TEACHING AND LEARNING: EXPLORATIONIST

PERSPECTIVES

Don Faust
Northern Michigan University
E-mail: dfaust@nmu.edu
ABSTRACT: The Explorationist perspective views all of our knowledge as (so far)
uncertain, that what we are doing both inside and outside of science is
approximative modeling of our world. (Of course, this perspective is itself, to wit,
maintained only uncertainly.) Within this perspective, teaching and learning, in
terms of both its epistemological foundations and its daily practice in the classroom,
is affected. We will here explore some of these changes, under this perspective, of
teaching and learning foundations and practice. Rather than being involved in the
teaching of absolutely known facts, according to this perspective teachers are
involved in helping their students gain familiarity with frameworks, evidence-based
approximative models of their world. The great utility of these models in both the
students scientific and everyday lives will of course be stressed. However, at the
same time, students, under this perspective, will be regularly reminded of the
uncertainty involved in these models, and the teacher will be regularly involved in
helping the students to be intellectually and emotionally comfortable with this new
evidential perspective about the nature of their knowledge which is replacing the old
paradigm of school knowledge as being absolutely true.

only uncertainly, and hence itself makes no

absolute assertions of any sort. With
respect to both W1 (the Physical World)
and W2 (the human-constructed Social
World), within the perspective of
Explorationism all of our knowledge is as
yet only partial and as yet only tentative.
One might surmise that, within
such a perspective entailing ubiquitous
uncertainty, some sort of belief in the
truth of a selected class of these
uncertainties would be not only natural,
but indeed required, in order to be
integrally participating in the manufacture
of scientific progress or indeed even to be
taking individual or communal action in
the daily unfolding of living. However,
this, we will argue, is NOT the case:
within the perspective of Explorationism, it
is maintained (without certainty, of course)
that NO BELIEFS ARE NECESSARY.
Let us try to be somewhat clear, even in

EXPLORATIONISM AND A LOGIC

FOR IT
Colors, sounds, temperatures, , and so
forth are connected to one another in
manifold ways, and with them are
associated dispositions of mind, feelings,
and volitions. Out of this fabric, that
which is relatively more fixed stands
prominently forth, engraves itself on the
memory, and expresses itself in language.
Relatively
greater
permanency
is
exhibited by certain complexes
which therefore receive names, and are
called bodies. Absolutely permanent such
complexes are not.
Ernst Mach, THE ANALYSIS OF
SENSATIONS, p. 2
Explorationism (Faust, 1999) is
based on the perspective that all of our
knowledge is so far uncertain. Of course,
then, this perspective itself is put forward

26

Faust, Don, Teaching And Learning: Explorationist Perspectives, 27

this brief paper, about this important

characteristic of Explorationism, by
roughing out a definition of belief as
follows (Faust, 2008):
Agent A believes a sentence S
if and only if A asserts S is true even
though A does not know that S is
true.
Of course, what it means for a sentence S
to be true, and what it means to know of
the truth of a sentence S, are both deeply
problematic, and much of the machinery of
Explorationism attempts to provide the
beginnings of a reasonable explication of
these problems, and even the beginnings of
a pathway to reasonably addressing these
problems.
Let us turn to briefly explaining
this explication, and this pathway, which
Explorationism provides through the construction and application of frameworks.
As we do so, one of the first things we
observe is that Classical Logic is woefully
inadequate for the representation and
handling of uncertainty: in Classical Logic
assertions are both only confirmatory and
only absolute, while in the perspective of
Explorationism there are no certainties at
all. An example of a logic tending toward
being adequate for Explorationism is the
logic Evidence Logic (EL).
Whereas in Classical Logic there
is only the two truth-values TRUE and
FALSE (1 and 0), in EL (Faust, 2000,
2007), for any n>1 there is an Evidence
Space
En = { i/(n-1): i = 1,,n-1 }
consisting of n-1 evidence values, with
least evidence value (and evidence
increment) 1/(n-1) =def and greatest
evidence value (n-1)/(n-1) = 1. In
implementtations, n tends to be bounded
above by computer-based implementation
constraints and bounded below by the
granularity of the domain evidence. In
deference to particularity and the decimal

mind, one might wish, in thinking about

EL, to have in mind the Evidence Space
where n = 11 and = .1, namely
E11 = { .1, .2, , .9, 1 }.
In ELn, the Evidence Logic equipped with
Evidence Space En, with respect to any
predicate P in the language at hand, and
any evidence value e in En, one has the
atomic formulas
Pc: e and Pr: e,
where the former asserts that there is
confirmatory evidence for P at the evidence level e, while the latter asserts refutatory
evidence for P at level e. It is part of the
logical axiomatization of EL that the
assertion of evidence at any level always
implies its assertion at all lower levels. So,
for example (using E11), Pr: .3 IMPLIES
Pr: .2 and Pr: .3 IMPLIES Pr: .1 (but of
course the converses are not, at the level of
the logical axioms of EL, asserted). We
might also note the following in helping
the reader to develop some familiarity with
the machinery of EL (again using E11):
NOT (Pr: ) asserts the absence of even the
least amount of evidence refuting P; the
conjunction Pc: .5 AND Pr: .3 asserts the
existence of conflicting evidence regarding
P (conflict at the evidence level .3, might
one say?); and, in EL there is a crisp and
important distinction, totally unavailable in
Classical Logic, between for example NOT
(Pc: .7) and Pr: .7, the former asserting the
absence
of
confirmatory
evidence
regarding P at the .7 level, the latter
asserting the presence of refutatory
evidence regarding P at the .7 level. This
last distinction, fundamental in any
penetrating explication of the concept of
negation in evidential logics, provides one
disambiguation of the rough but insightful
saying that absence of evidence is not the
same as evidence of absence.
A framework F is, syntactically,
any axiomatized theory in any Evidence

28, KNPM V, Himpunan Matematika Indonesia, Juni 2013

Logic EL, and, semantically, the space of

all models A of the theory. It is through
this machinery of frameworks, in a logic
EL for the perspective of Explorationism
(where, the reader will recall, there is no
absolute truth but only uncertainties
witnessed by various levels of confirmatory and refutatory evidence), that we
are able to realize, instead of absolute
truth, relativized and evidential Tarskian
truth in a model A of a sentence S, that
what S asserts evidentially is realized in
the model A of the framework F, that S is
true in the evidential model A of the
framework F.
So within the perspective of
Explorationism, where there is (as yet)
only uncertainty, absolutely certain
sentences S are non-existent. What one
does have, however, are evidential
sentences S which are, when witnessed in a
model of a stipulated EL-framework F,
true in a relativized and evidential Tarskian
sense.
Further, no beliefs are necessary in
such frameworks for an Explorationist
perspective. Indeed, functioning within
such frameworks requires only commitment to the framework, simply an
agreement to work in the framework. It
is crucially important to note that such
commitment involves no assertion of the
truth of the framework in any absolute
sense, no belief in either the framework or
any sentence S in the language of the
framework.
With this brief overview of the
frameworks provided for the perspective of
Explorationism, let us return to W1 and
W2 and the only partial and only tentative
evidential assertions which are (as yet),
under the perspective of Explorationism,
the only assertions we are able to make
about W1 and W2. With regard to the
scientific study of W1, one may roughly

dichotomize this arena into the empirical

and the theoretical sciences. An empirical
scientist need harbor no beliefs: he simply
daily performs experiments helpful in the
further testing and progressive modifycation of current frameworks. Similarly, a
theoretical scientist simply daily commits
to frameworks (no belief in them being
required), generating definitions and
theorems which aid in the further analysis
and progressive modification of those
theories. With regard to daily functioning within W1, which many might view
as non-scientific in nature, there is
similarly no need for beliefs: at all levels
(individuals, communities, nations, , the
United Nations, ), we simply on the fly
commit to frameworks, collect relevant
evidence, make rough and ready
decisions, and take actions in a continuous feed-back loop. Finally, with regard to
W2, no fundamental difference attains: as
with our dance with W1, our dance with
W2 similarly proceeds, at both of the
levels of scientific work and daily
functioning, by continuously looping
through the sequence of committing to
frameworks (without any need for beliefs),
collecting
evidence,
performing
framework-dependent analysis, generating
decisions, and performing actions.
EXPLORATIONIST PERSPECTIVES
ON TEACHING AND LEARNING:
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS
Theories are nets cast to catch what we
call the world: to rationalize, to explain,
and to master it. We endeavor to make the
mesh ever finer and finer.
Karl Popper, THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, p. 59
As overviewed above, the
epistemological foundations of Explorationism in general
involve,
most
fundamentally, the perspective that all of

Faust, Don, Teaching And Learning: Explorationist Perspectives, 29

our knowledge is (so far) only partial and

only tentative.
Hence teaching and
learning which takes place within such a
perspective, or is even only partially based
on such a perspective, will have
epistemological foundations attentive to
this perspective.
Such teaching and learning will,
then, emphasize the perspective that all the
domains of knowledge being taught and
learned (mathematics, biology, chemistry,
physics, the social sciences, the arts, )
involve only uncertain knowledge,
knowledge which is (as yet) only partial
and only tentative, in regard to its portrayal
of W1 and W2.
Each of these bodies of knowledge
is a framework, in the crisp sense defined
above using the Explorationist logic EL,
and hence each such body of knowledge is
providing, as it were, only our current best
approximative modeling of that as yet not
fully grasped reality of W1 and W2.
Further, our teaching and learning will,
with the perspective of Explorationism,
emphasize that this view of our knowledge
is itself uncertain.
This perspective may well be
refreshing, and indeed motivating in the
deepest sense, for both we as teachers and
our students as well. That the knowledge
we teachers are seeking to understand
better, and communicate with genuine
intellectual energy to our students, is (as
yet) only partial and only tentative, implies
that this knowledge is open-ended and
subject to the exciting process of criticism
and continual improvement. The writer
indeed finds, in teaching which makes
regular use of this perspective, that
students are more excited and genuinely
motivated in their learning, constantly
criticizing that knowledge in terms of how
its approximative models fit W1 and W2,
constantly feeling an engagement with

their learning and seeking ways to improve

the models.
EXPLORATIONIST PERSPECTIVES
ON TEACHING AND LEARNING:
PRAXIS
In earlier eras, prior to the connectedness
of the Global Village in which we are all
now immersed, societal groups could
harbor weakly evidenced, often conflicting,
even quite irrational, belief systems and yet
co-exist. However, that is no longer possible: in the Global Village of today, and for
all our tomorrows it would seem, we are
all hearing each others narratives, and
some are asserting that their views are
Right, and even that the other views are
Wrong, and some are even killing those
whose views they believe to be Wrong.
Don Faust, PROCEEDINGS OF
EARCOME 4, p. 7
One can easily construct numerous
ways in which carrying the Explorationist
perspective into the daily activities of
teaching and learning will significantly
affect that teaching and learning. In this
short overview we will have to restrict
ourselves to (1) the citing of a few typical
examples, and (2) an observation about the
teachers and the learners comfort level
under this approach.
(1)
With regard to any school subject,
whether mathematics, any of the natural
sciences, or the social sciences, or even the
arts, it is to be discussed with the students
that it is evidence-based frameworks which
are being committed to and studied, and
that no belief is required that the
framework is providing absolute truths.
For example, in mathematics what
is being learned are frameworks of
arithmetic, algebra, discrete mathematics,
geometry, calculus, and so on, for all of
which there is evidence-based knowledge
that the frameworks are efficacious

30, KNPM V, Himpunan Matematika Indonesia, Juni 2013

approximative models of our world. The

students can be thrilled, as we all are, and
motivated to learn, as we all are, by the
great utility of these models, while at the
same time being cognizant of the
approximative nature of the models.
Similarly, the models provided in
physics, although wonderfully efficacious
and highly motivating for student learning,
are only approximative. Based on these
approximative models provided in physics,
the models of chemistry (e.g. the atomic
theory) are built and seen to be themselves
only approximative. And, based on these
approximative models of chemistry, the
models of biology are built and seen, in
light of the physics and chemistry
foundations upon which they depend, to be
also only approximative.
Finally, regarding the social
sciences and the arts, as we find them often
targeting W2, we can help the student to
see these frameworks as only constructed
and only evidential also. Each of the
subjects, of psychology, economics, the
arts, sociology, and so on, consists of
approximative models, clarifying our
world evidentially while requiring of us no
belief in any absolute truth of their
representations of W2.
When we use these frameworks,
these approximative models, in W1 and in
W2 we are fairly successful, indeed often
quite successful (bridges stand, airplanes
fly, social systems function, and art forms
represent insightfully, ).
Increasing
awareness of this affects both the ways in
which we teach and the deeper aspects of
the motivational mosaic in the core of the
learning processes which, as teachers, we
attempt to nurture.
(2)
That what we are teaching our
students is the truth about W1 and W2,
although possibly not widely acknowledged in pedagogical theory, is an episte-

mological perspective widely seen at the

implementation levels of teaching, in the
daily unfolding of actual school teaching.
If this perspective about the nature of the
knowledge we are teaching and our
students are learning is to be replaced,
even only partially and only sometimes, as
we are proposing in this paper, with a
perspective of our knowledge as being (as
yet) only approximative of W1 and W2,
then we need to be sensitive to the
comfort levels of both the teacher and the
learner.
Implementation of this Explorationist perspective means that we shall be (at
least partially) replacing a superficial sense
of comfort based on believing that
absolute truths about W1 and W2 are what
is often being taught and learned with a
deeper sense of comfort based on an
accepting awareness that we are (so far)
doing only approximative modeling of W1
and W2.
Helping our students, and our
teachers as well, to come to appreciate,
nurture, and indeed come to feel, the latter
sense of comfort, is, we suggest, a
challenging and worthwhile goal.
CONCLUSION
Rationality is of supreme importance not only in ages in which it easily
prevails, but also, and even more, in those
less fortunate times in which it is despised
and rejected as the vain dream of men who
lack the virility to kill where they cannot
agree.
Bertrand Russell [reference unknown to
the writer]
One potential avenue, among
many, for improvement in our teaching
and learning may be in giving more
attention to the truth character of the
knowledge we are delivering in our
teaching. With this in mind, we have here

Faust, Don, Teaching And Learning: Explorationist Perspectives, 31

presented a perspective wherein all our

knowledge is (as yet) only partial and only
tentative. Using a logic which extends
Classical Logic, and which provides
machinery for the representation and
processing of confirmatory and refutatory
evidential knowledge, we have explored
both some of the characteristics of this
perspective and some of the potential
benefits which might accrue from
integrating this perspective into our
teaching and learning.
We suggest (with neither certainty
nor belief of course!) that Explorationism,

as a view of our current knowledge which

is in rather stark contrast to widely held
views of our current knowledge which
involve belief systems, is a perspective
which may be profitably considered in the
educational community. We, as teachers,
and our students as learners, may benefit,
especially in terms of the deeper goals we
have about education for the 21st century,
from focusing some of our attention on the
epistemological aspects of what we are
teaching and what our students are learning.

REFERENCES
Faust, Don, Explorationism, Evidence
Logic, and the Question of the
Non-necessity of All Belief
Systems, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 22ND WORLD CONGRESS
OF PHILOSOPHY, Seoul, Korea,
2008.
_________, On the Structure of
Evidential Gluts and Gaps, pp.
189-213 in HANDBOOK OF
PARACONSISTENCY (eds. JeanYves Beziau, Walter Carnielli, and
Dov Gabbay), 2007.
_________, Questions in the Foundations
of Mathematics which are as yet
Unanswered AND the Importance
of Teaching About Them,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH
EAST ASIA REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICS
EDUCATION (EARCOME 4),
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_________, The Concept of Evidence,
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_________, Conflict without Contradiction: Noncontradiction

as a
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