents were out of bounds
for scientists, so they could not confirm or deny this information. As for
the reminiscences of Jewish and Polish people, they gave a completely different picture, as mentioned above.
The lack of sources however, did not prevent publishing in Poland and
Ukraine a number of works on the OUN and UPA.10 Most of these books
7
8
10
Kazanivsky, B. : . (Shlyakhom Legendy: Spomyny), London, 1975, p. 264.

Lebed, M. i, i , i i i i i
i . (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya, ii geneza, rist i
dii u vyzvolniy borotbi ukrainskogo narodu za Ukrainsku Samostiynu Sobornu Derzhavu), Drogobich,
1993, book 1, p. 69.
i : , i i . (Medichna opika v UPA: Dokumenty, materiyaly i spogady), Toronoto, Lvov, 1992. For more details see also: Omelyusik, M. i
1943 i // i: i i. (UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotsi // Volyn i Polissya:
Nimetska okupatsiya), Toronto, 1989, book 1, pp. 3435.
Turowski, J., Siemiaszko, W. Zbrodnie nacjonalistow ukrainskich dokonane na ludnosci polskiej na
Woyni u 19391945. Warszawa, 1990; Maslovsky, V. Land accuses. (Obvinyaet zemlya) oscow, 1991;
12
were mainly describing the massacres of Polish people in Volyn, carried

out by UPA soldiers, but the issues of Ukrainian nationalists exterminating
Jewish people was also touched upon. The publications were mostly based
on the recollections of witnesses, were written in journalistic genre and
as a rule did not meet the strict requirements for scientific works. A geewhiz approach resulted in several factual mistakes in the above works.11
However, the authors of the publications produced a large amount of information, which made the statements of Ukrainian emigrant historians
and memoirists, who denied OUN and UPA participation in massacres,
including extermination of Jewish people, far less convincing and susceptible to falsehood.
A logical consequence of the denunciative the OUN and UPA historiography was the first book, devoted only to their attitude to Jewish
people. This book of the Polish historian Edward Prus Holocaust po banderowsku (Holocaust in Bandera style) was published in two editions.12
The advantage of the book was consolidation of previously published information on victimization of Jewish people by Ukrainian nationalists,
disadvantage journalist style and usage of the OUN and UPA documents of doubtful genuineness. However, some of the OUN orders on
extermination of Jewish people that Prust mentions in his work were later
found in the Ukrainian archives.13
11
12
13
Polischuk, V. V. Bitter truth: The evil of the OUN and UPA (Confessions of a Ukrainian). (Girka Pravda:
Zlochinnost OUN-UPA (Spovid ukrainstya)) Toronto; Warsaw; Kyiv, 1995; Poliszczuk, W. Dowody
zbrodni OUN i UPA. Toronto, 2000 .
For example, several photographs of OUN and UPA victims had wrong titles. For more details see:
Rutkowska, ., Stola, D. Faszywy opis, prawdziwe zbrodnie // Rzeczpospolita, 19.05.2007.
Prus, E. Holocaust po banderowsku: Czy ydzi byli w UPA? Wrocaw, 1995; Prus, E. Holocaust po banderowsku. Wrocaw, 2001.
The document Policy on treating minorities, quoted by Prus, is actually one of the paragraphs of
the OUN(B) directive Struggle and activities in war time (compare: Prus, E. Holocaust po banderowsku, s. 46; OUN v 1941 rotsi: Dokumenty (The OUN in 1941: Documents) / Institute istoriyi
Ukrainy NANU (The Institute of history of Ukraine of NSAU); Edited by O. Veselova, O. Lisenko, I.
Patrilyak, V. Sergiychuk; Introduction by S. Kulchitsky. yiv, 2006, part 1, pp. 103104). The directions on extermination of Jews both individually and as a national group, also quoted by Prus, are
actually an extract from the same directive, mentioned above (compare: Prus, E. Holocaust po banderowsku, s. 177; OUN in 1941, part 1, p. 129).
At the same time, it is doubtful that the order of the Commander in Chief of UPA, R. Shukhevich,
quoted by Prus, is genuine (To treat Jews in the same way as Polish and gypsies, eliminate without
mercy. Spare doctors, pharmaceutists, chemists, nurses, keep them under arrest in field hospitals and
watch their hands. Execute by hanging for any attempt of violating orders, escape or intentional harm
to patients. The Jews, who can not be used for digging trenches and fortifications, should be eliminated
after their work is finished Prus, E. Holocaust po banderowsku, s. 185). Despite the fact that the possibility of such an order having been issued is confirmed by the directives of OUN SS of 1943 and 1944,
the lack of reference to the source prevents us from using this quote as scientifically confirmed.
13
The opening of the Ukrainian archives for research and reference in

the 90s helped lay a scientific base for research on the OUN and UPA
history. Historians could now study dozens of thousands of archive documents, many of them were published too. Initially scientists seemed focused on the UPA struggle against the Soviet system, and later on some
publications appeared devoted to the attitude of Ukrainian nationalists to
the Jewish issue.
Studies of this subject were mainly carried out within research of the
Holocaust in Ukraine, occupied by the Nazis. The monograph of Felix
Levitas, PhD in History, published in 1997, includes a very important
document minutes of the OUN members meeting that took place in
the middle of July 1941 in Lvov. As Levitas states, this document proves
that there existed two groups in the OUN, different in their attitude to the
Jewish issue radical and democratic.14 This statement sounds at least
doubtful, because the minutes show the participants totally negative attitude to Jewish people, the difference was only in their preferred tactics.
Zhanna Kovba, a historian, in her monograph Humanity in the Abyss
of Hell also spoke about the OUN and UPA attitude to Jewish people, but
could not formulate a final conclusion. On the one hand, she states that
the OUN(B) had no clear policy on treating Jewish people; on the other
hand she says that common OUN members often violated their leaders
orders and helped Jewish people.15
One of the leading Russian historians, Iliya Altman, has a far more specific opinion on the history of the Holocaust. He states that the attitude of
the OUN towards Jewish people remained negative both before and during the war.16 The truth of his statement was also confirmed by Ukrainian
historian Maxim Gon in his research devoted to the relationships between
the Jewish and Ukrainian people in Western Ukraine in 19351939.17 He
14
15
16
17
Levitas, F. L. Jews of Ukraine in the times of WWII. (Yevrei Ukrainy v roky Drugoi Svitovi viyny), Kyiv,
1997, p. 180.
ovba, Zh. Lyudyanist u bezodni pekla: Povedinka mistsevogo naselennya Skhidnoi Galycyny v roky
ostatochnogo rozvyazanya evreiskogo pytannya (i i : i i
i ), Kyiv, 1998,
pp. 108, 230.
Altman, I. A. Victims of hatred: Holocaust in the USSR, 19411945. (Zhertvi nenavisti: Holokost v
SSSR, 19411945), oscow, 2002, pp. 220225.
Gon, M. M. Iz krivdoyu na samoti: Ukrainsko-evreyski vzaemini na zakhidnoukrainskih zemlyah u skladi
Polshi (19351939) (I i: -i i
i i (19351939)), Rivne, 2005; Gon, M. M. Kommunistychniy factor ukrainsko-evreyskih vzaemyn zakhidny Ukraini (1935-1939) (i ii i (19351939 .) // Galicia. Lvov, 2003, p. 9; Gon, M. M.
14
based his studies on many authentic documents, and proved that even
though before WWII, the OUN did not see Jewish people as their main
enemy; members of this organization arranged campaigns on destroying
Jews belongings and exerted psychological pressure on them.
Thorough studies of certain massacres of the Jews in the summer of
1941 also helped to clarify the attitude of the OUN towards the Jewish
issue. Hannes Heer, Alexander Kruglov and Ivan Himka studied the massacres that took place in Lvov after it was occupied by German troops,18
Bernd Ball and Marko Carynnik did research on the mass extermination
of Jews in Zlochew and Dubno in early July 1941.19 These scientists used
German documents that revealed active participation of the OUN members in both anti-Jewish campaigns.
Much more controversial was the question whether the soldiers of the
Ukrainian squadron Nachtigall, took part in the extermination of Jews in
Lvov. Official Ukrainian historians deny their participation, referring to the
decision of West German court on the Case of Oberlander.20 However, Alexander Kruglov states that the Prosecutors office of Bonn has determined
that there is a high probability of the Ukrainian Platoon of the 2nd company of Nachtigall squadron having had their contribution in the acts
of violence against the Jewish people in NKVD prisons, and is responsible
for deaths of many Jews.21 There are witness statements saying that at least
certain military men of Nachtigall took part in killing Jews.22
18
19
20
21
22
Ukrainski pravoradicaly ta evreyi Zakhidnoi Ukrainy (druga polovina 1930 rokov) (The Right Ukrainian radicals and the Jews in the Western Ukraine (second half of the 1930s) // Problemy istoriyi Ukrainy:
Facty, suzhdennya, poshuki. ( : , , ), Kyiv, 2006,
issue 15.
eer, H. Blutige Ouvertre: Lemberg, 30 Juni 1941: Mit dem Einmarsch der Wehrmachttruppen beginnt
der Judenmord // Der Zeit, 2001, no. 26; Kruglov, . Lvov, July 1941: Extermination starts (Nachalo
unichtozhenia) // Golokost i suchasnist (Holocaust and modern times), Kyiv, 2003, no. 5; Himka, I.
Dostovirnist svidchennya: relyatsia Ruzi Wagner pro lvivskiy pogrom vlitku 1941 (Trustworthiness of
the witness statement: Ruzya Wagners report on the Lvov massacre in the summer of 1941) // Golokost
i suchasnist (Holocaust and modern times), Kyiv, 2008, no. 2.
Boll, . Zloczow, Juli 1941: Die Wehrmacht und der Beginn des Holocaust in Galizien // Zeitschrift fr
Geschichtswissenschaft. 2002, no. 10; Boll, . Zloczow, July 1941: The Wehrmacht and the Beginning
of the Holocaust in Galicia: From a Criticism of Photographs to a Revision of the Past // Crimes of War:
Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century. New-York, 2002; Carynnik M. (Zolochiv movchit) // Krytyka. 2005, no. 10.
Organizatsiya ukrainskyh natsionalistiv i Ukrainska povstanska armiya: Fakhoviy vysnovok robochoi
grupi istorykov pri uryadovoy komisiyi vyvchennya diyatelnosti OUN i UPA (Oii
iii i i: ii
i ici ii i ), Kyiv, 2005, p. 8.
Kruglov, . Lvov, July 1941, p. 13.
For more details see: Vysotsky, S. Nachtigal: betrayors, criminals, heroes. // Gazeta 24, Kyiv,
15
Another subject of many heated discussions is the participation of

Bukovinsky Kuren, consisting of Ukrainian nationalists, in shootings
of Jewish people in Babiy Yar. Historians Ivan Fosty and Mikhail Koval
wrote that members of Bukovinsky Kuren participated in killing Jews
in Kiev,23 but lately this opinion has been doubted.24 It is impossible to
determine whose point of view is closer to the truth, since the amount of
scientific information on this subject is absolutely insufficient.
Grzegorz Motyka, a Polish historian, devoted two parts of his monograph Ukrainian Guerilla Movement to the massacre in Lvov in July
1941 and the OUN attitude to Jewish people. He included new internal
OUN documents into scientific studies, and came to the conclusion that
Ukrainian nationalists treated Jews as enemies. He was one of the first
to note the anti-Jewish activities of the OUN SS in 1943-1944, and also
ventured a reasonable estimate on the number of Jews killed by UPA. 25
However, a much more significant contribution to the studies of the
OUN-UPA attitude towards the Jewish issue was made by an article,
published in the Harvard Ukrainian Studies journal by Karel Berkhoff
and Mark Carynnik.26 The article included an excerpt from the Autobiography of Yaroslav Stetsko, one of the leaders of the OUN(B), written in the summer of 1941. Moscow and Jews are main enemies of
Ukraine, he wrote. That is why I support extermination of Jews
and introducing the German methods of extermination [elimination]
23
24
25
26
27.02.2008. The article represents the opinions of such historians as Mark Carynnik (USA), Karel
Berkhoff (The Netherlands), Zhanna Kovba (Ukraine), Alexander Ischenko (Ukraine) and Alexander Dyukov (Russia).
Babin Yar (September 1941 September 1943) (Babin Yar (veresen 1941 veresen 1943)) // Ukrainski
istorichesky journal (Ukrainian historical journal). 1991, no. 9; Fostyi, I. The OUN activity in Bukovina
in 19401941 (Diyatelnist OUN na Bukovini u 19401941) // Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB
2000, no. 24. [Quoted from the e-version, published on the official web-site of Ukrainian Security
Service, sbu.gov.ua].
For more details see: Nahmanovich, V. Bukovina kuren and mass execution of Jews in Kyiv in the autumn of 1941. (Bukovinsky kurin i masovi roztrili evreiv Kieva voseni 1941) // Ukrainski istorichesky
journal (Ukrainian historical journal). 2007, no. 3.
Motyka, G. Ukraiska partzyantka, 19421960: Dyiaalno Organizacji Ukraiskich

Nacjonalistw i Ukraiskiej Powstaczej Armii. Warszawa, 2006, s. 9699, 287298.
Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk, M. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude toward
Germans and Jews: Yaroslav Stetskos 1941 Zhyttiepis // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 1999, no. 34. Defacto this issue of the journal was published in 2002. Brief summary see: Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk,
M. The Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists and its attitude towards Germans and Jews. Autobiography of Yaroslav Stetsko of 1941. (Organizatsiya Ukrainskih natsionalistov, i stavlennya do nimtsiv
ta evreiv. Zhittepis Yaroslava Stetska vid 1941) // Golokost i suchasnist (Holocaust and modern times),
Kyiv, 2003, no. 1.
16
of Jews, excluding their assimilation etc.27 The authors of the article also
included other evidences of anti-Jewish policy of the OUN leadership.
Thus, Stetskos post-war statements, saying that he opposed anti-Jewish campaigns, were proved false. And though the Autobiography of
Yaroslav Stetsko was introduced as a scientific source by Levitas,28 this
article by Berkhoff and Carynniks drew much more attention that Levitas work.
Before that the issue of the OUN-UPA attitude to Jewish people did
not receive much attention of Ukrainian historians and publicists. The
works on denunciative historiography were as a rule ignored and considered non-scientific, the works of historians on Holocaust also drew
little of public attention. Hence, Ukrainian historians devoted very little
time to studies of this issue, there was only one significant article by
Yaroslav Gritsak Ukrainians in anti-Jewish campaigns in the course of
WWII, published in 1996.29 Apart from that, there have been just a few
references to anti-Jewish campaigns in publications, dedicated to combat activity of the OUN and UPA.30
Berkhoff and Carynniks article changed the state affairs and the existing status-quo. It was impossible to ignore an article, published in
a serious academic journal. It unleashed a barrage of criticism from
pro-OUN historians, announcing the documents doubtful and even
counterfeit. This accusation, related in particular to the Autobiography of Yaroslav Stetsko, was put forward by a historian from Lvov Taras
Gunchak31 However, his arguments were not convincing and the state27
28
29
30
31
Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk, M. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, p. 162.

Levitas, F. L. Jewish people of Ukraine, (Evrei Ukraini), p. 179.
Gritsak, Y. Ukraintsi v antiyevreyskih aktsiyah u roky drugoi svitovoi vyiny (Ukrainians in anti-jewish
campaigns during WWII) // Nezalezhny kulturologichniy chasopys I ( ). 1996, no.3.
Patrilyak, I. K. Legiony Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv, 1941-1942: Istoriya vinikennya diyatelnosti.
(i iii, 19411942: Ii ii), ,
1999, p. 26. For more details see also: Vedeneyev, D., Bistrukhin, G. Mech i trizub: Rozvidka I kontrrozvidka puhu ukrainskih natsionalistov ta UPA (19201945) ( :
(1920-1945)), Kyiv, 2006; Vedeneyev, D., Bistrukhin, G.
Povstanska rozvidka die tochno i vidvazhno: Dokumentalna spadschina pidrozdiliv spetsialnogo
priznachennya OUN ta UPA, 1940-1950-ti roki ( :
, 19401950-
), Kyiv, 2006.
Gunchak, . Problemy istoriographiyi: istoriya ta iyi dzherela (Problems of historiography: history and its
sources) // Ukrainskiy vizvolniy rukh ( ). Lvov, 2005, p. 4, pp. 253264.
For more details see also: Kosik, V. Garvard patronue nenaukovi metody istorychnogo doslidzhennya ( ) // Ukrainskiy vizvolniy rukh
17
ment was later on disproved by Canadian historians Taras Kurilo and

Ivan Himka.32
There were more attempts to clear the OUN from the accusations of
the extermination of Jews. Old arguments were repeated of Jewish members of the UPA and Soviet propaganda, as well as stated that neither
OUN nor UPA issued orders on extermination of Jews.33 These statements
sounded convincing to only some people, as proved by discussions of
historians and publicists, given in the journal Krytyka (criticism), published in Kyiv.34 Russian historians joined these discussions as well later.35
Public interest in the problem and its political significance played
their part: shortly afterwards, the Head of Liberation Movement Research
Center in Lvov, Vladimir Vyatrovich, published his book, the first ever
monograph on the attitude of the OUN towards Jews.36
Unfortunately, this monograph can only be considered as revising the
facts. Despite all assurance of scientific objectivity, we are astonished
at the way Mr Vyatrovich uses archive documents. The main source for
Vladimir Vyatrovich, when depicting the attitude of the OUN to Jews, was
propaganda material distributed by OUN itself. Of course, these materials
32
33
34
35
36
( ). Lvov, 2003. vol. 1, pp. 178190; Nakonechniy, E. Shoa u Lvovi.

( i), Lvov, 2006, p. 7.
Kurilo, T., Himka, I. Yak OUN stavilasya do evreyiv? Rozdumy nad knizhkoyu Volodymyra Vyatrovicha (What was the OUNs attitude towards Jews? Deliberations over the book of Vladimir Vyatrovich) //
Ukraina moderna (Contemporary Ukraine). 2008, no. 2, p. 253.
Gogun, A., Vovk, A. Evreyi v borbe za nezavisimuyu Ukrainu (Jews in the struggle for Independent
Ukraine) // Korny (Roots), Kyiv-Moscow, 2005, no. 25, p. 133; Rusnachenko, . Ne pro pidruchnyky
yidetsya ( i ) // Krytyka, Kyiv, 2007, no. 3. For more details see also: Rybak,
A. I. Ukrainska derzhava u planah OUN (19391950 roki): istoriko-politologichniy analiz. (The Ukrainian State in the OUN plans, 1939-1950: historical and politologycal analysis). Ostrog, 2007, pp. 154,
159160.
Grachova S. Vony zhyly sered nas? (Did they live among us?) // Krytyka, Kyiv, 2005, no. 9; Carynnyk,
M. Zolochiv movchit ( ) // Krytyka, Kyiv, 2005, no. 10. For more details see also:
Girik, S. Ukrainsko-evreyskiy konflikt 1941 roku v Galichyne: Sproba poshuku prychyny ( 1941 : ) // Nezalezhny kulturologichniy chasopys I ( ). 2007, no. 48.
Dyukov, A. Ob uchastiyi OUN-UPA v Holokoste: Moskva i zhidovstvo glavniye vragi Ukrainy
(The OUN-UPA participation in Holocaust: Moscow and Jews chief enemies of Ukraine) // IA REGNUM, 14.10.2007; Dyukov, . Evreysky vopros dlya OUN-UPA (The Jewish issue for the OUN and
UPA) // Weekly publication 2000, Kyiv), 08-14.02.2008; Dyukov, . OUN sotrudnichala s natsistami
i unichtozhala evreyev (The OUN collaborated with the Nazi and exterminated Jews) // Izvestiya (Moscow), 11.02.2008; Dyukov, . Byli li Banderovtsy antisemitamy? (Were Bandera people anti-Semites?)
// Komsomolskaya pravda (Moscow), 15.02.2007.
Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv: Formuvannya pozitsiyi na tli katastrophy (
: ), Lvov, 2006. For more details see also:
Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv (19201950) (The OUN attitude towards Jews (19201950))
// Ukrainskiy vizvolniy rukh ( ), Lvov, 2006, vol. 7.
18
are a valuable, though somewhat peculiar, source, one should use it with
discretion and always verify the information against inside documents,
not used for propaganda. However, Mr Vyatrovich, while widely using the
propaganda material, ignored most of the anti-Jewish provisions, given in
the directive The OUN struggle and activity during the war (May 1941).
He also omitted a number of other very important documents: address
of the OUN(B) regional leader of 01 July 1941, directive 6 by an OUN
Leader I. Klimov (August 1941) and directives of the OUN SS on secret
extermination of Jews serving in UPA. He also ignored the reminiscences
of witnesses, showing participation of the OUN and UPA members in the
elimination of Jews. A large number of anti-Semitic articles, published in
the OUN official publications, were ignored as well.
In the description of the OUN attitude to the Jewish issue Vyatrovich somehow managed to omit the large-scale anti-Jewish campaign, arranged by the OUN in the summer of 1936. After this campaign over 100
Jewish families were deprived of their houses. Mr Vyatrovich also didnt
notice many anti-Jewish campaigns of the summer of 1941, carried out
by OUN members.
We are surprised at Vyatrovichs claims to the historians involved in
studies of the OUN-UPA attitude towards Jews. In Zhanna Kovbas book
Humanity in the Abyss of Hell we find a reproach to V. Kosik, a diasporic
historian, because he had not included German documents on the OUN
anti-Semitic mottos into the book Ukraine and Germany during WWII
(mottos like Poles over San, Russian to pits, Jews on hooks). Vyatrovich tires to convince the reader that this reproach has no grounds. In
order to accuse V. Kosik of an intention to conceal some documents, it
would be well to know for yourself where those documents are, instead
of only asking rhetorical questions he wrote.37 It is at least odd to hear
this from a person, claiming to be a specialist in the OUN-UPA history.
We know that already in 1991 diasporic historians in Ukraine published
a German report, which mentioned a motto of the OUN used in the autumn of 1941: Viva Independent Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans! Poles over San, Germans to Berlin, Jews on hooks!38 How can
Vyatrovich not know this publication?
37
38
Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv (OUN attitude towards Jews), pp. 12-13.
UPA v svitli nimetskyh dokumentiv ( ii i i) / Edited and introduction by T. Gunchak; P. Potichniy. Toronto, 1991, book 3. [Litopys Ukrainskoy Povstanskoy Armiyi
(The Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chronicles), vol. 21], p. 96.
19
So it is no surprise, that the conclusions, given in Vyatrovichs monograph, are far from adequate. For instance, it was stated that the OUN
did not allow for its ideological and political descend to anti-Semitism.39
If that being the case, how should we treat their motto Moscow, Poland,
Magyars and Jews are enemies! Destroy them!40 issued by the OUN(B)
regional leadership in the beginning of war.
Though hardly based on scientific research and solid facts, the work of
Vyatrovich was heavily criticized by both Russian and Ukrainian scientists.41 Nevertheless, it was in high demand among the modern Ukrainian
authorities, rushing about in search of National History. In early 2008,
Vyatrovich was first appointed Chairman Advisor of the Security Service
of Ukraine on research and scientific work, and later on Head of the
State Sectoral Archive of the Ukrainian Security Service. He conducted
active propaganda of revisionist views on the OUN and UPA history. In
interviews to mass media, he kept assuring that Ukrainian nationalists
had nothing to do with extermination of Jews during the war.42 This statement is far from reality, but when repeated regularly, it might get the status of a well known fact in the Ukrainian society.
So, even with numerous discussions of historians and publicists on
the subject of the OUN and UPA attitude towards Jews, we can not state
that it has been studied thoroughly. Some publications do not meet tough
scientific criteria, others ignore the sources that do not fit the authors
views, still others describe only certain aspects of the problem or speak
very little about it at all. One cant help thinking that the researches of the
last couple of years turned out to be not very productive.
At the same time, now that the archives are open and Ukrainian historians are actively publishing their works, historical researches now have
39
40
41
42
Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv (OUN attitude towards Jews), p. 101.

Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941 ( . 30 )
1941, p. 129; OUN v 1941 rotsi. (The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 261; part 2, p. 576; CSA SBPGU, stock
3833, list 1, file 63, sheet 12; file 42, sheet 35; List 2, file 18, sheet 87.
For more details see: Dyukov, A. Vtorostepenny vrag: OUN, UPA i resheniye evreiskogo voprosa
( : , ), oscow, 2008, pp. 1719;
Kurilo, T., Himka, I. Yak OUN stavilasya do evreyiv? Rozdumy nad knizhkoyu Volodymyra Vyatrovicha (What was the OUNs attitude towards Jews? Deliberations over the book of Vladimir Vyatrovich) //
Ukraina moderna (Contemporary Ukraine), 2008, no. 2.
See for example: Vyatrovich, V. Ukrainsko-evreyskiye burgouazniye natzionalisty: Ob ukrainskoevreyskom sotrudnichestve v borbe za nezavisimuyu Ukrainu (Ukrainian-Jewish bourgeois nationalists:
on the collaboration of Ukrainians and Jews in the struggle for independent Ukraine) // Ukrainskaya
Pravda, Kyiv, 23.01.2008; Vyatrovich, V. Kak sozdavalas legenda o Nachtigall (The legend of Nachtigall
how it was created) // Weekly mirror, Kyiv, 16-22.02.2008.
20
a great number of sources available, to let them objectively describe the

OUN and UPA attitude towards the Jewish issue, and first of all internal documents of both OUN factions. Apart from the already mentioned
documents (minutes of the OUN members meeting in July 1941 in Lvov
and Yaroslav Stetskos Autobiography) historians can at present use such
crucially important documents as decrees of the OUN Great Congresses
and Conferences, Integrated General Plan of the OUN Insurgent headquarters (spring 1940), directives of the OUN struggle and activity during the war (May 1941),43 Draft Constitution of Ukraine, prepared by the
OUN(M) before the war, propaganda materials of both OUN groups, orders and directions issued by the OUN(B) leadership. Most of these documents were published in booklet form, compiled by the members of the
Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies, as well as by
members of the Institute of Ukrainian History of the NASU.44 Originals
of some very significant inside documents have till now not been found
(we speak first of all about directives of the OUN Security Service), but
their content is available in the documents of Soviet State Security service,
published by Ukrainian and Polish research workers.45
43
44
45
For more details on this document see: Patrilyak, I. . Viyskovi plani OUN(B) u taemniy Instruktsii
Revolutsiynogo provodu (traven 1941) (ii () i Ii i ( 1941 .)) // Ukrainian historical journal, 2000, no. 2.
Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i metrialiv ( . 30 1941: i i i ii) / Institute ukrainskoy
arkheographiyi ta dzhereloznavstva NANU (The Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and source
studies of NSAU); Edited by . Dzyuban; Introduction by V. Kyk; Y. Dashkevich, Lvov, Kyiv, 2001;
Sergyichuk, V. Ukrainski zdvig: Podillya, 19391955 ( : i, 19391955) / Kyiv
National University of Taras Shevchenko, Kyiv, 2005; OUN v 1941 rotsi: Dokumenty (The OUN in 1941:
Documents) /The Institute of history of Ukraine of NSAU Edited by . Veselova, . Lisenko, I. Patrilyak,
V. Sergiychuk; Introduction by S. Kulchitsky, Kyiv, 2006, pp. 12; OUN v 1941 rotsi: Dokumenty (The
OUN in 1941: Documents) / The Institute of history of Ukraine of NSAU; Edited by . Veselova, .
Lisenko, I. Patrilyak, V. Sergiychuk; Introduction by I Patrilyak, Kyiv, 2006; Roman Shukhevich u dokumentah radyanskih organiv derzhavnoi bezpeki (19401950) (Roman Shukhevich in the documents of the
Soviet State security bodies (19401950)) / Institute of National Source Studies; Edited by V. Sergiychuk,
S. Kokin, N. Serdyuk, S. Serdyuk; Introduction by V. Sergiychuk, Kyiv, 2007, vol. 1.
Unfortunately, the number of published copies of the booklets OUN in 1941 and OUN in 1942 is
stunningly low (150 and 300 copies correspondingly), hence they are not available for research workers.
Polyaki i ukraintsi mizh dvomya totalitarnymy systemamy, 19421945 (Polish and Ukrainian people between two totalitarian systems, 19421945) / The Institute of National Memory of Poland; The Institute
of political and ethno-national researches of NSAU; Edited by B Gronek, S. Kokin, P. Kulakowski, M.
Mayevsky, V. Pristayko, O. Pshennykov, E. Tukholsky, V. Khudzik. Warsaw, Kyiv, 2005, vol. 12; Borotba
proty UPA i natsionalistichnogo pidpillya: Informatsiyni dokumenty CK KP(b)U, obkomiv patriyi, NKVSMVS, MDB-KDB, 1943-1959 ( i ii ii: Iii
(), i i, -, -, 19431959) / Institute of Ukrainian
Archaeography and Source Studies of NASU; Edited by A. Kentiy, V. Lozitsky, I. Pavlenko; Introduction
by V. Sergiychuk, Kyiv, Toronto, 2002, book 1. [The UPA Chronicles, New Series, vol. 4.]
21
A very important source of information, for understanding the OUN

attitude towards Jews in the end of twenties and beginning of thirties, is
the journal Building up the nation, an official publication of the OUN
leadership.46 The articles in this journal were of a programme nature for
the OUN members they became a peremptory doctrine. This is proved
in particular by Vladimir Martinets, one of the OUN ideologists, in his
memoirs.47
There is also a third group documents German documents on UPA
activity, part of them were published within booklets and prepared by
Ukrainian emigrant historians.48 As a rule, these booklets omit documents, compromising the OUN and the UPA,49 but they reveal some information, very important for our research.
Live data on the OUN and UPA activity is given not only in German
documents. Soviet guerilla groups were also active in the territories, occupied by the Nazi. Their field reports to the Ukrainian headquarters of
guerilla movement represent an interesting source, but the information
in these reports is sometimes incorrect. Some of the reports were published in the first volume of Struggle against UPA and Nationalists underground, under the aegis of the Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography
and Source Studies in the so-called New series of multi-volume work
called UPA Chronicles.50
One more very important source the investigation materials from the
Soviet State Security Service, and statements of arrested OUN-UPA mem46
47
48
49
50
Rozbudova natsii: Organ provodu Ukrainskih natsionalistiv ( i:

iii (Prague), 1928, no. 112; 1929, no. 112; 1930, no. 112; 1931, no. 112;
1932, no. 112; 1933, no. 112; 1934, no. 18.
For more details see: Kurilo, T., Himka, I. Yak OUN stavilasya do evreyiv? (What was the OUNs attitude towards Jews?), p. 255.
UPA v svitly nemetskih dokymentiv ( ii i i)/ Comp., Introdution
by T. Gunchak, P. Potochniy. Toronto, 19831991. Books 13; Kosik V. M. Ukraina i Nimechchina v
Drugij svitovij vijni ( i i i ii ii), Paris New-York Lvov, 1993;
Kosik, V. M. Ukraina v Drugij svitovij vijni u documentah: Zbirnik nimetskih arhivnih materialov
( i ii ii : i i i ii), Lvov,
19972000, vol. 14.
On peculiarities of Kosiks selection of documents for the publication see for example: Kurilo, T.,
Himka, I. Yak OUN stavilasya do evreyiv? (What was the OUNs attitude towards Jews?), p. 259.
Borotba proty UPA i natsionalistichnogo pidpillya: Informatsiyni dokumenty CK KP(b)U, obkomiv
patriyi, NKVS-MVS, MDB-KDB, 1943-1959 ( i ii ii:
Iii (), i i, -, -, 19431959) / Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies of NASU; Edited by A. Kentiy, V. Lozitsky,
I. Pavlenko; Introduction by V. Sergiychuk, Kyiv, Toronto, 2002, book 1. [The UPA Chronicles, New
Series, vol. 4].
22
bers and interrogation records turned out to be far too brief and barely sufficient to provide valid information on the subject of our research.51 Only
some of them contain the information, related to our research.52 However,
the general informational potential of this kind of source is quite significant, but historians would have to work a lot to reveal these documents
and introduce them as scientific informational sources.
Historians do not make much use of witness statements, collected by
Emergency Commission on investigating the crimes of German Fascist
occupants and their accomplices. However, the information in these statements is very important for investigating the anti-Jewish massacres in the
summer of 1941. Unfortunately, the witnesses speak mostly about Nazi
crimes, and in order to reveal details of nationalists crimes, one should go
through numerous statements, most of them hand-written. There were
no large-scale publications of this information source.
Not only the State Emergency Commission collected the data and witness statements of the Nazi terror victims. After the war the statements of
the survived victims were, for instance, collected by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. The analysis of one of the statements (so called
Ruzya Wagner report on the massacre in Lvov), done by a Canadian
historian Ivan Himka, shows the high degree of authenticity of this information source.53
There also exists quite an unexpected source of information records
of interrogations, conducted not by Soviet State Security people, but by
the OUN Security Service members in Ternopol area. Till 2004, these
documents were buried in the courtyard of Saphron Kutny, one of the
inhabitants of Ozerna village in Ternopol area, who handed them over to
the local archive shortly before his death. At the end of 2006, a publication
in two volumes of these documents was issued as a part of UPA Chroni51
52
53
See for example: Borotba proty povstanskogo pukhu i natsionalichnogo pidpillya: protokoly dopytiv zaareshtovanikh radyanckimi organami derzhavnoy bezpeki kerivnykiv OUN i UPA, 19441945
( i ii ii: i
ii i , 19441945) /
The Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and source studies of NSAU; Editor, introduction by
O. Ischuk, S. Kokin, Kyiv; Toronto, 2007. [The UPA chronicles, new series, vol. 9].
For example: Polyaki i ukraintsi mizh dvomya totalitarnymy systemamy (Polish and Ukrainian people
between two totalitarian systems), pp. 442444, 448450.
Himka, I. Dostovirnist svidchennya: relyatsia Ruzi Wagner pro lvivskiy pogrom vlitku 1941 (Trustworthiness of the witness statement: Ruzya Wagners report on the Lvov massacre in the summer of 1941) //
Golokost i suchasnist (Holocaust and modern times), Kyiv, 2008, no. 2.
23
cles.54 The interrogation records contain mostly information about the

events of 19461948, but sometimes one can see statements related to the
events of beginning of the war, including anti-Jewish campaigns, arranged
by OUN people. This information is totally reliable, since it was received
from the OUN Security Service, which was absolutely not interested in
revealing such facts.
After-war reminiscences and memoirs are the least reliable source of
information, dependable only when the information is substantiated by
archive documents. When checked against archive documents, the statements, given in the memoirs of Y. Stetsko, N. Lebed and B. Kazanovsky
(quoted at the beginning of this chapter), prove false. During the first days
of war, Y. Stetsko directly participated in forming the Ukrainian militia
for extermination of Jews,55 I. Klimov prepared leaflets with anti-Semitic
mottos for the OUN(B) regional leadership56 and took part in the first war
time conference of the OUN(B),57 where they adopted their official antiJewish policy, and N. Lebed was a part of the OUN Security Service, which
eliminated Jewish non-professionals who had joined UPA58 It is still quite
common, that, despite the numerous published documents, the former
OUN and UPA members continue to deny the obvious facts. For example,
a former military man of Nachtigall squadron, Miroslav Kalba, denies the
anti-Jewish massacre in Lvov in June and July 19941. He says, during his
stay in Lvov he had not seen a single dead body in the streets, a drop of
blood, nor a single dead body of people hung on street lamp posts.59
54
55
56
57
58
59
Borotba z agenturoyu: Protokoly dopytiv Sluzhby Bezpeki OUN v Ternopilschyni, 19461948 ( : i ii, 19461948)
/ Edited, introduction by P. Potichny. Toronto; Lvov, 2006. Books 12. [The UPA chronicles, vol.
4344.] Detailed information on the above documents is available, see: Papakin, G. Ozernyanski
arhiv novi dzherela do istoriyi ukrainskogo ruhu otporu ( i i
ii ) // Ukrainian Archives. 2005, no. 13.
Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941. ( . 30
1941), p. 77; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 12, sheet 10.
OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 261; part 2, pp. 453, 483, 576; Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941. ( . 30 1941), p. 129; CSA SBPGU,
stock 3833, list 1, file 42, sheet 35; file 46, sheet 3637; file 63, sheet 12; List 2, file 18, sheet 87.
Polyaki i ukraintsi mizh dvomya totalitarnymy systemamy, 19421945 (Polish and Ukrainian people
between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 1, pp. 208210; SSA SSU, stock 13, file 372, vol. 5,
sheet 2138.
Borotba proti UPA ( ), Book. 1, pp. 125126; Vedeneyev, D., Bystrukhin, G.
Mech i trizub: Rozvidka I kontrrozvidka puhu ukrainskih natsionalistov ta UPA (19201945) ( : (1920-1945)), p. 219; CSAPOU,
stock 1, list 22, file 75, sheet 9495; stock 62, list 1, file 277, sheet 2; stock 57, list 4, file 451, sheet 10, 52.
Kalba, M. Nachtigal v zapitannyah i vidpovidyah (i i ii) / Introduction by V. Kosik. Lvov, 2008, p. 23.
24
It is hard to think of a more cynical lie that the above statement. However, odd it may seem, official Ukrainian historians are following the same
pattern in their attempts to clear the OUN image. Taking the side of the
OUN memoirists, they are persistent in ignoring the numerous documents published by their colleagues, proving that the OUN and UPA were
exterminating Jews. The main information sources for historians-revisionists are data prepared by the OUN propagandists, and these discoveries are followed by wide-scale PR campaigns. For instance, on 6 February
2008, in the course of a Public historical hearing arranged by Ukrainian
Security Service, Alexander Ischuk, a representative of USS State Archive,
made a statement that he had discovered a document, proving that the
OUN leaders took no part in anti-Jewish campaigns in July 1041 in Lvov.
He said it was a document titled To the book of facts, prepared by the
OUN members, where they describe the events from 22 July through September 1941. The documents states that on 4-7 July 1941 after their arrival
to Lvov, Gestapo representatives approached Ukrainians with an appeal to
conduct a three day massacre of Jewish people. the OUN leaders knew
about it, they informed the member that it was German provocation aimed
at discrediting Ukrainians, so that the German police had an excuse to interfere, also distracting attention from the struggle for independence and
promoting crime and anarchy, explained A. Ischuk, and emphasized
that there were no official orders from the OUN leaders to participate in
campaigns against Jewish population in Lvov.60 This statement was immediately published in the mass media, and photocopies of two pages of the
mentioned documents were published on the same day.61
Sometimes archive discoveries may change perspectives and shift
viewpoints on the problem drastically, but the above was not the case. By
now, Ukrainian and foreign historians have published a whole number of
official OUN documents, proving that by summer 1941 this organization
had a clear anti-Semitic position, such as mentioned in the directives The
OUN Struggle and activity during the War, the Appeal of the OUN(B)
regional leaders dated 1 July 1941, Directive 6 of the OUN head of the
60
61
U sluzhby bezpeki Ukrainy vidbuys Gromadski istorichni sluhannya Zvinuvachennya proti Nahtigalyu istorichna Pravda chi politychni tehnologiyi (

) // Sbu.gov.ua, 06.02.2008; Vyatrovich, V. Kak sozdavalas legenda o Nachtigall (The Legend of Nachtigall how it was created) // Weekly mirror, Kyiv, 16-22.02.2008.
Taina ukrainskogo bataliona Nachtigall (The secret of Ukrainian squadron Nachtigall) // RUpor.info,
06.02.2008.
25
territory Ivan Klimov dated August 1941 etc. There are also more than
enough German documents, giving evidence of the fact the Ukrainian nationalists took part in extermination of Jews in July 1941 in Lvov. Moreover, as the German documents clearly show, the Nationalists had started
massacring Jews on 30th June itself, which is before Einsatzgrupp B, currently held responsible for extermination of Jews, entered the city.
Another document, published by the Ukrainian Security Service, does
not reflect reality as well. For instance, the record dated 6th July 1941 states
that a Gestapo agent attempted assassination of an OUN Leader Yaroslav Stetsko. However, in his Autobiography written in summer of 1941,
Stetsko says that the assassination was attempted by Polish circles, and
in return Gestapo had to undertake punitive measures against the Polish
people.62
The documents further states that already in July 1941, the OUN(B)
Leader in Western Ukraine had refused cooperation with the Nazis. But
the directives published in 2006 by the members of the Institute of Ukrainian History of NASU signed by Klimov himself and dated 6th August 1941,
clearly prove that he ordered the use of the mottos Free Bandera! and
Heil Adolf Hitler!63 This obviously does not sound as refusal to cooperate with the Nazis!
Clearly, the document published by the Ukrainian Security Service contains a large number of false statements. No surprise, since here we deal
with the OUN propaganda materials, created in 19431944 whereby the
OUN hoped to get support from the USA and Great Britain, for which they
needed to clean up their image. For that the OUN regional leadership in
the Western Ukraine ordered to make up a special collection of documents,
which would state, that anti-Jewish and extermination campaigns had been
conducted by Germans without any involvement of Ukrainian police.64 It
is clear that to make this book, the OUN propaganda group had to use plain
forgery. In 2008, one of such non-existing documents was again used by
Ukrainian historians-revisionists. But their PR campaign has nothing to do
with history as an established stream of science.65
62
63
64
65
Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk, M. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, p. 161; CSA SBPGU,
stock 3833, list 3, file 7, sheet 4.
OUN v 1941 rotsi (OUN in 1941), vol. 2, pp. 453, 483; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 46, sheet
3637.
Kurilo, T., Himka, I. Yak OUN stavilasya do evreyiv? (What was the OUNs attitude towards Jews?),
p. 260 (with the reference to CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 43).
See also about the document, published by USS: Dyukov, A. OUN sotrudnichala s natsistami i unich-
26
Summary
Despite the fact that the OUN and UPA attitude towards Jewish people
was often touched upon by research workers, serious scientific studies of
the subject first appeared only in the latter half of the 90s. M. Gon provided description of pre-war relationship between Ukrainian and Jewish
people. Such researches as Hans Heer, M. Carynnik, B. Ball and A. Kruglov studied the key anti-Jewish campaigns in the beginning of July 1941
and the OUNs contribution. There were very heated discussions on the
participation of the Nachtigall squadron and the Bukovinsky Kuren in
the killings of Jewish people. F. Levitas, ZH. Kovba, I. Altman, K Berkhoff,
M. Carynnik and I. Himka did a thorough research of the political and
ideological directives of the OUN on the Jewish issue, and revealed the
clear anti-Semitic trend. I. Himka and T. Kurilo gave a brief but quite informative summary of the publications, related to the Jewish issue in
the official and semi-official OUN publications in the end of twenties
and beginning o thirties. The issue of Jewish people serving in UPA did
not become a subject for serious scientific study, though the public interest to this problem is quite high. One of the few historians, who touched
upon this issue, was G. Motyka he described the extermination of Jewish people serving in UPA. A great number of documents on the OUN
and UPA history were introduced as sources of scientific information, and
they made it possible to give an objective and thorough description of the
OUN and UPA attitude towards the Jewish people. Despite all the above
mentioned facts, Ukrainian historians-mainly revisionists (V. Vyatrovich,
A. Ischenko et al), currently enjoying serious support from the government, are trying to impose the false view on the public that the OUN
and UPA had nothing in common with extermination of Jewish people.
tozhala evreyev (The OUN collaborated with the Nazi and exterminated Jews) // Izvestiya (Moscow),
11.02.2008; Dyukov, A. Byli li Banderovtsy antisemitamy? (Were Bandera people anti-Semites?) // Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 15.02.2007; Himka, J. Be wary of faulty Nachtigall lessons // Kyiv Post,
27.03.2008; Himka, J. True and False Lessons from the Nachtigall Episode // BRAMA, 18.03.2008.
CHAPTER 2
Jewish Issue
in the OUN pre-war plans
28
CHAPTER 2
Jewish Issue in the OUN pre-war plans
When the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists was founded, it had
no clear view on the Jewish issue. The main goal of OUN was to establish
Ukrainian Collegiate Independent State (UCIS) which would include all
the territories, inhabited by Ukrainian people. But on the issues of multi-cultural populace residing in Ukraine, the founding fathers vision fell
woefully inadequate.
By the end of the twenties of the 20th century the anti-Semitic mottos
were well received by the Polish population of Ukraine. In 1928 during the
Polish Seym election campaign a large number of legal Ukrainian parties
used anti-Semitic statements. The Ukrainian Socialist party refused to set
up an electoral coalition with The Ukrainian Democratic Union, because
the latter had arrangements with the German and Jewish bourgeoisie.66
The Labour Party treated anti-Semitic statements as means of attracting
the electorate; the same refers to the unit Ukrainian field.67
The Ukrainian nationalists leaders approved of anti-Semitic propaganda: in the first issue of Building up the nation journal anti-Semitic
mottos were described as very good.68
In their discussions of trade and manufacturing the Ukrainian nationalists clearly showed their negative attitude towards Jews. The industrial
sector of Ukraine all over the country is in the hands of metropolises or
Jews an anti-national and anti-State element, said Leonid Kostarev
in his speech during the Congress of the Ukrainian nationalists in 1929.69
A similar statement was published in Building up the nation in the article of Yurko Rudenko: The industrial sector is owned by monopolistic
capital, and with the USSR power its ruled by the Moscow-Jewish body of
authorities for industry.70
Anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jewish dominance in the economy
gradually transformed into deliberations on the Jewish character of
the occupant authorities in Ukraine. Proletariat dictatorship has end66
67
68
69
70
Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1928, no. 1, p. 29.

Ibid., p. 30.
Ibid.
The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists in 1929 ( iii 1929 .), p. 217.
29
ed up with the authorities in the hands o Russian-Jewish minority in

Ukraine, said V. Bogush in his article, published in Building up the
nation in the last issue of 1928.71
The influence of anti-Semitic stereotypes was very strong among the
Ukrainian nationalists. However, the working materials of the first Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which took place in the beginning on
1929, contain no anti-Semitic statements, except for the above mentioned
speech of L. Kostarev.
The issue of the policy towards national minorities (including Jews)
was not much discussed at the Congress of Ukrainian nationalists. The
Congress did not discuss the Jewish issue separately and made no decisions it, later on said Nikolay Stsiborsky, one of the chief ideologists of
the organization and a political referent of the OUN headquarters.72
Nevertheless, the final appeal of the Congress, published in Building up the nation in the first issue of 1929, contained a significant statement: only total elimination of all occupants of Ukrainian land gives the
Ukrainian Nation the possibility of extensive development, within the
boundaries of our own country.73
The modern historiography gives two interpretations of the above
statement. According to Victor Polischuk, a historian and publicist from
Canada, total elimination of all occupants means physical elimination
of alien national groups, first of all Polish people, residing in the territory of Ukraine.74 Another opinion states that the occupants were
not national groups, but states, and first of all they were Poland and the
USSR.
We believe the second opinion is more reasonable. The Articles of
the Ogranisation of Ukrainian nationalists, adopted at the Congress, is a
much more detailed document than the Appeal, and it has the statement
on the total elimination of all occupants in Foreign policy section.75
Besides, the analysis of the evolution of the OUN attitude towards the
71
72
73
74
75

Ibid. 1930, no. 1112, p. 267.
Ibid., 1929, no. 12, p. 2; Mirchuk, P. Naris istorii OUN. ( ii ), Munich, 1968,
p. 93; The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists in 1929 ( iii 1929 .),
p. 295.
Polischuk, V. V. Bitter truth: The evil of the OUN and UPA (Confessions of a Ukrainian). (Girka Pravda:
Zlochinnost OUN-UPA (Spovid ukrainstya)), p. 109.
Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1929, no. 5, p. 177; The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists in 1929
( iii 1929 .), p. 289.
30
Polish issue and ways of solving it shows that the idea of ethnic cleansing of Polish people residing in Ukraine emerged rather late in the end
of 1942 beginning o 1943.76
However, in case of Jews the statement of total elimination of all occupants could have dreadful consequences, even if the occupants were
alien authorities and not national groups. The fact is that the Ukrainian
nationalists of those times saw Nationalist publications wrote about the
Jew community and the Russian-Jewish domination in the Soviet
Ukraine. For example, Building up the nation, the same issue where
they published the appeal of the Congress of Ukrainian nationalists, has
an article titled National and proletarian revolution. The article stated
that proletarian revolution in Ukraine was supported only by certain
Russian-Jewish groups: Russian and Jewish population of Ukraine
supported not only proletarian revolution, but such supporter of the old
regime and such enemies of Ukrainian State as Denikin, Wrangel; at
that time the people of Ukraine see Soviet authorities as alien power
(Moscow-Jewish power); Moscowites and Jews laid hands not only
power bodies; Moscow-Jewish authorities conduct Russian policy in
Ukraine.77
In the same issue of the journal we find V. Bogushs article Economic
relationship between Ukraine and Russia in the USSR, where he says that
such Russian-Jewish dominance in Ukraine existed back in the Tsar
times, when all the trade was concentrated in the hands of Russian and
Jews.78 Thus, we see that Ukrainian nationalists set tight connections between Jews and occupational Soviet authorities.
This statement, published in the first issue of Building up the nation
of 1929, was further developed in the following issue of the journal, in the
article of already mentioned V. Bogush Russian-Jewish dominance and
the role of Russian culture in the Soviet Ukraine. The first paragraph of
the article said: Russians and Jews seized power in the Soviet Ukraine
and now rule over millions of Ukrainian workers and farmers.79 The au76
77
78
79
For more details see: Dyukov, A. R . Polsky vopros v planah OUN(B): ot nasilstvennoy assimilyatsiyi
k etnicheskim chistkam (The Polish issue in the OUN(B) plans: from froced assimilation to ethnic
cleansing) // Zabytiy genotsid. Volynskaya reznya 1943-1944: documenty i issledovaniya (Forgotten
genocide. Massacre at Volyn in 1943-1944: documents and investigation materials), oscow, 2008,
pp. 6389.
Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1929, no. 12, pp. 9, 13, 14.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., no. 34, p. 85.
31
thor further on states that the Soviet power bodies consist of mainly Jews
and Russians.80
We should bear in mind that anything published in Building up
the nation was a programme to follow for common OUN members.81
The readers were to get a clear picture of Jews being alien and hostile to
Ukrainian people, because the former had first been part of the Tsar and
later on Soviet regime. So a question logically followed: What is to be
done to Jews?
Yuri Milyanich tried to answer the above question in his article Jews,
Zionism and Ukraine, published in Building up the nation.
The Jewish issue is becoming one of the major political problems in Ukraine. Unfortunately, neither Ukrainian publicists, nor
Ukrainian activists devote attention to the issue.
Nevertheless, reality remains reality: there are over two millions of Jews in Ukraine, they are alien and mostly hostile element
in our national State. Jews have done enough harm to our liberation movement. This has happened all the time in our history and
is happening now; be it Poles, Russians, Bolsheviks or Germans
the Jews were always on the opposite side and fought against
Ukrainians. And that too despite, or perhaps due to, unbelievable tolerance and friendly attitude of Ukrainian people towards
Jews. In our struggle against Poland they fortify the Polish front,
in the struggle against Bolsheviks they support the latter, and in
the struggle against Russian influence they are the most dedicated
followers and distributors of the latter.
Apart from a whole number of enemies outside, Ukraine has
an internal enemy Jews. Not only had they done harm to us all
the time, Jews have not changed their attitudes up to date; keep
doing harm and will carry on until Ukrainian people find some
ways to protect themselves, until Ukrainian people force Jews to
give due respect to the political and national systems of the State.
Just as Ukrainians set up defense against invaders, in the system
of Ukrainian liberation policy the time has come to think about
Ukrainian policy towards Jews.
80
81
Rozbudova natsii ( ii), 1929, no. 12, p. 88

p. 255.
32
What should we do to Jews? There are over two millions of

them in Ukraine. Should we let them infest the Ukrainian national system? Relocate them? But where? Two million people
are not so easy to relocate or get rid of in any other way. No one
wants them; everybody wants to be free of them. Except Spain, no
other Christian European country managed to solve the Jewish
issue once and for good.82
The articles then says that in the course of establishing Independent
Ukraine the struggle against Jews will be inevitable and Jews, knowing
that, interfere in the process of formation of the new State. 83 The article
concludes: During the struggle against the hostile Jews we must set up
our own system and use the ways of solving this issue which are of the
most benefit to us. The problem is complicated and deep-rooted, since we
had ignored for quite long. However, it must be solved.84
Milyanichs article confirmed the OUN negative attitude towards Jews:
anti-Semitism was becoming one of the ideological foundation principles
of the organization. Logically, the OUN publications contained more antiSemitic materials in the course of time, first of all related to Moscow-Jewish power. Provocations, violence and deaths have created the system,
ruled by the Moscow boor, with sadist Jews as servants, wrote an illegal
journal Surma.85 Similar ideas we can find on the pages of Building up
the nation.86 This propaganda was not in vain: according to the information of Polish police, the campaign against a communist Jew, conducted
by Ukrainian nationalists caused rapid growth of anti-Semitism in the
Western Ukraine.87
However, there were people among the OUN leaders who considered
it possible to give up the old anti-Semitic stereotypes. In 1930, one of the
chief ideologists of the organization, Nikolay Stsiborsky, published his article Ukrainian nationalism and Jews in the Journal Building up the
Nation. Stsiborsky noted the strong anti-Semitic trends in Ukrainian society. Most of Ukrainians have an extremely negative attitude to Jews.
82
83
84
85
86
87

Ibid., p. 272.
Ibid., p. 276.
Surma. 1929, no. 12, p. 22.
See for example: Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1930, no. 34, p. 53.
Gon, M. M. Ukrainski pravoradicaly ta evreyi Zakhidnoi Ukrainy (druga polovina 1930 rokov) (The
Right Ukrainian radicals and the Jews in the Western Ukraine (second half of the 1930s), p. 376.
33
The negative and often hostile attitudes to Jewish people are wide-spread
among Ukrainians, and in this the views and desires of the authorities and
common people are miraculously identical.88 It was that negative attitude
of Ukrainian people toward Jews, wrote Stsiborsky, which made the latter
apprehensive about Ukrainian nationalists.
The duty of the Ukrainian society said Stsiborsky, is to
persuade Jews that the emerging Ukrainian State is of no threat to
them. Moreover, in this new State with the new social, industrial
and economic structure, Jews will have more favourable conditions for working and living than they have now at the occupied
Ukrainian territories. We must point out to Jews that our movement sees no grounds or benefit in limiting the rights of the Jews
in Ukraine. On the contrary, the government will treat Jews as an
equal national group and will give them opportunity to participate in the social, cultural and other activities As for apprehensions that equality of Jews might harm the national identity, we
should keep in mind that Jews are not such a national minority
in Ukraine who could have any grounds to oppose our independence The task of the State authorities will be to create favourable conditions for Jews so that they could preserve their natural
racial, cultural and religious characteristics, and at the same time
be involved as equal participant in common social and state interests and its positive creation.89
Against the background of the openly anti-Semitic propaganda published in Building up the nation, Stsiborskys article was a blast. If the
plans he described had been implemented, the Jews in Western Ukraine
could not have wished for a better Nation to live in. But that article remained an exception from the general rule. Already in the following issue
of Building up the nation they started publishing the series of articles
related to the Jewish issue, written by Alexander Mitsyuk, the Professor of Ukrainian Liberal University in Prague. Mitsyuks article had been
published during three years almost in every issue of the journal,90 and
88
89
90
Rozbudova natsii ( i), no. 1112, p. 267.

Ibid., pp. 272-273.
Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1931, no. 12, pp. 1828; no. 34, pp. 7079; no. 56, pp. 127
137; no. 78, pp. 172181; no. 910, pp. 218230; no. 1112, pp. 276292; 1932, no. 12, pp. 1325;
34
later on were published as a separate book titled Ruralization of Jews in

general economic conditions.
As noted by Canadian historians T. Kurilo and I. Himka, Mitsyuks
work is one of the most significant anti-Jewish publications ever produced
by Ukrainian intellectual tradition.91 The only fact of systematic publications of his articles in the official OUN journal proves that the leaders of
the Ukrainian nationalists estimated the materials as highly important.
By all appearance, the series was directly ordered from Mitsyuk. The fact
is, that in the middle of 1930 the programme of the OUN ideologists was
published, which anticipated the required research of the heterogeneous
elements (by race) facilitate the decay of the Ukrainian State.92 And in
the beginning of the following year, 1931, Building up the nation started
publishing the Mitsyuks articles, exactly on this subject.
The main trend of Mitsyuks works was the demonstration of Jews
parasitism. The author gave grounds to his view and opposed the statement of Stsiborsky, who had said that the social role of Jews is explained
by their lack of rights, and thus took the wind out of sails of those who
wanted to mend the ties between Ukrainians and Jews. Note that during WWII Mitsyuk published a series of articles in Ukrainian newspaper
Krakow news, issued by the occupants. The series was titled Jews in
Ukraine and contained extremely anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi articles.93
The articles of Mitsyuk in Building up the nation gave scientific
grounds for the appeal to struggle against Jews, and were of course very
appreciated by the OUN activists. Anti-Semitic trends among them were
strong for very practical reasons. A Ukrainian State, that would ensure
consistent social and economic development for the citizens, remained
just a dream. In reality they had the poverty-stricken Western Ukraine,
turned into an eastern province of Poland. Merciless economic laws forced
Jewish and Ukrainian people fight amongst each other. Will villagers buy
from a Jewish or a Ukrainian shop? Whose products will enjoy higher
91
92
93
no. 34, pp. 7586; no. 56, pp. 118131; no. 78, pp. 185196; no. 910, pp. 253256; no. 1112,
pp. 296300; 1933, no. 34, pp. 7587; no. 56, pp. 130138; no. 78, pp. 180194; no. 910,
pp. 226235, no. 1112, pp. 277287.
p. 256.
p. 257. For more details see Himka, I. Krakowski visti pro evreyi, 1943: Ukrainsko-evreiskiy vidnosini pid chas Drugoi svitovoi viyny (ii ii , 1943 i: -i
i i ci ) // i i cii . 1994, no. 56.
35
demand? Such questions were much more important for Ukrainian people that abstract ideological concepts, because answers to those questions
determined their welfare.
For the nationalists, the reason for the poor state of Ukrainians was in
Jews and Poles. This was also stated in a leaflet, distributed in Beliv village
of the Stanislavsky province.
Ukrainian farmer! Ukrainian worker! The land owned by local Jews is the property of the Ukrainian Nation. The Jews are
eternal enemy of the Ukrainian Nation. From this day on nobody
will work for a Jew. Jews should disappear from the Ukrainian
land. Those who work for Jews will be condemned and severely
punished. Get away Jews!94
As it was said so it was done. The village boycotted Jewish shops, and
in the houses of Jewish people windows were shattered.
First the OUN tried to move away from anti-Jewish campaigns, especially when it was a clear law violation. Recently Jewish people in Stryi
area were attacked and robbed, wrote the Surma journal in autumn
1932. Polish mass media promptly reacted to it and accused the Ukrainian underground organizations of this crime. The OUN leadership in the
area stated in its Bulletin that they have nothing to do with the above
attacks.95
Soon however, the situation changed. The Ukrainian nationalists started leading anti-Jewish campaigns, and conducted them on a wide scale.
Dont let Jews rob you, said a leaflet, distributed by OUN people in
Korostov village of Zdolbunovsky district. Dont buy from a Jew. Kick
them out of the village. Let our motto be Get away Jews!96 In 1935, OUN
members conducted a campaign in the villages of Zhidachivsky, Kalusky,
Stanislavsky and Styisky districts, when they broke windows of Jews residences.97 Another hate campaign on a wider scale was conducted in the
summer of 1936 in Kostopol district. The local OUN leaders gathered
and made a decision saying that Jews are harmful for the Ukrainian nation, we need to get rid of them, and the best way to do it is to set fire on
94
95
96
97
Gon, M. M. Iz krivdoyu na samoti (I i), p. 77.

Surma. 1932, no. 1011, p. 8.
Ibid., p. 152.
36
their houses, shops etc.98 As a result, over 100 Jewish families lost their
homes.99
Several months after this campaign, the OUN regional HQ made a
clarification in their attitude towards Jewish people. According to the
directive there was a difference between Jews and communist Jews.
Towards the former economic boycott was advised, and communist Jews
were the enemy, against them we should fight with all our energy and use
terror.100
Escalation of hatred towards Jews promoted further radicalization
of OUN attitudes. In 1938, a prominent OUN member V. Martinets in
his article analyses the Jewish issue from the angle of racial theory. The
conclusion was as expected: Jews were to be fought against as enemies,
isolated and sent away from Ukraine altogether.101
Martinets suggestion had much in common with the anti-Jewish policy implemented in the Nazi Germany. Its not surprising, because by the
end of the 30s, Ukrainian nationalists had been actively cooperating with
the Nazi services, and found the German way of solving the Jewish issue
quite suitable. An indirect confirmation of this is the task given to the
OUN by Nazi leaders before invading Poland.
On 15th August 1939, the Abwehr of OUN members founded a raiding
force code-named Bergbauernhilfe. The group consisted of about 600 people, headed by Colonel Roman Sushko, one of the OUN HQ members.102
Their task was to arrange anti-Polish rebels in the West of Ukraine and clear
the territory from undesired elements. According to the statement of E.
von Lahusen, Head of 2nd (subvert) Abwehr department, made during the
proceeding of International Military Court in Nuremberg on 12th September 1939, the corresponding order was given to the supervisor of Abwehr,
Admiral Canaris, by the Minister of Foreign affairs of the Third Reich, I. von
Ribbentrop. The task was to get in touch with the Ukrainian nationalists,
98

Ibid.
Ibid.
101
Derevenskiy, V. Pitannya natsionalnyh menshyn v etnonatsionalniy kontseptsiyi OUN (
i ii i ) // Ukrainskiy vizvolniy rukh
( ). Lvov, 2004. B 3, p. 11; Kurilo, T., Himka, I. Yak OUN stavilasya do
evreyiv? (What was the OUNs attitude towards Jews?), p. 257258.
102
Organizatsiya ukrainskyh natsionalistiv i Ukrainska povstanska armiya: Fakhoviy vysnovok robochoi
grupi istorykov pri uryadovoy komisiyi vyvchennya diyatelnosti OUN i UPA (Oii
iii i i: ii
i ici ii i ), Kyiv, 2005, p. 6.
99
100
37
who already had contacts with the Intelligence Service, in order to initiate a
revolt in Poland, that would result in exterminating Polish and Jewish people in Poland. Ribbentrop spoke to Canaris about it in person. When they
spoke about Polish people, they meant intelligentsia and the circles bearing
national resistance to the Nazi ideology103
Clearly, Nazi leaders considered it convenient to use OUN groups for
the extermination of Jews.
Thankfully, his plan was not implemented. After the victory in Polish
campaign, the Bergbauernhilfe was dismissed, and some of its members
joined the police troops in the eastern territories of occupied Poland.104
The German Secret Services, in gratitude of services and assistance rendered by the OUN awarded them legal status, and its members joined the
Werkschutz subdivision (security of industrial objects). The Ukrainian
population of the province, created by the Nazis, received quite a number
of privileges, in particular, the houses and shops, seized from Jews, could
now be handed over to Ukrainians.105 This approach was certainly favoured by the Ukrainian nationalists.
Note that in 1940-1941 the collaboration between the OUN headquarters and Gestapo was of clear anti-Polish and anti-Jewish character. The
OUN headquarters allowed nobody to join Gestapo without informing
the former. Those, who informed the OUN leaders and joined Gestapo,
were warned that they should only work against Poles and Jews, said an
NKGB USSR agent planted in the OUN.106
Further on we can see that the anti-Polish and anti-Jewish collaboration between the OUN and Nazi secret service was considered a positive
experience by the OUN leaders, and they were ready to repeat it. In 19401941 this collaboration encouraged further radicalization of the OUN attitude towards Jews.
This gradual change in the attitude can be clearly seen when we compare the two OUN plans of anti-Soviet rebels. One of them, bearing
103
Judgment at Nuremberg: Collection of records, oscow, 1990, vol. 4, p. 181; Groscurth, H. Tagebcher
eines Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940: Mit weiteren Dokumenten zur Militropposition gegen Hitler, Stuttgart, 1970, s. 357.
104
Trofimovich, V. Rol Nimecchyny ta SSSR v ukrainsko-polskomu konflikti 1934-1945 (The role of Germany and the USSR in the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in 1939-1945) // Nezalezhny kulturologichniy
chasopys I( ) 2003, no. 28, p. 121.
105
Ibid., p. 122.
106
Stepan Bandera u dokumentah (Stepan Bandera in the documents), vol. 1, p. 99; SSA SSU, stock 65,
file -9079, vol. 4, sheet 221234.
38
the title The Integrated general plan of OUN rebel headquarters, was
prepared by one of the OUN leaders, ex-General of Ukrainian Galician
Army, Victor Kurmanovich in the spring of 1940.107 The plan described
in detail the tasks of anti-Soviet armed operation and the action planned
during the revolt.
By the time the Integrated general plan was made, there emerged a
split in the OUN, between the factions supporting Andrey Melnik and
Stepan Bandera. The old nationalist Melnik was supported by the executive members of OUN, while the young and radical Bandera had the activists of the Western Ukraine. By the spring of 1940, the split was not
yet final. Despite the fact that the author of the Integrated general plan
supported Melnik, his document was used by the Krakow OUN regional
leadership, headed by Bandera.
According to the Integrated general plan, one of the tasks of the rebel
forces was to eliminate all elements hostile to the nationalists. The introduction part said: The first night of action is very important, it is crucial.
On this night, everybody on the black list must be eliminated, the enemy
must lose its manpower (informers, enemy spies etc). We also must escalate turmoil.108 The part Main tasks for unit headquarters stated that it
was necessary to spread havoc and dissociation among the enemy (indiscriminate shootings of the enemy). This is a mandatory condition for
our victory, emphasized the author of the document.109
The OUN underground leaders in Western Ukraine, who received these
instructions, said they were not clear enough. For instance, it was not indicated who was to be included in the black lists for extermination. The
lists are not ready yet, as we dont know for sure who of the local population
represents personnel detriment for the OUN, wrote Ivan Maksimov,
member of OUN Lvov regional headquarters, in the autumn of 1940 (who
was subsequently arrested by the Soviet State Security Service).110 Under
further interrogation Maksimov explained that the black lists were made
on the spot, but by the time of his arrest they had not reached the regional
headquarters. His statement holds great significance for our research, as
evident from an excerpt from his interrogation records:
107
Roman Shukhevich u dokumentah (Roman Shukhevich in the documents ), vol. 1, p. 339; SSA SSU,
stock 9, file 19, sheet 104116.
108
Ibid., p. 57; SSA SSU, stock 16, list 33, file 63, sheet 2558.
109
Ibid., p. 40.
110
Ibid., p. 91; SSA SSU, stock 6, file 75170-FP, vol. 1, sheet 216225.
39
Question: What was included into the mobilization plan?

Answer: Mobilization plan had the following parts:
1. Combat staff OUN members.
2. General mobilization as a reserve.
3. Reconnaissance and registration of all forces, hostile to the
OUN and the revolt.
4. Zapilie establishing of the state government.
Question: How do you understand the third point of the mobilization plan Reconnaissance and registration of all forces, hostile to the OUN and the revolt?
Answer: The third point of the plan included collecting information on all object of military, state and economic significance
that were to be captured in the first place. Collecting information
on the attitude of the population toward the Soviet system and
the revolt,, besides, the OUN intelligence service was to make the
black lists of people, hostile towards the revolt, as well as people
taking an active part in the social and political activities.
Question: Who was included in the black lists, made by the
OUN, and what did the OUN plan to do with those people?
Answer: In particular the black lists included national minorities, hostile to the revolt, people cooperating with the Soviet
Government, leaders of the Red Army, NKVD members and people coming from the eastern parts of Ukraine.
Question: What was done for implementation of this part of
the mobilization plan?
Answer: The OUN intelligence service and areal, regional,
district and province leadership were making the black lists but
the lists have not reached the main headquarters yet.111
Clearly, the Integrated general plan was amended on the spot, and
black lists included not only representatives and supporters of the Soviet government, but also national minorities, hostile to the revolution.
We can not say for sure if the Jewish people were also included, but taking into consideration the anti-Semitic trends, described above, this is a
highly likely possibility.
111
Roman Shukhevich u dokumentah (Roman Shukhevich in the documents ), vol. 1, p. 9899; SSA
SSU, stock 6, file 75170-FP. Vol. 1, sheet 236243.
40
The Integrated general plan was not implemented. During the 1940s,
the Ukrainian underground nationalists in the Western Ukraine suffered
quite a number of tough attacks from the NKVD. Despite the OUN hopes
that either Turkey or Germany would attack the Soviet Union, this did not
happen either.
The failure to implement the plan further aggravated the split between
Melniks and Banderas factions in the OUN. In 1940, these criminal enemies of the revolution abandoned the people, laid an extra burden on
our organization and caused so many failures, wrote Melnik supporters about the estranged Bandera group.112 The Bandera people reacted,
calling them betrayers and opportunists, who did not understand the
worth of revolutionary struggle.
The conflict inside the OUN reached its peak. In April 1941, Bandera
group announced disavowal of the resolution of OUNs second Great
Congress, arranged by Melnik in Rome, and conducted their own Congress in Krakow. The resolutions of that Congress were promptly translated into German and sent to the leaders of the Third Reich.113
The resolution of the OUN(B)s second Great Congress clearly showed
the dangerously negative attitude of the organization towards Jews. Jews
in the USSR are the most dedicated supporters of the Bolshevist regime
and are the advance guard of Moscow Imperialism in the Ukraine, said
the resolution. Anti-Jewish attitude of Ukrainian people is used by the
Moscow Bolshevist government, in order to distract their attention from
the actual cause of the problem, and to direct their anger during the revolt to massacring the Jews. The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
fights the Jews as they are the support of Moscow Bolshevist regime, and
explains to the population that the main enemy is Moscow.114
This resolution of the OUN(B) was of crucial nature then, at the
threshold of German attack against the USSR. It proved that during the
war, the activity of the Ukrainian nationalists would be directed not only
against representatives of the Soviet system, but against Jewish people as
112
Grivul, T. Do pytannya konflictu v OUN 1940-1941 (D i 19401941 ).

// Ukrainskiy vizvolniy rukh ( ). Lvov, 2004, vol. 3, p. 163.
113
UPA v svitli nimetskyh dokumentiv ( ii i i), book 1, p. 2933.
114
OUN v svitli postanov Velikih Zborov, Conferentsiy ta inshih dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 (
i i, i i i 19291955 .),
1955, p. 36; Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941 ( .
30 1941), p. 11; OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 43; CSAPOU, stock 1, list 23,
file 926, sheet 192.
41
well. Action against Jews was of course a secondary task for the OUN, but
the fact that such a task existed conveys a great deal to us.
A number of contemporary Ukrainian historians have tried to interpret the anti-Jewish part of the resolution of OUN(B) second Great
Congress in a different way, saying that the OUN(B) was planning to
fight only the Jews supporting the Soviet system, and not Jews as a nation. But the internal documents of the OUN(B) do now show this distinction. The words Jew and Bolshevik supporter were treated as
synonyms.
We have already mentioned the Integrated general plan of OUN
rebel headquarters made in the spring of 1940. In May 1941, just before
the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the OUN(B) developed a new
plan The OUN struggle and activity during the war. This directive differed from the Integrated general plan by giving more details on certain
points. It included meticulous description of activities to be arranged by
the new government and military organizations. Unlike the Integrated
general plan, the directive covered the national issues as well.
According to point 16 of part Instructions for the first days of the state
system arrangement, the principles of the OUN attitude towards national
minorities were as follows:
National minorities are subdivided into:
) amicable to us, i. e. members of all enslaved nations; b) hostile to us, Russian, Jews, Poles.
) Have rights equal with Ukrainian people and are allowed to
return to their native land.
b) Are exterminated in the course of struggle, apart from those
supporting the regime: moving to their lands, exterminate intelligentsia first of all, prevent all access to government authorities,
and make emerging of intelligentsia impossible, close access to
schools etc. For example, the so-called Polish villagers must be assimilated, persuading them that they are Ukrainians, only of the
Latin tradition, and forcefully assimilated. Leaders must be eliminated. Jews must be isolated, removed from government bodies
in order to prevent sabotage, same for Russians and Poles. If it is
essential to leave a Jew on his position in the economic administration, he must be watched by our supervisor and eliminated for
any minor fault.
42
In certain areas of administration only Ukrainians can be

heads and leaders, enemies-outsiders. Assimilation of Jews is impossible.115
Point number 17 explained: Our system should be formidable for our
enemies. Terror is the treatment for enemies outsiders and betrayers.116
Terrorist action against enemies of the OUN was to begin right after
the armed operation. The military section of the directive had a special
paragraph on clearing the territory from hostile elements. During chaos and disarray, the paragraph went, we may eliminate undesired
Polish, Russian and Jewish activists, especially supporters of Moscow
Bolshevist imperialism.117 We should note that the quoted paragraph is
almost identical to the Order 1 of R. Heydrich, Chief of Security Police
and SD, which said it is reasonable, as stated above, to initiate local massacres.118 Only the OUN Directive was released earlier in May 1941, not
in the end of June.
Further clarification to the point of clearing the territory from hostile
elements was given in the section Organisation of Security Service.
We should keep in mind that there activists, who should be
neutralized in the course of establishing a new revolutionary system in Ukraine, as they are the main support of NKVD and Soviet Authorities in Ukraine. These activists are:
Russians, sent to Ukrainian land to strengthen the power of
Moscow in Ukraine;
Jews, both individually and as a nation;
Outsiders, mostly various Asians, who are sent by Moscow to
colonize Ukraine and create a national intrusion.
Poles in Western Ukraine, who still dream of Great Poland119
115
CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, fi le 1, sheet 38; OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1,
p. 103104.
116
Ibid.
117
CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, file 1, sheet 32; Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941
( . 30 1941.), p. 37; OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941),
part 1, p. 93; CSHAU, stock 309, list 1, file 2887, sheet 1622; Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk, M. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, p. 153.
118
RSMA, stock 500, list 1. D 25, sheet 17.
119
OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 129; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, file 1, sheet 5776.
43
Establishment of a new state system should have started with mass arrests of those enemies of Ukraine who had not been eliminated during
the armed operations. According to the directive, after police units were
arranged in villages all Jews must report to the Peoples police troops. All
citizens of the village (area, kolkhoz, plant) must surrender to the Peoples
police, all concealed Red Army soldiers, NKVD members, Jews, secret
agents etc.120
According to the same directive, the following people were to be excluded from kolkhoz:
1. All outsiders, who joined the community in order to promote exploitation of villagers;
2. Jews, working in the community as overseers of Bolshevist
system;
3. All representatives of Bolshevist system, secret agents and
others, related to NKVD, NKGB, prosecutors office and journalists of Bolshevist mass media.121
All those, who are not members of kolkhoz community must
be interned and taken under arrest.122
Just in the same way unreliable and hostile to the nationalist revolution elements at large industrial plants were to be interned and taken
under arrest. Besides, the directive went, all Jews, NKVD and NKGB
members must be interned and taken under arrest.123
In every area a camp for interned, intended for Jews, asocial elements
and prisoners of war was to be established in order to keep people under
arrest.124 The section Organisation of Security Service stated:
After establishing the Peoples Militia in the region, the regional superintendant should start systematic arrangements for order
and safety in the region. In connection to that is it required:
1. To make lists of all former members of NKVD, NKGB, prosecutors office and The Bolshevist Communist Party.
120
OUN v 1941 rotsi (Th e OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 131.

Ibid., p. 138.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid., p. 139.
124
Ibid., p. 143.
121
44
2. To make lists of individual, who were active at time of

Ukrainian nation persecution. First of all they are non-Ukrainians: Jews, Russians, Poles.
3. To intern non-Ukrainians described in point 1 and 2
above.125
OUN members expected to face much more obstacles in cities than
in villages. Big cities in Ukraine are mostly populated by outsiders, with
domination of Jews and Russians. stated the directive.126 However, the
same scheme was to be used here as well: repressions against supporters
of the Soviet system and against hostile national minorities. After the
order is set in town, the place is cleared from NKVD members, Russians,
Jews and others, arrangements for a new proper life in town may start.127
The structure of the prospective Ukrainian police included a special
communist and Jews subdivision within Investigation Departments.
The directive ordered police members: to register all Jewish population,
create an archive of communist-Jews activity, capture all political archives, register all outsiders like Russians, Poles, French, Czechs and all
other who could cooperate with the enemy.128
In general, the OUN Security Service and Ukrainian Police were to
strangle at birth, every attempt of the outsiders in Ukraine to act in
any organized way.129 This is the time of national revolution, said
the directive, so there should be no tolerance towards long-settled
outsiders.130
The second statement was to be supported by propaganda. The directive mentions mottos, approved by the OUN(B) headquarters for
distribution:
No mercy to Red blood-sucker!
No mercy to their servants!
Stalins and Jew commissioners first enemies of the nation!
125
OUN v 1941 rotsi (Th e OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 145.

Ibid., p. 147.
127
Ibid., p. 150.
128
Vedeneev, D., Bystruhin, G. Povstanska rozvidka die tochno I vidvagno (
), p. 248249.
129
OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 152; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, file 1, sheet
5776.
130
Ibid.
126
45
When the war begins, kill Bolsheviks who give you orders!
Destroy headquarters, shoot Russians, Jews, NKVD people, political instructors, and everybody who want war and our death! They
are the major enemies of the nation!
Ukraine is for Ukrainians!
Death to Moscow-Jewish community!
Destroy community, save Ukraine!
Workers! Dont let destroy your plants and factories after the
Red Army leaves! Kill the enemies among you Jews and secret
agents.131
The summary of the above statements of the directive The OUN
struggle and activity during the war gives us the following concept for
solving the national issue: after Germany invades the Soviet Union, OUN
members on the Soviet territory would start armed operations. They
would kill representatives of the Soviet System, Polish activists and Jews.
Jews, in particular, would end up being persecuted both individually and
as a national group.
After the Soviet troops retreat, establishing of the new state authorities would begin, and first of all police forces. In every region police
sets up special camps, where representatives of the Soviet power, Polish
activists, prisoners of war soldiers of the Red Army, and Jews are sent.
Those Polish, Jewish and Russian people who remain free, have very limited rights, cant hold any administrative posts. In case Jews turn out to be
irreplaceable professionals, they work under close supervision of police
and are eliminated for any minor fault.
The third stage of solving the problem of national minorities takes
place after the war. Polish and Russian people assimilate; they are not allowed education in their mother tongue. As for the Jews, their assimilation is impossible. Consequently they are either exterminated or sent
away from the country, or isolated.
As we can see, the OUN(B)s plan of action with respect to the Jewish
issue almost word for word repeats similar Nazi concepts. The leading
131
Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941 ( . 30

1941.), p. 4146; OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1, pp. 156162; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833,
list 2, file 1, sheet 7789; CSHAL, stock 309, list 1, file 2887, sheet 2642.
46
Russian researcher of the history of Holocaust believes that OUN people,

took their instructions related to persecution of Jews and translated them
from the German language.132 Anti-Jewish articles of the directive of 1941
clearly show that his assumption is far from improbable.
It is worth mentioning that the OUN(B) in its official instructions
prescribed more severe measures against Jews than against Poles. During
combat operations Poles, unlike Jews, were not to be persecuted as a national group, and after the Ukrainian State is established, they were to be
forcefully assimilated, instead of elimination, forceful relocation or isolation. However illogical it may seem, this fact shows the great significance
of the anti-Semitic component in the OUN ideology.133
Melniks faction had a far vaguer position with regards to the Jewish issue. The Jewish issue is mentioned in the draft Constitution of
Ukrainian State, prepared by the OUN(M). The article on citizenship
states:
At the moment of announcement of the Ukrainian State the
following people have Ukrainian citizenship:
1) all people of Ukrainian nationality residing within the
borders of the Ukrainian State;
2) people of other nationalities, whose fathers or who themselves have resided within the borders of the Ukrainian State
since 1 August 1941.
An exception is made for individuals of Jewish nationality
who are subject to a separate law.134
Curiously enough, the draft of the Constitution showing a clear discrimination for Jews, was prepared by none other than Nikolay Stsiborsky the very person who in 1930 suggested that Jews should be given
equal rights as all other citizens. By 1941 his view changed into radical
anti-Semitic attitude. Just before Germany invaded the Soviet Union,
Stsiborsky wrote that it was necessary to implement tough policies with
respect to national minorities in Ukraine, and break their back bone He
132
Altman, I. A. Zhertvy nenavisty: Holokost v SSSR, 1941-1945 (Victims of hatred: Holocaust in the
USSR, 1941-1945), p. 220.
For more details on the evolution of OUNs methods for solving the Polish issue see: Dyukov, A. R.
Polsky vopros v planah OUN(B): ot nasilstvennoy assimilyatsiyi k etnicheskim chistkam (The Polish
issue in the OUN(B) plans: from froced assimilation to ethnic cleansing), p. 6389.
134
OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 216; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, file 7, sheet 19.
133
47
spoke separately of the Jewish issue, for which they needed special plan
and methods.135
We can get the idea of what these methods were from the statements
an OUN(M) leader Myroslav Zybychynsky:
By the time Germany started the war against the Soviet Union, Andrey Melnik issued a directive, where he demanded that
OUN people start terror activity It was suggested that OUN
leaders should gather reconnaissance troops headed by German
spies and special agents. The troops were to consist of active
OUN members, and sent after the advancing German Army to
Ukraine, where they had to start the OUN terrorist activity.
The OUN leaders were offered to take chairmen posts in
Ukrainian OUN centers in villages and towns, introduce terror
groups, get close to administration of various German-Ukrainian authorities, police etc. so they had more ways for the terrorist actions.
ZYBYCHANSKY Myroslav listed the following known to
him directives for the above groups, who followed the advancing
German troops in Ukraine:
1. Organize and lead all nationalist forces to struggle against
the Red Army and Soviet system, mainly with terrorist actions,
such as:
. Introduce OUN terror regime;
b. Reveal and eliminate Soviet guerillas;
c. create false guerilla groups for provocative actions;
d. eliminate village activist groups and Soviet system supporters among the population;
e. conduct massacres of Jewish people136
Zybychanskys statements are confirmed by the OUN(M) propaganda materials. For example, there is an article Jewish issue in Ukraine,
published in Krakow News newspaper of the Central Ukrainian Committee several days before the war. The Ukrainian Committee was supervised by the OUN(M), its official publication spoke about Jewish
135
Maslovsky, V. Tragediya Galitskogo evreystva (The tragedy of Jews in Galicia), Lvov, 1997, p. 2122;
Prus, E. Holocaust po banderowsku, s. 139; Proboem (), 1941, no. 78.
136
FSB CA, stock 100, list 11, file 8, sheet 107108.
48
dominance in Ukrainian land and the need for vengeance and punishment.137
In 1940-1942 the conflict between Bandera and Melnik OUN factions
were not of ideological, but of tactical and personal nature. There were
no ideological or political contradictions between OUN(B) and OUN(M)
up to March 1942 said later on one of OUN top leaders, arrested by
Soviet authorities.138 The above comparison of the OUN(B) and OUN(M)
positions confirm this information. For OUN(M) members as well as for
OUN(B), the Jewish people represented the enemy. The two factions were
unanimous in their views with respect to this issue.
Summary
Established in 1929, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists initially had no clear view on the Jewish issue. The influence of anti-Jewish
stereotypes was very strong among Ukrainian nationalists. However, the
working materials of the first Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which
took place in the beginning on 1929, contain no anti-Semitic statements.
The issue of the attitude and policy towards national minorities was not
given due consideration during the Congress.
For quite a long time OUN ideologists and propagandists only repeated anti-Semitic statements of Moscow-Jewish reign in the Soviet
Ukraine and Jewish predominance in the economy. Building of the nation, the official OUN journal, described Jews as a national group, hostile
to Ukrainians and having tight connections with occupational Soviet
authorities. Some time later anti-Semitism became one of the OUN ideological foundation principles. The first proof of that was Milyanichs article
Jews, Zionism and Ukraine, where for the first time in OUN official publication the requirement to solve the Jewish issue was announced. The
author gave no direct answer to the questions of how the Jewish issue
should be solved, but stated that in the course of establishing Independent
137
Maslovsky, V. Tragediya Galitskogo evreystva (The tragedy of Jews in Galicia), Lvov, p. 2122; Krakowksi
visti ( ), 1941, 18 June. About Krakowksi visti see: Himka, J.-P. Ethnicity and the
Reporting of Mass Murder: Krakivs'ki visti, the NKVD Murders of 1941, and the Vinnytsia Exhumation,
Typescript, 2008.
138
Stepan Bandera u dokumentah (Stepan Bandera in the documents), vol. 1, p. 207; SSA FISU, file
10876, vol. 1, sheet 114116.
49
that, interfere in the process of formation of the new State.
it possible to give up the old anti-Semitic stereotypes. In response to Milyanichs article, one of the chief ideologists of the organization, Nikolay
Stsiborsky, published his article Ukrainian nationalism and Jews, which
said that the Jewish people should have the same rights as all other nationalities, as well as the opportunity to take an active part in all areas of social,
economic and cultural life in the new Ukrainian State. The second publication was an exception to the general rule. Already in the following issue
of Building up the nation they started publishing the series of articles related to the Jewish issue, written by Alexander Mitsyuk, the Professor of
Ukrainian Liberal University in Prague. Mitsyuks articles had been published during three years almost in every issue of the journal, and later on
were published as a separate book titled Rupalization of Jews in general
economic conditions. The articles of Mitsyuk in Building up the nation
gave scientific grounds for the appeal to struggle against Jews, and were
of course very appreciated by the OUN activists. The materials published
in OUN official press enforced those anti-Semitic trends.
Practical consequences of anti-Jewish propaganda of Ukrainian nationalists emerged very soon: in the middle of 30s OUN members conducted wide scale campaigns of boycotting shops run by Jewish people,
set fire to their houses, shops and storehouses. Escalation of hatred towards Jews further promoted the requirement to solve the Jewish issue in the OUN ideology. In 1938 a prominent OUN member V. Martinets in his article analyzed the Jewish issue from the angle of racial
theory. The conclusion was as expected: Jews were to be fought against
as enemies, isolated and sent away from Ukraine altogether. Martinets
suggestion sounded very similar to anti-Jewish policy conducted in the
Nazi Germany.
In the beginning of the war against Poland the Nazi leadership was
planning to use troops consisting of Ukrainian nationalists to exterminate
Jews and Polish intelligentsia, but the sudden termination of combat operation prevented the implementation of this plan. Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalists, residing on the Polish territory occupied by the Nazi,
received a number of benefits. For instance, they were allowed to receive
houses and factories, taken away from Jews. This approach contributed to
a deeper radicalization of the OUN attitude towards Jewish people.
50
This change of attitude is clearly seen when comparing the documents related to OUN arrangements of anti-Soviet revolts in the Western
Ukraine. In the spring of 1940, one of the OUN leaders Victor Kurmanovich prepared the Integrated general plan of OUN rebel headquarters.
The plan included instructions for shooting of the enemy in the beginning of war. However, it did not specify who the enemies are. Local OUN
leaders decided that together with representatives of the Soviet system
they should exterminate hostile national minorities, including, by all appearance, Jewish people.
This addition was taken into account and further developed in the directive The OUN struggle and activity during the war, prepared in May
1941 by OUN(B) members. According to this document, after Germany
attacks the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian nationalists were to start eliminating representatives of the Soviet authorities, Polish activists and Jews.
Jewish people were to be exterminated both individually and as a national
group. After retreat of the Soviet Army, the police forces, set up by the
Ukrainian nationalists, were to arrest the remaining representatives of the
Soviet authorities, Polish activists, soldiers of the Red Army taken as prisoners of war and Jews. Poles, Jews and Russians, who were still free, were
to have limited rights, not allowed to hold any administrative posts. After
the war Polish and Russian people were to be assimilated, and Jews sent
out of the country or isolated. It is worth mentioning that the OUN(B)
in its official instructions prescribed more severe measures against Jews
than against Poles. However illogical it may seem, this fact shows the great
significance of the anti-Semitic component in the OUN ideology.
The OUN(M) position with respect to the Jewish issue was much
less clear that that of Bandera faction. However, their soldiers also had
orders to exterminate Jews during the war. It is also known, that Melnik
supporters planned to limit Jews rights in the future Ukrainian State, and
the publication Krakow News, supervised by Melnik supporters of the
Ukrainian Central Committee, contained appeals for vengeance and punishment of Jews.
It is easy to see that the OUN anti-Semitic attitude developed exactly as
in Nazi Germany: from common anti-Semitism to struggle against Jewish
trade and finally extermination of Jewish people. By the summer of 1941,
OUN(B) views on the ways with the Jewish issue were identical to those
of the Nazi. At the same time, Jewish people were not the main enemy for
Bandera people. Their arch enemies remained Moscow and Poles.
CHAPTER 3
Extermination starts:
the OUN anti-Jewish campaigns
in the summer of 1941
52
CHAPTER 3
Extermination starts: the OUN anti-Jewish
campaigns in the summer of 1941
The German attack against the Soviet Union gave the Ukrainian nationalists the opportunity to start implementation of their plans, listed
in the directive The OUN struggle and activity during the war, which
included anti-Jewish campaigns.
Before the combat action, the OUN(B) established mobile groups
that were to follow the advancing units of Wehrmacht, spreading political
propaganda and setting up the Ukrainian police. A separate unit headed
by an OUN(B) leader Yaroslav Stetsko was sent to Lvov, to proclaim the
Independent Ukrainian State.
The mobile unit of Stetsko was the first to encounter the Jewish issue. A German soldier was killed in a village near Krakowets. In return,
the German leaders shot two villagers, who turned out to be Ukrainian
nationalists, and arrested two more people. Stetsko, having radical antiSemitic views, was indignant at such unscrupulousness of the German
allies. His objections were heard, and after the next death of a German
soldier, as he wrote in the report to Bandera on 25 June 1941, only Jews
were arrested. Stetsko did not stop at that. We are busy setting up police
forces to help exterminate Jews and protect the population, he wrote in
the same report.139
Stetsko had extreme anti-Semitic views. Moscow and Jews, he
wrote several weeks later, are archenemies of Ukraine and bearers of
demoralizing Bolshevist international ideas. I consider Moscow the main
enemy, who keeps Ukraine in captivity, but Jews are hostile and harmful,
as they help Moscow enslave Ukraine. That is why I support extermination of Jews and believe we must introduce the German methods of extermination, excluding assimilation of Jews etc in Ukraine.140 So it is not
surprising that it had to be Stetsko who initiated the large-scale anti-Jewish campaigns.
139

140
Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk, M. Organizatsia Ukrainskih natsionalistiv (The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), pp. 5, 162; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 3, file 7, sheet 56.
53
However, the crucial factor in this case was not the person only. The
tasks of mobile groups initially included extermination of harmful elements, Jewish people being one of the enemies. This is clearly stated in
the leaflet of the Northern mobile group: Actions of the unit: assistance in
establishing State order, arranging the OUN network, propaganda, extermination of harmful and hostile elements (NKVD people, secret agents,
Jews, Poles, Russians).141
The Ukrainian nationalists started their armed operations on the territory of the Soviet Army. OUN fighters attacked state institutions, small
units of the Red Army and undertook several attempts to capture prisons,
where their accomplices were kept under arrest. When the Soviet troops
retreated, Gumenyuk and his gang set machine guns on the roofs and
kept the passing troops under fire, recollected the resident of Zeleny
Ust, a Jewish woman Regina Krohmal. Those who stayed alive, they took
as prisoners. I saw that Yuzef Gumenyuk was kicking a soldier of the Red
Army, the soldier cried and begged to leave him alive, because he had a
wife and children, but Yuzef Gumenyuk had no pity for him and said that
he had been waiting for too long for the chance to take his revenge on
communists. He said communists, Jews and Poles have no right to live,
and killed the soldier hitting him with carbine gun on the head.142
The opinion communist, Jews and Poles have no right to live was
apparently widely-spread among the Ukrainian nationalists. According
to the instruction of May 1941, even before the German troops arrival,
the OUN members had started terror campaigns against undesired elements. A farmer Roman Otomanchuk, residing in Perevoloki village of
Ternopol, later on told: When the war between Germans and Bolsheviks
broke out, a strange person came to our village, gathered all OUN members and reasonable men and said that a war is going on and we should
take arms and fight for UCIS. I was at that meeting. That very night we
killed 18 secret agents, most of them were Jews.143
However, this incident was not typical: in most cases, extermination of
undesired elements started after the retreat of the Red Army.
141
Sergiychuk, V. Ukrainskiy zadvig: podillya ( : i), p. 43.

between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 2, p. 886; The Institute of the national memory of
Poland, 0192/336, vol. 29, sheet 2121.
143
Borotba z agenturoyu: Protokoly dopytiv Sluzhby Bezpeki OUN v Ternopilschyni, 19461948 ( : i ii, 19461948), book 1,
p. 249.
142
54
Among the first victims of the Ukrainian nationalist terror were Polish
and Jewish people of Lvov. Just several days after Germans attacked the
USSR, the Ukrainian nationalists tried to arrange a revolt in Lvov. They
shot units of the Red Army, passing through the city, and tried to capture
prisons of the city, intending to set free their associates under arrest.
The Red Army troops left the city on the night of 29th/30th June, and
early morning on 30th June, the Nachtigall squadron, founded by the
Abwehr and consisting of Ukrainian nationalists, entered the city, with
mobile group of Yaroslav Stetsko following. The main task of Stetskos
group was to proclaim the Ukrainian State. The OUN(B) leadership hoped
that this initiative will be supported by the Nazi authorities, because just
some months before during German invasion against Yugoslavia the Independent State of Croatia was established following the same scenario,
and it was acknowledged by the Nazi. As for the Nachtigall squadron, it
was to provide armed support to the new Ukrainian government.
Proclamation of the Ukrainian State was not a problem. Members
of Stetskos group arranged a meeting of representatives of the Ukrainian society and read out the Act of 30th June 1941. Yaroslav Stetsko was
announced the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government, his first
order being to establish Ukrainian police.144
At the same time the city witnessed wide-scale anti-Jewish campaigns.
The motive for the above was discovered bodies of shot convicts in Lvov
prisons, who had been shot before the Soviet troops retreated. The blame
for these deaths was laid on Jews, so Ukrainian police immediately
started arresting Jewish people. Some of the arrested Jews were convoyed
to prisons, where they were forced to bury the bodies of shot convicts.
They started seizing Jews to send to works, recollected later
a Jewish woman Ruzya Wagner. This task was given to common
Ukrainians. The first thing to do for the seized was to take away
corpses and clean up the prisons at Zamarstinovskaya, Lonskogo
and Kazimorovskaya (Brigidka) streets. It was terrible job, all the
more so because the overseers, Ukrainians and Gestapo people,
treated Jews as murderers of those people and tortured them mercilessly145
144
Kovba, Zh. Lyudyanist u bezodni pekla (i i ), Kyiv, 2000, p. 52; Kruglov,

A. Lvov, July 1941, p. 12.
145
Himka, I. Dostovirnist svidchennya: relyatsia Ruzi Wagner pro lvivskiy pogrom vlitku 1941 (Trustwor-
55
On the next day, Pfaleiderer, the representative of Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Germany, affiliated with the command of the 17th Army, reported to Berlin:
Arrived to Lvov last night, while combat action was still going on in the Western suburbs There are a lot of members of
the Ukrainian organization outside in the streets, bearing yellowblue badges, some also armed. The city has in some places suffered
from combat action destructions and fires, set by Russians. Now
the population acts aggressively against Jews.146
On the same day, the leading part of Sonder Battalion 4B, headed by
Sturmbannfhrer SS Gunter Heerman, entered the city. This Sonder Battalion was part of Einsatzgrupp B, its task being elimination of Nazi enemies, including Jews. On the next day the main troops of Einsatzgrupp
entered the city, and the following report was sent to Berlin: The Headquarters of Einsatzgrupp 1.7 arrived to Lvov at 5 a.m. and settled in NKVD
building. The head of Einsatzgrupp B reports that the Ukrainian revolt in
Lvov on 25.6.41 was severely suppressed by NKVD. Around 3000 shot by
NKVD, prison is on fire.147
According to Order 1 issued by R. Geidrich, the Head of Security
Police and SD, the task of Einsatzgruppen included arranging massacres
of Jews by the local population148 However, anti-Jewish campaigns in Lvov
had been started before the soldiers of Einsatzgrupp arrived to the city.
The only thing to do for the head of Einsatzgrupp Brigadefhrer SS Otto
Rash was to help arrange them on a larger scale. Soldiers of Einsatzgrupp
joined shootings of Jews, moreover, there are assumptions that they disfigured bodies of the shot convicts in Lvov prisons,149 doing this as a way
of propaganda. They also announced Jews, just killed by the Ukrainian
thiness of the witness statement: Ruzya Wagners report on the Lvov massacre in the summer of 1941),
p. 45.
146
1941), p. 98.
147
Kruglov, A. Lvov, July 1941, p. 13; Collection of documents on extermination of Jews by the Ukrainian
nationalists in 19411944, Kyiv, 2000, p. 26.
148
RSMA, stock 500, list 1, file 25, sheet 17.
149
Similar practice was applied in Latvia during the first days after German troops occupied the country.
For more details see: FSB CA, stock 100, list 10, file 1, sheet 225226; Latvia under the Nazi yoke: collection of archive documents, oscow, 2006, p. 6567.
56
police, as the victims of Bolsheviks.150 Thus, anti-Soviet and anti-Jewish

attitudes among people of the city were strengthened.
Ukrainian nationalists also started anti-Jewish propaganda. In the
morning of 1st July they put posters on walls of the buildings, with the
appeal of the OUN(B) regional headquarters. The wording had been prepared before the war by Ivan Klimov, an OUN(B) leader in the Western
Ukraine (also known under the name Legenda):
People! Know! Moscow, Poland, Magyars and Jews are your
enemies! Destroy them!
Know! Your leaders are the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists,
OUN.
Your Chief leader is Stepan Bandera!151
Later, the OUN(B) regional headquarters issued another important
order on establishing the Ukrainian armed forces. The order announced
collective responsibility (familial and national) for all faults against the
Ukrainian State, Ukrainian Army and the OUN.152 Thus, any Jewish or
Polish person was a legal target to be shot.
Anti-Jewish appeals were issued by the OUN(M) too. The leaflet
signed by Andrey Melnik and issued on 5th July said: Death to Jewish
henchmen communist Bolsheviks!153 Another OUN(M) leaflet was address to young Ukrainians:
OUN brings YOU, youth of Ukraine, freedom, and bright future, natural national life on YOUR land where there are:
NO RUSSIANS
NO JEWS
NO POLES.154
150
CSAPOU, stock 166, list 3, file 246, sheet 80.

1941), p. 129; OUN v 1941 rotsi`(The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 261; part 2, p. 576; CSA SBPGU, stock
3833, list 1, file 63, sheet 12; file 42, sheet 35; List. 2, file 18, sheet 87.
152
OUN v 1941 rotsi`(The OUN in 1941), part 1, p. 197; part 2, p. 486; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, file
41, sheet 89.
153
1941), p. 151; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 74, sheet 24; Altman, I. A. Zhertvy nenavisty (Victims
of hatred), oscow, 2002, p. 222.
154
CSAPOU, stock 57, list 4, file 370, sheet 18.
151
57
Appeals of both OUN factions resulted in new killings, and this time
not only of Jewish people. The register of combat action, kept by the 1st
mountain division , has this record for 1st July: During the commanders
meeting we could hear shots from the prison of the Chief Political Administration, where Jews were being forced to bury Ukrainians (several
thousands), killed during the past weeks. As the Ukrainian population
in Lvov insisted, on 1st July there was a real massacre against Jews and
Russians.155
Ukrainian nationalists and soldiers of Einsatzgrupp started a real
Jew-hunt. Germans seized Jews right in the streets and in their houses
and forced them to work in prisons, recollected Rabbi David Kakhane.
The newly established Ukrainian police were also tasked to capture
Jews. Every morning around 1000 Jews were gathered and sent out to
the three prisons. A few were ordered to break concrete and dig out
bodies and others were taken away to small backyards and shot there.
But those lucky ones who were working, not always had a chance to
return home.156
In the meantime the fun continued, recollected Ruzya Wagner.
Inhuman cries, broken heads, deformed bodies and faces of the beaten up, blood flowing and mixing with dirt, they evoked slaughterous
instincts of the mob, and they howled of pleasure Women and old
people, lying on the ground, were poked by sticks and dragged around.
When voracious slaughterers whipped off the clothes from some woman and started beating her up with sticks, we requested some German
soldiers, passing by, to interfere and stop that. They replied Das ist die
Rache der Ukrainer (Its the vengeance of the Ukrainians) and we heard
approval in their tone.157
Violence towards arrested Jews was practiced in various sophisticated ways. According to the statement of Maria Goltsman, on the third
day after the German troops had entered Lvov, a group of Ukrainian
police officers headed by German officers brought approximately 20
citizens of Lvov, among them women, to building 8, Artsishevsky street.
The group of convoyed people included professors, lawyers and doc155
Carynnyk, M. Zolochiv movchit ( ) // Krytyka. 2005, no. 10.

Kruglov, A. Lvov, July 1941, p. 13; Extermination of Jews in the USSR during the German occupation
(19411944): Collection of documents, Jerusalem 1991, p. 76.
157
Himka, I. Dostovirnist svidchennya: relyatsia Ruzi Wagner pro lvivskiy pogrom vlitku 1941 (Trustworthiness of the witness statement: Ruzya Wagners report on the Lvov massacre in the summer of 1941),
p. 46.
156
58
tors. The German officers made those people collect garbage from the
ground in the yard with the mouth (not using the hands) and beat them
with sticks.158 Marias husband, Bronislav Goltsman, added that policemen, perpetrating all this violence, had yellow-blue identification signs
on the uniform sleeves, which means they were Ukrainians. Five people
of the convoyed group were shot on the same day behind the nearby
railroad body.159
The action of Einsatzgrupp caused objections on the part of Abwehr.
A battalion chief of Brandenburg subversive regiment wrote in his report
of 1st July: On 30 June and on 1st July 1941 large-scale violence was unleashed against Jewish people where some of them turned into the worst
massacres. The police forces appointed were unable to accomplish their
tasks. They provoked the local population by their cruel and disgusting behaviour towards helpless people. As the reports of squadrons say,
their own forces were shocked at the acts of violence and tortures. They
considered it necessary to mercilessly punish the guilty Bolsheviks, but
did not see any reason for the torturing and shooting of Jews, including
women and children, arrested indiscriminately. Such acts undermined
discipline in the Ukrainian squadrons. They could not make out any
difference between Wehrmacht and the police, and since they saw German soldiers as role models, they were hesitant to criticize Germans. We
speak about the very same squadrons, who yesterday mercilessly shot
Jewish robbers, but now reject merciless violence.160
The Ukrainian squadrons mentioned above refer to Nachtigall
squadron, consisting of the Ukrainian nationalists, which entered Lvov
early morning on 30th June. As it was already said, the main task of this
squadron was to support proclamation of the Ukrainian State. According to the reminiscence of Myroslav Kalba, a soldier of Nachtigall, before they entered the city the battalion chief Roman Shukhevich ordered:
Dont spill anyones blood. Dont commit any crimes or revenge against
our enemies, Poles or Jews. Its not our job to deal with them.161
158
SARF, stock P-7021, list 67, file 75, sheet 106-106.

Ibid., sheet 6464 overleaf.
160
Kruglov, A. Lvov, July 1941, p. 13; Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges,
19411944, Hamburg, 2002, s. 95.
161
Kalba, M. Roman Shukhevich yak providnyk, komandyr, Ludina (Roman Shukhevich as champion,
commanding officer and personality)// General Roman Shukhevich Taras Chuprynka, Golovniy
Komandyr UPA (General Roman Shukhevich Taras Chuprinka, Commander-in-Chief of the
UPA), Toronto, Lvov, 2007, p. 355.
159
59
This quote clearly shows that Shukhevich undoubtedly treated the

Polish and Jewish people as enemies, but their extermination was the task
of newly established Ukrainian police and not that of Nachtigall.
Nevertheless, several small groups were established within the squadron, whose tasks included extermination of people on the black lists.
These lists were made according to the OUN directive of May 1941. This
information is confirmed by the post-war statement of Grigory Melnik, a
member of Nachtigall:
In the city of Lvov the squadron was located in different
premises. From our platoon and other platoons too a group of
8-10 people was selected, following the order of Oberlander and
Shukhevich. Among the selected there were Luschuk Grigory,
Pankin Ivan, Panchak Vasily and others.
After 4-5 days this group returned and they told that they had
arrested and shot many people in the city.
Pankin and Luschuk said that they and other participants of
other subversive groups received lists of people to be arrested from
Oberlander and Shukhevich. The arrested people were taken to
certain places, one of them as I remember was to a seminary of
Abragamovich, and then the arrested were shot dead according to
Oberlander and Shukhevichs order. Luschik and Punchak told me
that they personally shot Polish scientists at Vuletskaya mountain,
and stated their last names too, I clearly remember the name of
Professor Bartel, a former Polish minister, as I know.162
Black lists are mentioned by another OUN member, Yaroslav Shpital. He arrived in Lvov on 2nd July and was one of the personal security
guards for an OUN(B) leader, Nikolay Lebed.
We stayed in a house at Dragomanova street (former
Mokhnatskogo street), in building number 22, in the left wing on
the ground floor. People were kept under arrest in the cellar of
this building, at night they were taken outside to the backyard,
one by one, and shot.
162
Crimes of Oberlander: Report of the press-conference for Soviet and foreign journalists, conducted in
Moscow on 5th April 1960, oscow, 1960.
60
The shooting was done by Germans and the soldiers of Nachtigall squadron. They used small-bore rifles and handguns to
make less noise.
I saw with my own eyes that people lying on the ground were
lit by electrical flashlights, and those who were still alive were shot
dead. Then they were taken away, I dont know where.
I saw all this from the window of the room where I stayed.
One night, trucks brought a group of arrested people who were
straight away taken to the second floor, interrogated and beaten.
After that they were thrown out of the window from the second
floor on to the concrete yard. Those who were alive were shot dead.
The bodies were taken away quickly.
During the three days dozens of people were shot. Arrests and
shootings were done according to lists prepared in advance.163
Modern Ukrainian historians doubt the statements of Grigory Melnik and Yaroslav Sheptal, calling them part of the Soviet propaganda,
however the information that members of Nachtigall participated in
shootings of Lvov Jews was received by the West German court too. For
example, one of the former members of SD operation group Lvov stated during the interrogation in 1964, Here I witnessed the first shootings of Jews carried out by Nachtigall. I say Nachtigall because during the shootings the soldiers wore Wehrmacht uniform. The Jews
were shot. ., in the yard of a school by members of Wehrmacht units I
realized only later that those were Wehrmacht units, as I took an interest in that I determined that the soldiers in German uniform doing
the shooting spoke Ukrainian language.164 There is also mentioning of
Nachtigall soldiers taking part in killing Jewish people on 30th June in
the report of the battalion chief of Brandenburg regiment, We speak
about the very same squadrons, who yesterday mercilessly shot Jewish
robbers.165
Apparently some of the Nachtigall soldiers were used for individual
extermination of the OUN enemies, according to the black lists. The
163
Crimes of Oberlander: Report of the press-conference for Soviet and foreign journalists, conducted in
Moscow on 5th April 1960, oscow, 1960.
Kruglov, A. Lvov, July 1941, p. 13; Sandkuhler, Th. Endlosung in Galizien. Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz 1941-1944. Bonn, 1996, s. 488.
165
Kruglov, A. Lvov, July 1941, p. 13; Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges, 19411944, Hamburg, 2002, s. 95.
164
61
large-scale campaigns however, were conducted by the Ukrainian police, supported by members of Einsatzgrupp.
The Ukrainian nationalists and members of Einsatzgrupp B eliminated
around 4 thousand of Jewish people in Lvov during several days.166 It is
not possible to estimate the exact contribution of the OUN members into
this crime, but there is no doubt that their contribution was quite significant.
In any case, participation of the Ukrainian nationalists in campaigns
against Jewish people in Lvov was approved by the Nazi. Theodor Oberlander in his report to Lahusen, Head of the second Abwehr, on 14th July
1941, said the following:
On 2nd July I spoke to Mr Lebed. I conveyed your congratulations and thanked him on your behalf for the valuable cooperation and support, provided to us.
I emphasized that the main goal of our conversation is to
establish possible long-term, rational and systematic cooperation. I pointed out that now, during the war, we must intensify
our cooperation, and said that Mr Lebedevs assistance should
not end after the victorious German troops enter Lvov city, that
on the contrary, our cooperation should continue and become
even closer now.
As for the practical implementation of our cooperation, we are
currently discussing several events that you will be informed of. I
promised Mr. Lebed further support and said that his earlier work
was much appreciated by the head of Security police and Security
Service in Lvov.
From his remarks I understood he knew what I meant, so further explanations were not required.
Mr. Lebed assured me that he will gladly be at our service, following the interests of joint struggle against Bolsheviks and Jews.
He would be grateful if appropriate directives were given by us to
other individuals in Ukrainian circles in Lvov.167
166
167
The Holocaust: Encyclopedia, oscow, 2005, p. 634.

Poliszczuk, W. Dowody zbrodni OUN i UPA, Toronto, 2000, s. 614; Documents accuse: collection
of documents on cooperation between the Ukrainian nationalists and SS of the Fascist Germany /
Comp. G. Tkachenko, . Voytsekhovsky, . Tkachuk; Introduction by I. Gerasimov, Kyiv, 2005,
p. 3637.
62
Many OUN leaders shared the idea that cooperation with the Nazi
should be continued in relation to the Jewish issue. Stepan Lenkavsky
was one of such leaders and modern historians describe him as a prominent figure in OUN. The records of OUN conference in Lvov on 18 July
1941 do not need any further clarification:
Mr. Gupalo: The main thing is that there are so many Jews
all around. Especially in the center. Wont let them live like that.
Must force them move out, they should flee. Or maybe give them
some city, for instance Berdichev.
Mr. Lenkavsky: Describe Jews.
Mr. Golovko: Jews are impudent. Cant say Jew. We need to
take drastic measures. There is no way they should be allowed to
stay in the center. We need to do away with them.
Mr. Levitsky: In Germany, Jews have Aryan paragraph. We
are more interested in the situation in the area every Jew must
be registered. They were sent away from several cities, like Krakow, and relocated to other places, like Warsaw, where a ghetto
was set up behind a high wall. They have cinemas and theatres,
but have no food. The young and able work.
Part of them should be eliminated. Now some are already
eliminated Its a fact that some mixed with Ukrainian blood,
many married Ukrainian women. In Germany they are different:
half-Jew, quarter-Jew, but we cant have it. A German who marries a Jew, becomes a Jew.
Mr. Golovko: In Ukraine many men married Jewish women,
mostly in cities.
These Jewish women married Ukrainians for their own benefit. As soon as the Ukrainian husband had ruined himself or went
bankrupt, they divorced. And Jewish men lived very well with
Ukrainian wives. I like the German approach.
Mr. Gupalo: We have many Jewish members, who are respected, and there are even those who had been baptized before the
revolution.
Mr. Lenkavsky: Every case should be analyzed separately.
Mr. Levitsky: Germans use professionalsI believe the German way of solving the Jewish issue is not good for us. We must
look at every case separately.
63
Mr. Lenkavsky: For Jews all measures are to be used in order

to exterminate them.168
In this case as was said, so was it practiced. The German documents
prove that anti-Jewish campaigns were carried out by the Ukrainian nationalists in all big cities. So, the report of the head of SD Security police of 6 July
1941 contains information about arrests of Jews in Ternopol, conducted by
the Ukrainian police. During this campaign 20 Jews were killed in streets
by soldiers and Ukrainians, 70 Jews were convoyed by Ukrainians and
killed. The last paragraph of the report gives high estimation to the work
of the nationalists: Wehrmacht is satisfied with the decisive actions taken
against Jews.169 In the report of 16th July 1941 we can find a similar praise:
The Ukrainian population showed praiseworthy activity against Jews during the first hours after the Red Army retreat. In Dobromil they set a synagogue on fire, in Samobr 50 Jews were killed by the furious crowd. In Lvov
people of the city pursued and tortured around 1000 Jews, brought them to
the prison of the Chief Political Administration, which was captured by the
armed forces.170
An anti-Jewish campaign, comparable in its scale to Lvov massacre,
took place in the town of Zlochev on 2nd-3rd June. Just as in Lvov, the motive for it was discovery of dead bodies of some Ukrainian nationalists in
the local prison.
Zlochew had very active and powerful underground OUN forces. After
the Soviet troops left, a revolutionary Ukrainian government was set up in
the city with units of the Ukrainian police under its command. The police
was the main force in the later on following anti-Jewish campaign. Its important to note that unlike in Lvov, the massacre of Jews in Zlochew did not
involve Einsatzgrupp B members, and they didnt stay long in the city.171
On 3rd June, the Ukrainian police and soldiers of SS division Viking gathered local Jews at the square near the prison and started a real
168

1941), pp. 189190; OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 2, p. 338; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list
1, file 9, sheet 112; Altman, I. A. Zhertvy nenavisty (Victims of hatred), oscow, 2002, pp. 221222.
169
UPA v svitli nimetskyh dokumentiv ( ii i i), Toronto, 1991, book 3,
p. 53.
170
Kosik, V. M. Ukraina v Drugiy svitoviy viyni u dokumentah: Zbirnik nimetskih arkhivnyh materialiv
(Ukraine in WWII in documents: collection of German archive documents), vol. 1, p. 192194; Ukrainske derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941 ( . 30 1941),
p. 179; OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 1, pp. 327, 333.
171
Boll, . Zloczow, Juli 1941, s. 8.
64
slaughter. Abram Rozen in his post-war statement said: On 3rd July 1941
German SS units, police and the Ukrainian nationalists went around the
city, headed by Sagaty, Antonyak, Vanne, Voronkevich, Alishkevich and
others. They seized people, and brought them to prison saying they would
work there. When people were gathered at the square, all physically able
were ordered to dig pits. After the pits were ready the people, including
me, were ordered to lie down in the pits next to each other. After that German executioners started shooting the people in pits with machine guns
and submachine guns, and threw trench bombs into the pits. This way
around 3500 civilians were killed. I stayed alive as I lay under people and
was only injured in the leg. Because it was raining heavily the pits were
not covered straight away. I stayed in the pit till darkness and then escaped
and was hiding in cellars all the time.172
The witness statement is confirmed by the report of the 1st unit of
295 infantry division, dated 3 June, In the city and the tower, wide-scale
shootings and killings of Jews and Russians are taking place, women and
children are also being killed, thanks to the Ukrainians.173 SS together with civilian gangsters commit robberies, throw people out of their
own apartments and have already killed many, says another German
document.174
It is interesting to note that some time later Nachtigall squadron
appeared in Zlochew. Grigory Melnik, who has been quoted above, recollected, We stayed in Zlochew for several days, guarding prisoners of
war. The officers ordered to find communists among the prisoners and
then eliminate them. However, as of now no evidence has been found to
prove the participation of Nachtigall soldiers in campaigns against Jews
in Zlochew.
Instead, there is conclusive evidence of Nachtigall soldiers killing
Jews in Vinnitsa region. The following record was found in a soldiers
diary, who was a member of the reconnaissance unit of Nachtigall,
On the way we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Bolshevist and
Jewish terror, and that strengthened our hatred towards Jews so much,
that in two villages we shot all Jews. There was one incident which took
place while passing one of the villages. We saw a lot of people in streets
and when asked, they said that Jews were threatening them and that
172
SARF, stock -7021, list 67, file 86, sheet 2223.

Boll, . Zloczow, Juli 1941, s. 7.
174
Ibid., s. 10.
173
65
they were scared to sleep inside their houses. So, we killed all Jews in
that village.175
There were massive killings of Jews by the Ukrainian nationalists in
the rural area. On 5 June 1941 a group, gathered by Petr Voynovsky, a
member of OUN Bukovinsky leadership, arranged a massacre of Jews
in Miliyevo village, and killed around 120 people.176 On 7th June, following the order of an OUN(M) leader Stepan Karabashevsky, 45 Jews were
killed in Borovtsy village and 54 in Kiselevo village.177 In Trubov settlement nationalists eliminated all Jewish men and wanted to burn alive
their women and children, but German soldiers stopped them.178 On 7-8
June in Kosuv village of Ternopol region OUN soldiers killed 80 Jewish
people, including women and children.179
In the Mogilnitsy settlement of Ternopol region Leonid Kozlovsky, an
OUN member, arranged the Ukrainian police service after the retreat
of the Soviet troops. According to the statements of the villagers in July
1941 he arrested three Jewish families: Gelis, Mendel and Vorun, consisting of 18 people (elders, teenagers and children aged 6 months to 12
years old). They all were taken to the woods, where he shot the adults,
and killed small children taking them by legs and hitting with their head
against trees, and then threw them into a pit.180 Similar crimes were committed by Kozlovskys comrades, Josef Korchinsky and Peter Terletsky. In
the summer of 1941 they shot dead two members of the Internal Affairs
Agencies, the secretary of the local communist organization, the chairman of kolkhoz and two Jewish families.181
Evgenia Vaisburg, a resident of Kamenets-Podolsk region, recollected:
In July 1941 armed people, of Banderas forces, came to Kuzmin village
and announced that they would kill all men of the local population. So
men dressed in womens clothes. But when they were found, they were
175
CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 57, sheet 17; Patrilyak, I. K. Legiony Ukrainskyh Natsionalisstiv
(i iii), p. 26.
176
Fostiy, I. Diyatilnist OUN na Bukovyni v 1940-1941 (ii i 19401941 .)
// ---. 2000, no. 24.
177
Ibid.
178
Altman, I. A. Zhertvi nenanvisti (Victims of hatred), p. 223.
179
CSAPOU, stock 1, list 23, file 928, sheet 5759; Vedeneyev, D, Bistrukhin, G. Mech i trizub (
), p. 164; Vedeneyev, D. V. Odisseya Vasiliya Kouka: Voenno-politichesky portrait poslednego
komanduyuschego UPA (Vasily Kouks Odyssey political and military portrait of the last Commander-in-Chief of the UPA), Kyiv, 2007, p. 62.
180
FSB CA, stock 100, list 11, file 7, sheet 231234.
181
Ibid.
66
stripped naked in public and shot dead. Armed men came to our house
and took my mother, sister and myself out to the yard and beat us, my
father was ordered to strip, they made him stand naked in a corner of the
room and shot him dead.182
It is curious to see that the leaflets, distributed at that time by the
Ukrainian nationalists, had anti-Jewish, anti-Polish as well as anti-gypsy
mottos:
Ukrainian soldiers of the Red Army, think about it, dont be
deceived. Just have a look at the people in your Army units (some
text is unreadable), Jewish, gypsies and other rascals, those people
do not even have a right to live, no historian in the world will
remember them either. Ukrainian soldiers of the Red Army, you
are successors of the glorious Kazak knights, how dare you move
in the woods together with Jews and gypsies and rob your Ukrainian brothers.183
In some areas the violence against the OUN enemies and Jewish people was of pseudo-judicial appearance. For example, in Stanislavskaya region secret courts convicted around 450 people, accused of disloyalty to
the OUN(B),184 and in Chertkov town of Ternopol region, as stated by a
court clerk, they reviewed mostly the cases of people accused of cooperating with NKVD, of Polish and Jewish people.185
The Ukrainian police forced the Jews who were left alive to wear arm
bands with the image of star of Judah. The directive on the above was
issued already on 11 July 1941, for instance by Zhitomir regional administration: The Jews are ordered to register without delay with police authorities, wear a white arm band on the right arm with blue hexagram on
it and come immediately to work for clearing the city.186 A similar order
was issued by Murovich, the head of Radekhovsky local administration:
You must ensure that the Jewish population wears a white arm band with
182
Altman, I. . Victims of hatred, p. 223; Philkenshtein, I. S. Mass extermination of Jews in Podolia //

the catastrophe and resistance of Jews in Ukraine, Kyiv, 1999, pp. 2324.
183
CSAPOU, stock 57, list 4, file 370, sheet 3 overleaf.
184
Vedeneyev, D. V. Vasily Kouk, Kyiv, 2007, p. 62.
185
Borotba z agenturoyu: Protokoly dopytiv ( : i), book 1,
p. 426.
186
1941), p. 259.
67
the Jewish blue hexagram on it. Those who disobey and refuse to wear it,
must be arrested.187
Ukrainians were not allowed to interact with Jews and Poles. One of
the local leaders of the OUN Levko said in his order of 1 August 1941:
9. It is forbidden to greet Jews and shake hands with them.
10. It is forbidden to sell food to Jews and Poles, those who
disobey this order, must be boycotted.188
Jews became a legal victim for robbery and blackmail. The money
amassed from robbing Jews was invested by the OUN members into enterprises, which were also taken away from Jews. A part of the money was
used for the organization itself. Here is the statement of Evgen Lipovoy,
an OUN member:
In august 1941 when I worked in a court, two strangers came
up to me. They called themselves Sapischuk and Sovyak. They told
that they had arrived from Germany and were planning to set up a
trade and a production company in Yagolnitsa town. They came to
me with a request to speak to the district prefect, so he would let them
control Yagolnitsa town, a trade and industrial town. Then they told
me that they had the required money for setting up the company, and
that if more was needed then the Jews of Yagolnitsa had the money.
They could share the income of the enterprise equally between themselves and the OUN Both said they were OUN members.
In the beginning of October I quit the job in court, and was employed as a teacher in Dolina village. At this time Sapischuk and
Sovyak had settled in Yagolnitsa town and had a bakery, a restaurant, a shop selling bread for ration cards and a variety store. Financially they were doing very well. So I started going to their restaurant
for lunches and sometimes for dinners too. I saw with my own eyes
how they in the evenings changed into German Uniform and went to
town to rob local Jews.189
187
Ukrainskederzhavotvorennya.Aktchervnya1941(i.301941),
p. 282; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 15, sheet 4243.
188
Motyka, G. Ukraiska partzyantka, s. 98 (reference to: CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, file 3, sheet 12).
189
Borotba z agenturoyu: Protokoly dopytiv ( : i), book 1,
pp. 578579.
68
The money from robberies was used for national struggle: Sapischuk,
mentioned in the statement above, regularly shared the profit with the local OUN HQ.
The Ukrainian policed carried out arrests of the Jewish people in cooperation with occupation forces. In some cases the police let people free,
for a certain amount of money. The OUN leaders were furious when they
got to know this. On 28 June the OUN propaganda department sent the
following message to the OUN Security Service:
Archpriest Tabinsky told us the following: Our police together
with German authorities are now conducting mass arrests of Jews.
According to the information received by Archpriest Tabinksy,
there are people among our police forces, who for gold or money
release the Jews subject to arrest. We dont have any specific information on this matter, but send you this message for information
and further use. Long live Ukraine!190
One more internal document shows the zeal of the Ukrainian nationalists in the struggle against undesired elements, it is the directive of the
OUN(B) regional leaders, made in August 1941:
In every city we must take accommodation management under control. Towards that we must take people from villages, and
then we shall have control over buildings and houses. It is necessary to explain to Germany that at this moment the house management units are actually Polish, Jewish and communist organizations working against Ukraine and Germany. The lists of Poles,
Jews, their leaders and officers must be prepared and provided to
the OUN regional leadership.191
As mentioned before, a similar scheme (collaboration with Gestapo
against Jews and Poles) was implemented by the OUN in 1940 and beginning of 1941 in the occupied territories of Poland.192 Now the collaboration continued.
190
OUN in 1941, vol. 2, p. 389; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 23, sheet 51.
Ibid., p. 465466; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 46, sheet 5051.
192
Stepan Bandera u dokumentah (Stepan Bandera in the documents), vol. 1, p. 99; SSA SSU, stock 65,
file -9079, vol. 4, sheet 221234.
191
69
The Nazi appreciated the fact that the Ukrainian nationalists supported anti-Jewish campaigns. The only confusion was that the OUN people
were persecuting not only Jews and communists, but also the Poles. The
head of the Security police and SD in his report of 18 August 1941 described the situation as follows: The Ukrainian police continue to ravage,
persecute and kill Poles are equaled to Jews, and they are ordered to
wear arm bands. In many towns the Ukrainian police established special units called Ukrainian security service, Ukrainian Gestapo etc.
Superintendants in cities and field commanders partially disarm police
forces.193
Partial disarming of the Ukrainian police, which by then was under the total control of the Ukrainian nationalists, was another warning sign for the latter. By that time the German authorities had arrested
OUN(B) leaders Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko. They were explained that there is now way there could be any Independent Ukraine,
and that Ukraine is to become a German colony. Yaroslav Stetsko was
even kept in prison for a short time: arrested on 9th July and released
on 16th July.194 In August 1941 Abwehr decided to stop supporting the
OUN(B). Bandera received this message from Erwin Stolze. When I
announced to Bandera during our meeting that our cooperation is over,
he was frustrated and overreacted, as he believed that connection with
us meant that he was the acknowledged leader of the nationalist movement, told Stolze later.195
Nevertheless, the OUN(B) continued supporting the Nazi authorities.
On 1 August 1941 Yaroslav Stetsko appealed to Ukrainian people to help
German Army everywhere in fighting against Moscow and Bolsheviks.196
A similar appeal was issued also on 6th August.197
Stetskos decisions were fully supported by the OUN(B) leaders in the
Western Ukraine. I. Klimov, Legenda, issued directive 6 with the following orders:
193
(Ukraine in WWII in documents: collection of German archive documents), vol. 1, p. 253; Ukrainske
derzhavotvorennya. Akt chervnya 1941 ( . 30 1941), p. 391;
OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 2, p. 447.
194
Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk, M. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, p. 161; CSA SBPGU,
stock 3833, list 3, file 7, sheet 4.
195
FSB CA, file -20944, vol. 1, sheet 27.
196
CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 6, sheet 6.
197
Ibid., sheet 3.
70
On all walls, buildings, fences etc. slogans: Viva Independent

Ukrainian State! Long live Yaroslav Stetsko! Free Bandera! No return to Ukraine for Polish and Jewish Misters and bankers! Death
to Russians, Poles, Jews and other enemies of Ukraine!
Long live Adolf Hitler!
Long live German Army!
Long live Ortscommandant!198
Similar slogans were published in the mass media, controlled by the
Bandera group. Ukrainian people know that the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists, lead by Stepan Bandera, is fighting persistently and courageously for the nations freedom and independence, for land and power
for Ukrainians, for their free, happy and government ordered life without
kolkhozes, landlords, Russians, Poles, Jews, commissioners and their terror, as we can read in one of the August issues of Krements news
newspaper. Ukrainians know, that the German Army helped them get
rid of the Moscow-Jewish yoke. The German Army crushed Red Moscow
invaders, and that is why the OUN cooperates with the German Army
and helps it, and appeals to all Ukrainians to do the same.199
Its easy to see that the OUN(B) texts, pledging support to the occupant
army, are full of anti-Jewish statements. Its not surprising, as in the summer of 1941 the Ukrainian nationalists gave full support to extermination
of Jews by the Nazi and took an active part in their campaigns as well.
Summary
German attack of the Soviet Union let both OUN factions start implementation of their plans on eliminating the undesired elements, including the Jewish people. In addition to pre-war instructions and orders, the
OUN(B) regional leadership issued an order on collective responsibility
(familial and national) for all faults against the Ukrainian State, Ukrainian Army and the OUN, thus making any Polish or Jewish person a le198
OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 2, p. 453, 483; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 46,
sheet 3637.
199
1941), p. 394.
71
gal victim for persecution, irrespective of their age or sex. Propaganda of

both OUN factions called to exterminate enemies communists, Jews
and Poles.
The direct consequences of the above were anti-Jewish campaigns
in the summer of 1941. Jews were killed by the OUN soldiers and the
Ukrainian police both in rural areas and big cities. The largest campaigns on extermination of Jews took place in Lvov and Zlochew, in the
course of their action the nationalists cooperated with units of Einsatzgrupp B and soldiers of SS division Viking. At the same time Jewish
and Polish people in Lvov, who were on the black lists, were also eliminated by some soldiers of the Ukrainian Nachtigall squadron.
Killing of Jewish people by the Ukrainian nationalist went together
with violence. In full accordance with the order of OUN(B) regional leadership on collective responsibility, not merely Jewish men fell victims to
the Ukrainian nationalists violence, but also women and children. There
were incidents when German soldiers stopped OUNs massacres and violence against Jewish people.
Despite the failure to proclaim the Independent Ukraine in the summer of 1941, OUN(B) leaders continued supporting the occupants, in particular vis--vis the Jewish issue. The Ukrainian police, controlled by
the nationalists, actively participated in the Nazis anti-Jewish campaigns.
Both OUN factions conducted ant-Jewish and anti-Polish propaganda.
Those Jews who managed to stay alive, were limited in rights and forced
to wear arm bands with the image of Star of Judah and were victims of
blackmail and robberies carried out by the OUN people. The Ukrainian
nationalists tried to introduce similar measures against the Poles, but this
resulted in counteraction by the occupying authorities.
Thus, in the summer of 1941 both OUN factions supported extermination of Jews by the Nazi and took an active part in anti-Jewish campaigns.
CHAPTER 4
Correction of the anti-Jewish course
of the OUN(B)
74
CHAPTER 4
Correction of the anti-Jewish course
of the OUN(B)
By the autumn of 1941 the relationship between the OUN(B) and
the Nazi had further worsened. The OUN(B) agitation for Independent
Ukraine caused much consternation among the Nazi leadership, who
treated Ukraine as a future colony of the Third Reich. Berlin was also in
denial about the conflict of OUN(B) and the Melnik faction. On 30th August two of the OUN(M) leaders Omeliyan Sennik and Nikolay Stsiborsky were killed in Zhitomir. The OUN(M) leadership immediately
accused OUN(B) of this murder.200 The Bandera faction, in their turn,
denied any participation in the crime,201 but for the German authorities
this bad had gone on for too long and they swung into action.
On 13th September Heydrich, the chief of RSHA, signed the order to
arrest OUN(B) leaders:
The Bandera people have been too active recently in their
attempts to establish independent Ukrainian state by all means.
During the large propaganda campaigns they encouraged Galicia residents and the Ukrainian population of the area to support
their struggle not only against German troops, but also against
their political opponents.
By this moment more than 10 members of the Melnik group of
the OUN have been killed. Among them were prominent Ukrainian nationalists, two of the top OUN leaders Sennik and Stsiborsky, who were shot on 30th August in a street of Zhitomir by a
member of Bandera faction. We assume that Bandera group will
continue the terror acts in order to reach their political goals.
We propose the following:
a) To arrest all more or less significant leaders of Bandera OUN
faction on suspicion of abetting in the murder of the Melnik group
representatives. In order to ensure the success of the campaign, all
200
OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 2, p. 489, 491; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 42,
sheet 32.
201
Ibid., p. 493.
75
suspects must be arrested at the same time all over the country, in
Generalgouvernement and in the scene of operation, the proposed
time being the morning of Monday 15th September, 1945
b) To close down offices of Bandera movement, as well as the
office of the Ukrainian Service for mass media matters, located in
Berlin, building 78 in Mecklenburgische Strae, and the Ukrainian Bureau in Vienna, located in Landstrae-Hauptstrae. Execute a thorough search of offices and resident apartments of the
OUN(B) leaders subject to arrest.202
This repression from the German authorities was a debilitating blow
for the Bandera people, but they still hoped to resume the collaboration.
Curiously, the official OUN documents, such as Regulations for OUN
operations implementation of 14th September 1941 and the appeal of the
regional OUN(B) leadership to the Ukrainian nationalists (November
1941), contain no anti-German statements or mottos.203 Moreover, on
9th December the OUN(B) again offered their services to the Nazi, in a
memorandum addressed to Rosenberg. The Bolshevist Moscow has left
plenty of secret agents in Ukraine, it clearly stated in the memorandum. Just like the agents, sent later, they try to evoke hostility against
the Ukrainian national struggle and Germany. It is critical to disclose and
neutralize those secret agents. However, it is impossible to accomplish this
task within short time without the knowledge of the area and contacts
with the local population It is necessary to establish a powerful security
force that would consist of local people, with high level of national consciousness and steadfast reputation. This security force will collaborate
with the German forces. The nationalists will be happy to assist in establishing such a force and conducting related operations.204
But the Nazi had no plans to cooperate with Bandera group. Moreover,
on 25th November 1941 Einsatzgrupp C-5 issued the order to secretly
shoot members of Bandera group: All activists of Bandera movement
must be arrested immediately and after a thorough interrogation must be
quietly eliminated, as robbers.205
202
FSB CA, stock 100, list 11. . 7, sheet 4950.

OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 2, p. 528531, 547552; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2,
file 1, sheet 210211; List 1, file 63, sheet 211213.
204
Ibid., p. 565; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 22, sheet 1617.
205
The collection of reports of the State Emergency Committee on the crimes of German Fascist invaders.
oscow, 1946, p. 173; Kosik, V. M. Ukraina v Drugiy svitoviy viyni u dokumentah: Zbirnik nimetskih
203
76
Such activity of the Nazi authorities literally forced the OUN(B) to

accept an anti-German attitude. However, this change had no effect on
the OUN(B) attitude towards Jewish people. According to German documents, the new motto of the nationalists of the autumn of 1941 was: Viva
Independent Ukraine, without Jews, Poles and Germans! Poles go away to
San, Germans to Berlin and Jews to the gallows!206
So, as we can see, the trend of the Ukrainian nationalists to oppose the
German occupants did not change their negative attitude towards Jews.
The methods for addressing the Jewish issue, proposed by the Ukrainian
nationalists, were as radical as those used by the Nazi. Perhaps, the OUNs
methods were even more radical, as the motto Jews to gallows! had been
proposed before the Wannsee Conference, where the final solution of the
Jewish issue was approved.
And so it was done: the tasks, given by the OUN(B) leaders to underground forces, included penetrating into the police troops and local
administration, occupy leading posts, as well as exterminating Jews and
communists.207
But the logic of underground struggle sometimes forced Bandera people to use Jews for their benefit. For instance, on 17th June 1942 the police
and SD of the occupied eastern territories mentioned in their report that
the OUN(B) activity was funded, among others, by Jews too: It was confirmed that even Jews gave the money, they were forced or blackmailed
to do that.208 Also German security service registered several occasions,
when Bandera people provided Jews with fake passports.209
Of course, when the need came, OUN(B) people surrendered Jews
to the Germans without a moment of hesitation. Thus, in the beginning of 1942 the Ukrainian police in Roven region set up secret weapon
stashes, as was ordered by the OUN(B). When the storages were discovered by the Germans, Bandera people conveniently shifted the blame to
the Jews.210
arkhivnyh materialiv (Ukraine in WWII in documents: collection of German archive documents), Lvov,
vol. 1, p. 365; OUN v 1941 rotsi (The OUN in 1941), part 2, p. 553.
206
UPA v svitli nimetskyh dokumentiv ( ii i i), book 3, p. 96.
207
Ibid., p. 95.
208
Altman, I. A. Zhertvy nenavisty (Victims of hatred), p. 224; OUN v 1942 rotsi (The OUN in 1942),
p. 88; CSA POU, stock 1, list 22, file 76, sheet 613.
209
(Ukraine in WWII in documents: collection of German archive documents), vol. 2, pp. 152153; OUN
v 1942 rotsi (The OUN in 1942), p. 60.
210
OUN v 1942 rotsi (The OUN in 1942), p. 86; CSA POU, stock 1, list 22, file 76, sheet 613.
77
Cooperation of OUN(B) members with Jews in the spring of 1942 was,

of course, rare and situational. The official documents of the organization
still revealed the negative attitude to the Jews. In April 1942 The Second
Conference of the OUN(B) accepted the following resolution: Despite
the negative attitude to Jews as a weapon of Moscow-Bolshevist Imperialism, at present we consider it inappropriate to take part in anti-Jewish
campaigns, for we cant be a blind weapon in the hands of others and
distract the public attention from the main enemies.211
The inappropriateness of anti-Jewish campaigns was conditioned
among the rest by the fact that the Germans were busy solving the Jewish issue and that too in a radical way. On 6th August 942 the OUN(B)
regional leadership in Kamenets-Podolsk region noted with satisfaction:
The Germans solved the Jewish issues on their own. They brought the
Jews to Bolshevist cities and shot them. Some are left alive in small places,
for physical labour.212
There were many OUN people among the members of Ukrainian police, which was often involved into anti-Jewish campaigns, arranged by the
Nazi. When the war broke out, we set up Ukrainian military units, recollected an OUN(B) leader Vasily Kouk later on. When we realized that
Germans did not approve of that and started shooting us, we disguised
those units as police and continued to train the people.213 OUN great
influence on formation of Ukrainian police was mentioned in German
documents as well.214
So, disguised as police members, OUN people took an active part in
massacres of Jews. O course we can not put the blame for those campaigns on the OUN. But the fact that OUN leaders, despite the available
opportunities, did not stop killings of Jews by Ukrainian police, shows
a lot to us.
The OUN(B) propaganda included clear anti-Jewish appeals. Thus,
for example, the order, issued by an OUN(B) leader on 30th June 1942,
the date of one year anniversary of the Proclamation of the Independ211
Ideya i chin: Organ Provodu OUN, 1942 -1946. (I i : , 19421946), Toronto, Lvov, 1995, p. 52; OUN v 1942 rotsi (The OUN in 1942), p. 82; CSA POU, stock 63, list 1, file 7,
sheet 15.
212
213
Kouk V. UPA v zapitannyah ta vidpividyah Golovnogo Komandira ( ii ). Lvov, 2007, p. 18.
214
See for example: OUN i UPA v 1943 rotsi (The OUN and UPA in 1943), pp. 9899.
78
ent Ukrainian State, mentioned a brutal Jew-Rus as an enemy.215 The

OUN(B) appeal, issued on the same day, stated that Germans, Russians,
Magyars, Romanians, Jews and Poles were the enemies of the Nation.216
At the same time, the action plan of the OUN(B), given in the appeal, said
the following:
We, Ukrainians, are in a tough situation. On the one side,
we still feel the breath of the Moscow and Jewish invasion, on the
other side Germans with their colonial policy make their presence
very visible. Our honor calls to defend ourselves.
At the same time the struggle is going on with Moscow-Jewish
bolshevism and our political mind tells us to wait
We do not call people to barricades, do not start physical fights
with the new owners of Ukraine [the Nazi] for the territory. Our
primary and still main enemy is Moscow.217
Nevertheless, the Jewish policy of the OUN(B) was soon amended.
Starting from the second half of 1942 Bandera people published no propaganda materials with appeals to exterminate the Jews. 218 This did not
mean a radical change of the policy, as we can see from the resolutions of
the First Military Conference of OUN(B) in October, 1942:
The Chief Military Unit orders Regional Military Units:
To solve the issue of national minorities when the armed operations for the independence begin. In order to solve the issue,
the national minorities enemies of the nation must be exterminated.
1. Russians should not be touched, as they have assimilated
in Ukraine and present no threat. Together with the Ukrainian
people (mainly refers to peasants) they survive various political
events. But Russian activists, struggling against Ukrainians, must
215
OUN v 1942 rotsi (The OUN in 1942), p. 97; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 42, sheet 64.
Ibid., p. 100; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 63, sheet 16. Stepan Bandera u dokumentah (Stepan
Bandera in the documents), vol. 1, p. 154; SSA SSU, stock 13, file 372, vol. 35, sheet 200207.
217
Stepan Bandera u dokumentah (Stepan Bandera in the documents), vol. 1, p. 157158; SSA SSU,
stock 13, file 372, vol. 35, sheet 200207; OUN v 1942 rotsi (The OUN in 1942), p. 103; CSA SBPGU,
stock 3833, list 1, file 63, sheet 1616ov; Roman Shukhevich u dokumentah (Roman Shukhevich in
the documents), book 1, p. 345; SSA SSU Stock 9, file 19, sheet 104119 overleaf.
218
Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv (The OUN attitude towards Jews), p. 71.
216
79
all be registered and eliminated, especially in small towns, as these

Russians are enemies of the Ukrainians.
2. Jews should not be exterminated, instead they must be
sent out of the country with some of their belongings. We should
reckon with the Jews as they have much influence in England
and the US.
3. Poles must all be relocated, also with their belongings, as
England and the US will protect them. Those, who refuse to leave,
must be eliminated. The most active enemies, and members of all
anti-Ukraine organizations, must be eliminated one day before
the mobilization is announced. They are to be counted and registered beforehand by regional and district military units. Elimination will be done by police and in certain cases by the SB. Army
soldiers must not be used for that.
4. Dont touch Magyars, Czech and Romanians, as we must
keep in mind the liquidation of the Western frontline.
5. Dont touch the other national minorities of the USSR. Armenians should be treated just as Jews, taking into consideration
that they are loyal to Russia.219
As indicated above, the OUN(B) slightly changed their methods of
solving the Jewish issue. In the hope to get support from Great Britain
and the USA, Bandera group leaders rejected the idea of exterminating all
Jews, residing in Ukraine, and decided to send them out of the country
instead. But the Jews, who were soldiers of the Red Army and members
of the guerilla movement, as well as prisoners of war, were to be killed, according to the resolution of the same Conference: Pay special attention to
Russians and Jews. Political leaders and Jews must be eliminated.220
Its easy to see the resemblance between solutions for the Jewish issue,
given in the resolution of the OUN(B) First Military Conference, and the
Nazi plans before the attack of the Soviet Union: relocation of the Jews,
elimination of Jewish prisoners of war and military commissioners.
But the main goal of the Military Conference was of course not the
Jewish issues. By the autumn of 1942 all people of Ukraine realized the
219
Polyaki i ukraintsi mizh dvomya totalitarnymy systemamy, 19421945 (Polish and Ukrainian people between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 1, p. 208; SSA SSU, stock 13, file 372, vol. 5,
sheet 2138.
220
Ibid., p. 210.
80
evil essence of the Nazi occupation regime. While the OUN(B) encouraged avoiding fights with the Germans,221 the representatives of the lower
levels of this organization gained the permission for armed resistance to
the occupants, who robbed and killed Ukrainian people. The local OUN
units were left to their own devices, recollected Mikhail Stepanyak, a
member of Central Headquarters of the OUN(B). Very little was done
for military units, at that time OUN armed units emerged spontaneously,
and against the orders of OUN leaders they had armed conflicts with the
Germans.222 Alongside with that, in the autumn of 1942 OUN(B) leaders realized that Germany was about to lose the war, which meant that an
armed struggle was inevitable and the time for it was approaching fast.223
More military units of the OUN(B) were formed. In the spring of
1943 these military units and units of the Ukrainian police joined into the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The witnesses state that one of the
reasons for establishing the UPA by the OUN members was Soviet guerilla active operations in the area of Polesye.224 Polish residents of Volyn were
another enemy for the UPA units. In the summer of 1943 UPA troops
arranged large-scale ethnic cleansing campaigns in the residential areas
of Polish communities. According to Polish historians, over 40 thousand
people were killed during those campaigns.225 During the Volyn slaughter there were many victims among Jewish people, who tried to escape
from the Nazis.
By now, there were very few anti-Jewish slogans in published propaganda materials of the OUN(B).226 But they were still used in oral propa221
See for example: OUN v 1942 rotsi (The OUN in 1942), p. 103; CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 1, file 63,
sheet 1616 overleaf; Roman Shukhevich u dokumentah (Roman Shukhevich in the documents),
book 1, p. 345; SSA SSU, stock 9, file 19, sheet 104119 overleaf.
222
Borotba proty povstanskogo pukhu ( ), p. 87; Roman
Shukhevich u dokumentah (Roman Shukhevich in the documents), book 1, p. 314; SSA SSU,
stock 6, file 75135-, Sheet 1941; stock 65, file -9079, vol. 1, sheet 17, 3049.
223
between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 1, p. 204; SSA SSU, stock 13, file 372, vol. 5,
sheet 2138.
224
Omelyusik, M. UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotsi (The UPA in Volyn area in 1943) // Volyn i Polissya: Nimetska okupatsiya (Volyn and Polesye: German occupation), Toronto, 1989, book 1, p. 24. See also: Organizatsiya ukrainskih natsionalistov i Ukrainska povstanska armiya: Istorichni narysy (ii
iii i i: Ii ), Kyiv, 2005, p.
163164.
225
Makarchuk, S. Vtrati naselennya na Volyni u 1941-1947 ( i 1941
1947 .) // Nezalezhny kulturologichniy chasopys I(
). 2003, no. 28, p. 197.
226
One of the exeptions Appeal to Ukrainian nationalists dated May 1943, which mentions bygone
81
ganda. The OUN(B) people encouraged the killings of both local Polish
population and Jews. The priest said: Brother and sisters, now the time
has come for us to take revenge on Poles, Jews and communists, recollected one of the witnesses.227 We can find the same slogans in the reports,
submitted by Soviet guerillas to the Ukrainian Headquarters of Guerilla
Movement (UHGM): During meetings peasants are encouraged to eliminate communists, Jews and Poles.228
Contemporary Polish researchers published the data confirming the
information of the Soviet guerillas. For instance, on 15th July 1943 in
Velitsk village of Kovel area Ukrainian nationalists killed more than ten
people of Polish nationality, and a Jewish family, hidden by the Poles. On
29th July a gang of armed Ukrainians attacked Stavechki village in Vlodzimirsky area and killed several Polish families. With axes they killed the
Kulkinski couple, and the family of Vladislav Vitskevich together with a
young Jewish man, whom the Poles tried to hide. In the same month,
in Eliashovka village of Zdolbunovski area, Ukrainian nationalists killed
more than ten Polish people, as well as one Jew who hid in that village.229
The above information is confirmed by the statements of the OUN
and UPA members, arrested by the Soviet authorities. Our unit had the
task to kill and rob all Poles and Jews in Dederkal region, told Fyodor Voznyuk, a soldier of the UPA. I participated in the massacre of
Poles and Jews in Dederkal region, in the village of Kotlyarovka during
10-15 May of 1943.230
Regina Krochmal, a Jewish lady, told about the unit lead by an OUN
member Yuzef Gumenyuk:
It happened in that very settlement in the beginning of 1943,
we asked director Voznyak to host us. That time he gave us shelter made a bunker under the floor. We stayed like that for several
weeks, and then one day he said that somebody was watching us.
Jew dominance. For more details see: OUN i UPA v 1943 rotsi (The OUN and UPA in 1943), p. 143;
DAVO, stock -1021, list 1, file 1, sheet 1.
227
Polischuk, V. V. Girka Pravda (Bitter truth), p. 221.
228
Borotba proty UPA ( ), book 1, p. 62; CSA POU, stock 62, list 1, file 1347,
sheet 18.
229
Prus, E. Holokaust po banderowsku, s. 172173.
230
Polyaki i ukraintsi mizh dvomya totalitarnymy systemamy, 19421945 (Polish and Ukrainian people between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 2, p. 894; SSA SSU, stock 13, file 1020,
sheet 221229.
82
One evening I went out to cook, and saw that the house was surrounded by the gang with Yuzef Gumenyuk leading them. They
threw a grenade into the bunker. Some people were killed right
away, others injured. Only two ladies were not injured. I stayed in
the box room and saw that Gumenyuk tied up director Voznyak
with barbed wire and hung him on the door. The he cut Voznyaks
fingers, and when director screamed, cut his tongue off too, and
left him like that. After that Gumenyuk and his gang, there were
20-25 people, raped the girls, who stayed alive, and then killed
them to hit with an iron stick, so their brains spattered on the
walls and ceiling. In the same year Gumenyuk and his gang set fire
in Koroschatin village, only several houses remained in the center
of the village. That time they forced all women and children, who
were alive, gather in one building, then spread there feathers from
mattresses and set fire on the people all burnt alive.231
The family units, consisting of the escapees from Ghetto, were treated by UPA officers as Soviet and therefore eliminated. Several hundreds
of Jews, who escaped from the Tuchinsky Ghetto, managed to survive
through winter, but the conditions of life during several months in the
woods, with fake guerilla troops located or passing nearby, and robbers
and the OUN-UPA units roaming around, turned out to be disastrous,
and almost all escapees died.232
All [Ukrainian] young people, without any exception, had to join the
UPA. They were brought to the woods and trained for several months,
recollected Jan Cisek, officer of Berezhansky area of Polish Armia Krajowa. Those trainees in the woods were searching for the places where
Jews were hiding, and killed all Jews they found.233
We should remember that most of the UPA members were former soldiers of Ukrainian police same who had been used by the occupants in
massacres of Jews. They used their experience of ethnic cleansings during
the Volyn massacre. As for Jews, the former policemen have always considered the ones to be eliminated.
231
Polyaki i ukraintsi (Polish and Ukrainian people), part 2, p. 886888; The Institute of National
Memory of Poland, 0192/336, vol. 29, sheet 2121 overleaf.
Berenstein, L. E., Elisavetsky. S. Y. Evreyi geroyi Soprotivleniya v podpolnoy i partizanskoy borbe
protiv nazistkih okkupantov na Ukraine, 19411945 (Jews heroes of opposition in underground and
guerilla struggle against the Nazi occupation in Ukraine, 19411945). Tel-Aviv, 1998, p. 44.
233
Quoted from Prus, E. Holokaust po banderowsku, s. 167.
232
83
But the main struggle with Jews and other undesired elements was
done not by UPA units, but by the OUN Security Service, subordinate
to the UPA. Alexey Kirillyuk proved the above in his statements. Alexey
used to be an aid-de-camp of a Security Service officer in the north-west
Ukrainian region Alexander Prisyazhnyuk (cover name Makar).
Up to May 1943 I had been travelling together with Makar
around the villages of the Roven region. I was to do different jobs
for him and guard him.
Usually when we stayed in a village Makar sent me to gather
the local OUN core group and OUN SS guerillas. They provided
him with the detailed information about the climate in the local society, supplies to the UPA, the quantity and names of Soviet
prisoners of war, who had fled from German camps and stayed in
the village
After Makar left, a military unit arrived to the village and as
ordered by Makar killed those local people, who had expressed
their discontent over the UPA; Soviet prisoners of war, who had
fled from German camp, were killed as well.
In May 1943 Makar sent for me and said that he was very
pleased with my work, hence he considered me experienced
enough to take the responsibility of the Chief Officer of OUN SS
military unit in the Roven region. He said my official title would
be Chief of the police executive department.
I asked for details of my future responsibilities and Makar
told me the following:
For the OUN to be able to struggle for the Independent
Ukraine we must eliminate all enemies of the OUN. And for that
we need to have eyes and ears everywhere. That is the task of the
Security service in every settlement it has guerillas and a military unit of 10-12 people, who eliminate our enemies.
OUN leaders set the following tasks before the Security service:
1. To eliminate all enemies of the OUN and the UPA, who
are in particular Poles, Czechs, Jews, communists, officers and
soldiers of the Red Army, police officers and people of the local
population, who express loyalty to the Soviet authorities.
2. To arrest and shoot all prisoners of war, who are officers and
soldiers of the Red Army and had fled from German camps.
84
3. To exterminate, together with families, all deviating from

the service in the UPA, burn down their houses and take away
their belongings.
4. To watch the population of the region, monitor timely food
supplies for the UPA, apply physical punishment to those who
sabotage the supplies. Physical punishment means shooting and
execution.
5. To reveal and punish the people expecting the arrival of the
Red Army troops.
6. To exterminate all people, as indicated and ordered by OUN
leaders, without going into detail about their faults.
7. To hand over the most dangerous enemies to Makar
without interrogating them personally, most dangerous enemies
being communists and NKVD people.
The foundation stone of our work is loyalty to the OUN. When
you see your victim suffering, have no qualms. Remember, the
more enemies we destroy, the closer is our victory.
After Makar finished I realized that he gives me a job Im interested in, and it was convenient too, as I could stay at home and
avoid the Service in the UPA, where I didnt want to go because
of my poor health.
On the same day Makar took me to Zaritsk village of the
Roven region, where introduced the members of the military unit
to me.234
As we see, Jews were on list of enemies to be eliminated by OUN SS
people. Kutkovets I. T., another OUN member, described the tasks of the
OUN SS in a similar way in his statement:
In 1943 upon the order of the OUN regional headquarters SS
was working on the following tasks:
physical elimination of the prisoners of war, soldiers of
the Red Army;
elimination of the Polish people and burning down their
houses;
234
between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 1, p. 448450; SSA SSU, stock 13, file 372, vol. 20,
sheet 5663.
85
physical elimination of deserters from the UPA and beating people, who refused to join the UPA;
physical elimination of the hiding Jewish people.235
The tasks, set before the OUN SS people, were duly accomplished; we
have no doubt about that.
The victory of the Soviet troops in the Kursk Bulge battle was the final
sign to convince the OUN(B) leaders of Germans soon defeat. In the August of 1943 the Third Emergency Conference of the OUN(B) was conducted in a remote village of the Ternopol region. Vasily Okhrimovich
(secret name Garmash), a member of the Central headquarters responsible for propaganda, presented his report on the international situation.
He concluded that the USSR was moving fast on the way to victory. At the
same time there were some contradictions between Great Britain and the
US on the one side and the USSR on the other side. In connection to the
above Garmash proposed implementation of the following policy:
to direct the activity of the Organization towards arranging a revolt in
the USSR, for that a union with the other USSR peoples is required,
and a common front line too, as well as military action of the UPA;
to get in touch with the nations of Europe, who are not members of
the USSR, in order to act together;
to obtain support from Great Britain.236
But to create the front line of the enslaved nations and obtain support from Great Britain the OUN(B) had to officially stop brutal persecution of the minorities, residing in Ukraine, first of all of Polish and Jewish
people. These changes were introduced: a new OUN(B) programme was
approved. The new programme showed our anti-imperialist, anti-fascist
and anti-racist position, recollected Mikhail Stepnyak, a member of the
OUN(B) Central headquarters. It ensured equal political rights and the
rights in the national affairs for all people of the Ukrainian state. The previous programmes were far from that, as they were purely fascist.237
Thus, the Bandera programme of solving the Jewish issue was drastically changed. Those, who had recently been persecuted, were now given
the rights of fully legitimate Ukrainian citizens!
235
Dokumenty izoblichayut (Documents accuse), p. 97.

Roman Shukhevich u dokumentah (Roman Shukhevich in the documents), book 1, p. 321322;
SSA SSU, stock 65, file -9079, vol. 1, sheet 3049.
237
Ibid., p. 324.
236
86
However, even after the resolution of the Third Emergency Conference of the OUN(B), the Ukrainian nationalists admitted the right to exist
only for certain Jews. The Directive of the General Headquarters of the
UPA, issued on 1 November 1943, includes the following instructions:
Circulate the information that we admit all nationalities, including Jews,
who work for the benefit of Ukraine. They will be considered Ukrainian citizens and have full rights. This must be told to doctors of Jewish
nationality and other professionals, working for us.238 We can see clearly
that the instruction admitted not all Jews, but only those who worked for
the benefit of Ukraine.
A similar thesis can be found in the Temporary instruction, issued
in the beginning of 1944. This document contained an appeal to conduct
no campaigns against the Jews since the Jewish issue is no longer a
problem (there are very few of Jews left). At the same time there is a very
important note: This does not refer to those Jews who are against us.239
This note evidently opened many opportunities to persecute Jews, who
could always be called supporters of Moscow Bolsheviks.
Despite the changes in the OUN(B) programme, the attitude of the
Ukrainian nationalists towards Jews remained mostly negative. We should
remember that the UPA consisted mainly of the former officers and soldiers of the police troops, set up by the Germans. Those people had a little
while before participated in many anti-Jewish campaigns. So their attitude
to Jews did not change. When the head of a Soviet guerilla unit tried to
start negotiations with the UPA representatives, the latter said: First you
get rid of all Jews in your unit and then we shall do the negotiating.240
Thus, it is not surprising that the UPA troops continued ethnic cleansing,
despite the propaganda of equal rights for all nationalities. The difference
between words and actions of the Ukrainian nationalists is clearly shown in
the report to the UHGM, sent by Fyodorov, the head of a big Soviet guerilla
unit in the Volyn region: The nationalists accuse Russian people of illit238
Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv ( ), p. 73.

Motyka, G. Ukraiska partzyantka, s. 297 (with the reference to: SARF, stock 9478, list 1, file 126,
sheet 233235); Altman, I. A. Zhertvy nenavisty. (Victims of hatred), p. 225; Wais, A. Otnosheniye
nekotorih krugov Ukrainskogo Natsionalnogo dvizheniya k evreyam v period vtoroy mirovoy voiny (The
attitude of certain groups of the Ukrainian national movement towards Jews during WWII) // Vestnik
Evreyskogo universiteta v Moskve (The Newsletter of the Jewish University in Moscow) 1995, no. 2,
p. 110.
240
sheet 2022.
239
87
eracy and savagery in their publications. At the same time in the numerous
leaflets they call all nations of the East and West to establish their independent national States. And alongside with that they brutally persecute and kill
Polish and Jewish people, and others too, irrespective of their nationality,
if they are sympathetic to the Soviet regime or assist guerilla movements.
People are burnt down, cut down with axes and killed.241
This information is confirmed by UPA documents. For example, on
2nd April 1944 9 poles and 2 Jewish women who worked for the Jews242
were killed in a village in Peremyshlensky district.
Witnesses said: On the night 17th/18th March [1944] The Ukrainian
nationalists, Bandera people, arranged a massacre of Poles in Mogilnitsy village. Disguised as Soviet guerillas and wearing masks, they broke
into houses of Polish families, tortured them, cut them up with knives,
chopped up children with axes, broke their heads, and then burned everything down in order to conceal their crimes. That night Bandera people
killed, cut and shot about 100 people Soviet activists, Jews and Poles.
My family was killed that night my wife, a 17-year-old daughter and my
son. Around 15 nationalists broke into my house, among them I recognized KRITCHKOVSKY Josef Antonovich, a member of Bandera group.
He participated in the murder of my family members243 This statement
was given by Yanitsky S. I. after the village had been liberated by the Red
Army. In the woods near Mogilnitsy village of the Budzanovsky district,
pits were unearthed with 94 bodies of the village residents, murdered by
Bandera people on 18th March 1944.244
Polish historians give the following examples of anti-Polish campaigns,
conducted by the UPA in the autumn of 1943 and winter of 1944, when
Jewish people fell victims to their cruelty:
Malaya Panikovitsa (Brody district), Tarnopol military province. In the autumn of 1943 Bandera people attacked the village and murdered Polish people. The Jews,
found in the village, were quartered, i. e. cut into four pieces.
241
sheet 4855.
Polyaki i ukraintsi mizh dvomya totalitarnymy systemamy, 19421945 (Polish and Ukrainian people between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 2, p. 1032; SSA SSU, stock 13, file 376, vol. 34, sheet 263.
243
FSB CA, stock 100. 11, file 7, sheet 231234.
244
Ibid.
242
88
Dryshkov. In the autumn of 1943 Bandera people killed two

Poles after they found out that Jews were hiding in their houses.
The six found Jews were also murdered with knives.
Shumyany. In November 1943 three Polish people were
killed, and in December of the same year 7 more were killed, and
their houses burnt down. The Jews, hiding in stables and barns,
had no chance to get out. Eleven Jewish families were burnt.
Bydlo (Rogatin district). In November 1943 a Bandera gang
murdered priest Antony Verbovski, and a teacher named Vrobl.
Both were accused of hiding Jews, and ordered to hand them over
to the Bandera people. The Jews (five people), hidden in a secret
place, survived.
Yazlovets (Buchach district). In December 1943 Bandera
people attacked the parish. They tortured priest Andzej Krasitsky
and tried to get the names of people, who were hiding Jews. In other
words, they tried to force him break the seal of confession. The priest
remained silent, was caught in some unknown place and killed.
Kudlubiska (Olesko area). On the night of 2nd\3rd October
1943 Bandera gang murdered 11 people including three Jewish
children.
Ruda Brodzka (Brody district). Bandera people attacked the
village in August 1943, gathered in front of the house of the parish
priest. They shouted and demanded to surrender Jews to them. In
1944 UPA soldiers attacked this village for the second time, killed
six Poles and burnt down seventy houses. Together with Poles a
Jewish family of four people was killed.
Baranovka (Brezhany district). In December 1943 Bandera
people shot a Polish man, who used to give food to a Jewish family,
hiding in the woods.
Svitazhuv (Peremyshlyany district). Fearing the attack of
Bandera gangs, who demanded to surrender Jews, the Polish people of the village left the place in the beginning of 1944 and moved
to Sokal district.
Plebanovka (Trembovla district). In autumn 1943 Bandera
people killed 11 Polish people, declaring that they had been hiding
enemies of Christianity and murderers of Christ.
Malkov (Sokal district). In winter 1943/44 Bandera people
attacked the village, set fire on it and shot the people who tried
89
to escape. Among the people shot from machine guns there were
Jews too.
Zhabintse (Kopytchintse district). Bandera gang attached
the village twice in September and December of 1943, they always attacked the houses where Jews stayed. The number of Jewish people killed during those attacks remains unknown.245
The above reportings are by no means a final account.
We also know that UPA members provided the information on Jewish
groups to German occupation forces. According to German documents,
in April 1944 UPA officers gave the Germans information on the activity of gangs in the district of Zlochew-Borbrika-Podyasy, they informed
about a gang of Jews in Svirets, gang of Poles in Visina and a Russian gang
in Podyasy district246
Thus, despite the directive of the 3rd Third Emergency Conference of
the OUN(B), UPA soldiers continued elimination of Jews in autumn 1943
and winter 1944. The only exception was made for the useful Jews, who
worked for the benefit of the UPA.
By the autumn of 1943 there was a small number of Jews serving
in the UPA. One of OUN(B) leaders, Nikolay Lebed, recollected in his
memoirs: Most of the UPA doctors were Jewish people, saved by the
UPA from the Hitlers forces. Jewish doctors were considered equal citizens of Ukraine and leaders of the Ukrainian army. I should emphasize
that all of them were honestly doing their hard duty, helped not only
soldiers but also the civilians, went around the areas, arranged field hospitals and hospitals in settlements. They stayed with the army in very
tough circumstances, and even when they had a chance to join the Red
Army. Many of them died as soldiers, fighting for the same ideals as the
whole Ukrainian Nation.247
His words are confirmed by Russian documents. On 30 October 1943,
the leader of the guerilla unit Begma located in Volyn area, reported
to the UHGM: The nationalists in Dombrovitse mobilized all tailors to
stitch warm clothes for the winter. According to the latest order from the
245
Prus, E. Holokaust po banderowsku, s. 182183.

SSA SSU, stock 13, file 372, vol. 36, sheet 120124. For more details see: Spravka SBU pro diyalnist
OUN_UPA on 30 lypnya 1993 roku ( ii - 30 1993
) // Bez prava na reabilitatsiyu ( ), Kiyv, 2005, book 2, p. 219.
247
Lebed, M. Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya ( i), book 1, p. 69.
246
90
Headquarters, the nationalists accept everybody who wants to join them,

but for Polish people. There are many Jews among the nationalists, especially Jewish doctors.248
Moreover, UPA members in their memoirs mention small Jewish family camps, controlled by the UPA.249
The reasons for the Ukrainian nationalists to accept Jews were purely
practical and never concealed from anyone by the UPA leaders. Volyn was
an underdeveloped agricultural area, with most of the population being
farmers. Up to the beginning of the war about one third of the population
in the area remained illiterate, and there was a lack of handcraft workers
and doctors.250 This very shortage of specialists forced the UPA leaders to
use Jews.
It should be noted that the number of Jews in the UPA is much exaggerated by both OUN memoirists and modern historians-revisionists.
This was proved by Ivan Patrilyak in his recent analysis of the new information source personal information cards of soldiers of the military
district Bogun, group UPA-North. The number of soldiers in Bogun
district in the end of 1943 was 8 to 10 thousand people. In the Central
State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine
there are 1445 personal information cards, which is 17-20% of the total
number of soldiers. This sampling allows restoring a collective portrait
of a UPA soldier.251 According to this data, 98,27 % of the soldiers were
Ukrainian, and only 1,73 % represented other nationalities: Russians, Uzbeks, Byelorussians etc. There was not a single Jew among them.252
So, a Jewish UPA soldier was rather an exception; apparently, the involved Jews were not included in the UPA and not listed.
While the Jews were openly used in the UPA, they were also secretly
exterminated. People had been killed by the OUN Security Service; this
248
sheet 108.
249
For more details see: Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv ( ),
p. 7576.
250
This is proved by the UPA documents. For more details see: Volyn i Polissya: UPA ta zapillya, 1943 1944: Dokumenty i materialy ( i i: i, 19431944: i i), Kyiv, Toronto, 1999, p. 41; Volyn, Polissya, Podillya: UPA da zapillya, 19441945: Dokumenty i materialy (B, i, i: i, 19441945: i i),
Kyiv, Toronto, 2006, p. 397.
251
Patrilyak, I. K. Yevedentsiyni kartki UPA yak statistichne dzherelo (ii
) // Ukrainskyi vyzvolnyi ruh ( ) Lvov, 2006,
vol. 6, p. 111
252
Ibid., pp. 117118.
91
unit had been eliminating Jews up to the day when the Resolutions of the
3rd Great OUN(B) Conference were issued and afterwards too.
An officer of the OUN(B) Security Service, captured by Soviet guerilla
troops, described in detail the real policy and attitudes of the nationalists:
Earlier the SS issued an order to secretly eliminate all non-professional
Jews and conceal the killings from both Jews and our people, and tell everybody that they left and joined the Bolsheviks.253 Similar information
was found in the order from an OUN SS leader, Zhiburta, captured by
guerillas: All non-professional Jews must be secretly eliminated, also the
information must be spread that they left and joined the Bolsheviks.254
As we see, non-professional Jews were eliminated straight away. Professionals lived a bit longer, but as soon as the Red Army troops approached,
they were killed as well. The leaders of the OUN and the UPA issued a
whole number of directives on the secret extermination of unreliable elements. Yuri Stelmaschuk, the head of Turiv unit of the UPA group
Sever, said in his statement:
There was a secret order of the OUN central HQ, given to us
orally by Klim Savur of the SS. The order was to exterminate all
Soviet prisoners of war on the territory of the Western Ukraine,
considering them supporters of Bolsheviks.
The UPA received a secret order from the OUN central HQ to
exterminate all UPA members of Russian nationality. The order
also stated that the killings must be disguised as sending the UPA
people to special Russian units.
I know of one more secret order of the OUN central HQ, given
to the SS. The SS was to exterminate all family members (including infants, women and old people) of those individuals, who were
suspected of anti-OUN ideas.255
The information, given by Stelmaschuk, is confirmed in the text of the
OUN order of 13th March 1944, found by the Soviet State Security body:
253
sheet 9495.
254
Vedeneyev, D., Bystrukhin, G. Mech i trizub ( ), p. 219. (With the reference to CSA POU,
stock 62, list 1, file 277, sheet 2; stock 57, list 4, file 451, sheet 10, 52).
255
between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), part 1, p. 442444; SSA SSU, stock 65, file -9079, vol.
1, sheet 168169.
92
We order to start merciless extermination of all enemy elements, secret

agents, residents (confidants) of all nationalities, be they Ukrainians, secret agents or Poles, or all prisoners of war from the east. In particular
people from the east must be eliminated. All people from the east, if they
are not secret agents or reconnaissance men, will join the Bolsheviks when
the latter arrive, and give out all information about us. Pay attention the
eastern people serving in the OUN, must not be eliminated.256
The OUN SS in Volyn issued a similar order on 11th March 1944: exterminate all communists and Jews immediately.257 Several days before
that, on the 3rd of March 1944, the administrative office of the OUN(B) in
the East of Ukraine issued an instruction to clear the UPA of unreliable
members, and persons of non-Ukrainian origin. A similar instruction we
can find in the order, issued on 28th April 1945 by V. Sidor (Shelest), the
leader of the UPA unit Zapad (west).258
The above orders were duly executed. The first victims of the Ukrainian
nationalists were former prisoners of war, who had settled in villages. Some
of them were released from the camps in 1941, some had fled from the
prisons or camps in any case, those people could disclose the information
about the system and methods of Bandera units. So the regional leaders
ordered to kill every one of them. The killings were brutal, wrote Aron
Sheer, a historian. In Goschansky area of the Roven region they tortured
and killed about 100 prisoners of war. Bandera people tied stones to the
bodies, some of the people still being alive, and threw them into Goryn
River. Thousands of prisoners were killed soldiers and officers of the Red
Army, among them Ukrainian nationals from the eastern areas.259
Its hard to believe that when the nationalists exterminated their countrymen, only for the suspicion that they might cooperate with the Soviet
authorities in the future, at the same time they would spare much hated
Jews. The directive of the administrative office of the regional OUN(B)
HQ in the West of Ukraine explicitly instructed to clear the UPA of individuals of non-Ukrainian origin. One of miraculously survived escapees
256
Polyaki i ukraintsi mizh dvomya totalitarnymy systemamy, 19421945 (Polish and Ukrainian people between two totalitarian systems, 19421945), p. 330; SSA SSU, stock 71, list 9, file 22, vol. 3, sheet 341.
257
Motyka, G. Ukraiska partzyantka, s. 294295 (With the reference to CSA SBPGU, stock 3833,
list 1, file 57, sheet 6).
258
Vedeneyev, D., Bystrukhin, G. Mech i trizub ( ), p. 288; Kentiy, A. V. Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya v 1944-1945 (The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1941-1945), Kyiv, 1999, p. 91, 167.
259
Shneer, A. Plen: Sovetskiye voyennoplenniye v Germaniyi, 19411945 (Captivity: Soviet prisoners of
war in Germany, 19411945, Moscow; Jerusalem, 2005, p. 204.
93
from the Ghetto gave a straightforward description of what happened to

the Jews serving in the UPA:
After the Kurovitse camp was destroyed and people fled to the
woods, some free Jews got in touch with the Ukrainian underground forces, Bandera units, and started cooperating with them.
This initiative was supported by Bandera people, because they
benefitted from Jewish professionals. Bandera group members offered help to many doctors and technical people to escape from the
Kurovitse camp.
Doctor Staropolsky and doctor Kalfus agreed and joined Bandera group. Staropolsky, an honest and simple man, believed the
Ukrainian nationalists assurance that they would not hurt him. He
stayed with them for a long time, helped the injured and the sick.
One dentist joined doctors Staropolsky and Kalfus. That dentist managed to escape on the day of the big Russian attack on
the 22nd of June 1944 he went to the fields and when a unit of Russian soldiers approached, he held up his hands and went out of
his hiding place. Later he told that before the Russians came, the
nationalists had killed doctors Staropolsky and Kalfus, because
the latter knew too much.260
The memoirs, recorded by S. Redlich and V. Semashko, both are researchers, tell us that Jewish family camps, controlled by the UPA, had
also been destroyed, together with the inhabitants, before the Red Army
troops arrived.261 Gzegocz Motyka, a Polish historian, calculated that the
UPA eliminated between one thousand and two thousand of local Jews,
most of them in Volyn area.262 Keeping in mind that by the time the UPA
started its activity there were just a few Jewish people in the area, who had
escaped from the Ghetto, this figure is substantial.
As we can see, the resolution of the 3rd Emergency Conference of the
OUN(B) on equal rights of all nations living in Ukraine had very little
impact on the process of extermination of Jews by the OUN SS and the
UPA. Despite the above, it may not be treated as pure propaganda. The
260
Yones, E. Die Strasse nach Lemberg: Zwangsarbeit und Widerstnd in Ostgalizein, 19411944, Frankfurt/Main, 1999, s. 111112.
261
Motyka, G. Ukraiska partzyantka, s. 295297.
262
Ibid., s. 297.
94
resolution of the Conference laid foundation to the official changing of

the Ukrainian nationalists programme in terms of the Jewish issue.
Naturally, not all OUN leaders were ready to give up their anti-Semite
attitude. In 1944 Dmitry Dontsov, the leading ideologist of the Ukrainian nationalists, expressed relentless criticism of the new OUN(B) programme, in particular of the new attitude to the Jewish issue. The programme contains no connection with the Ukrainian historical tradition,
social, national or political, he said. I speak not only about the Cossaks
traditions, but also about the traditions of the recent rebel movement of
1917-1922, known for their xenophobia against invaders from the north,
anti-Semitism, religious attitude and tendency for private interests.263 According to Dontsov, it was necessary to note in the OUN programme that
mentality and policy of the Jews around the globe are harmful for the
Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian State. The struggle against Jews is for
the good of the Ukrainian nation and follows its traditions.264
Osip Pozichyanyuk, a young member of the Chief Council of OUN(B),
raised his objections to Dontsovs opinion, and spoke about futility of old
methods for solving the Jewish issue:
After the German experience it is difficult (if not pointless at
all) to go the same way again. Moreover, the Jewish issue does
not exist in Ukraine now What was appropriate for rebel
gang leaders, who could use nothing else but anti-Semitism and
xenophobia, and followed only those patterns because anything
different was beyond their ideological, political and organizational potential. Those ways are not acceptable for us we are the
generation with a task much greater than primitive xenophobia.
So do not drive away from the main road to the sideways of antiSemitism and xenophobia, because Hitler with his whole Reich
broke their legs there. One should be politically illiterate to fail
to understand that in spite of all our traditions in relation to the
Jewish issue we must move away from anti-Semitism today, for
the very same reason why we must be dissociated from any hint of
Hitlerism. Our own people will crucify or expel those who follow
that path, and that too not because they sympathize with Jews.
263
264

Ibid.
95
Our people have suffered from Hitler gangs, the global bearers of
anti-Semitism, a much bigger tragedy than Jews. They will treat
any similar policy as the continuation of what they had once experienced, and those who implement it as Hitler agents. The OUN
programme must contain no anti-Semitism or any other phobia.
Instead, we should acknowledge the rights of national minorities
and emphasize the benefits to those who cooperate and sacrifice
in the struggle for the Ukrainian State.265
The reasoning of Pozichyanyuk was quite cynical but irrefutable. AntiJewish provisions in the OUN(B) programme would make it impossible
to get any support from the west and very much possible to lose the
support of the population of the Western Ukraine, who strongly disapproved of the nationalists. At the same time there was no Jewish issue in
Ukraine the Nazi, with some help from the OUN, managed to solve it.
So why not give up anti-Jewish statements?
Pozichyanyuks attitude was officially accepted by the OUN leaders.
This is confirmed by the order, issued by the HQ of the military district Boog on 5th September 1944. Unlike the directive for propaganda
groups, issued by the General Headquarters of the UPA on 1st November
1943, and the Temporary instruction of 1944, this document contained
no inconsistencies: Jews and other non-Ukrainians in our territory are
considered national minorities.266
They went further than issuing the resolution. The OUN and UPA
leaders were persevering with its implementation and any anti-Jewish
campaigns were strictly prohibited. For example, in 1947 during the preparations of the UPA propaganda raids in Czechoslovakia Vasily Galasa,
the OUN leaders responsible for propaganda in Zakerzonie, emphasized
in his instructions to Vladimir Goshks brigades that killings of Jews were
unacceptable, as well as anti-Semitic propaganda. Under no circumstances is it allowed to kill or hurt a Jew, wrote Galasa. If this subject
comes up in a conversation, you must strongly criticize Hitlers brutality,
and explain that in Ukraine we are struggling for everybodys equal rights
and freedom, including Czech and Slovak Jews. Do not speak about Jews,
unless required.267
265

CSA SBPGU, stock 3833, list 2, file 3, sheet 5 overleaf.; Motyka, G. Ukraiska partzyantka, s. 297.
267
Vyatrovich, V. Reydy UPA terenami Chekhoslovachyny ( ),
266
96
At the same time the OUN(B) attempted to cleanse their image, damaged by the preceding anti-Jewish policy. In 1947 Yaroslav Starukh, the
OUN(B) leader in Zakerzonie, prepared a booklet titled To our brothers Czech and Slovak people. In this booklet he gave a brief description
of history and ideology of the liberation of Ukraine, and wrote about
the attitude of the OUN and UPA towards Jews. We have never issued
or distributed, in Ukraine or Slovakia, any anti-Jewish leaflets, wrote
Starukh. In our political publications, underground newspapers and
proclamations either now or issued during the German occupation you
will not find a single word against Jews. Such accusations are pure fantasy and malarkey. During the German occupation a lot of Jewish people
served in the UPA troops, especially there were many doctors. They found
shelter and protection there, and helped with their knowledge to struggle
against the terror of the German occupants.268
Certainly, it was far from the truth. However, such statements first
shifted from the OUN propaganda materials to memoirs of OUN members, who ended up in the West, then to works of Diaspora historians
and finally to the research works of contemporary historian-revisionists. But here we deal with historiography, not history.
Summary
In the autumn of 1941 the German authorities refused to cooperate
with the OUN(B) and launched extensive repressions against its members. So, despite the intentions of its leaders, the OUN(B) was opposed
to the occupants. However, this change had no impact on the anti-Jewish policy and activities of Bandera people. The OUN(B) new motto was
Viva Independent Ukraine, without Jews, Poles and Germans! Poles go
away to San, Germans to Berlin and Jews to the gallows! The antiJewish position was officially approved during the Second OUN(B) conference in April 1942, at the same time the resolution of the conference
stated it inappropriate to participate in anti-Jewish campaigns.
268
Toronto; Lvov, 2001, p. 172.

Anglomovni vydannya ukrainskogo pidpillya, 1946-1947 (i ii, 19461947,) Toronto, 1988, p. 24; Vyatrovich, V. Reydy UPA terenami Chekhoslovachyny (
), p. 55.
97
By the autumn of 1942 OUN(B) people started uniting spontaneously into armed groups to struggle against the German occupation. At
the same time Soviet guerilla troops entered the Western Ukraine and
the German troops got stuck near Stalingrad. That was the time when
the First Military Conference of the OUN(B) was arranged in October
1942, where the decision was taken to obtain support from the USA and
Great Britain. In connection to the above decision the OUN(B) anti-Jewish programme was mitigated: they planned to deport the Jewish people
from the Ukrainian territory. At the same time the plan included killing
prisoners of war, political leaders and Jewish members of the army. This
looked very much like the pre-war Nazi plans.
The decisions remained on paper. In the spring of 1943 the OUN(B)
military units and units of the Ukrainian police formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which started vast ethnic cleansing in the Volyn area. The
main victims were Polish people, and together with them many Jews were
killed, who tried to hide from the Nazi. The OUN Security Service also
contributed to the persecution of Jews.
In August 1943 the Third Emergency Conference of the OUN(B) accepted the thesis of equal rights for people of all nationalities, residing in
Ukraine, including Jews. It was a purely propaganda movement, the thesis
was widely used by the OUN(B) and was certainly far from the real state
of affairs. In fact they stopped persecuting only those Jews who served in
the UPA (doctors and other professionals). Those Jews, who had escaped
from Ghetto to the woods, as well as Polish people, were exterminated
as before. The UPA kept accepting Jews into, but only useful specialists
were left alive, the rest were secretly eliminated by the OUN SS, according
to the order of the OUN(B) leadership. Just before the Red Army entered
the Western Ukraine the OUN SS killed the Jews who served as professionals in the UPA, as well as former Soviet prisoners of war and Ukrainians from the west. At the same time the UPA destroyed Jewish family
camps and killed all inhabitants.
The OUN leadership gave up anti-Jewish positions only in 1944.
The reasons for that were purely practical: anti-Jewish provisions in the
OUN(B) programme would make it impossible to get any support from
the west and very much possible to lose the support of the population
of the Western Ukraine, who strongly disapproved of the nationalists. At
the same time, the Jewish issue in Ukraine ceased to exist, it was finally
solved during the Nazi occupation.
98
Later on the OUN(B) attempted to clear their image, damaged by

the preceding anti-Jewish policy, and was relatively successful in that. The
statements that the OUN had never arranged any anti-Jewish campaigns
first shifted from the OUN propaganda materials to memoirs of OUN
members, who ended up in the west, then to works of Diaspora historians and finally to the research works of contemporary historian-revisionists.
CONCLUSION
100
Alexander DyukovMinor enemyConclusion
CONCLUSION
The attitude of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army to Jewish people is one of the most controversial problems in the OUN and UPA historiography. Today the researches
have divided into two opposite groups. One group believes that the OUN
and UPA took an active part in extermination of Jews, and the other group
denies this. Both parties accuse each other of political intentions and usage of propaganda tools, and at times these accusations are justified.
Despite the fact that the OUN and UPA attitude towards Jewish people was often touched upon by research workers, serious scientific studies
of the subject first appeared only in the latter half of the 90s. The scientists studied key aspects of this problem. M. Gon provided the description of pre-war relationship between Ukrainian and Jewish people. Such
researches as Hans Heer, M. Carynnik, B. Ball and A. Kruglov studied
the key anti-Jewish campaigns, conducted in the beginning of July 1941,
and the OUNs contribution. There were very heated discussions on the
participation of the Nachtigall squadron and the Bukovinsky Kuren in
the killings of Jewish people. F. Levitas, Zh. Kovba, I. Altman, K. Berkhoff,
M. Carynnik and I. Himka did a thorough research of the political and
ideological directives of the OUN on the Jewish issue, and revealed the
clear anti-Semitic trend. I. Himka and T. Kurilo gave a brief but quite informative summary of the publications, related to the Jewish issue in the
official and semi-official OUN publications in the end of twenties and beginning o thirties. The issue of Jewish people serving in UPA has not become a subject for serious scientific study, though the public interest to this
problem is quite high. One of the few historians, who touched upon this
issue, was G. Motyka he described the extermination of Jewish people
serving in UPA. A great number of documents on the OUN and UPA history were introduced as sources of scientific information, and they made
it possible to give an objective and thorough description of the OUN and
UPA attitude towards the Jewish people. Despite all the above mentioned
facts, Ukrainian historians-revisionists (V. Vyatrovich, A. Ischenko et al),
currently enjoying serious support from the government, are trying to
impose the false view on the public that the OUN and UPA had nothing
in common with extermination of Jewish people.
According to the documents, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, founded in 1929, initially had no clear view on the Jewish issue. The
101
influence of anti-Jewish stereotypes was very strong among Ukrainian nationalists. However, the working materials of the first Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which took place in the beginning on 1929, contain no
anti-Semitic statements. The issue of the attitude and policy towards national minorities was not given due consideration during the Congress.
For quite a long time OUN ideologists and propagandists only repeated anti-Semitic statements of Moscow-Jewish reign in the Soviet
Ukraine and Jewish predominance in the economy. Building of the nation, the official OUN journal, described Jews as a national group, hostile
to Ukrainians and having tight connections with occupational Soviet
authorities. Some time later anti-Semitism became one of the OUN ideological foundation principles. The first proof of that was Milyanichs article
Jews, Zionism and Ukraine, where for the first time in OUN official publication the requirement to solve the Jewish issue was announced. The
author gave no direct answer to the questions of how the Jewish issue
should be solved, but stated that in the course of establishing Independent
that, interfere in the process of formation of the new State.
it possible to give up the old anti-Semitic stereotypes. In response to Milyanichs article, one of the chief ideologists of the organization, Nikolay
Stsiborsky, published his article Ukrainian nationalism and Jews, which
said that the Jewish people should have the same rights as all other nationalities, as well as the opportunity to take an active part in all areas of social,
economic and cultural life in the new Ukrainian State. The second publication was an exception to the general rule. Already in the following issue
of Building up the nation they started publishing the series of articles related to the Jewish issue, written by Alexander Mitsyuk, the Professor of
Ukrainian Liberal University in Prague. Mitsyuks articles had been published during three years almost in every issue of the journal, and later on
were published as a separate book titled Ruralization of Jews in general
economic conditions. The articles of Mitsyuk in Building up the nation
gave scientific grounds for the appeal to struggle against Jews, and were
of course very appreciated by the OUN activists. The materials published
in OUN official press enforced those anti-Semitic trends.
Practical consequences of anti-Jewish propaganda of Ukrainian nationalists emerged very soon: in the middle of 30s OUN members conducted wide scale campaigns of boycotting shops run by Jewish people,
102
set fire to their houses, shops and storehouses. Escalation of hatred towards Jews further promoted the requirement to solve the Jewish issue in the OUN ideology. In 1938 a prominent OUN member V. Martinets in his article analyzed the Jewish issue from the angle of racial
theory. The conclusion was as expected: Jews were to be fought against
as enemies, isolated and sent away from Ukraine altogether. Martinets
suggestion sounded very similar to anti-Jewish policy conducted in the
Nazi Germany.
In the beginning of the war against Poland the Nazi leadership was
planning to use troops consisting of Ukrainian nationalists to exterminate
Jews and Polish intelligentsia, but the sudden termination of combat operation prevented the implementation of this plan. Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalists, residing on the Polish territory occupied by the Nazi,
received a number of benefits. For instance, they were allowed to receive
houses and factories, taken away from Jews. This approach contributed to
a deeper radicalization of the OUN attitude towards Jewish people.
This change of attitude is clearly seen when comparing the documents related to OUN arrangements of anti-Soviet revolts in the Western
Ukraine. In the spring of 1940, one of the OUN leaders Victor Kurmanovich prepared the Integrated general plan of OUN rebel headquarters.
The plan included instructions for shooting of the enemy in the beginning of war. However, it did not specify who the enemies are. Local OUN
leaders decided that together with representatives of the Soviet system
they should exterminate hostile national minorities, including, by all appearance, Jewish people.
This addition was taken into account and further developed in the directive The OUN struggle and activity during the war, prepared in May
1941 by OUN(B) members. According to this document, after Germany
attacks the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian nationalists were to start eliminating representatives of the Soviet authorities, Polish activists and Jews.
Jewish people were to be exterminated both individually and as a national
group. After retreat of the Soviet Army, the police forces, set up by the
Ukrainian nationalists, were to arrest the remaining representatives of the
Soviet authorities, Polish activists, soldiers of the Red Army taken as prisoners of war and Jews. Poles, Jews and Russians, who were still free, were
to have limited rights, not allowed to hold any administrative posts. After
the war Polish and Russian people were to be assimilated, and Jews sent
out of the country or isolated. It is worth mentioning that the OUN(B)
103
in its official instructions prescribed more severe measures against Jews

than against Poles. However illogical it may seem, this fact shows the great
significance of the anti-Semitic component in the OUN ideology.
The OUN(M) position with respect to the Jewish issue was much
less clear that that of Bandera faction. However, their soldiers also had
orders to exterminate Jews during the war. It is also known, that Melnik
supporters planned to limit Jews rights in the future Ukrainian State, and
the publication Krakow News, supervised by Melnik supporters of the
Ukrainian Central Committee, contained appeals for vengeance and punishment of Jews.
It is easy to see that the OUN anti-Semitic attitude developed exactly
as in Nazi Germany: from common anti-Semitism to struggle against
Jewish trade and finally extermination of Jewish people. By the summer
of 1941, OUN(B) views on the ways with the Jewish issue were identical
to those of the Nazi. At the same time, Jewish people were not the main
enemy for Bandera people. Their arch enemies remained Moscow and
Poles.
German attack of the Soviet Union let both OUN factions start implementation of their plans on eliminating the undesired elements, including the Jewish people. In addition to pre-war instructions and orders, the
OUN(B) regional leadership issued an order on collective responsibility
(familial and national) for all faults against the Ukrainian State, Ukrainian Army and the OUN, thus making any Polish or Jewish person a legal victim for persecution, irrespective of their age or sex. Propaganda of
both OUN factions called to exterminate enemies communists, Jews
and Poles.
The direct consequences of the above were anti-Jewish campaigns
in the summer of 1941. Jews were killed by the OUN soldiers and the
Ukrainian police both in rural areas and big cities. The largest campaigns on extermination of Jews took place in Lvov and Zlochew, in the
course of their action the nationalists cooperated with units of Einsatzgrupp B and soldiers of SS division Viking. At the same time Jewish
and Polish people in Lvov, who were on the black lists, were also eliminated by some soldiers of the Ukrainian Nachtigall squadron.
Killing of Jewish people by the Ukrainian nationalist were violent and
merciless. In full accordance with the order of the OUN(B) regional leadership on collective responsibility, not merely Jewish men fell victims to
the Ukrainian nationalists violence, but also women and children. There
104
were incidents when German soldiers stopped the OUNs massacres and
violence against Jewish people.
Despite the failure to proclaim the Independent Ukraine in the
summer of 1941, the OUN(B) leaders continued supporting the occupants, in particular vis--vis the Jewish issue. The Ukrainian police,
controlled by the nationalists, actively participated in the Nazis antiJewish campaigns. Both OUN factions conducted anti-Jewish and antiPolish propaganda.
Those Jews, who managed to stay alive, were limited in rights and
forced to wear arm bands with the image of the Star of Judah and were
victims of blackmail and robberies, carried out by the OUN people. The
Ukrainian nationalists tried to introduce similar measures against the
Poles, but this resulted in counteraction by the occupying authorities.
In the autumn of 1941 the German authorities refused to cooperate
with the OUN(B) and launched extensive repressions against its members. So, despite the intentions of its leaders, the OUN(B) was opposed
to the occupants. However, this change had no impact on the anti-Jewish policy and activities of Bandera people. The OUN(B) new motto was
Viva Independent Ukraine, without Jews, Poles and Germans! Poles go
away to San, Germans to Berlin and Jews to the gallows! The antiJewish position was officially approved during the Second OUN(B) conference in April 1942, at the same time the resolution of the conference
stated it inappropriate to participate in anti-Jewish campaigns.
By the autumn of 1942 OUN(B) people started uniting spontaneously into armed groups to struggle against the German occupation. At
the same time Soviet guerilla troops entered the Western Ukraine and
the German troops got stuck near Stalingrad. That was the time when
the First Military Conference of the OUN(B) was arranged in October
1942, where the decision was taken to obtain support from the USA and
Great Britain. In connection to the above decision the OUN(B) anti-Jewish programme was mitigated: they planned to deport the Jewish people
from the Ukrainian territory. At the same time the plan included killing
prisoners of war, political leaders and Jewish members of the army. This
looked very much like the pre-war Nazi plans.
The decisions remained on paper. In the spring of 1943 the OUN(B)
military units and units of the Ukrainian police formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which started vast ethnic cleansing in the Volyn area. The
main victims were Polish people, and together with them many Jews were
105
killed, who tried to hide from the Nazi. The OUN Security Service also
contributed to the persecution of Jews.
In August 1943 the Third Emergency Conference of the OUN(B) accepted the thesis of equal rights for people of all nationalities, residing in
Ukraine, including Jews. It was a purely propaganda movement, the thesis
was widely used by the OUN(B) and was certainly far from the real state
of affairs. In fact they stopped persecuting only those Jews who served in
the UPA (doctors and other professionals). Those Jews, who had escaped
from Ghetto to the woods, as well as Polish people, were exterminated
as before. The UPA kept accepting Jews into, but only useful specialists
were left alive, the rest were secretly eliminated by the OUN SS, according
to the order of the OUN(B) leadership. Just before the Red Army entered
the Western Ukraine the OUN SS killed the Jews who served as professionals in the UPA, as well as former Soviet prisoners of war and Ukrainians from the west. At the same time the UPA destroyed Jewish family
camps and killed all inhabitants.
As we see, the external circumstances of the time forced the Ukrainian
nationalists introduce some changes in their anti-Jewish policy. The brutal
persecution, characteristic for the first years of the war was replaced in the
end of summer 1943 by the official acceptance of their rights, equal with
the other nationalities, and secret extermination of the Jews by the OUN
Security Service. However, in fact these were only cosmetic repairs the
extermination went on, in one way or the other.
The OUN leadership gave up anti-Jewish positions only in 1944.
The reasons for that were purely practical: anti-Jewish provisions in the
OUN(B) programme would make it impossible to get any support from
the west and very much possible to lose the support of the population
of the Western Ukraine, who strongly disapproved of the nationalists. At
the same time, the Jewish issue in Ukraine ceased to exist, it was finally
solved during the Nazi occupation.
Later on the OUN(B) attempted to clear their image, damaged by
the preceding anti-Jewish policy, and was relatively successful in that.
The statements that the OUN had never arranged any anti-Jewish campaigns first shifted from the OUN propaganda materials to memoirs of
OUN members, who ended up in the West, then to works of Diaspora
historians and finally to the research works of contemporary historian-revisionists. However, such statements do not reflect the real state
of affairs.
106
It is impossible to tell the exact number of Jewish people, killed by the

OUN and UPA units. There is only one figure in historiography: according to Aaron Weiss, an Israeli researcher, the OUN people killed about 28
thousand of Jews in the Western Ukraine.269 It remains unknown whether
this number reflects the reality.
In conclusion we should note the characteristic feature of the holocaust in OUN style: Jewish people were neither main nor only victims
of the Ukrainian nationalists. Together with Jews, the OUN and UPA
soldiers killed Polish people and those Ukrainians, who supported the
Soviet authorities, and there were much more victims among the latter.
The massacre of outsiders and betrayers was the basic characteristic
of the radical Ukrainian nationalism. Therefore, the attempts to proclaim
soldiers of the OUN and UPA the national heroes of the contemporary
Ukraine are the cause of grave concern. Just as the pertinacious efforts of
the authorities to re-write the World War II history.
269
Weiss, . The attitude of some, p. 106.
APPENDIX
Appendix I
List of the basic OUN documents,
related to the Jewish issue
Appendix II
New archive documents
on the OUN connection
with the Nazi secret Service
Appendix III
on the crimes of the OUN and UPA
108
Alexander DyukovMinor enemyAppendix
Appendix I
List of the basic OUN documents,
related to the Jewish issue
The resolution of the OUN(B)s II Great Congress, April 1941. Published:
i i, i
i i 19291955 . . ., 1955.
P. 24 47; . 30 1941:
i i i ii. Lvov, Kyiv, 2001. P. 515;
The OUN in 1941. Documents: Kyiv, 2006. Part 1. P. 3550.
Directive The OUN struggle and activity during the war, May 1941.
CSA SBPGU. Stock 3833. List 2. File 1. Sheet 1589. Published:
The OUN in 1941: Documents, Kyiv, 2006. Part 1. P. 65176.
Order of the regional OUN(B) office on the Ukrainian military forces
[issued after 22nd June 1941]. CSA SBPGU. Stock 3833. List 1.
File 41. Sheet 89. Published: The OUN in 1941: Documents,
Kyiv, 2006. Part 1. P. 195198.
Draft Governing Law (Constitution) of the Ukrainian State, developed
by the OUN(M) [issued after 22nd June 1941]. CSA SBPGU.
Stock 3833. List 1. File 7. Sheet 1 overleaf 9 overleaf. Published:
Report of Y. Stetsko to the leader of the OUN(B) S. Bandera on the situation in Krakowets-Yavorov area, 25th June 1941. CSA SBPGU.
Stock 3833. List 1. File 12. Sheet 10. Published:
. 30 1941: i i
i ii. Lvov, Kyiv, 2001. P. 7778.
OUN(B) address to the Ukrainian to rural dwellers, [issued after 31st
June 1941]. CSA POU. Stock 1. List. 23. File 931. Sheet 121121
overleaf. Published: The OUN in 1941: Documents, Kyiv, 2006.
Part 1. P. 247248.
109
Address of the OUN(B) regional leadership to Ukrainian people, 1st July 1941. CSA SBPGU. Stock 3833. List. 1. File 63.
Sheet 12; File 42. Sheet 35; List. 2. File 18. Sheet 87. Published: . 30 1941:
i i i ii. Lvov, Kyiv, 2001. P. 129; The
OUN in 1941: Documents, Kyiv, 2006. Part 1. P. 261; Part 2.
P. 576.
OUN(M) address to the Ukrainian people, 5th July 1941. CSA SBPGU.
Stock 3833. List 1. File 74. Sheet 24. Published:
. 30 1941: i i
i ii. Lvov, Kyiv, 2001. P. 150151.
OUN(M) address to the Ukrainian youth, July 1941. CSA POU. Stock 57.
List 4. File 370. Sheet 18.
Y. Stetsko autobiography, July 1941. CSA SBPGU. Stock 3833. List
3. File 7. Sheet 16. Published: Berkhoff K. C., Carynnyk M.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Yaroslav Stetskos 1941 Zhyttiepis //
Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 1999, no. 34. P. 158163.
Short-hand notes of the OUN conference in Lvov, 1819 July 1941.
CSA SBPGU. Stock 3833. List 1. File 9. Sheet 112. Published: . 30
1941: i i i ii. Lvov, Kyiv, 2001. P.
181191; The OUN in 1941: Documents, Kyiv, 2006. Part 1.
P. 337350.
Message of the OUN(B) Main propaganda center to the OUN Security
Service, 28th July 1941. CSA SBPGU. Stock 3833. List 1. File 23.
Sheet 51. Published: The OUN in 1941: Documents, Kyiv, 2006.
Part 2. P. 389.
OUN(B) regional leadership regulations on organizational activity
of the local Ukrainian nationalist offices, August 1941. CSA
SBPGU. Stock 3833. List 1. File 46. Sheet 5051. Published:
The OUN in 1941: Documents, Kyiv, 2006. Part 2. P. 464466
110
Directive 6 of OUN(B) regional leader I. Klimov, August 1941. CSA

SBPGU. Stock 3833. List 1. File 46. Sheet 3637. Published:
Resolution of the II OUN(B) Conference, April 1942. CSA POU. Stock
63. List. 1. File 7. Sheet 15. Published: The OUN in 1942: Documents, Kyiv, 2006. P. 7785.
Address of the OUN(B) on the day of one year anniversary of the Independent Ukrainian State proclamation, 30th June 1942. CSA
SBPGU. Stock 3833. List 1. File 63. Sheet 1616 overleaf. Published: The OUN in 1942: Documents, Kyiv, 2006. P. 99104.
Resolution of the 1st OUN(B) Military Conferenc, October 1942. Presented: SA SSU. Stock 13. File 372, vol. 5. Sheet 2138, Publihed, abbreviated: Polish and Ukrainian people between two totalitarian
systems, 19421945. Warsaw, Kyiv, 2005. Part 1. P. 204212.
OUN Security Service tasks, May 1943. Presented: SA SSU. Stock 13.
File 372, vol. 20. Sheet 5663, Published: Polish and Ukrainian
people between two totalitarian systems, 19421945. Warsaw,
Kyiv, 2005. Part 1. P. 448450.
The resolution of the Third Emergency Conference of the OUN(B), August 1943. Published: i i,
i i i 19291955 .
1955. P. 112.
Directives of the UPA HQ for propaganda services, 1st November 1943.
Extract: Kirichuk Y. i 40
50 i i. Lvov, 2003. P. 145.
OUN Security Service order on secret elimination of Jews, autumn 1943.
Presented: CSA POU. Stock 1. List. 22. File 75. Sheet 9495, Published: i ii ii:
Iii (), i i,
-, -, 19431959, Kyiv, Toronto, 2002,
vol. 1. P. 126.
111
Regulatory provisions of the OUN(B) leadership, 13th March 1944.

SA SSU. Stock 71. List 9. File 22, vol. 3. Sheet 341 Polish and
Ukrainian people between two totalitarian systems, 19421945.
Warsaw, Kyiv, 2005. Part 1. P. 330.
The Order of the UPA HQ, 5th September 1944. CSA SBPGU. Stock 3833.
List. 2. File 3. Sheet 5 overleaf.
112
Appendix II
on the OUN connection with the Nazi secret Service
1. The statement of Feldwebel Alfons Paulus

on the activity of Abwehr division in Krakow,
2429 September 1945.
AUTOGRAPHIC STATEMENT
of the prisoner of war Feldwebel of the German Army
PAULUS Alfons
on Abwehr division activity in Krakow.
Date 24-29 September 1945
I, Alfons Paulus, was born on 15th June 1913 in Neukirchen, Trier area.
In 1933 I joined the military service, for the term of 12 years. After general
duties in 21st and 42nd infantry schools I was shifted in 1936 to the Administration of the enlistment area Marktredwitz, and in November 1933 to
the Administration of the enlistment area Krummauna Moldaw, where I
served as clerk and accountant until January 1940.
With the assistance of Mr TANZER, a member of Abwehr division in
Sudeten region, the administration Abwehr II of the General Headquarters of Germany Armed forces arranged my transfer to Brandenburg special regiment, where I served as a clerk in the HQ from January
1940 till the end of April 1941.
In May 1941 I was transferred to Abwehr division in Krakow, subgroup II (subversive actions, rebellions, terror).
The head of Abwehr division in Krakow at that time was Lt Colonel
WIESER, a commissioned officer. Before the Abwehr division in Krakow
was set up, he used to be in charge of an Abwehr sub-group in Breslau
113
town. In August 1941 he was appointed the head of Abwehr unit-202,

attached to the southern force group, and then the head of Abwehr division in Breslau. Of late WIESER was the head of Abwehr division of XVII
military district in Vienna. His family resides in Breslau. WIESER is about
48 years old, thin, chestnut-haired, height 185 cm.
Abwehr division in Krakow subordinated Abwehr divisions in Warsaw, Lublin and later in Lvov. The area of its activity was the Generalgouvernement and the Western Ukraine.
At that time our division had the listed tasks:
1) Reconnaissance in the Russian districts of the Western Ukraine;
2) Arranging and conducting subversive operations and sabotage at
the rear of the Russian troops;
3) Inspection of military plants and factories in the Generalgouvernement, struggle with the Polish rebel movement, connected with
the Russians, using the statements of the prisoners of war and using the
Ukrainian national movement to the benefit of Germany.
Upon arrival to Abwehr division, I was enrolled in sub-group II. The
tasks of that group were:
1) to make preparations for the tasks implemented by people from the
Western Ukraine;
2) to exploit Melnik and Bandera people;
3) to conduct degenerative propaganda in the rear of the Russian
front;
4) to classify the statements of Russian captives about the climate in
the Soviet Union, the state of roads and military installations;
5) to arrange security service in military plants and factories of the
Generalgouvernement;
6) to arrange security service in the oil regions in Borislau and Stryi;
7) to infiltrate the Russian territory, arrange rebels among the Ukrainian population;
8) to exploit the Ukrainian church for the benefit of Germany.
I reported to Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN, the head of sub-group II.
He was a bank specialist by profession; in 1937 he joined the Army as
a Junior Officer in the Abwehr division in Breslau. In sub-group II he was
head of the group of agents, who fought against Poles, later he was shifted
to Krakow to take charge of sub-group II of the Krakow Abwehr division,
and after it was closed down, he was appointed head of the sub-group II
in Abwehr division 202-B.
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After division 202-B was attached to the HQ of the southern force

group, EIKERN was appointed head of Abwehr regiment Kurfurst in
Brandenburg, and then took over Stolze and became the leader of Ost
unit of Abwehr II administration in the HQ of the German military forces
in Berlin.
EIKERN appointed me as head of the financial unit of sub-group II
and I was in change of Abwehr treasury. The financial connections with
Melnik and Bandera people were going through me. I went to inspect military training camps several times. After ERNST zu EIKERN was shifted
to Abwehr division 202-B, I had to discharge sub-groups in Krakow, Lublin and Lvov.
While working there I got to know the following about Abwehr activity: the main task in Krakow was to exploit Melnik and Bandera people in
our struggle against Russia.
The Bandera group was named so after its leader. Their goal was to establish Independent Western Ukraine, and for that they cooperated with
German troops. The communication went through Abwehr administrative office II and Abwehr division in Krakow, the latter was to exploit Bandera people for its tasks, as ordered by the general HQ.
BANDERA himself was in Berlin in the General HQ. I saw him once,
in a meeting in Krakow, and accompanied him during his transfer to Berlin, where I handed him over to a Colonel in Ost unit of Abwehr II, in
August 1941.
Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN told me later that BANDERA had
been arrested by SD, then released and sent to OKW for further cooperation.
Together with BANDERA I had brought to Berlin his Deputy Stetsko
too.
My first encounter with Bandera group occurred during my first
month of service in Krakow. Some FABER was sent to me to collect the
monthly allowance for Bandera group. To find out more details I turned
to Lt Colonel EIKERN and asked who those people were and what connection they had with Abwehr. I was told that Bandera group worked for
Abwehr, the group provided their people for certain Abwehr tasks in the
Russian territory (the Western Ukraine) and for security service in the
military plants of the Generalgouvernement. The money was used for the
needs of the group, to provide for the families of the people who are in
military training camps etc.
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FABER was the connection between Bandera people and Abwehr division. The monthly amount was equal to 5000 Ruble, 10000 Zloty 3000
Pengo, 4000 Crones.
FABER used to visit me on other occasions, for example if he needed
to send one of his people to hospital etc.
During the working hours we met in Abwehr office, otherwise in a
safe house in Serena, Farm 7, the apartment rented by Dr ENDERS (the
cover name Lt Colonel EIKERN used when communicating with Bandera people).
FABER had a security pass to enter Abwehr office, the same pass that
he also used to get German ration cards.
FABER was about 34 years old, height 172 cm, blonde, with oval face
and dark skin, thin, fluent in German. Faber was the cover name; the real
name is unknown to me.
BANDERA was about 30 years old, height 175 cm, fair haired, sturdy,
nose a bit curved. He used to stay with FABER in Krakow.
FABER gathered Ukrainians and sent them to training camps in Krinica, Dukla, Barvinsk and Kamenec. The camps were disguised as labour
duty camps, and for conspiracy from the Polish people the inhabitants
of those camps were often taken to lay roads, uproot trees and do other
jobs.
The head of all training camps was Oberleutnant ARENDT, who was
later replaced by Captain WOLF and Lieutenant EGGERS. Oberleutnant
ARENDT was subsequently transferred to Brandenburg regiment.
Brandenburg training regiment was training the coaches for training
camps. Those were mostly people from former Polish Upper Schlesia,
who spoke Ukrainian or Polish.
There were 120-150 Ukrainians in the training camp in Krinica. The
head of the camp was sonderFuhrer BREUER, a resident of Breslau, where
he taught at the local school of commerce. Before the war broke out,
BREUER used to work in Abwehr division sub-group II in Breslau. After
the camp in Krinica was closed down, Lt Colonel EIKERN sent him to
Abwehr division 202-B, and then BREUER became the head of Abwehr
division in the southern district of the Eastern front. His subordinates
were Unteroffizier Gergard FOK and Gefreite MASLOVSKY.
The biggest training camp was located in a Dukla estate. The head of the
camp was Feldwebel FALBERG, with his subordinates Gefreite ARENDT,
Unteroffizier UNTERSHUTZ, me and one more Gefreite. There were 200
116
to 300 trainees in the camp. The camp in Kamenec was for 100-150 people
and Unteroffizieren JAROSH were in charge of it.
The smallest camp was in Barvinsk, its head being Unteroffizier
KIRCHNER. It had 100150 trainees. Bandera people were sent to camps
in Dukla, Kamenec and Barvinsk, Melnik people were sent to the camp
in Krinica.
The people in the camps underwent infantry training. They were sent
back to their homes and professional vocations after completion. Unmarried men were sent to security service of military installations of the Generalgouvernement, which were attached to Abwehr.
A special training was arranged for Ukrainians from the west of the
country, the territory occupied by Russians. The training lasted four
weeks and took place in Alentzei (Brandenburg). After completion they
were given special assignments like border infiltration etc. If they received
radio equipment, they had to complete another special training course on
radio equipment in Abwehr sub-group 1. N. Eger, Durr and FLEISCHER,
residents of the Abwehr division, were responsible for acquiring the information and conducting operations on border in filtration.
The spots to cross the border line were in Slovakia and Hungary. When
the war against Russia broke out, Bandera people from the training camps
were sent to Neuhammer (Sagan) and there were attached to Brandenburg
regiment. Thus two more units were formed: Nachtigall and Miner
(Bergman), headed by Oberleutnanten GORTZNER and OBERLANDER.
Both units suffered bad losses during the battle at Vinnitsa, hence were
called back from the front and discharged.
When German troops entered Lvov, Bandera group took the opportunity and proclaimed the Independent Western Ukraine, and announced
STEPAN BANDERA its leader. STETSKO was appointed the president of
the new state. Both BANDERA and STETSKO were present there. Abwehr was represented by Lt Colonel EIKERN and his colleague, Professor
Dr KOCH, a native of Galicia, who spoke Ukrainian fluently. In the end
of the meeting Dr KOCH made a speech in Ukrainian. All this happened
without the Generalgouvernement administration knowing. Later came
the order from the Generalgouvernement administration to arrest STETSKO and BANDERA, and Lt Colonel EIKERN and professor KOCH received an admonition, which was also sent to OKW.
BANDERA and STETSKO were delivered to Abwehr office in Krakow,
and from there I convoyed them to Berlin.
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Lt Colonel EIKERN and his deputy Captain LAZAREK were put

in charge of exploiting the remaining Bandera people. They conducted
negotiations with Bandera group representatives in the safe house or in
Abwehr office. They discussed the places and methods for Bandera people
to accomplish the tasks from Abwehr. At such meetings FABER handed
them over the lists of people, included in the groups to be sent to Russian
territories.
There were three more people dealing with the tasks where Bandera
people were involved. They were in touch with Lt Colonel EIKERN. Their
role was to maintain connection with certain groups of Bandera people
and select spots to conduct transfer of people.
The residents were:
1. SALLABA, cover name Jager (yager), about 33 years old, blonde,
grey eyes, long narrow face, thin, height 172 cm.
SALLABA was born in Egendorf, his wife resided there. By the time I
arrived to Krakow, he was working as a resident. Once a month he visited
Abwehr office to submit reports and collect money. In urgent cases he was
called up to office by phone.
He received 600 Zloty per month, and additional 100 Zloty for every highly valuable report. SALLABA lived in the suburbs in the area of
Komonoz and used the nom de guerre of being an engineer. He was responsible for transfers of people over the border and maintaining connection with them. During the war against Russia he moved to serve in
the Brandenburg training regiment. Later on Abwehr sent him to serve in
the Crimea. From there, supervised by Oberfeldwebel Herman, he, several
people from Brandenburg regiment and Caucasian agents were sent on
an assignment to the rear of the enemy front, to Tiflis. None of them returned from that assignment.
As said above, SALLABA was responsible for transfers of people they
were Bandera people, sent to the territories occupied by Russians. The
agents were mostly transferred via Slovakia or Hungary. I got this information from Captain LAZAREK, he was a Junior Officer of sub-group II
in Krakow, often visited SALLABA and was on duty at the border to receive the information of transfers completion. The transfer of agents was
conducted on a regular basis from May 1941 till July 1942.
2. NOGLINSKY, cover name DIER. He worked as a resident when
I came to Krakow. Fraulein MEZER, a member of sub-group II in Krakow, who used to work as a typist for Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN in
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Abwehr division in Breslau, told me that NOGLINSKY had worked as an

Abwehr agent before the campaign in Poland. NOGLINSKY resided in
Katovice and worked in a firm called Rooh-A. G. Several other agents
were employed by that firm; among them was the director of the branch of
this firm in Krakow (Adolf Hitler-platz). In Katovice NOGLINKSY lived
with his sister, people called him Booby. He was single, 32 years old,
blonde wavy hair, round face, stubby figure, height 172 cm. He had the
same responsibilities as SALLABA. He also received 600 zloty per month,
and sometimes extra payment for some reports. Later on NOGLINSKY
joined Brandenburg training regiment.
During my service in Abwehr division in Krakow, I went to Katovice once to buy some items for agents (razors, shaving brushes, mirrors,
pocket knives etc). NOGLINSKY advised me to go and meet his sister,
who had some contacts among the shop keepers in Katovice and could
assist me. His sister lived in the suburbs of Katovice, to the direction of
Krakow, her address is available in Rooh-A. G. (the firm where NOGLINKSY worked). Her address is known to Fraulein ZAZHETSKAYA,
the secretary of Lt Colonel WIESER in Krakow, who lived in Breslau with
her parents).
3. FLEISCHER (cover name unknown) was a member of Brandenburg training regiment before joining Abwehr division in Krakow. He
worked as an agent for SALLABA, received assignments from him and
earned 300 zloty per month.
FLEISCHER was born in Rybnik area (upper Silesia) and according to
Fraulein MEZER he had worked as an Abwehr agent in Breslau before the
campaign in Poland.
Fraulein MEZER was in change of agents personal files; therefore she
had detailed information about them. Fraulein MEZER lived with her
parents in Sibillenort, near Breslau. After sub-group II in Krakow was discharged, she worked as a typist in Abwehr II, unit Ost in Berlin.
Having finished his activity in Krakow, FLEISCHER joined Brandenburg regiment.
The meetings with those agents took place in Abwehr office or the
safe house. Abwehr was located in the administrative building at Vokzalnaya street. The safe house was located at Sereno Fena street bld. 7,
second floor. The building belonged to the firm Frank A. G. engaged
in coffee business. The apartment was rented by Dr Enders, the phone
was registered in his name as well. The lower floor was occupied by the
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manager of the building with his family, a Polish national. I used to stay
in the safe house and wear civilian clothes. Agents on temporary assignment in Krakow stayed in this apartment as well. The place was looked
after by a Ukrainian lady from Melnik group, named Anna, she lived at
Grune Gasse, near the Aid to Ukrainians Committee, and she earned
100 Zloty for the housekeeping job. The apartment was rented for 180
zloty, the payment was sent directly to the bank account of the firm. After
sub-group II was discharged, the safe house was passed over to sub-group
III. Major von KOVAL, the leader of sub-group III, used this apartment
in his work as well.
After leaving Krakow I have not heard anything else about Bandera
group. In the summer of 1944 Major DEDEKIND of the second army
informed Abwehr unit 205 that in the area of corps XX disposition some
members of Taras Bulba group would cross the front line. According
to the statements of those people their group suffered persecution from
NKVD, lost many members, had no ammunition or food and had asked
Germans for help.
At that time I served in Abwehr unit 205, located in Fianovici, 12 km
to the west of Drogichin. Major DEDEKIND ordered unit 205 to transfer
several agents to Taras Bulba group across Pripyat river (about 30 km to
the south of Drogichin) together with those who escaped from the group,
and verify the statements on the spot. Lieutenant LAUER, a junior officer
of Abwehr unit 205, myself and 8 other agents went to corps XX to transfer the people. However, this was not implemented, because there came a
report that in 1-2 days the rest of Taras Bulba group will be joining the
German side.
After that unit 205 was ordered to gather all border crossers, Lieutenant HASELMAN was in charge of this task (a junior officer of unit 205).
He gathered all border crossers from that group in one village near Fianovici. I went there one or two times, brought Lt HASELMAN the uniform
I received from the army depot in Brest-Litovsk. There were about 120
border crossers with HASELMAN, from him I got to know that Taras
Bulba group belonged to the Bandera movement.
HASELMAN organised new groups of those people, conducted the
election of new leaders, and taught them how to use German weapons.
They arranged secret depots with food and ammunition in the woods to
the south of Drogichin, between Pripyat river and the channel. During
the attack of the Red Army the group stayed on the free territory, in the
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swampy and woody areas, to the west from the depots of ammunition and
food, to the east from Malorita village. I learnt this from HASELAMAN,
who conducted this operation.
There existed another Ukrainian nationalist movement in Krakow,
when I worked in Abwehr there. It was the Melnik group and Abwehr exploited them too. Its members were mainly emigrants, who fled to Poland
after Russians came, their HQ was located in Krakow at Grune Gasse 12.
For conspiracy the group used the name Aid to Ukrainians Committee.
Most of its members were intelligentsia from the Western Ukraine, they had
connections with emigrants in Prague, Vienna and Berlin. Once I went to
Prague to fetch some member of this group from Prague to Krakow.
I went to Prague together with a person from Melnik group. He was a
doctor and lived in Krakow in the outer ring, not far from SS cinema. We
parted near Wilson station in Prague, because I wanted to visit my wife,
who had come to Prague on my request. Two days later I met the doctor
and his people at the same spot.
Colonel Melnik was the leader of that group, I have never seen him.
As they said to Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN, Melnik lived in Berlin and
had connections with OKW. His deputy, Lt Colonel Sushko, was the head
of Aid to Ukrainians Committee in Krakow. He and his deputy Dr Sulyatitsky worked closely with Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN, and received
tasks from him. Their people were trained in Krinica camp. Once, after Lt
Colonel EIKERN had left Abwehr division (in November 1941), a person
came to Abwehr office and asked for support and medical assistance. He
claimed to be a member of Melnik group, said he had been sent to the
rear of Russians and that Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN had detailed information about him. He told that he had been captured by Russians, and
sent to the Eastern Front, but managed to escape on the way and joined
German troops. Lt Colonel Sushko confirmed that all he said was true.
After the campaign against Russia started, Melnik group used to provide interpreters to Abwehr office, who were thereafter sent to troop units.
Melnik group always worked for Germans and later on Bandera people
strongly opposed it.
Sonderfuhrer BARGEL of sub-group II told me that Melnik people
were exploited in Russian territories mainly for propaganda, and he used
to select propaganda material for them.
BARGEL used to make drafts of propaganda leaflets, and with the help
of sub-group II sent them to Berlin for approval and publishing.
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After German troops crossed the demarcation line, Abwehr office

helped Melnik group to get two cars. Sushko, Dr Sulyatitsky and Kobzar
received permanent IDs or passports, also with the help of sub-group II,
and with those passports they could cross the former demarcation line.
In June 1941 Abwehr unit 205-B was set up, and Melnik group transferred KOVALSKY and some other people to that unit on permanent basis. In November 1942 Colonel SUSHKO went to Abwehr, located at that
time near Vinnitsa town, to get his assignment from Lt Colonel EIKERN.
I was informed about it by the person, who drove Sushko to that place.
After Lvov was occupied Sushko set up his own branch of Aid to
Ukrainians Committee there, and from that time on was travelling between Krakow and Lvov. The office of the branch was located in Lvov, near
the administration building.
In Krakow the main connection between Abwehr office and Aid to
Ukrainians Committee was a Ukrainian named KOBZAR. Melnik group
was in touch with the administration of the Generalgouvernement through
Colonel BIZANTZ and government advisor Dr FEL. They were heads
of departments in the administration: one of residence department, the
other of provision department. They met with Melnik group representatives in Abwehr office or in the safe house in Sereno Fene street.
Apart from Bandera and Melnik groups Abwehr division, or Abwehr
unit 202, exploited Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The training camps of
the Generalgouvernement trained priests of Ukrainian Orthodox Church,
who later took part in assignments together with other Ukrainians. This
was approved by the Church. Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN told me
once that Ukrainian Orthodox Church supported the nationalists and
their political activity.
Upon arrival to Lvov together with unit 202-B (sub-group II) Lt Colonel ERNST zu EIKERN got in touch with Metropolitan of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church. The Metropolitan Duke SHEPTITSKY was proGerman, as EIKERN told me, he gave up his house at the disposal of unit
202, though the building did not belong to German military authorities.
The metropolitan resided in a monastery in Lvov, the members of the unit
used supplies of the monastery.
I went to the monastery for a short time, to have a talk with Professor
Dr KOCH and government advisor Dr FEL. Dr Koch told me then that
EIKERN and the metropolitan meet every day to discuss various matters,
and he attended those meetings as an interpreter.
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Usually the metropolitan had lunch together with EIKERN and his
closest colleagues. Later EIKERN, as he was the leader of the team and the
head of OST department, ordered all subordinate units to set up connections with the Church and support it in all possible ways.
By the time I arrived to Krakow Senior Lieutenant OBERLANDER
already worked in the sub-group.
He was responsible for matters related to Bandera and Melnik groups.
When the war against Russia broke out he gathered Ukrainians at the training ground in Neuhammer, and together with Oberleutnant NITZER he
conducted trainings for future rebel groups Nachtigall and Bergman.
Later on he was the leader of an Abwehr unit in the East.
OBERLANDER was 32 years old, height 178 cm, blonde, strong built,
fast and fidget. He was an associated professor in a University in Prague,
his family lived there too.
Alfons PAULUS.
FSB CA. Stock 100. List 11. File 8. Sheet 117137.
123
2. Statement of Siegfried Muller,

an officer of Abwehr unit-202,
19 September 1946
In 1940, when I worked in department 4 (Gestapo) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt the HQ of State Security Service of Germany,
one of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists Melnik used to visit
Schrder, the head of department 4, in his office in Gestapo, to take instructions and orders.
I often saw Melnik in Gestapo, and Schrder also told me that he suggested that Melnik should establish a Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs in
Berlin under control of German Intelligence service.
The same Schrder told me that by establishing a Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs in Berlin Gestapo aimed to consolidate the Ukrainian nationalist movement and with Melniks help gain control over it.
Question: Did Melnik agree to become the head of the Bureau for
Ukrainian Affairs?
Answer: Yes he did, and such a bureau was established in Berlin with
the help of Melniks supporters. However, in 1940, i. e. after the negotiation between Melnik and Schrder, I left to work for Abwehr, which let
me get the information about the members and activity of the Bureau for
Ukrainian Affairs.
Question: What was the relationship between Melnik and Bandera
within the Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs?
Answer: I recollect that during the discussion Schrder offered Melnik
to agree with Bandera about his participation in the Bureau for Ukrainian Affairs activity.
Schrder told that Germany would need the Ukrainian nationalists
to send them to the East for certain assignments, supervised by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, department for Ukrainian community affairs.
In November 1940 I joined Abwehr, and there got to know that Melnik was working for German Intelligence service alongside his cooperation with Gestapo. He was a resident of Abwehrstelle-Berlin. I know that
since I worked as an information officer for Intelligence service against
the USSR in Abwehrstelle-Berlin.
Question: How did you get this information?
Answer: I worked in the first Intelligence service department in Abwe-
124
hrstelle-Berlin as an Information Officer for Intelligence service against

the USSR. I shared the office with Captain Pulyui, with whom Melnik had
personal connection and to whom he submitted reconnaissance information about the Soviet Union.
All information about the USSR Melnik received from his people
Ukrainian nationalists in the Western Ukraine, and from the residents of
Novi Zol (Czechoslovakia).
Among Pulyuis papers I saw Melniks personal commitment to cooperate with Abwehrstelle-Berlin with his photograph attached. Pulyuis cover name for Melnik was Doctor Kuchert, Melniks cover name in
Abwehrstelle-Berlin is not known to me.
From Abwehrstelle-Berlin I was sent to the eastern front to German
reconnaissance forces, to serve in Abwehr unit-304.
Question: Did you come across any activity of the Ukrainian nationalists there?
Answer: No, not in Abwehr unit-304.
Question: And later?
Answer: In 1944, when I was transferred from Abwehr unit-304 to
Abwehr unit-202, I again encountered with Ukrainian nationalists subversive activity against the USSR, but those were Bandera people.
In Abwehr unit-202 I was supposed to maintain connection between
the German reconnaissance forces and Ukrainian nationalists.
Question: Who gave you the orders to get in touch with the Ukrainian
nationalists?
Answer: In October 1944 I was sent from Abwehr unit-202 to the infantry training school in Libawa. I didnt want go there, so during my
short vacation in Berlin I met a friend of mine, officer of the German
Army HQ.
Upon my request captain Lamerau cancelled my assignment in Libawa and arranged one in Abwehr unit-202 instead, located at that time
in Krakow.
In 1-C department of the German Army HQ I received detailed information about situation at the central front of the German Army and the
negotiations between our Intelligence forces and the Ukrainian Nationalists regarding a joint struggle against the Red Army.
Question: What instructions did you get in 1-C department?
Answer: Captain Lamerau, the deputy head of 1-C department of the
central HQ on Intelligence affairs, and Captain Stolze told me that in Octo-
125
ber 1944 the leader of Abwehr unit-202 Captain Kirn established connections with the UPA southern HQ and was conducting negotiations with the
Ukrainian nationalists on involving the UPA units into subversive operations
in the rear of the Red Army, under the supervision of Abwehr unit-202.
Upon arrival I was to help Captain Kirn with his job, and utilize the
opportunity to recruit the Ukrainian nationalists for subversive operations in the rear of the Red Army.
Lamerau and Stolze put high hopes on cooperation with the Ukrainian
nationalists in their subversive activity against the USSR, and believed that
the activity of the well-organized and thoughtfully directed UPA units could
break the plans of the Soviet authorities during their armed operations.
Question: When did you join Abwehr unit-202?
Answer: I arrived on 1st December 1944 and immediately started
work in Abwehr unit-202.
When I met Captain Kirn, he told me that in October 1994 he had met
representatives of the UPA southern HQ. Together they crossed the front
line (in the area of Abwehr unit-202) and conducted negotiations with the
UPA southern HQ.
Question: Where was the UPA southern HQ located at that time?
Answer: According to Captain Kirn, the UPA southern HQ was located in the mountain woods not far from Lvov. He didnt mention the
staff of the HQ, but told in detail about the negotiations.
Question: What do you know about the negotiations between Captain
Kirn and the UPA southern HQ?
Answer: The UPA leaders and the Captain reached agreement in principle on joint operations in the rear front of the Red Army, but the UPA
leaders set forth the following conditions:
The German authorities had to release Stepan Bandera from house
arrest and release all Ukrainian nationalists, who were at that time in German camps;
Germany must guarantee the formation of the Independent Ukrainian State;
The German army must provide the troops of the Ukrainian nationalists with uniform, weapons, means of communication, medicines and
money.
As for the practical issues of arranging subversive operations in the
rear front of the Red Army, the Ukrainian nationalists set forth some conditions too:
126
German reconnaissance forces must set up subversion schools for

the Ukrainian nationalists on the territory, occupied by the Germans, and
conduct trainings for individuals, selected by the UPA, trainings on wireless communications and military service;
Subversion groups of the Ukrainian nationalists would be subordinate to Abwehr unit-202 in affairs related to operations, for the rest they
remain under control on the UPA HQ.
Kirn was authorized to accept the conditions of the Ukrainian nationalists, which he did, and from the side of the German authorities he set
forth some conditions as well. They were as follows:
The UPA south HQ must make as many subversives available to
Abwehr unit-202 as deemed necessary by the latter;
Abwehr unit-202 has the right to make up groups of the above individuals, select the venue and objects for subversive operations.
Besides, the UPA HQ must provide all available information about
the Red Army to Abwehr unit-202, as well the information on general activity of the Ukrainian nationalists in the rear of the Red Army as well as
in the area of southern troops of the German Army, i. e. in the area from
Warsaw up to the Romanian border.
The UPA south HQ accepted the above conditions and the decision
was taken to exchange representatives to maintain connection between
Abwehr unit-202 and the UPA south HQ. I was offered the positions of
the liaison officer in Abwehr unit-202.
Question: Who was the liaison person from the Ukrainian nationalists?
Answer: In the end of 1944 Professor Danyliv was appointed the representative of the south UPA HQ in Abwehr unit-202. His cover name
was Eagle; he was about 43 years old, of middle height, strong-built with
dark hair, spoke German, French and English fluently. He used to work as
professor of philosophy in Lvov University. He had an officer rank in the
UPA Colonel.
Question: What was the subversive work against the Soviet Union,
done by Danyliv in cooperation with the Germans?
Answer: He assisted Abwehr unit-202 in recruiting and training Ukrainian nationalists, compiling subversive units of them, and moving these forces to the rear of the Red Army for conducting subversive operations.
In December 1944 the German authorities released Stepan Bandera,
and by order of 4-D Gestapo department he received a summer house
127
near Berlin. Since then Bandera remained under personal supervision

and worked by direction of Obersturmbannfuhrer Wolf, who had been
newly appointed the head of 4-D department. In the same month Bandera arrived to Krakow and joined Abwehr unit-202. He personally gave
instructions to Danyliv, as well as the trained agents, who were sent to the
UPA HQ for communications support.
Therefore, the subversive activity of the Ukrainian nationalists in the
rear of the Red Army was authorized by Stepan Bandera and was conducted under control of the German Intelligence service.
Question: Have you had any personal meetings with Bandera, related
to reconnaissance activity?
Answer: Yes I have. On occasion of Banderas arrival to Abwehr unit202 captain Kirn arranged a reception in the villa of our unit, located at
Gartenstrasse 1 (near Krakow stadium). Bandera, Captain Kirn and Professor Danyliv made speeches during the dinner. I met Bandera there, and
several days later we had a business meeting.
On 27th December 1944 I prepared a subversive group to be moved to
the rear of the Red Army with a special assignment. The group consisted
of three Ukrainian nationalists Lopatinsky, Demed and one radio operator whose name I can not recollect.
Stepan Bandera gave instructions to those agents personally, in my
presence, and with them he sent an order to the UPA HQ to intensify
subversive activity in the rear of the Red Army and maintain permanent
radio connection with Abwehr unit-202.
I was introduced to the group as the liaison officer of Abwehr unit-202,
so that they could recognize me when I reach the UPA HQ.
The whole group of Lopatinsky was moved to the rear lines of the Red
Army in a German aircraft from the Krakow airport to Lvov area. They
carried one million rubles, medicines, uniform, explosives and a radio set
to be delivered to the UPA HQ.
Question: Was the radio connection set up between Abwehr unit-202
and the UPA HQ?
Answer: The radio connection between Abwehr unit-202 and the
UPA HQ existed since October 1944, but it was supported by a 40 watt
radio set, call sign Vera.
We considered the 40 watt radio set quite powerful, so there existed
the risk of listening through and deciphering from long distances. Hence
we gave Lopatinsky and his group a 3 watt radio set that could function
128
safely for a long time. As I know, Lopatinsky group did not arrive to the
UPA HQ, and we considered them eliminated during landing by the military security service of the Red Army.
Question: What was the subversive activity, conducted by Abwehr
unit-202 together with Ukrainian nationalists?
Answer: Out of the five subversion schools under control of Abwehr
unit-202 one school, where I was the head was involved in training subversives out of Ukrainian nationalists up to Apil 1945. The people were
recruited by Professor Danylivs agents and Abwehr unit-202 officers.
Besides, Abwehr team-206, included in Abwehr unit-202, had direct
connection with the rebel unit of the UPA in Carpathian Mountains. So
we recruited people from those rebel units, trained them in subversive
schools, on a short-term programme, and then sent them to subversive
jobs in the rear of the Red Army.
Question: Which groups of Ukrainian nationalists were sent to the
rear of the Red Army with subversive assignments?
Answer: During the months before the capitulation of Germany there
were 45 subversives in my school Moltke, all were Ukrainian nationalists. 25 of them were sent to the school by the UPA HQ, they came from
the territories occupied by the Red Army, and the others were recruited
from prison camps.
The first group, called Paul-2, consisting of 8 people, I sent to the area
of Sarny town on 7th April 1945. Their assignment was to restore connection with the HQ of the UPA Volyn unit and conduct subversive operations at the railway near Sarny town.
The second group was called Paul-3 and also had 8 members, all
born in the rural area of Vladimir-Volynsky town. They were sent to the
above area on 7th April 1945, transported from the Prague airport. This
group was to conduct subversive operations to disturb the communication lines of the Red Army in the area of Vladimir-Volynsky town.
The third group had a name Paul-1 and consisted of 9 members, all
natives of the Kovel town area. They were sent to Kovel area on 13th April
1945 from the Prague airport.
In connection with the approaching capitulation of Germany, after the
transfer of the last group, I went underground on 21st April 1945 and
stayed in Prague. I had not reported to Abwehr unit-202 since then. I do
not know anything about the further activity of Kirns group.
I do know, however, that Ukrainian nationalists had attempted to get
129
connected with the HQ of British-American troops. Danyliv and Burlay

had directives from the UPA HQ to cross the front line and reach the
British-American troops, inform them of their wish to adjust their own
subversive activity on the territory of Ukraine to the plans of the BritishAmerican troops. Part of the group was to escort Burlay to the Americans.
Danyliv intended to escape to the allies together with Bandera. Knowing
that I can speak English and French, Burlay offered me to join his groups
and join the Americans.
Early in April 1945 the RSHA ordered Bandera to gather all Ukrainian
nationalists near Berlin and protect the city from the attacks of the Red
Army. Bandera arranged units of the Ukrainian nationalists, which were
included in Volkssturm, and then fled. He left the summer residence of
Department 4-D and fled to Weimar town. Burlay told me later that Bandera agreed with Danyliv to join the Americans together.
CSA SBPGU. Stock 57. List 4. File 338. Sheet 268279.
130
3. Extract from the transcript of interrogation

of Siegfried Muller, Officer of Abwehr unit-202,
19th September 1946.
MULLER Siegfried, born in 1916 in Stuttgart,
Germancitizen,highereducation,memberofFascist
Party since 1953, former Lieutenant of the German
Army, before arrest an officer of Abwehr unit-202.
Question: During the previous interrogations you stated that rebel
troops of the Ukrainian nationalists coordinated their subversive activity in the rear of the Red Army with the orders from Abwehr unit-202.
Give details on the practical connection of the troops with the intelligence
service.
Answer: During the previous interrogation I only listed the facts of
joint subversive activity of the German intelligence service and the UPA
HQ in the rear of the Red Army during 1944 and 1945.
However, I also know about the collaboration between the Ukrainian
nationalists and German intelligence service before the WWII broke out.
Question: What was the subversive activity in the rear of the Red
Army, carried out by Abwehr unit-202 together with Ukrainian nationalists?
Answer: One of the five subversive schools of Abwehr unit-202, the
one under my supervision, had been training Ukrainian nationalists into
subversive agents till April 1945.
Question: What groups were sent to the rear of the Red Army with
subversive assignments?
Answer: During the months before the capitulation of Germany there
were 45 subversives in my school Moltke, all were Ukrainian nationalists. 25 of them were sent to the school by the UPA HQ, they came from
the territories occupied by the Red Army, and the others were recruited
from prison camps.
The first group, called Paul-2, consisting of 8 people, I sent to the area
of Sarny town on 7th April 1945. Their assignment was to get in touch with
the UPA Volyn unit and conduct subversive operations at the railway lines
near Sarny town.
131
The other subversive agents of my school Moltke were transferred to

Danilov and Burlay. That group included: a radio operator YAROMENKO,
agronomist, arrived to the UPA in 1942 from Kiev, had studied in school
of Sonderstab REGENAU, radio operator MAYEVSKY, 30 years old, arrived from the UPA HQ; radio operator KRAN, 26 years old; subversive
SOVVA; radio operator LENA, I dont know her last name.
Question: Why were those people shifted to DANILOV and BURLAY?
Answer: The plan was to send part of the group to the area of Stryi
town, for subversive operations. The head of the group was to be Captain
KIRN, who at that time was busy liquidating Abwehr unit-202. According to the order from Wehrwolf he was to go underground and conduct
guerilla operations against the Red Army.
I was included as a member of that group as well.
Interrogated by
Deputy Head of criminal investigations unit
for major cases MSS USSR
Lt Colonel (signature)
132
4. Statement of Erwin Stolze,

the ex-Head of Abwehr department in Berlin,
29th May 1945
We exploited Ukrainian nationalists for subversive operations in Poland. In order to recruit people for subversive operations against Poles we
hired Evgen Konovalets, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement,
a Colonel of Petlyura Army and a white migr. He monitored terrorist
attacks and subversive operations in Poland and Western Ukraine, as well
as small rebellions in some places. Similar operations were conducted via
Belorussians and Lithuanians.
Early in 1938 I received the order from Admiral Canaris to switch the
available agents of Ukrainian nationalists to operations against the Soviet
Union.
Some time later I met Konovalets, in Baden town, near Vienna, in the
flat of Kurmanovich, a General of Petlyura Army, and conveyed the order
from Canaris. Konovalets eagerly agreed to send part of the OUN underground to fight against the Soviet Union, as he believed it correct to
continue work against Poles, which was, in addition, approved by us.
Shortly after that Konovalets was killed.
The Ukrainian nationalist movement was thereafter headed by Andrey Melnik, who just as the former leader was involved in collaboration
with the German intelligence service.
As part of the subversive activity against the USSR, Abwehr used its own
agents to stir up national hatred among the Nations in the Soviet Union.
According to the above orders from Keitel and Yodel, I got in touch
with the Ukrainian nationalists serving in the German intelligence, as
well as other members of nationalist fascist factions, and engaged them in
implementing the tasks.
In particular, I personally gave the order to leaders of the Ukrainian
nationalists, German agents Melnik (cover name Consul-1) and Bandera
to arrange acts of provocation in Ukraine immediately after the German
attack against the USSR, in order to sabotage the rear of the Soviet troops
and to convince the world community of the corruption and moral decay
in the Soviet rear.
Question: Under what circumstances was Melnik recruited as a German intelligence agent?
133
Answer: While Konovalets worked as our agent, for the conspiracy

sake he recommended to hire a person called Yary (cover name Consul2), a Ukrainian nationalist, a cavalry captain of Petlyura Army, who used
to be a contact between us and Konovalets, and Konovalets in his turn was
a contact to the nationalist underground.
When Konovalets was alive, Melnik and other nationalists knew Yary
as an active nationalist and a person closely connected with Konovalets,
so Canaris ordered Colonel Lahausen the head of Abwehr unit-II, get in
touch with Melnik through Yary. By that time Melnik had moved from
Poland to Germany.
Thus, in the end of 1938 or beginning 1939, Lahausen met Melnik,
hired him and the latter got a cover name Consul.
Since I was supposed to work with Melnik, him being a German agent,
I was also present at that meeting.
I should mention that the recruiting process was very smooth, as we
knew enough about Melniks activity, and he was actually an agent of
Konovalets in his activity against Poles, while he stayed in Poland.
Question: Please continue. What subversive operations had German
intelligence arranged through Ukrainian Nationalists?
Answer: After the recruitment meeting in a safe house (the corner
of Berlinstrasse and Friedriechstrasse), which was maintained by officer
Knusman, an agent of Canaris, Melnik told about his plan of subversive activity. He wanted to set up and maintain connection between the
Ukrainian nationalists residing in Poland, and the nationalists, living in
the USSR, as well as conduct spying and subversive actions in USSR and
prepare the rebel. At the same time Abwehr took up all the costs of subversive activity, as was requested by Melnik.
During later meetings Melnik asked for approval to arrange an intelligence department at the OUN. He said that such a department will promote subversive activity against the USSR, improve connection with the
OUN underground and myself, as an Abwehr representative. His suggestion was approved, and such a department was established in Berlin, its
head being Roman Sushko, a colonel of Petlyura army.
After the war with Poland was over, Germany engaged in thorough
preparation to the war against the Soviet Union, and Abwehr took certain
measures to boost subversive activity, as the activity of Melnik and other
agents seemed insufficient.
For this reason another leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, Stepan
134
Bandera, was hired. The Germans released him from prison, where Polish
authorities kept him for participation in terrorist attack against members
of the Polish government.
I dont remember who exactly recruited Bandera, but I was his connection.
In the beginning of 1940 we got to know about some conflicts among
the leadership of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, in particular,
between Melnik and Bandera, and that this conflict might end up in splitup of the nationalist movement.
Those conflicts, let alone the split-up, were no good for the German intelligence service at the time of preparation for the war against the USSR,
when they needed all their forces. So as ordered by Canaris in the summer
of 1940 some measures were taken to harmonize Melnik and Bandera, in
order to unite all Ukrainian nationalists in the struggle against the Soviet
authorities.
In summer 1940 I met Bandera, who accused Melnik of inaction, and
tried to prove that he, Bandera, was the chosen leader of the Ukrainian
nationalists. For the sake of the common goal he agreed to come to terms
with Melnik.
Some days later I met Melnik, and had a similar conversation with him.
Melnik accused Bandera of self-advancement, tried to prove that Banderas
haste activity did more harm than good to the Ukrainian nationalist underground in the Soviet Ukraine, especially in the western areas. Melnik tried
to convince me that he was given the leadership by Konovalets and asked
for help to preserve his leadership for the unity of the organization. He also
promised to do the needful to come to terms with Bandera.
Despite the promises of both parties I personally believed that Melnik and Bandera would not be able to re-unite because they were very
different. Melnik was a quiet clerk, while Bandera was a career oriented,
devoted gangster.
After the German attack against the Soviet Union Bandera set the nationalist movement in motion in the areas occupied by the Germans, and
won most active nationalists to his side, and in fact pushed Melnik out of
leadership. The conflict between Melnik and Bandera reached its peak.
In August 1941 Canaris ordered me to stop connection with Bandera,
and keep Melnik as head of the nationalists.
Soon after we broke the connection with Bandera, he was arrested for
the attempt to establish a Ukrainian government in Lvov.
135
The excuse to break connection with him was that in 1940 he received
a big sum of money from Abwehr to maintain the underground and conduct subversive actions, but he tried to pocket it and made a wire transfer
to some Swiss bank. We retrieved the money from the bank and gave it to
Bandera again.
The same happened with Melnik too.
Question: To what extent did you use the Ukrainian nationalists in the
struggle against guerilla movement, underground of the Communist party
in the occupied territories of Ukraine, and what was Abwehrs role in it?
Answer: Abwehr maintained cooperation with the Ukrainian nationalist throughout the war against the USSR.
Ukrainian nationalists were used to fight against the Ukrainian guerillas. Police recruited Ukrainian nationalists and sent them as agents
beyond the front line for subversive actions, terrorist attacks and spying.
I dont know the details of this work, as it was the direct responsibility of
Abwehr units, Abwehr groups and Abwehrstelle, established in the areas
of occupied territories.
During the retreat of the German troops from Ukraine Canaris gave
directions to establish a nationalist underground (gangs) to continue spying and the struggle against the Soviet authorities in Ukraine, as well as
for conducting subversive actions. The leadership team of the nationalist
movement was complied of official members officers and agents.
Directives were issued to set up arms depots, food storages etc. Agents
were sent across the front line to contact the gangs. Some agents, as well
as ammunition and weapons, were parachuted to the spots.
Question: What other counter-revolutionary unit did German intelligence use for subversive operations against the Soviet Union?
Answer: In 1937, following the order of Canaris, I got in touch with
Skoropadsky, the Hetman of Ukraine, who was at that time an emigrant
in Germany. His son Skoropadsky Daniel helped me.
Canaris ordered me to get from Skoropadsky the information about
his connections and influence in the Soviet Ukraine, and after that decide
how to use the connections and Skoropadsky himself for the purposes of
our intelligence service.
Skoropadsky shared the information about his connections, and probably he understood our intentions, since he offered cooperation himself.
Later on Skoropadsky asked for a huge amount of money in order to
arrange the activity in Ukraine, but Canaris knew that Skoropadskys in-
136
fluence and connection were insufficient and refused to finance him and
cooperate with him.
Skoropadsky was persistent in his attempts to set up cooperation with
Abwehr, and I remember one incident when he told Canaris about his
close connections with the US, UK and other countries, and that he could
use those connections for the benefit of Germany.
Canaris considered that Skoropadsky sought personal favours from
the connection with Abwehr and could not actually do much, and declined his services.
During the occupation of Ukraine Professor Koch, an officer of Abwehr unit-II in Lvov, reported to me that they had recruited Metropolitan
Sheptitsky. After it was reported to Canaris he personally went to meet
Sheptitsky, and the meeting was arranged by Koch.
FSB CA. File -20944. Vol. 1. Sheet 1430
137
Appendix III
New archive documents on the crimes
of the OUN and UPA
1. Special report of 4th NKGB division of the USSR

on extermination of Polish population
by Ukrainian nationalists, 4th August 1943
TOP SECRET
TO THE DEPUTY OF PEOPLES COMMISSAR
OF THE STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR
Comrade KOBULOV
From the area of Rovno town, Ukrainian SSR.
Received on 3rd August 1943
An agent of KUTS unit, upon return from Vladimir-Volynsk
town, reported that on 18th June he witnessed a massacre of Polish people in Vladimir-Volynsk by Ukrainian nationalists belonging to Bandera
group.
During holy masses in churches, the Bandera faction killed 11 priests
and around 2000 common Poles in the streets.
The German garrison, police and Cossacks, of whom there were about
600 people, did not take any measures against the massacre of Poles, and
only after it was over the German leaders appealed to Polish people to join
the gendarmerie for the struggle against Bandera people.
138
Many Polish people joined the German service out of fear of repressions.
PASHA.
HEAD OF 2ND DEPARTMENT OF
3 UNIT OF 4 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
NKGB OF THE USSR (signature)
RD
TH
4th August 1943.

FSB CA. Stock 100. List. 11. File . 7. Sheet 102.
139
2. From the special report of NKGB USSR

on increased terrorist activity in Volyn area,
15th August 1944
TOP SECRET
TO THE DEPUTY OF PEOPLES COMMISSAR
OF THE STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR
TO PEOPLES COMISSAR
OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE OF THE USSR,
FIRST-RATE PEOPLES COMISSAR
OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVCE
Comrade Merkulov
Moscow
SPECIAL REPORT
On increased terrorist activity in Volyn area
There has been a major increase of terrorist activity in Volyn area,
both from the previously existing and the newly established UPA gangs,
the latter coming from the area of Zapadny Bug river, as well as those
who had crossed the Pripyat river on their way from Pin area of Belorussian SSR.
The terrorist actions of the OUN underground and the UPA gangs
are aimed to disrupt the events, arranged by the Soviet authorities, and
most importantly to interfere in the recruiting of the local population
to the Red Army.
On 27th July 1944 a gang attacked a group of recruits on their way to
military enlistment office in Gorokhovsky area, between villages Taratanovo and Shpikolosy. As a result of the attack, out of 6 soldiers, who
convoyed the recruits, 1 was killed, another one badly injured and the
other four taken away to the woods by the bandits.
On 10th August 1944 in Ozyutichevsky forest, a gang attacked a file
of recruits on their way from Torchin to Yanov town. The gang opened
140
fire from mortars, machine-guns and small arms.

In Golovno settlement bandits put up the following order of the
UPA:
Those who join the Red Army will be punished by death. Betrayers
and secretaries of village Soviets will be shot for delivering the notification. Klim SAVOOR.
On 4th August 1944 the chairman of village Soviet of Grabov village
was stopped by a gang, on his way to a meeting in Shatsk. The bandits
warned him that if anyone from the village joined the Red Army, their
families and the chairmans family would be eliminated.
Almost in all districts of Volyn area there have been records of increased terrorist action against the leaders of village authorities, activists
and people supporting the Soviet authorities, as well as the families of
people who joined the Red Army.
On 4th August in Balyagina village of Golovnyancky district bandits
killed the chairman and secretary of the village Soviet.
On 4th August 1944 in Rogoviye Smolyary Miron VALYUK was
killed, the secretary of the village Soviet.
On the night 3rd/4th August 1944 in Polapy village of the same area a
member of the village Soviet was killed, Ivan BIKUN.
On the night 3rd/4th August 1944 in Golyadin village of Shatsky district bandits murdered Petr KHMIZOVETS, the chairman of the village
Soviet, and former chairman of the revision committee.
On 4th August 1944 bandits murdered Savely DEMCHUK, the chairmain of Odligalychy village Soviet of Turiysk districts, as well as his wife
and four children aged from 5 to 14.
On 5th August 1944 bandits took away the chairman of Kukuriki village Soviet in Golovnyansky district.
On the night of 6th/7th August 1944 a gang attacked the family of
SHELEST, the chairman of Podgaitsy village Soviet in Vladimir-Volynsky district, during the attack Shelests wife was killed.
On 7th August 1944 in Rusnov village of Vladimir-Volynsky district
the mother-in-law of the chairman of the village Soviet was killed.
On 1st August 1944 in Byk village of Golovnyansky district Maria
KUZMICH, whose brother joined the Red Army, was murdered.
PEOPLES COMISSAR
OF THE STATE SECUTIRY SERVICE OF THE USSR,
141
THIRD-RATE PEOPLES COMISSAR

(SAVCHENKO)
15 August 1944
Kyiv.
To comrade Merkulov
To comrade Kobulov
FSB CA. Stock 100. List. 11. File 8. Sheet 2428.
142
3. From the special report of NKGB USSR

on gangster and terrorist activity of the OUN
and UPA in Ternopol area, 17th August 1944
TO PEOPLES COMISSAR
FIRST-RATE PEOPLES COMISSAR
Comrade Merkulov V. N.
Special report on gangster and terrorist activity of the OUN and the
UPA in Ternopol area
Just as in other areas of western Ukraine, recently there has been an
increase of gangster and terrorist activity by the UPA in Ternopol area.
The activity of the Bandera gangs is highest in Berezhnyansky, Podgaetsky, Buchachsky, Borschovsky and Grimailovsky districts.
On 12th August 1944 in Razgadov village of Zbrovsky district a meeting was arranged to collect the money for a tank convoy. A gang attacked
the village, opened fire and scattered the people, took away DIMIDENKO,
the chairman of the Communist Party unit, and shot behind the village.
He worked as an authorized Peoples Commissar of the Food supply committee in Zbrovsky district.
On 5th August 1944 in Yankosvky village of Lanovetsky district, bandits hiding in an ambush shot SHETNEV, the assistant police agent of
NKGB in Lanovetsky district, wounded ISCHENKO, the police agent in
the same district, and one soldier.
On the night 30th/31st July 1944 in Verbovka village of Lanovetsky district bandits killed deputy chairman of the village Soviet KULIK, a village activist KUCHER and the director of Storage of the Areal Consumption Union Proschuk.
On 2nd August 1944 in Dubrovo village of Vishnevetsky district the
chairman of the village Soviet LITVIN and his son were murdered by a
gang. Their bodies were left on a junction and to one body the bandits
attached a note:
For the betrayal of Ukrainian people. For cooperation with NKVD
and turning in two revolutionaries to NKVD. Dogs death to dogs.
143
Now is the turn of other betrayers. We, Ukrainian revolutionaries,

state that the one, who seeks a colony in Ukrainian land, will find black
soil for his grave.
On the night of 3rd/4th August in Ugrinov village of Podgaetsky district
bandits killed the wife of SAVICH, the ex-chairman of the village Soviet,
and her 12 year old son.
PEOPLES COMISSAR
THIRD-RATE PEOPLES COMISSAR
(SAVCHENKO)
17 August 1944
Kyiv.
144
4. Special report of Secret Service Division

Smersh of the first Ukrainian front,
20 May 1944
TO THE HEAD OF SECRET SERVICE DIVISION SMERSH
SECOND-RANK COMISSAR OF STATE SECURITY
Comrade ABAKUMOV
Moscow
On 4th May this year unit Smersh of the first Guard Army, on the
grounds of documents and witness statements, arrested active Ukrainian
nationalists of Mogilnitsy village of Budzanovsky district Ternopol area:
KOZLOCHKOVSKY Leonid Grigorievich, born in 1983
KRICHKOVSKY Josef Antonovich, born in 1910
KORCHINSKY Josef Petrovich, born in 1910
TERLETSKY Petr Ivanovich, born in 1906
The investigation proved that the above persons were members of the
OUN and participated in the struggle against the supporters of the Soviet
authorities. They conducted nationalist propaganda for the establishing of
Independent Ukraine.
A witness RYZHIY S. A. during the interrogation on 3rd May stated the
following regarding the anti-Soviet activity of KOZLOVSKY L. G.:
In July 1941, after Germans entered Mogilnitsy village, KOZLOVSKY
joined the Ukrainian police as a volunteer, was armed with a carabine and
wore a band with a Trident symbol.
In July 1941 he arrested three Jewish families: GELIS, MENDEL and
VORUN, consisting of 18 people, among them old people, teenagers and
children aged 6 months to 12 years old. All of them were taken to the woods,
where he shot the adults, and took kids aged 6 months to 6 years by the feet
and hit their heads against a tree, and then threw them into a pit.
Before the Red Army entered the village he went around the place and
suggested that people should hide their belongings and food, saying that
soon Bolshevik robbers would come, and everybody had to hide the cattle, food and belongings.
KOZLOVSKY told that when the Red Army arrives, the UPA will
leave to the Carpathian Mountains for some time, then return and with
145
the help of local OUN members, meaning us, will destroy the rear of the
Red Army and kill NKVD members. The Red Army will be eliminated
under the attack of the Germans, the UPA and Galicia Army.
The criminal activity of the arrested KRICHKOVSKY is similar to the
crimes of KOZLOVSKY, he also participated in shootings of the Soviet
citizens and served for quite a long time in Ukrainian police.
A witness YANITSKY S. I. stated the following about KRICHKOVSKY:
On the night of 17th/18th March Ukrainian nationalists of Bandera
group arranged a massacre of Poles in Mogilnitsi village. Disguised as
Soviet guerillas and wearing masks, they broke into the houses of Poles
and severely tortured them, cut them with knives, cut kids with axes,
broke heads, and then burned down everything in order to conceal their
crimes.
That night Bandera people tortured, slaughtered and killed about 100
people, Soviet activists, Jews and Poles. My family were killed that night
too my wife, a 17-year-old daughter and my son. 15 nationalists broke
into my house, among them I recognized KRICHKOVSKY Josef Anatolievich, he participated directly in killing my family.
During the investigation, based on the statement of Yanitsky, there
were discovered 94 bodies in pits in the forest near Mogilnitsi village of
Budzanovsky district. Those were bodies of the tortured and killed inhabitants of the village, murdered by the nationalists on the night of 17th/18th
March 1944.
The arrested nationalists KORCHINSKY and TERLETSKY also took
an active part in extermination of Soviet citizens. It was proved that in 1941
they personally killed: NKVD members GOLOVETSKY and GORENYAK, secretary of the Komsomol organization SALIY Pavel, chairman of
kolkhoz VYLINSKY Josef and two Jewish families.
The investigation of the cases of the above people is conducted by
Smersh unit of the first Guard Army.
HEAD OF SECRET SERVICE DIVISION SMERSH
OF PEOPLES COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENCE
OF THE FIRST UKRAINIAN FROM, MAJOR-GENERAL
(OSETROV)
20 May 1944
FSB CA. Stock 100. List. 11. File. 7. Sheet 231234.
146
5. From the special report of Secret Service Division

"Smersh" of the first Belorussian front in Peoples
Commissariat of Defense of the USSR
TOP SECRET
TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLES COMISSAR OF THE USSR DEFENCE
MARSHALL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade ZHUKOV
On the results of struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists
in the rear of divisions and units of the first Belorussian front.
As of 20th June 1944.
On the night of 11th/12th May this year in Teodorvka village of Klesovsky district in Roven area bandits killed two families consisting of 6
people: MIKHAREVICH Nikita 50 years old, ABRAMCHUK 28 years
old and four children aged 7 to 10 years old.
MIKHAREVICH and ABRAMCHUK worked in a subsidiary plot of
the 79th railway restoration squadron of the 5th railway team.
Near the house where the killing took place the following note was
found put up on a pole (translated from Ukrainian):
These are people, punished by death by the UPA tribunal for their
collaboration with our greatest enemy Bolsheviks. Warning to all farmers: those who continue collaboration with Bolsheviks, will all be punished like that. Bolsheviks exist today and tomorrow they are gone, while
we, Ukrainian farmers, we were here, we are here and we shall stay. Viva
Ukraine and its heroes!
On the night of 28th May in Khritsik village of Dombrovitsky district
a gang of about 15 people came up to the shed with the people, evacuated
from the immediate battle area, and suggested that all men should go out to
the yard. KURGAN Savva Mikhailovich, aged 50, his sons Anantoly aged
22 and VAsily aged 18, and their relative LUZKO Grigory went to the yard.
They had been evacuated from the Stolinsky district of Pinskaya area.
The bandits, pretending to be guerillas, asked them why the men
were still at home and not serving in the Red Army. Both KURGAN and
147
LUZKO men offered excuses and said that they were not drafted into the
Army because they worked on defense constructions for the Red Army,
and each of them tried to show his loyalty to the Soviet authorities.
KURGAN Vasily was sent back to the shed, since he was young, and
the rest were taken away, as if to be convoyed to the Army. Having left
Khritsik village, on the way to Zaleshani village, the bandits murdered
KURGAN Anatoly and LUZKO, and the father KURGAN Savely was
hung on a corner of some barn.
On the same night the bandits came up to the house of PRISHO Khavronia Sevastianovna, aged 20, called her out of the house and took her
away. 200 meters away from her house they killed her cut her stomach
open and hung by feet on a tree. They put a note on the body of PRISHKO:
This will happen to all traitors who betray the Ukrainian nation. Death
to traitors
FSB CA. Stock 100. List 11. File 8. Sheet12.
148
Alexander DyukovMinor enemyAbbreviations
ABBREVIATIONS
SA RF The State Archive of the Russian Federation
SSA SSU The State Sectoral Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine
SSA FISU The State Sectoral Archive of the Foreign Intelligence
Service of Ukraine
NASU The National Academy of Science of Ukraine
PCIA (here NKVD) Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs
OUN The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
OUN(B) The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera
faction)
OUN(M) The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Melnik faction)
RSMA The Russian State Military Archive
WFRA The workers and farmers Red Army
SS OUN The Security Service of the Organisation of Ukrainian
Nationalists
SSU The Security Service of Ukraine
UPA Ukrainskaya Povstantcheskaya Armiya (Ukrainian Insurgent
Army)
IUS The Independent Ukrainian State
UHGM The Ukrainian Headquarters of Guerilla Movement
FSB CA The Central Archive of the Russian Security Service (FSB)
CSHAL The Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lvov
CSA SBPGU Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and
Government of Ukraine
CSA POU Central State Archives of Public Organizations of Ukraine
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Volynskaya reznya 1943-1944: documenty i issledovaniya (Forgotten genocide. Massacre at Volyn in 1943-1944: documents and investigation materials) Moscow, 2008.
Dyukov, A. R. Byli li Banderovtsy antisemitamy? (Were Bandera people antiSemites?) // Komsomolskaya pravda (Moscow), 15.02.2007.
Dyukov, A. R. Extermination policy in the occupied Soviet territory: trends
and research works // Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945:
opyt izucheniya i prepodavaniya (The Second World War, 19411945: studying and teaching. Moscow, 2005.
Dyukov, A. R. Ob uchastiyi OUN-UPA v Holokoste: Moskva i zhidovstvo
glavniye vragi Ukrainy (The OUN-UPA participation in Holocaust:
Moscow and Jews chief enemies of Ukraine) // IA REGNUM,
14.10.2007.
Dyukov, A. R. OUN sotrudnichala s natsistami i unichtozhala evreyev (The
OUN collaborated with the Nazi and exterminated Jews) // Izvestiya
(Moscow), 11.02.2008.
Yuri SHEVTSOV
The UPA cult: amorality in Ukraine
166
Alexander DyukovMinor enemy
The UPA Cult:

Amorality in Ukraine
It often happens that crucial events go unnoticed by the contemporaries. Few people believed that a new Chancellor in pluralistic Germany,
who took power in 1933, would initiate a major World War just two years
later. Same relates to capture of the Winter Palace in St-Petersburg in
October 1917 the following collapse of the Russian Empire was hardly
expected. Or take the events of August 1991: again the collapse of a powerful empire had scarcely been envisaged as a consequence of an attempt
for a military revolution. The ideological transformation, a major change
in terms of possible consequences, currently taking place in Ukraine, is
treated exactly in this way, as something mundane and ordinary. The cult
of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is being incorporated into the national ideology of Ukraine, just before our eyes. It is only a matter of several months. And with every passing month the intensity of forcing it in
Ukraine is growing, planting a new ideology in one of the biggest European countries.
For all its liberalism, Europe is far from amorality and lack of principles. The modern Europe allows a vast variety of beliefs and identities,
but in no case it admits apologetics of Nazism and revision of the WWII
results. The contemporary European Union and former USSR are still
unified by the rejection of racism ideology, which had been spread by the
Nazi Germany during the WWII. This rejection is more important than
democratic values and freedom. During the WWII, Europe faced a threat
of death from the internal virus of the Nazi idea, brought to life by Europe itself. Only the union of supporters of democracy, Christianity and
Communism saved Europe from vanishing. For many decades after the
WWII, de-Nazification and acknowledging Nazism as an absolute evil,
defeated with united efforts, were the cultural basis which brought East
and West of the Old World together, despite all confrontations. The utter denunciation of Nazism became a global ideology and a foundation
principle for the UNO.
What we witness now is the fast spreading of something that was unacceptable for many decades. In their struggle against the Russian influence
and the remains of communism, the eastern European countries conduct
revision of the WWII results, rehabilitate collaborationists, and further
on, as seen in the eastern European communities, a new wave of explicit
The UPA Cult: Amorality in Ukraine (by Yuri Shevtsov)
167
neo-Nazism is gaining momentum. We have seen a miniature version of

this process in Latvia and Estonia. First there were nice words about antihumanism and national oppression from the USSR-Russia, then a slight
segregation within the country, and now memorials to collaborationists
and national rehabilitation of collaborationism revision of the WWII
results on the national level.
Latvia and Estonia are relatively small countries and the significance
of their local neo-Nazism for the whole Europe is not that big. However,
what is now happening in Ukraine follows the same scheme of events we
had seen in Latvia and Estonia. And this, we should emphasize, relates
to the second biggest (after Russia) in terms of population, eastern-European country. And the quality of consequences of the Ukrainian neoNazism will be quite different from that of the two Baltic States wave. The
Ukrainian neo-Nazism, if it grows and wins, can create a critical mass,
crystallize neo-Nazism as a minimum of eastern-European countries and
create problems for the whole Europe.
The UPA cult is not neo-Nazism yet. It is a cult of an extremely radical
nationalism, which denies universal moral and European values, based
on it, justifies collaboration with Nazism during the WWII and military
confrontation against anti-Hitler forces, but does not postulate racism yet.
This transitional character of the UPA cult is its weak point the growing
radical nationalism can be defeated by joint international efforts without
major collapses. At the same time, its an advantage too liberal and opportunistic forces in particular, as well as many others, see a chance to
make use of this new development, exploit it to their own benefit and
primarily use it against Russia.
It has happened before, especially in the inter-war history. Radical nationalistic Poland aligned with Hitler in 1934 without a second thought
about dangers of that game. France and Great Britain used both Nazism
and radical eastern-European nationalism, apprehensive about a threat
from the USSR and without a second thought about dangers that game
implied. The liberal world exaggerated the importance of its own intrigues,
political culture, its competency and its influence upon the development
of nationalist movements in Europe, and was close to collapse under the
pressure of joint attack of radical nationalism and Nazism.
The UPA cult in Ukraine reiterates the errors of the liberal world of
the 20s and 30s of the 20th century. The liberal nations of those times
planned to use radical nationalism against the USSR, and now against
168
Russia. There was no importance attached to the growth of racism, as it

was considered nonthreatening. The threat is not seen now either. Starting from 1934, when Poland and Germany seemingly stood united, a
formation of a powerful nationalist cluster in the Eastern Europe was a
strong possibility. That cluster was seen to be capable of conducting its
own large-scale policy. A similar event is taking place now.
Following the anti-Nazism tradition, we have solid reasons to doubt the
capability of the liberal world for a resistance against the alliance of radical nationalism and Nazism. Similarly, we have the reasons to be seriously
alarmed: the UPA cult in Ukraine is driven by a political force which is enjoying the support from the West. The above cult is develops alongside the
cult of Famine-Genocide and other ideological movements, initiated by
the new Ukrainian authorities and directed against Russia. This reminds
of the situation of 30s in the Eastern Europe. Understandable would it be,
if they spoke about the historical memory of Famine-Genocide, about regrets of the tragic mistake of the Ukrainian nationalism, which placed its
stake on Nazism, and later on, for no particular reason, struggling against
everybody, in the first place against the USSR and Polish anti-Nazi forces.
However, what we see is glorification of those who first directly and then
indirectly fought in favour of Nazis. Now they are being justified through
Famine-Genocide and similar tragic events.
The UPA cult may result in a hazardous transformation within the
Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian identity, which becomes too concentrated on itself. One can not consider Shukhevich a national hero, taking into
account his loyal service to the Germans during 1939-1942. One can not
vindicate the armed forces that fought against Soviet guerillas and shot in
the backs of soldiers of the advancing Red Army. If the UPA, like Polish
Craiova Army, had been an ally of democratic countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, we would have had a slim chance to understand and justify
the situation. But this was not the case. So it is only possible to justify the
UPA if we take its loyalty to Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian people as
the criteria for the assessment. This sounds nice for a nationalist, and at
the same time means that a whole national culture rejects absolute moral
values. There is just a fine line between that and the ideology of racism
itself.
The main problem with the UPA cult at the moment is that its being
used for amoralization of the Ukrainian society, putting radical nationalism in place of all the civilized ideology and values, developed by Europe,
The UPA Cult: Amorality in Ukraine (by Yuri Shevtsov)
169
including Russia, down through many centuries of rich history. With the
UPA cult, Ukraine opposes itself not only against Russia; it opposes its
spiritual life and national ideology to the whole Europe. And if Western
Europe refuses to see it, just like it happened in the 30s with other countries, it in no case does it mean that those see the world with a clinical eye
should fail to notice it either.
The strength of the current Ukrainian radical nationalism is that it has
resources of a huge country available; moreover this new trend is exploited
by some western players in their strategic moves against Russia. This nationalism is flexible, it learnt from the experience of the Eastern Europe
during inter and after-war times. We see this nationalism reconciling with
the Polish radical nationalism, both directed against Russia. And the subject
of the UPA is accepted by Poland for various reasons. Poland suffered great
losses during the WWII, and it has a strong anti-Nazi instinct. However, its
tradition is strong as well, which failed them more than once excessive
expectations from the western allies, radical Russophobia and opportunistic foreign policy. There is no assurance that the current Ukraine with its
radical nationalism, conducting the revision of the WWII results and implementing amoralization of its national ideology, that this Ukraine does
not form a strong alliance with Poland, which is growing more and more
nationalistic. At least for some time such an alliance might exist after all,
Poland had had a similar alliance with Hitlers Germany up to 1939. And
this would provide the critical mass to strengthen neo-Nazism and radical
nationalism in the whole of Eastern Europe.
The Ukrainian radical nationalism with its thorough revision of WWII
results through the UPA cult is a foothold for similar radical nationalistic and neo-nationalistic forces in all neighbouring countries of the Eastern Europe. And those forces are plenty. Now, taking into account the
developments in Latvia and Estonia, it would be logical for us to expect
Ukraine start defending the SS division Galicina and plain policemen in
the nearest future. The reason could be the same as given in Latvia and Estonia they had to resist the USSR, even if in alliance with Hitler. Hence,
if anything can be done for the sake of their own nation, and it would be
accepted too, then why not admit a moral justification of the service in an
SS division?
What are the possible consequences of that tendency development in
Ukraine and Easter Europe? First of all, the eastern European countries
will initiate a revision of the WWII results on the level of European Un-
170
ion ideology, under the veil of the struggle against already non-existent
communism. The EU failed to stop neo-Nazist transformations even in
Latvia and Estonia. The tussle with Gazprom, common sybaritism and
the discomfort caused by the inflow of migrants of various cultures created and obstacle for nipping this virus in the bud. As a result, we see the
UPA cult, an official development, has not been criticized so far by even a
single European leader! This also holds good of the conflict between hundreds of neo-Nazis and anti-fascists in Prague. Nor does the European
mass media utter a word to analyze the actual nightmare of the event in
Prague. Neo-Nazis went to the Jewish quarters of the paradise city in an
explicit march, fraught with massacre and violence. They were stopped
by anti-fascists, not by police or special services. What happens when all
these cults of the UPA, Waffen-SS in Latvia and Estonia, Czech neo-Nazism, traditional Russophobia of Poland and lots of eastern-European nationalist radicals unite in a European coalition and attain the change of
the European ideology? For instance, disapproving of the de-nazification
policy as contradicting to the European freedom of speech and choice of
identity? What will be left of Europe then?
Perhaps somebody is preparing another anti-Jewish and anti-humanist transformation of Germany? Prague is very much exposed to the influence of the German culture.
And what security system should work in Europe for the Europeans
themselves? Do they need to establish anti-fascist brigades in each city?
And what about the EU neighbours, who remain true to anti-Nazi European principles?
The current UPA cult is no more an issue of internal Ukrainian discussion of values and ways of Ukrainian national development. Shukhevich
is already a national hero of Ukraine. And all of us have the right to ask:
why this could happen and what will be consequence of it?
We have the right to stay alert. A respected man, dying of the lack of
alertness, in Prague, by the way, bequeathed: People, stay alert. Besides,
our own historical memory has so far been preserved, unlike that of the
others.
Yuri Shevtsov
Director of the Center for the problems of European integration
Of the European Humanitarian University (Minsk)

Ukrainians OUN, Jews

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Institute of European Studies

The Minor enemy

Riga Vilnius Tallinn

THE MINOR ENEMY: OUN, UPA AND THE SOLUTION OF

First Russian publication in 2008 by

Conclusion by Yuriy Shevtsov.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyIntroduction

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyIntroduction

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyIntroduction

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyIntroduction

information and comments of colleagues-historians are also taken into

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyIntroduction

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Kazanivsky, B. : . (Shlyakhom Legendy: Spomyny), London, 1975, p. 264.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

were mainly describing the massacres of Polish people in Volyn, carried

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

The opening of the Ukrainian archives for research and reference in

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Another subject of many heated discussions is the participation of

Motyka, G. Ukraiska partzyantka, 19421960: Dyiaalno Organizacji Ukraiskich

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Berkhoff, K. C., Carynnyk, M. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, p. 162.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

ment was later on disproved by Canadian historians Taras Kurilo and

( ). Lvov, 2003. vol. 1, pp. 178190; Nakonechniy, E. Shoa u Lvovi.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Vyatrovich, V. Stavlennya OUN do evreyiv (OUN attitude towards Jews), p. 101.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

a great number of sources available, to let them objectively describe the

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

A very important source of information, for understanding the OUN

Rozbudova natsii: Organ provodu Ukrainskih natsionalistiv ( i:

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

cles.54 The interrogation records contain mostly information about the

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 1

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Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1928, no. 1, p. 29.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

ed up with the authorities in the hands o Russian-Jewish minority in

Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1928, no. 5, p. 425.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

Rozbudova natsii ( ii), 1929, no. 12, p. 88

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

What should we do to Jews? There are over two millions of

Rozbudova natsii ( i), 1929, no. 78, p. 271.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

Rozbudova natsii ( i), no. 1112, p. 267.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

later on were published as a separate book titled Ruralization of Jews in

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

Gon, M. M. Iz krivdoyu na samoti (I i), p. 77.

Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

Gon, M. M. Iz krivdoyu na samoti (I i), p. 102.

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Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 2

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Alexander DyukovMinor enemyIntroduction

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Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 3

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Alexander DyukovMinor enemyChapter 4

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