Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

LIGAYA V. SANTOS,
EDNA CORTEZ,
and
CHRISTOPHER CASTILLO,

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2181-RTJ] GIRLIE CASTILLO

Present:

Complainants,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and

JUDGE ROLANDO G. HOW,

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Regional Trial Court, Branch

257, Paraaque City,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
January 26, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Before us is an administrative complaint[1] dated January 31, 2005 filed

by Ligaya V. Santos, Edna Cortez, Girlie Castillo and Christopher Castillo
(complainants) against Judge Rolando G. How (respondent), Regional Trial Court,
Branch 257, Paraaque City, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Partiality
and Serious Misconduct, relative to Criminal Case Nos. 01-0921, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Ligaya V. Santos, and 01-0425, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Rolly Tonion, Jhunrey Soriano, Christopher Castillo, Girlie Castillo,
Robert Bunda and Pedro Jimenez.
The facts of the case as found by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) are as follows:
Complainant Ligaya V. Santos is the Chairwoman of Barangay 659A, Arroceros, Manila, while the other complainants are Barangay Councilors
and Barangay Policemen, respectively. They are presently detained without bail
in Paraaque City Jail as accused in the aforementioned criminal cases involving
the successive 'ambush' incidents during the second quarter of 2001 against two
sons of Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo I. Orda, Jr. On the second
'ambush' incident, the Paraaque City Prosecutor's Office found probable cause
against the accused (complainants herein) but the Department of Justice (DOJ),

upon review, recommended the dismissal of the complaints in a Joint Resolution

dated 13 June 2002.

On 21 June 2002, the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City, acting on

the DOJ Joint Resolution, moved for the withdrawal of the Information against
complainants. It was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 5 July
2001. The Court of Appeals, acting on the Petition filed by Prosecutor Orda in
CA GR SP 72962, nullified the order of withdrawal. As a consequence, the
accused were arrested on the basis of the previous warrants of arrest issued by the
trial court. This Honorable Court, on review, in GR No. 158236, sustained the
ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Upon receipt of the Supreme Court Resolution, the trial court directed the
resumption of the proceedings on the subject criminal cases. However,
Prosecutor Orda filed a motion to inhibit Presiding Judge Raul E. de Leon for
partiality in the issuance of the previous order granting the withdrawal of the
Information. Judge de Leon inhibited himself, and the cases were re-raffled and
eventually assigned to respondent judge before whose court complainants filed
their petition for bail.

On 14 December 2004, the prosecution presented as its first

witness, SABINO FRIAS, the same star witness who previously surfaced with an
affidavit after erstwhile 'star witness' GINA AZARCON repudiated her prior
declarations. Frias re-affirmed his affidavit and positively identified all the
alleged malefactors, including herein complainants.

On 16 December 2004, the prosecution presented its second witness,

JONAS AGNOTE, a Lawton jeepney dispatcher and alleged co-conspirator, who
volunteered

to

testify

only

the

day

before. Agnote directly

implicated Ligaya Santos as the mastermind who instructed him to look for gun-

for-hire, which he provided in the person of 'Dagul' who was eventually hired for
a price of P100,000.00 to kill Prosecutor Orda.

Respondent Judge held that he would resolve the petition for bail
on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. When complainants
manifested that they would present one witness to identify the documents on
record, respondent branded the request as 'misplaced.' He even rejected outright
the request of the defense counsel to make a tender of proof and instead declared
the petition deemed submitted for resolution, subject to the filing of memorandum
by the parties within five (5) days.

On 29 December 2004, respondent issued an Order denying bail to the

accused. Complainants assail the order for being based on a one-sentence
conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong, without any supporting evaluation
or consideration of the issues raised.[2]

In his Comment,[3] respondent professes impartiality in handling the subject

criminal cases. He asserts that he had explained to the parties that, for purposes of
bail hearing, only the prosecution is required to present evidence since it is not yet
a trial of the main case and the court is only preliminarily tasked to determine if the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Respondent argues that, even granting the accused may be allowed to
present their evidence but the Judge did not allow it, the disallowance cannot be
considered partiality or misconduct. He claims that he believed in good faith that
he would fairly and correctly resolve the petition for bail by evaluating it based
solely on the evidence of the prosecution; and that allowing both parties to present
their evidence would mean resolving the merits of the case itself. He contends that
if ever he committed any error, it was an error of judgment committed in good
faith for which complainants have remedies under the Rules.

Respondent further contends that it is inaccurate and unfair to claim that his
Order denying bail was without supporting evaluation of the evidence and only
made a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong. He stresses
that the questioned Order contains a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses
of the prosecution and it is only after the summary that he made a conclusion that
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. He explains that he did not elaborate
each and every point in support of the conclusion since they are already contained
in the summary. He avers that he intentionally made the conclusion terse because
an outright conclusion of everything might be considered a prejudgment of the
case.
In the Agenda Report dated July 13, 2005,[4] the OCA made the following
evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION:

xxxx

Respondent Judge insists that, for purposes of bail hearing, only the
prosecution is required to present evidence since it is not yet a trial of the main
case and the court is only preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt
is strong. He claims that in decreeing such position he merely exercised his
discretion, bail being discretionary in the subject cases, and that if ever he erred in
his ruling it is merely an error of judgment.

The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right
to bail, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong. The rules likewise mandate that before ruling on an
application for bail, a hearing should first be conducted to determine the existence
of a strong evidence against the accused.

A hearing for bail is summary in nature or otherwise in the discretion of

the court. Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving
and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence
for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount
of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing.

It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the

sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty. At the hearing, the court should assure that the prosecution is afforded the
opportunity to adduce evidence relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant
having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal. Both the prosecution and the defense must be given reasonable
opportunity to prove, in the case of the prosecution, that evidence of guilt of the
applicant is strong; and, in the case of the defense, that such evidence of guilt is
not strong. The accused has the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the prosecution and to introduce his evidence in rebuttal to establish his right to
bail.

In fine, the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force the
accused is entitled to provisional release on bail. At the hearing, the petitioner can

rightfully cross examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal.

In the instant case, respondent cut short the hearing after the prosecution
presented its evidence and dispensed altogether with the defense's turn to adduce
evidence in rebuttal. Said denial of the request to present evidence shows
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent
Judge. The deficiency is magnified by respondent's outright denial of
complainants' request to make a tender of proof, which is allowed under the
Rules. It is not accurate to contend that hearing the prosecution overcome its
burden of proof would suffice. Dictates of fair play should have at least reminded
respondent to inquire first the nature of the evidence proposed to be presented,
determine whether or not they will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining
entitlement to bail, before discarding any evidence outright. This is in keeping
with procedural due process, given established rules and jurisprudence on bail.

It is a pressing responsibility of judges to endeavor at all times to avoid

such actions as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process. On
this, respondent had been remiss.

True, as a matter of public policy, a judge may not be disciplined for error
of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to cause injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge
need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his
official functions. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear
of criticism.

The records, however, fail to establish bad faith, corruption, dishonesty or

fraud on the part of respondent, thereby meriting for him a tempered penalty. In

fact, a finding of good faith is consistent with the fact that respondent still granted
both parties opportunity to submit their respective memorandum after he
disallowed the defense to present evidence.

Finally, the rest of the charges against respondent lack

merit. Specifically,

the

charge

of

bias

and

partiality

was

not

substantiated. Moreover, that the decision was based on a one-sentence

conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong is inaccurate. The conclusion to
that effect was actually preceded by a thorough summary of the evidence. The
fact that there was no categorical discussion on how the conclusion was reached
does not make it less a reasonable conclusion. Obviously, respondent accorded
the evidence probative weight, which he deemed to be adequate for his
inference. At any rate, the inadequacy of expression of the questioned Order is
outweighed by its substantial compliance with the requirements for an Order
granting or denying bail.

RECOMMENDATION:

Respectfully submitted for consideration of

the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:

1. The

instant

complaint

be RE-DOCKETED as

regular

administrative case;

1. For deficiency in prudence, which borders on disregard of due

process, respondent be REPRIMANDED with Stern Warning that
subsequent infractions shall be dealt with more severely;

The rest of the charges against respondent be DISMISSED for lack of merit.

We adopt the findings of facts and recommendation of the OCA.

On September 12, 2005, respondent manifested that there is a related case

Administrative Case No. 6701 entitled Judge Rolando G. How v. Atty. Roan
I. Libarios. He avers that since the present case and the latter case arose from the
same incident, the two cases should be consolidated.[5] In its Resolution of August
23, 2006, the Court denied consolidation and considered the matter submitted for
resolution based on the pleadings filed.
On September 23, 2005, complainants manifested their willingness to submit
the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[6]
At issue is whether or not the acts committed by respondent judge constitute
gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and serious misconduct.
On gross ignorance of the law.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[7]
Stressing our ruling in Basco v. Rapatalo,[8] we held that when the grant of
bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains
with the judge. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of
guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross
examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.[9]

The discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control. It must
be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds.[10] Judicial discretion, by its
very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control.[11] An uncontrolled or uncontrollable
discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield,
speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, said: but
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by
law. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular.[12]
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the right of petitioner in bail
proceedings to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.[13] Respondent failed to
observe and consider for his proper determination and evaluation the weight of
evidence presented by the prosecution. This, to our mind, is a clear denial of
complainants right to due process and equal protection of the law as embodied in
our Constitution.[14]
Records show that during the hearing of the application for bail,
complainants' counsel insisted on presenting their evidence to disprove the
allegations of the prosecution. However, respondent argued that the prosecution
has to establish evidence against the accused because if he will go to the defense
evidence, there will be no way of stopping it, it will go through and through, as if,
he is already hearing the main case.[15] This line of argument by respondent is
misplaced considering that what the complainants were asking is for their
evidence, which is already a part of the record, to be presented and admitted as
tender of proof.
The reasons given by respondent that for purposes of bail hearing, only the
prosecution is required to present evidence since it is not yet a trial of the main

case; that the court is only preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt
is strong; and that to allow complainants to present their evidence would mean
resolving the merits of the case itself, are not plausible.
Respondent, in effect, deprived the accused with their right to present
rebuttal evidence which to our mind is a clear violation of their right to due process
and equal protection of the law. As aptly observed by the OCA, dictates of fair
play should have at least reminded respondent to inquire first of the nature of the
evidence proposed to be presented, determine whether or not it will be essential for
the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before discarding any evidence
outright. This is in keeping with procedural due process, given established rules
and jurisprudence on bail.[16]
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent is remiss in his responsibility to
endeavor at all times to avoid such actions as would impress upon litigants the
disregard of due process.
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability
civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as along as he acts in good faith.[17] To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[18]
However, although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary
action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, relative immunity is not a
license to be negligent, abusive or arbitrary in the performance of his adjudicatory
prerogatives.[19]

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.[20] Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.[21]
However, good faith in situations of fallible discretion inhered only within
the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so
simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond
possible margins of error.[22]
In this case, respondent's act of cutting short the hearing after the
prosecution presented its evidence, without affording the defense to adduce
evidence in rebuttal together with his outright denial of complainants request to
offer proof, is a clear disregard of the right of the accused to disprove that the
evidence of guilt is strong. It is of no moment that respondent
required complainants to submit their memorandum. What is significant is
that complainants were deprived of their constitutional right to present evidence
during the hearing which the respondent may intelligently appreciate and
evaluate in the light of the circumstances then obtaining.

It must be stressed that occupying the exalted position of a judge entails a

lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. Canon 3, Rule
3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the
laws and maintain professional competence. He is mandated to be conversant with
the law and to have more than a cursory acquaintance with the rules and
authoritative doctrines. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance thereof. Judges are expected to have more than just a
modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.

On manifest partiality and serious misconduct.

Nothing in the records suggests that respondent was motivated by malice or
corrupt motives to deny the application for bail. Complainants failed to
substantiate their other allegations with competent proof besides their own bare
allegations. Respondent did what he thought was right under the law and
established principles. Hence, respondent could not be held liable for manifest
partiality and serious misconduct. The Court cannot presume partiality based on
the circumstances alleged in the complaint.
Moreover, for serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of
should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules.[23] The records are bereft of any evidence to
this effect to warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On denying bail based on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt
is strong.
We agree with the OCA that although there was no categorical discussion on
how the conclusion, that the evidence of guilt is strong, was reached, the same does
not make it less a reasonable conclusion. The inadequacy of expression of the
questioned Order is outweighed by its substantial compliance with the
requirements for an Order granting or denying bail.
In sum, the act of respondent in denying the complainants the right to
present evidence constitutes simple ignorance of the law; but in the absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations on the part of the respondent,
the penalty of reprimand recommended by the OCA is just and reasonable.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Judge Rolando G. How guilty of simple

ignorance of the law and REPRIMANDS him with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Chairperson

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]

[13]
[14]

[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]

[21]
[22]
[23]

Rollo, pp. 1-29.

Id. at 519-520.
Id. at 410-419.
Id. at 522-524.
Id. at 527-528.
Id. at 529-530.
Sec. 7, Rule 114, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
336 Phil. 214 (1997).
Paderenga v. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 862, 876 (1995).
Supra note 8.
Id.
Id., citing Francisco, Ricardo J., Criminal Procedure, 1993 ed., p. 226, citing Rex v. Wilkee, 4 Burr., 2527;
98 Reprint, 327, citing in note 26 (a), 6 C.J., p. 254.
Id. at note 9.
Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
Id. at 523.
Hilado v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 146, 162.
Sacmar v. Reyes-Carpio, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1766, March 28, 2003, 400 SCRA 32, 35.
Managuelod v. Paclibon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1726, March 29, 2004, 426 SCRA 377, 382.
Officers and Members of the IBP, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691,
November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 87, 110; Ong v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA
150, 159; Pesayco v.Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450,
460; Dadizon v. Asis, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1760, January 5, 2004, 419 SCRA 456, 463-464; Zuo v. Cabebe, A.M.
OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 382, 391.
Balsamo v. Suan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1656, September 17, 2003, 411 SCRA 189, 200.
Dantes v. Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1919, June 27, 2005, 461 SCRA 236, 246.
Francisco v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-04-37, March 16, 2004, 425 SCRA 521, 525.

SECOND DIVISION
ROGELIO H. VILLANUEVA,

ADM. CASE NO. 5018

Complainant,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. AMADO B. DELORIA,

Respondent.
Promulgated:

January 26, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

This treats of the Complaint[1] for Disbarment dated February 17, 1999 filed
by Rogelio H. Villanueva (Villanueva) against Atty. Amado B. Deloria in connection
with HLRB Case No. REM-080592-5166, entitled Spouses Conrado De Gracia v.
Estate of Jaime Gonzales, et al. Atty. Deloria, a former full-time Commissioner of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), appeared as counsel for the
spouses De Gracia.

Villanueva avers that a decision in that case was rendered by Housing and
Land Use Arbiter,[2] Atty. Teresita R. Alferez, requiring the Estate of Jaime
Gonzales to, among other things, refund to the spouses De Gracia the amount
of P69,000.00 plus interest at the prevailing commercial interest rates. The case
was eventually assigned to Villanueva upon the latters designation as Arbiter.

It appears that Atty. Deloria filed a Motion for Issuance of Substitute

Judgment and for Consignation[3] claiming that the Estate of Jaime Gonzales does
not want to pay interest based on commercial interest rates. Villanueva asserts,
however, that Atty. Delorias allegation is belied by two motions filed by counsel

for the Estate of Jaime Gonzales which merely seek to clarify the precise interest
rate applicable to the case in order for it to fully comply with the decision.

Atty. Delorias misrepresentation is allegedly a violation

Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Canons 1,[4]

of

the

10,[5] 12[6] and 19[7] thereof, the Attorneys Oath of Office and Art. 19 of the Civil
Code. Atty. Deloria also allegedly violated Canon 11[8] of the Code because he
sought the substitution of a decision which he knew had already become final and
partially executed.

Villanueva notes that Atty. Deloria enclosed with his motion a check in the
amount of P69,000.00 payable to the order of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales and
Corazon Gonzales, representing the principal refunded to the spouses
De Gracia in compliance with the decision. Villanueva states that the check was
drawn against Atty. Deloriaspersonal checking account in violation of Canon
16[9] of the Code.

Moreover, according to Villanueva, Atty. Deloria offered him 50% of the

recoverable amount in the case if he resolves the latters motion
favorably.[10] Atty. Deloriasconduct allegedly violates the previously cited canons
of the Code, Canon 13,[11] Rule 15.06,[12] Canon 15 of the Code, Art. 212 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Attorneys Oath of Office and Art. 19 of the Civil Code.

Villanueva also alleges that Atty. Deloria used his influence as former
Commissioner of the HLURB to persuade Atty. Alferez to impose interest based on
commercial rates instead of the interest rate fixed in Resolution No. R-421[13] and
Memorandum Circular No. 19,[14] both of which provide a uniform rate of interest
in decisions involving refunds. Atty. Deloria also allegedly used his connections in
the HLURB to prevent Villanueva from releasing an Order denying
the formers motion and to prevail upon the agencys Legal Services Group to

interpret the term commercial rate of interest in a way that is favorable to his
clients case, again in violation of the Code.[15]

Further, Villanueva claims that Atty. Deloria assisted his client in filing an
unfounded criminal case against him before the Office of the Ombudsman with
the purpose of getting even with Villanueva for denying their motion. When his
client pursued this course of action, Atty. Deloria allegedly should have withdrawn
his services in accordance with Rule 22.01,[16] Canon 22 of the Code.

In his Comment[17] dated September 22, 2000, Atty. Deloria denies any
wrongdoing and sought the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of merit. He avers
that the refusal of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales to pay the interest stipulated in
the decision is evident from the various motions it has filed. On the alleged
commingling of his funds with those of his clients, Atty. Deloria claims that the
spouses De Gracia requested him to advance the amount intended for
consignation as they were then on vacation in the United States. He also
maintains that he did not exert any influence on the HLURB to rule in his clients
favor, adding that the draft order which he filed in the case is required under the
rules of the agency.

Atty. Deloria counters that it is Villanueva who has exhibited partiality in

favor of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales by failing to rule on the motions for
clarification filed by the latter, thereby forcing the spouses De Gracia to wait for
an inordinately long time for the decision in their favor to be fully implemented.

Villanueva, in his Reply[18] dated November 10, 2000, contends that he

would have been indicted by the Office of the Ombudsman if it were true that his
Order in the case was motivated by bias and partiality in favor of the Estate of
Jaime Gonzales.

In a Resolution[19] dated February 19, 2001, we referred the case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

Investigating
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted
a
[20]
Report dated September 29, 2005, finding merit in the Complaint and
recommending that Atty. Deloria be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years and/or be fined in the amount of P20,000.00. This recommendation was
annulled and set aside by the IBP in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-279 dated May
26, 2006. The case was instead dismissed for lack of merit.

The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

appears to be based solely on the Rollo of the case which the Court sent to the
IBP pursuant to the Resolution dated February 19, 2001. The Investigating
Commissioner did not conduct any hearing to determine the veracity of the
allegations
in Villanuevas
Complaint and
the
truthfulness
of
Atty. Delorias answers thereto.

A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be

dispensed
with
except
for
valid
and
compelling
[21]
[22]
reasons. In Baldomar v. Paras, we held:

Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court.
If, at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit,
it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further
inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely
evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal
investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be
heard. An ex-parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to
appear despite reasonable notice. x x x

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for investigation in
disbarment and disciplinary proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus:

Sec. 8. Investigation.Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent

to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation
of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his
behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex-parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from
the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of
Governors upon prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by
the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding
charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall
require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP
Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with
the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing
shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Baord of Governors shall within a like period of
fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if
warranted, the imposition of penalty.

We find that due observance of the foregoing rules is necessary for the
proper resolution of this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings. The IBP is also directed
to act on this referral with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE
TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

O.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 1-38.

[2]

Now HLURB Commissioner.

[3]

Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 47-49.

[4]

CANON 1A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[5]

CANON 10A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
[6]

CANON 12A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
[7]

CANON 19A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW.
[8]

CANON 11A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
[9]

CANON 16A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

[10]

Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 13.

[11]

CANON 13A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.
[12]

Rule 15.06A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.
[13]

Rollo, p. 71.

[14]

Id. at 60.

[15]

Id. at 17-21.

[16]

Rule 22.01A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
a)
When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he
is handling;
b)
When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c)
When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
d)
When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
e)
When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
f)
When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g)
Other similar cases.

[17]

Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 177-190.

[18]

Id. at 195-203.

[19]

Id. at 233.

[20]

Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 245-255.

[21]

Tabang v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6490, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 307; Fajardo v. Dela Torre, A.C. No.
6295, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 125; and Arandia v. Magalong, 435 Phil. 199 (2002).
[22]

401 Phil. 370, 373 (2000), citing Cottam v. Atty. Laysa, 383 Phil. 510, 514-516 (2000).

EN BANC

MARISSA R. MONDALA,
Legal Researcher, Regional Trial

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2010

Court, Branch 136, Makati City,

Complainant,

Present:

Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus -

Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,

Garcia, and
Velasco, Jr., JJ.
JUDGE REBECCA R. MARIANO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 136,

Promulgated:

Makati City,
Respondent.

January 25, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative matter concerning the letter-complaint of Marissa

R. Mondala, Legal Researcher of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
136, against Presiding Judge Rebecca R. Mariano of the same court.[1]

In her letter, Mondala charged respondent judge with misrepresenting in

her Report of Pending Cases for January 2005 that she had already decided Civil
Case No. 00-564 entitled Amanet Inc. v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc. when in fact the case was still with Mondala for research and drafting of the
decision.

In her Comment, Judge Mariano denied Mondalas allegations and insisted

that at the time she prepared the monthly report, a decision had actually been
prepared in theAmanet case and it was mere oversight on her part, not
misrepresentation, when she reported the status of the subject case as
decided. Notwithstanding this, Judge Mariano subsequently prepared and signed
another decision on the same case.[2]

To support her allegations, Judge Mariano attached a certification dated

October 25, 2005 issued by Atty. Teodorico L. Diaz, present Branch 136 Clerk of
Court, as well as the affidavits executed by Prosecutor Teodoro
Rey S. Riel, Jr., former Branch 136 Clerk of Court; Elvira L. Tablate, Clerk-in-Charge
of Civil Cases; and Ma. Theresa M. Belando, a Clerk detailed to Branch 136.[3]

In his affidavit, Atty. Riel claimed that he was the Clerk of Court of Branch
136 from April 1999 up to January 2005; that the Amanet case was among those
reported as decided for the month of January 2005; that when the January 2005
report was being prepared, he was informed by the Clerk-in-Charge for Civil Cases
that a decision had already been prepared and was due for printing in final form;
that Judge Mariano instructed him to include the said case in the list of cases
decided for the month and to submit a copy of the decision later on since it was
still to be printed in final form.

Tablate, Clerk-in-Charge for Civil Cases, stated in her affidavit that when the
January 2005 report was being prepared, the decision in the Amanet case had
already been drafted and was due for printing in final form; that upon the
instruction of Judge Mariano, Amanet was included in the list of cases decided for
the month without attaching a copy thereof and with the intention of submitting
the same at the soonest time; that after submission of the said report and when
the draft decision was being printed in final form, the computer bogged down and
the draft decision could no longer be retrieved.[4]

Belando alleged that she is the permanent employee of the local

government of Makati City detailed to Branch 136; and that she re-typed the final
draft of the Amanet case in the early part of 2005 upon Mondalas instructions.[5]

Atty. Diaz claimed that the Amanet case was one of the cases turned over to
him by Mondala on August 13, 2005; that the Amanet case had been with
Mondala for research since February 2005 while the latter served as Officer-inCharge of Branch 136; that the case remained pending up to the time Mondala
turned over the same to him on August 13, 2005.[6]

Judge Mariano averred that Mondala should have called her attention
regarding the status of the subject case to enable her to address the situation;
that Mondalas failure to inform her of the status of the case showed her
inefficiency and unworthiness as a public servant.

Judge Mariano insisted that the quarrel between her and Mondala which
transpired on August 22, 2005 prompted the latter to write the letter-complaint;
that Mondala is a perennial latecomer, a habitual absentee, and negligent in the
performance of her duties; that Mondalas disrespectful attitude and
unprofessional conduct during the August 22, 2005 encounter prompted her to
ask for Mondalas detail to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Makati RTC.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy Court

Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao and Assistant Court Administrator Antonio H.
Dujua, made the following recommendations, the dispositive portion of which
states:

1.

That the instant case be converted into a regular administrative matter and that
Judge Rebecca R. Mariano be found liable for misrepresenting that she decided
Civil Case No. 00-564 entitled Amanet Inc. vs. Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. sometime in January 2005 when such case had yet to be

printed, signed by her, and filed with the Clerk of Court as of March 7, 2005,
such misrepresentation partaking the nature of dishonesty, and be fined in the
amount of P20,000.00;

2.

That Judge Mariano be directed to explain in writing within ten (10) days from
notice why she should not be disciplined for her failure to decide the following
cases within the 90-day reglementary period without any request for extension
of time being filed by her, to wit:

Case No.

Title

Date

Date Due

Status as

Submitted

of Dec.

For

2004

Decision
CIVIL CASES
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

96-1626

91-980

02-546

93-4083

98-460

01-754

Philam Insurance Co.

June 29,

Sept. 29,

Pending

v. Marathon, Inc.

2004

2004

Resolution

Estate of Zulueta v.

June 30,

Sept. 30,

- do -

Augusto Camara

2004

2004

BPI v. Milwaukee

June 30,

Sept. 30,

Builders, Inc.

2004

2004

Phil. Charter Ins. v.

June 28,

Sept. 28,

Swissair

2004

2004

Export Industry v.

June 28,

Sept. 28,

Sps. Sy

2004

2004

Philam v. Geologistic

June 25,

Sept. 25,

2004

2004

- do -

- do -

- do -

- do -

7.

8.

9.

00-564

Amanet v. Eastern

01-810

M-5893

June 18,

Sept. 18,

2004

2004

Jasper Ong v. HBI

August 27,

Nov. 27,

Securities

2004

2004

In Re: Guardianship of

Sept. 20,

Dec. 20,

Minors Manguale

2004

2004

- do -

- do -

- do -

CRIMINAL CASES
1.

01-2653

PP v. Simon Shamie,
et al.

2.

3.

4.

5.

01-2299

PP v. Lemuel Patungalan

02-2787

PP v. Reynaldo Almerie

03-049

PP v. Wilma Cabe

02-1505

PP v. Alfredo Japon

June 25,

Sept. 25,

2004

2004

June 25,

Sept. 25,

2004

2004

June 23,

Sept. 23,

2004

2004

June 18,

Sept. 18,

2004

2004

June 7,

Sept. 7,

2004

2004

and

3.

That the Office of the Court Administrator be authorized to constitute a team to

conduct a judicial audit of Branch 136-RTC, Makati City, to enable the said Office
to determine the true state of this courts docket.[7]

- do -

- do -

- do -

- do -

- do -

The issues in the instant case are: whether Judge Mariano is liable for
misrepresentation when she included in the January 2005 monthly report the
case of Amanet Inc. v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. as among
the decided cases; and whether respondent judge made inaccurate entries in the
monthly reports and failed to decide the other cases within the 90-day
reglementary period.

We agree with the findings of the OCA that Judge Mariano is liable for
misrepresenting that she had decided the case of Amanet Inc. v. Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. before it was drafted, printed and signed by
her.

Granting arguendo, that Mondala was motivated by a desire for revenge

and harassment due to her quarrel with Judge Mariano on August 22, 2005, this
does not deny the fact that Judge Mariano included an undecided case in the list
of decided cases in the January 2005 monthly report.

There is no merit in Judge Marianos claim that the Amanet case was
included in the list of decided cases because at the time of the preparation of the
report, a decision had already been prepared and was due for printing in final
form.

A decision in a civil case is rendered only upon the signing by the judge who
penned the same and upon filing with the clerk of court. A judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.[8] What
constitutes rendition of judgment is not the mere pronouncement of the
judgment in open court but the filing of the decision signed by the judge with the
Clerk of Court.[9]

It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a

case until the same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and
promulgation.[10] Hence, rendition of judgment is not effected and completed
until after the decision and judgment signed by the trial judge.

In Echaus v. Court of Appeals,[11] we held:

Time honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or

order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set
down in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of
Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after
promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served
on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. x x x[12] (Emphasis supplied)

The fact that Judge Mariano had not yet decided the Amanet case in
January 2005, is likewise pointed out in the affidavit of Tablate, Clerk-in-Charge
for Civil Cases. The records, on the other hand, show that Judge Mariano
submitted the January 2005 monthly report only on March 7, 2005,[13] which
means that it was only then when RTC-Branch 136 initiated the printing of the
decision in the Amanet case.[14]

As correctly pointed out by the OCA, what the monthly report requires is a
list of cases decided during the month covered and not a list of cases with
prepared drafts. Moreover, the list of decided cases should pertain to those
decided during the month for which the report is being submitted, the basis of
which is the seventh paragraph of Administrative Circular No. 4-2004.[15]

Thus, Judge Mariano misrepresented herself regarding the date of the

promulgation of the decision in the Amanet case. While the January 2005
monthly report of Branch 136 was submitted on March 7, 2005, the subject

decision in the Amanet case had not yet been printed. Amanet had obviously not
yet been decided in January 2005.

Judge Mariano is likewise guilty of other administrative transgressions.

The January 2005 monthly report of Branch 136 reveals that there were
cases submitted for decision but remained undecided beyond the 90-day
reglementary period without any request for extension of time within which to
decide the same being submitted.[16]

The records show that Judge Mariano failed to request an extension of time
to decide Civil Case Nos. 01-754 and M-5893 and Criminal Case Nos. 01-2653, 012299, 02-2787, 03-049 and 02-1505. Her request for extension of time to decide
was only with respect to Civil Case Nos. 00-465, 00-594, 99-936, 96-1626, 91-980,
02-546, 93-4083, 00-1022, 01-810 and 98-960, which this Court granted by giving
her additional 30 days from September 30, 2004 within which to decide these
cases.[17]

Despite the extended period, Judge Mariano still failed to decide Civil Case
Nos. 96-1626, 91-980 and 93-4083. The December 2005 Monthly Report
submitted by Judge Mariano shows that these cases remained undecided for
more than a year from the extended period.[18]

A number of other cases were decided more than a year from the time
these were submitted for decision without any request for extension, as shown in
the monthly reports for September, October and November 2005.[19] In the
monthly report for July 2005, Civil Case No. M-5893 and Criminal Case No. 022787 did not have a status report and were not in the list of decided cases for the
same month.[20]

No less than the Constitution mandates that all cases or matters must be
decided or resolved within 24 months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.[21]

In implementing this constitutional mandate, Sec. 5, Canon 6 of the New

Code of Judicial Conduct[22] exhorts in the section on Competence and Diligence
that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

Judges should therefore be prompt in the performance of their judicial

duties for delay in the administration of justice is a common complaint. They are
enjoined to strictly comply with the reglementary period of 90 days in disposing
of a case submitted for decision.[23]

In Request of Judge Roberto S. Javellana for Extension of Time to

Decide,[24] we held that decision-making, among others, is the primordial and
most important duty of every member of the bench. Judges have a sworn duty to
administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. No
less than the Constitution requires that a trial court judge shall resolve or decide
cases within 3 months after they have been submitted for decision. In addition,
the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts Judges to dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required period. A judge should not pay
mere lip service to the 90-day reglementary period for deciding a case.[25]

A judges failure to observe time prescription for the rendition of

judgments in derogation of an otherwise speedy administration of justice
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction. The Court is not unaware of,
and certainly not without sympathy for, the heavy caseload of most judges. Thus,
as it has so often stated on a number of occasions, all that a judge has to do is to

request additional time to decide cases, and such requests, if meritorious, are
almost invariably granted by the Court.[26]

It is desirable that a judge should at all times manifest fidelity to the trust
reposed in him. An adequate grasp of the codal and statutory provisions, not to
mention the Constitution, as well as legal doctrines, is necessary. That he should
be impartial is likewise a truism. Of equal importance, however, is the
promptness with which cases in his sala are disposed of. The peoples faith in the
administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low income group,
would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial
courts, which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended
deliberation, could be expected to act with dispatch. Unfortunately, it cannot be
denied that delay still attends the performance of the judicial task. It could
amount to serious inefficiency, arising either from lack of skill in the handling of
authoritative legal materials or lack of a proper system in the handling of court
business. For that matter, negligence, if reckless in character, could amount to
serious inefficiency.[27]

Respondent judge in Yu v. Serrano[28] signed and submitted to this Court

conflicting monthly reports of pending cases. When the attention of respondent
Judge Serrano was called to the inconsistencies in his reports, he contended that
he signed the same without reviewing them as he relied solely on the reports of
pending cases prepared by his clerk of court. This fact, as well as the loss of the
original copy of the decision in Criminal Case No. 3994 and the records thereof,
show at the very least respondent Judge Serranos gross neglect or inefficiency in
the performance of his duties as municipal judge. As stated by the Court in the
analogous case of Tadiar v. Cases,[29] respondent could not use the clerk of court
as the scapegoat for his remissness and slothfulness.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Panganiban[30] is likewise instructive:

Respondents failure to decide cases constitutes a violation of Canon 3, Rule

3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to dispose of their courts
business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the Constitution, i.e.,
three (3) months or ninety (90) days from the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum. This Canon is intended to implement the Constitution which makes it the
duty of trial courts to decide cases within three months, even as it gives parties to a suit
the right to the speedy disposition of their cases.

Respondent judge knew of the cases pending resolution. In fact, she had been
reporting them to this Court in her monthly reports. Nonetheless, she stated in her
certificates of service that she had no case submitted for decision within the 90 days
preceding the submission of her certificate, in the honest belief that the salary which
she collected on the basis of such certificates had been justly earned notwithstanding
the fact that there are submitted cases remaining for decision. This of course
constitutes misconduct under Rule 140, 1 of the Rules of Court. As an officer of the
court, she should conduct herself strictly in accordance with the highest standards of
ethics.

Neither good faith nor long, unblemished and above average service in the
judiciary can fully justify respondent judges lapses. The Court cannot countenance
undue delay in the disposition of cases which is one of the causes of the loss of faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary and brings it into disrepute. Nor can the Court
turn a blind eye to what might constitute gross misconduct because of the submission of
false certificates of service.[31]

Under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 4-2004, the penalty for
judges and clerks of court who are responsible for inaccurate entries in their
monthly reports is to have their salaries withheld.[32] However, the circumstances
in the instant case warrant a penalty under the Rules of Court as the entries are
not simply inaccurate or the result of mere oversight, but rather the product of a
deliberate misrepresentation of the status of Amanet and other undecided
cases. Respondent judge ought to be held administratively accountable for gross
misconduct in intentionally concealing the truth, i.e., in misleading the Court
regarding the date when she decided the Amanet case and for making inaccurate
entries in her monthly reports, a breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
this Court upon members of the Judiciary.

Under Sec. 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges ought to
ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in the view of a reasonable observer. Integrity is essential not only to the
proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.[33]

In the instant case, respondent was guilty of intentional misrepresentation

of her records resulting in a breach of trust and confidence, amounting to the
serious charge of gross misconduct due to violations of the Canons of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and provisions of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 42004; as well as of making untruthful statements in the monthly reports, as
provided in Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[34] Taking into consideration
the mitigating circumstances that this is her first infraction and that the records
do not show any administrative case filed against her concerning the same or
similar charges, the proper penalty for her acts of deliberate misrepresentation
constituting gross misconduct is a fine of P40,000.00, with a stern warning that a
commission of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely in
the future, in accordance with Sec. 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[35]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rebecca R. Mariano of the Regional Trial

Court of Makati City, Branch 136, is found guilty of the serious charge of gross
misconduct due to violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
provisions of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 4-2004, as well as of
making untruthful statements in the monthly reports; and ordered to pay
a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00 directly to this Court, with a stern warning
that a commission of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent Judges personal

record.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

[1]

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Memorandum for Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban from Hon. Zenaida N. Elepao, Deputy Court
Administrator and Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Court Administrator, and Assistant Court Administrator Antonio
H. Dujua, April 18, 2006.
[2]
Id.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.

[6]

Id.
Id.
[8]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 36, Sec. 1.
[9]
Sta. Maria v. Ubay, Adm. Matter No. 595-CFI, December 11, 1978, 87 SCRA 179, 186. See also Herrera, Oscar
M., Remedial Law Vol. VII: Comments on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure As Amended (1997 ed.), p. 293.
[10]
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80, 91-92.
[11]
G.R. No. 57343, July 23, 1990, 187 SCRA 672.
[12]
Id. at 674.
[13]
Supra note 1.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id. Administrative Circular No. 4-2004 provides for the Revised Form, Rules, Guidelines and Instructions in
Accomplishing the Monthly Report of Cases. Paragraph 7 states:
7.
The following shall be attached to the Form which shall not be submitted separately or in batches,
to wit:
a.
List of cases that have been newly filed or newly raffled;
b.
List of cases that have been revived/reinstated or those received from other salas;
c.
List of cases that have already been decided or resolved, archived or transferred to other salas;
d.
x x x. (Italics supplied).
[16]
Id. See also Rollo, Annexes B and B-2. The January 2005 monthly report shows that Philam Insurance Co.
v. Marathon, Inc., Civil Case No. 96-1626; Estate of Zulueta v. Augusto Camara, Civil Case No. 91-980; BPI v.
Milwaukee Builders, Inc., Civil Case No. 02-546; Phil. Charter Ins. v. Swissair, Civil Case No. 93-4083; Export
Industry v. Sps. Sy, Civil Case No. 98-460; Philam v. Geologistic, Civil Case No. 01-754; Jasper Ong v. HBI
Securities, Civil Case No. 01-810;In Re: Guardianship of Minors Manguale, Civil Case No. M-5893; People v.
Simon Shamie, et al., Criminal Case No. 01-2653; People v. Lemuel Patuggalan, Criminal Case No. 01-2299;
People v. Reynaldo Almerie, Criminal Case No. 02-2787;People v. Wilma Cabe, Criminal Case No. 03-049;
and People v. Alfredo Japon, Criminal Case No. 02-1505 were the cases which remained undecided even beyond the
90-day reglementary period without any request for extension of time.
[17]
Id. See also Id. at Annexes C and C-2.
[18]
Id. See also Id. at Annexes D and D-1. Philam Insurance Co. v. Marathon, Inc., Civil Case No. 96-1626;
Estate of Zulueta v. Augusto Camara, Civil Case No. 91-980; and Phil. Charter Ins. v. Swissair, Civil Case No. 934083 were the three cases that were left undecided within the extended period.
[19]
Id. See also Annexes E, E-1, F, F-2, G and G-1. Philam v. Geologistic, Civil Case No. 01754; People v. Simon Shamie, et al., Criminal Case No. 01-2653; People v. Lemuel Patuggalan, Criminal Case No.
01-2299; People v. Wilma Cabe, Criminal Case No. 03-049; and People v. Alfredo Japon, Criminal Case No. 021505 were the cases decided more than a year from the time these were submitted for decision without any request
for extension having been filed.
[20]
Id. See also Id. at Annexes H and H-1. In Re: Guardianship of Minors Manguale, Civil Case No. M-5893
and People v. Reynaldo Almerie, Criminal Case No. 02-2787 were not in the list of decided cases for the month of
July 2005.
[21]
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 15.
[22]
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC.
[23]
Escabillas v. Martinez, Adm. Matter No. 127-MJ, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 367.
[24]
A.M. No. 01-6-314-RTC, June 19, 2003, 404 SCRA 373.
[25]
Id. at 376-377.
[26]
De Joya v. Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1450, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 408, 410-411.
[27]
Vda. de Lapea v. Collado, Adm. Matter No. 480-MJ, March 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 82, 85-86.
[28]
198 Phil. 831 (1982).
[7]

[29]
[30]

[31]

Adm. Matter No. 89-MJ and Adm. Case No. 1192, October 21, 1974, 60 SCRA 215 (1974).
343 Phil. 276 (1997).

Id. at 281-282.
Admin. Circular No. 4-2004, par. no. 8.
[33]
Id. at Canon 2.
[34]
Sec. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
[32]

1.

Bribery, direct or indirect;

2.

Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);

3.

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

xxxx
[35]

Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions
may be imposed:
1.
Dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in
no case include accrued leave credits;
2.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3.

A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00.

EN BANC

OFFICE
OF
THE
ADMINISTRATOR,

COURT

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1661

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-9-250-MCTC)

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

HON. RAMON R. LEGASPI, JR.,

Presiding
Judge,
3rd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, KinoguitanSugbongcogon, Misamis Oriental,

Promulgated:

January 25, 2007

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before us is an administrative complaint for gross inefficiency or gross
neglect of duty, dereliction of duty and incompetence against Judge Ramon R.
Legaspi, Jr., presiding judge of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Kinoguitan-Sugbongcogon, Misamis Oriental.
On October 1, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted
a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases in respondents sala and the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Medina, Misamis Oriental, where respondent was
also the Acting Presiding Judge.

The audit team found that as of audit date, the MCTC of KinoguitanSugbongcogon had a total caseload of 256 cases consisting of 220 criminal cases
and 25 civil cases, with the records of 11 cases missing. There were 51 criminal
cases that had remained in the preliminary examination stage despite the lapse of
a considerable length of time; 39criminal cases in the preliminary examination
stage had been submitted for resolution but remained unresolved beyond the

reglementary period; 14 criminal cases and 1 civil case had pending incidents
submitted for resolution but likewise remained unresolved within the
reglementary period; and 15 criminal cases and 6 civil cases had not been acted
upon for a considerable length of time after the last order or incident in the
case. There also had been no setting for a considerable length of
time: in 8 criminal cases which were in the preliminary conference or pre-trial
stage, in 17 criminal cases and 1 civil case which were at the trial stage, and
in 4 criminal cases which were at the arraignment stage. There likewise had been
no action for a considerable length of time: in 9 criminal cases, where the parties
failed to comply with the directives of the court, in 44 criminal cases, where
warrants and alias warrants of arrest were issued, and in 3 criminal cases since
the time of their filing. Lastly, there was 1 civil case which had remained
undecided beyond the reglementary period.[1]

The audit team also found that Clerk of Court (COC)

Glenda dela Victoria failed to discharge strictly her duties and functions to
implement an efficient system of records management and supervision over court
personnel. Specifically, the audit team found that the docket books were not upto-date; that the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1893,1898 and 2029 pending in
another court were included in the inventory of the MCTC of KinoguitanSugbongcogon; that 11 case records were missing; and that the daily time records
of court personnel do not reflect the correct time out in the afternoon. The audit
team later found that COC dela Victoria was suffering from Parkinsons disease
after observing that she had difficulty standing still, walking, writing and speaking.

Regarding the MTC of Medina, the team found that the court had a total
caseload of 51 criminal cases. There was 1 criminal case which had not been
resolved within the reglementary period and another one which was almost
beyond it. Also, 3 criminal cases have not been acted upon for a considerable
length of time.

On January 8, 2003, the OCA issued a memorandum with the following

directives:
(1)

Hon Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr., is hereby DIRECTED to:

(A)

EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice hereof his FAILURE to:

(a-1) CONDUCT and RESOLVE the preliminary examination for a

considerable length of time in the following criminal cases, to
wit: 1573, 1592, 1607, 1609, 1706,1700, 1672, 1749, 1775, 1820, 1831,
1833, 1789, 1840, 1849, 1860, 1885, 1884, 1892, 1890, 1949, 1959, 198
6, 2057, 2118, 2122, 2123, 2155, 2177, 2179, 2181, 2187, 2185,2186, 22
07, 2206, 2214, 2228, 2237, 2221, 2250, 2253, 2252, 2248, 2171, 2255,
2257, 2261, 2266, 2267 and 2269;
(a-2) RESOLVE within the reglementary period the: (a-2.1)
preliminary
examination of
the
following
criminal
cases: 1597, 1612, 1659, 1728, 1767, 1776, 1779,1973, 1800, 1838, 184
5, 1847, 1878, 1896, 1900, 1899, 1907, 1910, 1918, 1919, 1945, 1952, 2
008,
2009,
2010, 2011, 2021, 2092, 2119, 2126, 2176, 2180, 2193, 2194, 2218,2223
, 2258, 2265 and 2168; (a-2.2)
pending
incidents submitted for
resolution
in
Criminal
Cases
Nos. 1180, 1614, 1661, 1663, 1738, 1768, 1823, 1888, 1937, 1989, 2002,
2065, 2096, and 2198 and Civil Case No. 223;
(a-3) SET and ACT for a considerable length of time after the
last order/incident of the case in Criminal Cases Nos. 1632, 1702, 1703,
1705, 1735, 1761, 1806, 1987, 2094, 2117, 2152, 2104, 2233, 2259, and
2260 and in Civil Cases Nos. 217, 216, 218, 234, 207 and 204;
(a-4) SET for a considerable length of time for: (a-4.1)
preliminary conference/pre trial Criminal Cases Nos. 1880, 2199, 2232,
2234, 2205, 2208, 2256 and 2217; (a-4.2) trial Criminal Cases Nos. 1678,
1692, 1895, 1742, 1333, 1338, 1334, 1337, 2151, 2146, 2161, 2215,
2240, 2188, 2133, 2007 and 1990 and Civil Case No. 219; (a-4.3)
arraignment Criminal Cases Nos. 1430, 2064, 2076, and 2136;
(a-5) ACT on the: (a-5.1) failure of the parties to comply with
the directive of the Court for a considerable length of time in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1810, 1811, 1908, 1973, 2015, 2077, 2093, 2153, and
2254; (a-5.2) warrants and alias warrants of arrest issued by the Court
for a considerable length of time in Criminal Cases Nos. 1416, 1449,
1645, 1746, 1815, 1731, 1977, 2019, 2025, 2058, 2142, 2132, 2165,

2139, 2191, 2213, 2211, 2242, 2241, 1724, 2249, and 2224; and Criminal
Cases Nos. 1762, 1771, 1674, 1785, 1872, 1902, 1943, 1677, 1985, 1966,
2012, 2005, 2044, 2130, 2175, 2172, 2201, 2204, 2192, 2220, 2219, and
2231, respectively; and (a-5.3) complaint/s and affidavit/s filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1873, 1905, and 2203; and
(a-6) DECIDE Civil Case No. 211 within the reglementary period;
(B)

to IMMEDIATELY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on: [the said cases]

x x x x.

(C)

to DECIDE with DISPATCH Civil Case No. 211 which was submitted for
decision on 01 July 1998 and SUBMIT copy of the decision within ten (10)
days from promulgation thereof.

(2)
Hon. Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr., Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court Glenda F. dela
Victoria, both of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kinoguitan-Sugbon[g]cogon, Misamis
Oriental, are DIRECTED to: (2-a) EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice why the case
records of Criminal Cases Nos. 1898, 1893 and 2029, pending in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Salay-Binuangan, Misamis Oriental are in the possession of said Court and
eleven (11) case records were not presented to the audit team; (2-b) RETURN the
aforecited criminal cases to the court of origin; and (2-c) SUBMIT compliance therewith,
both within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(3) Clerk of Court Glenda F. dela Victoria, same Court, is DIRECTED to: (3-a) TAKE
APPROPRIATE ACTION to make the personnel log book and the daily time records
reflective of the correct and accurate time in and out of court personnel; and (3-b)
REGULARLY UPDATE the entries in the docket books; and (3-c) SUBMIT: (3c.1) compliance with this directive; and (3-c.2) herself for a medical examination to the
Supreme Court Medical Services, Manila, to determine whether or not she is still
capable of performing the functions of her office, both within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof;
(4) Hon. Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr., as Acting Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court,
Medina, Misamis Oriental is: (4-a) DIRECTED to: (4-a.1) EXPLAIN within ten (10) days
from notice his failure to resolve the pending incident in Criminal Case No. 08-60-99
within the mandatory period and to RESOLVE the same within twenty (20) days from
notice; (4-a.2) INFORM the Office of the Court Administrator, through the Court
Management Office, within ten (10) days from notice, whether or not the pending
incident in Criminal Case No. 03-36-02 was resolved within the reglementary period;
and (4-a.3) IMMEDIATELY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on Criminal Cases Nos. 06-5402, 10-36-01 and 08-61-02 which have not been acted upon nor further set in the
calendar for a considerable length of time; and

(5) Hon. Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr., is DIRECTED to SUBMIT COMPLIANCE with all the
above directives to this Office through the Court Management Office, by submitting
copies of the decisions, resolutions and orders issued in the above-mentioned cases
within ten (10) days from rendition thereof.

[2]

Respondents designation as Acting Presiding Judge of the MTC of Medina

was also revoked by this Court to help him resolve his cases.

On February 28, 2003, respondent asked for an extension of twenty days to

comply with the directives.[3]

COC dela Victoria, for her part, sought to be excused from the directive to
submit herself for medical examination in Manila. She denied that her disease
had impaired her ability to perform in her job and added that she was in financial
difficulty and could not afford the trip.[4]

The Court sent a medical team to Misamis Oriental, which examined COC
dela Victoria along
with
several
other
court
personnel
on
June 24 and July 29, 2003. Dr. Prudencio Banzon, Jr., Senior Chief Staff Officer,
Medical and Dental Services, Supreme Court, reported that COC dela Victoria was
suffering from Organic Mental Syndrome, moderate in proportion, permanent
and irreversible. Her condition was progressively debilitating and rendered it
physically and mentally difficult for her to perform her duties and responsibilities
efficiently as clerk of court. Thus, upon Dr. Banzons recommendation, the OCA
advised COC dela Victoria to avail of disability retirement.[5]

COC dela Victoria complied fully with the directives to her in the January 8,
2003 memorandum, then filed her application for optional retirement
on January 5, 2005.[6]

Meanwhile, respondent Judge Legaspi continually failed to make full

compliance with the January 8, 2003 memorandum. The OCA again ordered him
on October 17,2003, to comply strictly with the directives within a non-extendible
period of 15 days.[7] Respondent replied that he has already started sending the
Court Management Office, OCA, copies of orders and resolutions issued in some
of the cases mentioned in the memorandum. He also asked for an indefinite
period of extension, alleging that it was impossible to comply fully with all the
directives within the allotted time.[8]

The OCA noted that respondents alleged partial compliance consisted

merely of attaching copies of the orders and resolutions to his monthly reports
without the required explanation as directed. Thus, the OCA once again ordered
respondent to comply strictly with the January 8, 2003 memorandum, and to
make his compliance in chronological order. In its memorandum
dated December 16, 2003, the OCA gave respondent a non-extendible period
of 30 days.[9] Respondent still failed to comply.

On November 9, 2004, the OCA conducted a follow-up audit in the 3rd MCTC
of Kinoguitan-Sugbongcogon. The audit revealed that the revocation of
respondents designation as Acting Presiding Judge of the MTC of Medina and the
lapse of more than two years from the time of the first audit made little
difference in improving the case flow and resolution of cases in respondents
sala. As of audit date, the MCTC of Kinoguitan-Sugbongcogon had 228 pending
cases, consisting of 194 criminal cases and 34 civil cases. The audit team reported
that of the 194 criminal cases, 114 cases had no further setting for a considerable
length of time, 5 cases had no setting at all from the time of their filing, 10 cases
had unresolved motions or pending incidents submitted for resolution beyond the
reglementary period, and 2 cases had not been decided despite the lapse of the
reglementary period. The audit team also reported that of the 34 civil
cases, 18 cases were without further setting or action and 2 cases were with
unresolved motions beyond the reglementary period.

On February 1, 2005, the OCA issued a memorandum directing respondent

to:
a. TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the following criminal and civil cases wherein
the court failed to take any action from the time of their filing and those cases without
further setting or action for a considerable length of time: [Criminal Case
Nos. 1597, 1873, 1823, 2203 and 1738, wherein the court failed to take any action from
the
time
of
their
filing;
and
Criminal
Case
Nos. 1416, 1412, 1573, 1605, 1640, 1659, 1612, 1661, 1706, 1700, 1632, 1728, 1731, 16
72, 1746, 1749, 1767, 1761, 1775, 1776, 1707, 1703, 1702, 1678, 1768, 1692, 1800, 180
6, 1671,1785, 1833, 1831, 1742, 1789, 1838, 1849, 1860, 1884, 1885, 1896, 1890, 1899,
1907, 1910, 1878, 1918, 1919, 1949, 1945, 1943, 1677, 1705, 1900, 1977, 1872, 2192, 1
985, 2008, 2009, 2010,2011, 1966, 2015, 01-0799, 2044, 2049, 1973, 2119, 2177, 2092, 2176, 2187, 2096, 2186, 2193, 2250, 2218, 226
6, 1770, 2275, 03-0004, 2255, 03-0005, 03-0001, 2271, 03-0008, 2277, 2098,030018, 03-0038, 03-0029, 2199, 2214, 03-0034, 03-0048, 03-0007, 03-0051, 1663, 030060, 04-0002, 03-0056, 03-0057, 03-0058, 03-0059, 03-0053, 03-0054, 030055, 2002, 03-0068, 04-0004, 04-0005, 04-0012, 04-0011, 2007; and in Civil Case Nos.
SP Case No. 203, Brgy. Case 4, 204, 215, 216, 218, 217, 237, 234, 219, SP Civil Cases 0301 and 03-02, 03-01, 243, 246, 247,245, 244 which had no further setting for a
considerable length of time.]
b. RESOLVE with dispatch the pending incidents in the following criminal and civil
cases submitted for resolution (which are already beyond the reglementary period to
resolve) and furnish copies of the resolutions to the Court Management Office, Office of
the Court Administrator, within ten (10) days from resolution thereof: [Criminal Case
Nos. 1614, 1735, 2254, 2133,1888, 2153, 2141, 2140, 2188, 2208; Civil Case Nos.
Election Case I-S 2002, and 224]
c. DECIDE with dispatch the following criminal and civil cases submitted for
decision which are already beyond the reglementary period and furnish copies of the
decisions to the Court Management Office within ten (10) days from their
promulgation: [Criminal Case Nos. 1818 and 1908].
d. IMMEDIATELY APPOINT an Officer-in-Charge who shall:
(1) APPRISE [him] from time to time of cases submitted for resolution/decision
and those cases that require immediate action;
(2) ORDER and SUPERVISE the stitching of all the criminal and civil case
records/folders in the court; and

(3) INFORM this Court whether the [moneys] collected were immediately
deposited and postal money orders remitted to the Supreme Court, furnishing this
Office documents to support compliance and to STRICTLY COMPLY with the provisions
of Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 dated June 15, 2000; and
e. EXPLAIN [his] CONTINUED FAILURE to act on cases that require immediate
action, to resolve incidents submitted for resolution, to decide cases submitted for
decision and to fully comply with the directives of the Memorandum dated
January 8, 2003 within fifteen (15) [days] from notice.

[10]

Respondent again asked for an indefinite extension of time

on May 13, 2005 and sent three letters dated August 22, November 30,
and December 14, 2005, with attachments of additional judgments, decisions,
resolutions and orders. Respondent, however, never fully complied. The OCA
also noted that many of the attachments in the three letters pertained to cases
not covered by the February 1, 2005 memorandum.[11]

On September 28, 2005, this Court treated the two audit reports as an
administrative complaint against respondent for gross inefficiency or gross
neglect of duty, dereliction of duty and incompetence, and ordered respondent to
show cause within 30 days why he should not be dismissed from the
service.[12] Respondent likewise failed to comply with this directive.

On April 27, 2006, the OCA recommended to the Court that

respondent be dismissed from the service for insubordination, contumacy, gross
inefficiency or gross neglect of duty, dereliction of duty and incompetence.
We find the recommendation well taken.

The Constitution mandates all cases be decided or resolved by lower courts

within three months from submission.[13] The Court has consistently impressed
upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously for the reason
that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with

dispatch and should likewise be careful, punctual and observant in the

performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith
and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it
into disrepute.[14] Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the
period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency that
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction.[15]

In this case, respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his judicial
duties. The first audit revealed that excluding the 11 cases with missing records,
only 10 of the 228 cases that were supposed to be in active files were moving in
respondents sala.[16] His inaction or failure to resolve the preliminary
examinations and pending incidents submitted for resolution generally lasted
more than five years for most of the cases reported by the audit team. In some
instances, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 1597, 1612,1659, 1728, 1767,
and 1776, respondent even allowed more than ten years to pass without
resolving the preliminary examination in said cases. He neglected for the same
inordinate length of time the pending incidents submitted for resolution in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1180, 1614, 1661, 1663, and 1738. Furthermore, in the MTC
of Medina where he was Acting Presiding Judge, respondent failed to
decide 1 criminal case within the reglementary period.

Respondent was instructed on January 8, 2003, to take appropriate action

on 211 criminal cases and 9 civil cases. He was given more than two years grace
period from the first audit on October 1, 2002, to act on, resolve and decide his
cases. However, respondent failed to act on 147 of the 211 criminal cases
and 8 of the 9 civil cases subject of the memorandum.[17] Thus, a follow-up audit
was conducted in his sala on November 9, 2004, and a memorandum issued
on February 1, 2005, directing him to take appropriate action in his cases. Again,
respondent failed to comply fully. Only 62 of the 151 cases subject of
the February 1, 2005 memorandum were acted upon by him. The OCA reported
on April 27, 2006, that as of said date, respondent left 89 cases to be acted upon,
resolved or decided, including one case, Criminal Case No. 1818, which had been
submitted for decision since 1996.[18]

Notwithstanding his failure to take appropriate action on his cases,

however, respondents certificates of service and his courts Monthly Report of
Cases for the 3rd and 4thquarters of 2004 did not state the cases that have
remained undecided beyond the reglementary period.[19]

Moreover, respondent refused to heed the directives of this Court and the
OCA to explain his shortcomings. Respondent ought to know that a resolution of
the Court is not to be construed as a mere request nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively. At the core of the judges esteemed position
is obedience to the dictates of the law and justice. A judge must be first to exhibit
respect for authority.[20]

Considering the gravity of respondents omissions and the absence of any

explanation whatsoever on his part, his dismissal from the service is not
unwarranted.[21] The administration of justice demands that those who don
judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before
them. In this regard, respondent miserably failed. The wheels of justice would
hardly move if respondent is allowed to continue working in the judiciary. Thus,
as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, after a thorough
judicial audit, and considering the unrebutted audit reports on record, we are
constrained to impose upon respondent the penalty of dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, Judge Ramon R. Legaspi, Jr., presiding judge of

the 3 Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kinoguitan-Sugbongcogon, Misamis
Oriental, is foundLIABLE for gross neglect of judicial duty, stark inefficiency in the
performance of official functions, and manifest indifference to his responsibilities
concerning speedy disposition of cases. He is ordered DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and
with prejudice to re-employment in any government branch or instrumentality,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
rd

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

Rollo, pp. 28-35.

Id. at 42-45.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 65-67.
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 74.

[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

Id. at 232-241.
Id. at 482-488.
Id. at 311.
Art. VIII, Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
xxxx
Office of the Court Administrator v. Gaudiel, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1825 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 03-12-689RTC), January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 266, 272.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Legaspi, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1893 (Formerly A.M. No. 04-10-598RTC), March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 584, 606-607.
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 55, Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, A.M. No. 05-4-213-RTC, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 99, 112.
Rollo, pp. 29-36.
CRIMINAL CASES
STAGES OF CASES
1. For Preliminary Examination
2. Submitted for resolution:
a. Preliminary examination
b. Pending Incidents
3. No further setting/action
4. Preliminary conference/Pre-trial
5. For compliance
6. Warrants/alias warrants of arrest
7. For trial
8. Arraignment
9. No initial Action Taken
TOTAL

CIVIL CASES
STAGES OF CASES
1. No further action
2. For compliance
3. Pre-trial
4. Hearing
TOTAL
[17]

TOTAL
53

ACTIVE
2

INACTIVE
51

40
14
15
10
9
44
19
4
3
211

1
2
1
2
8

39
14
15
8
8
44
17
4
3
203

TOTAL
6
3
5
3
17

ACTIVE
2
2

INACTIVE
6
3
5
1
15

Rollo, p. 5. Respondent failed to:

1. Conduct/resolve for a considerable length of time the preliminary examination in Criminal Case
Nos. 1573, 1592, 1672, 1700, 1706, 1749, 1775, 1789, 1831, 1833, 1840, 1849, 1860, 1884, 1885, 1890, 1892,
1949, 1959, 2057,2118, 2155, 2171, 2177, 2179, 2181, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2206, 2207, 2214, 2221, 2228, 2248,
2250, 2252, 2253, 2255, 2257, 2261, 2266, 2267 and 2269;
2. Resolve within the reglementary period the preliminary examination in Criminal Case
Nos. 1597, 1612, 1659, 1728, 1767, 1776, 1779, 1800, 1838, 1847, 1878, 1896, 1899, 1900, 1907, 1910, 1918,
1919, 1945, 1952, 1973, 2008,2009, 2010, 2011, 2092, 2119, 2126, 2168, 2176, 2193, 2194, 2218, 2223, 2258,
and 2265;
and
the pending
incidents
submitted
for
resolution in
Criminal
Case
Nos. 1180, 1614, 1661,1663, 1738, 1768, 1823, 1888, 2002, 2065, 2096, and2198;
3. Set and act for a considerable length of time after the last order/incident in Criminal Case
Nos. 1632, 1702, 1703, 1705, 1735, 1761, 1806, 2094, 2117, 2152, 2233, 2259, and 2260 and in Civil Case
Nos. 217, 216, 218, 234, 207 and204;
4. Set for a considerable length of time for preliminary conference/pre-trial Criminal Case
Nos. 2199, 2205, 2208, 2232, 2234 and 2256; trial Criminal
Case
Nos. 1333, 1334, 1337, 1338, 1678, 1692, 1742, 2133, 2188 and 2240 and
Civil
Case
No. 219;
and
for arraignment Criminal Case No. 1430; and

[18]

[19]
[20]

[21]

5. Act on the failure of the parties to comply with the directives of the Court in Criminal Case
Nos. 1908, 1973, 2015, 2077, 2093, 2153, and 2254; on the warrants of arrest issued in Criminal Case
Nos. 1416, 1731, 1746, 1977, 2191, and 2249; on the alias warrants of arrest issued in Criminal Case
Nos. 1677, 1785, 1872, 1943, 1966, 1985, 2012, 2044, 2192, and 2231; and on the complaints/affidavits filed
in Criminal Cases Nos. 1873, 1905 and 2203.
Id. at 488-496. Respondent left the following 89 cases to be acted upon, resolved or decided: Criminal Cases
Nos. 1823, 2203, 1738, 1412, 1573, 1640, 1612, 1661, 1700, 1728, 1731, 1749, 1767, 1775, 1776, 1707, 1678,
1800, 1671,1785, 1833, 1742, 1838, 1849, 1860, 1896, 1899, 1907, 1910, 1878, 1918, 1919, 1949, 1943, 1677,
1705, 1900, 1977, 1872, 1985, 1966, 2015, 2044, 2049, 1973, 2119, 2177, 2092, 2187, 2096, 2186, 2193, 2250,
2218, 2266, 1770, 03-0004,03-0001, 03-0008, 2277, 2098, 2199, 03-0048, 1663, 04-0002, 2002, 03-0068, 1614,
1735, 2254, 2133, 1888, 2153, 2141, 2140, 2188, 2208, and Civil Cases Nos. SP Case No. 203, Brgy.
Case 4, 204, 234, SP Civil Cases 03-01 and 03-02,243, 245, 244, Election Case I-S 2002, 224, 1818.
Id. at 9.
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC-Br. 47, Urdaneta City, A.M. No. RTJ-051968, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 76, 90.
See Re: Report of Bernardo Ponferrada Re Judicial Audit Conducted in Br. 21, RTC, Cebu City -- Judge
Genis B. Balbuena, Presiding, A.M. No. 00-4-08-SC, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 490, 498-499; Lambino v. De
Vera, A.M. No. MTJ-94-1017, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 60, 64-65.

INTERNATIONAL MILITIA OF PEOPLE

AGAINST
CORRUPTION
AND
TERRORISM, represented by ATTY. ELLY
VELEZ PAMATONG,

A.C. No. 7197

Present:

Petitioner,
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus -

CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

(Ret.)

Promulgated:

Respondent.
January 23, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:

In the petition of January 31, 2006 filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Atty. Elly V. Pamatong, representing the International Militia of
People against Corruption and Terrorism, seeks the disbarment of retired Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.

Upon receipt of the petition, docketed at the IBP as CBD Case No. 06-1646,
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Rogelio A. Vinluan,
issued on February 2, 2006 an Order directing the respondent to submit an
answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order. The
Order was apparently not sent to the correct address of the respondent, for the
CBD subsequently directed the petitioner to furnish the Commission with the
respondents appropriate address.

On August 2, 2006, Director Vinluan forwarded to the Court the records

of CBD Case No. 06-1646.

Records show that respondent Davide came to know of the existence of the
petition to disbar only after being served a copy of the Courts Resolution dated
July 18, 2006, noting (a) the May 29, 2006 1st Indorsement of then Chief Justice

Artemio V. Panganiban referring to the Court a copy of the Order of February 2,

2006, supra, of the IBP Director on Bar Discipline, and b) the said Order.

Shortly after obtaining a copy of the petition in question, respondent filed

on November 6, 2006, a MOTION TO DISMISS with a prayer that, in relation to his
Order ofFebruary 2, 2006 adverted to, Director Vinluan be ordered to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for usurpation of
power.

A perusal of the petition readily shows that the causes of action enumerated
therein, namely:

1.

Overthrow of a duly elected president;

2.

Abandonment of impeachment proceedings against President Estrada;

3.

Usurpation of the revenue-raising power of Congress;

4.

Failure to cooperate in giving due course to impeachment proceedings against him;

5.

Negligence in handling the election-related case of the petitioner; and

6.

Persecution of the petitioner,

are not grounds for disbarment. They are, as the respondent correctly observed,
all related to incidents or proceedings while he was Chief Justice and are related
to or connected with the exercise of his authority or the performance of his
official duties. It cannot be over-emphasized that the bona fides of such discharge
of duty and authority are presumed.

Not lost to the Court is the fact that the petition is summary in form and
consists, for the most part, of self-serving and gratuitous conclusions and

offensive innuendoes, when the Rules of Court requires that a complaint for
disbarment shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate such facts.[1] The Court
also notes that the petitioner filed this case out of ignorance of the authority of
the Court and how it operates, as typified by his condemnation of the
respondent and a group of justices for imposing what he perceives to be
exorbitant filing fees when, according to him, the revenue raising power of the
government is exclusively vested upon the legislative branch.

In both form and substance, the instant petition deserves to be dismissed

outright.

On the matter of citing CBD Director Rogelio A. Vinluan for contempt, we

note that the petition, as pointed out by the respondent, was filed with the Court,
albeit through the IBP. In effect, the petition was directly invoking the primary
jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, the CBD should have immediately referred
the petition to the Court for such action it may deem appropriate to take, instead
of assuming initial jurisdiction thereon by ordering the respondent to submit an
answer.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court loathes to initiate contempt

proceedings against Director Vinluan on account alone of his having issued the
Order of February 2, 2006. As it were, there is no indication that he harbored illwill toward the respondent or was moved by a malicious desire to undermine the
authority and jurisdiction of the Court. Far from it. For Director Vinluan,
doubtless after realizing his mistake or being apprised of extant rules relating to
disbarment proceedings, issued, on June 6, 2006, an Order recalling his earlier
Order of February 2, 2006 and required Atty. Pamatong to file his petition to
disbar directly with the Court pursuant to its existing rules and guidelines relating
to retired justices and judges. Indeed, as an immediate off-shoot of the matter at
hand, the Court, by Resolution dated September 5, 2006, approved in principle

the amendment of SC Circular No. 3-89 such that the IBP is henceforth required to
forward to the Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment
and discipline filed with the IBP against all justices and judges, sitting or retired,
for acts and/or omissions committed during their tenure in the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:

1.

The instant petition for disbarment against retired Chief Justice

Hilario G. Davide, Jr. is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit; and

2.

The motion to cite IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Director

Rogelio A. Vinluan for contempt is DENIED. He or his successor, as
the case may be, is admonished, however, to be more circumspect in
disposing of similar petition or complaint to disbar in the future.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

[1]

Sec. 1, Rule 139-B.

SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES

A.C. No. 6270

LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA,

Complainants,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus -

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
January 22, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent), filed

by the heirs of the late spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva (spouses
Villanueva),
namely:Ardenio M. Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier, Alano M. Fonacier, Eusebio M. F
onacier, Jr., Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro V. Nazarro, Margarita
V. Collado, Felisa Collado, andHerminigildo Ylhi (complainants).

The Facts

During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of land
in Pangasinan, one of which was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
2522. Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in 1974. Their five children,
namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia, survived them.
On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication[1] (affidavit
of adjudication) stating that as the only surviving son and sole heirs (sic) of the
spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel of land under OCT
No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[2] (deed of sale) on 5 July

1984, conveying the property to Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared as

notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale.

Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still

alive at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale, as
were descendants of the other children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants
claimed that respondent was aware of this fact, as respondent had been their
neighbor in Balungao,Pangasinan, from the time of their birth, and respondent
constantly mingled with their family. Complainants accused respondent of
knowing the true facts and surrounding circumstances regarding the properties
of the spouses Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of
their rightful shares in the property.

In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent to

comment on the complaint.
In her Comment,[3] respondent admitted that she notarized the affidavit of
adjudication and the deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984. However,
respondent denied that she conspired with Alfonso to dispose of fraudulently the
property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed the two documents under
the following circumstances:
That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been divided equally
among their compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for themselves one titled lot, the
subject now of the complaint x x x That said titled property was the only property left by
the old couple, to answer for their needs while they are still alive until their deaths
x x x. Alfonso [and his wife] were tasked to take care of the old couple, as they were
the ones living in the same compound with their late parents. This fact was and is
known by the other compulsory heirs, and they never questioned the said act of their
parents, as they already had their own share on the estate of the late [spouses
Villanueva]. This fact was also known to me because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across
the street from our house and I was requested to the house of the old man when he
gave said title to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his wife]. The other compulsory heirs who were

still alive at the time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in their old house
to help in the care of their parents. Even [when] the parents died, it was [Alfonso and
his wife] who took charge of the funeral and all other acts relative thereto.

xxxx

That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after the death of the
old man, when the spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa] needed money to finance the
schooling of their children, it was then that they thought of disposing the land x x x and
said land was sold by them to one Adriano Villanueva of which in both documents, I
notarized the same (sic).

xxxx

I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I notarized said
documents, it was done in good faith, to do my job as expected of me, to help, assist
and to guide people who come to me for legal assistance, as contained in my oath as a
lawyer when I passed the bar. x x x[4] (Emphasis supplied)

According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonsos co-heirs filed their
objections at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication proved that most
of the properties of the spouses Villanueva had earlier been distributed to the
other heirs. It also proved that the heirs had agreed to abide by the intention of
the spouses Villanueva to leave the property to Alfonso. Respondent asserted
that the personal appearances and acknowledgment by the party to the
document are the core of the ritual that effectively convert a private document
into a public document x x x.

On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP), which designated Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (IBP
Commissioner Villadolid) to investigate, and submit his report and
recommendation on, the complaint.

The IBPs Findings

In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid found

that respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the spirit and intent of the notarial law when she notarized the affidavit
knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory heir of the spouses Villanueva.
Although he found no evidence of fraudulent intent on respondents part, IBP
Commissioner Villadolid held that respondent engaged in conduct that lessened
confidence in the legal system. Thus, he recommended suspension of
respondents notarial commission for one year. He further recommended that
respondent be reprimanded or suspended from the practice of law for up to six
months.

The Courts Ruling

We sustain partly the IBPs findings and recommendations.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most

common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or
instrument. In the performance of such notarial acts, the notary public must be
mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a document.
The notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after which it may
be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due
execution.[5] Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless,
or routinary act.[6] As early as Panganiban v. Borromeo,[7] we held that notaries
public must inform themselves of the facts to which they intend to certify and to

take no part in illegal transactions. They must guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements.[8]

On its face, Alfonsos affidavit does not appear to contain any illegal or
immoral declaration. However, respondent herself admitted that she knew of
the falsity of Alfonsos statement that he was the sole heir of the spouses
Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a document while fully aware that it
contained a material falsehood,i.e., Alfonsos assertion of status as sole heir. The
affidavit of adjudication is premised on this very assertion. By this instrument,
Alfonso claimed a portion of his parents estate all to himself, to the exclusion of
his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent notarized the deed of sale, knowing
that the deed took basis from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication.

Respondent never disputed complainants allegation of her close

relationship with the Villanueva family spanning several decades. Respondent
even underscored this closeness by claiming that Lucas himself requested her to
come to his house the day Lucas handed to Alfonso a copy of OCT No. 2522,
allegedly so she could hear the conversation between them.

Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the time

Alfonso executed the affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their respective
shares from the estate of the spouses Villanueva. However, we are not concerned
here with the proper distribution of the spouses Villanuevas estates. Rather,
respondents liability springs from her failure to discharge properly her duties as a
notary public and as a member of the bar.

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false

statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or hernotarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this
case, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated
Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

We also view with disfavor respondents lack of candor before the IBP
proceedings. The transcript of hearings shows that respondent denied preparing
or notarizing the deed of sale,[9] when she already admitted having done so in her
Comment.

WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, we REVOKE the commission of respondent
Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY her
from being commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We
further SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
upon finality of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
ANTON
IO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

[1]
[2]

[3]

[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

Rollo, p. 9.
Id. at 10.

Id. at 13-18.

Id.
Sicat v. Ariola, Jr., A.C. No. 5864, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 93.
Id.
58 Phil. 367 (1933).
Dela Cruz v. Zabala, A.C. No. 6294, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 407.
TSN, 9 November 2004, pp. 12-14, 21-24.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

CLARITA J. SAMALA,

ADM. CASE NO. 5439

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -

CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
_______________________

x----------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a complaint[1] dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita
J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for
Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as
counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting
false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October
24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[2]
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus
B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective
memoranda[3] and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E.
Reyes
prepared
the
Report
and
[4]
Recommendation dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of
violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution[5] passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on
immorality and as to the recommended penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial
Court
(RTC),
Branch
272, Marikina City,
entitled
Leonora
M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while
being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the
tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga[6] by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC.[7]
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba,
Jr. v. Salve Bustamanteand her husband for ejectment, respondent represented
Valdez against Bustamante one of the tenants in the property subject of the

controversy. Defendants
appealed
to
the
RTC,
Branch
272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his
decision dated May 2, 2000,[8] Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz[9] warned
respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both
parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch
273, Marikina City, entitled Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register
of Deeds of MarikinaCity, respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint
for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 986804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent
admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of
the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga[10] albeit he filed the Explanation
and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants.[11] Respondent also admitted that
he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK
against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba
although the case is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband,
because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the
property[12] and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint
for ejectment.[13] But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba,
respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba
when the latter charged respondent with estafa.[14] Thus, the filing of Civil Case
No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client.[15] He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than
he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles
of public policy and good taste.[16] It springs from the relation of attorney and

client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [17]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance of that duty.[18]
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorneys duty to
represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the clients
confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an
attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.[19]
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated.[20] The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an
attorney from accepting professional employment from the clients adversary
either in the same case[21] or in a different but related action.[22] A lawyer is
forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the
subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former
client.[23]
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[24] that the termination of the relation of
attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is
that the clients confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of
the professional employment.[25] Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the
severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should
he disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous
relation.[26]

In this case, respondents averment that his relationship with Alba has long
been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in
Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is
unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney
from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba
may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, is a clear indication that respondent is
protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent
cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has
long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
wherein the written consent of his client is required.
In Gonzales
v. Cabucana, Jr.,[27] citing
of Quiambao v. Bamba,[28] we held that:

the

case

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a

situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an
unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that
the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients
and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[29]

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client,
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes

familiar with all the facts connected with his clients case. He learns from his
client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge
must be considered sacred and guarded with care.[30]

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents representation

of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case,
and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests
which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have
withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by
the court,[31] but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing
conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional

employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including
circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.[32]

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch
75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's
ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the
name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27,
2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the
subject property.[33] During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent
avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he
came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the
court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore.[34] Respondent
further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to
him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed
on November 27, 2000,[35] before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the
averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when
the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before
Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on
the same date, although in different courts and at different times.

Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he
submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba
in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by
respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by
its
decision
dated January
8,
2002[36] dismissing
the
complaint
for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to
mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title
was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the
name of Alba.

In Young v. Batuegas,[37] we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of

truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to his clients.[38] He should bear in mind that as an officer of the
court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts
of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.[39] The
courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty
to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense
of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which

society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.[40] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to
emulate.[41]

On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case
No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC,
Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled
Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before
the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases
were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No.
00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent)
for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with
respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property
for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.[42]

Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439[43] and 01-036162[44] both entitled

Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his
client's
rights
against
complainant
who
filed
I.S.
No.
00[45]
[46]
4306 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin
Valencia[47] for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of

filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and
his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative
charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse
judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the

interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing
lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children

by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age,[48] while his first wife was still
alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of
whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he
married Lagmay in 1998.[49] Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying

in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not

consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship[50]and does not consider the
latter as his second family.[51] He reasoned that he was not staying
with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another
inMarikina.[52]

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to
hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did
not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does
not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three
children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted
that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he
has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina,
where Lagmay lives.[53] It is of no moment that respondent eventually
married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that
respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum
required of the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be
difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as
immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been
defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.[54] Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a
lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of
the community.[55] That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after
the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve
to mitigate his liability.

ACCORDINGLY,
the
Court
finds
respondent
Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for
their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondents personal
records.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]

CANCIO C. GARCIA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Rollo, pp. 1-4.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 118-125; 129-134.
Id. at 569-579.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 411-417.
Id. at 5-7.
Id. at 11-13.
Now Assistant Court Administrator.
Rollo, pp. 397-398; 407-410.
Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 434.
Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 393, 400.
Agpalo, LEGAL ETHICS, 6th Edition, pp. 219, 225; citing cases.
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949).
Santos, Sr. v. Beltran, 463 Phil. 372, 383 (2003).
Tiania v. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 472, 479.

[20]

[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]

Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Daria, Adm. Case No. 2736, May 27, 1991, 197 SCRA 428,
435; Buted v. Hernando, Adm. Case No. 1359, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 1, 8.
Natan v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640, 648 (1952).
Nombrado v. Hernandez, 135 Phil. 5, 9 (1968).
Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 177-178.
Nombrado v. Hernandez, supra.
Natan v. Capule, supra at 648.
Ibid. at 648.
A.C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 320.
A.C. No. 6708, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 1.
Id. at 11.
Maturan v. Gonzales, 350 Phil. 882, 887 (1998); U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500, 510 (1912).
Rollo, pp. 423-427.
Gamilla v. Mario, Jr., 447 Phil. 419, 432 (2003).
Rollo, pp. 30-32.
Id. at 459-474.
Id. at 14-16; 471-473.
Id. at 127-128.
451 Phil. 155 (2003).
Id. at 161.
Ibid. at 161.
Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 108, 117.
Ibid. at 117.
Rollo, p. 485.
Id. at 144-146.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 41-43.
Id. at 44-45.
Son of respondent and one of the tenants in the subject property.
Rollo, pp. 514-515.
Id. at 517-519.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 520-524.
Id. at 520-521.
Rau Sheng Mao v. Velasco, 459 Phil. 440, 445 (2003).
Mendoza v. Mala, A.C. No. 1129, July 27, 1992, 211 SCRA 839, 841; Vda. de Mijares v. Villaluz, A.C.
No. 4431, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 1, 6; Paras v. Paras, 397 Phil. 462, 475 (2000); Cambaliza v. CristalTenorio, A.C. No. 6290, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 288, 294; Go v. Achas, MTJ-04-1564, March 11, 2005,
453 SCRA 189, 201; Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, August 3, 2005, 465 SCRA 520, 530.