LARA

VS DEL ROSARIO
94 Phil 778

FACTS: Lara et al were former taxi drivers of the defendant. When the latter sold some
of his vehicles, the plaintiffs who were no longer needed were dismissed. Because the
employer did not give them their one months salary in lieu of the notice required in Art
302 of the Code of Commerce, this action was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1949.

HELD: In this case, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum held that the New Civil Code
of the Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the
Official Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having
been made on August 30, 1949. The plaintiffs then are not entitled to any
compensation, the New Civil Code having repealed the Code of Commerce.

PEOPLE VS SIMON
234 SCRA 555, 569 (1994)

FACTS: Accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charges on November 10, 1988
with a violation of Section 4, Article II of RA No 6425 under an indictment alleging that
on October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags
to a NARCOM poseur-buyer in consideration of P40.00, which tea bags when subjected
to a laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. On December 4, 1989,
the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Intermediate Sentence Law is applicable to the case.

HELD: Yes. Drug offenses are not included in nor has the appellant committed any act
which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed
dies not involve reclusion perpetua to death. The Intermediate Sentence Law is a legal
and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused.

PEOPLE VS GODOY
250 SCRA 676, 732 (1995)

FACTS: Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate filings before the
Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention of 17-year-old Mia Taha.

ISSUE: Whether or not, if found guilty, accused-appellant Godot will be subject to death
penalty imposed by RA No 7659.


HELD: Yes, since RA No 7659 which reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous
crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, fifteen days after its publication in the
December 16, 1996 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya, and Philippine
Times Journal, and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.

GSIS VS COMMISSION ON AUDIT
301 SCRA 731, 736

FACTS: The case before the Court is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to review
the decision of the Commission on Audit that affirmed the ruling of Corporate Auditor
Mariano C. Gaborne disallowing in the audit the payment of death benefits in the
amount of P43,107.19, to the heirs of the late Brig. Gen. Arturo T. Asuncion, who died
on November 16, 1987, in a helicopter crash, for the reason that a reserve officer like
him of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was not at that time a compulsory member
of the GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Brig. Gen. Asuncion should receive payment of
death benefits.

HELD: Yes, since EO No. 79 is effective fifteen days following its publication in the
Official Gazette, or on January 7, a987. At that time, the late Brig. Gen. Asuncion was a
reserve officer who had rendered a total of ten years of continuous active duty service
commission in the AFP. Hence, he was compulsorily covered as a member of the GSIS on
the date he died on November 15, 1987, in line of duty in a helicopter crash.
Consequently, his heirs are entitled to payment of death benefits.

TANADA VS TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (1995)

FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as
wells as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette, Lorenzo Tanada, et. al petitioned a writ of mandamus to compel Juan
Tuvera, Executive Assistant to the President et al to publish a number of presidential
decrees, letter of instructions and general order to the Official Gazette.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents
further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of the laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement
for the effectivity of PDs, LOIs, General Orders, Eos, ets, where laws themselves provide
for their own effectivity dates.

HELD: Yes, since the publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of

general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially informed of its content.

BASA VS MERCADO
L-42226

FACTS: Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. On January 30,
1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared
him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration
proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which
they prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked
jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with
requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in the following
section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that
although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required
notice for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on
the will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the
hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of
the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The
appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly
newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published, was a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

ISSUE: Whether the 21 days requirement for publication be followed pursuant to the
sec. 630 of Code of Civil Procedure? Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper
considered a newspaper of general circulation?

HELD: In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be
published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other
words the first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the
day appointed for the hearing. The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of
general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local
news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the
publication to be made inIng Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of
general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that
publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in
the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of
general circulation.

PEOPLE VS QUE PO LAY

L-6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS: Po Lay was accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank compelling
those who had foreign currency to sell the same to the Central Bank. Po Lay alleged that
as the circular had not yet been published in the Official Gazette before he committed
the act, the circular should have no effect on his act and that, therefore, he should be
acquitted.

ISSUE: Is publication in the Official Gazette a requirement for the effectivity of monetary
board circulars?

HELD: Yes, so long as the circulars issued are meant not merely to interpret but to fill in
the details of the Central Bank Act.

MARBELLA-BOBIS VS BOBIS
336 SCRA 747, 755 (2000)

FACTS: Respondent contracted a first marriage with Maria Javier. Without said marriage
having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with a petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage
with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of bigamy despite respondents claim of
ignorance of Art 40 of the Family Code.

HELD: Yes, ignorance of the existence of Art 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complies with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.

CONSUJI VS CA
GR No 137873, April 20, 2001

FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M.
Consunji Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May
9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceaseds employer. The employer raised among other defenses, the
widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the
RTS rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D.M. Consuji, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE: (1)Whether or not the petition is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
(2)Whether or not the injures employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of

selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under
Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages (actual, moral, and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively
of both actions.

HELD: (1)Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor (the thing or transaction speaks for itself)
is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It has the following requisites: (1.1)the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (1.2) the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (1.3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitor are present in the case at bar. Petitioner does not cite any
other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitor, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. (2)
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could
only be filed under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided un the
Workmens Compensation Law, the claimants are deemed to have waived their known
right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that
the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would have opted to avail of a better
remedy than that of which she already had.

ORTIGAS & CO VS CA
GR No 126202, December 4, 2000

FACTS: Ortigas & Co sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills
Subdivision, San Juan with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be
used exclusively for residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later,
a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as
commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso
and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
Ortigas & Co. filed a petition which sought the demolition of the constructed car sales
company against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.
Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the zoning ordinances may impair contracts entered into prior to
its effectivity.

HELD: Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect
over any standing contract. Hence, petition is denied. A law enacted in the exercise of
police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given
retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the
superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover,
statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.

AGUJETAS VS CA
261 SCRA 17 (1996), G.R. No. 106560

FACTS: Criminal charges were filed against three board members of the provincial board
of canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental for violation of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) and R.A. No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987), specifically for the
failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate. After preliminary investigation, criminal
charges against them were filed for violation of 2nd paragraph of Sec 231 in relation to
Sec 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. One of the defenses offered by the accused was
that such crime no longer exists because R.A. No. 6646 and 7166 amended the Omnibus
Election Code and that among those amended was Section 231, which was modified by
Sec 28 of R.A. No. 7166 by removing the specific manner by which the proclamation of
winning candidates by the Board of Canvassers should be made and thereby, in effect,
repealing the second paragraph of Sec 231 of the Old Omnibus Election Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7166 repeals Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code,
saying that winners should be proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers.

HELD: No, since R.A. No. 7166 neither expressly nor impliedly repeals Section 231 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA
251 SCRA 421 (1995), G.R. NO. 120865-71

FACTS: Section 4(k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, R.A. No.
4850, the provisions of P.D. No. 813 and Sec. 2 of E.O. No. 927, specifically provide that
the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said
region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7160, the Local Government Code
of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters.

ISSUE: Did R.A. No. 7160 repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority?

HELD: No, since it has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority constitutes a special law. R.A. No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It
is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a special statute, provided for a particular
case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law.

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statue, the special statute
should prevail since it evidences the legislative intent more clearly that the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general laws in the absence
of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals
are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent
general law by mere implication.

DE AGBAYANI VS PNB
38 SCRA 429

FACTS: Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a Real Estate Mortgage,
which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the Real
Estate Mortgage. Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription.
She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff. PNB argued that the
claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of E.O. 32 to the
time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted; (E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing
for debt moratorium; RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium).
The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was
likewise nullified. Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending
the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of
validity. PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period
since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such,
the action has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?

HELD: No. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from
infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.


However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have
been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such
legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now
accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.
This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period
of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may
lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE).
The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which
legal consequences are attached.

During the 8-year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of
invalidity.

FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORP
G.R. No. 30642, April 30, 1985

FACTS: Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corp
who, while working in its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet oon
June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim
their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens
Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue
Philex for additional damages. Philex invoke that they can no longer be sued because
petitioners have already calimed benefits under WCA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits
under the WCA, then they will be estopped from proceedings with a civil case before
the regular courts, vice versa. The Supreme Court however ruled that Floresca et al are
excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such,
then they may not have availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they win in the
lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA
should be deducted. The Supreme Court emphasized that if they go strictly by the book

in this case, then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the
letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival
and ennobles him.

FILOTEO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
263 SCRA 222 (1196), G.R. No. 79543

FACTS: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police
District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of
various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a
police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the
other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking
of a postal delivery van.

Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers as his
confederates. On May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog
before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero.

Petitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible, saying that the law
should favor him as an accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given
retroactive effect and petitioners extrajudicial confession be held inadmissible
evidence.

HELD: No. While Article 22 of RPC provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is
being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of
Rights which is obviously not a penal statute.

PEOPLE VS AMIGO
252 SCRA 43, 53-54 (1996), G.R. 116719

FACTS: Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the
regional trial court, Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and
pleads for sympathy.

HELD: Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of the courts is to apply
the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused. Dura lex sed lex.
The remedy is elsewhere clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by
the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court cannot but apply the law.