Professional Documents
Culture Documents
14 January-February 2008 •
1LT Rory McGovern, E Company, 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment (E/2-5), Fire Support
Officer, left, and an interpreter, center, conduct tactical questioning near Abu Ghraib in April
2007. (Photo by CPT Lawrence Obst, E/2-5 CAV)
tion and local pattern analysis within ligence cell’s mission was to conduct
its own AO than traditional military company-level intelligence operations
intelligence systems and organizations in the Iraq theater of operations during
at higher levels. Commanders must un- OIF 06-08 to support E/2-5 Cav’s COIN
derstand this strength and organize their and reconstruction operations.
intelligence cells to maximize efforts in Brief and to the point, the mission
these areas, not overreach and attempt statement answers the “five W’s” (who,
to handle everything under the broad what, where, when and why) without
umbrella of military intelligence. getting into the specificity of how the
To keep the focus on HUMINT and mission is going to be accomplished.
pattern analysis, company intelligence The simplicity of the mission statement
cells should be organized to meet three is not indicative of a simple mission. The
distinct requirements: collect raw HU- mission is broad and complex, further
MINT in the field, collect and record data complicated by the fact that none of
in the CP and analyze the data collected those executing the mission are trained
or recorded in the field and in the CP. All intelligence professionals. This being the
else in the company intelligence cell’s case, the “how” must be planned for in a
critical task list (CTL) comes from these detailed CTL and battle rhythm.
three basic requirements. This demands Critical Task List. The E/2-5 Cav intel-
that company intelligence cells organize ligence cell deployed with an established
to build it. The intelligence cell must in such a manner that divides work to CTL that was adapted and modified over
be organized in such a way that it can maximize efficiency. time. Based on what that CTL became
meet its requirements efficiently. In In the model implemented in E/2-5 over the course of my time with E/2-5
establishing these requirements, it must Cav, the FIST is responsible for the col- and on thorough retrospection of how
be noted that the need for a company lection of HUMINT in the field which it could have been improved, Figure 2,
intelligence cell in no way negates the includes: meeting with local nationals, on page 16, is a suggested CTL for all
need for intelligence sections at higher conducting sensitive site exploitation company intelligence cells. Each task is
echelons. In fact, the company intel- (SSE) on objectives, conducting tactical discussed below.
ligence cell is most effective if its work questioning, etc. Simultaneously, head- 1. Collect data and conduct pattern
is complementary to the battalion S2 quarters platoon Soldiers are responsible analysis.
shop’s work, not in place of it. for logging and plotting significant ac- Collect and Analyze Patrol Debriefs.
A company intelligence cell should tivities (SIGACTS) and collecting patrol Patrol debriefs are important in painting
not be organized and tasked to perform debriefs. The responsibility for the final the overall intelligence picture in a com-
those tasks that can be performed bet- requirement, the analysis, lies with the pany AO. Though the FIST is responsible
ter by the already existing intelligence company intelligence cell leadership— for the intelligence cell’s operations in
support systems and infrastructures. By the FSO and FSNCO. the field, the FIST reasonably cannot be
focusing primarily on its own areas and Mission. With the organization and on every patrol. These debriefs become
conducting operations in the field, the basic requirements established, the the intelligence cell’s record of what hap-
company intelligence cell’s strength is commander and the FSO next must pened on missions and patrols it wasn’t
that it unquestionably is suited better for agree upon a mission statement for the actively a part of. Detailed debriefs are
human intelligence (HUMINT) collec- intelligence cell. The E/2-5 Cav intel- vital not only in answering priority intel-
ligence requirements (PIRs) and specific
information requirements (SIRs), but
Legend:
also in providing a written record from
HQ Plt FIST Line Plt** FIST = Fire Support Team which enemy tactics, techniques and
FSNCO = Fire Support NCO procedures (TTPs) can be gleaned.
FSO = Fire Support Officer
HQ = Headquarters
A complex ambush in one month might
OIC: FSO
NCOIC = NCO in Charge bear striking similarities to a complex
NCOIC: FSNCO*
4 x HQ Plt Soldiers
OIC = Officer in Charge ambush in an earlier month. Being able to
Plt = Platoon
FIST Soldiers
SGT = Sergeant confirm the details about the two attacks
Line Plt Soldiers**
might help the company adjust its own
procedures and prevent such attacks in
Company
* Original concept had the HQ Plt SGT assigned the future. It is the headquarters Soldiers’
as the NCOIC.
Intelligence ** Original concept did not have Line Plt Soldiers responsibility within the intelligence cell
Cell assigned to the cell, but the author feels their
addition would enhance its capabilities greatly.
to ensure debriefs are collected for review
and analysis by the FSO and FSNCO. A
method that worked in E/2-5 Cav was
to have one laptop in the common area
Figure 1: Building the Fire Support Team (FIST)-Centered Company Intelligence Cell
of the CP set aside for patrol leaders to
cells should track SIGACTS in their area companies must have an independent the proponent and Artillery as the unit type.
of interest (AI) as well as their AO. These way of executing bilateral engagements Figure 2: Suggested Critical Tasks List for
should be tracked because enemy orga- with local nationals without waiting for a Company Intelligence Cell
nizations in the AI are closely related to, a scheduled meeting with a THT. This
if not the same as, enemy organizations naturally falls under the purview of the cell is the liaison between the company
in the AO. Thus, patterns just outside company intelligence cell. and whatever organizations or agencies
the AO likely will reflect patterns within It is important, however, that the intel- exploit the evidence and interrogate the
the AO. These also should be tracked ligence cell provides the battalion with detainees, ensuring that the company is
because the enemy won’t withhold an a detailed summary of any exchange aware of any intelligence gained from
attack because a company’s duties take it that generates HUMINT. The battalion those endeavors.
just outside the boundaries of its AO. intelligence section and the THT associ- 3. Facilitate exchange and dissemina-
Conduct Local Intelligence Analysis ated with it, if there is one, can format tion of intelligence.
and Forecast Enemy Actions. This task the summary into a draft intelligence Facilitate Information Flow between
relies heavily on the pattern analysis report and log it into databases acces- Company and Battalion S2. This task
described above. Combining pattern sible by any unit or agency in theater or is vital to the proper functioning of a
analysis with analysis of HUMINT stateside with the necessary clearance. company intelligence cell. One of the
gained from sources, tips, spot reports, As these summaries are sent to the bat- faults of a traditional battalion S2 shop
intelligence reports, etc., will paint a talion, they should be sent to adjacent is it is not accessible easily from the
detailed picture of what is going on units simultaneously. company level. The company intel-
in the AO with regard to enemy ac- Supervise Detainee Operations. At ligence officer and NCO can serve as
tions, popular opinion and loyalties of the battalion level and higher, detainee the liaison between the company and
individuals, tribes or sects within the operations fall under the realm of the the battalion S2, sorting through infor-
AO, and so forth. With this picture, the intelligence sections, and this also mation and products gleaned from the
company intelligence cell can provide should be the case at the company level. S2 shop to separate what is relevant to
the commander with a reasonably ac- From the point of capture in the field, the company’s operations and ensuring
curate forecast of what the enemy’s next if possible, to the point of transfer to a the dissemination of appropriate intel-
steps may be. higher authority, the intelligence cell is ligence throughout the company. Further,
2. Conduct HUMINT operations. in charge of detainee operations. The in ensuring the information flows both
Create and Execute Tactical Question- intelligence cell ensures that paperwork ways, the company intelligence cell can
ing and SSE Plans. On intelligence- is filled out and evidence is documented have a positive effect on the battalion S2
driven raids or similar operations, the properly. Afterwards, the intelligence shop because of its unique and valuable
16 January-February 2008 •
perspective gained from the company tions and operational templates of two Summary. Every month, the intelligence
intelligence cell’s intimate knowledge al Qaeda-affiliated organizations in a cell should produce a detailed intel-
of its own AO and interaction with the town sitting along the MultiNational ligence summary. This product is sin-
local populace. Division, Baghdad (MND-B) and gularly important because it can shape
Facilitate Intelligence Sharing with MultiNational Forces, West (MNF-W) company operations significantly. The
Adjacent Units. In terms of contribut- boundary. This proved to be an important intelligence summary should include a
ing to the larger fight, this is the most first step in the eventual successful effort written summary of the current situa-
important thing the company intelligence to regain control of that city. tion in the AO, noting the identities and
cell can do. A company’s AO will never Maintain Intelligence Board for Outgo- dispositions of key individuals and
encompass the entire sphere of influence ing Patrols. The platoons and the com- groups (friendly and hostile), the cur-
of any given tribe, sect or even individual. pany will benefit from a well placed, well rent overall enemy situation, a written
This being the case, a company’s AO kept intelligence board somewhere in the 30-day SIGACT analysis noting recent
and AI undoubtedly will be merely a company CP. The board serves as a quick patterns, a 30-day SIGACT rollup chart
fraction of the size of its enemies’ AO reference for leaders before missions. (see Figure 3), 30-day SIGACT graphs
and AI. With intelligence sharing across The intelligence board should include the by type, time and day, and a map of the
unit boundaries going through the usual following: current light and weather data, AO noting locations of SIGACTS in the
channels, a company rarely will receive updated SIGACT trackers and graphs, last 30 days.
relevant and timely intelligence from current battalion and company PIRs 4. Advise the commander.
the areas around it if those areas are and SIRs, enemy situational template, Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the
controlled by other battalions, brigades recently observed enemy TTPs, current Battlefield for Company Operations. The
or divisions. This problem can be solved route status and copies of the most recent company intelligence cell is to company
by company intelligence cells serving as monthly intelligence summary. operations what the battalion S2 shop
conduits of information—facilitators of a Produce Detailed Monthly Intelligence is to battalion operations. Based on all
mutual exchange of relevant and timely
intelligence with adjacent units for the
benefit of all units involved. 0000 0100
E/2-5 Cav’s AO in OIF 06-08 sat in the 2300
02
southwestern portion of its brigade’s AO, 22
00 0 0
which in turn lay in the northwestern 03
portion of the division’s AO. As such, 00
21
00
its western boundary was a division
boundary split by an Iraqi Army (IA) bat-
04
00
00
20
0500
1900
0600
Sunday
that was not numerous in the rest of the
battalion AO, but enjoyed prominence in
Monday
the IA and USMC controlled areas to the
1700
0700
west and in a different brigade’s AO to
Tuesday
the south. What happened in E/2-5 Cav’s
AO affected events in those areas, and
00
08
Wednesday
16
00
15
a network of willing junior officers and Friday 10
senior NCO’s from all concerned units for
0 0 00
14
the purpose of sharing intelligence. Up- 1300 Saturday 1100
to-the-minute information was shared as
1200
18 January-February 2008 •