Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S.

Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against

Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan):
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]
Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] []Yung putang babae[,] ang
gumagana lang doon[,] []yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol
pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G
rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference.
Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension
from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB.

HELD:
The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average
child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US
Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the
utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of
the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible
to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a
child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an
order of suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under
its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said
that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of
Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the
indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program. (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636,
April 29, 2009)
Dissenting Opinion:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a separate dissenting opinion, said that a single government action
could be both a penalty and a prior restraint. The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the three month
suspension takes such form because it also acts as a restraint to petitioners future speech and thus
deserves a higher scrutiny than the context based approach that the majority applied. In voting to
grant Sorianos petition, the Chief Justice said that in the absence of proof and reason, he [Soriano]
should not be penalized with a three-month suspension that works as a prior restraint on his speech.

Moot and Academic Principle; Exceptions. (J. Abad)(Rodolfo Navarro v Exec Sec Ermita)
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts
from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Political Review Side Notes
Here are selected February 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:
Constitutional Law
Equal protection; requisites. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first,
third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the
differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of
the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698,
February 22, 2010.
Expropriation; private use. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments
power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements
partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to
keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,

the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for
the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which
the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of
law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to
the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the
property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the
amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Bernardo Lozada, et al.,G.R. No. 176625,
February 25, 2010.
Gerrymandering; meaning. Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined gerrymandering as the
formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate
or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to
comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one
island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is
an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda EcleoVillaroman. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050,
February 10, 2010.
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET); jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over the
question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and
Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives
that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives
no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of
the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests

relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al.
/Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et al., G.R. No.
189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February 11, 2010.
Judicial review; requisites. The courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred
by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he
has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the second requisite
is absent in this case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.

Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that
he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of
such illegal act by public officials. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the
President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
Judicial review; standing to sue. In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. EcleoVillaroman of the Province of Dinagat Islands raises procedural issues. She contends that petitioners
do not have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of
Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its creation and are without substantial interest
over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she alleges that the petition is moot and academic
because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the
petition should be dismissed.
The contention is without merit.
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws,
even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes
aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in
keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution.
Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. The courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
Local government; creation of province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local
government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation
of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution.
R.A. No. 9355 (creating the province of Dinagat Islands) is unconstitutional for its failure to comply
with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government
Code. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed

province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is null and void. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
President; immunity from suit. Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity
from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity
heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his
co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the
President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly
clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency.
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific
presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. Lourdes D.
Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
Overbreadth. In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in
the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and
perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes)
outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go
unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be
placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would
cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain
in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having
arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad
statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes which are, at
best, bold predictions cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State
from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably
within its power and interest to proscribe. Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with
these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through
a total invalidation of the statute itself. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.

Public assembly; modification of permit. In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor of Manila
gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been
heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition
to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. Intergrated Bar of the
Philippines, represented by its National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs.
Honorable Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010.
Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these
posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare
assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of
MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an exofficio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded
by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA was merely
an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a
member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the
MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary
(Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National
Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of
Trade and Industry Secretary.
It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary
capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both
appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions
of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible

offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,
words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IXB. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and
administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of
the office.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times
and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution
consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils
sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of
designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing
bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious
causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance
with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft
into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy,
if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and
employment. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No.
184740, February 11, 2010.
Administrative Law
Proceedings; evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof required
for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise.
In the present case, petitioners Order of May 18, 2004 finding respondent administratively liable for
neglect of duty, which implies the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee
arising from either carelessness or indifference, was adequately established by substantial
evidence. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) vs. Asteria E. Cruzabra, G.R. No. 183507, February 24,
2010.
Election Law
Appointive officials; filing of certificate of candidacy. Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position,

including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA
9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and
rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned
only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running,
an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for
another position without forfeiting his seat.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and does not suffer from overbreadth. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. (Note: The Supreme Court reconsidered its
earlier decision of December 1, 2009.)
Automation project; validity. The contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint
venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic) is valid. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel R. Butuyan, Romel R. Bagares, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, represented by Hon. Chaiman Jose Melo, et al., Pete Quirino-Qaudra (Petitionerin-intervention) Senate of the Philippines, represented by its President Juan Ponce Enrili (MovantIntervenor), G.R. No. 188456, February 10, 2010. (Note: The Supreme Court denied the motion to reconsider
its earlier decision of September 10, 2009.)
Ballot; tampering. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring Peano, based on the
results of the revision of ballots, the winner in the mayoralty contest for the Municipality of Alfonso,
Cavite. The ballots, after proof of tampering, cannot be considered reflective of the will of the people
of Alfonso. Mayor Virgilio P. Varias vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 189078, February 11,
2010.
COMELEC; ballot appreciation. The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en banc
proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining whether
the ballots to be recounted had been kept inviolate. The COMELEC cannot proceed to conduct a
fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof. Sandra Y Eriguel vs.
Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; elevation to en banc without division decision. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, which reads: SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.All such election cases shall be heard and decided in

division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc.
It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the
present case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and
en banc only upon motion for reconsideration.
Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency exercising
quasi-judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the parties; it
cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties.
Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court, more particularly so in election cases
where the interest involved transcends those of the contending parties.
This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard
and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc,
the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as
additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by
Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. Sandra Y
Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26,
2010.
COMELEC; failure of elections. The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to
enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary
authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may
declare failure of elections. The COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of
elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes.
The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the elections were suspended
before the hour fixed by law due to violence caused by undetermined persons, there was obviously a
failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct.

The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure of
election (i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions
of fact, which can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of
the parties. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances of
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. TheCOMELEC, as the
administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its findings and conclusions are generally
respected by and conclusive on the Court.
Petitioners allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent COMELEC en banc implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other
words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not present in
this case, as public respondent issued the COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on
the evidence on record and the law on the matter. Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 170365, February 2, 2010.
COMELEC; injunction. If instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a TRO, a court opts to
decide the case on its merits with the result that it also enjoins the same acts covered by its TRO, it
stands to reason that the decision amounts to a grant of preliminary injunction. Such injunction
should be deemed in force pending any appeal from the decision. The view of petitioner Panlilio
that execution pending appeal should still continue notwithstanding a decision of the higher court
enjoining such executiondoes not make sense. It will render quite inutile the proceedings before
such court. Mayor Jose Marquez Lisboa Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184286.
February 26, 2010
COMELEC jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party
leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission
on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to
register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought
before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC
had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for

certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP
president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to
local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of
the party. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
COMELEC; tampered votes. We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the subject returns
to be fatally flawed. In the absence of clearly convincing evidence, the validity of election returns
must be upheld. A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and
consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution and
only upon the most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any plausible explanation, one which is acceptable
to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice
to avoid outright nullification, which results in disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right
of suffrage. As will be discussed shortly, there is a patent lack of basis for the COMELECs findings
that the subject returns were tampered. In disregard of the principle requiring extreme caution
before rejecting election returns, the COMELEC proceeded with undue haste in concluding that the
subject returns were tampered. This is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the subject returns resulting in
the disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the records of this case. The proper procedure
in case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of the election returns is clearly spelled out in
Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening this legal provision, the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rose Marie D. Doromal vs. Hernan G.
Biron and Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010.
Disqualification; voter inclusion/exclusion proceedings. Voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the
one hand, essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from
the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show
possession of these qualifications.
On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false
representation of a material fact. The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere
innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidates qualifications for elective
office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or,
otherwise stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates
qualifications for public office.
In Velasco, the Court rejected Velascos contention that the Comelec improperly ruled on the right to
vote when it cancelled his COC. The Court stated that the Comelec merely relied on or recognized

the RTCs final and executory decision on the matter of the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction.
In the present petition, it is Panlaquis turn to proffer the novel interpretation that the RTC properly
cancelled Velascos COC when it ruled on his right to vote. The Court rejects the same.
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take
cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no
jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether
there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of ones qualifications for public office. The
finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not translate
into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render him ineligible. Mozart P. Panlaqui vs. Commission on Elections and Nardo M. Velasco,G.R. No.
188671, February 24, 2010.
Pre-proclamation controversy; contested returns. It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is
summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies be
promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers (BOC)
will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear
otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.
Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy, Section
20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC.
Compliance with this procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections as
quickly as possible.
Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that any candidate
may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned return is
submitted for canvass; the objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing simultaneously
with the oral objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections and opposition, if any, and
summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any party adversely affected by such ruling must
immediately inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling.
After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall
suspend the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of
Appeal; the appeal shall be filed within five days. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC will
make its report to the COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.

Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where the ERs appear to
have been tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC shall examine the other copies of the
questioned returns and, if the other copies are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, or otherwise
spurious, after having given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that the integrity of the ballot
box and of the ballots therein have been duly preserved, shall order a recount of the votes cast,
prepare a new return which shall be used by the BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the
proclamation of the winner accordingly.
Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely make his objections to the
contested ERs. Themistocles A. Sao, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 182221, February 3,
2010.
Local Government
Succession; sannggunian. Sec. 45(b) of RA 7160 provides for the rule on succession in cases of
permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. The law provides for conditions for the rule of succession
to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian
member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate
of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. Atty. Lucky M. Damasen vs.
Oscar G. Tumamao, G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010.
Public officers
Appointment; submission to Civil Service Commission. The deliberate failure of the appointing authority
(or other responsible officials) to submit respondents appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days
from its issuance did not make her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, [t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor
voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. Applying this to the appointment process in the civil service,
unless the appointee himself is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the
CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing
authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to the CSC. While it may be argued
that the submission of respondents appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the
conditions for the approval of respondents appointment, however, deliberately and with bad faith,
the officials responsible for the submission of respondents appointment to the CSC prevented the
fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said condition should be deemed fulfilled.
The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains valid in certain
instances despite non-compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules. Arlin B.
Obiasca vs. Jeane O. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

February 10, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule65 to
nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands for being
unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province
of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial Government
of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual
income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers
as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610,
The Local Government Code
, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on
1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than
250,000inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of
the province.Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a
plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative.With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat
Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued that
exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to
develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations have the force
and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
RULING: No.
The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such criteria, must
all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461
of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as it already
conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no
dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing
the said law, the basic law prevails.

CITY ENGR OF BAGUIO V BANIQUED

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule.37 It admits of several
exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled that the doctrine does not apply in cases (1) when the question
raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is
small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the proceeding is
private land; (10) in quo warranto proceedings; and (11) where the facts show that there was violation
of due process.38
DISTILERIA LIMTUACO V ADBOARD (Copy Post Case)
The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of the Philippines (AdBoard)
to require its clearance prior to commercial advertising and to impose sanctions on its members who
broadcast advertisements without its clearance.
AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 1974[1] composed of several
national organizations in the advertising industry, including: Advertising Suppliers Association of the
Philippines (ASAP), Association of Accredited Advertising Agencies Philippines (4As), Cinema
Advertising Association of the Philippines (CAAP), IndependentBlocktimers Association of the Philippines
(IBA), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), Outer Advertising Association of the Philippines
(OAAP), the Marketing & Opinion Research Society of the Philippines (MORES), Philippine Association of
National Advertisers (PANA) and the Print Media Organization (PRIMO).
Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of PANA.
In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency,
SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a
radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos).
First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from
requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast
or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance.[6]
Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later on
amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction with
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-277.[4] The Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation
of AdBoard's registration and its dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the functions
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) by misrepresenting that it has the power to screen, review and approve all radio and
television advertisements. Petitioners seek the nullity ofAdBoard's Code of Ethics for Advertising and
ACRC Manual of Procedures for Screening and Filing of Complaints and Appeals.[

Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against AdBoard's officers.
On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person
has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[7
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the
action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer
or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for
the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[8]
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.[9] What is at contest here is the power and
authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and
authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The
definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group
of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals
or corporations so acting.[10]
GOV FUA V COA (Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies)
FACTS:
o

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247
segregating the sum of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at
P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees.

Thereafter, Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President GMA for an authority to
the Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant such bonus.

Petitioner wrote a letter to the President reiterating said request.

On said letter, the President then wrote a marginal note reading, NO OBJECTION.

The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the Presidents
marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to its officials and
employees.

However, a post-audit was conducted by Ms. Eufemia C. Jaugan, Audit Team Leader (ATL),
Province of Siquijor, and thereafter, she issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) Nos.
2004-011 and 2004-022, respectively.

In AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022, Ms. Jaugan questioned the legality of the payment of said
bonuses, citing Section 4.1 of Budget Circular No. 2003-7 limiting the grant of Extra Christmas
Bonus to P5,000.00, and Section 325 (a) of the Local Government Code imposing a 55%
limitation on Personal Services expenditures.

AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster
Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, COA Region VII.

Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and issued Notices of Disallowance.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Regional Cluster Director.

From said denial, petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office
(COA-LAO-Local).

However, the COA-LAO-Local issued a Decision affirming the Regional Cluster Directors Notice
of Disallowance.

Aggrieved by the foregoing Decision of the COA-LAO-Local, petitioner filed a Petition

forCertiorari, under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING: Yes.
o

By immediately filing the present petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him.

Rule VI, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA states that: The party
aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper.

The Commission Proper, which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and
tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the audit,
would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No Objection on

petitioners letter-request to the President is indeed authentic and tantamount to the required
approval.
o

It was absolutely necessary for petitioner to allege in the petition, and adduce evidence to
prove, that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.

Thus, since petitioner could have appealed the Decision of the Director to the Commission
Proper under the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, he is definitely not entitled to a
writ of certiorari, because there was some other speedy and adequate remedy available to him.

Petitioner having failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision issued by
the COA-LAO-Local has become final and executory.

Consequently, the Decision of the COA-LAO-Local can no longer be altered or modified.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Doctrines:
The thrust of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allowadministrati
ve agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within thespecialized areas of
their respective competence.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense
for it isenough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to
complywith government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (
DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA
resolvedthat respondent is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to
reconsider however theLLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to
pay the penalties.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on t
o chidepetitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal from
decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which
should have first beenexhausted before invoking judicial intervention.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as
groundswhich exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Held:

No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The
rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution
of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus available administrative
remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR
Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best,
speculative and presumptuous.The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunityto explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given
the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Here are selected February 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent. The trial court was correct in declaring that
respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that an employee
who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is
considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case, respondents were placed under
preventive suspension for 90 days from 23 May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After serving the period of
their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents
should have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step increment.The Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2,
2011 .
Equal Protection; valid classification. Petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
SC held that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and the apprehension that before long the country
will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It found that the imposition of the P100 million
average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made as there
was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The
imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to
make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. The SC also found that
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,

manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit
for cityhood up to the present. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities
of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R.
No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011 .
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final
decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the
government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had
been closed and abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly established by evidence that the
National Airport Corporation, MCIAAs predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given
assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in
the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held that the government acquires only
such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the
properties. This means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is
expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of
right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation
judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of
approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport
project. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed
public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the
government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of
the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the
payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it
pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al.
v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in
his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her
personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February
9, 2011 .
Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on
mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the
parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of interests
earned by the amounts they received as just compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code
providing that if the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the
benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their
respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect
of nature and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu
International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of

Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of
Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011 .
Impeachment; narration of facts. Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts
constituting the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. The SC
denied this as that would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question, which the Constitution has left
to the sound discretion of the legislature. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011 .
Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended that she was deprived of due process
since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent
ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacked her contention on Section 3(8),
Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. While promulgation would seem synonymous to
publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must thus be used in the
context in which it is generally understood, that is, to make known.What is generally spoken shall be
generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general
must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. Since the
Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine
on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate
when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The SC observed that
it is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had the
Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically
as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that publication is
required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment
Rules, which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459,
February 15, 2011 .
Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year. Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posited that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint
may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to petitioners claim, the SC found that
the previous case of Francisco v. House of Representativeswas applicable to this case. There the SC held
that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. It refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial
action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchstick light the
candle at the same time. According to the SC, what is important is that there should only be one candle
that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011 .
Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance. Petitioner claimed that Congress failed to ascertain
the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the
Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. The SC found this claim to be untenable. The
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the
express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed
such determinative function to public respondent. Contrary to petitioners position that the
Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form
and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is
met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee. Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary.
This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution
basically merely requires a hearing. Prudential considerations behooved the Supreme Court to respect
the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011 .
Internal Revenue Allotment; just share. Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the
Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective
capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A.
No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress desired only
to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals, which is the
very mandate of the Constitution. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011 .
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into theAgreement, does
thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek
recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in
the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines
national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility
and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome
Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of
the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it

may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing
high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the
same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the
RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international
agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state
power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual
underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a
reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the
other. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011 .
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no
difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the
contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional
efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the
people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory
enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines
and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of
national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take
the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the
form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under
any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered
by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of
claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be
covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no
hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive
agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the
form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they
so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to
effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the
parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.Bayan
Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011 .
Judicial Review; expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Respondents raised the impropriety of the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition. They argued that public respondent (the Congress) was not exercising any

judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as
it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is
akin to a preliminary investigation. The case of Francisco v. House of Representativescharacterizes the
power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
reflects, includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The SC found it well-within its power to determine whether Congress committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and
prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective
measures from the Court. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011 .
Judicial Review; ripeness. An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of
ripeness. The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an
individual by the challenged conduct. In the present petition, the SC found no doubt that questions on,
inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of
simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation
to invoke judicial power. Petitioner was, therefore, found not to have acted prematurely when she took
the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011 .
Legal Standing; requirements. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that
he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In this case, as citizens, petitioners interest
in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions questioning
the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US are made of a public right, i.e., to
ascertain that the Agreementdid not go against established national policies, practices, and obligations
bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep.
Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618,
February 1, 2011 .
Stare Decisis; nature. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question
of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. The
previous case of Lubrica and the present case involve two different issues. The relief prayed for in the

previous case of Lubrica is that the amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the
basis of the time of payment and not of the time of taking. But in the present case, the prayer of the LBP
is for the deposit of the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and Department of Agrarian
Reform and not that of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. The principle of stare decisis,
therefore, does not apply. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of
RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of
Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011 .
Sovereign Immunity; expropriation. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked
to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without
the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property. The SC cited the
previous case of De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court where it ruled that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the
right of eminent domain, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights,
or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without
just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and Elisea
Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011 .
Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and proprietary function. The immunity from suit is based on
the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. Practical considerations dictate the
establishment of immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the
instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety
endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. An unincorporated
government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit
because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against
the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the
need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function
and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the
former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in
favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
essentially a business. In this case, the juridical character of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) as an
agency of the Government was not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was
instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not
the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
States immunity from suit. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No.
159402, February 23, 2011 .
Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and principles. The doctrine ofimmutability of
decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve a
modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special
Third Division may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final. A decision
rendered by a Division of the SC in violation of the constitutional provision, that only the SC En Banc may

modify or reverse a SC doctrine and principle, would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.
Any entry of judgment may thus be said to be inefficacious since the decision is void for being
unconstitutional. That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of occasional
error cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general allegation of occasional error
but also a seriousaccusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles of law
were modified or reversed by the Courts Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution. David Lu v.
Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. v. David Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v. The Hon. Court of
Appeals of Ceby City, et al. G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889. February 15, 2011 .
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies. Petitioners argue that the
Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
declaring the prepayment stipulation in the contract between Land Bank and Remad Livestock
Corporation (REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code of the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not
give merit to petitioners argument. It emphasized that the COA Auditor noted that nowhere in the
documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD. It is well settled that findings of
fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this
Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters
under their jurisdiction. If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have
produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, the
Supreme Court was at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as its review of
Annex I, the document to which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does not
contain such a stipulation or provision. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that much reliance was
made by petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the Credit Facility Proposal allowed for
prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD.
It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating from the Land
Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the
cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the parties embody the terms and conditions of a
transaction. If there is any agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a form of prepayment
scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such
stipulation as petitioners had failed to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present
petition. Based on the foregoing, the COA was not faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the
commission of the irregular transaction. Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219,
February 8, 2011 .
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from coverage. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all landsexclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry-raising from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioners
admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. The SC, in
this case, accorded respect to the CAs observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating

Teams Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by
petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011 .
Agrarian Reform; just compensation. The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that should apply in the
determination of just compensation for the subject agricultural land. The LBP and the DAR argue that
P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be applied in determining the just compensation for
the subject property of the case. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula
in determining the just compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972. As the
subject property was tenanted and devoted to rice production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at
the prevailing rate at that time, when the emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the
soil was declared in P.D. No. 27. As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it applies only
to ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972. According to them, the governments
OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues
separately and distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and
distribution program under R.A. No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27
and EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This is so since the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 are also
applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No.
228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. It would certainly be
inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228
considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Magin V. Ferrer, et al./Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by
Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman v. Antonio V. Ferrer and Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R. No. 172230, February
2, 2011 .
Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just compensation. It is the initial valuation made by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the Philippines that must be released to the
landowner in order for DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA 6657
does not authorize the release of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators determination of just
compensation for the land which has not yet become final and executory. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and
Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23,
2011 .
Civil Service Law
Regulations; Civil Service. Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be
filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. Resolution
No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the
2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion
plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of
the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law

Center. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et
al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011 .
Local Government Code
Cityhood; criteria for conversion. The cases involved here were initiated by the consolidated petitions
for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and
Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality
covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated
November 18, 2008, the SC En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood
Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. Then,
in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the SC En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood
Laws as constitutional. Thereafter, on August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a
vote of 7-6, reinstated the November 18, 2008 Decision. The SC held that the Cityhood laws were
constitutional. Based on the deliberations by Congress on R.A. No. 9009, Congress intended that those
with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher
income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and
12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of
the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws
were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation
of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. League of Cities
of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056, February 15, 2011 .
Legislative power; amendment. R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the SC also held that, in effect, the
Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood
Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such
Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al.
v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil.
etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011 .
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) v.La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), March 22, 2011
Non- exclusivity for the operation of a public utility.
FACTS:
TMPC is a cooperative organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, LaTrinidad,
Benguet. On the other hand, LTWD is a local water utility created under PD 198 which authorized to
LTWD supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet.On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the NWRB an application for a certificate of
public convenience to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed

TMPCs application claiming that under Section 47 of PD No. 198 its franchise is exclusive. In its
Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPCs application for a CPC. In its 15
August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWDs franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and
maintain a waterworks system.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is exclusive.
RULING:
NO. The constitution provides in Section 11, Article XII that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form
of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,certificate or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. The Constitution is clear that franchises for
the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. This constitutional prohibition is
absolute and accepts no exception. On the other hand, PD No.198, as amended, allows the BOD of
LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that the
board of directors consents thereto x x x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a
glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.

GANNAPAO V CSC
Administrative proceedings; due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of. In the application of the
principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial
of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he was not denied due process. Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed
against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge
investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearingon the complaint,
petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side.
He was not denied due process.
Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative circumstance. Length of service as a
factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is not always a
mitigating circumstance. It is an alternative circumstance, which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate
the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. Where the government employee concerned
took advantage of his long years of service and position in public office, length of service may not be

considered in lowering the penalty. The Court will take this circumstance against the public officer or
employee in administrative cases involving serious offenses, even if it was the first time said public
officer or employee was administratively charged.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; requirements; examples. The acts of
respondent constitute the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, which need not be related to, or connected with, the public officers official functions. As long
as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding
penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. Under the Civil Service law and rules,
there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, the Court has considered the following
acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation
of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to
safe keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court
orders; a judges act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation;
and a court interpreters participation in the execution of a document conveying complainants property
which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family.
Procedural due process; right to cross-examine. While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of
procedural due process, the right does not require an actual cross examination but merely an
opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case, while National Police
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall
take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, petitioner missed this
opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental
answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer considered the case submitted for
decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with a copy of the complaint
and its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a
motion to dismiss.
CSC V MERLE RAMONEDA (Issue: Administrative Jurisdiction of SC)
Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court defined dishonesty as
intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any
deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus,
dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of
intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken
not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but
also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment. Evidence showed that respondent was not the one who took the Civil
Service Sub-Professional Examinations. The Court, citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
stressed that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of the
esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty

perpetrated by its employees. Civil Service Commission vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-082531. April 11, 2013
There lies the question as to how should respondent then be proceeded against with respect to her
employment in the Judiciary. We deem that we cannot just implement CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 and
dismiss the respondent outright. The Court still maintains its administrative jurisdiction over the
respondent and should therefore have the final determination of her administrative liability.
The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the
Supreme Court through the OCA as shown in several cases. The Court, however, has made exceptions in
certain cases. In the very recent case of Ampong, the Court, although it declared that it had
administrative jurisdiction over the petitioner, nevertheless upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the
principle of estoppel
We have always maintained that it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.24 However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of
the law, that is, afforded due process. She was able to file several affidavits and pleadings before the
CSC with counsel. It may also be noted that the case had been elevated to the Court of Appeals and this
Court, where the Resolution of the CSC was upheld in both instances.
OCA V DESIDERIO(Issue: Effect of Cessation of office)
Macusis prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is baseless. Macusis constructive
resignation from service through filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 Local Elections does
not render the case against him moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability
when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.27 As the Court held in Baquerfo v. Sanchez28:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said
administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of
the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had
ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondents resignation does not preclude the finding
of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
MARK JEROME MAGLALANG V PAGCOR( Doctrine of Exhaustion of Adm. Remedy)
It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution] governmentowned or controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original
charters, as distinguished from those created under general law.
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983.
Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR

should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service
Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and jurisprudence that provide that
when the penalty involved in an administrative case is suspension for not more than 30 days, the CSC
has no appellate jurisdiction over the said administrative case. As authority, petitioner invokes our ruling
in Geronga v. Hon. Varela23which cited Section 47,24 Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 292 otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section 47 provides that
the CSC may entertain appeals only, among others, from a penalty of suspension of more than 30 days.
Petitioner asserts that his case, involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC.
Thus, he submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a petition for certiorari.25
On the other hand, PAGCOR alleges that petitioner intentionally omitted relevant matters in his
statement of facts. PAGCOR essentially claims that petitioner refused to apologize to Cecilia; that he
treated Cecilias complaint with arrogance; and that before taking the aforementioned 10-minute break,
petitioner slammed the cash to the counter window in giving it back to the customer. PAGCOR argues
that the instant petition raises questions of fact which are not reviewable in a petition for review on
certiorari. Prescinding from the foregoing, the sole question for resolution is: Was the CA correct in
outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies? We resolve the question in the negative.
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime
Holdings, Inc.28 on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is
irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego

of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would
greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13)
where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.29
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered
by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30
days.
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
provides for the unavailability of any appeal:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may
be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in
which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or
group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case
the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the department head.
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the
law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty
(30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy reason for
declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are
the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level
appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat
the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is
not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn

evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism
cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequiturto contend that
since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a
decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are
still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco
OFC OF OMBUDSMAN V JOSE CAPULONG(Issues: Findings of facts of an Adm. Agency)
The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Section 85 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713
Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct
under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service7 filed on
July 27, 2009, before the Ombudsman, by Joselito P. Fangon, Acting Director of the General
Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman, against respondent Jose T. Capulong , Customs Operation
Officer V of the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
These charges were based on two particular acts: first, for failure to file the required Statements of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for calendar years 1987, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1998; and
second, for failure to disclose in his SALNs for calendar years 1999 to 2004 his
wifes business interest in two corporations, namely, SYJ Realty Corporation and Radsy Production, Inc.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman issued an Order dated December 7, 2009 directing Capulong to file a
counter-affidavit.
On March 30, 2011, Capulong received an undated Order12 issued by the Ombudsman placing him
under preventive suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is terminated but shall not
exceed six months effective from receipt of the Order. Capulong filed an Urgent Motion to
Lift/Reconsider Order of Preventive Suspension with Motion to Resolve13 contending that his
preventive suspension was not warranted because his continued stay in office will not prejudice the
investigation of the case against him. Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the
threatening and coercive nature of the Ombudsmans order, Capulong, on April 19, 2011, filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari. temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA granted the petition and issued a TRO dated April 26, 2011, enjoining and prohibiting the
Ombudsman and any person representing them or acting under their authority from implementing the
preventive suspension order of the Ombudsman until further orders from the court. Meanwhile, the
Ombudsman issued an Order dated May 13, 2011 lifting Capulongs preventive suspension. On the
same date, in the scheduled hearing, the Ombudsmans representative manifested in open court that
the assailed order of preventive suspension had already been lifted, thus the CA held in abeyance the
application for preliminary injunction.
On May 18, 2011, Capulong filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File and Admit Memorandum
asking the CA to rule on the merits of the petition. On the other hand, the Ombudsman filed a
manifestation on June 9, 2011 declaring that the lifting of Capulongs preventive suspension had
rendered the case moot and academic; hence the petition should be dismissed.

On July 29, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,which granted Capulongs petition and
dismissed the criminal charge docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0560-J (LSC). According to the CA, the petition is
not rendered moot and academic by the subsequent lifting of Capulongs preventive suspension. The CA
further held that: (a) the Ombudsman has lost its right to prosecute Capulong for non-filing of SALNs
because it had already prescribed in accordance with Act No. 3326;21 and (b) the simple allegation of
non-disclosure of Capulongs spouses business interest does not constitute gross misconduct and
serious dishonesty since the complaint-affidavit failed to allege that the said non-disclosure were
deliberately done. Hence, there was absolutely no basis to warrant Capulongs preventive suspension as
it is evident on the face of the complaint that there was nothing to support the same.

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN.
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished
by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall
prescribe after twenty years. Provided, however, That all offenses against any law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. (As amended by Act No. 3585 and by Act No.
3763, approved on November 23, 1930.)
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the
law not included in the Penal Code.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved on December 4, 1926
Ineluctably, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint. The
Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule. However, the crime of perjury for which Capulong
was charged, requires a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in a statement under oath or in
an affidavit, and the statement or affidavit in question here is Capulong's SALNs. It then becomes
necessary to consider the administrative charge against Capulong to determine whether or not he has

committed perjury. Therefore, with the dismissal of Capulong's administrative case, the CA correctly
dismissed its criminal counterpart since the crime of perjury which stemmed from misrepresentations in
his SALNs will no longer have a leg to stand on.
-

End -

Nota bene:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers
of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or
beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.

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