The Muhammadiyah Movement and Its Controversy With Christian Movement

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F O R M IV
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE BOARD
Title o f Dissertation:
THE MUHAMMADIYAH MOVEMENT
AND ITS CONTROVERSY WITH CHRISTIAN MISSION

IN INDONESIA
Author:
Alwi Shihab
ry\.
Read and Approved by:
Date submitted to Graduate Board: ............
Accepted by the Graduate Board o f Temple University in partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the
degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy.
Dati
(Dean o f Graduate School)

AND ITS CONTROVERSY WITH CHRISTIAN MISSION
IN INDONESIA
A Dissertation
Submitted to
the Temple University Graduate Board
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
by
Alwi Shihab
August 1995
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 9600080
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My first contact with Temple University, Department of

Religion dates back to early 1991, when I, as a visiting
scholar at the Philosophy Department of Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale, had the opportunity to discuss
with Professor Mahmoud Ayoub my plans to pursue advance
studies at Temple. He encouraged me to undertake the study
of comparative religion with an emphasis on Christian-Muslim
relations. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Professor
Ayoub, who has been my principle advisor since I began my
studies at Temple. It was due to his suggestion to write on
the Muhammadiyah that I began to formulate the topic of this
dissertation. Without his continuous guidance and invaluable
help, the completion of this dissertation would be
unthinkable.
I must also record my deep gratitude to Professor John
Raines
who, despite his heavy engagements has found time to
read, correct and give his insightful suggestions, which

will
always be appreciated.
I also wish to express my sincere thanks to Professor
Khalid Blankinship, whose corrections and valuable advice

made this dissertation possible. Similarly, I would like to
thank Prof. William Liddle for graciously agreeing to be a
iii
member of my committee and for having given of his time,

guidance and moral support.
To all my former professors, the faculty members and
the staff at the Department of Religion, whose names are too
many to be mentioned here, hearty thanks.
My study at Temple would have been unthinkable had it
not been for the financial assistance offered by the
Department of Religion. In this connection I wish to express
my deep appreciation to Professor Vasiliki Limberis, chair
of the committee, and other Scholarship Award Committee
members for their kind consideration.
In preparation of this dissertation I have been very
ably helped in different ways by many persons, including my
Indonesian friends. My wholehearted thanks are due to all of
them. I would like, however, to single out The Rev. Judith
Buck-Glenn, who lent her helping hand in editing and
proofreading this dissertation.
I wish also to thank the Indonesian Embassy in
Washington, and the Muhammadiyah office in Jakarta, which
provided me with some valuable materials related to this
dissertation.
Last but certainly not least, to Ashraf Shahab, my
wife, and to my children who lived with me through often
difficult circumstances, heartfelt thanks and deep
appreciation are due to them for their constant love and
support.
iv
Dedicated to:
my parents whose spirit
will never be pulled out from its essence;
my wife and children for whom my love and affection can
never dim
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................
INTRODUCTION
.....................................
iii
viii
Chapter
I:
INDONESIA: AN HISTORICALOVERVIEW .........
Animism .................................
The Hindu-BuddhistInfluence ..............
I s l a m ...................................
Christianity .............................
4
7
18
28
THE CONSOLIDATION OF CHRISTIANITY........
36
The Introduction of Christianity and

Its Growth in J a v a .................
Samuel Eliza Harthoom (1831-1883)
Carel Poensen (1836-1919).........
Lion Cachet (1835-1899)
Baron Van Boetzelaer (1873-1956) .........
54
65
68
70
71
III: THE DUTCH COLONIAL P O L I C Y ...............
77
II:
The
The
The
The
IV:
Structure of the Colonial Government . .

Rust en Orde P o l i c y .................
Policy of Guardianship...............
Dutch Islamic Policy .................
99
104
112
121
THE MUHAMMADIYAH M O V E M E N T ...............
138
The Cultural M i l i e u .....................

The Political Movement ...................
The Religious Movement ...................
Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah .................
The Muhammadiyah Movement ...............
Ahmad Dahlan, the F o u n d e r ...............
The Muhammadiyah Movement During
Dahlan's T i m e ...........................
140
147
151
153
162
170
vi
183
V:
VI:
THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE BIRTH OF

THE MUHAMMADIYAH...................
205
The Middle East Reformist Ideas .........

The Factor of Abduh's Reform
...........
The Factor of Internal Antagonism
in the Javanese S o c i e t y .............
The Factor of the Christian Penetration . .
Guru Ordonnantie (the Teacher of Ordinance).
The Ducth Infringement on the Local Culture.
The Foundation of Freemasonry ...........
227
242
253
261
267
THE ENCOUNTER OF THE MUHAMMADIYAH WITH

THE CHRISTIAN MISSION
.............
272
The
The
The
The
Formative Stage of the Muhammadiyah .

Soekarno E r a .......................
"New Order" E r a ...................
Cause of Muslim-Christian Controversy.
208
217
. 277
291
304
. 332
VII: CONCLUSION.................................. 338

BIBLIOGRAPHY
.........
343
vii
INTRODUCTION
Six thousand inhabited islands, with over 190 million

inhabitants, the world's largest archipelago, comprises the
nation of Indonesia. This country has always been receptive
to foreign ideas and has proved itself hospitable to foreign
civilizations.
To judge from scattered information, the religious
pattern of Indonesia in the pre-Islamic era, before 600 C.E,
was essentially animistic. During the early centuries, owing
to sea travel by Indonesians to the ports of India, Hindu
culture influenced Indonesia. The spread of the Hindu
religion was associated with the florescence of great
empires in Java.
This period of hinduized empires lasted
until the demise of the Javanese kingdom of Madjapahit in

the wake of a newly Islamized Mataram that arose during the
seventeenth century C.E.
After almost a millennium of Hindu-Buddhist dominance,
the Islamic culture spread over almost the whole of
Indonesia. Islam penetrated Southeast Asia as early as the
eleventh century C.E., then flourished for the next half a
millennium until the arrival of Western culture. However,
the process of Islamization in the great diversity of local
culture brought about different degrees of conformity to
what is viewed as the "authentic" Islam of the Middle-East.
viii
As a result, two groups of different degrees of attachment

to Islam emerged. The santri. or committed Muslims,
generally belonged to a maritime culture where Islam
penetrated deeply, and the abanaan. the nominally Muslim
group of the interior regions which had a more enclosed
agrarian culture.
The Dutch pulled ashore at Banten, Java, in 1596, and
proceeded to join the Portuguese, the English, and the
Spanish in a quest for profit in the tropical waters.
Ultimately, the Dutch triumphed in the battle for dominance
in Indonesia. In the eighteenth century, the Dutch forces
won a major victory over the Muslim kingdom of Mataram.
In its aim to provide services in education and social
welfare, the Dutch colonial government recruited many
Indonesians to acquire Western education. Westernization,
along with Christianization, evoked in Indonesia, as
elsewhere, feelings of alienation and confusion. Most of the
major movements of twentieth century colonial Indonesia can
be traced to these problems as well as to economic and
political colonial interests.
On the other hand, the important position of Makkah as
the source of Islamic dynamic impulses, especially in
cunjuction with the haii pilgrimage, attracted a large
number of scholars and students from all over the Muslim
world. There were sincere efforts among those scholars to
revitalize the teachings of Islam. As a result, the spirit
ix
Muslim world. Although Indonesia was situated on the

periphery of the Muslim world, it was able to reap the
benefits of this reform spirit'. In the nineteenth century,
after acquiring Islamic knowledge in Makkah, some of the
more astute Indonesian students
founded religious schools
when they returned home. Thus they were able to spread

reform ideas which were transformed into active movements
that stimulated the great awakening of the Indonesian
Muslims.
The earliest indigenous movements under colonial
Indonesia were cultural rather than political. They divided
along religious and secular lines. One of the most important
educational and cultural movements among the santri. or
religious group, was the Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912 in
central Java by Ahmad Dahlan. The significance of this
movement in the development of modern Islamic thought in
Indonesia cannot be appreciated without some knowledge of
the social and religious life of the Indonesian people. Such
knowledge is important, particularly during the first decade
of the twentieth century prior to the rise of the
Muhammadiyah movement.
During the course of its history, the Muhammadiyah has
presented a unique phenomenon in Indonesian religious life.
As an organization it has proven itself over time to be not
only an educational and socio-religious reformist movement,
x
but also as an active movement that has stimulated a yreat

awakening among the Indonesian Muslims. Apart from its
impressive social, political and educational contributions,
the Muhammadiyah's woman branch, Aisyiah, is probably the
most dynamic women's movement in the Muslim world.
Basically, the Muhammadiyah played four interrelated
roles: as a religious reform movement; as an agent of social
change; as a political force and, foremost, as an active
opponent of the Christian missions. As a religious reform
organization, Muhammadiyah aimed at purifying the Islamic
faith by seeking to eradicate superstitious practices and
traditional admixtures. As an agent of social change, it
aimed at modernizing the Indonesian Muslim community in
order to lift it up from its backwardness to a place of
respectability in the modern world. As a political force, it
became a major interest group in Indonesian politics.
As an opponent to Christian missions the Muhammadiyah
openly sought to cope with the rising tide of Christian
missionary activity in a variety of ways, sometimes
directly, but most often under the guise of providing and
promoting Islamic educational and health facilities as an
alternative to those established by the Christian
evangelization institutions.
In contemporary studies on Indonesian Modernist
movements, it has generally been held that the Muhammadiyah
as a reformist movement aimed at adapting Islam to modern
xi
Indonesia,- and was chiefly inspired by the Middle East

reform movement led by men like Shaykh Mohammad 'Abduh of
Egypt. Occasionally the movement is also lauded as the most
dominant force in Indonesian Islam and the most effective
organization ever to exist in the region of South East Asia,
or, to borrow Peacok's expression, "perhaps in the world."1
The Muhammadiyah movement is also regarded as a dynamic
force in the renewal of the "orthodox" current of thought
that struggled against the mystical and syncretistic
tendencies which marked the early development of Indonesian
Islam. As a corollary to the above, the Muhammadiyah is
usually thought of as a reformist/salafi movement, which
stressed the exclusive authority of the Qur'an and the
Sunnah in determining what truly constitutes Islamic beliefs
and practices. Thus it has been cast in the mold of the
Wahhabi movement of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the
Muhammadiyah is placed among the reform movements that
strongly opposed Sufism.
In our opinion a more careful analysis is required to
explore additional information and will enable us to
discover the true character and purpose of the Muhammadiyah.
Such an analysis would show that the Muhammadiyah, in fact,
had set its sights well beyond these reformist goals. Aside
from the Muhammadiyah's role as an agent of religious reform
1James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans. Reformist
Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkely: University of
California Press, 1978), 19.
xii
and modernism aiming at purging Islamic practices of

superstitious accretions, there is still another equally
important goal, if not the most important one. It is,
moreover, a goal which scholars have placed on the periphery
and, therefore, subjected it to analytical neglect. It is
the active resistance to the Christian missions in their
deep penetration into the fabric of Indonesian Islamic
culture. This important goal is discernable not only during
the time of the movement's birth but it continues to
manifest itself over the course of its development up to the
present time.
In our view, the importance of this goal can be best
assessed by going behind the ostensible purpose of the
establishment of the Muhammadiyah. This also calls for
measuring the pulse, so to speak, of the Indonesian Muslims
as grievances mounted against what they considered as the
Christian threat to their religion. The missionary problem
will, therefore, be the main focus of this study.
Significance of the Study

In recent years Islam has played an increasingly
central role in world affairs. With a population of nearly
two hundred millions, eighty-seven percent of which is
Muslims, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the
world, outnumbering all Muslims of the entire Arab world.
Thus Indonesia can avail itself of an excellent oppoi' nity
xiii
to play an influential role not only in the region of

Southeast Asia, but in the Islamic world at large. Any study
pertinent to the role of Islam and its institutions in
Indonesia therefore is naturally of utmost importance.
Amid the Islamic revivalism which prevails in many
Muslim countries today, including Indonesia, any work on the
contribution of any such Islamic revival institutions is
noteworthy. The Muhammadiyah movement certainly falls into
this category. The study of the Muhammadiyah is, therefore,
not only of a great value to those who wish to learn about
it and trace its far-reaching influence, but also to those
who are interested in the development of Islamic resurgence
in Indonesia and its religio-cultural environment.
The Muhammadiyah, as one of the most influential
reformist movements in Indonesia, has been and will most
likely continue to be a force in Indonesian politics. This
is all the more evident when we take a closer look at the
contemporary development of Indonesian politics. For the
first fifteen years of the "New Order" period,2 President
Suharto carefully squeezed the political life out of Islam.
In the early 1990s, however, Suharto appeared to change
course. He encouraged the formation of the "Indonesian
2The "New Order" here is meant the Suharto regime.

Suharto, the second President of Inonesia has been re-elected
to his sixth term in 1993. For further discussion on the "New
Order" Indonesia, see, Hal Hill, Indonesia's New Order: The
Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation. (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin, 1993) . See also, page 303-330 of this dissertation.
xiv
Muslim intellectual society, and in 1991 he went on his

first pilgrimage to Makkah. In addition to that, Suharto,
for the first time in the history of "New Order" Indonesia,
officially inaugurated the opening ceremony of H.M.I.
(Muslim Students' Association), the largest and most
influential youth organization in Indonesia. Furthermore,
changes are beginning to be made in certain laws to
accommodate Islamic sentiment. In this favorable political
climate for Islam, the Muhammadiyah can by no means be
ignored. Its dynamic influence in shaping Indonesian life in
the immediate future is unquestionable.
Moreover, because Indonesia has a diversity of ethnic
groups and religious persuasions it is important for her to
create constructive and harmonious interactions in order to
maintain its stability. Consequently a study of MuslimChristian relations in Indonesia is, to say the least,
important. The study of the Muhammadiyah and its controversy
with the Christian missions, therefore, can be used as a
means to work out problems between religious communities in
order to promote peace and cooperation. It is hoped that the
present study will contribute to the realization of this
goal.
This study will also bring to light patterns of
relationship that exist between religions, especially the
more pathological aspects, with the hope of attracting the
attention of those who strive to prevent the emergence of
xv
hostile feelings toward any religious belief or faithcommunity. It is also hoped that this work will stimulate
other Indonesian students to embark on the scientific study
of various religions in order to be able to overcome
irrational prejudices and to discover
the connections which
O
exist among the various religions. Considering the dearth of
scholarly attention to the underlying factors related to the
birth of the Muhammadiyah, let alone those related to its
controversy with the Christian missions, this study will
hopefully be of some significance to Christian-Muslim
understanding in Indonesia's pluralistic and multi-religious
society.
Scope of the Study
This study is mainly concerned with the birth of the

Muhammadiyah movement and the milieu in which it operated;
its founder as well as its main objectives. In the course of
this analysis, we shall attempt to shed some light on a
number of contemporary social movements. A primary concern
of this work, however, is to elucidate the underlying
factors that prompted the emergence of the Muhammadiyah.
In contrast to the widely-held view among scholars that
the reason for the birth of the Muhammadiyah is a result
either of the spread of Islamic reformist ideas from the
Middle East, or of the long ideological antagonism within
Javanese Society, namely between the abanaan and the santri
xv i
groups, this dissertation will seek to underscore the

importance of the deep Christian penetration into the
country and the great influence it exerted. In discussing
this issue the present work will place a special emphasis on
the Muhammadiyah's manner of dealing with Christian
missionary activities. In order to adequately assess the
Muhammadiyah'S effectiveness in this regard, this study will
examine the movement's encounter with Christian missions
beginning with the first generation of the movement, passing
through the Sukarno era and moving up to the present time.
We shall also examine briefly some pertinent causes of
controversy between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia.
In concrete terms, this dissertation will seek to
answer the question concerning the main determining factor
leading to the birth of the Muhammadiyah Movement. In
offering a response to this question the prtesent study
seeks to substantiate its thesis by investigating both the
manifest and latent reasons which arose prior to and after
the birth of the movement.
Review of Related Studies
Many works have been written and much ink has been
spilt on Muhammadiyah, both by Indonesian and Western
scholars. Among the most important works are the following;
1.
James L. Peacock, Purifying Faith: The

Muhammadiiah Movement in Indonesian Islam (1978),
xvii
is mainly concerned with the educational and

social activities of the Muhammadiyah as a mass
organization. In this book the author describes
the cultural conditions on which the Muhammadiyah
came to life and developed.
2.
Alfian, Muhammadiyah; The Political Behavior of a

Muslim Modernist Organization Under Dutch
Colonialism (1969) lays its emphasis on the
political role and behavior exhibited by the
Muhammadiyah from its birth up to the end of Dutch
colonial rule. It is by far the most detailed work
on the Muhammadiyah focusing on politics.
3.
Syamsuddin, M Siradjuddin, Religion And Politics

In Islam: The case of Muhammadiyah In Indonesia/s
New Order (1991). This study puts significant
weight on the Muhammadiyah's view of the concept
of state and the relationship between religion and
politics in Islam. The author examines the
Muhammadiyah's political role and places it as a
case study in relation to political Islam. His
study also addresses the role of the Muhammadiyah
in Indonesian politics in the "New Order" period
beginning with the ascendancy of Suharto up to the
present time.
4.
Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in

Indonesia 1900-1942. (1963). This work mainly
xviii
describes the historical roots of the prominent

modernist movements in Indonesia, their roles and
contributions, as well as their achievements in
Indonesian Islam, Muhammadiyah being one of them.
Although this work covers other aspects besides
the politics of the various reformist movements,
it is limited to the Dutch colonial era.
5.
In addition to the above works, Mukti Ali (the

former Minister of Religious Affairs of Indonesia)
also wrote in 1957 a useful bibliographical work
on the pre-war period of the Muhammadiyah: The
Muhammadiiah Movement: A Bibliographical
Introduction. It is an informative historical
account of the movement, its founder and goals.
6.
Mitsuo Nakamura, in his book The Crescent Arises

Over the Banvan Tree: A Study of The Muhammadiiah
Movement in a Central Javanese Town, observes the
development of the Muhammadiyah by focusing upon
local realities facing the movement in the small
town of Kotagede. In his study he seeks to prove
that the Muhammadiyah represents the process of
religious change developing from interactions
among various elements internal to Javanese
Society.
In addition to the above, there are several works which

are mostly in the form of essays or books which are
xix
biographical in nature. The more outstanding of these works

which contain accounts of the struggle and the ideas of
Dahlan include those written by Abdullah Puar, Periuangan
dan Penaabdian Muhammadiyah (The Struggle and Dedication of
the Muhammadiyah), 1949; Solichin Salam, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan.
Reformer Indonesia (Ahmad Dahlan, The Islamic Reformer of
Indonesia), 1963; Syamsi Sumardjo, Pengetahuan Muhammadiyah
dan Tokoh-tokohnva (Understanding the Muhammadiyah and its
leadership), 1967; (Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Matahari-Matahari
Muhammadivah (The Light of the Muhammadiyah); Yunus Salam,
Riwavat K.H. Dahlan dan Amal Periuangannva (The Biography,
Dedication and Struggle of Ahmad Dahlan), 1968; M. Rusli
Karim, Muhammadiyah Dalam Kritik dan Komentar (The
Muhammadiyah in Critique and Comment), 1968. Beside the
above works, there are many monoghraphs written in the
Indonesian language, most of which, however, do not provide
additional information worthy of special attention.
In all that has been written about the Muhammadiyah, to
the best of my knowledge, there is no single work that
focuses on the study of the underlying factors in the
emergence of this movement, much less one attributing to the
Christian factor major importance. Up to now, scholars of
Indonesian Islamic movements have not taken the initiative
to study seriously and exhaustively the manifest, and, more
importantly, the latent reasons for the birth of the
Muhammadiyah. The reason for the absence of such a study
xx
appears to be political. The Indonesian government has been,

and still is, of the firm view that any work that could
evoke any religious Polemics, especially between Christians
and Muslims, should be strongly avoided. This is no doubt
due to the fact that the apparently harmonious ChristianMuslim relations in Indonesia are pregnant with latent
tension and hostility. Therefore any such work might
unintentionally contribute to exacerbating of tensions.
Sources and Methodology of the Study
The present study will employ a number of approaches.

Firstly it will endeavor to undertake a historical survey
and analysis of the Muhammadiyah movement as a necessary
step to answer the question posed. The prevailing mood of
the Indonesian Muslims prior to and during the advent of the
Muhammadiyah is carefully scrutinized. The analysis of the
political and socio-religious environment of that time
serves as a significant backdrop to the study. The
historical record of the colonial policies and the works of
various experts in Dutch colonial policy have been used as
one of the main sources.
In its effort to achieve its aim this study will
conduct its investigation by tracing the important events
that preceded and accompanied the birth of the Muhammadiyah
in order to find out what roles seem to have been played by
the Muhammadiyah during its formative period. After having
xxi
established these roles, the next step will be to assess and

analyze them carefully by examining the attitudes of the
Muhammadiyah leadership in the formative period and by
interpreting the primary texts written by Muhammadiyans and
others. For this purpose the study will gather the best
available information, then extract and analyze them.
In the section concerned with the role of the Christian
missions in Indonesia and their relationship to the colonial
rule, as well as the threat it posed to Islam, the study
will rely on works of Indonesian and Western scholars,
including those Dutch works which have been translated into
the English and Indonesian languages. The works of Christian
scholars and missionaries will also be used.
In determining the motivating factors that served to
arouse Dahlan to found the Muhammadiyah, biographical
materials written by both Indonesian and foreign scholars
will be utilized. In addition, both official and non
official publications of the Muhammadiyah, which constitute
a rich and useful source for this part of the study, will be
employed. Additionally, important books, treatises, reports
of Muhammadiyah Congresses and the works of Muhammadiyah
functionaries will be used as primary sources in determining
the concerns, objectives, and aspirations of the movement.
Equally important is the approach of interpreting and
understanding the key statements of Dahlan so as to
determine their relevance to the thesis of the dissertation.
xxii
In order for the study to discern the underlying motives of

Dahlan, these statements will be interpreted in light of
Dahlan's actions, concerns and grievances. The method which
will be used to interpret these texts, therefore is, to a
certain degree, hermeneutical in nature. This method, in its
broader sense follows that proposed by Hans-George Gadamar
in Truth and Method.3 in that a dialogue between the text
and the interpreter is established. By using this method,
the study will be able to bring together and interpret the
various dimensions of Dahlan's life, particularly the
psychological and religious ones most pertinent to the birth
of the Muhammadiyah.
Finally with this assessment and analysis, it is hoped
that this study will offer a better understanding and
explanation of the entire phenomenon of the Muhammadiyah
movement. It is important to note that although this study
will focus on one of the most important underlying missions
of the Muhammadiyah, i.e. countering the Christian
missionary activities, this study is by no means intended to
play down the significance of the Muhammadiyah's other
missions, which are overtly stated. They are:
to uphold and uplift the teaching of Islam so as to
create a truly Islamic society.
3Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. trans. Joel

Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (New York:
Crossroad Publishing Co., 1989).
xxiii
Synopsis of the Dissertation

This dissertation begins with a preliminary discussion
of the history of religious persuasions adhered to by the
people of Indonesia. This will provide the background needed
for an appropriate understanding of the ensuing issues. The
discussion of the religious history starts with Animism, the
belief held by the ancient Indonesians. Following this early
period, the first chapter will briefly discuss the
penetration of four different strains of religious faith,
namely Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. Each of
these religions will be evaluated in the context of its
influence on the Indonesian people.
Chapter two examines the early introduction of
Christianity during the Portuguese occupation of some parts
of Indonesia. This is followed by an exposition of the
process of Christian growth and consolidation up to the
final years of the Dutch colonial rule. This chapter also
includes a number of concrete examples of the process of the
consolidation of Christianity. The history of the early
Christian missions along with the role of important figures
who participated in spreading the Christian Faith in
Indonesia, will help explain the process of Christian
consolidation.
This treatment is followed by the exposition of Dutch
colonial Policy in chapter three. The point to be argued in
this chapter is that the Dutch policy was largely
xx iv
responsible for both enhancing the position of Christianity

and stimulating the emergence of many nationalist movements,
including the Muhammadiyah. In this chapter the role and
views of Snouck Hurgronje, the chief architect of the Dutch
Islamic Policy are also elaborated. According to him, to
create durable and harmonious relations with the largely
Muslim population of Indonesia, the Dutch ought to
domesticate Indonesian leaders and attract them to the
benefits of Western civilization. It was hoped that through
this process the Indonesian leaders would be dissuaded from
the Islamic system and adapt instead a system based on
Western values.
Chapter four is devoted to examining the rise of
several social movements in the early years of twentieth
century Indonesia. In its treatment of these diverse
movements, this chapter puts a special emphasis on the
Muhammadiyah movement. The birth of the Muhammadiyah, its
cultural, political, religious context and the biography of
its founder, as well as its main objectives, are extensively
discussed.
Chapter five, which constitutes the core chapter of the
dissertation, seeks to review the main factors that
contributed to the emergence of the Muhammadiyah. The first
section of this chapter begins with the presentation of
different theories and points of view on the issue in
question. The two commonly held views concerning the reason
xxv
for the emergence of the Muhammadiyah are presented prior to

the discussion of the main thesis of the dissertation. In
enhancing the dissertation's thesis, namely the Christian
penetration factor, three other variables that subsume under
this factor are also discussed. These are the impact of the
Guru Ordonnantie (Teachers Ordinance ; the Dutch
infringement on local custom; and the establishment of
Freemasonry in Indonesia.
In order to substantiate the primary thesis of this
dissertation, an account of the Muhammadiyah's encounter
with Christian missions is presented in the last chapter.
The account of this encounter covers almost a century. This
encounter took place in three stages. The first stage was
during the formative period of the Muhammadiyah up to the
final days of colonial rule; the second was during the
Sukarno era; and the third encompasses the contemporary
period. In each stage the encounter between the Muhammadiyah
and the Christians is treated extensively. Toward the end of
this chapter, the causes of the currently existing
antagonism between the Muhammadiyah and the Christians is
addressed.
Finally a conclusion follows which summarizes the
findings of the study. Some recommendations are suggested as
possibilities to help mitigate somewhat this antagonism
which lies just beneath the surface of Indonesia's apparent
social harmony.
xxvi
CHAPTER I
INDONESIA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Indonesia, formerly called the Netherlands' Indies,

lies where the Indian Ocean merges with the tropical
Pacific. It comprises around three thousand inhabited
islands stretching over three thousand miles along the
equator. These islands, along with others, around ten
thousand islets in all, make up the fourth largest nation by
population, and the sixth by area in the world. The
country's population exceeds one hundred ninety million.1
Sixty percent live on the island of Java which contains less
than seven percent of the nation's territory. Furthermore,
and according to the best available archeological evidence,
one of the earliest races of humankind made its home in what
is now Indonesia.2
Geographical factors such as extended coastlines and
tropical forests have deeply affected the country's history.
These geographical variations have given rise to three
According to the 1995 Encyclopaedia Britanica world

data, the population of Indonesia in 1994 is 191,340,000.
See, Encyclopedia Britanica. 1995 Book of the Year, 630.
2Eleven skulls found in central Java near the city of
Solo (Homo Solensis) were judged to be some 40,000 years
old. See Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara: a History of
Indonesia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), 3-4.
However, it is extremely doubtful that modern Indonesians
descend from these prehistoric races.
different types of Indonesian societies. The seas that

surround the islands played a crucial role in the
establishment of the first type, namely, the trade-oriented
strongly Islamic coastal people. The sea trade routes
enabled this area to have an easier access to the outside
world and alien cultures as compared with the interior
areas. The second type are animistic tribal groups who
inhabit the isolated mountainous areas. The third group is
generally Hinduized, closely attached to the court elite,
and mostly live in the accessible interiors of the
country.3
From almost any standpoint
and cultural
geological, historical
Indonesia is complex. Hence it was not
without reason that the country's official motto, "Bhineka

Tunggal Ika" ("Unity in Diversity"), was devised by the
founding fathers of Indonesia to emphasize its ethnic
heterogeneity and unity. In spite of its ethnic diversity,
including more than two hundred and fifty regional
languages, the people of Indonesia are united in using
primarily the national language, Bahasa Indonesia.4
3Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities,"

in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. Mcvey (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1963), 25-30.
4Bahasa Indonesia is a Malay language which has been
known for more than a thousand years as the commercial
language in the coastal areas of the archipelago. It
originated from the peoples living around the straits of
Malacca and was spread to other islands. It has contributed,
more than any other factor, to the unity of the country.
There are a multitude of religious persuasions adhered

to by the people of Indonesia. These religions include most
of the present world religions. Around eighty-five percent
of the population embrace Islam, and the remaining fifteen
percent is shared by the Hindu, Buddhist and Christian
religions.
Before we embark upon a discussion of the history of
ancient Indonesian religious beliefs, it is important to
note that such a task is by no means easy, one of the
reasons being the insufficient attention that has been given
by scholars to the circumstances surrounding the lives of
the
early Indonesians. This lack of concern mainly is due
to the scarcity of written records and documentation.

Consequently, and to the great regret of the Indonesian
people, Indonesia has one of the least-known histories of
the major states. Until the end of World War II, virtually
the only outsiders with an interest in the area were the
Dutch. It was only in the last two decades that Englishspeaking countries
trainedspecialists on Indonesia. Very
few, however, have
made an attempt to deal with Indonesia,
let alone its religious history. As the Dutch historian J.C.

van Leur rightly puts it, "Whoever approaches the history of
Indonesia enters into the unknown."5
5J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society (Bandung:

Sumur, 1960), 10.
Animism
To judge from scattered archaeological and ethnological

information, scholars seem to suggest that the Indonesian
people have been civilized for many centuries, since they
practiced techniques of rice cultivation and had developed
forms of social organization. In religion, they were
believed to be animists, believing that inanimate objects
and possessed spirits, trees and living creatures were
alive. Moreover, they also practiced ancestor and spirit
worship. These early Indonesians also believed that spirits,
such as mountain, tree, and ancestral spirits could evoke
fear, cause sickness and bring death. Such spirits could
also bring about health, fertility and prosperity. To honor
the good spirits and placate the bad ones, a number of rites
were instituted and performed during harvest time and at
birth, at marriage and at death. The remains of of several
stone figures and places of worship in antiquity have been
found in East Java and South Sumatra.
Furthermore, the ancient Indonesians also believed
that the universe was conceived as a structure of spiritual
forces that directs the daily life of the people. These
spiritual forces were sometimes divided into female and male
forces. Each force had its distinctive role and function.6
6For an excellent introduction on several aspects of
Indonesian history written by Indonesian scholars, see,
Haryati Soebadio and C. A. du Marchie Sarvaas, eds. Dynamics
of Indonesian History (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing
Company, 1978).
In general, the most fundamental basis of the

Indonesian tribal religion is expressed in the myths of
origin and the relation between deity and creation in such
myths. The main themes in the myths concern the sacred war
between the Upper World and the Lower World or the sacred
wedding of Heaven and Earth; the result in both myths was
separation.7 However, evidence regarding prehistoric
Indonesia is scanty and even clouded with mystery. No one
knows with any certainty what the way of life was then. But
one can be fairly certain that at times animism was
prevalent. In fact, certain animistic aspects of the ancient
Indonesian worlview are still apparent today.
Following the early period of animistic belief,
Indonesia was penetrated by four different strains of
religious faith: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity.
Each of these has added its particular and varied influences
to the early beliefs. Not everywhere, however, did each
influence reach the same depth, nor did each of them
exercise its influence everywhere. Nevertheless, Islam has
retained the greatest share in both the domains of influence
and population.
In the first and second centuries C.E., Indian traders
brought Hinduism to the region. The Hindu religion and
culture developed during the sixth to the fourteenth
7M.P.M. Muskens, The Catholic Church in Indonesia

(Aachen: Missio Actuell Verlag, 1979), 17.
centuries into a powerful kingdom. In the sixth, seventh and

eighth centuries, Hinduism became overlapped by Buddhism.8
Then in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Islam appeared
on the scene and gained its first foothold in Aceh. Lastly,
Christianity found its way there with the arrival of
Portuguese traders on the Indonesian shores in the early
sixteenth century.
From the early periods of Indonesian history and
continuing over 1500 years until the fourth wave of cultural
penetration took place, the Indonesian people had shown the
ability to create syntheses of these different ingredients,
accepting the new without discarding the old, absorbing and
accommodating rather than rejecting. This characteristic
aspect of Indonesian history clearly mirrors the predominant
attitude of its people in seeking consensus rather than
confrontation. In what follows, I will try to examine the
degree of cultural perceptivity and religious creativity the
Indonesians demostrated when dealing with the incoming
cultures.
80n the role of Indian influence in Indonesia and of

the character of Indonesian history during that period of
influence, see 0. W. Wolters, Earlv Indonesian Commerce
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); B.R. Anderson,
Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1965).
The Hindu-Buddhist Influence
The long coastal area of Indonesia has allowed the

country to be in contact with alien cultures. The seas that
separate and link Indonesia's numerous islands, and which
cover more than two-thirds of its territory, have made it
accessible to foreign cultures and forces. In addition to
the importance of the seas for economic and cultural
penetration, Indonesia's natural resources were also
appealing to foreigners. Thanks to this distinct
geographical setting, Indonesia became a highly commercial
center, linking it to other centers of world trade.
Later, from the bases of her harbors there developed
political powers. The Buddhist empire of the seventh to the
thirteenth century, Sriwijaya, in southern Sumatra, was one
of the greatest.9 The Muslim empires of the Melacca and
Aceh, which followed in the fifteenth and the sixteenth
centuries respectively, were equally strong political
powers.
Although the exact manner and date in which Indian
influence reached Indonesia is disputed,10 most authorities
agree that the penetration of Hinduism was peaceful and non
90. W. Wolters, The Fall of Sriviiava in Malay History

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 1X-5.
10F.D.K.Bosch, Selected Studies in Indonesian
Archaeology (The Hague: Martinus Nighoff, 1951), 11.
political.11 The early contact of Indonesia with the Hindus

was apparently due to sea travel by Hindus to the ports of
Indonesia. The interaction of the two peoples
may have been
started during the early centuries when Indian traders may

have come to the early Indonesian kingdoms. Early on, Indian
merchants migrated to Indonesia and intermarried with the
local people and, thereby, transmitted Indian culture.
Communities influenced by these merchants sought Brahmin
priests to serve in performing their religious rites. Over
time, intermarriage and the teaching of the Brahman priests
brought about the merger of Hindu religion with the local
cults. It is highly probable that during this process of
cultural interaction, the Indonesian side acted as more of a
passive recipient of the new culture, rather than an
imposing force.
Both Van Leur12 and Wertheim13 contend that the Indian
influence penetrated through a number of influential Indian
Brahmans who lent political support to Indonesian rulers by
providing them with genealogical confirmation of being in
the highest caste. During this period, it was also believed
that certain rulers were characterized as the incarnation of
11John F. Cady, South East Asia; Its Historical

Development (New York: Me Graw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 41.
12Jacob C. Van Leur "Indonesian Trade and Society",
Asian Social and Economic History (Van Hoeve, 1933), 98-103.
13W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition
(Bandung: Sumur, 1956), 237-238.
Hindu gods such as Vishnu or Shiva, while the minor rulers

became great god-kings. The propagation of such beliefs,
which served as a solid legitimization of the living rulers
may have been the central motive for Hinduization.
As for Buddhism, it is believed that it may have
entered Indonesia through a more popular interaction.
Buddhist missionaries visited Indonesian courts, preached
their laws and converted the rulers and their families.
Through this form of preaching, they were able to establish
an order of monks. Furthermore, the Indian preachers also
managed to send groups of Indonesian converts to visit
Buddhist monasteries in India. These Indonesian Buddhists,
upon their return, promoted Buddhist teachings and
philosophy. Interestingly enough, soon after these
missionary activities took place, Buddhism practically
vanished from its homeland, but not before it was
introduced, preached and took roots in many other lands,
including Indonesia.
Indianization, both Hindu and Buddhist, was basically
added to the existing Indonesian culture. As in India,
Indonesian societies, particularly the Javanese society,
were stratified. They also resembled India in its Hinduized
culture of mystical tradition: in remote forest schools,
pupils learned ascetic techniques from a guru whom they
respected more than their own biological fathers.
1 0
Despite these similarities to their Indian models, some

aspects of Indian teachings were not as important in
Indonesian society as they were in India. The Indonesians
sifted the teachings and shaped certain cultural dimensions
to fit the Indonesian model. Chief among the de-emphasized
teachings were the caste system and the concepts of purity
and pollution which were not rigorously enforced.
One of the most striking features of the Hindu-Buddhist
influence found its expression in the emergence of
Indonesian political powers. These temporal powers were
given both political and religious foundations upon which to
stand firmly. The Hindu influence was clearly evident in the
early empires of Indonesia.
When the Chinese Funan Empire began to decline around
500 C.E., the first great Hinduized Indonesian empire, the
Sriwijaya, appeared on the scene in the area of modern
Paiembang, the southern part of Sumatra.14 By 670 C.E., the
Sriwijaya Empire had become an important center of Manayana
Buddhist learning. And within less then a decade, it had
extended its rule over most of Sumatra, the western part of
Java, a small section of Borneo and portions of the Malay
Peninsula.
Sriwijaya eventually was able to establish its control
over the harbors of its potential competitors in the region.
14D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London:

Macmillian Company, 1964), 41.
1 1
In this way, it became virtually the dominant power in the

area. This empire persisted almost unchallenged for six
centuries. Only in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
was the final chapter of its history concluded when Pasai,
the first Muslim kingdom, established itself in the region.
Unfortunately, Sriwijaya left no material evidences of its
civilization to compare with the roughly contemporary
Borobudur, the sacred monument of Central Java.15
The second Indonesian empire, the Sailendra,
established itself in central Java around 732 C.E. The
language of the empire was Sanskrit and the religion was
Shaivism, a type of Brahmanism. This Buddhist empire erected
a sacred place, Borobudur, which was the greatest religious
monument ever built in the entire history of Indonesia. This
eighth and ninth centuries edifice marked a high point in
Javanese architectural and artistic achievement.16
Following this empire there were several Hindu-Buddhist
empires which ruled Indonesia. Chief among them were the
15Unlike many other religious monuments, Borobudur

is not a tomb, nor is it a temple with an interior. Rather
it is a stupa built around the summit of a hill and rising
in nine layers up to the top. The monument symbolizes the
individual stage of growth to perfection. Starting from the
base at the earthly level, the structure goes up one layer
after the other until the uppermost level of empty stupa
which symbolizes the ultimate reality. It is a huge
monument; the galleries around its terraces are almost five
kilometers in length.
16Indonesian leaders often refer to Borobudur as proof
that Indonesia had a high civilization long before those who
branded Indonesia as an underdeveloped country.
1 2
Mataram and the Majapahit. In 930 C.E., after the decline of

the Sailendra kingdom, the King of Mataram moved the center
of Hindu-Buddhist religion to East Java. During the reign of
Dharmawangsa (985-1006), Sriwijaya was attacked by Mataram.
Sriwijaya then mounted a counter-attack that reduced the
Kingdom of Mataram to chaos.
In 1293, Wijaya founded the Majapahit kingdom, the last
Hinduized empire before the revival of the Islamized
Mataram. During the Majapahit kingdom, in the fourteenth
century, Indonesia witnessed the rise of power of one of its
greatest statesmen, Gajah Mada, chief minister of King
Hayam. Under Gajah Mada, the kingdom claimed suzerainty over
the whole archipelago, and Gajah Mada almost attained his
goal of ruling all of Indonesia. He succeeded in
establishing a considerable empire extending beyond Java.
Even the mighty Sriwijaya had not enjoyed such unchallenged
authority. Thus Majapahit is, for modern Indonesians, one of
the greatest glories of the past.
With respect to religion, the Kingdom of Majapahit
leaned more toward reviving the indigenous Javanese
standard; hence it represented the climax of Hindu-Javanese
civilization. With the death of Gajah Mada in 1364 C.E., the
period of Indianization and the great empires was coming to
an end. During that time, a new factor was added to the
gradual disintegration of the kingdom; the penetration of
13
Islam. During that time Islam was already reaching the

shores of northern Sumatra.
It is worth noting that the Indian period saw
considerable change within the religious history of
Indonesia. Theravada Buddhism reached the region first, but
was replaced by Mahayana Buddhism both in Sumatra and Java.
Sumatra remained primarily Buddhist, but Hinduism eventually
prevailed on the island of Java as it did in India.
Toward the end of the Indian period, Hinduism was
represented by the last Hinduized kingdom, that of
Majapahit. The kingdom remained an enclave of Hindu-Javanese
culture until the early part of the Islamic period. During
the years 1513-1528, the kingdom was attacked by Javanese
states that had newly turned Muslim, and its rulers fled to
the island of Bali. Bali has remained Hindu up to the
present time and represents the only survival of the early
Hindu community.
The extent to which Indian culture has exerted its
influence on Indonesia is evident. One could not deny the
fact that the wealth of architectural remains, along with
the remnant of the mystical dimension of Javanese life,
testify effectively to the power of that influence. Apart
from material remains, the Indian cultural impact is also to
be seen in the concept of kingship in the Javanese kingdoms
and in the survival of the privavi aristocratic layer of the
14
Javanese society.17 In rural society the popularity of the

shadow play on Indian epic themes, before it was transformed
into Islamic themes, the Javanese and Balinese dances, the
use of Indian motifs in the traditional batik design,18 the
Sanskrit loan words, all combine to present and reveal the
powerful Indian influence. Voicing the same opinion, Sir R.
Winstedt, a British official in Malaya during the colonial
period, contended that India had influenced the spiritual
and material life of the people of the archipelago to such
an extent that they owed nearly everything to her: alphabet,
religion, a political system, law and literature.19
In the realm of religious belief, Mahayana Buddhism and
Hinduism, including Shaivism and Vaishnavism, were regarded
as dominating the spiritual practices of the people. Despite
having a mutual conflict of interest, both Hinduism and
Buddhism had gone through a process of syncretization. The
syncretism of Shiva-Buddha is clearly observable in the
Javanese sacred writing Smaradahana Kvanq Kamahavanikan.
17Central to the Hindu-Javanese political system was

the Brahmanic concept of the God-king, whose powers underlay
the whole system of authority. The earthly order was
regarded as a reflection of the heavenly order. See, I. W.
Mabbett, "Devaraja," Journal of Southeast Asian History
(September 1969) Vol. 10, No. 2.
18See Fritz A. Wagner, "Indonesia", Art of the World
Series (London: 1959) vol II. See also, Claire Holt, Art in
Indonesia: Continuities and Change (Ithaca: Cornell
19Richard Winstedt, Malay and Its History (London:
Hutchinson's University Library, n.d.), 47.
15
which attempts to syncretize the Hinduism's Trimurti and the

Mahayana Buddhism's deities. In this connection, R.C.
Majumdar asserts that the association between Shiva and
Buddha was a characteristic feature of Javanese religion;
even in modern Hindu Balinese theology, Buddha is regarded
as a younger brother of Shiva.20
It is highly probable that the process of the diffusion
of the Hindu and Buddhist religions and their socio
political culture among the indigenous people evolved
through cultural absorption and acculturation.21 Through
this process much of Indian culture, which has a belief
system similar to that of the prevailing early Indonesians,
was accepted and practiced. Some examples are
the
veneration of particular physical objects such as trees,

stones and hills, along with the general acceptance of the
existence of spirits who must be propitiated in everyday
life.
This strong Indian cultural influence covers a span
of time of well over a thousand years, starting from the

early sixth century up through the 15th century, until
Islam's penetration, which assumed the role of a newly
influential culture.
20R.C. Majundar, Hindu Colonies in the Far East

(Calcutta; Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963), 99.
210n the historical records of the Buddhist religion as
practiced in the Indonesian Archipelago, see, I-Tsing,
A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and
the Malay Archipelago, tr. J. Takakusu (Oxford: Clarendom
Press, 1896), 1-20.
16
Before we look at the following period, namely the

Islamic period, one important observation must be made.
After almost a millennium of domination in almost every
aspect of the religious, social and political life of the
people of the region, one is inclined to raise the question:
Why did this culture fail to maintain its powerful grip on
the region in the ensuing period?
Why was the newly
introduced Islamic culture able to overshadow the prevailing

one? Many speculations have been offered, and I believe many
are still yet to follow.
On this issue, Al-Attas is of the opinion that Hinduism
had remained only an exclusive cult of the priests and
princes throughout most of its domination. It was a
superstructure maintained mostly by the ruling group. The
majority of the people never really grasped
Hindu-Buddhist
philosophical and theological thought. The people were more

concerned with its aesthetic aspect. The intellectual
speculation and its metaphysical dimensions had never been
popular. To borrow Legge's remark, the Hindus, though they
may have settled in the cities, "remained separate from the
surrounding societies." 22 This view is also substantiated
by the fact that the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra did not make
themselves felt in the realm of metaphysics and philosophy,
but only in art. Therefore, during this long period of
22J.D. Legge, Indonesia (Sydney: Prientice-Hall of

Australia, 3rd ed. 1980), 40.
17
domination, Hindu-Buddhist culture did not produce renowned

thinkers and reformers in the region.23
Indeed, seldom does one cultural period pass quickly
into the next one peacefully. However, in the history of
Indonesia, the shifty from Hindu-Buddhist culture into Islam
was an exception to this general rule. While the former
seems to have continued unchallenged for a millennium, the
latter appeared with great strength and terminated the
former. Islam came and dominated almost the whole region,
leaving no space for Hindu-Buddhism to maneuver except in
the tiny area of Bali.24
It is, perhaps, not out of place to point out that
there have been several theories put forth by scholars to
explain people's shift from one religion to another.25 To
explain the overwhelming conversion of the people of
Indonesia to Islam, Nock's catagories of "conversion" and
"adhesion" might be useful to start our discussion. Based on
Nock's definition, "conversion" refers to an act of adhering
23Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas, Preliminary Statement on a
General Theory of the Islamization of the Malav-Indonesian
Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1968),
2-5.
24In this respect, W.F. Wertheim suggested that Islam
gave lay persons a sense of individual worth and equality
irrespective of their social status, unlike the Hindu caste
system. See, Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition.
196.
25See, for instance, A.D. Nock, Conversion: The Old and
the New Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of
Hippo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933); A.I. Gordon, The
Nature of Conversion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
18
to a prophetic religion, while "adhesion" denotes an act of

embracing a non-prophetic religion. Hence the process of
Islamization of the people of Indonesia falls under the
catagory of "conversion", because Islam is a prophetic
religion that demands unqualified commitment to attain
salvation. In other words, in their whole-hearted acceptance
to Islam, the people of Indonesia have "converted" to a new
prophetic religion. Unlike "conversion", "adhesion" refers
to a process of people's adhering to a non-prophetic
religion out of a desire to satisfy their natural needs. In
this process, the adherents do not necessarily have to
discard their old religious doctrines and practices.26
Considering the nature of the Indonesian Muslim, who in
many instances, continue to retain their previous religious
practices, Nock's theory does not seem to fit the
Islamization process in Indonesia. On this issue, we concur
with Khurshid Ahmad who asserts that "Islam has been an
absorbing religion rather than a converting religion.1,27
Islam
As with Hinduism and Buddhism centuries earlier, Islam
was accepted peacefully. The
most widely accepted notion
suggests that it was through the teaching of Sufi Islam that

26A.D. Nock, Conversion. 7-9.
27Ali Muhsin Barwani, "Christian Mission in the Muslim
World" in International Review of Mission, vol 65 (1976),
426.
19
this religion successfully obtained a hold over eighty-five

percent of the present Indonesian population. Sufism is said
to have played a more dominant role in the spread of Islam
when compared to other branches of Islamic discipline.
However, the history of the Islamization of the Indonesian
archipelago is still a much-neglected field, particularly
the period of large-scale conversion around the fifteenth
century. G.E. Marrison complains that works on Islam in
Indonesia are almost non-existent. The reason for this, as
has been earlier indicated, is the poor archeological
evidence, coupled with a lack of interest on the part of
Western scholars, who were too absorbed in Middle-Eastern
Islam.
Scholars dealing with the history of Islam in the area
suggest that Islam was brought to the region by traders from
Arabia, Persia and India. They also point out that ever
since the pre-Islamic period there had been a trade
relationship between the Indonesian archipelago and Arabia.
By the eighth and ninth centuries, several ports in the
region, presumably during the peak era of the Sriwijaya
Empire, had been known to traders. The region had become
2 0
virtually a cultural melting pot of Arab, Indian, Persian

and Chinese.28
According to a reference of Ibn Battutah's fourteenth
century account of his travels in South-East Asia, even then
there existed an Islamic community in the region. Arnold
wrote that "long before Ibn Battutah's travel, merchants
from the Deccan had lived in large numbers in the region and
sowed the seed of Islam."29 In spite of this early contact,
only a relatively small proportion of the Indonesian people
then embraced Islam. It was only in the thirteenth to the
sixteenth century that intense Islamization occurred.
Many theories have been put forward with regard to the
reason for this large-scale conversion. It is, however, not
necessary, to go into detail on these different theories
here, since they have been exhaustively discussed
28G.R. Tibbets, "Pre-Islamic Arabia and Southeast

Asia," JMBRAS (March 1956), 207. See also, G.F. Hourani,
Arab Seafaring (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1951). The
two authors quote statements of Hamzah Isfahani and alBaladhuri and al-Tabari respectively, about the earliest
intercourse between Arab and Chinese traders.
29Arnold T.W., The Preaching of Islam (London:
Constable & Company, 1913), 364-365. See also the seminar
resolutions held respectively in 1963, 1978 and 1980 on the
coming of Islam to Indonesia which stated that Islam had
already been known in the region since the Umayyad period of
the early Hijrah.
2 1
elsewhere.30 Different factors such as trade and politics,

as well as the Muslim-Portuguese antagonism, inter-marriage,
and Sufism all have played their role and contributed
their part to the Islamization of the region. Of all these
variables, scholars agree that the Sufi factor was the
predominant one in prompting the Indonesian people to accept
and embrace Islam.31
Most scholars, Indonesian and Western alike, contend
that the Sufis' success in turning the archipelago to Islam
was primarily because their interpretation of Islam was very
well suited to the Hindu-Buddhist mystical background. The
interplay between Hindu-Buddhist mysticism and Islamic
mysticism set the stage for the people of the region to
accept Islam wholeheartedly. Because the Sufis skillfully
interpreted the existing Hindu-Buddhist culture so as to fit
30Syed Farid al-Attas, "Notes on Various Theories

Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago," The
Muslim World. (1986), 164. See also, S.Q.Fatimi, Islam Comes
to Malaysia (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research
Institute Ltd., 1963).
31For a good survey of the literature relating to the
coming of Islam to Indonesia, see A. Hasjmi ed., Seiarah
Masuk dan Berkembananva Islam di Indonesia (The History of
the Coming of Islam and its Spread in Indonesia) (Bandung:
al-Ma'Srif, 1989): S.M.N. al-Attas, Islam dalam Seiarah dan
Kebudavaan Melavu (Islam within the Malay History and
Civilization) (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa fit Pustaka, 1969);
G.W.J. Drewes, "New Light on the Coming of Islam to
Indonesia?", BKI, 124 (1968); S.Q. Fatimi, Islam Comes to
Malaysia (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Institute,
1963) ; R.O. Winstedt, "The Advent of Muhammadanism in the
Malay Peninsula and Archipelago", JMBRAS. 77 (1917), 171-3;
G.E. Marrison, "The Coming of Islam to the East Indies",
JMBRAS. 24 I (1951), 31-7.
2 2
into the Islamic framework and the basic teachings of Islam,

Islam took a solid root in the region.
This successful
accommodative attitude on the part of the Sufis toward the

existing culture has provoked a great deal of comment. Many
western scholars of Indonesia have maintained that
Indonesian Islam is no more than a thin layer over the mass
of inherited pre-Islamic beliefs and a product of the
syntheses of Islam and Hindu-Buddhist culture.32 Certain
Indonesian Islamic modernist movements have also been
critical of the way in which the Sufis dealt with the
existing culture. Both Western scholars and Indonesian
Muslim modernists suggest that those Sufis, by accomodating
Hindu-Buddhist culture, departed from the doctrinal core of
Islam. As this issue lies beyond the scope of this chapter,
I will confine myself to the history of Islam in the region.
The first region in which Islam took hold was northern
Sumatra. Spice traders from the west coast of India
(Gujarat) stopped there on their way to the Moluccas
(Maluku). The Moluccas, which were commonly called "the
Spice Islands," lie in the eastern part of what is now
Indonesia.33 To this end, a community of Arab traders was
present in northern Sumatra as early as the seventh century.
32Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: The

Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1961), 38.
33This region was called the Spice Islands because it
was the main pepper-producing region in the world.
23
In 1292, Marco Polo, the Venetian traveller and author,

and the first European to visit the region, noted that the
inhabitants of the town of Perlak on the northern tip of
Sumatra had been converted to Islam. This was probably Pasai
where the Muslim traveller Ibn Battutah spent two weeks in
1345. Battutah reported that the ruler of Pasai was a Muslim
convert with great interest in Islamic learning. The
tombstone of Malik al-SSleh. the first Muslim ruler of that
kingdom, who died in 1297, has been discovered in the area.
Also, in 1281 China sent two Muslims, Sulayman and Shams alDin, to Melayu (Jambi), suggesting Muslim influence there.
Fourteenth century Indonesia witnessed the arrival of
more Arabs than ever before. These new arrivals resulted
from the Muslims in India being blocked from the west by the
Mongols. They had no choice but to turn their attention
toward eastern trade. The coming of those Arabs in fairly
large numbers, along with the teaching of Islam, heralded
the end of Indonesia's Indian period and the beginning of
the Islamic era.
Another port affected by this spice trade was Malacca,
on the Malayan Peninsula. Its rulers accepted Islam in the
fifteenth century, and by the sixteenth century it had
become the principle port of the region.34 From there Islam
Â European traveller to Malacca in the sixteenth

century guessed that more ships harbored there than any port
in Europe. See, Bruce Grant, Indonesia (Parkville: Melbourne
University Press, 1964), 8.
24
spread outward and made its way steadily to almost the

entire archipelago. By the time of Majapahit's final days in
the early sixteenth century, many of its old principalities
had declared themselves independent Muslim states.
In Java, along the northern coast, a number of
independent kingdoms had begun to develop commercially
as a
result of participation in the spice trade. Chief among them

were the kingdoms of Demak and Cirebon. As they were drawn
into the commercial center of Muslim Malacca, they found
themselves drawn simultaneously into her religion. In
subsequent developments, a new Muslim kingdom arose in
central Java, calling itself Mataram after the earlier great
Hindu state.
Furthermore, in Celebes, the present day Sulawesi, the
twin principalities of Makassar and Goa followed suit and
also embraced Islam in the early seventeeth century. The
Australian historian C.M.H. Clark says that if there had not
been the coming of the colonial forces to the region to stop
the spread of Islam, "the kingdom would have moved further
to New Guinea and from there across to the north coast of
35Not to be confused with "Goa" which is located north

of Bombay across the gulf of Cambay on India's west coast.
Goa remained the principal Portugese administrative base in
the East, while Malacca became the center of its power in
the more remote areas until the Dutch conquered it in 1614.
See J.M. Richards, Goa (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
1982), 24-28.
Australia.1,36 In due course, various of the Indonesian

kingdoms were converted to Islam, and indeed the faith
spread all over the archipelago, with the exception of Bali,
which to this day has resisted Islam and stayed with its
Hindu tradition.
The story of the gradual Islamization of Indonesia, or
to borrow Al-Attas' term, the "two phases of the
Islamization,"37 raises a number of questions regarding
Islam's role in the archipelago. Today, nearly ninety
percent of the Indonesian people are classified as Muslims,
but the observance of Islamic teachings has clearly been a
matter of degree, varying widely both from group to group
and from area to area. There are those who accept the
absolute requirements of the faith, and there are others
who, while insisting on calling themselves Muslims, have
little devotion to Islam. On the one hand, there are those
who would, if they could, establish their society to fit the
most extreme Islamic image and create the Islamic state; on
the other hand, there are those who are strongly attached to
36See, C.M.H. Clark in the first volume of his A

History of Australia, as quoted by Bruce Grant, Indonesia.
8.
37By phase I, he means the early period of the

introduction of Islam into the region which extended to the
thirteenth century. As for phase II, which constitutes the
continuation of the previous phase, it proceeded from the
fourteenth century onward, when large-scale conversion took
place. See, Al-Attas, Preliminary Statements. 27-29.
26
the cultures of the past, and are no more than nominal

Muslims.
In Java, where Islam took almost six centuries to
permeate the whole social fabric, the observance of Islamic
teachings is less rigorous than that of the main centers of
the faith such as Aceh, West Sumatra and South Sulawesi.
However, although Islam in other areas has undeniably
played, and continues to play, a leading role while
preserving the "purer" Islam, it is in Java that Islam has
found its most important organizational expression. It is
there, also, that Islamic groups, traditional as well as
reformist, have been involved in the shaping of Indonesian
politics in general.
As the Dutch colonial rule consolidated itself in Java
in the second half of the nineteenth century and began to
penetrate more deeply into the outer islands, Islam came to
offer a symbol of resistance to foreign domination. That it
could do so is in part the result of the increasing depth of
Islamic religious influence throughout Indonesia. At that
particular juncture, Indonesian Muslims felt deeply called
by their religious sentiment to counter the colonial rule
which came, morally and materially, to support Christianity.
The Muhammadiyah, a leading social and religious movement by
virtue of its mission, took upon itself the task of
resisting
the colonial cultural and religious invasion.
27
Indonesia today has rejected the idea of being an

Islamic state, but in many respects appears, nonetheless, to
be an Islamic country. However, a great deal of blending
with the local culture has taken place. This blending is
particularly apparent in the particular segment of society
closely associated with the local patterns of custom and
belief. Geertz's formulation, which distinguishes three
religious outlooks within Javanese society, stems from this
reality. These three social groups are the spirit-worshiping
and custom-oriented abanoan village-folks, the Hinduoriented privavi of the aristocratic classes, and the purer
Islamic outlook of the santri.38 As this issue lies beyond
our present focus, we will come to treat it separately as we
discuss the origin of the santri movement of the
Muhammadiyah.
it should be stressed, however, that this formulation

is a suggestive classification which needs to be handled
with care. It represents only a Javanese model and needs the
additional recognition of other Indonesian ethnic groups. It
is also important to mention that Geertz's catagorization
has drawn critical attention from many scholars. Some
scholars voice their objections based on the fact that the
terms santri, abancran. and privavi are not precise in their
usage in Indonesia and may mean different things to
different people. For critical analysis of such
catagorization, see Harsja W. Bachtiar, "The Religion of
Java: A Commentary, Maialah Ilmu-ilmu Sastra Indonesia. 5
(1973), 85-118; Mark R. Woodward, "The Sharl'ah and the
Doctrine: Muslim Law and Mystical Doctrine in Central Java,"
unpubl. Ph.D. diss., (Urbana- Champaign: University of
Illionois, 1985).
28
Christianity
Some Christian scholars argue that the first messengers
of Jesus to arrive in what is now Indonesia may have come
during the period of the early Christian fathers.39 Muller
Kruger, in his book Church History in Indonesia, asserts
that, according to an ancient Arab source, in the second
half of the seventh century a community of Christians lived
in Sibolga, Sumatra, and established churches. Meanwhile the
trade routes by land and by sea from Central Asia to East
Asia had been travelled by Europeans, among whom there were
also missionaries.40 After this early period, however,
Christianity remained in obscurity for a long time in the
region.41
Following the era of Columbus' voyage, the Portuguese
discovered a route to Asia via South Africa, which marked a
39Dr. Kurt Koch points out that it is not unlikely that
the apostle Thomas, who worked in India, crossed over to
Indonesia with the Indian traders. Kurt Koch, The Revival in
Indonesia (Michigan: Kregel Publication, 1972), 13.
40According to Cosmas (Indicopleustes), an Egyptian monk,
writing around 547 C.E. in The Christian Topography, tr. by
J.W. Me Crindle (London: The Hakluyt Soceity, 1897), around
the fifth century C.E. there was a church of Persian
Christians in "Sielediba" (Cylon) with a Presbyter appointed
from Persia. This account strengthens the hypothesis that it
was a probable that some Christians had arrived in the
Indonesian archipelago from Cylon in the early centuries of
Christianity. See Wolter B. Sidjabat, Religious Tolerance and
The Christian Faith (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1965) ,
30.
41For a detailed account on the early coming of
Christianity to Indonesia, see Theodor Muller Kruger,
Seiarah Geredia di Indonesia (The History of the Church in
Indonesia) (Jakarta: Badan Penerbitan Kristen, 1959), 7-21.
29
new era of missionary activity in the region. At the same

time, the seafaring nations were competing to seek new
avenues to increase their trade. Two important economic
centers for South-East Asia, namely Malacca in the northern
part of the archipelago and the Moluccas, now Maluku (the
Spice Islands) in the eastern part, were points of struggle
for domination.
In 1511, the Portuguese conquered Malacca and by the
end of the same year, they reached Maluku and expanded their
influence to the surrounding areas. Christianity then
entered the region and its spread followed the path of the
Portuguese conquerors. As in Latin America, the cross was
planted wherever the ships of the Christians found harbor.
The first Catholic church in the region of Maluju was
founded in 1522. Not long after, a number of missionaries
came over from India to preach the Gospel.
Most of the
missionaries working in the region during that period

belonged to the Society of Jesus. Among those early
missionaries was Francis Xavier (1506-1552), who ever since
has borne the appellation "Apostle to the Indonesians." The
success of the missionaries was often bound up with the
stability of Portuguese power. Therefore, remarkable growth
is seen in the first period of the church's life. In 1546,
Xavier wrote " (If) only a dozen priest's helpers would come
here from Europe each year, it would not be long before the
30
Moslem movement ended and all in these islands would become

Christians.1,42
Owing to the gradual diminution of Portuguese power in
the area, there was a sharp decline in church membership
after 1560. During that period the Muslim sultan led a
social revolt against the Portuguese, aimed at expelling
them from the region. Then in 1605, the Portuguese were
driven out of Maluku by the Vereeniqde Post -Indische
Compaqnie (VOC), the Dutch East India Company. But a year
later, the Spaniards, coming from Manila, took over control.
The struggle which the Dutch carried on in the Far East
against the English, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese, from
1605 to 1623, resulted in the loss of Spanish and Portuguese
colonies in what is now Indonesia. At the end of this
period, the Anglo-Dutch rivalry for commerce and sea power
ended with the victory of the Dutch. The operations of the
VOC, which was the greatest corporation of the seventeenth
century, led to the founding of a permanent colony in
Indonesia that was maintained into the twentieth century.43
42Arthur R. McGratty, Fire of Francis Xavier: the Story
of an Apostle (New York: Bruce Publishers, 1952), 179.
43The Dutch during the seventeenth century were the
world leaders in most sciences and arts and the greatest
center of commerce in the Western world. Interestingly
enough, the southern provinces of the Netherlands where
commerce and industry prospered, were inhabited by more than
eighty percent Roman Catholics. This phenomenon suggests a
refutation to Max Weber's thesis that links Protestantism to
the spirit of capitalism. See Albert Hyma, The Dutch in the
Far East: a History of the Dutch Commercial and Colonial
Empire (Michigan: George Wahr Publisher, 1942), 1-10.
31
In 1677, the VOC, cooperating with the local Sultan of

Ternate, drove away the Spaniards along with the Jesuits.
The Calvinist Dutch then forced the Catholics they
encountered to become Protestants which marked the demise of
the Catholic Church of East Indonesia.
With the rise of Dutch power, the story of the
Protestant advance begins in the region. Under the VOC,
Christianity was dominated by the Reformed Church. They took
over the Portuguese Catholic congregations and commissioned
pastors to serve churches. The Dutch were thoroughly opposed
to, and intent on destroying, what the Roman Catholics had
built up. This coincides with the change in the whole
international situation when Catholic Spain and Portugal
were no longer the leading powers in the world. The Pope's
decree dividing the world between them became a worthless
piece of paper. From 1600 onwards, the Protestant powers
began to replace the Roman Catholic. The VOC declared that
no Christian religion would be practiced in the region
except that of the Dutch Reformed Church.
It is, however, the case that in the islands dominated
by the VOC, which was only seeking commercial gain, the
growth of Christianity was not spectacular. Little real
attention was given to the Indonesian Christians, or the
expansion of the Church's domain of influence. The VOC
Church was primarily aimed at serving their employees and
the residents of the European traders in their religious
32
life. They were more interested in securing commercial gain

than in converting Indonesians.44
The policy of the VOC in Java was even more
disappointing to the Christians. For two hundred years, the
Dutch Church existed solely to serve the European
Christians. There were no efforts of any magnitude to reach
the Javanese in order to convert them. In fact, such efforts
were avoided by the VOC for fear of negative economic
consequences.45 However, the VOC deserves credit by
Christians for one achievement. It was through its efforts
that the publication of the New Testament in the Indonesian
language came to be. It was probably inspired by the first
principle of Protestant missions, which was to urge
44H ow much the VOC and its profit-minded stockholders

were interested, not in proselytizing, but in commercial
gain, is reflected by several moves taken by Jan Pieterson
Coen, who was made the Governor-General of VOC in 1618. He
imposed "forced delivery" and "contingent" systems under
which the islands would be exploited agriculturally. The
islanders, through the local rulers, would be forced to turn
out certain items and fixed quantitities of tropical produce
to provide the VOC's export commodities. To generate more
profits, Coen also turned his attention to the Chinese and
granted them a variety of commercial tasks. Coen had been
the first Dutchman to urge the importation of Chinese into
Indonesia. Coen even advocated the kidnapping of Chinese if
they would not voluntarily settle in Indonesia. Ever since,
they have formed the "middle class" between the rulers and
the people. See, Wilfred T. Neil, Twentieth Century
Indonesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 284285.
45David Bentley Taylor, The Weathercock/s Reward
(London: Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1967) 16-17.
33
Christians to have the Bible in their hands in their own

language and at the earliest possible time.46
In general, one can safely say that the efforts of the
missionaries were weaker in the earlier stage than in the
ensuing period. This is because, during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, religion in The Netherlands was under
the control of the government. Since the function of the
government in the East Indies (Indonesia) was given to the
VOC, it, therefore, regarded the Church as one branch of its
activities. It employed clergymen of the Reformed Church to
serve the interests of religion in the same way that it
employed other agents to serve the interests of trade.
Missions, in other words, were looked upon as a government
enterprise. As the VOC had little, if any, spirit for
missions, it made no appeal to the Christians in Holland to
obtain clergymen.
In 1795, the French conquered Holland. The new Dutch
government was organized according to the policies of
Napoleon.47 Accordingly, Church and State in Holland were
46Stephen Niel, A History of Christian Missions (New
York: Penguin Book Library, 1986), 177.
47During the Coen administration, the Dutch succeeded
in depriving the English, their long-time rivals, of all but
a minimal share in the archipelago trade activities. The
English, however, regained their former trade privileges in
the area when, for a brief period (1811-1816), they occupied
and held the East Indies. The Dutch domination by the
French, the enemy of Great Britain, was the justification
for the British conquest of the East Indies. During this
time, under the British Governor in Java, Stanford Raffles,
the first British Baptist Church was established, and a
34
completely separated, and three years later the East India

Company (VOC) was abolished. By that time the VOC had no
more than seven ministers on its payroll, and only the
native preachers saved the missions from complete
collapse/8
After the central government assumed direct
responsibility for the region in place of the VOC and took
control of the church, a new Christian spirit emerged in the
region. The era of Christian consolidation began with the
formation of the Netherlands Missionary Society, which was
the oldest, and for a long time the only, mission
organization of its kind in Holland. Not long after, its
first fruits appeared. All the Protestant churches in the
region were united under the name of "The Indian Church"
(The Indonesian Church). Thanks to the profound efforts and
sincere work of Christian missionaries, a new era of
Christianity began to rise in Indonesia. Since then,
Christianity has recouped its losses and has gradually
number of English missionaries arrived in Batavia, which is

now Jakarta. This first Baptist Church of England still
exists and functions, though under a different name. See, T.
M. Kruger, Seiarah Geredia. 135-6. On Pieterszoon Coen's
administration, see John David Legge, Indonesia (Sydney:
Prentice-Hall of Australia, 1980), 79-80; M.C. Ricklefs, A
History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the Present
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 27-28.
48See, James Thayer Addison. The Christian Approach to
the Moslem: a Historical Study (New York: Columbia
35
started to prosper. Eventually, it regained its early

strength and maintains its presence to this day.
CHAPTER II
THE CONSOLIDATION OF CHRISTIANITY
In the final days of the VOC, whose rule once extended
from the Cape of Good Hope to Ceylon and Indonesia, it was
still by no means certain whether Christianity would be
successful in turning itself into an accepted religion in
the area dominated by Muslims. Nonetheless, there were two
great changes which made possible a new era for Christianity
in the region: the conquest of Holland by the French in 1795
and the shift of control in the Dutch Indies from the VOC to
the Dutch government in 1799.
The annexation of the Netherlands by France encouraged
the British to invade Java and establish their brief
interlude of rule within the Dutch period. This interlude
lasted from 1811 to 1816. Under the British governor
appointed in Indonesia, Thomas Stanford Raffles, the
"contingents and the forced delivery system"1 of the VOC
were abolished in their entirety. From the time of the
British occupation, Christianity, particularly
1Both contingents and forced deliveries were supplies

of products exacted annually from the native governments of
Java in recognition of the supremacy of the VOC. In theory
the contingents were fixed amounts of products for a small
return or for nothing, while the forced deliveries varied in
amount, and were sold to the company for a price agreed
upon. See, Clive Day, The Policy and Administration of The
Dutch in Java (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904), 63.
37
Protestantism, began to breathe a freer air.2 The British

Christians played a leading part in missionary work, and the
London Missionary Society established in Batavia (now
Jakarta) the first British Baptist Church.3
As the Napoleonic Wars ended, Indonesia was returned to
the Dutch. This transition carried with it many blessings
for Christianity. It did, indeed, represent a turning point
in the history of Christianity in Indonesia. From this time
onward, Christianity
gradually took root in the Indonesian
soil and established itself as a recognized religion.

Indeed, at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
extraordinary power and confidence were being shown by the
Western world both in the church and state. The day of
colonialism had come as the whole world was open to Western
commerce and exploitation. Reflecting this situation, in
1825 the Dutch government took a firm stance and instituted
a new approach in Indonesia called the "Cultural System."
2A1though Catholics preceded Protestants, their mission

activities were restricted by the Colonial government
regulations. While Catholic power was dominant only in the
small regions (Flores, Wetar and Timor), Protestant
Christianity had been planted in almost every section of the
islands. See, Frank L. Cooley, Indonesia; Church and Society
(New York; Friendship Press, 1968), 43.
3It is recorded in the history of the Church in
Indonesia that the initial liturgical services at the
Batavia Church were held in the English tongue. See, A.T.
Keen, A History of The British Church of Batavia
(Weltevreden: G. Kolfs and Company, n.d.) 8. This has been
the case almost everywhere. After a mission's church gets
established and builds a local infrastucture, it adopts the
local language and in time becomes a national church.
The Dutch designed the "Cultural system" to help

overcome their financial crisis at home by imposing a more
rigorous exploitation of the Indies. This system aimed to
turn Indonesia into a vast, state-owned plantation in which
certain agricultural commodities would be cultivated by
forced labor, and stated quotas of every crop would have to
be delivered. Encouraged by the initial success of the
"Cultural System" in Java, the Dutch slowly extended their
effective control to the rest of the Indonesian islands.
Soon after, around the initiation of the Liberal Policy in
1870, the Dutch government adopted a Colonial Constitution
regulating the life of the people, including their religious
life.
During this time, the history of Christian missions had
also undergone a tremendous development. A long list of
missionary societies, groups and organizations came into
being. As a result, the Christian missions entered a large
number of countries and showed that they were ready to take
up responsibility for preaching the gospel. In many cases
voluntary societies, dependent on the initiative of
consecrated individuals and relying for financial support on
interested Christians, were established.
By the middle of the 19th century the Catholic and
Protestant missions in Indonesia were still in the initial
stages of the great missionary movement. Thus, the 19th
century is sometimes called the Age of Missions. Motivated
39
by Christian idealism and a sense of adventure, a group of

Dutch people decided to travel to the colonies. Like many
others, this group, longing to perform heroic deeds for
Christ, which they despaired of performing at home, felt
prompted to leave for Indonesia.4 In general they were
remarkably successful in their effort to preach the gospel
in Indonesia.5
In 1847, the Dutch Mission Society was founded in
Holland. The small group of Dutch Mennonites who established
this Mission Society represented a breakthrough of mission
consciousness and a revival of a spirit of evangelization in
Holland. The Mennonite Society, whose name was subsequently
changed to Mennonite Sending (Mission), now began to put
more emphasis on the outward mission instead of the inward
mission, which had so far dominated their concern. Their
first priority in evangelism was directed to the
Netherlands7 overseas possessions. They thus arranged to
4During that period the trauma of industrialization,
rationalism and secularism clouded the sense of religiosity
at home. Many people were suffering from spiritual
impoverishment and the church was suffering a period of what
William Carey, the British Baptist, describes as "a period
of dearth and decay." See, Rita Smith Kipp, The Earlv Years
of a Dutch Colonial Mission: The Karo Field (Michigan: The
University of Michigan Press, 1990), 26.
According to the Government Almanac for the Dutch
Indies, there were only seventeen Protestant ministers,
twenty-seven missionaries and only nine Roman Catholic
priests in 1850. These numbers had increased in 1900 to
seventy-seven, seventy-three, and forty-nine respectively.
These numbers continued to rise in subsequent years. See,
Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam
(Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1993), 98.
40
send a group of missionaries to convey the gospel message to

Indonesia.6 For Indonesia, a country of friendly people,
the entry of the Gospel has proved difficult. A region in
which the dominant religion was Islam has always proved
highly resistant to the Christian message. Hence, in areas
where Islam prevails, Christian progress has been slow,
difficult and costly.7
6The first group of missionaries was not officially
registered as missionaries. P. Jansz was appointed as a
private teacher, Klinkert worked as a land surveyor, Doyer
as an architect. The only official missionary with
governmental permission was Schurman. See, Kruger, Sediarah
Geredia di Indonesia. 163-165.
7It is worth digressing for a moment to touch upon the
issue of scarcity of converts from Islam. In the colonial
period, in Java and Sumatra there were no less than forty
five thousand converts from Islam, and yet the Dutch and the
German missionaries did not regard their efforts as being
successful because the number of animist converts in less
than a century reached almost nine hundred thousand. Many
reasons were put forth as to the scarcity of converts among
the Muslims. Some put the cause on the quality of the
missionaries, others on the poor method of preaching, and
still others to the Islamic teaching as such. Paul F.
Knitter says: "(W)hen confronted by living religions,
especially if they are undergirded by some kind of
intellectual system, Christian missionaries have had
practically no success at conversion." Another interesting
justification came from Samuel M. Zwemer, who believed that
the most important reason for the meagerness of Muslim
converts is the Muslim law regarding the apostates. Islam,
he says "like a cunning trap, has made it easy to enter the
Muslim brotherhood, and extremely difficult for those who
once enter its fold to find exit." While I would consider
the plausibility of Zwemer's assessment in other Islamic
countries, I am strongly convinced that such an assessment
is by no means accurate in the case of Indonesia. Unlike the
isolated Indonesian animists and the people who were
untouched by any civilization, the Muslims had been exposed
to Christianity since early on by their Muslim scripture.
Besides, Islam came to offer a symbol of common resistance
to alien domination both politically and religiously.
Therefore, when the gospel was preached to the Muslims, they
41
In the early days, the missionaries had to endure every

kind of hardship, particularly the anti-foreign attitude of
the local Muslim rulers. The missions were often
characterized as colonial tools with agents whose aim was to
Christianize people. As a result, a great deal of attention
was paid, in the missionary circle, to the question of
whether their resources and efforts should be focused on the
"pagan" areas rather than the Muslim areas. In this respect,
most missionaries were convinced that regions which had
become Muslim would no longer embrace Christianity.
Therefore, they argued that Christianity ought to
anticipate Islam in those regions into which Islam had not
penetrated, and at the same time, an attempt should be made
to exert pressure on the colonial rulers to obstruct Islam
from reaching those areas. Hendrik Kraemer, a missionary who
was assigned to Indonesia in 1921 by the Dutch Bible
Society, described the Muslim's inaccessibility to mission
work as follows:
Islam as a mission problem: there is no religion for
which mission has worked itself to the bone with less
result and on which it has scratched its fingers till
they were bloody and torn than Islam.
were not so much attracted to it as were their fellow
Indonesian who were animists. The law of apostasy, in my
view, is an irrelevant factor to the scarcity of Muslims'
conversion to Christianity, as there was no physical threat
involved in the event of a Muslim's conversion to another
religion in Indonesia. See, Samuel M. Zwemer, The Law of
Apostasy in Islam (London: Marshal Brothers, 1924), 15-17.
See also, Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey
of Christian attitudes Toward the World Religions (New York:
Orbis Books, 1990), 4.
42
He then continued,
The riddle of Islam is that, though as a religion it is
shallow and poor in regard to content, it surpasses all
religions of the world in the power of which it holds
those who profess it.8
However, Christian missionaries being suspected of
being colonial agents, along with the presumption that
Christianity was the religion of the invading Westerner,
increasingly prevented the attainment of the missionary
goals. Therefore the greatest success of the missionaries
was among the poor and underprivileged or in tribal
societies. Among the Muslims, the yield was generally small.
Nonetheless, attended by the effective Dutch colonial rule,
the consolidation of Christianity in Indonesia began.
Observing the great leap of progress for Christianity, Smith
asserts: "The works of God in Indonesia are among his
mightiest deeds."9
In many countries, missionary work has had a long
history of cooperation with colonialism. While, many
8See, Hendrik Kraemer. The Christian Message in a NonChristian World (Michigan: Grand Rapids, Kregell Publishers,
1st ed. 1963) 7.
9Ebbie C. Smith, God/s Miracles: Indonesian Church
Growth (South Pasadena, California: William Carey Library,
1971), xiii.
43
Indonesian Christians 10 have attempted to play down the

significance of the relation between
colonial rule and the
Christian mission, the historical evidence indicates

otherwise. As we will later discover from the colonial
religious policy, the consolidation of Christianity in
Indonesia could hardly be disassociated from the colonial
rule. Therefore, the foundation of the Christian churches in
Indonesia is regarded today with mixed feelings by the
Christians.11 These mixed feelings partly stem from the
fact that during that time, the pastors were state officials
receiving their remuneration from the colonial
10A notable Christian scholar, Dr. W. B. Sidjabat,

suggested that the Dutch colonial rule by no means
patronized the spread of Christianity in Indonesia. He
pointed out that, in fact, the missionaries had nothing to
do with the worldly ambitions of the colonialists. He
further asserted that the early pioneers of the 19th century
gospel preachers, Pastor Emde and Pastor Coolen, were not
Dutchmen, the former being of German descent while the
latter was born of a Russian father. Thus, both had no
connection with the colonial establishment. The spread of
Christianity was not so much the work of the Christians as
it was through the power of the Gospel. Another important
Indonesian Christian, T.B. Simatupang, the ex-chairman of
the Indonesian Council of Churchs, and an Indonesian army
general, held the same view with regard to the above issue.
See, Dr. W. B. Sidjabat, Panaailan Kita di Indonesia Dewasa
ini (Our Present Call in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit
Kristen, 1964), 24-55.
11Kurt Koch, The Revival in Indonesia. 14. See also,
Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia.
1900-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 162-165.
government.12 Besides, many of the missions7 suggestions

for the sake of the spread of Christianity were well
accepted by the colonial rulers.
Among other things that could be seen as the
government's support of the mission's effort to stem the
progress of Islam was the idea of creating a Christian
buffer zone against Muslim areas. The attempt to use the
region of Tengger in Java and the area of Batak in Sumatra,
which had not yet become Muslim, as Christian buffer zones
against the Muslim areas of East Java and Aceh respectively,
are cases in point. Likewise the idea of not appointing
Muslims as village chiefs in areas that were not Muslim was
another example of ways to curtail Islam's penetration.
For the most part, the colonial rule was so closely
connected to the missions that there was hardly any
separation between the two. Several Royal Decrees were
issued to this effect. In 1810, King William I of Holland
issued a decree that missionaries were to be sent to
Indonesia by the Government. In 1835 and 1840, another
decree was issued to the effect that church administration
of the Indies was placed under the supervision of the
Governor General of the colonial rule in Indonesia. In 1854,
12During that time, the ministers were civil servants.

Besides their responsibility for the spiritual care of the
European residents, they were also to work for the
conversion of the Indonesians. The ministers were rewarded
with a special cash bonus for each person baptized. See,
Stephen Neil, A History of Christian Missions. 190.
45
another decree was issued to reflect the interdependence of

the two establishments. The decree stipulated that the
church administration had the task of maintaining the
doctrine of Christianity. Therefore a number of facilities
were given to the missionaries, including subsidies and
financial aid and tax exemptions.13
Another factor that helped the consolidation of
Christianity was the policy of the French. A new field of
activity for Christian mission, particularly the Protestant
missions, opened up when the Indies Governor General,
Daendals (1806-1811), following the Napoleon's example in
the Netherlands, equalized all religions in Indonesia. Both
Catholic and Protestant churches were to be given equal
opportunity to carry out their activities. In subsequent
developments, in spite of the claim that the government was
neutral toward religion, missionary activities were, in
fact, being promoted. Missions often received political and
financial support in areas where Islam threatened to advance
rapidly.
At first, this policy was motivated not so much by
religious considerations as it was by desire to secure
financial gain. It has been said that no colonial power
developed its economy to rely on colonial possessions to the
13See, Hendrik Kraemer, De Huidiqe Stand van het

Christendom in Nederlandsh Indie (The Hague: Boekencentrum
N.V., 1937), 66-68, as cited by Noer, The Modernist
Movement. 163-164.
46
extent that the Dutch did in the case of Indonesia.14 For

the colonial rule, Christian converts would pose less of a
threat than the Muslims because the former were more likely
to be cooperative than the latter. Both the Christian
missionaries and the colonial rulers found it beneficial to
their respective causes to have such cooperation. On the one
hand, the colonial powers saw the colony as an arena for
financial gain, on the other, the missionaries saw the
colony as a place given by God in the campaign to extend the
Christian kingdom. Given such commonalities, many
Indonesians dared to suggest that Christian missionaries
were agents of colonialism. At what point missionary
ideology and practice diverged from the colonial rule, and
how much autonomy missionaries exercised, is an interesting
issue to explore. However, in Indonesia, this relationship
bore the fruit of new converts, particularly in the isolated
interior areas.
During the middle years of the nineteenth century, the
Dutch policy towards Indonesia was subjected to review. The
Forced Cultivation (Cultural) System15 collapsed during the
1860's under the weight of internal corruption. Under the
14Dr. Herbert Feith makes the point: "With the Indies,

Holland was the world's third or fourth colonial power,
without them it would be called a little country on the
North Sea." See, Bruce Grant, Indonesia (London: Melbourne
University, 1964), 19.
15For more information on the Dutch Cultural policy,
see page 84-85 of this dissertation.
47
pressure of the politically powerful private business

interests in the Netherlands, the government dismembered the
system gradually and allowed private enterprise to enter
Indonesia. Soon after, in about 1870, the policy of the
government towards Indonesia came to be known as the
"Liberal Policy."
Under the "Liberal Policy," Indonesia was opened to the
penetration of private capital. Increasing numbers of
Europeans were introduced to the region, and these began to
recreate their own Western way of life. This new phenomenon
carried with it the need for churches and schools to serve
the newly emerging Western community. A number of churches
and schools were established accordingly. These religious
institutions, which were basically designed to serve the
European Christians, won new Indonesian converts as well.
Consequently, this new development undoubtedly contributed
to the consolidation process of Christianity also.
Not too long after the "Liberal Policy" was instituted,
the new European community in Indonesia started to demand
greater local autonomy from the Netherlands. They also
voiced their concern regarding the improvement of the
conditions of the indigenous population and the betterment
of their well-being. This call for a more justice for the
indigenous culminated in the famous article "Eereschuld"
("A Debt of Honor") by an influential Dutch humanitarian,
Van Deventer, who reminded the Dutch Government about their
48
moral obligation for improving the declining welfare of

their Indies subjects. The writer presented his sympathetic
feelings toward the Indonesians. He called upon the Dutch
government to make a financial settlement with the colony as
partial recompense for all the profits taken from them
during the "Cultural Policy" period. This settlement was
seen by the writer as a "Debt of Honor" to be paid to the
colony.16
Van Deventer's article opened the way for others to
confront the Dutch government with its colonial policy.
Douwes Dekker was the first Dutch humanist who registered
his disagreement directly to his own government. He was a
former civil servant in the colony. Therefore, he was wellinformed of conditions in the Indies. He published a book,
Max Havelaar. and successfully incited humanistic sentiments
against the Culture System. Among other things he said, with
characteristic sarcasm, that:
There were in the Netherlands two parties " with very
different principles": the conservatives, who wanted to
get from the Indies all the profit possible, and the
liberals, who wanted to get all the profit possible
from the Indies.17
16J.S. Furnivall, "An Introductory Survey, 1815-1930"

Studies in the Economic and Social Development of the
Netherlands Indies (Rangoon, British Burma Press, 1933), 19.
See also Clive Day, The Policy and Administration of the
Dutch, 382-383.
17At the top of the list was H.H. van Kol, the colonial
authority for the Social Democratic Party. Robert Van Neil,
The Emergence of The Modern Indonesian Elite. 5-15. See
also, Ruth Mcvey, Indonesia. 288-293.
49
Although this widespread dissatisfaction with the

government's colonial policy did but little to improve the
social conditions of the Indonesians, it did bring about a
new orientation. In September 1901, in her annual Royal
Message to the Dutch Parliament, the Queen of the
Netherlands officially inaugurated a new policy called "The
Ethical Policy." Reflecting her Christian spirit, the Queen
spoke of "...ethical obligation and moral responsibility to
the people of the East Indies"18 Since this policy was
designed to bring socio-political and economic reform in
Indonesia, theoretically Indonesia would no longer be
considered an area to be exploited by the Dutch. Rather, the
policy was to concern itself with promoting the welfare of
the people by instituting a series of new welfare
legislation. It is evident that this policy, which was
depicted as the Dutch effort to resolve the colony's problem
through their "moral vocation," was very much shaped and
colored by Christian values.
In addition to its overt objective of increasing the
welfare and prosperity of the Colony, the Dutch had, as
well, a hidden and vested interest. They aimed to provide
for themselves, through this "Ethical Policy," a sound moral
foundation to ward off any foreign claim on its colony.
Other foreign powers had an interest in the Far East and
18See, Neil, The Emergence of The Modern Indoneisan
Elite. 32.
50
could create a pretext for penetration should the Dutch fail

to embark upon a new humanitarian policy. Japan as a strong
rising power in the East was one of those powers which
constituted an indirect threat to the Netherlands.
The period of the "Ethical Policy" constituted the
third colonial period since the beginning of the 19th
century. Following the period of forced farming and the
period of "Liberal Policy," the "Ethical Policy" sought to
address a variety of issues. It sounded excellent on paper.
The policy covered a system of guardianship followed by a
policy of emancipation, understood to be a policy of welfare
of the Indonesians as well as a policy of native association
to the Dutch.
Although none of the policy's aspects were overtly and
explicitly asserted to promote the Christian cause, the
facts of the matter suggest a strong correlation. The
Ethical Policy, in my view, constituted the platform on
which the concrete presence of Christianity was firmly
established. What follows illustrates the extent to which
this policy served the undoubtedly high purpose of the
Christian cause.
In the year in which the "Ethical Policy" was
instituted, the Netherlands witnessed an unprecedented
political development in favor of religious factions. The
party election of 1901 changed the political picture of the
Netherlands and thus its colonies. The Liberal Party, which
51
had been in power for fifty years, found itself defeated by

a coalition of rightist and religious groups. The Christian
Party leader, Abraham Kuyper was appointed Prime Minister in
1901. The following year, Alexander Idenburg, who in his
youth had wanted to be a missionary, took over the colonial
office. The somewhat religiously neutral policy maintained
by the liberal Party for almost half a century in Indonesia,
suddenly changed into a policy that was determined to
promote Christian missions. The government that previously
took cautious measures in its support of the Christian
mission began to adopt a more daring approach.19 Subsidies
to Christian missionary schools and institutions, which had
previously been denied to prevent Muslim resentment, were
now generously granted. Effectively, during the initial
period of this policy, the colonial government was ruled by
a leadership in favor of the Christianization of its
colonies.
The "Ethical Policy" clearly constituted the turning
point in the colonial strategy, towards the affirmation of
the goal of Christianizing Indonesia. This was a policy
which in fact indicated that religious neutrality was an
illusion. Idenberg, the Governor-General from 1906 to 1916,
overtly declared his support for a mission in Indonesia. In
19By now, Java was virtually open for Christian

mission, which was previously denied admission. For more
discussion on this issue, see page 241 chapter five of this
dissertation.
one of his reports to his government he indicates that, "I

am quite busy with the Christianization of the outlying
areas."20 In fact no statement was more indicative of this
direction than the royal address of 1901 which stated:
As a Christian Nation the Netherlands have a duty
to improve the condition of native Christians in
the archipelago, to give Christian missionary
activity more aid and to inform the entire
administration that the Netherlands have a moral
obligation to fulfill as regards the population of those
regions.21
The Christian character of the colonial policy was
further emphasized by one decree after another. In 1903, all
government officials were reminded that they represented a
Christian nation. In another decree it was stipulated that
all Muslim religious teachers were required to obtain a
special license before they were allowed to teach. In
addition, during this period a Consul for Mission office was
established. This consulate had been founded to function as
a contact point between the government and the missions.
Through this office, the government's financial and
political support for missionary activities was facilitated.
All that has been mentioned indicates that the Dutch
"Ethical Policy" had substantially served the cause of
Christianity and its consolidation in Indonesia. As a
20See, De Bruijn,J. and G. Puchinger, Briefwisselinq
Kuyper-1denburq (Franekar: Wever, 1985), 228, as cited by
Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 110.
21Handelinqen der Staten General. (Troonrede, 18
September 1901), as cited by Noer, The Modernist Movement.
165.
result,
as we will later discover, this policy paved the
way for the emergence of many contrasting and contending

Indonesian political and social movements. One of these was
the Muhanunadiyah movement.
This chapter is mainly concerned with the consolidation
of Christianity. We shall, therefore, examine the "Ethical
Policy" and its ramifications more extensively in the coming
chapter in connection with "The Dutch Islamic Policy", and
the issue of the Muslim encounter with the Christian
missions. More specifically, we shall discuss this important
issue in relation to the encounter of the Muhammadiyah
movement with Christian missionary activities.
In what follows we shall describe a number of concrete
examples of the process of the consolidation of Christianity
in Java. Although Java was not among the first areas
penetrated by Christianity nor the one most successfully
penetrated,22 its strategic position at the center of the
religious and political arena of Indonesia underlies our
choice. Furthermore, the Muhammadiyah movement, which is the
main concentration of this study, was born in Java. In
addition, Java, for the most part, may serve as a good
representation of the whole of Indonesia. Apart from being
22Among the more successful areas dominated by

Christianity are the Minahasa and Sangir-Talaud islands of
North Celebes, and Timor Island, as well as the Batak areas
of northern Sumatra. According to E. Smith, "... the Bataks
form one of the strongest Christian enclaves in Asia." See,
Ebbie Smith, God/s Miracle. 52.
54
the base of the central government of both colonial and

independent Indonesia, Java is also the home of sixty- five
percent of Indonesia's entire population.
The Introduction of Christianity

and Its Growth in Java
According to the view in Christian mission circles,23
Indonesia was an area in which missionaries made spectacular
progress in Asia. In Java, the church growth realized by the
mission work, although small in numerical terms, is not
paralleled in any other Muslim area. The Christian mission
circles further suggest that there were several religious
and ethnological factors that contributed to this success.
Among others, the Javanese are known to have an inherent
mystical tendency. The Javanese refer to this tendency as
Mencari Noelmu (the desire to seek wisdom). Closely related
to this tendency is receptivity to and tolerance of other
doctrines. This tolerance and willingness to accommodate new
or alien religious messages constitutes a major factor in
the growth of Christianity in Java. Moreover, the type of
Islam in Java, with its animist and Hindu-Buddhist
background, was also an important factor in the spread of
Christianity. It has been, therefore, suggested that
Javanese Islam offered a more favorable soil for
23See, for example, A History of Christian Missions by
Stephen Neil, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam by
Steenbrink, and Seiarah Geredia di Indonesia (The History of
the Church in Indonesia) by Kruger, and many others.
55
Christianity than forms of Islam elsewhere.24 Commenting on

this favorable condition inof the Javanese, Frank Cooley
says:
Development during the first period of the East Java
Church's history suggests that quite a different
situation might have evolved had the Dutch authorities
permitted and encouraged missionary work among the
Javanese.25
As we have indicated earlier, the VOC had made very
little attempt to expand Christianity in Indonesia for fear
of losing economic gains. This policy, which was based on
economic considerations, had more serious consequences for
Java than elsewhere. For almost two hundred years, from 1650
to 1850, the Dutch had restricted the activity of the church
solely to European Christians. There were no sustained
efforts to convey the message of Christ to the Javanese. At
times such efforts were avoided and considered to have
negative economic consequences.
240n this issue, I disagree with the conclusion of the

Christian mission circles. Without ignoring the factors in
question in contributing to Church growth, I believe that
those factors can not be applied to all Javanese.
Historically, we find that the highly Islamized areas of
Java were extremely resistant to the gospel message, areas
such as Sunda, Madura and other coastal regions. What
counts, in my opinion, is the intensity or laxity of the
observance of Islamic teaching among the people. The
abangan, therefore, are more receptive to the Gospel than
their fellow santri. The interior areas of Java, where
Christianity is more accepted, were the home of either the
animists or the abangan. On the other hand, in almost all
santri areas, Christianity encountered many difficulties
stemming from Muslim resistance. Ricklefs, A History of
Modern Indonesia. 114-124.
25See, Cooley, Indonesia: Church and Society. 87.
56
It is worth-noting that the Dutch colonial rulers did

not oppose the preaching of the gospel to the native and
more animistic Javanese. The Dutch were averse only when it
came to preaching to the Muslims. For them, what was allimportant was peace and order (Rust end Ordet. Preaching to
the Muslims might involve a risk to the rich resources of
Java, the chief source of revenue for the Dutch.
During the short intrusion of British rule (1811-1816),
the first British Baptist Missionary was to reach Java.26
He was William Robinson, who came to Indonesia with
instructions to consider himself a missionary to the
Javanese. He was joined by three missionaries from the
London Missionary Society, John Supper, Gottlob Bruckner and
Joseph Kam.27 Despite this good beginning, the British were
forced to leave the country and had to return the rule to
the Dutch in 1816. All missionaries affiliated with the
British had to leave the country except Bruckner, who was of
German origin. He was allowed to continue his mission's
activity.
26British Baptists also worked on the mission in

Sumatra. They successfully made contact with the Batak
people who later produced one of the strongest Christian
movements in all Asia. John Irvin Nance, "A History of the
Indonesian Baptist Missio: 1950-1960," unpubl. M.A. Thesis,
(Baylor University, 1969), 18.
27Earnest A. Payne, South-East from Serampore (London:
The Carey Press, 1945), 17. See also, Kruger, Sediarah
Geredia di Indonesia. 161.
57
Aware of the small response from the Javanese because

of the difficulty of direct contact with them, Bruckner
concentrated on translation and writing. He produced many
tracts and publications in Javanese. By his hand a Javanese
translation of the New Testament first saw light.
In spite of the fact that distributing the Javanese
Bible was not encouraged by the Dutch authorities for fear
of Muslim protest, Bruckner's translation had a tremendous
impact on the growth of Christianity in Java. The Javanese
Bible undeniably set the stage for the emergence of the
early Christian Javanese community. Furthermore, Bruckner's
publications also stimulated Dutch missionaries to redirect
their attention to mission work among the Javanese.
Another factor which contributed to the early growth of
Christianity was the arrival of lay Christians in Java.
During the early years of the 19th century, Java had
witnessed important lay Christians who began to convey the
message of Christ in Java. There were many of them, each of
whom in his turn had contributed a definite share toward
building the success of Christianity.28 Therefore, I will
28Among those dedicated lay people was Mr. C. Anthing
(b. 1820), a sincere evangelist who devoted his time and
spent his own funds to teach the gospel to the Javanese. Mr.
C. Anthing, according to Kruger, should never be forgotten
in the history of the Church in Indonesia. Under his
supervision he had recruited at least 50 Javanese
evangelists before any missionaries appeared on the scene in
Java. Another influential person was A.M.N. Keuchenius who
succeeded in establishing a congregation of 40 to 50
Javanese before 1860. See, Kruger, Sediarah Geredia di
Indonesia. 150-155.
58
confine myself to mentioning only a few figures. However,

all contributed to the process of consolidation of
Christianity in Java.
In 1811, a German pietist, Johannes Emde, settled in
Surabaya, the second largest city in Indonesia, as a
watchmaker.29 In this city, he married a Javanese woman who
helped him establish contacts with local people to preach
the Gospel. This led him to translate portions of the Bible
into the Javanese language. By 1845, Pastor Emde had
succeeded in forming his congregation in Surabaya known as
"The Pious of Surabaya." He assumed leadership of the
congregation and brought into existence a living group of
Javanese Christians. Emde, being a German and not familiar
with the Javcinese culture, expected his Javanese converts to
accept Western ways. He taught a "pure Westernized"
Christianity to his 220 baptized Javanese, separating them
from their culture and community.
The second important figure who settled on Java at
about the same time was Coenraad Laurens Coolen. His Russian
father had migrated to Indonesia and worked as a mercenary
in the VOC army. His mother was a Javanese woman of noble
family. From his father, Coolen inherited Western Christian
29His voyage to Indonesia was inspired by his curiosity
to see a place with no winter season. He was anxious to see
what would be contradictory to the promise of Genesis 8:22,
"Summer and winter and day and night shall not cease." See,
David Bentley Taylor, The Weathercock7s Reward (London:
Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1967), 56. See also, Stephen
Neil, A History of Christian Missions. 247.
59
values, and from his mother he inherited the mystic spirit

of Javanese culture. As a result he appreciated the ancient
Javanese traditions and their importance in the life of the
Javanese. Out of this cultural mingling, he created another
Christian community, one completely different from that of
Pastor Emde. On his own plantation, in the vicinity of
Ngoro, he used indigenous methods to attract people to
Christianity. He preached to his group that in order to be
Christians, they did not have to discard their Javanese
character and culture. Therefore, Coolen would not allow any
of them to be baptized. In his attempt to make Christianity
more Javanese in form and character, Coolen used the
traditional shadow play to tell Bible stories and convey its
message. This was a similar technique and strategy to that
employed by the Sufis to attract people to Islam centuries
before.
Coolen, and many others who followed his method,
operated on the principle that Christianity must be
presented to people in the form most acceptable to their
culture and worldview. The gospel, while maintaining its
fundamental teaching, could still be adapted to the local
culture. The Christian message, Coolen upheld, is
potentially universal, hence, not bound to any particular
culture. It can be expressed and adopted by any culture
without destroying either the message of Christ or the local
culture.
60
Several Christian communities headed by Javanese

evangelists sprang up as a result of Coolen7s emphasis on
Javanese culture. Among those Javanese Christians were
Singotruno, Paulus Tosari, Matius Niep and the most
influential and outstanding of them all, Sadrach. Sadrach,
(1840-1924) who established his own religious center in the
vicinity of Purwerojo, Central Java, largely emulated the
Islamic pesantren in organization and architecture. In his
mission work, he acted independently of any other Christian
missionaries.
European missionaries were generally not opposed to
Javanese Christianity. In the case of Sadrach, some
missionaries treated him as an independent leader of his
community, while many disagreed to the extent of severing
contact with him. Frans Lion Cachet (1835-1899) a Reformed
minister, took a very strong position against Sadrach. His
unconditional condemnation of the doctrine and practice of
Sadrach is clearly reflected in his words:
The mission had to break with the liar Sadrach, who
poisoned our mission field completely and had brought
into existence a Javanese Christianity in which there
is no place for Christ.30
In this respect Coolen and his followers, particularly
Sadrach, anticipated the contemporary concept of
30See, F. Lion Cachet, Een iaar op Reis in Dienst der

Zendinc (Amsterdam: Wormser, 1897), 842, as cited by
Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 106.
61
"inculturation.1,31 This concept, on which so much has been

written and said in recent years,32 in the church official
documents, denotes the very ideas set forth by Coolen. It
stresses the need to create a dynamic relation between the
church and the variety of local cultures. Although this term
is a recent addition to the vocabulary in Christian thought,
its frequent usage in theological discussions gives the
impression of its importance. The very concept is seen not
only as meaningful but as imperative in the field of
missiology. It is even regarded as a fundamental condition
for keeping the timeless message of Jesus alive on the face
of the earth in shifting cultural conditions.
31Various definitions are given to the word

"inculturation", but it was originally employed to refer
primarily to theological education in non-Western countries.
Later it denoted the concept of relationship to cultures to
which the Christian message had not yet been announced. Or,
to borrow the definition of Ary Roest Crollius, S.J., it is
" The dynamic relation between the Christian message and
culture/cultures; an insertion of the Christian life into
culture and an ongoing process of reciprocal and critical
interaction and assimilation." The word later became a
familiar and useful concept in the field of missiology. See,
Ary Roest Crollius, S.J., What is So New about
Inculturation? (Rome: Pontificial Gregorian University,
1984),7-10. For further discussion on this topic, see
Marcello De Carvalho Azevedo, Inculturation and The
Challenges of Modernity (Rome: Centre "Cultures and
Religions"- Pontificial Gregorian University, 1982), R.B.
Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood: Cliffs, 1959), and P.L.
Lehman, Ethics in a Christian Context (London: np. 1963).
32The Council of Vatican II
exchange between the Church and
people." In a more explicit way
been employed in the concluding
Bishops in 1977. See, Crollius,
Inculturation?. 17-18.
speaks of "a living

the diverse cultures of
the word "inculturation" has
remark of the Synod of
What is so New about
On the other hand, Pastor Amt, standing precisely at

the opposite extreme from Coolen, was more concerned to
present Christianity in its undiluted and pure" European
form.33 For Amt and many others, the true representation of
the message of Christ is the Christianity of the West. This
is because the fate of Christianity has been historically
linked to the destiny of Europe.
These two distinctive methods and approaches played an
important role in introducing Christianity to the Javanese
people. Proponents of each method were able to create their
own distinct congregations. Oftentimes they were at odds,
but in some instances they were mutually supportive.
It was at this point, when the two Javanese Christian
communities had established themselves independently, that a
new era in the spread of Christianity began. It was in 1846
when J. van Rhijn of the Netherlands Missionary Society,
together with Pastor Jellesma set out on a fact-finding
visit to look into the possibility of pursuing mission work
on Java. As a result, about three years after the visit,
Jellesma was appointed by the Netherlands Missionary Society
to assume the responsibility for mission work.
33At times, and because of Amt's emphasis on

"unadulterated" Christianity, the Javanese Christians were
named Kristen Londo (Dutch Christians) and were also known
as "Dutchmen without hats and shoes." Christianity,
accordingly, was called "Aoama Belanda" (Dutch religion).
See, Kruger, Sediarah Geredia di Indonesia. 145.
63
After the arrival of Jellesma, the seed of Christ's

message was sown in ever-deepening soil and over a widening
area. The spread of Christianity began to advance more
rapidly. Jellesema's policy of reconciling the two
remarkably diverse groups of Javanese Christians was so
successful that he was able to combine the best insights of
both. Wisely, Jellesma remained neutral and settled in a new
region where he established a training program for Javanese
evangelists. In the words of Kraemer, Jellesma was
11 . . .
a man of apostolic temper, truly consumed by the
desire to convert the Javanese." Before his death, Jellesma

succeeded in baptizing over 2,500 Javanese. Sadrach, the
influential Javanese evangelist, who met him in 1855, was
profoundly influenced by him.34
In the ensuing years, and with the direct involvement
of the professional missionaries preaching the Gospel in
Java, the consolidation of Christianity was carried out even
more profoundly. Among ether things that reflected this
consolidation was the policy of establishing Christian
villages as suggested by the Mennonite Missionary, Pieter
Jans. He believed that since life in Javanese society is
very much attached to its villages, mission work should be
carried on by opening new villages where new converts could
^See, Hendrik Kraemer, From Mission field to

Independent Church. (The Hague: Boekencentrum, 1958), 79.
See also, Cooley, Indonesia: Church and Society. 88.
64
be attracted to lead a life according to Christian

values.35
Through those newly established Christian villages, the
new Javanese Christian communities became the backbone of
the Church on Java. For the missionaries, this method was
considered an effective means of attracting
new converts in
the highly resistant Muslim areas. However, although the

method of opening new Christian villages was not as
successful as was anticipated to be in its early period,36
it had a tremendous impact by establishing the foundations
of the many Christian centers which were scattered
throughout Java in the ensuing years.
The history of the early Christian mission in Indonesia
includes many important figures who participated in the
35Residents were to follow certain Christian rules,

such as imposing a mandatory holiday and attending Church
services on Sunday. See, for example, Governer General
Idenburg's circular on "Pasar and Zondag Circulaires"
(Market and Sunday Circulars) in which the Dutch colonial
government commanded tha people to respect Sunday service,
W.X. Alting von Geusav, Neutralitied der Overheid, in The
Nederlansche Colonien Yeqens Godsdienstzaken. as cited by
Suminto, Politik Islam. 22-23.
^Some of the unexpected results of this method were
the sense of isolation and the withdrawal of the Christian
communities from their Muslim neighbors. This isolation
resulted in the ineffectiveness of the Christian Javanese in
communicating and relating the gospel to their fellows, the
Javanese Muslims. Consequently the native Christian's
dependency on the foreign missionaries in preaching the
gospel became even greater. This sense of dependency
undoubtedly impeded the progress of Christianity, something
that had never been envisioned by the initiator of this
method.
65
process of spreading Christianity. Some were lay Christians,

others were professional missionaries affiliated with
different mission soceities. In the preceding part of this
chapter, a brief historical survey on the early pioneering
lay Christian preachers has been presented. Against this
background, the activities and views of some important
additional official and professional missionaries may
illustrate this process. Reflecting on those activities and
views, we will then be able to better perceive the growth
and the consolidation of Christianity prior to the emergence
of the modern religious movements in Java which were partly
influenced by the Christian missionary activity. As space
will not allow for a thorough discussion of the life and
views of many of those missionaries, I will limit myself to
mentioning some key figures who had left significant marks
on the history of the consolidation process prior to the
emergence of the Muhammadiyah movement.
Samuel Eliza Harthoom (1831-1883)
Harthoom was known to be liberal in his theological

views. Through a number of his writings he proved to be
critical of the methods employed by his contemporary
missionaries. He was a man of moderate stance toward the
local culture and beliefs. For him, to produce pure
Christians in Java within one generation would reguire an
accommodative attitude toward the existing Javanese
66
tradition and Islamic customs. From the start he succeeded

in establishing good relations with the native people,
studying their language and respecting their customs. For
him, preaching the gospel required an attitude of respect
for the local culture no matter what its historical origin.
Through this strategy, Christianity could enter the heart of
the Javanese without disruption or arousing the resistance
that there might have been if it were preached otherwise.
One good example of this strategy was the performance
of the Selamatan ritual. Selamatan. a traditional feast and
ritual practice very central to Javanese daily life, was
infused with Christian values by the church in Java. Some
Selamatan-like procedures were found within the Javanese
Christian community to be entirely Christian in nature but
at the same time fulfilled the basic needs of the Javanese
in their daily life. The church, in this respect, had
succeeded in finding some functional substitute for the
traditional Selamatan. More than that, the Islamic sufi
practice of remembrance of God, zikir and tahlil, was also
practiced by the Javanese Christians in their own way.
Harthoom and his wife arrived in Indonesia in 1854. Two
years later he served as a missionary for the Dutch
Missionary Society until 1862 when he resigned his position
following a conflict with the leadership of the Missionary
Society. One of the major issues of the conflict was
Harthoon's insistence on educating and "civilizing the
67
native population before they could be converted. This view,

which was incompatible with the strategy of the mission as
seen by his contemporaries, caused Harthoon to come into
conflict with the mission officials in Holland as well as
with his fellow missionaries in the area. He went back to
Holland to try, in vain, to persuade the mission leadership
to adopt his method.
As he was not successful in convincing the mission
leadership, it was only logical that he then decided to sail
back to Java and, this time, chose the island of Madura on
the eastern tip of Java as his mission base. Being selfappointed, he became a private missionary. He made every
effort to defend his method and his conception of education,
which was designed to adapt to the local religious
traditions and the country's condition. For this purpose,
Harthoon wrote a book entitled, "The Situation and Needs of
Education among the Peoples of the Dutch East Indies." In
the wake of the tragic murder of his wife in 1868 on the
island of Madura, he devoted himself to the field of
education and retreated from missionary work.
For Harthoom, the interests of the Netherlands and the
interests of the Indies lay in the promotion of education.
Consequently, Harthoom was seen as an advocate of the
colonial system of education in Indonesia. Harthoon believed
that Western civilization and Christian faith were strongly
connected and stood inseparable from each other. Thus, one
68
can understand why in his later missionary career, education

superseded the preaching of the gospel as his goal. In this
respect Karel Steenbrink rightly asserts that "Harthoon had
come to view civilization or education no longer as simply a
means to the goal of conversion but as the most important
goal in itself."37 It goes without saying that Harthoon's
emphasis on education, and in this case the colonial system
of education which was laden with Christian values, helped
Christianity consolidate itself and gave it fresh impetus.
Carel Poensen (1836-1919)
Poensen arrived in Java in 1860 while serving as a

missionary for the Dutch Missionary Society, and he remained
until 1890. His view of Islam was relatively moderate. He
saw some positive aspects of Islam during his tenure in
Java. The Javanese, he said, were not as susceptible to the
negative consequences of alcohol, opium and gambling as the
Europeans and Chinese were. However, he asserted, "Islam was
unable to satisfy the ultimate needs of the human soul."38
Poensen was of the view that it was impossible to form
a Christian community within the Muslim majority unless a
new conversion strategy was employed. The Javanese were so
tightly connected to their community that individual
37Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 101.
38C. Poensen, Brieven over den Islam uit de
binnenlanden van Java. (Leiden: Brill 1886), 113-115, as
cited by Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 103.
69
conversion to Christianity was simply an illusion. He,

accordingly, advocated the necessity to establish a mission
center by opening new, large plantation areas managed by
Christians. People would then be invited to the area and
gradually introduced to Christian values. In so doing, the
new converts would not feel isolated from their community.
This strategy, according to contemporary Indonesian
Christians, was profoundly wise and farsighted. Missionaries
had often been accused of unnecessarily separating
Indonesian Christians from their close kinship ties and the
ordinary life of their people and tribes.
Poensen was well-versed in the Javanese language and
culture and was highly regarded as a scholar and missionary.
His profound knowledge of the local culture put him in
cordial relations with many circles of the native people. At
some point he became critical of the Dutch authority and
increasingly spoke in the interest of the natives.
Among other things, he strongly criticized the Dutch
for their exploitative and repressive ways of governing. He
equated the Pharaoh/s oppression of the Israelites to that
of certain Dutch administrators' oppression of the poor
Javanese. He was particularly opposed to the Dutch
regulation which combined administrative matters and
religious affairs in the hands of the Muslim native chiefs.
The regulation, he protested, impeded the possibility of
converting people through their chiefs.
70
To boost the mission's success in gaining new converts,

Poensen strongly favored attracting the Javanese to
Christianity through material gains. For him, providing
employment, creating worldly prosperity as a means of
delivering and disseminating the message of Christ, was well
justified. In what later became known as "The Rice Christian
Policy," Poensen advocateed this as a sound method to make
the message of Christ appealing to the Javanese. This notion
of the "Rice Christian," which was to be strenuously
protested by Indonesian Muslims, and many Christians at the
present time we assumed, was, apparently, initially
introduced and practiced during Poensen's time. Through this
method Java witnessed a remarkable number of conversions to
Christianity.
Lion Cachet (1835-1899)
Cachet served as a missionary to the Reformed Mission

in 1855. In his capacity as a minister of the Nieuwe
Westerwerk in Holland, he traveled to the Indies in 1891 as
an inspector of the mission work and stayed in Java for a
year. In his travel report he was critical of the Dutch
authorities for having ruled Java for three centuries
without succeeding in spreading the religion of Christ to
the Javanese.
He was mainly concerned with the low social standards
of the missionaries and the poor outward appearance of the
71
churches as a result of the frugality of the mission

officials. He also regretted the complicated procedures for
obtaining a mission permit for the missionaries from the
Dutch.
Out of his sense of Western superiority, Cachet
strongly rejected the Javanese form of Christianity and
condemned the practices of Sadrach, the Javanese preacher.
On the other hand, Cachet saw Islam as the absolute negation
of Christianity and as a thorn in Christian flesh.
Therefore, he maintained that every effort should be made to
curtail its influence. He saw the presence of Islam in Java
as constituting one of the most crucial obstacles to
Indonesia's conversion to Christianity.
The mission leadership in the Netherlands was anxious
to hear Cachet's travel report. Reacting to Cachet's
account, the leadership made a concerted effort to elevate
the missionaries' social standards and to improve the
churches' condition in Java. Cachet had contributed
indirectly to this betterment and thus deserves recognition
for striving for the growth and consolidation of
Christianity in Java.
Baron Van Boetzelaer (1873-1956)

Boetzelaer was the first Consul for Missions to be
appointed in Batavia, the capital city of the Dutch
administration in the Indies. Echoing the publications of
72
the German missionary, G. Simon, who wrote extensively in

Java in 1906 on what he called "the Dutch policy of indirect
support to the promotion of Islam",39 Boetzelaer exerted
his influence to tilt the Dutch policy in favor of the
Christian cause. He made every effort to persuade the Dutch
Government to place "governmental support for mission" on
the high priority list of the government agenda.
Thanks to Boetzelaer's strong support for mission work,
missions in Java received substantial financial and
political support from the Dutch government. In no uncertain
terms Boetzelaer urged the colonial government to treat
Indonesia as a subject of a Christian nation which thus
deserved every attention for mission promotion. In this
respect, it could not be denied that Boetzelaer was
instrumental in laying the foundation for the solid
39Simon gave several examples while urging the Dutch to

alter their policy on Islam and to take necessary steps to
stem the progress of Islam in Java. Among other things,
Simon cited that the colonial government, by using and
promoting the use of the Malay language, which was written
in Arabic script, indirectly but definitely promoted Islam's
progress. Furthermore, Simon also cited another indirect
impact of the Dutch policy on the spread of Islam in Java.
He said that by the beginning of the nineteenth century,
most of the interior regions had not been exposed to Islam.
It was only when the Dutch opened new interior areas for its
commercial gain, and allowed the Muslims to live there, that
Islam penetrated those areas that otherwise were long
inaccessible to it. Islam, Simon argued "accompanies the
colonial government, and as a corollary makes itself known;
hence it stands as an obstacle to the Christian truth." See,
Per Islam wie ich ihn kennen lernte auf Sumatra(Bremen: RMG,
1909), 4, as cited by Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 107.
73
structure of Christianity in Java. His name can't be erased

from the modern history of Christianity in that region.
There were many others who were also important along
with the above-mentioned figures.40 Among those who deserve
a mention were:
1. Hendrik Kraemer (1888-1965) was an important and
influential figure in the world of church and missions. He
was well-versed in the Javanese culture and had a good
command of the Javanese language. He was assigned to the
work of assisting with the revision of the Javanese
translation of the Bible. Through his expertise in the
Javanese culture he was made an advisor to the student
society of Java around 1924. He upheld the idea of excluding
Islamic elements from the Javanese society. His view of
Islam was negative and far less compassionate than that of
many other Dutch missionaries. For him, Islam was altogether
superficial, shallow, poor in content, having nothing of
value to offer to the rest of humanity. For many, Kraemer
was a symbol of missionary arrogance and intolerance. Since
his involvement in the mission work in Java came after the
birth of the Muhammadiyah movement, I will return to discuss
his role and influence at a later stage.
2. Alexander Idenberg served as the Governor General in
Indonesia from 1909 to 1916. During his tenure, the
Muhammadiyah movement was born. He was so supportive of the
40See, Kraemer, Christian Message. 220.
74
mission's cause that he was often called
"the first
Christian on the throne of Boetenzorg."41

Having furnished brief portraits of a number of
missionaries, before leaving this chapter we must add that
while those missionaries had an important influence, each
adding something to the convergence of the consolidation of
Christianity, they displayed differing attitudes toward
the
Javanese Muslims whom they encountered. As different as

these portraits may be from one another, certain shared
characteristics appear to highlight their attitude and the
nature of their missions.
First, these men were sure that evangelization was
God's command and that they worked in consonance with the
Divine Will. They were also convinced that Christianity
offered both a superior moral life on earth and the only
available ultimate salvation hereafter. Hence, most viewed
Islam as a significant, yet intimidating opponent that
should be overcome by curtailing its power and influence
through every conceivable means.
Second, while the method of attracting the Javanese to
the message of Christ differed from one missionary to the
41Boetenzorg, later called Bogor, is located 40 miles

east of the capital city of Jakarta. Boetenzorg, with its
beautiful palace, huge garden and cool weather, was the seat
of the Governor General during colonial times. Sukarno, the
first President of Indonesia, inherited that palace and used
it as his official weekend resort.
75
other, the ultimate goal of all missionaries was to expand

the influence of Christianity across Indonesia.
Third, the relationship between these missionaries and
the colonial rulers was generally cordial, with a few
exceptions. For the most part the relationship was seen as
one of mutual manipulation. However, the predicament of the
missionaries was how to link Christian ideals with the
worldly pursuits of the powerful colonial rule. To maintain
their mission's activities they often had to agree with, and
at some points to enhance, the exploitative policy of the
colonial rulers, a policy which was utterly contradictory to
their self-professed Christian ideals, and also, perhaps
counter-productive to their efforts.
Fourth, the missionaries displayed a profound sincerity
in carrying out their divine call. Many had to dwell in the
wild locations of their mission and in the sparsely
populated and rugged jungle areas. Some were wonderful
examples of great sacrifice for the sake of Christ.
Separation from families and the risk of great dangers and
murder characterized the lives of these missionaries.42
42In 1834 two American missionaries of the American
Board, Henry Layman and Samual Munson, entered the Batak
area, but the missionary expedition ended in tragedy. Both,
along with their Batak-speaking guide, met their death at
the hands' of the frightened native people before they were
able to begin their mission work. See, Stephen Neil,
A History of Christian Missions. 295. Likewise, Harthoom's
wife was murdered at Pamekasan on the island of Madura in
1868. Harthoom was a private missionary on Madura island at
the time of this tragic event. The island of Madura remains
up to the present an area whose people are highly resistant
76
Despite all their fiery spirits and good intentions to

elevate the spiritual conditions of the natives, these
missionaries sometimes either failed miserably or created
unforseen problems for themselves and others.
What has been mentioned here are most important factors
contributing to the process of the consolidation of
Christianity in Java. Therefore, all who were engaged in the
above-mentioned spiritual undertaking share the credit and
deserve the honor of the past, the present, and the coming
generations of Indonesian Christians.
This consolidation process was later followed by a
stage of intensive effort aimed at inculcating Christian
tenets through the establishment of educational and medical
institutions scattered in many cities across the country.
The great success of this stage in the history of missions
in Java evoked a sense of resentment and spurred fear in the
Muslim circles, for which the Dutch Islamic policy embedded
in the Dutch "Ethical Policy" bore partial responsibility.
As we will observe in the following chapter, the Islamic
policy of the Dutch had both enhanced the position of
Christianity, and, at the same time, had prompted the
emergence of many national movements, one of which was the
Muhammadiyah movement.
to non-Islamic preaching. See, Nellie Dewaard, Pioneer in

Sumatra (London, China Inland Mission, n.d.) 16-18. See
also, Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 101.
CHAPTER III
THE DUTCH COLONIAL POLICY
There can be no doubt that the nineteenth century was a

time of intense social change for many societies in the Far
East. The Indonesians, or the people of the "Netherlands
Indies," as they were called, were among those most directly
affected by such change, owing to the presence and policies
of the Dutch colonial government. In addition to the Dutch
policies, the Indonesians were also affected by contemporary
Islamic reform ideas, especially during the latter part of
the nineteenth century. During this time, education spread
and nationalist, as well as reformist, Islamic movements
made their appearance. From this time onward, Indonesians
underwent tremendous changes as they moved from the state of
being an underprivileged and exploited people to one to
which some basic rights were restored.
As already noted in the preceding chapters, from the
time of the arrival of the Dutch in what is now Indonesia,
in the late sixteenth century, and for almost three hundred
years afterward, the main aim of Dutch policy was to exploit
the country for material gain. Although from early times
some voices were raised amongst the Dutch colonists in favor
of providing for native interests and showing concern for
their well being, the government's response was confined to
78
symbolic gestures. Those changes in the colonial policy

which occurred as a result of Dutch liberal concerns were
superficial rather than fundamental.
During the early years of the twentieth century,
Indonesia experienced unprecedented growth and development.
This development and change, occurring in the context of a
colonial situation, was strongly influenced by the Dutch
government's colonial policies in general and its Islamic
policies in particular. In this chapter this change will be
treated insofar as it was affected by the Dutch policies.
However, before looking at the manifestation of these
policies, it might be well to look at the situation of
Indonesia before the coming of the twentieth century.
Because although the term "Netherlands East Indies" had been
used throughout the nineteenth century, it gained more
effective reality only after the Dutch seized control of the
whole archipelago. In general, prior to this, Dutch rule
over the area was far from established in a real sense of
sovereignty and actual control.1
Before the nineteenth century, the people of Indonesia
had experienced considerable pressure from European forces,
10utside of Java, Madura and the "Spice Islands" of

Moluccas, Dutch control was only nominal. Even in Java the
Dutch rule was limited, as much of Java was still under
local rule. In 1819, the Dutch were in effective occupation
of only a few small areas in the Outer Territories. See,
Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies: Its Government.
Problems, and Politics (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1941), 57.
79
but they had not yet been submerged in Western influences.

Not until the early years of the nineteenth century, after
the Napoleonic Wars, were the Dutch concerned with
transforming Indonesia into a self-supporting colony,
subjugated to their rule.2 During that time, marked changes
in the structures of colonial policy and practice took
place. In 1806, Marshal H.W. Daendals was appointed by the
King of Holland, Louis Bonaparte, as the new Governor
General in the Indies. The old system of the VOC was
replaced by Daendals7 rule, which marked the beginnings of
effective Dutch administration. His main task was to
simplify the government and to reform the corrupt
administration bequeathed by the VOC. Under Daendals7 reform
program the people were more heavily burdened than ever
before. Shortly after he ended his term in 1811, an English
expeditionary force conquered Java. Henceforth the burden of
the provincial administration was to lie firmly on the
shoulders of the European officials, and, therefore, Western
influence began to permeate Indonesian society.3
In the course of the nineteenth century, many
important factors led the Dutch colonial power to extend its
2The exercise of the Dutch power over the vast
territory of the Indies was partly direct and partly
indirect. In all there were 282 principalities, 278 in the
Outer Territories and the remaining four in Java.
Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 147.
3For more information on Daendel7s rule, see De Kat
Angelino, Colonial Policy, trans. G.J. Renier (The Hague:
Gravenhage, 1931) Vol. 2, 26-30.
80
territorial control effectively over the whole of the

archipelago. Among other factors was the Java War (18251830) in which the Javanese prince, Diponegoro, took up arms
against the Dutch,4 followed by the Dutch intervention in
the Padri War (1821-1838) in Minangkabau. This was later
followed by Dutch campaigns against the Balinese (18461849), battles in Borneo (1850-1854), in Celebes (18581860), in Sumatra (1870) and finally, in 1894 the Dutch
conquered the island of Lombok, placing it under their
direct rule.5
However, the most important military operations were
the Padri War and the Aceh War.6 In the first war, the
4The Java War marked the watershed between the 'old
Java of the VOC and the "new" Java of the Colonial period.
For further information on the Java War, see M.C. Ricklefs,
A History of Modern Indonesia . 107-166. See also, B.P.R.
Carrey, "Aspect of Javanese History," in The Development of
Indonesian Society, ed. Harry Aveling (New York: St Martin
Press, 1980), 63-78.
5Bernard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieh
Century (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 4-5.
^ h e Padri War, or Perang Putih (White War) as it was
called by the people of the area, was a result of a conflict
between Salafi-oriented reformist Muslims and some of the
traditional local leaders in the Minangkabau area in Sumatra
with its matrilineal system. The most controversial and
disputed issue was the question of inheritance. This issue
has not been solved completely, although some adjustments or
reinterpretations have been made from both sides. In the
traditional order there had been a place for both Islamic
law and local custom. The reformist Muslims did not
recognize this distinction, since they believed that Islamic
law and practice should control all aspects of life. Noer,
The Modernist Movement. 16-17, and Robert van Neil, "From
Netherlands East Indies to Republic of Indonesia, 1900-1945"
in The Development of Indonesian Society, ed. Harry Aveling
(New York: St. Martin Press 1980) 112-113. For detailed
81
native authorities who upheld the traditional customary laws

appealed to the Dutch authorities to help them defend
themselves against the Islamic reformers known as the
Padri.7 The long and exhausting war was at last ended by
the intervention of the colonial government in favor of the
Adat party.8 In the Aceh War (1873-1903) the Dutch were
information on the Padri War, see Hamka (Hadji Abdul Malik
Karim Amrullah), Sediarah Islam di Sumatra (The History of
Islam in Sumatra) (Medan: Pusaka Nasional, 1950).
7Padri was named for Pedir, a town in Aceh through
which Muslim pilgrims usually returned home. Padri was then
widely known to mean the 1Qlama (Muslim scholars) who began
to spread the teaching of Islam immediately after they
returned from Makkah, beginning in 1804. By 1821 the Padri
had occupied most of the Minangkabau area; consequently the
adat party requested the military aid of the colonial Dutch
against the Padri. In return the Dutch were promised
control of the Minangkabau, an area known for its gold
mining and coffee production. The war ended in 1837 when the
fortified town of the Padri leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol
(1772-1864), was finally taken. Imam Bonjol fled but then
was captured. He was first exiled to Priangan (West Java),
then to Ambon, and finally to Menado, where he died in 1864.
The Padri War ended with a final Dutch victory at the end of
1838. See, Noer, Modernist Movement. 25, and Indonesia:
Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism. 18301942. edited and translated by Chr. L.M. Penders (St. Lucia,
Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1977), 181. See
also M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 134. It
has also been suggested, though it is unlikely, that the
word Padri is one of many existing Portuguese loan-words in
the Indonesian language, meaning "priest." See, Wilfred T.
Neil, Twentieth Century Indonesia (New York: Columbia
8Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia (BerkeleyLos Angeles-London, 1972), 10. See also, W.F. Wertheim,
Effects of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society (New
York: I.P.R. 1950), 50. For a thorough discussion on the
rivalry between adat (custom) and Islam in Sumatra, see
Taufiq Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda
Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca: Cornell
University, 1971). For further information on the Padri War,
see M. Radjab, Perana Paderi di Sumatera Barat 1803-38 (The
8 2
forced to make their greatest military effort9 in order to

bring the people of Aceh under complete control.10 These
two wars marked the beginning of the extension of Dutch
sovereignty over the whole of Indonesia.
As a consequence of the Dutch gaining the upper hand,
Van Heutsz, who became Governor General of the Dutch East
Indies in 1904, decided to consolidate the colonial rule and
its effective sovereignty by employing a drastic measure
designed to overthrow the autonomous structure of the
traditional principalities. Van Heutsz obliged the rulers
who had already submitted, and the other local authorities,
to sign the so-called "short declaration" in lieu of the
previous long-term agreement. The new agreement stipulated
that the rulers, particularly of the outer territories,
recognized Dutch suzerainty and promised to carry out all
orders from the Dutch. At the same time the rulers were to
Padri War in West Sumatra, 1803-1838) (Jakarta: n.p. 1954) 8

ff. See also, Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising
Sun (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958), 18.
9The Dutch troops were led by General Van Heutsz who
later became the Governor General of the Indies. This
General had repeatedly urged military action in lieu of
negotiations to end the Aceh War. Vandenbosch, The Dutch
East Indies. 96; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia.
136-138.
10For information on Aceh war, see Snouck Hurgronje,
Achehnese. trns. A.W.S. Sullivan (New York: AMS Press,
1984), and Indonesia. Selected Documents. 207-214.
83
pledge not to enter into any agreement or negotiation with

other foreign powers.11
To enforce this agreement, military expeditions were
sent to the local rulers. The Dutch succeeded in imposing
their will upon the local rulers, though some vainly
resisted the military campaign and the foreign subjugation.
Thus, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Dutch
sovereignty was extended until for the first time the Dutch
ruled a more unified colonial dependency under a single
authority. By so doing, the Dutch unintentionally paved the
way for future Indonesian unity. For some Indonesians at the
time, the Dutch-imposed unification was seen as a blessing
in disguise. For prior to that era, "Indonesia" was only a
scattered group of islands between the Indian sub-continent
and Australia, inhabited by a number of tribes that adhered
primarily to the religion of Islam and who were subsequently
loosely united under colonial rule.12
11H.J. de Graaf, Geschiedenis van Indonesie (History of
Indonesia) (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1941), 454.
See also Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 149.
12It is worth mentioning that during the time of the
preparation for Indonesian independence, a Committee for the
Investigation of Independence was installed and consisted of
63 nominated members from all classes of the population. As
regards territory , opinions were divided. Hatta, the thenVice President of Indonesia, thought that the territory of
independent Indonesia should be limited to the former Dutch
East Indies, excluding New Guinea, with the option of
including Malaya. However, the majority of the committee,
including Sukarno, demanded the whole of New Guinea,
Portuguese Timor, the British possession in Borneo, and
Malaya as far as the frontier with Thailand. Bernard Dahm,
History of Indonesia . 104.
84
Dutch territorial expansion was accompanied by rapid

economic development in the archipelago. The social impact
of this development upon Indonesian society was
revolutionary. Economic and political expansion brought with
them a massive influx of Dutch and other European newcomers
who formed a new enclave within the multiracial traditional
society of Indonesia. They were Dutch civil servants,
businessmen who ran commercial enterprises, or planters. At
the same time they were agents of Western culture and
civilization.13
The imposition of Western norms, which was expressed in
the "Cultural Policy"14 and the collaboration of the
13The 1930 census gave the Dutch East Indies a total
population of 60,731,025, out of which 41,719,524 lived on
the islands of Java and Madura. The number of non-native
population was as follows. Europeans: 242,372, Chinese:
1,233,858, Foreign Asiatics: 114,000, most of whom were
Arabs (71,000), and British Indians (30,000). As for the
percentage of population increase, that of the Europeans and
foreign Asiatics was greater than it was for the natives.
See, Vollstellina. 1930. Departement van Land bouw,
Nijverheid en Handel, as quoted by Vandenbosch, The Dutch
East Indies. 5.
14This policy was adopted by the Dutch from 1830-1850.
As has been alluded to in the previous chapters, this system
was founded on a simple principle: each village should set
aside part of its land to produce export crops for sale at
fixed prices to the colonial government. In theory, everyone
was to benefit from this system, but in practice the guiding
principle was profit at any cost for the colonial government
even if the people had to suffer to provide it. No wonder
that the results of the system for the Dutch were evident.
Steady and immense profit were achieved; as a result the
colonial Indonesian budget was balanced, and the old debts
of the VOC were paid off. In addition, the substantial
surplus of revenue produced by the system was also used to
support the colonial rule to conquer the Outer Territories
of Indonesia. On the other hand, that the burden of work,
nobility with the colonial administration served to cut off

this once-most-revered and prestigious elite from the rest
of the population. Their traditional role as leaders of the
rural population was effectively relinquished. They were co
opted by the colonial government and appeased with
privileges and prestige, but their effective power was
circumscribed.15 While during the Java War the nobility had
commanded respect and support, they played an insignificant
role in the subsequent local revolts against the colonial
and often of risk, fell heavily on the peasants was one of

the principle causes of a succession of famines in Central
Java in the 1840s. Kennedy asserts that, just as on the
medieval manor in Europe the serfs had to labor annually to
produce crops for the government, so also, under the
Cultural System, the Javanese were required to devote a
certain part of their land and labor annually for the
government. Raymond Kennedy, The Ageless indies (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1968), 43. For further discussion on the
"Culture Policy", see Clive Day, The Policy and
Administration of the Dutch. 243-365; and Ricklefs, A
History of Modern Indonesia. 114-118; and Donald W. Fryer
and James C. Jackson, Indonesia (London: Ernest Benn
Limited, 1977), 51-61. For a good review and discussion on
the Dutch "Cultural Policy", which Robert van Neil
translated as "Cultivation System" to denote the original
Dutch term Cultuurstelsel. see his Java Under the
Cultivation System (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1992).
150n the decline of the prestige of the native rulers,
see "Regents, Reformers, and Revolutionaries: Indonesian
Voices of Colonial Days; Selected Historical Readings 18991949" trans. Greta 0. Wilson in Asian Studies. No 21 (The
University Press of Hawaii, 1978), 6-17; and Peter Carey,
"Aspects of Javanese History in the Nineteenth Century" in
The Development of Indonesian Society, ed. by Harry Aveling
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1980), 83.
86
government.16 Gradually, the nobility who served the

colonial cause were transformed from traditional leaders
into agents of Dutch exploitation. To a large extent, this
transformation was due to the impact of the "Culture
Policy."
As the traditional leaders declined in public
estimation, a new elite gained prominence. This was the
religious teachers, the Sufi masters as well as the hajjis.
These religious teachers were mostly in close contact with
the center of orthodoxy in Makkah by way of pilgrimage. Many
of them called into question not only the authority of the
noble elite, but also of the colonial authorities.
It was
not surprising, therefore, that the colonial power began to

keep a close eye on this newly-established elite. As social
uprisings began to appear one after the other, the colonial
masters began to fear Islamic activities, led by the
16The only noteworthy exception was the resistance

against the colonial rule shown by the Yogyakarta court on a
number of occasions, including its fruitless effort in
fostering the popular uprising led by Sarip Prawirasentana
in 1939, and the role played by the Sultan Hamangkubuwono IX
in the struggle for independence. During the Indonesian
revolution, the capital of the principality of Yogyakarta
was made the capital of independent Indonesia. Ricklefs, A
History of Modern Indonesia. 208, and Carey, "Aspect of
Javanese History", 89. For further information on the
insignificant role of the Javanese courts in resisting
colonial rule, see, Sartono Kartowidjoya, Ichtisar Keadaan
Politik Hindia-Belanda Tahun 1839-1848 (A Summary of the
Political Situation of the Dutch Indies in 1839-1848)
(Jakarta: Arsip Nasional, 1973), 82-83.
87
kivais.17 and accordingly started to shift gears and

initiate a new Islamic policy.18
Alarmed by the steadily-increasing rural revolts, on
the one hand, and the pressure from the liberals at home
after 1848 to open up the "Cultural System" to free
enterprise on the other, the colonial authorities felt
prompted to adopt the "Liberal Policy." Through this policy,
economic liberalism was introduced into the archipelago.
During this period, beginning in 1860 and continuing until
the initiation of the "Ethical Policy" in the early years of
the twentieth century, the economy was largely in the hands
of either private planters or state-controlled Dutch
financial interests. This era witnessed considerable
prosperity and increased fortunes for the Dutch, while the
17There are a number of meanings of the word kivai. The
most commonly known refers to learned santris and religious
teachers. Kivai vary in role from individual to individual,
from spiritual leader to learned santri and syncretist
healer to cultural "broker." See, Roy F. Ellen, "Social
Theory, Ethnography and The Understanding of Practical Islam
is Southeast Asia" in Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. M. B.
Hooker (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983), 60. See also, Clifford
Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a
Cultural Broker" in Comparative Studies in Society and
History (1960), 2, 238-9.
18Among the most notable early Islamic uprisings
stirred up by religious leaders was an inflammatory call in
1832, from a kivai at Kalasan, central Java, to the kings of
Surakarta and Yokyakarta to take the initiative to lead a
"holy war" against the Dutch. In 1865 a movement of large
proportions centered around West Java the famous war of
Banten aimed at the re-establishment of the Islamic
Kingdom of Pajajaran. The popular revolts on the north coast
of Java from 1839 to 1847 against the Dutch were also
inspired by the haiiis and kivais from all over Java. Carey,
"Aspect of Javanese History," 87-90.
88
Javanese agricultural sphere suffered further

impoverishment. For the Indonesians, the replacement of the
"Cultural policy by the "Liberal" policy was no more than
one form of slavery being replaced by another.
In almost all aspects, the social and economic
situation of the people continued to deteriorate under the
impact of the Dutch Liberal Policy.19 The lot of the wageearning population was determined almost entirely by their
employers, which only brought the majority of the people
into an ever more appalling condition. Three decades of
Liberal Policy did not appear to have improved the welfare
of the people. However, as a result of the 1848 Dutch
constitution, in which the conduct of colonial affairs was
regulated under the Regeerinas Reglement (Government
Regulation), a glimmer of relief was at hand. The
Regulation, among other things, allowed for greater freedom
of the press, mandated the abolition of slavery, advocated
further education for the natives, and established the
proper regulation of labor services. However, despite the
requirement for more educational opportunities for the
19The "Liberal Policy", theoretically, sought a far
greater role for private enterprise and was concerned for
the interests of the natives. However, a growing list of
grievances ranged from discrimination in government
employment to the dominating role of Chinese middlemen,
producing rising dissatisfaction among the Indonesians. For
further discussion on the "Liberal Policy", see Bernard H.M.
Vlekke, The Storv of the Dutch East Indies (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1945), 176-182. See also, Donald
W. Fryer and James C. Jackson, Indonesia (London: Ernest
Benn Limited, 1977), 51-61.
89
people as a result of these regulations, virtually no

schools were set up in Java, except those which were
allocated for the children of the Javanese noble elite.20
Most of the elementary education for the masses was still
carried on in the traditional Islamic pesantren schools.21
The failure of the "Liberal Policy" to protect the
welfare of the people prompted the implementation of a new
policy called the "Ethical Policy." This new policy was
initiated as a response to what humanitarian advocates, like
Douwes Dekker and others, brought home to the Dutch people
about the agonizing, grinding reality of daily life for the
colonial subjects in the Indies. Under this new policy, the
Netherlands was to provide financial assistance dedicated to
the welfare of the people. This financial aid was
particularly allotted to the extension of health, education
and agricultural services. The policy was seen by its
supporters as a noble experiment designed to enable a wider
cross section of Indonesian society to share the "benefits"
20In 1912-1913, for instance, all of the forty

Indonesian students in the Law College were sons of the
nobility. Secondary education was open to only those who
could pay the fees, which were unaffordable to those with
ordinary Indonesian incomes. George McT. Kahin, Nationalism
and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1952), 32. See also, Leslie H. Palmier,
Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) 26-27.
210n the Pesantren traditional education and its
system, see Elaine Mckay, Studies in Indonesian History
(London: Pitman House, 1976), 44-52.
90
of Western Civilization, and to bring the colony to the

threshold of the modern world.22
Despite the noble vision of this policy, its
achievements were much less far reaching than expected. It
failed to improve social welfare and to reverse the
declining living standard of the people.23 It did, however,
provide better education for certain strata of the society,
though little was done to provide a better educational
opportunity for the masses. Hence the literacy rate did not
reach the desired level.24
22Allen M. Sievers, The Mystical World of Indonesia;
Cultural and Economic Development in Conflict (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 132-147. See also,
Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 63-67, Neil,
The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite. 36-38, and Legge,
Indonesia.96-100.
230n the shortcomings of the policy, see G.H. van der
Kolff, "European Influence on Native Agriculture", The
Effect of Western Influence on the Malay Archipelago
(Batavia, 1929) 123-125, and Neil, The Emergence of Modern
Indonesian Elite. 39-40.
24According to the Dutch statistical data, ninetythree percent of the total population of sixty million
Indonesians in 1930 were still illiterate. In 1940, only
forty percent of all children of six to eight years old
entered elementary schools. J.M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia
and the Evolution of the Netherlands Empire" in Indonesia in
the Modern World (Bandung: Sumur, 1954), 16. See also I. J.
Brugmans, Geschiedenis van het Onderwiis in Nederlandish
Indie. (Groningen/Batavia: J.B. Wolters, 1938), 157 as
quoted by H. Aqib Suminto, Politik Islam Hindia Belanda
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984), 49. On this, Abdoerrachman
Soeryomihardjo comments, " ... (T)he Dutch reluctance to
promote education for Indonesians was understandable.
Because for the Dutch, education constituted a dynamite that
would cause a great shock for their rule." See, his
"Analysis of Suwardi Suryaningrat's Ideals and National
Revolutionary Actions (1913-1922)" in Madiallah Ilmu-ilmu
Sastra Indonesia. II, October 1964, 389.
91
The explanation of its shortcomings could be found,

perhaps, in the fact that while the goals of the policy were
set quite high, the means employed for its implementation
were relatively modest.
Given the complexity of traditional
Indonesian society, in which a majority were Muslim, it was

not as easy a task to transform this society into a new
Westernized one as the initiators of the policy had hoped.
Besides, the high hopes and ideal goals envisioned by the
policy makers were not infrequently lost sight of and
constrained by conflict with the very basic interests of the
colonials.
Being caught between the rock of the noble
intentions of the policy and the hard place of its own

economic interests., the Dutch administration more often than
not sacrificed the former in order not to endanger the
latter.
The second part of the nineteenth century also
witnessed a series of no less momentous phenomena occurring
within Indonesian society itself. Chief among these was the
Islamic religious revival. This important phenomenon had
helped to shape the initial Dutch Islamic policy in the
archipelago prior to the arrival of Snouck Hurgoronje, the
great architect of the Dutch Islamic policy whose ideas will
be extensively examined in the following pages.
From the early days, the Dutch officials expressed
their apprehension of Muslim preachers. This fear seemed to
be justified in the light of the numerous wars and upheavals
92
which took place under the banner of Islam. From the period
of the Java War on, a more rigorous Dutch policy toward
members of the Islamic community can be discerned. To
curtail the influence of the haiiis. who were believed to be
the source of the Islamic upheavals, certain measures were
taken. The main reason for these measures was the experience
of the Dutch during the Padri war. The leaders of that war
had begun to spread militant Islamic doctrines immediately
after their return from Mecca. The Dutch attempted,
therefore, to limit the pilgrims to Makkah by taking several
restrictive steps. The requirement for pilgrims to buy an
extremely expensive travel pass, costing as much as the
travel itself, was a clear effort to deter a large number of
people from performing the pilgrimage.25 Failure to
purchase this travel pass before departure meant that the
25Very early, the pilgrimage to Makkah had been an
irresistible attraction for Indonesians no matter how severe
the deterrents were, physically or materially. About the
middle of the nineteenth century an average of some 2000
persons a year went to Makkah. This number, however,
increased annually; in 1886, the number increased to 5000
pilgrims, in 1890 it increased to 7000, until by the end of
the century the number reached 11,700. In 1927 no fewer than
sixty thousand Indonesian made the pilgrimage. The number
has again increased markedly during the post war era,
reaching some seventy thousand by 1980s. In 1994, Indonesia
set a record of around 180,000 pilgrims, which constituted
the single largest haii contingent of all Muslim countries.
For this coming pilgrimage season (May 1995) the number of
registered pilgrims has reached 240,000 persons. For a good
review of the prewar period, see J. Vredenbregt, "the
Haddj", Bidrauen Tot de Taalland en Volkenkunde 118 (1962)
91-154, and Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 30-32. For
information on the Indonesian Haii contingent, after the
independence of Indonesia, review the annual report of the
Department of Religion of Indonesia.
93
pilgrim had to pay double the amount upon return. Moreover,

the returning haiii had to pass a special examination before
they could use the haiii title. In addition, the Dutch
established a consulate in Jeddah in 1872 to watch the
activities of the many thousands of Indonesians there, both
pilgrims and settlers.
Those Indonesians, particularly the
settlers, who devoted their time to the study of Islamic

sciences, to borrow Hurgoronje's remark, "...acted as fresh
blood being pumped to the entire body of the Muslim populace
of Indonesia."26
Furthermore, the harsh policies toward, and resolute
measures taken against, prominent religious leaders were
also an indication of the great fears of the Dutch regarding
the Muslims.
Many religious leaders were either taken into
custody or banished, often for guite trivial offenses.27 Of

26Snouck Hurgoronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the
19th Century, trans. J.H. Monahan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, &
London: Luzac & Co., 1931), 291.
27Among those prominent religious leaders who were
banished was Kivai Madja of Central Java. He was banished to
Menado (North Sulawesi) in 1829 along with sixty-two of his
followers. Ilyas Ja'kub, and Muchtar Luthfi, who both spent
several years in the Middle East and brought reform ideas
home, were prohibited from teaching and later detained and
exiled to West Irian in 1933 together with Hadji Djalaluddin
Thaib, the prominent teacher of the Thawalib school. Haji
Abdulkarim Amrullah of Minagkabau was another prominent
religious scholar who was detained by the Dutch and exiled
to West Java in 1941 at the age of 62. Noer, The Modernist
Movement. 50 and 156. See also Hamka, Avahku (My Father)
(Djakarta: Widjaya, 1950) 133-150.
It was sufficient reason for the Dutch to banish Haji Ahmad
Rivai in 1859 that he had spent seven years in Makkah and
preached Islam upon his return to his home town, Pekalongan
in Central Java. He was pronounced guilty and thus held to
94
particular threat to the Dutch was the influence of the

tarekat teachers (Sufi Shaykhs),28 The Dutch were highly
suspicious of them, as they were greatly respected by the
people and commanded intense loyalty from their
followers.29 In the words of Carrey, "Islam under these
shaykhs was construed in much the same fashion as the Roman
Catholic Church; tightly organized religion with
hierarchical clergy, owing allegiance to a supreme figure,
namely the Sufi master."30
These factors all combined helped to heighten the
impression of discrimination by the colonial authorities
against the Islamic community. Perhaps most crucial of all
was the conviction of the Dutch that the people of Indonesia
deserve banishment to Ambon (Molucca Islands) for expounding

a legal opinion different from other religious scholars.
Karel A. Steenbrink, Paderi. Penahulu dan Peniual Jimat;
Islam di Indonesia pada Abad XIX (Paderi, the Religious
Judge and the Amulet Seller: Islam in Indonesia in the
nineteenth century) (Jakarta: Diktat Pasca Sarjana, IAIN,
1982), 98-99.
28For further discussion on the influence of the Sufi
shaykhs, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants7 Revolt of
Banten in 1888 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), 154-157, and
Benda, Crescent and the Rising Sun. 11-13.
Âs did Raffles before him, Snouck Hurgoronje
considered the Shaykhs and haiiis the greatest enemy of
every colonial regime: "... (T)he Sheikhs and their
followers constitute the most dangerous enemies of the Dutch
authority, at least as dangerous as the Sanusi's to the
authority of France in Algeria." See, Een Arabich Bondgenoot
der Netherlandch Indische Reaeerina. as cited by Noer, The
Modernist Movement. 24.
30Carey, "Aspects of Javanese History", 96.
95
could only be drawn away from Islam by the spread of

Christianity.31
To the harsh policy of the Dutch must also be added the
fact that "Islam during this time was synonymous with
"indigenousness.I|32 Even among the Bataks, who were mostly
"pagans," those who converted from animism to Islam were
called Malays. The same was true of the Chinese in Sumatra
who embraced Islam.33 Islam7s importance in the life of
society, and its identification with indigenousness,
provided a powerful means of expression of loyalty to the
country over against foreign rule. Hence it was logical for
the Dutch to be suspicious of, and to discriminate against,
the Indonesian Muslims.34 Islam was seen not only as a
31Benda, "Continuity and Change", 84.

32During this time, to profess Islam was a means of
expressing commitment to an Indonesian identity. Thus, Islam
was a covert means of establishing national unification and
rallying support against the colonial power. This attitude
is exemplified by a certain old lady in Sumbawan who, when
questioned about her nationality, replied that she was
banqsa Islam (Citizen of Islam). See, P.R. Goethals, Aspects
of Local Government in a Sumbawan Village (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1961), 22.
33Noer, The Modernist Movement. 7. See also, Gottfreid
Simon, The Progress and Arrest of Islam in Sumatra (London:
Marshal Brothers, 1912), 191.
Ât one time this discriminatory attitude was
supported by a Dutch regulation. According to the Alqemeenee
Bepaling van Wetaevinq (General Rule of Enactment) in 1849,
Indonesian Christians were placed in the category of
Europeans, enjoying equal legal rights and privileges. See
Noer, The Modernist Movement. 8. Prejudice against Islam on
the part of the Dutch might well have been a heritage of the
medieval Christian outlook. On this theme, see, Norman
96
threat to the Dutch "Rust en Orde11 (Peace and Law) policy,

but it was also conceived as a potent menace to their
continued existence in the archipelago.35
Only when the colonial authorities realized the danger
of the Islamic wave and the passion it evoked were they made
aware of the importance of mass education. In this respect
the Dutch could not allow the teachers of the pesantren who
spoke against the "infidel exploiters" to freely dominate
the field. The Dutch thus began to initiate more seriously
expanded educational programs for the masses in order to
counterbalance Islamic-oriented education. Under the guise
of promoting government educational programs, the statesubsidized Christian mission schools became a noticeable
presence throughout the country.
The Muslim community reacted strongly to the harsh
policies of the Dutch and to their support of Christian
missions. Thus the Dutch policy contributed much to the
religious militancy in the countryside. In addition, the
Muslims, being constantly under pressure from the Dutch,
began to draw increasing strength from Arabia, the center of
Daniel, Islam and the West:The Making of an Image

(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1980), and R.W..
Southern, Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962).
35Prijono, "Riwayat Penjajahan Barat dan Perlawanan
Ummat Islam" (The Western Colonial Rule and the Muslim
Resistance) in Beberana Peninaqalan dari Seiarah Periuanqan
Islam (Jakarta: n.p., 1945), 73-89.
97
Islamic orthodoxy.36 As a result, an Islamic religious

revival began to clearly assert itself in the archipelago.
The most powerful expression of this revivalism
was
manifested in the opening of new religious schools in

steadily increasing numbers by returning pilgrims. The
erection of a number of mosques in the countryside was also
indicative of the religious revival in the country.37
To sum up, during the latter half of the nineteenth
century, with the spread of the religious revival and the
impact of the colonial policy toward Muslims, each pesantren
became a potential source of anti-Dutch leaders. Just as the
pesantren came to provide a meaningful infrastructure for
^The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to an
increase of Indonesian pilgrims and encouraged a new wave of
settlers from Hadhramaut. Those Arabs who succeeded in
opening up Islamic communities in Java were accepted into
the upper reaches of the society and became simultaneously
the agents of Islamic orthodoxy. L.W.C. Van den Berg, Le
Hadramaut et les Colonies Arabes dans 1/Archipel Indien (The
Hadramaut and the Arab Colonies in the Indian Archipelago)
(Batavia: n.p. 1886), 110. On the impact of Islamic
orthodoxy on the Javanese texts, see Soebardi, Santri
Religious Elements as Reflected in the Tientini. vol 127 No
3 (Jakarta: BKI, 1971), 348-349.
37The most prominent pesantren during the time of Java
War were in Kedu, Padjang, and Mataram. They successfully
created a network of countryside support for Prince
Diponegoro. After the Java war, there were many other
pesantren were founded on Java, Madura, and Sumatra. Tebu
Ireng pesantren. founded in 1901, was one of those
traditional schools which survived the colonial rule.
See P.B.R. Carey, "Pangeran Dipanagara and the Making of the
Java War: Jogyakarta History 1785-1825," unpublished
dissertation, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, 1975,
168-182. Among the well-known religious schools established
in Sumatra were Adabiyah, established in 1905, and Thawalib,
which grew out of Jembatan Besi school, established in 1904.
Noer, Modernist Movement. 34-37.
98
resistance against Dutch rule, so also did the tarekat (Sufi

Brotherhood), which served as important centers of
resistance to the colonial government.38 At one time in
Indonesia, initiation into a Sufi order was considered part
and parcel of a serious adherence to Islam.
During this time, namely the latter part of the
nineteenth century, the religious leaders and the Sufi
masters came to the forefront of the opposition to the Dutch
rule. The movements which they led all had as their goal the
defense of Islam and the restoration of traditional Islamic
values. In this, the influence of the traditional religious
authorities was clearly to be discerned. Thus, it was not
until the beginning of the twentieth century, with the rise
of modern Islamic movements such as the Muhammadiyah, that
modernistic implications developed. However, the presence
^ a n y Sufi masters were banished to remote areas or

sent abroad. The most renowned of all was Shaykh Yusuf
Alkhalawaty. This Shaykh, who was the founder of the
Khalawaty order in Indonesia, was first sent into exile in
Ceylon in 1683 and later banished to Cape Town. Even from
Ceylon, his influence on Indonesia was still evident.
Therefore, the Dutch decided to send him further away, to
South Africa, to insure his being cut off from all further
contact with Indonesia. Tudjimah, Shavkh Yusuf Makassar
(Jakarta: Departmen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1987) 4-10,
and Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 75-76. For
detailed information on the role of the religious scholars
during the era of Shaykh Yusuf, see, Azyumardi Azra, "The
Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of
Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian "'Ulama" in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries." Ph.D. Diss., Columbia
University, 1992. It is helpful to note that the Dutch were
involved in the administration of Ceylon until 1796, when
the British took over the region.
99
and the role of the traditional Islamic movement still

remained intact and strong.
An important phenomenon in Indonesia, similar to the
situation in other colonized lands, was that the Europeans,
who, at the turn of the nineteenth century, numbered almost
one hundred thousand, were concentrated in the cities,
whereas ninety percent of the Indonesian population lived in
poverty-stricken areas outside the cities. The European
population was divided into two groups, Europeans and
Eurasians.39 Since all these Europeans felt superior to the
Inlanders. as the Indonesians were called, there were many
conflicts over the course of the nineteenth century, which
gave a strong impetus to the rise of many social movements.
The Structure of the Colonial Government

Before examining the Dutch colonial policy it may be
useful to touch upon two related aspects. The first is the
structure of the Dutch government; the second is the
underlying philosophy of the Dutch toward their colony.
39The Eurasians, or the Indos as they were also called,

were the mixed offspring of Europeans and Asians. They were
mostly of native mothers and European fathers. Under this
term were also included "pure-blooded Dutchmen born in the
Indies. They were in general a better-educated group than
the Indonesians. In 1900 they were 75% of the European
community on Java. Many of the higher civil servants in the
Dutch colonial government were from this group. Neil, The
Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite. 13-16 and 33-34. See
also, Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 7-8.
100
The organization of the Dutch government in the Indies

was determined by a great number of laws which sought to
regulate its workings to the smallest detail. For the
purpose of a general sketch, it is necessary to omit all but
the most essential aspects of this organization. Those
essential aspects, which were connected with the Islamic
policy of the Dutch, played a large role in inducing the
emergence of several Indonesian modernist movements in the
early years of the twentieth century.
Generally speaking, the Dutch government was divided
into three departments, with each department having a
particular function corresponding to its geographical
position. The home government resided in The Hague and was
mainly concerned with legislation. The second department was
the central government in Batavia which combined the
functions of legislation and administration, though in
performing these functions it had always to follow the
general rules which had been formulated by the home
government. The third department was the local
administration run by officials scattered throughout the
country administering their territories in line with the
home government's general rules as well as the nearer and
more direct control of Batavia.
While ultimate control over colonial affairs resided in
the hands of the Netherlands' parliament, practical control
was in the hands of the Minister of Colonies, who was a
101
cabinet member and responsible to the Parliament for his

actions. To assist him in this task, he employed personnel
experienced in colonial affairs. These personnel were often
able to influence the minister.
About two hundred persons were employed in the Colonial
Office. Attached to this office were several advisers. The
most important were the Adviser for International Opium
Affairs and the Adviser for East Indian and Arabian Affairs.
The latter position was held for almost two decades by
Snouck Hurgronje, whose service to his government in this
capacity, first in the Indies and later in his home country
was of inestimable value to the Dutch government.40
The power of administration in the colonial government
resided almost without restriction in the hands of the
Governor General in Batavia as the head of the
administrative hierarchy. He was the supreme authority in
40Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) was a great scholar of

Islam, and wrote extensively on a number of Islamic topics.
In 1880, Leiden conferred a doctorate upon him. In 1891, he
was made adviser for Native Affairs and Professor of Arabic
at Batavia, Java. During his seventeen-year stay in the
Indies (1889-1906), he was not only engaged in scholarly
work dealing with native affairs, but also in doing
statesmanlike work in helping the Government with
recommendations on policy. His influence on Dutch policy in
the Indies was so great that no one denied that he was the
originator of the Dutch colonial policy toward Islam that
prevailed until the final days of Dutch rule in Indonesia in
1942. On Hurgronje, see H. Aqib Suminto, Politik Islam. 114125; G.W.J. Drewes "Snouck Hurgronje en de Islamwetenschap"
in Hondred Jaar Studie van Indonesia 1850-1950 (Den Haag
1976), 43-58. See also, H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara. A History of
Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1959), 324325.
102
the colony and was responsible to the home government for

the implementation of colonial policy. Next to the Governor
General was a high ranking advisory body consisting of five
members appointed by the home government. This influential
body was known as the Council of the Indies and was presided
over by the Governor General ex-officio. The Dutch Islamic
policy during the final years of the nineteenth and the
first decade of the twentieth centuries was heavily shaped
and colored by Snouck Hurgronje's advice, and most of the
remaining pages of this chapter will, therefore, focus on
Hurgronje's ideas in connection with the Islamic policy of
the Dutch government.41
It is not easy to ascertain exactly what the Dutch
colonial ideal was, nor to uncover its fundamental
underlying philosophy. Many of the Dutch policies were
initiated either to meet the exigencies of the time or to
follow the direction which the Dutch parliament mandated.
Religious and political divisions among the Dutch were so
great that it would be difficult to describe the general
41For a detailed description on the Dutch Policy in the

Indies, see Clive Day, The Policy and Administration of the
Dutch. 409-432, and Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 5159. See also, J.S. Furnival, Colonial Policy and Practice: A
Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1948).
103
attitude of the mother country toward its colony, nor its

ultimate goal for colonialization.42
No one denies, and the Dutch themselves acknowledge,
that from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries the
colony was indecently exploited, first for the greater
financial gain of the VOC and later to swell the coffers of
the home country. The reforms which were initiated by the
Dutch at the beginning of the twentieth century were in part
explained by the desire of the Dutch to recoup the losses
caused by the Dutch injustices committed in the past. Hence
the previously unprivileged natives were now given some
basic human and civil rights.43
Aside from a number of concepts put forward for
colonial policy within Dutch academic circles, some of whom
advocated the idea of Groot Nederland (Greater Netherlands),
42In general, the Dutch political parties divided
themselves into two camps. The religious groups were
comprised of the KVP (Catholic Party), ARP (AntiRevolutionary Party), and CHU (Christian Historical Union);
the secular groups included the W D (The Liberal Party) , the
PVDA (The Socialist Party), and the CPN (The Communist
Party). In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the
secularists took the lead in the Parliament, while from the
turn of the century up to World War II, the religious
parties prevailed. Hence the Dutch policy towards its colony
was greatly affected by the political rivalry in the
Parliament. H. Aqib Suminto, Politik Islam. 19-21. See also,
Johan Goudsblom, Dutch Society. (New York: Randomhouse,
1967), 85-88.
43The Dutch policy in putting stumbling-blocks in the
way of education of the people may well be compared, as
Kartini suggested, "... to the acts of the Tsar, who while
he is preaching peace to the world, tramples underfoot the
good rights of his subjects." See, R.A. Kartini: "Letters of
a Javanese Princess," Indonesia: Selected Documents. 220.
104
while others pushed for the idea of cultural assimilation,

two central policies were pursued by the Dutch
administration during their 300 years of dominion. They were
those of
Rust en Orde i.e., maintaining
"Peace and Law",
on the one hand, and the policy of "Guardianship" on the

other. These two fundamental policies, along with their
ramifications, however weakly and sporadically adhered to at
times, always remained the same in spirit.
The Rust en Orde Policy

This was designed to be a positive policy to keep
people cooperative and peaceful but its method was primarily
harsh and punitive. Under this policy the Dutch earnestly
attempted to prevent any possible problems that might affect
the sources of the great wealth of a colony whose population
was about equal to that of all the French colonies combined.
There was a saying, in this respect, that "The Indies are
the safety-belt of the Netherlands." Given the importance of
the Indies, coupled with the Dutch lack of the material
resources necessary to maintain a large military force to
keep order, the Dutch policy was one of caution and
prevention. In the international sphere, the Dutch were
careful not to offend those opinions which might result in
physical conflict with foreign powers. In the domestic
realm, and for the sake of "peace and order," they were much
more liberal than those in power in more autocratic
105
countries. Unlike what occurred under the brief occupation

of the Japanese during the Second World War, only in very
rare instances was brutal treatment knowingly inflicted upon
the natives by the Dutch.44 For the Dutch, death sentences
and executions were taboo. The Dutch, for example, could not
revive the repressive measures used by the VOC, who
slaughtered a number of dissident Chinese, nor revert to the
methods of Jan Pieterzoon Coen (1587-1629), who had used
harsh measures, killing a number of Muslim village
chiefs.45
Typical of the caution of the Dutch was their attitude
toward the Christian missions. Because Muslims were
sensitive about these missions, which they generally
regarded with great suspicion, the Dutch had to adopt
certain measures in order not to jeopardize their Rust en
Orde policy. By virtue of the Indisch Staatsrealement
(Indies Constitution), Christian missionaries had first to
obtain a special license before undertaking their religious
w On Indonesia under the Japanese occupation, see M.A.
Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1955), and S. Tas, Indonesia: The Underdeveloped
Freedom, translation of De onderontwikkelde vriiheid:
Indonesia toen en nu (1905) by Derek S. Jordan (New York:
The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1974), 140-169. It is worthwhile
to note that, today, although the Japanese are welcomed as
investors in Indonesia, Indonesians who witnessed the World
War II still speak privately of the Japanese occupation with
contempt.
45W.P. Coolhaas, "Over Karakter en daden van J.Pz.
Coen." Biidraaen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en
Oudheidkunde. 1943-1944, VIII 4:201-237; VIII 5:60-74, as
cited by Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 61.
106
task.46 Surprisingly, although a licence was required for

Muslim teachers under the Guru Ordonnantie at a later
time,47 Islam enjoyed the fuller liberty, in that no
license was necessary to preach Islam.
It must be noted that the Dutch, whose attachment to
the Christian missions was unquestionable, at times had to
swing over to the other extreme in an effort to maintain law
and order. Because of frequent social unrest in Aceh in
Sumatra, and Bantan in West Java, as well as other places,
the Dutch had found it necessary to modify their attitude
toward the Christian missions. To prevent disturbances and
unrest, and from fear of Muslim reaction, restrictive
measures against the activity of the Christian missions had
to be adopted. The policy became all the more necessary to
achieve two goals: first, to leave an impression in the mind
of the people that the Dutch had a neutral attitude about
religion and, second, to maintain the Rust en Orde. which
was for the orderly Dutch, to borrow a witty Dutchman's
remark, "above God the Father." This seemingly neutral
policy, which was not free from serious objections on the
part of the Christian missions, was less the result of
hostility to the Christian cause than a yielding to a
46Vandenbiosch, The Dutch East Indies. 46. See also,

Kennedy, The Ageless Indies. 111.
47On Guru Ordonnantie (Teacher's Ordinance), see footnote
73, page 254 above, in chapter five.
107
realistic appraisal of the measures needed to maintain

peaceful conditions in the area.48
However, because of fear and extreme hypersensitivity
regarding Islamic sentiment, the Dutch also took a hard line
against any Islamic uprising and its leaders. This fear of
any Muslim unrest which might offer powerful resistance to
the Dutch was an important factor in setting the tone of
colonial policy for quite a long time. Banishments, exiles,
imprisonments and occasional armed assaults were employed
under the pretext of this policy.
Another interesting situation, intimately connected
with the Rust en Orde policy, was the Dutch encouragement of
antagonism between the religious leaders and the indigenous
elite who upheld cultural conservatism in Java, and between
the adat (custom) leaders and the 'ulama (the Islamic
religious scholars) in Sumatra. For the Dutch, the guiding
principle was enhancing cultural conservatism, even if the
people had to stay in their state of stagnation or to suffer
thorough backwardness. When it came to a choice between
supporting traditional authority and secular power against
forces of change, the Dutch invariably came down in favor of
the former. The local rulers were strengthened, and their
48Suminto, Politik Islam. 4. See also, Benda, "C. S.

Hurgronje, and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in
Indonesia," in Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia.
(Yale University, 1972), 83, and Vandenbosch, "Review", in
Comparative Studies in Society and History. II, 1959-1960,
258.
108
power to control the rural areas was constantly enhanced by

the Dutch. From the point of view of maintaining peace and
order, this attitude was understandable.49 Furthermore, in
igniting this antagonism, the Dutch like all other colonial
powers from time immemorial, were inspired by the familiar
but always serviceable principle, divide ut imoeres ("divide
and rule").50
It is evident that the above policy was characterized
by gradualism and compromise. On one hand, the colonial
government sought to keep native customs and institutions
intact, so far as was possible, thus maintaining the status
quo. On the other, it sought slowly to open educational and
political privileges to the Indonesians. In this respect the
Dutch did not parallel the Americans in the Philippines, who
49A s was the case in Sumatra where the Dutch were in

favor of the "customs group" (kaum_adat) in their strife
with the reformist Padri group, in Java as well, the
relations between the Dutch and the Javanese courts took the
form of alliance in the face of religious uprisings. In
theory, the four Sultanates, Yogyakarta, Surakarta,
Mangkunegaran and Pakualam, ruled their own territory, but
in fact the Dutch Residents exercised the real control. In
other words the four Sultanates were allowed to survive but
only completely under the direction of the colonial
administration. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia.
119-120.
50Since the time of the VOC, the Dutch conducted a
remarkable series of intrigues among the local rulers by
either shifting alliances or pitting one Sultanate against
another to create rivalries and antagonism. In so doing the
Dutch never had to face an effective united force of local
states allied against their rule. Legge, Indonesia. 34. For
additional information on this theme, see, B.J.O. Schrieke,
"The Native Rulers," in Indonesian Sociological Studies. I
(The Hague, 1955).
109
started a general reform of government, education, and

social life right after they replaced the Spanish.51 The
Dutch retained so far as possible the traditional forms of
government, and left the people uneducated as long as
possible,52 while slowly moving toward the goal of native
self-government under Dutch supervision.53 This policy of
preserving and encouraging local custom, had, consciously or
not, functioned to maintain the disunity of the people, thus
in fact applying the divide-and-rule strategy. However,
partly as a result of this weak emphasis on education ,
Pauaw observed that among Southeast Asia's newly independent
countries, Indonesia stands out for the rapidity with which
it has eradicated the Dutch educational tradition and its
language.54
51In comparison to the educational policy in the
Philippines, the Dutch policy was one of extreme gradualism.
For the Dutch, rapid education would have produced
discontent among the natives. Therefore, only five per cent
of Dutch colonial expenditures had been allocated for
education as against twenty-five per cent in the
Philippines. Kennedy, Ageless Indies. 112, 137-139.
52The Dutch caution in introducing Western-style
education to the people of the Indies was, as Robert van
Neil asserts, "compatible with their desire not to change
native society so that they could exploit it more easily."
See, "From Netherlands East Indies" in The Development of
Indonesian Society. 114.
530nly when
higher class of
was the Special
See, Clive Day,
390.
necessity dictated the education of the

natives, whom the Dutch used in government,
Department of Education established in 1866.
The Policy and Administration of The Dutch.
54Douglas S. Pauaw, "From Colonial to Guided Economy,"

in Indonesia, ed. by Ruth T. Mcvey, 155.
110
In theory, it appears that the preservation of local

custom and tradition was desirable on two accounts. On the
one hand, it helped to maintain the existing status quo; on
the other, it aimed to diminish the impact of Islamic
revivalism. For the Dutch, it would seem, the development of
the natives beyond their existing condition was as dangerous
as the Islamic reforms. Consequently every effort was made
to let the society evolve very slowly.
The promotion of local culture by the Dutch as a means
of preserving peace and order led to serious consequences
for their linguistic policy. The rational consistency of
this policy led to the promotion of the local as well as the
national languages of the natives. Aside from other
considerations,55 their decision not to promote their own
language among their subjects resulted from their belief
that it was in their own best interest not to do so. Since
550ne strong rationale behind the Dutch linguistic
policy was their desire to establish their superiority over
the natives. The use of the Dutch language could diminish
the gap between the "inferior" native and the "superior"
Dutch. The Dutch maintained that they were uncomfortable
letting their subjects understand their conversation. In one
of her letters, Kartini relates a story of a gifted and
educated Javanese student, who ranked the highest among all
students in one of the principle high schools in Java. As he
returned home, he thought it would be proper to pay his
respect to the local Dutch authorities. Here, he made the
mistake of daring to address the great man in Dutch. As a
punishment for his "misdeed," a notice of an appointment as
clerk to a controller in the mountains was sent to him.
Kartini further says that the young man had learned wisdom
from this mistake; namely, that one cannot serve a European
official better than by creeping in the dust before him, and
by never speaking a single word of Dutch in his presence.
See, Indonesia: Selected Documents. 219.
Ill
the language of the colonizers was less essential to the

natives, Dutch was hardly spoken during the VOC era. Only
during the course of the nineteenth century did the language
begin to be used as a medium of communication, though in a
limited circle. In general, the Dutch language was not
widely spoken, unless it was needed for economic
development.
Unlike the Dutch, in French colonialization, cultural
conquest was as crucial as military and political conquest.
For the French, cultural and linguistic assimilation was
imperative. In the words of Bousquet, "France does not
conquer only to carry off what is valuable; she also brings
with her something definite and durable. At heart the
Frenchman is essentially a potential assimilator."56 While
the Frenchman was happy to point with pride to the spread of
his language in all French colonies, the Dutchman, on the
contrary, spoke with pride the native tongue and insisted
that his own language not be given to his subjects.
As a result, the Dutch, unwittingly, did much to
strengthen the feeling of national unity among the
Indonesians. The historical bond between the different
elements of the people of the Indies of the pre-colonial era
was revived. As the use of the Indonesian language increased
proportionally, so also did the feeling of unity. Gradually,
56G .H . Bousquet, A French View of The Netherlands
Indies, trans. by Philip E. Lilenthal (London: Oxford
112
the Indonesian language came into self-conscious existence

and succeeded in nurturing the spirit of nationalism.
Indeed, the Dutch, to their regret, had given birth to a
feeling of patriotism, and had thus created an anti-Dutch
Indonesia by their own colonial policies.57
On the whole, the Dutch had neglected to make their
language the national one in their colony. Less than thirty
years after the independence of Indonesia, the Dutch
language ceased to play any role in what had been a Dutch
territory for more than three hundred years. This is
something that would hardly have been conceivable in a
British, French or American colony.
The Policy of Guardianship

Given the fact that the Dutch colonialized a Muslim
population six or seven times more numerous than the
inhabitants of their mother country, a policy of
guardianship was, for the Dutch, obviously imperative. Under
this policy, it was stipulated that the Dutch exercise a
"guardianship" over their subjects in the sole interest of
57While Dutch-language instruction for the natives was

not seriously undertaken until the early twentieth century,
the Indonesian language evolved in the meanwhile on the
basis of an ancient inter-insular lingua franca (Melayu),
which was also used by the early Muslim preachers. By 1928,
shaped by two generations of writers and readers, it was
ready to be adopted by Young Indonesia as the national
language, Bahasa Indonesia, in their Sumoah Pemuda (Youth's
Oath) of 1928. Benedic Anderson, Imagined Communities (New
York: Verso, 1991), 131-132.
113
the latter. The subjects should be treated rather like

children, and the guardian alone would decide when the time
was right to yield and when to discipline, whichever seemed
best to the guardian.
The Dutch policy of "guardianship" was so conspicuous
that, perhaps, it was unparalleled in the way in which the
rule of the colony deeply saturated the life of the mother
country. The intensity of colonialization was far greater in
Indonesia than either in the Philippines or British India.
Most of the civil officers assigned for Indonesia were
knowledgeable in the field. Before leaving for Indonesia
they had acquired a thorough knowledge of Indonesian
history, the ethnology of the native people and their
languages. In general, most of them conversed fluently in
the Indonesian language.58
There were, in proportion to the local inhabitants,
nearly six times as many Europeans in Indonesia as there
were in India. In 1938, British India, generally considered
the greatest imperial fortune of all, and two and one half
times the size of Indonesia with a population six times as
large, had only about the same number of Europeans as
58Kennedy made the point when he characterizes them as

expert scholars and the best colonial administrators in the
world. See, Kennedy, The Ageless Indies. 118-119
114
Indonesia.59 Large investment, extensive missionary

enterprises, and a large number of colonial civil servants
all indications of the keen Dutch interest in the colony.
This was due in part to the fact that many Dutch regarded
Indonesia as their home. This sense of belonging was quite
different from that of the British in India. As the number
of Dutch inhabitants increased in Indonesia, so did the
number of colonial experts in the Dutch parliament. The
result was a lively public interest and much serious
discussion over the questions of colonial affairs.
Through the policy of guardianship, the Dutch thought
that they had the right, and even the duty, to impose their
will upon their subjects in every conceivable manner. As a
result the Dutch meddled with the most petty aspects of
native life. More often than not they attached extreme
importance to minor details while overlooking broader
essentials. An amusing example of the detailed Dutch
supervision of agriculture was that they tried not only to
teach the natives how to plant seeds, but even compelled
them to transplant the seedlings at prescribed distances
59Kennedy, The Ageless Indies. 148-149, 169. The reason
for this higher proportion of Europeans living in the Indies
was that Holland, perhaps, was the only colonial power that
heavily relied on its colonial possession to develop its
economy. The Indies was the most profitable colonial
possession of its size in the world. The Indies's natural
wealth and agricultural riches produced a vast store of
commodities for export. These exports made Holland one of
the richest countries in the world. See, Bruce Grant,
Indonesia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964),
17-18.
115
from each other. Furthermore, as a rule, the natives were

prohibited from riding a horse bareback. And it was
prescribed how they should build their houses and fence
their yards.60 As for the essential matters, the Dutch were
less imaginative. They were less eager to share with their
subjects their language and culture. They constantly stood
aloof from their subjects and maintained their superiority.
Nevertheless, the Dutch became increasingly involved in
regulating matters to a far greater degree than they had
foreseen. So much so that Snouck Hurgronje commented, " . . .
(A)11 that is now lacking is an order instructing the
natives at what hour they must do their daily duty."61 It
was an attitude, to borrow Edward Said expression,
"paternalistic arrogance of imperialism,"62 which was
embodied in the Dutch guardianship policy.
Apart from such expressed noble intentions and
apparently cordial relations between the Dutch and the
natives on the surface when this policy was in force,63
60For more information on the detailed Dutch supervision
of Indonesian life, see Dahm, The History of Indonesia. 14-15,
and Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 312-313.
61Snouck Hurgronje, Verspreide Geschriften. Volume IV,
Leiden, p. 24, as cited by G.H. Bousquet, A French View. 52.
62Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism
Vintage Books, 1994), xviii.
(New York:
63H.H. Van Kol, a Dutch Social Democrat politician

pointed out that "... We must bring up the child in such a
way that it can learn to dispense with our help." This
statement appeared in his article, "Het Imprialisme van
Nederland" in Indische Gids (Bandung: The Hague, 1902), 41.
116
certain actions on the part of the Dutch officials were not

legally justified or were they based on mere persuasion.
Among other things, Perintah Halus. which in Dutch is Zachte
dwana and means "gentle compulsion" or "disguised order,"
was one of the more obvious expressions of these unwarranted
orders.64 Over time, this approach inevitably led the Dutch
to adopt an extremely harsh and an almost tyrannical
administrative style, especially during the era of the
Culture System.
It is worth mentioning that the relatively successful
end-result of the Dutch policy
the Dutch peacefully
that the people accepted
was not wholly attributable to the
Dutch genius. A combination of several factors contributed

to this success, the key one being the temperament and
mentality of their colonial subjects.
As was stated, Java was the nucleus of Dutch power.
On
Java lived the majority of their subjects, and from Java the
Dutch drew their main resources. The Javanese were an
exceptionally gentle, uncontentious and peace-loving people.
The Dutch had the unprecedented good fortune to engage with
wThis "gentle compulsion," which constituted a

camouflaged coercion, appeared in commands given by the
Dutch officials through their native chiefs, to be executed
by the people. These commands which were given orally; even
though they were illegal, had to be ensured or else the
people would face punishment. Bousquet, A French View. 5457. See also, Tan Malaka, Dari Peniara ke Peniara (From Jail
to Jail) (Djakarta; n.d.) I. 68, and Neil, The Emergence of
the Modern Indonesian Elite. 81, as well as Legge,
Indonesia. 87.
117
people who, as they themselves acknowledged, were "Het

zachtste volk der aarde.
"The gentlest people in the
world." For many years, the Javanese subjects were tolerant,

patient and docile subjects. It was upon these significant
characteristics of the Javanese character that the Dutch
founded their rule. Had Java been inhabited by Achenes,
Maduranese, or Buginese, whose temperaments were vastly
different, the Dutch, perhaps, would never have been able to
rule the island as they wished.65
It is against a background of all these factors that
the turn of the twentieth century brought the beginning of
important changes. The "Ethical Policy" of the Dutch was
developed, designed to bring reforms in the Indies which
were to affect the political, economic, and social
conditions of the people. It had both humanitarian and
65For more information on the fierce war and the strong

resistance the Dutch encountered from the natives of Aceh
and the Bugis, see Kennedy, The Ageless Indies. 44-50. Aceh,
according to M. Natsir (The Prime Minister of Indonesia in
1950-51), had staged such a fierce resistance to the Dutch
that it can be said it had never been under the full control
of the Dutch. Muhammad Natsir, "The Role of Islam in
Indonesia," a lecture delivered at the Diplomatic Club,
Jakarta in 1976. (Jakarta: Thailand Embassy, 1976). This
strong resistance owed a great deal to the intimate
connection of the Acehnese with Islam. For further
information on the close relation of Aceh to the center of
Islamic learning in the Middle East, see R. H.
Djajadiningrat, Kesultanan Aceh (The Sultanate of Aceh),
trans. T. Hamid (Banda Aceh: Departmen P&K, 1984), 25, 2930.
118
economic motivation, and was sloganized as "Education,

Irrigation, and Emigration."66
The policy advocated the improvement of yields by
better irrigation and the encouraging of internal migration
so as to relieve the pressure of population in Java.
Furthermore, the policy also laid much emphasis on the
systematic development of education with the aim of creating
a more prosperous colony. For the most part, its more
enthusiastic proponents envisioned a great moral, social and
economic uplift for the natives.67
Although the "Ethical Policy" was designed to somehow
transform Indonesian society in order to share in the riches
of Western culture and to bring Indonesia into the modern
world, its ultimate goal was not clearly defined. Some
envisioned the emergence of a Westernized elite who would
gratefully recognize their indebtness to the Dutch for their
prosperity. Others hoped for growth and progress by
"cultural synthesis" based on the blending of elements of
local and Western cultures. Still others alluded vaguely to
the possibility of a hypothetical future independence for
the colony, and offered a solution which would then keep the
former colonizers apart from the formerly colonized. Some,
êil, "From Netherlands East Indies," 117.
67 For elaborate discussions on the "Ethical Policy"
which was considered the official Dutch colonial policy in
the twentieth century, see Vandenbvosch, The Dutch East
Indies. 63-73, 208-305. See also, Indonesia: Selected
Documents on Colonialism . 60-78.
119
however, wanted a Greater Netherlands in which a living and

organic community of peoples would live within the
boundaries of the Dutch State, not so much through cultural
association, but through what de Kat Angelino called
"dynamic synthesis."68 The Christian mission circle,
however, was concerned only with
"uplifting" the spiritual
condition of the people through conversion.

Three terms were used with regard to the question of
how to maintain satisfactory relations between the
Netherlands and its colony in the light of the Ethical
Policy. To create among the Indonesians a feeling of content
with the Dutch rule, the terms "unification", "assimilation"
and "association" predominated. The term "unification" has
more of a legal connotation and denotes an attempt to
establish a unified system of legislation. The terms
"assimilation" and "association" are very similar in
meaning. Both have a cultural character, but the former
seeks to have all peoples, irrespective of their race and
origin, subjected to the same conditions and regulations.
The latter, however, aims to bind a certain people more
closely to one another by making available the "advantages"
of the latter7s culture. In the case of Indonesia, through
"association" the Indonesians would adopt Western culture as
^De Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy. Vol. II, trans.

G.J. Reiner, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff), 721.
120
their own without necessarily neglecting their own

culture.69 The fact, however, remains that the theoretical
pronouncement did not conform to what was practically
implemented. What Indonesia did witness of the aloofness of
the Dutch to their Indonesian subjects only proved the
discrepancies between official statements and their
practical application. This and other evidence led some
Indonesians to believe that the concept of "association11 was
no more than an euphemism for "apartheid," which implied an
institutional separateness and inferior status for the
Indonesians.
The foremost public preference was to adopt a policy of
"association." Snouck Hurgronje, an early advocate, stated
that the Netherlands ought, while always respecting the
Indonesian religious institutions, to accept the moral
obligation of preparing Indonesians for full participation
in Dutch political and national life. Through this
"association" of Indonesian and Western culture, a
progressive Indonesian society, loyal to the Netherlands,
was to emerge.70
69 See Encyclopedia van Netherlandsch Indie (The

Hague: 1917), Vol I, 496.
70Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam. Leiden.
1911. 2nd edition, chaps. Ill and IV. as cited by
Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 71, and Harry J. Benda,
"Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundation of Dutch
Islamic Policy in Indonesia," 89. See also Snouck Hurgronje,
Islam di Indonesia, trns. S. Gunawan, (Jakarta, 1973), 50 as
cited by Suminto, Politik Islam. 38.
121
The Dutch Islamic Policy

The Islamic policy of the Dutch, or the reformulation
of the colonial stand on Islam in Indonesia, can be most
directly conveyed by describing the work and ideas of Snouck
Hurgronje. In developing the new guidelines of the policy,
Hurgronje's influence was great. During his long stay in the
Indies, his advice helped resolve several crucial issues.71
Beginning with him as an adviser, the Dutch government had
at their disposal an increasing number of experts on Islam
and on Indonesian social institutions. After his return to
the Netherlands in 1906, where he became a professor at the
University of Leiden, Hurgronje's continued to be the
guiding spirit behind Dutch Islamic policy.
Any exposition of Dutch Islamic policy shall give full
attention to the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken or Bureau for
Native Affairs. In the colony, the head of the Bureau
enjoyed special privileges. His work was quite scientific in
nature, for he was required to report every movement which
took place in the religious, cultural and political life of
71With the aid of Snouck Hurgronje's profound knowledge
of Indonesian society and psychology, coupled with his
knowledge of Islamic sciences, the pacification of the Aceh
people was partially accomplished. It was thanks to the work
of Hurgronje (1857-1936) and General Joannes Benedictus van
Heutsz (1851-1924) that the Dutch finally found some
solution to their dilemma. It was only at the end of the
nineteenth century, after they had spent thirty years in
fruitless effort, that the Dutch were able to mostly control
Aceh. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 136-137. See
also, Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and
Indirect Rule. (New York: Macmillan, 1937) 394-398, and
Dahm, The History of Indonesia. 5-6.
122
the society. In addition, he was to keep an eye on the

currents in the Indonesian colony in Arabia, and on trends
in the Muslim world at home and abroad. To perform his
duties adequately, he was obliged to be conversant with
local language and culture and to be keenly attuned to the
pulse-beat of Indonesian life. All of this scientific work
had a practical purpose, namely to enlighten the government
and furnish it with information. In general, the head of the
Bureau, or the Adviser on Native Affairs, was empowered to
offer suggestions to the government and was consulted on all
questions regarding native society.
Hurgronje's policy toward Islam and Indonesian Muslims
was based on his experience, especially his famous visit to
Makkah. He spent seven months (February to August of 1885)
there, disguised as a Muslim, under the name of Abd alGhaffar.72 In Makkah, he mingled as much as possible with
În 1884, Hurgronje arrived in Jeddah and stayed there
five months before he moved to Makkah. Commenting on
Hurgronje's disguise as a Muslim to allow himself to enter
Makkah, W.F. Wertheim asserts that by so doing Hurgronje had
tarnished his intellectual integrity. "Snouck Hurgronje and
de Etiek van Sociaalwetenschappelijk Onderzoek", in De Gids.
5, 1981, 327. See also Johannes Pederson, The Scientific
Work of Snouck Huraronie (Leiden: E.J., Brill, 1957), 22.
Intrestingly enough, there were two opposing views on
Hurgronje's affiliation to Islam set forth by two prominent
Dutch scholars. On the one hand, Dr. Van Koningsveld
suggests that Hurgronje pretended to embrace Islam in order
to be able to well-serve the colonial interests. Dr. Willem
Remmelink, on the other hand, lauds Hurgronje's contribution
to Islam in Indonesia because, he believes, Hurgronje was a
real Muslim in the guise of a Christian. Hasbullah Bakri,
Pandanaan Islam Tentana Kristen di Indonesia (The View of
Islam Regarding Christianity in Indonesia) (Jakarta: C.V.
Firdaus, 1990), 52, as quoted from an Indonesian daily
123
the Indonesian community and learned a great deal regarding

their institutions and religious activities.73 Hurgronje
concluded that most Muslims who came to Makkah for
pilgrimage were not fanatics who were planning the
advancement of the Faith at all cost:
"...
(V)ery many
come back as much sheep as when they went."74 The Dutch

officials, according to Hurgronje, should not have an
exaggerated fear of most of the local kivais (religious
teachers). Of more importance and danger were the
Indonesians who went to Makkah to study and remained for
years and eventually acquired a sense of unity with all
Muslims based on their shared Islamic identity. For this
reason, Hurgronje argued, it would be wise to allow the
majority of Indonesian Muslims to practice their religion at
home without interference. However, those who were preaching
newspaper, Komoas. January 16 and February 2, 1983,

respectively. Such differing views are also found in the
Indonesian scholarly circle. While M. Rasjidi refers to
Hurgronje as a "friend of the Indonesian Muslim," Solichin
Salam, on the other hand, along with many Indonesians
regarded Hurgronje as the effective hand of the colonial
Dutch. See, Soebagijo I.N., "Dari Saridi ke Rasjidi" (From
Saridi to Rasjidi) in 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. M. Rasiidi. ed.
Endang Basri Ananada (Jakarta: Harian Umum Pelita, 1985),
53- 54; and Salam's refuting article against Rasjidi,
entitled "Snouck Hurgronje dan Rasjidi" (Snouck Hurgronje
and Rasjidi) in Berita Buana. Jakarta, July 24, 1985.
^Hurgronje, Mekka. 291. H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara. 324.
74Snouck Hurgronj e, Mekka in the Latter Part of the
19th Century. 256.
124
"holy war" against the "infidel" ruler should be identified

and dealt with harshly.75
It is important to note that it was not until the
arrival of Snouck Hurgronje that the Dutch adopted a clear
Islamic policy. In many respects, Hurgronje's view was a
reversion to the previously existing Dutch policy. Hurgronje
amended many past mistakes made by the Dutch colonial rulers
out of both misinformation and lack of knowledge in dealing
with the Muslims' problems. As a result the Islamic policy
developed by Hurgronje was to become an integral part of the
Ethical Policy.76
As indicated above, traditionally Dutch attitudes
toward Indonesian Islam had been colored by a blend of fears
and hopes. Both were born of a misconception, if not of
ignorance, with regard to Islamic matters. The fears were of
the "Muslim fanatics" at home and of the danger of
Indonesian appeals to Muslim rulers abroad. Islam thus
appeared as a formidable enemy. On the other hand, high
hopes were raised of eliminating the influence of Islam by
Christianizing the Indonesians.
Against this background, Snouck Hurgronje formulated
his Islamic policy. Out of his understanding of the nature
^Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam. (Leiden : 1915), 58

and W.J.A Kernkamp, Islam Politiek.(Amsterdam. 1941), 200,
as cited by A. Suminto, Politik Islam. 96.
76Benda, "Christian Snouck Hurgronje", 20, and see also
his The Crescent and the Rising Sun. 28.
125
of Indonesian Islam, Hurgronje countered previous Dutch

policy by arguing that the Dutch fear of the influence of
the local religious teachers and the notion that their
connection with the Turkish Caliphate was the motivating
force b e h i n d their Pan-Islamism were exaggerated. Hurgronje
further argued that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims,
even the "fanatics," were not necessarily enemies of the
Dutch. Accordingly, Hurgronje demolished the prevailing
Dutch conviction that the Makkah pilgrimage transformed a
great number of peaceful native haii is into rebellious
fanatics.77
Hurgronje insisted, however, that Islam was not to be
underestimated either as a religious or as a political force
in Indonesia. The Indonesians, he concluded, were so
attached to Islam that, counter to optimistic Dutch
expectations of their easy conversion to Christianity, they
considered themselves to be good and devout Muslims, and saw
their religion as the best of all religions. On the other
hand, Hurgronje was not blind to the powerful impact of
political Islam on Indonesian life. There remained, he
asserted, cause for fear that some dedicated Muslim group,
though small in number, might seek to incite their followers
to wage war against the "infidel" rulers. Therefore, he was
^Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam. 58. See also,

Bernard H.M. Vlekke, The Storv of The Dutch East Indies.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), 326.
126
of the opinion that the enemy was not Islam as a religion,

but Islam as a political doctrine.78
Hurgronje's recommendations for a new Islamic policy
follow logically from his analysis of Indonesian Islam. For
him, the solution of "the Muslim question" depended wholly
upon the association of Muslims, who were Dutch subjects,
with Dutchmen themselves. If this association were not
accomplished, asserted Hurgronje, the inevitable development
of the Indonesian civilization would take it ever further
from the Dutch. Consequently, other forces would then
control its way of life and intellectual evolution.79
In general, his Islamic policy was grounded on three
basic principles.80 First, in all matters of religious
78Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam. 66-69. On the
impact of Pan-Islamism on Indonesia, see Suminto, Politik
Islam. 78-98, Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. 22-23.
^Snouck Hurgronje, "La Politique Musulmane de la
Hollande" in Versoreide Geschriften. IV, I, 204 as cited by
Suminto, Politik Islam. 38. See also Benda, "Continuity and
Change in Southeast Asia," 89. It is interesting to note
that G.H. Bousquet gives an illuminating, yet chauvinistic,
remark regarding Hurgronje's preference for the
"associationist" concept in formulating the Dutch colonial
policy. He avers that this notion is typically French in
nature in terms of its colonial policy. Hurgronje, being a
direct descendant through the paternal line of a
seventeenth-century Frenchman, Jean le Hurgroigne, may have
retained the spirit of his ancestor's colonial
Weltanschauung. See, Bousquet, A French View. 110.
^These three foundations first appeared in Hurgronje's
Verspreide Gerschriften (Collected Works), IV/II, Leiden, J.
Brill, 1927, 219 as cited by Alfian, Muhammadivah. 22-25. In
this respect, W.J.A. Kernhamp, who labels Hurgronje's policy
as the Sp Iitzinqtheorie (Split Theory), rejects, as most
Muslims do, the idea of the separation of the abovementioned three aspects of Islamic teaching. See, his
127
ritual, or the 1ibadat aspect of Islam, the people should

have full freedom to practice. The logic behind this policy
was to leave the conviction in the minds of the people that
the government was not interfering with their faith. This
was a very sensitive area for Muslims, for it touched upon
their deepest religious values. By so doing, the government
would win the Muslims over, "domesticate" them and,
accordingly, would lessen, if not completely eliminate,
"fanatical" opposition to colonial rule. Hurgronje,
according to Muhammad Natsir, a prominent Indonesian
scholar, frequently invoked a dictum which, he believed, was
widely accepted by Muslims: "A just ruler, though an
unbeliever, is preferable to Muslim despot."81 Based on
"Regeering en Islam" in W.H. van Helsdingen and H.

Hoogenberk, ed., Daar werd wat Groots Verriicht (Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 1941), 196 as quoted by Suminto, Politik Islam.
11.
81Natsir, "Oleh-oleh dari Algiers" in his Capita

Selecta, Vol I, (Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1954), 157. In this
respect, Hurgronje might have referred to Ibn Taymiyyah's
view in which he asserted that a healthy society presupposes
a just ruler even though he lacks Islam, for inequity,
albeit attended with Islam, will cause society to collapse.
Ibn Taymiyyah bases his argument for of the preferebility of
a strong, just secular authority over a righteous Muslim who
lacks the strength to uphold justice on the fact that the
Prophet Muhammad appointed Khalid ibn al-Walld to worldly
authority even though he lacked religious fervor. TaqI alDln Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-SivSsah al-Shar*iwa h fi Islah al-Ra'i
wa al-Ra'ivvah (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabl, 1951), 14-19.
See, also his Al-Amr bi al-Ma'rnf wa al-nahv 'an al-Munkar.
ed. Saiah al-Dln al-Munajjid (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Jadld,
1396/1976), 40. In the same line, we also find a similar
view of Abl Ya'ia al-Farra, al-Hanball in his Al-Ahkam alSultanivvah (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabl, 1386/1966),
20.
128
this dictum. Hurgronje suggested that the "unbelieving"

Dutch could still govern Indonesia so long as they afforded
the people equality and justice, free of intimidation and
despotism; and this was the key to the policy he sought to
establish.
The second principle for Hurgronje was that in matters
relating to Islamic social institutions, or the mu'amaiat
aspect of Islam, such as marriage, inheritance, endowment,
and other social interactions, the government should try to
maintain and respect their existence. However, the
government should seek to attract as many Indonesians as
possible to the benefits of Western culture in hopes that
they would replace those institutions with Western ones.
It
was hoped that gradually, by associating with the Dutch, the

Indonesians would realize the backwardness of their own
Islamic institutions, and demand the replacement of these
institutions with Western types. Ultimately, then, a closer
It is worth adding that the Dutch policy of toleration for

the ritual aspect of Islam was widely accepted by many of
the Muslim religious teachers, and thus it continued to
yield dividends of general peace for the Dutch until the end
of their rule. Sayyid 'Uthman bin Yahya, a prominent
theologian, was a good example of those controversial
religious teachers. Sayyid 'Uthman wrote a treatise, Manhai
al-Istiaamah fi al-Din bi al-Saiamah. in which he refused to
see a number of adherents of the Sufi Order who were engaged
in the great insurrection at western Java against the
colonial rule as martyrs. Sayyid 'Uthman was of the
conviction that those who were killed were only victims of
their own foolishness. For further discussions on this
issue, see, Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 130-135. See
also, Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants Revolt of Banten in
1888 . 160-161.
129
relationship between the Dutch rulers and their subjects

would be established.
The third and most significant principle was that in
matters of politics the government was advised not to
tolerate any activity by the Muslims which might fan the
flames of Pan-Islamism or lead to political or armed
resistance to Dutch rule. The government should exert firm
control over the flow of any political ideas that could
incite the Indonesian Muslims against their rulers. The
elimination of such ideas would separate out those political
aspects of Islam which posed the greatest threat to the
Dutch administration. Again, Hurgronje laid a great emphasis
on the importance of associating the Muslims with Western
civilization. For association to become a reality, Western
education had to be made available to the people, as only
through the penetration of Western education could the
influence of Islam in Indonesia be eliminated.
Hurgronje's vision of a better Indonesia with a
peaceful and lasting relationship with the mother country
amounted to a vision of an improved Indonesian society as a
whole, socially and culturally patterned after the West. He
appears to have had the conviction that such improvement
would eventually narrow the ever-widening gap between the
"backward" Indonesian and the "modern" Dutch societies. For
130
the Dutch to maintain their rule peacefully in Indonesia,

every effort should be made to fill this cultural gap.82
To achieve these goals, Hurgronje strongly urged that
Western education should be provided, first and foremost,
for the Indonesian nobility. For him, the Indonesian
aristocracy's higher cultural level, and its proximity to
Western influence, as well as its relative aloofness from
Islam, made it the appropriate group to be first drawn into
and made a partner in Western culture. Gradually, Indonesian
society, rooted in custom, would follow the path charted by
its traditional leadership, the nobility. This was based on
Hurgronje's observation that the majority of the people were
more influenced by local traditions than by Islam and that
the nobility seemed to have higher authority and exert more
influence over the people than the santri leaders.
Therefore, the well-educated Indonesian nobility, who were
mostly lukewarm Muslims, Hurgronje claimed, would drift away
from Islam, and would take the leading role in guiding
Indonesia into a Western-style world of prosperity for
all.83 Hurgronje's view on this point was highly
snouck Hurgronje, Mohammedanism (New York: Putnam's,
1916), 147-148.
Hurgronje himself had worked closely with the
children of the Javanese nobility and placed them under his
supervision. Husein Djajadiningrat, the first Indonesian to
take his doctorate at the University of Leiden in 1913, was
recruited by Hurgronje and literally raised by him from the
age of secondary school level on. When Hurgronje was to
leave Indonesia in 1906, there were eight Indonesian
students under his supervision. Hurgronje then entrusted Dr.
131
influential and was one of the reasons for the expansion of

general educational facilities after 1900.84
Although the Islamic policy designed by Hurgronje met
with considerable success, it was not without its setbacks.
One of Hurgronje's grave mistakes, we believe, was his
underestimation of the ability of Islam to reform and
modernize itself as a dynamic force. His conception that
Islam in Indonesia could be reduced to a merely ritualistic
religion, separating it from its social and political
aspects, seems to have been erroneous. That the significant
success of Islamic modernism was partly due to one of the
ritual aspects of Islam, the pilgrimage to Makkah, which was
freely permitted by Hurgronje, proves his misconception. The
pilgrimage to Makkah, where Muslims interact and exchange
ideas and experiences, was one the principle sources of the
G.A.J. Hazeu, his successor, to take over the task of

supervising those students. See, . Gobee en C. Andriaanse,
Ambteliike Adviesen van C. Snouck Huroronie (Gravenhage:
Martinus Nijhooff, 1959), I, 45, as quoted by Suminto,
Politik Islam. 42.
În 1890, one year after his appointment in Indonesia,
Hurgronje noted an increase in the number of Islamic
training schools in Indonesia. Twenty years later, he
observed that Western schools were starting to outnumber the
Islamic schools and win the race. See, Snouck Hurgronje,
Rapport over de Mohammedaansche aodsdienstiae rechtsoraak,
Vol IV, Pt. 1, p. 102, as cited by Harry J. Benda,
"Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundation of Dutch
Islamic Policy in Indonesia," in Readings on Islam in South
East Asia, compiled by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and
Yasmin Hussain, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1985), 65.
132
modern and revolutionary Islamic ideas of twentieth-century

Indonesians.
During the time of the operation of Hurgronje's Islamic
policy, Indonesia did indeed see the release of tremendous
forces of social change. These changes were not those
envisaged by the initiators or the outcome of conscious
planning, but for the most part occurred as an indirect
effect of the policy. The most unpredicted, yet powerful,
and indirect result of this policy was the creation of a
small educated elite who were ready to give expression to
the frustration of the masses.85 To the great surprise of
the Dutch who educated them 86, this small elite, shaped by
Western culture, turned out to be the leaders of many self
consciously nationalist movements.87
Equally significant was the emergence of several
modernist movements championed by Muslim scholars as a
85The emergence of this elite in the political arena

against the Dutch was partly due to the fact that when they
were educated, employment opportunities to match their
education were lacking. Furthermore, though Westernized by
training, they still retained their traditional ties with
their society. For more information on the anti-colonial
movement, see, Penders, Indonesia. 215-235.
For the uncontrolled and unexpected consequences of
the Dutch Policy that stemmed from causes quite outside the
sphere of government intentions, see Legge, Indonesia. 9293.
87Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition. 281. See
also, A.D.A. de Kat Angelino, Staatkundia beleid en
bestuurszorq in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague, 1929) 3 vis.
Abridged edition in English by G.J. Rainer, Colonial Policy
Vol I, (The Hague: Gravenhage, M. Nijhoff, 1930), 480.
133
response to the Dutch educational policy. This educational

policy, according to the Dutch socialist parties, was one of
"forced Christianization", and was said to use the
government to Christianize the natives by turning education
over to Christian mission schools.88 Since they attached so
much importance to education in order to advance their
Islamic Policy, the Dutch had to turn to mission schools to
support their program. From the government's point of view,
the task of educating the populace was too great for the
government alone to accomplish. It was, therefore, thought
wise to accept with appreciation all aid from private
sources. The government's most obvious explanation of this
move was the nature of the mission schools: in this view,
these schools represented a suitable and powerful means to
develop the people. By subsidizing mission schools, the
government was able to make education far more available
than it otherwise would have been.
Quite a different reason, subordinate perhaps, but
nevertheless noteworthy, was the government's sharply
From 1909 to 1912, during which the Muhammadiyah

movement emerged, the mission schools increased in number by
40 percent. Twenty percent of all pupils were in private
schools, a large majority of them in mission schools. See
Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 66.
134
limited educational funds.89 Erecting new schools would

require a far greater effort, and a much greater expense,
than supporting mission schools, which were funded by
different missionary societies. Given the fact that while
the government expenditures on education during this period
were relatively on the rise, the results were still not
satisfying, the use of such institutions was considered
justifiable.90
89For this reason many observers describe Dutch
education policy in Indonesia as a total failure. Contrary
to the British in India and the American in the Philippines,
a very small proportion of Indonesians ever attended
schools. In the words of Kennedy, "The Dutch had left the
people of the Indies almost as uneducated as they were when
the first white men appeared there." See, Kennedy, The
Ageless Indies. 112.
^The statistics on the growth of education in
Indonesia were both encouraging and discouraging. Judged by
the progress made since 1900, the advance was heartening. On
the other hand, judged by what still remained to be
accomplished, the condition was disappointing. The 1930
census gave a figure of a literacy rate in Indonesia of
6.44%. In the middle ranges of education only a handful of
graduates was produced annually. Until 1920 there was no
university in Indonesia. An indication of how few
Indonesians were ready for higher education may be gathered
from the fact that in 1940, only 240 Indonesians graduated
from high school. This figure suggests the low number of
educated Indonesians before independence. George Me. T.
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press. 1952), 31-32. Aside from the
limited funds for educational expansion, the Dutch policy
lacked two features generally found in the European and
American school systems. First was the lack of compulsory
schooling, and second was the tuition fee requirement. From
the Dutch perspective, however, the reluctance to expand
education functioned to maintain the status quo. Rapid
education among the natives would have produced discontent
and instability. In other words, the way to assure the
maximum material gain from Indonesian wealth was to avoid
raising the Indonesian standard of living by curtailing
educational expansion. Kennedy, The Ageless Indies. 140.
135
This educational policy, which was inherent in the

Islamic Policy and designed to uplift the intellectual
standards of the natives, had a grave impact on the
people.91 Laying other factors aside,92 the Muslims reacted
negatively to the penetrating influence of the Christian
missions brought about by the cooperation established
between the government and the Christian mission schools.
Muslims were deeply concerned because they feared this
change would cause the breakdown of Islamic values. Muslims
91The reason for the frustration on the part of the
Indonesians was that the Colonial rule failed to provide for
them the jobs for which they had been trained. The Dutch
seemed not to have been able to expand the employment rate
at the same level at which the graduates were being
produced. Even during prosperous times the rate of the
increase in state employment was only two percent in
contrast to the seven percent increase in the number of
Indonesian graduates. What caused more bitterness for the
Indonesians was the fact that the available jobs that they
could have had were either given to Dutchmen or the
Eurasians. George Me. Turnan Kahin, Nationalism and
Revolution in Indonesia. 34. See also Lesllie H. Palmier,
Indonesia and the Dutch (London, New York, Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1962), 29-30.
92Among other factors was the sharp rise in the
population which sapped so much of the government's energy
and resources, impeding the progress of the overall
government welfare program. In addition, many of the
intellectual values that were derived from Western sources
had their impact even within the framework of Islamic
education. If the new educational policy was not a free gift
bestowed by the Dutch, it was eye-opening because of the
Dutch failure to meet the popular demand for schooling at an
adequate rate. This was an unexpected consequence of the
Netherlands's educational policy. In fact the educational
plan did not produce the desired aim. Western education
instead played its part in strengthening the modernistic
strain within Indonesian Islam, and enhancing the position
of the intelligentsia who were central to the rise of
Indonesian nationalism. See, Kennedy, The Ageless Indies.
125 and 141.
136
requested that the government refrain from favoring

Christian causes in a country so overwhelmingly nonChristian. The Muslims saw the government's extensive
subsidy of mission schools, while ignoring the comparable
Muslim institutions in a population ninety percent Muslim,
as a curious anomaly. It was considered a policy which ran
counter to all modern conceptions of the proper relationship
between religion and the state. During this period of the
first decade of the twentieth century there developed great
discontent within the Muslim community over the Dutch
Islamic policy. The policy, which claimed to advocate
"religious neutrality," proved to be nothing but an empty
phrase.93 It was against this backdrop that many reformist
movements in the region began to appear. In the end these
reformist movements, nationalist and religious alike, were
to become important threats to the colonial regime.
In the beginning the government alternated between
toleration and repression in its handling of the nationalist
movements. It was thought that an awakening of political
consciousness was a proper consequence of the educational
policies.
However, as the movements started to show their
muscle, the government took a firmer stand against them. The

first outward manifestation of these nationalist movements
93On the discrepancy between the officially pronounced

Dutch neutrality and their actual discriminatory attitude
toward Islam in Indonesia, see, Suminto, Politik Islam. 2629, and Furnival, Colonial Policy and Practices. 370.
137
was the establishment of Budi Utomo (High Endeavor) in 1908.

It was soon eclipsed by a more popular political society
with a strong Islamic leaning: Sarekat Islam (Islamic
Association). Contemporary to the latter was the
establishment of the Muhammadiyah. During this time, to
enlist the interest of the masses, an appeal was made to
Islam as the common element in Javanese life. Islam was, at
this time, stiffening its resistance to the increased
Christian missionary movement. While Budi Utomo had confined
its activities to the cultural field, Sarekat Islam was more
concerned with economic and political activities.
Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, was focusing its efforts on
the defense of Islam in general.94
It was through modernism that Islam was able to
contribute to, and share in, nationalistic thought and
organization. The Muhammadiyah movement, one of the most
important religious movements in Indonesia, emerged during
this crucial time. When the air hung heavy with the fear of
a deeper Christian penetration into the country, and the
need was keenly felt to dissipate this threat, the
Muhammadiyah took upon itself the burden of challenging the
missionary activities. The following chapter is devoted to a
detailed discussion of this movement.
94We will deal more extensively on these three

important movements in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV
The factors that combine to move a people to build up a

nation as an entity are not confined to matters of common
heritage such as race, language and religion. Equally
important are the common circumstances that create a solid
bond and form a community into a conscious entity. Of these
common circumstances, the painful ones are the most
decisive. In the case of Indonesia, it was not surprising
that the painful experiences of poverty, injustice, and
above all, fear of loss of religious identity caused by the
Dutch colonial policies became powerful stimuli for the
social movements which awakened the Indonesian people.
While over the centuries anti-Dutch activities had been
characteristic of Indonesian life, the actual emergence of
several organized social movements was the most noteworthy
phenomenon of the early decades of the twentieth century.1
Although these social movements were diverse in origin as
well as purpose, all converged on a common ground of
^ n the emergence of secular and religious

organizations in the early decades of the twentieth century,
see Anthony A. Johns, "Indonesia: Islam and Cultural
Pluralism," in Islam in Asia. Religion. Politics and
Society, ed. by John Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987), 203-213. A useful study of nationalist
organization and thought is provided by Van Neil in his
book, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite.
139
resistance to Dutch policies. They had all shared, over the

centuries the common fate of a people deprived of freedom.
Some of these movements were non-political, others were more
strictly political, and still others were religious or
cultural.
Interestingly enough, the majority of the leadership of
these movements had a Western education in some form.
Because of this, some scholars of the history of the
Indonesian nationalist movement claimed that Western
education was a direct and major cause of the emergence of a
nationalist elite, at least in the earliest stage.2 This
elite, in turn, was successful in providing the leadership
for several movements destined to annoy the Dutch. In
general, there were three distinct social movements that
emerged in Indonesia during the early years of the twentieth
century. These movements had, in the main, three aspects:
cultural revival in addition to political and religious
orientations.
Among these, those with religious orientations, in
turn, comprised more than one movement, each with a
distinctive emphasis and concern of its own. By and large,
these religiously-oriented movements had two different kinds
of emphases and orientations; commercial and political on
2See, for example, J.D. Legge, Indonesia. 120-121: B.
Dahm, History of Indonesia. 20-30; Ricklefs, A History of
Modern Indonesia. 155-160; B. Grant, Indonesia. 16-19;
S.Tas, Indonesia the Underdeveloped Freedom. 106-140 and
Penders, Indonesia: Selected Documents. 215-219.
140
the one hand, religious and non-political on the other. The

chief concern of this chapter will be the latter, of which
one of the most important was the Muhammadiyah Movement,
which is the main focus of this dissertation.
Therefore, we do not intend to discuss in depth the
Indonesian cultural and political movements nor attempt to
elaborate all the numerous movements which fall under the
rubric of religious. This is a topic that would reguire
separate, extensive research and lies beyond the scope of
this study. Our main focus as the title of the chapter
suggests, is on the Muhammadiyah Movement: its birth; the
milieu in which it operated in its formative stages? its
founder; its main concerns and objectives.
However, by way of an introduction to the discussion of
the Muhammadiyah, we will highlight a number of social
movements contemporary to the Muhammadiyah. In so doing, we
will also be able to shed some light on the political and
socio-cultural climate as well as on the religious
conditions which prevailed during that time. Such
information is necessary to a fuller understanding of the
Muhammadiyah.
The Cultural Milieu
In the secular cultural movement, the first modern

Javanese
organization, called Budi Utomo ("high endeavor"),
141
was born in May 1908.3 The formation of this organization

is generally accepted as marking the initiation of the
Indonesian nationalist movement. As a reaction to cultural
imperialism and intensive Westernization, an aristocratic
Javanese physician, Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo, founded this
organization.4 It was originally intellectual in character;
its initial membership was mostly restricted to the privavi
class (aristocracy) and, understandably, it had little
influence on, or appeal for, the masses.
The original aim of the organization was the
establishment of study funds for the promotion of education
among the people of Java. Its purpose was also to promote
the revival of the old Javanese culture by organizing
schools in which the Javanese cultural heritage was taught.
3For a detailed discussions of Budi Utomo. see, Akira

Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism; The Early
Years of the Budi Utomo. 1908-1918. See also, Neil, The
Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 56-62, and
Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture. 76-79.
4Dr. Wahidin (1857-1917) was born in the village of
Melati near Yogyakarta. He belonged to the lower privavi. as
indicated by his less impressive title Mas Naabehi (a title
for lower rank nobility). He was one of the first native
pupils to attend Dutch primary school. He graduated from
Stovia (Doctor Java School) and was appointed as assistant
director to the medical school. He was not only respected in
the medical profession but was highly regarded as a man of
humility and refinement who blended his Western education
with his Javanese culture. He strongly believed that
education held the key to progress. Ricklefs, A History of
Modern Indonesia. 156-158. See also, A.P.E. Korver, Sarekat
Islam 1912-1916. trs. into Indonesian by Graffiti Pers
(Jakarta; Graffiti Pers, 1985), 5-7: Neil, The Emergence of
the Modern Indonesian Elite. 58-59 and Koentjaraningrat,
Javanese Culture. 76-77.
142
In other words, this organization asserted itself as the

organ of indigenous intellectuals aimed at reinforcing and
improving the status of the Indonesian nobility and
protecting it from the oppressive guardianship of the Dutch.
The organization reacted against the existing obstacles to
the emancipation of the Javanese from intellectual
backwardness and the improvement of their living
conditions.5
It soon broadened its scope when intellectual groups
favoring progressive cultural action came to dominate the
organization and drew it gradually out of its initially
conservative character. It was not, in fact, established to
break with the colonial system, and its founders could
scarcely have envisaged the political consequences of their
initiative.6 This new influence from the progressive group
led to aspirations to see the future of Indonesia, not as a
"Western" Indonesia but as an independent Indonesia, with
its own culture and character. By this time, the
organization had expanded its agenda to include political
involvement. Hence, it was not without reason that the Budi
Utomo was considered the pioneer in the Indonesian
5Kuntjaraningrat, Javanese Culture. 76-78.

6A.K.
Indonesia
(Djakarta:
Indonesia,
Pringgodigdo, Sediarah Percrerakan Rakiat

(The History of the Indonesian People's Movement)
Pustaka Rakjat, 1949), 5. See also, Tas,
the Underdeveloped Freedom. 108-109.
143
nationalist movement.7 Although it originated as an

organization primarily concerned with improving education
and culture, it underwent a significant transformation into
a politically activist movement.
However, it was not until 1918, the year the People's
Council was inaugurated as the supreme advisory body of the
Governor General, that the Budi Utomo adopted a political
platform demanding a parliamentary government, universal
suffrage, a uniform legal system, religious neutrality and
many other freedoms. It remained, however, politically
moderate until 1920, when it finally amalgamated with
another political party called Persatuan Indonesia (The
Indonesian People's Union); thereafter, it played only a
minor role on the Indonesian stage.8
To understand how Indonesian intellectuals of the time
saw their world, we must turn to that small group of
Western-educated leaders who have left us records of their
thoughts. The most prominent of all was Raden Adjeng Kartini
( 1879-1904), Dr Wahidin's associate, the aristoctaric
daughter of a Javanese regent. She first clearly depicted
the feelings of frustration and resentment that Indonesians
harbored at Dutch contempt. The extreme frustration felt by
the new Javanese Western-trained elite was illustrated in
7Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch. 12-13; Nagazumi, The
Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism. 58-70, 82-83. See also,
Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 60.
Tas, Indonesia, the Underdeveloped Freedom. 107-109.
144
the letters sent by Kartini to her friends in Europe.9 In

one of her many letters she said:
They are many, yes many (Dutch) Government officials
who allow the native rulers to kiss their feet, and
their knees. In many subtle ways they make us feel
their dislike. 'I am European, you are a Javanese',
they seem to say, or 'I am the master, you are the
governed.' And even many Hollanders find it unpleasant
to converse with us in their own language. Dutch is too
beautiful to be spoken by a brown mouth . . .10
For Kartini and her contemporaries, Dutch rule was not
rooted in justice. The Dutch opposed attempts by Indonesians
to educate themselves and resisted the endeavors of educated
Indonesians to enter the modern world. Having prepared
themselves for employment through education, those
intellectuals found that such opportunities were given
9This selection of these letters was later published

under the title From Darkness into Light, and became the
inspiration for subsequent national movements and
particularly for the Indonesian women's movement in its
initial stage. Kartini, who is considered the pioneer for
the emancipation of women in Indonesia, did not live long
enough to see the flowering of her ideas, as she died in
childbirth at the age of twenty-five. Her inspiration,
however, was responsible for the numerous Kartini schools
for girls all over Java. Many of the graduates of Kartini
schools later joined the Budi Utomo. Penders, Indonesia:
Selected Documents. 219-223. For more information on the
struggle of Kartini, see Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Pangqil aku
Kartini (Call me simply Kartini) 2 Vols. (Djakarta: n.p.
1962) and Heather A.J. Sutherland, "Pangreh Praja: Java's
Indigenous Administrative Corps and Its Role in the Last
Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule," Ph.D. diss. Yale
University, 1973.
10Raden Adjeng Kartini, Letters of a Javanese Princess,
trans. A.L. Symmers, ed. by Hildred Geertz (New York:
Norton, 1964), 56-61.
145
primarily to Dutchmen.11 Furthermore, Dutch unwillingness

to allow any meaningful Indonesian participation in the
administration was also a source of deep mistrust among the
people. As a result, those frustrated intellectuals became
an ever-growing source of opposition who found an outlet in,
and gave a powerful impetus, to rising nationalist ideals.
It was against this background that cultural movements
in Indonesia developed and found their first expression in
the establishment of the Budi Utomo. which was among the
first signs of a growing nationalist feeling in Indonesia.
Hence, as the Budi Utomo's members came from the same social
class as Kartini, their ideals were also Kartini's: to
preserve the Javanese culture but at the same time to
integrate it into the modern world.
Inspired by the ideals of the Budi Utomo. a Yogyakarta
aristocrat, Suwardi Suryaningrat (1889-1959),12 who renamed
himself - Ki Hajar Dewantoro, meaning "Teacher who mediates
11Dahm, History of Indonesia. 21-22; Palmier, Indonesia

and the Dutch. 7-9, 27.
12Suryaningrat was widely known for a pamphlet that
appeared on the day celebrating the Dutch liberation, Als ik
een Nederlandert was (If I Were a Dutchman), in which he
drew a parallel between the situation in Holland during its
liberation in 1813 and the situation in Indonesia under
colonial oppression in 1913. To him, it was an indignity
that the oppressed Indonesian should be asked to participate
in the celebration of the Dutch liberation day. Dahm, The
History of Indonesia. 37.
146
among the Gods"13 - founded an indigenous school called

Taman Siswa ("The Garden of the Pupil") in 1922.14 Suwardi
Suryaningrat was among the radical members of Budi Utomo who
quit the organization to join the progressive Indies Party.
Having been exiled to Holland with other Indies Party
leaders upon suppression of the party in 1913-1918,
Suryaningrat applied himself to further schooling and
acquired a teacher's certificate before returning home to
establish the Taman Siswa schools. His hope for an
autonomous Indonesia, which had inspired him while in the
Indies Party, was revived by a strong conviction that
another approach was badly needed, an educational approach,
rather than a political one. What the founder of Budi Utomo
felt was needed for the Javanese
proper education
was
clearly spelled out and realized by the founder of Taman

Siswa. The school promulgated a cultural nationalism which
embodied a response to, and a protest against, the Dutch
educational policy.15 In this school, much emphasis was
13It is customary for Javanese to change name to sinnify

a new life career. For Suryaningrat it was to signify that he
was embarking on a new period of life, from politics to
education. Dahm, History of Indonesia. 60.
14For more information on the Taman Siswa school, see
Ruth T. Mcvey, "Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National
Awakening" in Indonesia. Vol. 4 (October 1967); Tsuchiya
Kenji, "The Taman Siswa Movement; Its Early Years and
Javanese Background" in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies.
(June, 1975), 164-177. See also, J.D. Legge, Indonesia. 132.
15Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite.
220-222; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 180-239.
147
placed on the traditional skills and values of Javanese

life. In setting forth the principles of his school, Suwardi
said, "In this cultural confusion, let our cultural history
be a starting point from which we advance."16 These
principles were regarded as logical extensions of the goals
of the Budi Utomo in a certain sense.
The Political Movement

We have already observed that the colonial education
program inherent in the Dutch "Ethical Policy" had created
the nucleus of a new indigenous elite. Under the aegis of
this policy, political life in Indonesia developed as well.
Curbed in their ambitions and at the same moment influenced
by Western ideas of social justice, this elite turned to
nationalism and demanded the elimination of the colonial
system. As a result, many of the more radically-inclined
members of the Budi Utomo joined the first indigenous
political party in Indonesia, the Indische Partii (the
Indies Party) ,17 This party was founded in 1911 by Douwes
16S. Mangoensarkoro, "Het Nationalisme in de Taman

Siswa-beweging", in Koloniale Studien XXI (The Hague: 1937),
288, as cited by Niel, The Emergence of The Modern
Indonesian Elite. 221.
17From the outset, when the Budi Utomo was founded as a
national organization, there were already two groups within
it: the moderates and the radicals. The latter afterwards
split into two groups. The less religiously-inclined group
joined the Indies Party, and the more religiously-inclined
group embraced the Sarekat Islam and the Muhammadiyah.
Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch. 12-13.
148
Dekker (1879-1950), a Eurasian and the grandnephew of the

famous Multatuli.18 Douwes Dekker, Dr. Tjipto Mangungkusumo
(1885-1943), and Suwardi Surjaningrat worked together in the
years before the party was formed, and the three then became
the nucleus of the party.19
Following in his granduncle's footsteps, Douwes Dekker
and his Western-trained Indonesian co-founders fought for an
independent Indonesia. With the motto "The Indies for those
who make their home there,"20 Dekker succeeded in
assembling a group of intellectuals and urged them toward
militancy.21 The party was basically an expression of
resentment against the Dutch policy in allowing increasing
numbers of Netherlanders to come out to Indonesia to make
their fortune and then return to Holland for retirement. The
party had no social or cultural emphasis; it was strictly
political.22
18Edward Douwes Dekker (1820-1882), who published a

novel entitled Max Havelaar. under the pseudonym Multatuli.
The work was a devastating exposure of the oppressive rule
of the Dutch in Java. Richlefs, A History of Modern
Indonesia. 118.
63-66.
20Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch. 15.
21Paul van der Veur, "E.F.E. Douwes Dekker; Evangelist
for Indonesian Political Nationalism," in Journal of Asian
Studies. Vol. 17, No. 4, 1958.
22Legge, Indonesia. 129: Neil, The Emergence of the
Modern Indonesian Elite. 64-65.
14 9
The Dutch rulers, for obvious reasons, denied the

party's request for legal recognition.23 Instead, the Dutch
tried the leaders of the party (Dekker, Dr. Tjipto and
Suwardi), on fabricated charges, and exiled all the three to
Holland in 1913.24
Despite its brief life, the Indies Party strongly
affected subsequent Indonesian nationalism. The party
constituted a source of inspiration for the Indonesian
movements that emerged in the ensuing years.25 The party
was disbanded on several occasions, only to be reconstituted
under a different name (Insulindo) from 1914 to 1920.26
Although Indies party lost none of its ideals, it was open
to the influence of the Communist-oriented members, who had
ample opportunities to learn from their contacts in the
Netherlands. As a result, at the eighth Insulindo Congress
in 1919, a split in the movement took place. A proposal to
change the organization's name to Nationale Indische Partii
23Alexander Idenburg, the Minister of Colonies in 19021905, 1908-1909 and in 1918-1919, was convinced that the
Indiche Party could not qualify for government recognition
by reason of its revolutionary character. Dahm, History of
Indonesia. 35. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 143.
24The three were exiled to
Tjipto remained in exile until
Surjaningrat spent the longest
in exile until 1919. Ricklefs,
Indonesia. 163.
the Netherlands in 1913.

1914, Dekker, until 1918.
period of all there, staying
A History of Modern
25Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch. 16.

123, 137.
150
was defeated. Shortly thereafter, Dekker, the initial

founder of the party, withdrew and established a separate
National Indies Party.
Meanwhile, as the educational facilities for
Indonesians grew rapidly, more Indonesians had gone to
Holland to study. As a result of this educational expansion
the seeds of nationalism, already sown, became deeply rooted
among the students. These students in the Netherlands formed
the Indische Vereeniaina (Indies Club) as early as 1908.27
Originally founded for the benefit of all who had a
connection with Indonesia, the club was soon infused with
the fresh blood of nationalism with the arrival of new
Indonesian students. Realizing the mild nature of the
organization's original nationalism, the new students
proposed to confine the membership to Indonesians. This
united effort among the new arrivals was directed chiefly
toward political ends. The new orientation of the
organization was changed to become a weapon in the struggle
for national independence. Out of strong resentment against
the racial preferences of the Dutch, the society became
purely Indonesian and excluded Eurasians from its
membership.28
27Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 175; Dahm,

History of Indonesia. 61.
223. See also, Dahm, History of Indonesia. 61-62.
151
This new emphasis on strong political goals was

expressly manifested by the changing of the name from the
non-political "Indies Club" to the revolutionary and
political "Perhimpunan Indonesia" (Indonesian Organization).
During the course of its existence, this organization became
in many ways the mouth-piece for the Indonesian national
movement. Muhammad Hatta, who was then studying economics in
Rotterdam, became the principal figure in the
organization. He later became the Vice President of the
newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia in 1945.29
The Religious Movement

During the early years of the twentieth century the
Muslim traders, who generally came from the santri group,
divided themselves into two lines of responsibility in order
to challenge the Dutch. The organization Sarekat Daqanq
Islamivah (Islamic Trade Organization) was set up by the
santris to take charge of the commercial and political
spheres, whereas the Muhammadiyah movement assumed most of
the responsibility on the religious and educational planes.
Both groups, however, shared the same sense of religious
responsibility to protect and advance Islamic values among
the people.
^Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite.
223-225. For a study of the influence of Indonesian students
in the Netherlands, see John Engleson, Perhimpunan Indonesia
and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement. 1923-1928 (Monash
Papers on South East Asia, No.4, Clayton, 1975).
152
It is worthwhile to note that the birth and the rise of

these religious movements was in part the direct result of
the failure of the Dutch Islamic policy in general and the
mistakes committed by Snouck Hurgronje in particular. The
emergence of the above-mentioned movements demonstrated two
interesting points with regard to pitfalls of the Dutch
Islamic policy. The first was Hurgronje's fallacy in his
assertion of the superiority of Western civilization over
Islam, which, in his view, had no substantial basis for
modernism, and, following from that, his misconception about
the inability of Islam to revitalize itself in the face of
the
challenge of the modern world. The second was the
absurdity of his attempt to separate Islam into three neat

compartments, as if these were not interrelated, through
which separation he tried to encoure the ritual aspects of
Islam while suppressing the political ones. This could in no
way reflect the reality of the social and political
development of Indonesia during the emergence of the
religious movements under discussion. These religious
movements, though they had overtly declared their non
political aims, were at times consciously struggling for
Indonesian independence= Motivated by the spirit of Islamic
teaching, national consciousness evolved with their
formation. These movements, contrary to what the Dutch
policy envisaged, were instrumental in the struggle against
Dutch colonial power. For these movements, the struggle for
153
and defense of national independence was equated with the

defense of Islam.30
Sarekat Dagang islamiyah
In 1908 Haji Samanhudi, a Javanese trader from Solo

(Central Java),31 founded a trade organization called
Sarekat Dagang Islamivah.32 The general purpose of the
organization was to create an effective lever for activating
Muslims in order to promote a more commercial spirit and to
30In their struggle against the colonial rule, these

movements employed Islamic symbols, which had high appeal
for the masses. The well-known oath of membership initiation
to Sarekat Islam, in which certain Quranic verses were
recited is a perfect case in point. Korver, Sarekat Islam.
183-190.
31Haji Samanhudi was born into a santri family in 1868.
His father, Haji Muhammad Djen (Zen), was a successful batik
trader. Samanhudi was a typical Muslim of his period, in
that though he lacked much in Islamic knowledge, he was
deeply committed to Islam. Ricklefs, A History of Modern
Indonesia. 175. Noer, The Modernist Movement. 102, 176.
32According to Deliar Noer, who conducted interviews
with Haji Samanhudi, the Sarekat Daqana Islamivah was
established in 1905 by Samanhudi together with M.
Asmodimedjo, M. Kertotaruno, M. Sumowerdoyo and Hadji
Abdulradjak. See, Utusan Hindia. 21 April 1914, as cited by
Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement. 102. Therefore,
according to Noer, the organization should be recognized as
the starting point of the Indonesian national awakening,
instead of the popular 20 May 1908, the birth of the Budi
Utomo. On the same lines, Anton Timur Djaelani pointed out
that the real hero of the Indonesian Nationalism has
remained obscure. What he meant by the "real hero" was none
other than Samanhudi. See Djaelani, "The Sarekat Islam: Its
Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism" (M.A. Thesis at
McGill University, Montreal, 1959), 26-27. For further
examination of this issue, see, Korver, Sarekat Islam. 11.
154
strive for advancement within the framework of Islam.33

This was combined into a concept of a brotherly relationship
and mutual assistance among members. This economicallyoriented movement was originally aimed at protecting the
interests of Indonesian Muslim traders; it might best be
described as a "Chamber of Commerce" based on Islamic
ideals.
The main reason for the emergence of Sarekat Daqang
Islamivah was that the Chinese traders, whose commercial
activities were previously restricted to big cities, had now
started to penetrate the rural economy. Thus, the initial
purpose of the movement was to lead a campaign against the
Chinese who controlled the means of distribution throughout
the country. This Chinese control effectively prevented
Indonesians from
gaining access to the economic sector.34
At least in part, the Dutch were responsible for this

economic situation. Around the beginning of the century the
Chinese were first permitted to travel freely around the
country and reside in rural areas. Inevitably, this policy
33The organization stipulated in its September 1912

statute that the membership of the organization should
exclusively be confined to Muslims eighteen years of age and
older. See, Article 3 of the Sarekat Islam Statute, as
quoted by Korver, Sarekat Islam. 208.
34Noer, The Modernist Movement. 102.
155
brought about conflict with the Indonesian traders, who felt

threatened by the Chinese economic penetration.35
From the outset, the organization was founded on the
dual basis of common religion (Islam) and common commercial
interests. It was emphasized that its program was not
political. The organization's leaders vowed to maintain
loyalty to the government while intending to improve the
commercial standard of its members in accordance with
Islamic principles.36 Nonetheless, as economic conditions
began to decline, the feeling of discontent with Dutch rule
increased substantially. The organization, whose initiallyconservative leadership soon receded into the background,
was transformed into Sarekat Islam in 1912 under a new
leadership.37 The new leader, the charismatic Haji Omar
35The foundation of Sarekat Dagang Islamivah coincided

with 1912 anti-Chinese riots in Java. The organization was,
at that time, suspended for a few months. It was then
reorganized and transformed under the new name of Sarekat
Islam. Korver, Sarekat Islam. 14. See also, J.S. Furnival,
Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 213-214. Korver
disputes the "the Chinese threat" factor, arguing an absence
of direct connection between the foundation of Sarekat
Islam and the people's reaction to the "Chinese threat."
Korver, Sarekat Islam. 13-21.
^Palmier, Indonesia and The Dutch. 15-16.
37Amelz, H.O.S. Tiokroaminoto: Hidup dan Periuancannva
(Tjokroaminoto: His Life and His Struggle) (Djakarta: Bulan
Bintang, 1952), 88-89. See also, Korver, Sarekat Islam. 165.
156
Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934),38 was surrounded by the

well-regarded intellectuals and stood firm as head of the
first mass political organization to rally against Dutch
rule under the banner of Islam.39
Initially, the tone of the Sarekat Islam toward the
colonial government was quite moderate. During the formative
stage of the organization, both the government and the
Sarekat Islam were moving in the same direction: both
desired to improve the living conditions of the Indonesian
people. In the words of Tjokroaminoto, "We are loyal to the
government; we are satisfied under Dutch rule; it is not
true that we want to fight; we do not wish this: a thousand
times, no."40 Nevertheless, in its Second National Congress
tjokroaminoto was born in Madiun, East Java, on

August 16, 1882, into a noble and religious family. He was a
well-trained Indonesian with a radical attitude toward the
injustices suffered by his people, he graduated from OSVIA
(Training School for Native Officials), but turned his back
on government service. He was so charismatic he soon became
the most prominent leader of the early popular movements.
Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 158.
39On September 14, 1912, the new statutes of the
organization were sent to the colonial government seeking
recognized legal status. In June, 1913, Idenburg, the
Governor General, granted the Central body of Sarekat Islam
legal recognition. Van Neil describes this newly-established
organization as "one of the most illustrious of the
twentieth century Indonesian organizations." See, Neil, The
Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 92-93, 295. See
also, J.T. Petrus Blumberger, De Communistiche beweaina in
Nederlandsch-Indie (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1928), 61.
94. It is worthwhile to note that this attitude was quite
understandable since the organization was still in the
process of obtaining legal status from the government.
157
in 1917, the Sarekat Islam no longer called for selfgovernment under the Dutch, but for independence, and
declared that if this could not be obtained peacefully,
other means would be employed.41 On the same occasion,
Sarekat Islam expressed its belief in its "Declaration of
Principles" that Islam was the source of democratic ideas as
well as the religion for the spiritual education of the
people. It, therefore, demanded the repeal of all laws and
regulations which hampered the spread of Islam. It should
not be forgotten that the membership of this organization
was principally drawn from the santri and the lower privavi.
For both groups, Islam provided a common link and force
welding their communities together.42
As the tone of the organization's leadership became
more strident, the attitude of the Dutch hardened, so that
it became difficult to distinguish between a policy of
maintaining "Peace and Order" from one employing "divide and
41Sarekat Islam Conares (The Second National Congress)
20-27 October 1917 in Batavia, as quoted by Neil, The
Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 134. In its
previous local congress,which was held in 1913 at Surakarta,
the organization's tone was embittered due to the civil
administration's unsympathetic attitude toward the movement.
Korver, Sarekat Islam. 22-26.
42In the Second National Congress, Sarekat Islam
explicitly named Islam as the most suitable religion for the
moral development of the people. See, leaflet at the end of
Sarekat Islam Congress, in Neratia. 25 October 1917 on
Sarekat Islam Congress) (Djakarta: Landsdrukkerij, 1919). On
the Sarekat Islam's Islamic orientation and goals, as well
as its struggle against those who stood in opposition to the
advancement of Islam, see Korver, Sarekat Islam, chapter 3,
on the religious character of the movement, 43-72.
158
rule" tactics.43 It was in this political atmosphere that a

new era began for Sarekat Islam. The heterogenous nature of
the organization soon brought about internal conflict over
the long-range goals of the organization and the methods
necessary to achieve them. From 1916 onward, there was a
period of marked change in the historical development of
Sarekat Islam. With the infiltration of communist ideas into
the organization, the split among the leadership became
serious.44
Semaun, who was the head of the Semarang (Central Java)
chapter, shook the organization to its very foundation with
his communist ideas, creating a severe contradiction in an
organization that had adopted Islam as its main basis for
unity. He strongly criticized the role of Islam as an agent
of progress; instead he propagated socialist ideas and
43Semaun, an influential figure in Sarekat Islam, branded

the Ethical PIicy of the Dutch as a divide-and-rule tactic
designed to disunite the Indonesian people. Neil, The Emerge
of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 143.
44By the end of 1916, perhaps the majority of Sarekat
Islam branches had come under communist influence. The most
prominent of these was the Semarang branch led by Semaun,
which rivalled in importance the head office led by
Tjokroaminoto. The continuous pressure of the leftist
leaders to push the organization in a radical direction
caused strong opposition from the Islamic-oriented leaders,
which created an irreparable rift in the organization. In
his last bid for reconciliation, Tjokroaminoto went so far
as to declare in principle his attachment to communism to
prevent a further split. Neil, The Emergence of the Modern
Indonesian Elite. 155; Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture.
82. See also, Noer, The Modernist Movement. 125, and Tas,
Indonesia; The Underdeveloped Freedom. 112.
159
proposed the transformation of the Islamic-oriented Sarekat

Islam into Sarekat India.45
The split between the pro-communist and anti-communist
factions greatly weakened the organization.46 The popular
appeal and rapid expansion of Sarekat Islam was indicated by
the phenomenal increase in its members during its first two
years. In April 1912 there were 4,500 members; two years
later the number stood at to 366,913.47 Because of this
dramatic growth, one cannot discard the possibility of
external conspiracy. The efforts of Sneeveliet and Baars to
indoctrinate key members of Sarekat Islam with communist
ideology in order to shake its foundation might have been a

153. It is important to note that communism was introduced
to Indonesia by the Dutchman H.J Fransiscus Marie Sneevliet,
who set up ISDV, Indisch Sociaal Democratische Partii
(Indies' Democratic Party), together with another Dutchman
called Adolf Baars in Semarang (Central Java) in 1914.
Originally ISDV was a non-communist organization of IndoEuropeans. It developed into a ommunist party after the
success of the revolution in Russia in 1917. Foremost among
the young Indonesians recruited by Sneeveliet was Semaun,
who belonged to a lesser privavi family. He was placed among
the leadership of the party. By 1916 he had succeeded in
moving upward in the Semarang Sarekat Islam leadership.
Noer, The Modernist Movement. 118-119. Ricklefs, A History
of Modern Indonesia. 164-167. On Sneevelit, see, Ruth T.
Mcvey, "The Comintern and the Rise of Indonesian Communism",
Ph.d. Diss., Cornell University, 1961, 18, 34-39.
46On the split within the Sarekat Islam movement and
the attempted communist coup in Indonesia, see Dahm, History
of Indonesia. 51-57. See also, R. Mcvey, The Rise of
Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University
Press, 1965), 19.
47With regard to Sarekat Islam's membership figures, see,
Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism. 87.
160
strategy of the Dutch to split this popular movement, whose

growth had indeed created fear among the Dutch.48 After
all, the principle of "divide-and-rule" fits very well with
this assumption. However, the communist threat to dominate
the organization was overcome in 1921 with the expulsion of
the communists. In the 1921 Sarekat Islam Congress in
Surabaya (East Java), the Islamic-oriented group was
dominant and the communists were expelled from the
organization and so were several communist-oriented
branches. The remaining Sarekat Islam, thus rid of its nonIslamic elements, was transformed into a new-style party in
1921 under the name of Partai Sarekat Islam, and
subsequently into the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia in
193l.49 In addition, the increasingly uncongenial
government policies toward the movement led to the arrest of
Ât one point in 1915, widespread rumors reached the

colonial government that a Pan-Islamic plot was about to
start an armed uprising against the Dutch. It was said that
arms had been smuggled into the country on a German ship for
the above purpose. Sarekat Islam was accused of being the
agent of the plot. Neil, The Emergence of the Indonesian
Elite. 118-119. Another hint of Dutch involvement in the
Sarekat Islam split was the support of the Adviser for
Native Affairs, G.A.J. Hazue for the proposal to transform
Sarekat Islam into Sarekat India (United Indies) which was
set forth by the communist oriented group led by Semaun.
Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 153.
49Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 119.
See also, Noer, The Modernist Movement. 101.
161
Tjokroaminoto. This arrest did serve as a great blow to the

already deteriorating condition of the movement.50
Although Tjokroaminoto, after his release, along with
his followers, did his best to breathe new life into the
organization, none of these initiatives succeeded.51 The
era of the Sarekat Islam was past, and of the millions of
members, no more than a few thousand remained by 1925.52
The full history of the reasons for its downfall remains to
be written.
From the time of its creation
until 1920, Sarekat
Islam was unquestionably the largest Indonesian movement of

its time.53 Its national stature was justified by a
membership from all over Indonesia of approximately two
million by 1919. But after its disintegration, beginning in
50Tjokroaminoto was arrested in 1921-1922 and accused

of being involved in the radical activities of a clandestine
organization assumed to be connected to Sarekat Islam. Neil,
The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 198.
119. See also, Noer, The Modernist Movement. 101.
52In his report to the 1917 Sarekat Islam Congress,
Tjokroaminoto declared that the membership of the
organization had reached 2.5 million. However, Korver seems
to suggest that this was an exaggeration on the part of
Tjokroaminoto. See, Korver, Sarekat Islam. 195.
53Pringgodigdo, Sediarah Peraerakan Rakiat. 1-8.
162
1920 54, another religious organization began to expand

from local to national dimensions. This was the Muhammadiyah
movement which has been and continues to be highly regarded
by the Indonesian Muslims.
The Muhammadiyah Movement

As already indicated, during the previous centuries
almost all of Indonesia had been at least nominally
incorporated into the world of Islam. However, the problem
of a more thorough Islamization was only addressed in a
resolute and organized manner in the early years of the
twentieth century. Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth
century, Indonesia was ripe for the emergence of various
Islamic movements. The formation of these religious
movements was a clear response to the Islamization problem.
Among those movements that had awakened the consciousness
restored self-respect to a new generation of Indonesian
54Korver, Sarekat Islam. 3. During its peak popularity

several branches of Sarekat Islam, such as Jakarta and
Palembang, had to cease to accepting new members to allow
the movement to do necessary screening. S.L. van der Wal, De
Qpkomst van de nationalistiche beweaina in NederlandsIndie. Een Broneenpublicatie (Werk Door Gronigen, 1967),
170, as cited by Korver, Sarekat Islam. 190.
163
Muslims, was the Muhammadiyah. It was to have a resounding

impact on the whole nation.55
The commonly-held view about the Muhammadiyah movement
has been that it was established as a socio-religious
organization aimed at adapting Islam to modern Indonesia. It
was founded in Yogyakarta (Central Java) in November 1912 by
Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923) in response to suggestions made by
his colleagues and students to establish an institution of
permanent character. Dahlan, who was a teacher and had
55Fred R. van der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in

Southeast Asia: Burma. Indonesia. The Philippines (Madison:
The University of Wisconsin Press), 98. See also, Mitsuo
Nakamura, The Crescent Arises Over The Bahvan Tree: A Study
of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Center Javanese Town
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976), 3-5. It
should be noted that scholarly works both in English and in
Indonesian are numerous. Among others are Mukti Ali, "The
Muhammadiyah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction,"
(Unpbl. M.A. Thesis, Me.Gill University, Montreal, 1957),
Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim
Modernist Organization Under the Dutch Colonialism
(Yogyakarta: Gaiahmada Press. 1969); M. Natsir, Disekitar
Reformasi dan Modernisasi Masvarakat Islam (1972) ; Noer, The
Modernist Muslim Movement (1973); James Peacock, Purifying
the Faith (1978); A. Jainuri, Muhammadivah (1980); M. Rusli
Karim, ed. Muhammadiyah Dalam Kritik dan Komentar (1986);
M.T. Arifin, Muhammadiyah: Potret Yang Berubah(The
Muhammadiyah: The Changing Portrait)( Surakarta: Institute
Gelanggang Pemikiran Filsafat Sosial Budaya dan
Kependidikan, 1990); Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, "Religion and
Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's
New Order." Ph.D diss., University of California at Los
Angeles, Los Angeles: 1993.
164
previously founded the Muhammadiyah religious school, named

the newly established organization after the school.56
The movement has also reputed to have been chiefly
inspired by modern and reform ideas which were, for the most
part, those of the great Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abduh
(1849-1905), who stirred the Islamic world toward the final
years of the nineteenth century.57 The movement was
dedicated to, among other things, the purification of Islam
in Indonesia from traditional non-Islamic superstitious
practices.58 For its reform program, the Muhammadiyah
advocated return to pristine Islam and the interpretation of
56The Muhammadiyah religious school was founded in

1911. It was the first of its kind to use desks and
blackboards. Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Matahari-Matahari
Muhammadiyah (The Light of the Muhammadiyah) (Yogyakarta:
Persatuan n.d.), 72.
57Noer, The Modernist Movement. 296. See also, Harun
Nasution, Pembaharuan dalam Islam; Seiarah Pemikiran dan
Peraerakan (Reformism in Islam: The History of Thought and
Movement) (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1975), 69. In the words
of Nieuwenhuijze: "Following the examples set by Muhammad
Abduh's group in Egypt, Kivai Haii Ahmad Dahlan, founded his
Muhammadiyah movement in 1912." C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze,
Aspect of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia (The Hague? W.
Van Hoeve, 1958) 45. Likewise, Gibb and Smith placed Dahlan
as a reformer who, in many respects followed the path of the
reform movements of Egypt and India. H.A.R. Gibb, Shorter
Encyclopedia of Islam. (London: EJ Brill, Luzac & Co.,
1960), 409. See also, Wilfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern
History (Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press,
1957), 81.
58Nakamura, The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree,
10; Legge, Indonesia. 64-65; R. McVey, Indonesia, 66. On
Dahlan's commitment to purifying Islamic faith and practices
and the influence of 'Abduh's and Ibn Taymiyyah's views,
see, Yusron, Ahmad Dahlan. 43-44.
165
elements of western culture within the principal tenets of

Islam.
As a religious reform movement, the Muhammadiyah
pleaded for the advancement of education as the key to
progress and prosperity. However, it originally vowed not to
be involved in politics.59 The birth of this movement
unconsciously brought to fruition the dreams of many
Indonesian Muslims who had long desired to see a solid
religious organization capable of improving the quality of
their lives within the framework of Islam. Therefore, it
touched a deep chord in the Indonesian people through its
goals and aspirations. Viewed sociologically, the core
members of the Muhammadiyah, at least at its inception, were
originally among the urban traders, school teachers, and
small manufacturers.60 Their religious orientation has been
described as "orthodox Islam," developed through centuries
of cultural contact and trade. They were commonly called
59Hadikusuma, Matahari Muhammadiyah. 13-14? Dahm,

History of Indonesia. 75
^However, in its later development a significant shift
of the membership took place. The change in the economic
environment into a general impoverishment in Indonesia had a
profound effect upon the constituency of the organization.
Though first viewed as an elite organization, the
Muhammadiyah later became an organization of the
economically-threatened, if not of the poverty-stricken
masses. Nakamura, The Crescent Arises. 238-239. From this,
perhaps, Wertheim, and later followed by Nail, ventured to
coin "Bourgeois Islam" as a label for the Muhammadiyah
movement. See, W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in
Transition. 231; Neil, The Emergence of the Modern
Indonesian Elite. 167.
166
santri Muslims. Under the leadership of Dahlan, this

organization slowly but surely spread throughout the country
and soon became a powerful force. During the movement's
formative years, more precisely during the pre-independence
period, it in fact witnessed dynamic growth and played a
decisive role in initiating social reform within Indonesia.
It brought a reformist and modernist aspect to religious
values as well as to the educational institutions of
Indonesia.61
Being one of the largest Islamic organizations in
modern Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah has been the subject of
many studies by Indonesians as well as foreign observers.
Scholarly works both in English and in Indonesian are
numerous. The fact that the Muhammadiyah proved itself not
only as an educational and social movement led many
observers to identify it in terms of the weight of its
leaning and tendencies. The movement, asserted itself as a
reformist movement concerned with the propagation of Islam,
and thus created a great awakening among Indonesian Muslims.
As a result, diverse labels were attached to the
61Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. 9. On Dahlan's

commitment to education, see Rusli Karim, "Gagasan K.H.A.
Dahlan, Banyak Yang Belum Dioperasionalkan" (Dahlan's ideas:
Many Yet Remain to Be Actualized) in Muhammadiyah Dalam Kritik
dan Komentar (Muhammadiyah in Critique and Comment) ed., by
Rusli Karim (Jakarta? Rajawali, 1986) 14-18. See also Jainuri,
Muhammadiyah. 32 and Yusron, Ahmad Dahlan. 74.
167
Muhammadiyah to the point of paradox.62 Some writers, such

as Peacock, Vlekke and Wertheim, characterize the
Muhammadiyah as a puritanical movement with the goal of a
return to the original commands and sources of Islam in
order to a faith pure from traditional admixtures and
formalism.63 On the other hand, Kahin, Dalier Noer, and
Alfian tend to include it in the modernist Muslim
movements.64 Still others suggest that its main concern has
been religious propagation as a da'wah movement covering all
social activities: religious, educational, and economic, as
62Nakamura asserted that the Muhammadiyah looks

doctrinaire at a distance, yet on closer examination it
lacks theological systematization. Likewise it looks
exclusivist when viewed from without, yet in fact it is
extremely open if viewed by the insiders. Furthermore, it
looks aggressive and fanatical but in fact its mode of
propagation is tolerant. Nakamura, The Crescent Arises. 230231. In the same tone, M. B. Hooker describes the
Muhammadiyah as "scripturalism that contains paradox." It is
modern in that it encourages new values and rejects
mysticism and syncretism, but is fundamentalist in that it
demands a return to an earlier purity. See, Roy Ellen,
"Social Theory, Ethnography and the Understanding of
Practical Islam," in Islam in Southeast Asia (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1983), 76.
^Peacock, Purifying the Faith, and Bernard H. Vlekke,
Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago
(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1943). See
also, Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition.
^Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. See
also, Alfian, Muhammadiyah. and Noer, The Modernist
Movement.
168
well as political.65 In this respect, the Muhammadiyah has

been seen to have become one of the important elements in
the process of socio-political change in Indonesia. No less
important is the significant role which the Muhammadiyah
played in challenging the deep penetration of the Christian
missions in Indonesia.66
In sum, it is more plausible to assert that the
Muhammadiyah movement actually belongs to a combination of
labels and attributes, corresponding to its diverse
objectives and goals, which have undergone many changes in
response to the need of the hour. It is a puritan,
modernist, salafi, and socio-political movement which has
been concerned with many aspects of Indonesian life. It has
not confined itself to religious propagation in its
strictest sense but embraces all aspects of community
65Neil, Drewes and Gibb, on the other hand, emphasized

its reformist tendency. See, Neil, The Emergence of the
Modern Indonesian Elite, and G.W.J. Drewes, "Indonesia,
Mysticism and Activism" in Gustav E. von Grunebaum, ed.,
Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1955), and see also H.A.R.
Gibb, ed., Whither Islam? a Survey of Modern Movements in
the Moslem World (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932).
^Yusuf Abdullah Puar, Periuanaan dan Penaabdian
Muhammadiyah (The Struggle and the Dedication of the
Muhammadiyah) (Jakarta; Pustaka Antara, 1989), 40-41. See
also, Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 162.
169
development depending on the urgency of the time.67 In the

words of Alfian, the Muhammadiyah has at least a threefold
role: 11As a religious reform movement, as an agent of social
change, and as a political force.68
To trace in detail the process of the Muhammadiyah
development from its inception through its initial growth
into an influential movement, the biographical materials of
the founder must be used as primary illustrative sources.
For no single individual was as focused as well as deeply
connected with the Muhammadiyah as its founder, Haji Ahmad
Dahlan. Hence, a deeper look into the personality of the
founder will enable us to uncover much important data.
Working through the interpretation of these data and taking
into account their socio-cultural contexts, we may be able
to unfold something of the founder's psychology. This is all
the more crucial in light of the main purpose of this
dissertation, which seeks to investigate the main overt as
well as covert factors behind the birth of this movement.
67For this reason, in assessing the role of the

Muhammadiyah in general, it is important to understand
variations in local orientation and temperament. For
example, Federspeiel contrasts its explicitly political
stance in Sumatra with its more passive and religious role
in Java. Therefore, to characterize the movement as solely
religious and educational is as inaccurate as to call it
solely political, as Kennedy asserted. See, Howard M.
Federspiel, "The Muhammadiyah: A Study of an Orthodox
Movement in Indonesia," in Indonesia. 1970, No. 10, 57-59,
and Kennedy, The Ageless Indies. 125.
Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 178. See also, Kahin,
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. 87-88.
170
Ahmad Dahlan/ the Founder
Ahmad Dahlan, who was the fourth child of his mother,

was born in 1868 into a traditional Muslim family in a
strongly religious quarter called Kauman in Yogyakarta.
Kauman, situated next to the palace of the Sultan of
Yogyakarta, was known as the residence of the pious. This
pious quarter was both the life-long home of Dahlan and the
birthplace of the Muhammadiyah.69
As a child he was named Muhammad Darwish. Upon return
from Makkah, as was customary for the returning pilgrims, he
adopted Ahmad Dahlan as his new name.70 His father, Kivai
Haji Abubakar bin Haji Sulaiman, was the official khatib
(Friday preacher) of the Great Mosque of the Sultan. This
position was later occupied by Dahlan upon his father's
death in 1896.71 His mother was the daughter of a religious
judge, Kivai Haji Ibrahim. According to Ahmad Dahlan's
69Solichin Salam, KH Ahmad Dahlan: Tiita-tiita dan

Periuanoannva (Ahmad Dahlan: His Goals and Struggle)
(Jakarta; Depot Pengajaran Muhammadiyah, 1962), 5-6. See
also, Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 144.
70Puar, Peri uanaan Muhammadiyah. 54. It was reported
that after he had completed the pilgrimage rite, Dahlan went
to Sayyid Bakri ShatS, a prominent traditional religious
scholar, to acquire a new name. Yusron Asrofie, Kivai Ahmad
Dahlan: Pemikiran dan Kepemimpinannva (Ahmad Dahlan: His
Thought and Leadership) (Yogyakarta; Yogyakarta Offset,
1983), 23.
71Yusron, Ahmad Dahlan. 24.
171
biographers,72 one of his ancestors was the first and most

prominent saint of the Wali Sonao (nine saints) called
Maulana Malik Ibrahim. The nine saints, for most
Indonesians, are believed to be descendants of the Prophet
Muhammad.73
One of the Dutch reports on Dahlan's ethnic origin
suggested that he was of Arab descent.74 This is, in fact,
not unlikely, for against this genealogical background, and
imbued with reform ideas, Ahmad Dahlan, prior to forming his
own organization, joined the Jamiat Kheir (Benevolence
Ôn Ahmad Dahlan's biography, see Perinaatan 40 Tahun
Muhammadivah (The 40th Anniversary of the Muhammadiyah)
(Jakarta; Panitia Peringatan 40 Tahun Muhammadiyah, 1952),
367-368; Yusuf A. Puar, "Kenangan Hari Wafat Kiyai Hadji
Ahmad Dahlan dan Pembaruan Pembangunan Islam" (The
Commemoration of Dahlan and the Islamic Reform) in Pandi i
Masvarakat. Vol.II No. 17 (February I960). Yusron, Kivai
Ahmad Dahlan. 21-89.
^The wali soncro. successfully spread Islam among the
Javanese in the early period of the Islamization of Java.
Raffles asserts in his History of Java that Maulana Ibrahim,
who migrated from Morocco to Java during the Majapahit
Kingdom, was a descendant of Imam Zainal 'Abidin, the
grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Maulana Ibrahim settled
and remained in Gresik, East Java, until he died in 1419.
His grave remains an object of veneration to Indonesian
Muslims. See, Thomas Stanford Raffles, The History of Java.
Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) 113. See
also, Yunus Salam, Riwavat Hiduu K.H.A.Dahlan: Amal dan
Periuanaannva (Jakarta: Department of Education of
Muhammadiyah, 1968) 2. For further information, see,
Solichin Salam, Sekitar Wali Sonqo (Jakarta: Menara Kudus,
1960), 26, and his "Riwayat K.H. Achmad Dahlan" in
Muhammadiyah Setenaah Abad (Muhammadiyah in One Half of a
Century) (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1962), 146, and
Puar, Periuanaan Muhammadiyah. 53.
74Mailrapport from Departmen van Kolonien, Ministerie
van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1914-1782/14 Moehammadijah,
Jogjakarta, as cited by Peacock, Purifying the Faith. 36.
172
Society) and later sent his son to the school which this
group had established.75 The Jamiat Kheir was founded in
1905 by Indonesians of Arab origin believed to be connected
with the Prophet Muhammad by blood lineage.76
As it was common for most Indonesians of Islamic
religious upbringing to send their children to traditional
Islamic religious institutions of the more legalistic
pattern typical of pesantren schools, this was, naturally
the source of Muhammad Darwish's (that is, Ahmad Dahlan's)
^Niel, "Netherlands East Indies to Republic of

Indonesia," 128. According to the membership list of the
Society, Dahlan's membership number was 770. Jainuri,
Muhammadiyah Gerakan Reformasi Islam di Jawa Pada Awal Abad
Kedua Puluh (The Muhammadiyah as a Reform Movement in the
Early Twentieth Century Java) (Surabaya: Bulan Bintang,
1981), 13.
76According to Dalier Noer, the founding fathers of the
organization were Syed Muhammad al-Mashhur, Syed Muhammad
bin Shihab, Syed IdrQs bin Shihab and Syed Sheikhan bin
Shihab. Though Jamiat Kheir was open to every Muslim, the
majority of its members were Indonesian Arabs. The
organization mainly tried to fulfill the need for education
among the Muslims amidst the lack of opportunities and
meager attention given to the Muslims by the Dutch. The
organization also devoted itself to the establishment of a
school and to sending youth to Turkey and Egypt to pursue
advanced study. The organization also invited scholars from
Arab countries to teach Islamic sciences in its school. The
Jamiat Kheir school, which remains in operation today, was
not a school of exclusively religious character, but taught
secular sciences as well. Van Niel points out that the
organization "stood prepared to support almost any
organization in the Indonesian world which showed strong
Muslim leanings." Niel, The Emergence of the Modern
Indonesian Elite. 84. See also, Noer, The Modernist
Movement. 58.
173
early education.77 As a child, Dahlan was reported to have

been honest and congenial, which made him well-liked. This
was a characteristic which he carried through his entire
life. Following the typical educational pattern of his time,
he moved from one school to another to study religious
sciences. While critical of, yet powerless to improve, the
traditional methods of education, he was fortunate to have
the opportunity to advance his knowledge at Makkah, the
center for orthodox learning, when he went there in 1890 at
the age of twenty two.78
Concerning his stay in Makkah, most biographers agree
that he lived in the sacred city for several years pursuing
religious studies. Whether or not Muhammad Darwish, the
diligent student, was influenced by the reformist ideas of
his time during his somewhat formal education in Makkah,
remains an open question. But it is certain that he was a
student of Shaykh Ahmad Khatib (1855-1916), who reached the
highest-ranking position in religious teaching in Makkah.79
^Puar, Periuanaan Muhammadivah. 55. See also,

Hadikusuma, Dari Jamaluddin A1 -Afghani Samoai K.H. Ahmad
Dahlan (Yogyakarta: Persatuan, n.d), 74.
78Musthafa Kamal Pasha, Muhammadiyah Sebaaai Gerakan
Islam untuk Anokatan Muda (Muhammadiyah as a Youth Reform
Movement) (Yogyakarta: Persatuan, 1975), 8-9.
Âhmad Khatib was a native of Bukittinggi, Sumatra,
who went to Mecca in 1876 for advanced study. He was known
to be highly critical of the Dutch policies and was not on
good terms with Hurgronje when the latter was in Makkah.
Among his students was the renowned scholar Kivai Haj i
Hashim Asyari, the founder of the Tebuirencr pesantren and
174
This Shaykh, who was a forerunner of the reformists in

Minangkabau, Sumatra, trained many prominent Indonesian
scholars, both traditionalists and modernists, during his
teaching career in Makkah.
In his formal religious training, it appears that
Dahlan was largely steeped in traditionalist teachings.
Hence, Dahlan's acquaintance with the ideas of Islamic
modernism might have derived rather from his personal study
and through various connections with other Muslim
modernists. Because of his predominantly traditional
education, apparently, his stance was somewhat moderate or,
for some, quite favorable toward certain religious
manifestations, such as sufism, which were regarded by the
radical reformists as "deviating" from the "true" teaching
of Islam. This and other related issues will be discussed
more elaborately in the following chapter.
Soon after his return from his second stay in Makkah in
1905,80 Dahlan married Siti Walidah, the daughter of a
later of the Nahdhatul 'Ulama traditionalist organization.

See, Noer, The Modernist Movement. 32, 74.
jainuri, Muhammadiyah. 25. There has been
disagreement among the biographers of Dahlan concerning his
visits to Makkah. According to Mukti Ali, Dahlan's first
visit took place in 1890 and he stayed only one year; as for
the second visit, Dahlan stayed for two years, though
another source states four years, and still another that he
stayed for only one and a half years, together with his son
Siraj. See Yusron, Ahmad Dahlan. 25. The official periodical
of the Muhammadiyah, Suara Muhammadiyah (The Voice of the
Muhammadiyah), in its November, 27,1952 issue, however,
neglected to mention the duration of Dahlan's stay in
175
Jogjakarta judge. They were blessed with six children from

this happy marriage. Siti Walidah, who was later known as
Nvai Dahlan, shared her husband's ideas and activities.
After his death, she was made responsible for the Aisviah
women's division of the Muhammadiyah.81
During the course of his religious career, two
important events imprinted themselves deeply on Dahlan's
mind, which may have given him profound insights for his
future struggle. The first event occurred soon after his
return from his first trip to Makkah. Being equipped in the
religious sciences and being a man of strong determination,
Dahlan started to wage a struggle against what he perceived
as a religiously deviant practice. With his strong religious
fervor, he made himself unpopular among the "established"
*ulam5 by correcting the direction of the prayer in the main
mosque in his area.82 The reaction was so harsh from the
Makkah. See also, Mukti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement,"
38.
81In recognition of her contributions to the cause of
woman in Indonesia, on September 25, 1971, the Government of
Indonesia, through a Presidential decree, granted Nyai
Dahlan the status of national hero. Puar, Periuanaan
Muhammadiyah. 60. See also, Salam, KH Ahmad Dahlan. 7-8.
^Dahlan was of the conviction that the Central Mosque
of Yogyakarta had a difference of 24.5 degree from the
precise criblah direction. Jainuri, Muhammadiyah. 27. Mukti
Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 31. See also, M. Idris,
"K.H. Dahlan, His Life and Thought" (Unpublished M.A.
Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1975), 27. It is
reported that prior to his decision to establish his own
mosque with a corrected aiblah direction, Dahlan met with
sixteen religious scholars for consultation. See, Yusron,
Ahmad Dahlan. 38.
176
'ulama, who were backed by the Sultan, that Dahlan was

almost completely in despair.83 Subsequently, and to the
great disappointment of Dahlan, the original aiblah was
restored.84 The punishment of Dahlan was severe and took
the form of demolishing his own little mosque where he
gathered his students and had begun expounding his reform
ideas.85 According to the Dutch observers Rinkes and Van
Neil, this incident resulted in his being exiled to
Makkah.86
The second incident related to the day of *Ied al-Fitr
(the feast of the fasting month). Based on his astronomical
calculation, Dahlan suggested to the Sultan that the Ramadan
feast, which was simultaneously the Sultan's birthday
ceremony, be celebrated one day ahead of what was suggested
by the "established" 'ulama. Though the Sultan's decision
Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 147. See also, Yusron, Ahmad
Dahlan. 25.
it is reported that Dahlan reacted by saying,
"Though they are rejecting my theory, one day they will come
to realize its accuracy." His prediction was true, as not
only the people of his immediate area soon accepted his
reform, but even those who lived outside his district
followed suit. See, Mukti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement,"
31.
85Noer, The Modernist Movement. 74
See, Mailrapport, Reports from Departmen van
Kolonien. (Ministerie van Binnenlansche Zaken, 1913, 1096/13
Moehammadijah, Jogjakarta, as cited by James L. Peacock,
Purifying the Faith (Menlo Park, California: The
Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1978) 36. See also,
Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 85. Some
Indonesian scholars, however, doubted the accuracy of the
exile account. Idris, "KH Ahmad Dahlan," 29.
177
was in favor of Dahlan, as he accepted his astronomical

calculations, it was, however, at the expense of Dahlan's
losing the sympathy of the established *ulam5 even
further.87 This incident profoundly affecteDahlan's
approach in dealing with religious matters. Dahlan learned
his lesson, realizing that any successful effort in
advancing new religious ideas could not be achieved unless
carried out together with others working in an organized
fashion. Accordingly, what was conceived in his mind in the
form of a united effort soon came to light with the birth of
the Muhammadiyah.
These incidents shaped the way Ahmad Dahlan advanced
his reform ideas in the ensuing years. He was made keenly
aware that changes could not be realized instantly, and that
patience, understanding and persuasion as well as moderation
were the keys to winning people's trust and confidence.
Conversely, confrontation, denunciation, and an impulsive
attitude would hamper the achievement of the desired ends.
This amiable and gradual approach, less a protest than a
reform, later came to color the nature of the organization
he founded.88
These incidents also indicated his inclination to
exercise independent thinking about religious matters; this
87Mukti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 32; Noer, The

Mukti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 32.
178
is something which has always been highly cherished and

valued by the reformists. In addition, these incidents also
confirmed Dahlan's pragmatism.89 For him, direct and
concrete action took precedence over theoretical thought or
philosophical treatises in addressing religious problems.
The scarcity of Dahlan's written literary output, therefore,
was the logical consequence of this pragmatism.
Against this background, the mature Kivai Dahlan
decided to advance his concepts and ideas in a calmer
manner, not so much on formalistic ritual issues as on
broader substantive ones with more important ends. Those
issues of Dahlan's deepest concern have been schematically
listed by most of his biographers as follows:
1. the impurity of religious life;
2. the inefficiency of religious education;
3. the activities of the Christian missionaries;
4. and the indifferent and even anti-religious attitude
of the intelligentsia.
Each of the above issues was felt by Dahlan to have led to
the decline of Islam in Indonesia.90
Kiyai Dahlan, who for his entire life was khatib
(sermon giver) of the Sultan Mosque, only received a modest
monthly salary that hardly met his daily sustenance.
Therefore, he was engaged in batik trading as a means of
89Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 150.
90Puar, Periuanqan Muhammadivah. 34-38.
179
earning extra income. His business activity took him to

nearby areas in Java and gave him the opportunity to carry
along his ideas to prominent local Muslims who constituted
the nucleus of the Muhammadiyah and subsequently became his
most fervent supporters.91 Much of his time was spent on
the road expounding his religious ideas while attracting new
converts. Obviously, his inherently likeable personality
played an important factor in easing his way to earning new
friends and supporters outside his hometown of
Yogyakarta.92 This itinerant pattern of preaching remains
up to the present time a core of Muhammadiyah life, in
emulation of its founder.
Prior to the formation of the Muhammadiyah, Dahlan had
joined the Jamiat Kheir organization, the first reformist
movement in Indonesia. Dahlan's motivation in joining the
organization was his attraction to reformist ideas and the
intellectual atmosphere in this circle. The organization's
library, which included among other things works of
modernist thinkers such as Al-ManSr and al-'Urwah al-Wuthcxa
91Syamsi Sumarjo, Pengetahuan Muhammadiyah denaan

Tokoh-tokohnva dalam Kebanounan Islam (Understanding the
Muhammadiyah and its Leadership in the Islamic Awakening)
(Yogyakarta; P.B. Muhammadiyah, 1967), 4.
92In one of his Sumatra trips, Dahlan was offered the
position of Khatib at the city of Medan mosque, which was a
strong indication of the local people's respect and
appreciation to Dahlan. Tamar Djaya, Pusaka Indonesia
(Orang-Oranq Besar Tanah Air (The Indonesian Legacy)
(Bandung: G. Kolff & Co., 1951), 263.
180
was unquestionably an alluring factor.93 It is, therefore,

very probable that through this organization, Dahlan gained
access to Muhammad 'Abduh's works and the ideas of other
Middle Eastern reformers which had been brought by Arab
scholars who came to teach at the organization's school.94
Furthermore, Dahlan also attached himself to the Budi
Utomo organization. In joining this organization, Dahlan's
main concern was to provide a religious dimension for this
essentially secular organization and thus disseminate
religious values among the members, who were highly
intellectual but less committed to Islam.95 Dahlan's
rationalistic and untraditional method in formulating the
doctrines of Islam seems to be the reason for his ability to
win influence and acceptance among the Budi Utomo's Dutcheducated members. He remained as an active member of that
organization even after the formation of the Muhammadiyah,
maintaining cordial relations and fruitful cooperation with
its leadership.
93Noer, The Modernist Movement. 58. On this, Solichin
Salam mentions a number of 'Abduh's works which were
accessible to Dahlan, including RisSlat al-Tawhld. Tafslr
al-Manar and Tafsir iuz *amma. See, Salam, KH. Ahmad Dahlan.
8. Yusron, however, added a number of other books, including
Al-Tawassul wa al-Wasilah and Fi al-Bid'ah of Ibn Taymiyyah.
Yusron, Ahmad Dahlan. 25-26.
94C.W.J Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," in
Gustave E. Von Grunebaum, ed., Unitv and Variety in Muslim
Civilization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1955), 301.
^Noer, The Modernist Movement. 75. See also, Idris,
"KH. Ahmad Dahlan," 35.
181
The third organization with which Dahlan had some

association was the Sarekat Islam, the first Islamic mass
political organization in Indonesia. To channel and
facilitate his political aspirations, Dahlan and many other
prominent Muslims actively joined the Sarekat Islam. Dahlan,
was at times, responsible for religious affairs in the
capacity of an advisor to the Central Committee of the
organization. He remained in close contact with the
organization even while devoting most of his attention to
the Muhammadiyah, which refrained from overtly political
activities. By and large, Dahlan was instrumental in
establishing close intermediary and complementary relations
between the Muhammadiyah and the Sarekat Islam.96 While the
former was dedicated to the economic and political fields,
the latter devoted itself to religio-cultural affairs. Yet
both were committed to the cause of Islam.
What Dahlan found in the above organizations
Jamiat
Kheir's religious intellectualism, Sarekat Islam7s political

enthusiasm, and Budi Utomo's cultural revivalism. But these
did not seem to satisfy Dahlan's far-sighted vision for
overcoming the problems faced by his society.97 Rather, he
110 .
97It is worthwhile to note that Dahlan's intuition with

regard to the destiny of these organizations was correct. Of
the three organizations, none continued to prosper. Sarekat
Islam and Budi Utomo didn't survive the Dutch rule, while
the Jamiat Kheir suffered internal antagonism which hampered
its progress. The Muhammadiyah, conversely, has continued to
182
was inspired to found a new organization which would

effectively meet the challenges encountered by the
Indonesian Muslims. For Dahlan, this organization needed to
have a unique character and responsibility as well as a
definite religious program which other organizations had
never had. As a result of this thinking, Dahlan's
participation in these other organizations actually helped
to bring about an orientation conducive to the establishment
of a new organization of his own.98
When he was urged to organize an association by his
early nucleus of students, relatives and fellow teachers, he
founded his organization and named it after his own school,
the "Muhammadiyah," in 1912.99 What was formed here was a
flourish up to the present time and became, as Peacock

affirmed, "The most powerful Islamic movement ever to exist
in Southeast Asia". See, Peacock, Purifying Faith. 24.
98For example in Budi Utomo's 1917 Congress, Dahlan
conspicuously used the forum to advance his ideas. Dahlan,
being a member of the organization, offered his house to be
used by the secretariat of the congress. He made such an
impression on the participants, both through his activities
and lectures, that many requests to set up branches of the
Muhammadiyah came from various places. Koentjaraningrat,
Javanese Culture. 79.
99 The following were the initial members of the
organization's leadership:
1. Haji Ahmad Dahlan (Chairman)
2 . Abdullah Siradj (Secretary)
3. Haji Ahmad
4. Haji Abdul Rahman
5. Haji Sarkawi
6 . Haji Muhammad
7. Haji Jaelani
8 . Haji Anis
9. Haji Muhammad Pakih.
183
group of religious people whose value during that time, as

is still true today, was as a symbol of resistance to the
foreign culture being imposed on the local people. This
alien culture, in the eyes of this group, was comparable to
a polluted stream whose flow endangered the pure stream
religion of Islam and the Indonesian Muslims. To meet this
danger, a high and solid dam was constructed in the form of
the newly-born Muhammadiyah.
The Muhammadiyah Movement During Dahlan's Time
To trace in detail the Muhammadiyah's development from

its inception to the last days of Dahlan is not an easy
task. The scarcity of information, due to the lack of
materials written by Dahlan, makes it even more
problematic.100 However, we do know that, although very
It is noticeable that the initial nucleus of the

organization consisted predominantly of religious persons,
as nearly all bear the prestigious Haii title. See,
Departemen Penerangan, Muhammadiyah Setenaah Abad (Jakarta:
Muhammadiyah Publication, 1962), 157.
100Jainuri, Muhammadiyah. 30-31. Yunus Salam, Riwavat
Hidup K.H. Ahmad Dahlan. Amal dan Periuanaannva (The
Biography, Dedication and Struggle of Ahmad Dahlan)
(Jakarta; Departemen Pengajaran Muhammadiyah, 1968), 26.
Beside some scattered material composed of Dahlan's
admonitions to his students, there are two small books
commonly referred to as primary sources to Dahlan's life.
The first, written by R. H. Hadjid, an intimate friend and
follower of Dahlan, was entitled K.H. Ahmad Dahlan denaan 17
Kelompok Avat-avat al-Our'an (The Teaching of Dahlan along
with Seventeen Different Themes of the Qur'an), the second,
which remained a private work of H.M. Sjoedja, entitled
"Riwavat Hidup K.H.A Dahlan. Pembina Muhammadiyah Indonesia
(The Biography of Dahlan, the Founder of the Muhammadiyah of
184
limited in its program at the start, the Muhammadiyah grew

rapidly beyond the geographical boundaries of its
birthplace. As the number of branches increased, its
activities and responsibilities expanded as well.
Shaped by the congenial and amicable personality of
Dahlan, and by the milieu in which the organization
operated, the basic foundation of the Muhammadiyah was
successfully laid down. Dahlan took full advantage of the
initiation of the Dutch Ethical Policy, in which education
was placed on the priority list, to carry out his
mission.101 However, Dahlan saw in the Dutch education many
shortcomings. It was extensively western in spirit, which
would only make the students lose sight of their cultural
background. Dahlan, therefore, offered a solution for
Indonesian Muslims in the form of modern education of
Islamic character.
In 1912 Dahlan filed a formal request applying for
legal recognition for his organization, covering the
Indonesia). Yusron, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan. xii, see also, Idris,
"K.H. Ahmad Dahlan," 97-98.
101Nieuwenhuijze, Aspect of Islam in Post Cololonial
Indonesia. 45-46. Yusron, Ahmad Dahlan. 74. As was mentioned
earlier, prior to the formation of the Muhammadiyah
organization Dahlan had initially established his religious
school. At one point, due to the constraints of funds,
Dahlan had to sell his own furniture to cover the shortages
on the school's construction. See, Amir Hamzah Ws,
Pembaharuan Pendidikan dan Penqadiaran Islam va
Diselenqqarakan oleh Percruruan Muhammadvah (The Muhammadiyah
and the Reformation of Islamic Education and Learning)
(Yogyakarta: Pembaharuan Pendidikan dan Pengajaran Islam,
1962), 46.
185
territory of the whole of Java and Madura. The application

was submitted with a draft of the statute of the
organization. The Dutch authorities rejected a wider
territory beyond the city of Yogyakarta, and as a result,
the organization was set up initially to cover only a
limited area of central Java.102 Accordingly, the statute
of the organization was revised in line with the Dutch
directive to run as follows:
1. The spreading of the teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad among the native people in Yogyakarta; and
2. The promotion of religious life among its members.
The means to achieve these goals were stated in the
following words:
1. The establishment of educational institutions where
secular and religious sciences would be offered;
2.
The holdingof meetings
on religious matters in
which religious teachings would be discussed;

3. Building and maintaining mosques as well as
supporting any prayer houses and endowments where
public religious services would be performed; and
102It was only in August 1914 that the government decree

was released for the legal recognition of the Muhammadiyah.
Puar, Periuanqan Muhammadiyah. 62-63. Solichin Salam,
Muhammadiyah dan Kebanqunan Islam.46-67.
1 8 6
4. Publishing and rendering support in publishing of

books, brochures, treatises, newspapers and the like
dealing with religious affairs.103
From the officially authorized statement of purpose and
goals, as well as the very name "Muhammadiyah," we can
elicit certain conceptions of the organization as envisioned
by Dahlan. The very name "Muhammadiyah" indicates the
Islamic teaching brought by the Prophet Muhammad.104 Dahlan
was reported to have said that he aimed to bring back the
true, orthodox teachings of Islam in its original form as
brought by the Prophet Muhammad.105 In this regard, he
sought to purify Islamic rituals of any accretions of nonIslamic practices and ideas. The establishment of
educational institutions seemed to be the main concern of
Dahlan and the central aim of the organization. Hence,
Dahlan went so far as to establish a counterpart to the

104It was said that, in naming his organization
"Muhammadiyah", Dahlan hoped that his organization would
have the final and everlasting status of the teaching of the
Prophet Muhammad. In addition, the members of the
organization were also expected to follow the ideal example
of the Prophet Muhammad. For further information on the
establishment of the organization, see Sjoedja, Riwavat
Hidup K.H.A. Dahlan. as cited by Yusron, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan.
51-53.
105Imam Prakoso Ciptohadiwardoyo, "Al-Islam A1-Quran"
in Fajar, 11, No. 8 (1960), a translation of a Javanese
version which was originally written by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan
himself. The original article in the Javanese language was
found in the Muhammadiyah library in Surakarta (Central
Java), in 1926.
187
Dutch government schools. He followed the example of the

Christian missions by adopting as his task the spread of
educational facilities and the exhortation to deeper
faith.106 He seemed to be impressed by the work of the
Christian missionaries and their H.l.S (Hollands Inlandse
School) met de Bible (Dutch Native-Speaking Elementary
Schools with the Bible), and took this model to establish
his "Dutch Native-Speaking Elementary Schools with the
Qur'an."107
In the Muhammadiyah schools, religion was taught as a
compulsory subject and the students were required to adhere
to religious disciplinary regulations. In these schools
scientific education and foreign languages were also
incorporated into the curriculum. The Muhammadiyah school
system also maintained its strong Islamic dimension but was
different from the earlier Islamic schools of the
traditional pesantren character. Through the example of his
106Dahlan often took his students to visit churches and

mission schools to show the dedication of the missionaries
to their religious as well as social duties in order to
ignite the students' spirit. Noer, The Modernist Movement.
93. See also, Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian
Elite. 85.
107Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 150. See also, Arif in,
Muhammadiyah. 64-66.
188
new method and system of education,108 Dahlan also aimed to

modernize the existing traditional religious schools.109
To escalate his educational program and advance Islamic
educational quality, Dahlan established Muallimin (male
teachers) and Muallimat (female teachers) schools in which
the instructors for the Muhammadiyah elementary and
secondary schools were trained. Parallel to these schools,
Dahlan set up Muballiahin (male preachers) and Muballiahat
10aOn Dahlan's educational reform, see, Mukti Ali, "The

Muhammadiyah Movement," 53.
109The word pesantren literaly means "the place or the
school of the santri.11 The latter, as has been earlier
described, originally denoted the students of an Islamic
religious school. However, in Javanese society, the term
encompasses a wider meaning; it was used, and still is, to
denote the religiously observant orthodox Muslims as a group
in society, in contradistinction to the abanoan (the nominal
Muslim) and the privavi (the Javanese aristocrat). Hence,
pesantren is not what Geertz described as the school of
religious people whose piety reflected the product of a
synthesis of Islam and pre-Muslim Javanese religion far from
the Islamic orthodoxy. Pesantrens . in fact, were established
and gradually became the heart of orthodox Islam in the
rural areas all over the archipelago, though under different
names. The education provided in these schools, at least up
to the emergence of the Muhammadiyah, consisted exclusively
of the study of religious subjects. Instruction was given in
an informal manner, with the students sitting in a circle
around the teacher. The Muhammadiyah came to modernize these
institutions by incorporating secular sciences and
introducing a new system. Indeed, one of the Muhammadiyah's
distinctive educational contributions was making Islamic
education transcend the traditional pesantren system. See
Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java. 125. See also, Mark
R. Woodward, Islam in Java; Normative Pietv and Mysticism in
the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press, 1989), 79-80. On the pesantren in different
regions, see R.L. Winzler, "The Social Organization of Islam
in Kelantan" in Kelantan: Religion. Society and Politics in
a Malay State, ed. W.R. Roff (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1974), 265-268.
189
(female preachers) schools equivalent to other secondary

schools' level.110 These schooformed the main educational
foundation for the idea of setting up a Muslim University a
decade later.111 In so doing, Dahlan was aiming to create
Muslim
cadres as cornerstones for his reform programs.
These prospective cadres were to form the central core of

the movement to assist him in carrying out his mission and
to continue it in the years to come.
At the same time, Dahlan labored with great
earnestness to elevate morals and to improve the position of
women within the framework of Islam. He was successful in
establishing a strong women's division called Aisviah (after
'Aishah, the Prophet Muhammad's wife) with the help of his
110Mukti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 50-55.

111In its 25th Congress in 1936, a resolution to
establish a university was passed. Consequently, a special
committee was set up for this project. However, it was not
until July 1945 that an Islamic college was founded in
Jakarta. In 1946 this college was transformed into a
University, the University Islam Indonesia (Islamic
University of Indonesia), located in Yogyakarta. See, Mukti
Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 79. It is worth noting
that the number of educational institutions of the
Muhammadiyah has been on the rise since then. According to
the 1994 data, there are 111 higher institutiuons, including
24 universities, presently operating under the name of the
organization. See, Muhammad Afnan, The Head of the
Information and Data Section of the Higher Education Counsil
of the Muhammadiyah, "Informasi dari PP Muhammadiyah"
(Information from the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah) in
Forum No. 10, Tahun III, (September 1, 1994), 8.
190
wife and immediate associates in 1917.112 Within this

division, the women were organized into a separate union,
with a subsection for girls. In this regard, Dahlan strove
to include women as effective and active instruments within
his organization. For him, women were too important an
element in the society to be excluded frcm the organization.
In some places special mosques for women were opened, which
are rarely found in other Islamic countries even today. In
addition, regular religious courses for women were also
offered. Although for external affairs the Aisviah was
completely under the control of the central body of the
organization, it acted autonomously in its internal affairs.
Inspired and favorably impressed by seeing on one of
his trip the uniformed boys of the Javaansche Padvinders
Orcranisatie (The Javanese Organization of Boy couts)
standing in line in a disciplined fashion, Dahlan initiated
the boy scout movement of the Muhammadiyah.113 Muslim boys,
accordingly, were incorporated into the Muhammadiyah boy
scout and youth division, called Hizbul-Watan (the Nation
Party). This division, which was initially subsumed under
the Muhammadiyah's Department of Education and Learning,
112See, Boeah Conares Moehammadiyah Seperempat Abad (The
fruit of the 25th Annual Congress of the Muhammadiyah)
(Djokjakarta: Hoofdcomite, Congres Moehammadijah, 1936), 2425. See also, Solichin Salam, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan. Reformer
Islam Indonesia (Ahmad Dahlan, The Islamic Reformer of
Indonesia) (Djakarta: Djajamurni, 1963), 54.
113Mukti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 57-58. See
also, Jainuri, Muhammadiyah. 44.
191
soon came into prominence and became a new department of its

own.114
In the field of social welfare, Dahlan urged his
students incessantly not only to understand the Quranic
admonitions of sarah 107,
al-Ma'On (Assistance), but, most
importantly, to put them into daily practice.115 He

appealed to all his students to meditate on the misery of
their surroundings and urged them to mitigate the agony of
needy people. Inspired and motivated by the above Qur'anic
verses, Dahlan initiated a separate body called "The
Department of Help the Needy," which undertook to provide
114Hizbul-Watan. which constituted the nucleus of the

youth movement of the Muhammadiyah, produced many prominent
national figures in the history of Indonesia. General
Sudirman, the "Great Commander" and one of the founders of
the Indonesian Army was an active member of the HizbulWatan. Yusron, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan. 77; Nakamura, The Crescent
Arises over the Banvan Tree. 150; Salam, KH Ahmad Dahlan.
50-55. On General Sudirman's attachment to the Muhammadiyah,
see, Mastum Lubis, ed. Kenana-kenanqan pada Panqlima Besar
Diendral Sudirman (Memories of the Great Army Commander,
General Sudirman) (Djakarta; Perwakilan Kementerian
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1950).
115The verses of Al-Ma'qn or "Assistance" deal with the
meaning of true worship, which requires faith, the practical
and helpful love and affection of those in need, and
profound sincerity in deeds rather than display in devotion
and charity in words. Ou'ran. surah 107. Inspired by these
verses, Dahlan is often quoted as saying: "More work less
talk," which reflects his realistic approach in addressing
the problems of his people. Asnawi Hadisiswaja, "Kiyai Hadji
Ahmad Dahlan" in Pandii Masiarakat. No. 3 (1959), 17. See
also, Yusron, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan. 50, quoting from Dahlan's
student Haji Syudja. For this reason, perhaps, Alfian, when
referring to the life of Dahlan, highlighted Dahlan's deeds
rather than his words. On the same line, Nakamura describes
the Muhammadiyah movement as an action group. Alfian,
Muhammadiyah. 164; Nakamura, The Crescent Arises. 257.
192
care for orphans, the poor and the sick. Out of this
Department, Muhammadiyah orphanages, clinics, and hospitals
emerged to put into effect the initial directives of the
founder.
The Muhammadiytih remained circumspectly outside
politics during Dahlan's time.116 Given the socio-religious
condition of his time with the attending Dutch Islamic
policy of discouraging politics, Dahlan was of the view that
it would be unrealistic to employ a more politically
activist attitude. It should not be forgotten that the
Muhammadiyah operated in an atmosphere conditioned by harsh
Dutch policies. Any sign of political incitement was
resolutely met with force by the Dutch. The case of the
Indische Partii previsiously discussed was a perfect example
of the Dutch attitude.
Realizing this serious limitation, Dahlan expressly
avoided politics to assure himself that he could sail his
important goals happily over the waves of the constant
threat from the Dutch. Although Dahlan was not blind to the
116Tas, Indonesia. 122-123; Legge, Indonesia.

65-66. However, some of the policies of the Muhammadiyah had
important political implications. Foremost was its
contribution in creating Muslim opposition to colonial rule.
According to Mehden there were five facets of the
Muhammadiyah's ideology which had their impact upon politics
in the pre-independence Indonesia. They were rationalism,
education as the basis for political development, the
influence of the middle-class membership, an interest in
Javanese culture, and an aversion to alien doctrines such as
Communism and Christianity. Mehden, Religion and
Nationalism. 196.
193
essence of the colonial policies, which were permeated by

prejudice against Islam, he had no other alternative but to
take a safe and cautious course. Had he not feared standing
in opposition to the Dutch, which might have caused his
organization to be banned as other organizations were,
Dahlan certainly would have spoken out in bitterness.
Thus, in none of his statements directly attacked the
Dutch Islamic policy. What was important to him was to run
his organization smoothly to achieve his ends. He was simply
not convinced that direct political involvement was the
answer to the problems that faced Indonesian society. He
seems to have adopted a delaying tactic which would allow
his organization to establish itself, before taking firmer
action at a more suitable time.
No one denies that in its ensuing developments, the
Muhammadiyah movement became one of the important elements
in the process of socio-political change in Indonesia. Its
approach to the problem of reforming Islamic teaching did
ultimately have political implications. Through its
educational programs, the Muhammadiyah contributed to the
growth of the opposition of Muslim intellectuals to the
colonial regime. The creation of MIAI (Mailis Islam al- A 7la
Indonesia), which began in 1937 as an anti-Dutch
organization, was part of the Muhammadiyah's initiative.
Equally significant was the role of the Muhammadiyah in the
establishment of an all-embracing consultative council of
194
Indonesian Muslims (Masvumi; Mailis ShQra Muslimin

Indonesia). This council, in which the Muhammadiyah was an
important element, laid the foundation for concerted Muslim
political activity which was to carry over into the early
years of independence.117
During the time of Dahlan's leadership, however, a
creative and harmonious cooperation between the Dutch and
the Muhammadiyah was clearly discernable on the surface.
Both the Dutch authorities and the Muhammadiyah profited
from such a mutually beneficial relationship. The former
benefitted from the overtly non-oppositional stance of the
latter, while the latter benefitted from the former's
favorable attitude to its religious reform. This explains
how the Muhammadiyah was able to grow and progress during a
period in which no comparable Indonesian movement even
survived. Its accomodative and cooperative stance gave it
the flexibility necessary for survival in a climate
otherwise hostile to indigenous nationalist movements.
In conformity with his tolerant spirit, Dahlan laid
greater emphasis on the things that unite rather than upon
those which divide. Aware of the sensitivity of the Dutch in
matters of politics, and to avoid any suspicion that would
only provide excuses for suppression, Dahlan managed to find
favor among both Dutch and Indonesian groups and succeeded
117Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 58; Mukti Ali, Muhammadiyah.
133-134. See also, H. Benda, "Islam Under the Japanese
Occupation" in Pacific Affairs. December, 1955, 18, No.4.
195
in laying a broad base for his movement.118 For him, the

problem of maintaining a balance between his cause of
providing Islamic education and accommodating the Dutch
policies required wisdom and sophistication.
His tolerance toward Christians and their
missionary
activities, especially in the early days of the

Muhammadiyah, could not be interpreted other than as an
indication of Dahlan's realistic approach.119 Dahlan, in
118The most striking example of Dahlan's ability to

capture the hearts of the secular Budi Utomo leadership was
the significant assistance rendered by Mas Ngabehi
Dwidjosewojo and Raden Sosrosugondo. The former was the
first secretary of the first Budi Utomo Congress, and the
latter was the second secretary of that Congress who later
represented Budi Utomo in the Volksraad (people's council).
Sosrosugondo, who became more attracted to the Muhammadiyah,
finally joined the latter organization and held an important
position as the vice chairman of the Department of Education
during Dahlan's tenure. See, Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 158.
119An often-repeated theme in the various biographies of
Dahlan was his unprecedented close friendship with many
Christian clergymen. This was so true that Reverend Baker
asserted that Dahlan had a tendency toward religious
syncretism. Hendric Kraemer, commenting on Dahlan's
willingness to have constructive dialogue with Christian
clergymen, regarded the modern Kivai Dahlan as his friend.
Kraemer further encouraged the maintaining of this
friendship for the cause of Muslim-Christian relations.
However, Dahlan's tolerant spirit did not pass without
bitter attack from his Muslim opponents. At times, Dahlan
was named a kivai Kristen (Christian Kiyai), and accused of
being a kivai palsu (fake kiyai). The Muhammadiyah, too, was
called the movement of orana kafir (the infidels). Dahlan,
however, did not react, but quietly pursued a policy of
self-restraint to accomplish his mission. See, Asnawi
Hadisiswaja, "K.H. Ahmad Dahlan," in Panii Masiarakat. 1,
No. 3, 1959, 18; Yusron, KH Ahmad Dahlan. 70-71. See also,
Carl F. Hallencreutz, Kraemer towards Tambaran; A study in
Hendrik Kraemer's Missionary Approach (Uppsala, Alonqvist &
Wiksells, 1966) 159-62 as cited by Alfian, Muhammadiyah.
160-161.
196
this particular stage of his career, showed a maturity very

much in contrast to the rebellious kivai of his youth. This
discretion characteristic of his peaceful attitude and overt
tolerance toward Christians contributed to the creation of a
favorable atmosphere conducive to the smooth construction of
the solid infrastructure of the movement. However, it should
be said that, in spite of Dahlan's overt and seemingly
sincere tolerance toward Christian missionary activities, he
was not blind to their imminent threat to Islam and Muslim
society.120 But was only through this tolerance that Dahlan
successfully appeased the authorities and earned their
acceptance and recognition.
As an indication of the favorable attitude of the Dutch
toward the Muhammadiyah, Dahlan#s requests to establish new
branches were met with approval. Dahlan's perseverance and
his tireless efforts to establish a sound foundation for the
movement was eventually to pay off handsomely shortly before
his death. In 1921 the Dutch government partially lifted its
120In one of the important statements that reflects his

deep concern over the Christian missionary menace for Islam,
Dahlan asserted the following: "Although Islam will never
disappear from the face of the earth, it could, however,
vanish from Indonesia, unless the Indonesian stands by it."
Hamka, K.H.A. Dahlan (Djakarta: Sinar Pujangga, 1952), 17.
On Dahlan's interaction with Christian missionaries, see
M.T. Arifin, Muhammadivah the Changing Portrait. 40-42.
197
control on the Muhammadiyah and gave consent for it to

operate all over the archipelago.121
It should be added, however, that despite its non
political nature, as a movement the Muhammadiyah could not
be deemed devoid of long-term political aspirations. Its
non-political character was clear in the sense that it was
not actively involved in pressuring the Dutch to bring about
change, but it was political in the broader sense of
stimulating reforms in the country. In this latter sense, it
became one of the most influential movements to set the
stage for Indonesian independence. It was for this reason
that Bousquet was strongly critical of the high favor
displayed by the Dutch toward the Muhammadiyah. For him,
this was an incomprehensible attitude which lacked political
intelligence. The Muhammadiyah, in the words of this French
scholar, was "quite as strongly anti-Dutch as other
nationalists, Muslim or otherwise... and it would be very
wrong to suppose that its members entertain no political
bias. "122
In the field of economic affairs, Dahlan was also aware
of the commitment of the Muhammadiyah to elevate the
standard of the economic life of the Muslims. A Department
of the Economy was later established to organize and
121The Dutch Government's Decree No. 38, on September
1921 was issued in response to the Muhammadiyah's petition
in May of the same year. Jainuri, Muhammadiyah. 40-41.
122See, Bousquet, A French View. 5.
198
stimulate the economic activities of the movement's members.

In ensuing years, the economic department recommended
establishing banks to strengthen the economic activities of
the members.123
In discussing the economic dimension of the
Muhammadiyah, one could not but point out the showplace of
the organization, the Pekaianaan village in the vicinity of
Jogjakarta. This village, prior to the foundation of the
Muhammadiyah, had been the dwelling place of illiterate
thieves and murderers. Thanks to the Muhammadiyah, the
village transformed itself into a center for fabric
manufacture and dyeing whose inhabitants embraced the
movement and followed its reform program with the help of an
immediate student of Dahlan.124
Much has been said of the close association between
Islam and trade. It has been suggested that those early
Indonesian converts to Islam who were in contact with a
wider world found in Islam a more symphathetic set of
beliefs and practices than the traditional Hindu-Buddhist
123In its 26th Congress which was held in Yogyakarta in

October 1937, the Muhammadiyah passed a resolution to
establish a "Muhammadiyah Bank." The establishment of this
bank, which was subject to the approval of the Mailis Tariih
(Religious Consultation Committee), aimed to overcome the
deteriorating economic condition of the Indonesian Muslims.
See, Boeah Conores 26 (The Fruits of the 26th Congress)
(Djokjakarta: Hoofdcomite Muhammadiyah Congres, 1937), 10.
On the promotion of the economic aspect of the Muhammadiyah,
see, Puar, Periuanqan Muhammadiyah. 208-213.
124Peacock, Purifying the Faith. 70-72.
199
doctrine to which they had formerly adhered. With Islam,

there is no intermediary agent that stands between God and
humankind. God could be worshiped directly, anytime and
anywhere. Furthermore, the usual interpretation of Islam
gave meaning and legitimacy to trade, encouraged commercial
values, urged professionalism and the stimulation of growth
through legitimate earnings.125 With this Islamic
ideological basis, the Javanese santri. who were well
represented in the Muhammadiyah membership, proved
themselves to be good Muslims and succesful traders.
It is worth noting that this view is not new in
sociological study. It suggests a similarity to Max Weber's
thesis linking the Protestant ethic to the rise of
capitalism in western Europe.126 What seems to be the
common ground is that the emerging middle-class Muslim
traders in Java who were primarily influenced by certain
religious ideas originating in Islam, resembled the middle125The popular prophetic saying reads Al-vad al'ulva
khairun min al-vad al-sufia ("The giving hand is preferable
to the receiving one"). In another popular hadlth. the
Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said that God likes any
of His servants, who, if he does something, does it
professionally. Inna AllSha vuhibbu ahadakum idha 'amila
1amalan an vutainahu.
126Max Weber, in both of his books mentioned below,
examines the relationship between religious belief and
social behavior. He traces the influence of religious ideas
upon the conduct of individuls, in demonstrating how the
capitalist spirit emerged out of the "Protestant ethic." The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans.
Talcott Parson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958),
27, and The Sociology of Religion, trans. Ephraim Fischoff
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 20.
200
class Protestants whose emergence promoted the spirit of

capitalism in western Europe.127
Viewed in relation to Weber's thesis about the
connection between religious ideas and economic progress, as
we sought to demonstrate that connection between the
Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, one may see
the relevance of the Muhammadiyah to Weber's methodology. As
the Calvinist's impetus toward service for God which came to
influence all life, so the Muhammadiyah came to emphazise
hard work for the betterment of the people as a condition
for the attainment of God's reward. The Muhammadiyah, in
other words, was more interested in practical work than
formulating theory. Out of this motive grew the spirit of
capitalism in the West. And out of the same spirit, the
Muhammadiyah was able to transform the degenerate
Pekadjangan into an industrial village. The evolution of the
above mentioned Muhammadiyah village to become an industrial
center strongly suggests the impact religious ideas can have
upon economic behaviour.128
Furthermore, the Weberian style of rationalization is
clearly manifested by the Muhammadiyah. Among other things,
127For further discussion on this issue, see, C.
Kessler, "Islam, Society and Political Behaviour: Some
Comparative Implications of the Malay Case" in British
Journal of Sociology (1972), No. 23, 35-50. See also, Syed
Hussein Alatas, "The Weber Thesis and Southeast Asia," in
Archives de socioloaie des religions (1963), No. 15, 21-35.
128Peacock, Purifying Faith. 70-71. See also, Alfian,
201
the Muhammadiyah's most distinctive educational contribution

was clearly seen in its successful transformation of the
traditional system of education of the oesantren into a
modern one. In addition, the Muhammadiyah's rationalization
of the belief system, organization, and the conduct of life
can also be viewed as, in some respects, fitting into
Weber's catagorization of Weber's rationalization. In its
simplification of religious practices, by purifying religion
from ritual accretions, the Muhammadiyah fits well into
Weber's concept of the rationalization of doctrine or belief
system. By moving the organization from a charismatic
leadership under Dahlan into a collective leadership or
separate divisions under several persons, the movement
operates in parallel fashion with Weber's theory of a
rationalized movement which evolves from charisma to
bureucracy. And finally, the Muhammadiyah striving to
rationalize the Muslim way of life by spreading the doctrine
of Islamic modernism, as opposed to the traditional Javanese
way of life, was also an indication of congruity with what
is described by Weber as a rationalization of the conduct of
life.129
Toward the end of his life, realizing his ill health
and spending the remaining days of his life in a flurry of
activity, Dahlan devoted all his time and whatever energies
129For further discussion on Weber's theories, see his
The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism and his
Sociology of Religion.
202
were left to him in laying the groundwork for the expansion

of the Muhammadiyah.130 Two years before his death, Dahlan
finally obtained approval from the authorities to establish
branches and sub-branches of the Muhammadiyah throughout the
country. Having received this legal approval, the
Muhammadiyah began to grow during the final days of Dahlan's
life. By the time of his death in 1923, the Muhammadiyah had
become highly organized, though it was still small. It is
recorded that in 1921 the Muhammadiyah had only five
branches; in 1922 there were fifteen Muhammadiyah branches
all over Indonesia.131 Two years after Dahlan's death, by
1925, the Muhammadiyah had established twenty-five branches
130 During the year before Dahlan died, he made

seventeen out-of-town trips for the Muhammadiyah. When his
wife begged him to rest, as was advised by doctors, he
responded;
I must work hard, in order to lay the first stone in
this great movement. If I am late or cease, due to my
illness, there is none who will build the groundwork. I
already feel that my time is almost gone, thus if I
work as fast as possible, what remains can be brought
to perfection by someone else.
What he said was apparently true; his intuition did not fail
him. For soon after he died in peace on February 23, 1923,
after delegating his tasks to his successors. See, Peacock,
Purifying Faith. 39. See also, Puar, Periuanqan
Muhammadiyah. 57.
131The important branches were Djakarta, Garut in Westen
Java, Solo, Pekalongan, Kelaten and Pekajang in Central
Java, and the capital of East Java, Surabaya. See,
"Muhammadiyah 40 Tahun: Suara Muhammadiyah( The Voice of the
Muhammadiyah), No. 27, (Djakarta: 1957), 371. See also,
Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 175.
203
and continued to grow rapidly throughout the country,

reaching a remarkable 1275 branches in 1942.132
That Dahlan's achievement and influence was so
astonishing was due, in the first place, to his far-sighted
outlook and optimism, and in the second place to his
resolute personality and perseverance. He was not a man to
give up on his aspirations and hopes.133 Dahlan/s sense of
timing and patience, which deeply imbued his personality,
made him successful in gaining Dutch favor. A classified
Dutch report written during the time of Dahlan suggests that
he was highly regarded by the Dutch. Dahlan was
characterized by these reports as energetic, militant,
intelligent and strictly orthodox but with a trace of
tolerance. One report further says that personally Dahlan
makes a good impression and is a man of a character and a
will which is not seen every day in either the Indies or
132Hadikusuma, Matahari-Matahari Muhammadiyah. 63-64.

133It is narrated by almost all Dahlan's biographers
that he recieved a letter threatening his life on his return
from his mission to Banyuwangi (eastern part of Java).
Instead of taking the advice of his family and students to
ignore the letter, the resolute Dahlan took the opposite
course. He decided to go to the city from which the letter
came. To the strong appeal of his family he said, "If a
person of sin dares to do this why should I, a man who
brings God's Truth, be afraid of facing them?" His
determination bore fruit: he succeeded in drawing more
followers from that city. See, Tamar Djaya, Pusaka Indonesia
(The Legacy of Indonesia), 1951), 271. See also, M.J. Anies,
"Muhammadiyah Seperempat Abad" (Muhammadiyah in a Quarter of
a Century) in Boeah Conqres Moehammadivah Seperempat Abad
(Djogjakarta: Hoofdcomite Congres Moehammadijah, 1936), 35,
37.
204
Europe. In another report, one year before his death, the

report on Dahlan remained favorable. According to Schrike,
even the Catholic missionary, Bakker, one of the
Muhammadiyah's opponents, pointed out that Dahlan himself
was a man of tolerance toward Christians. Concerning the
Muhammadiyah, the Dutch consistently regarded it as rational
and safe. One report also approvingly suggested its non
political nature, and accordingly advised the government not
to oppose its expansion as long as it remains true to its
original objectives.134
What led Dahlan to devote himself entirely to the
Muhammadiyah and sacrifice all that he possessed for the
birth of this movement is an ongoing question. Addressing
this question, easy as it may seem, has led to differing
views. The next chapter will concern itself with the main
factors, aside from the personality of Ahmad Dahlan, that
contributed to the birth of the Muhammadiyah movement.
134See Mailrapport, Muhammadiyah. 1913 and 1922, and see

also F.L.O. Bakker, "De Opleving Van den Islam in Djokdja"
De Macedonier. 1925, 29: 161-178, as cited by Peacock,
Purifying Faith. 36-37.
CHAPTER
THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE BIRTH OF THE MUHAMMADIYAH
In reviewing the main factors that contributed to the

emergence of the Muhammadiyah, various theories and points
of view have been presented. Scholars dealing with this
issue sought to set forth theories based on their reading of
the socio-religious environment prior to the emergence of
the movement. Each finding has been substantiated and
corroborated by certain facts believed to explain the main
driving force behind the birth of that movement.
Despite the fact that it is extremely difficult to
describe accurately the incipient stage of the Muhammadiyah,
due to the scarcity of the primary sources, no one denies
that the birth of this movement was brought about by the
interaction of a number of complex factors, the most
important of these, however, remain disputable. At the heart
of this debate, two commonly held views come to the fore.
The first view suggests that the spread of Islamic reformist
ideas from the Middle East to Indonesia in the early years
of the twentieth century constituted the main factor in the
birth of the Muhammadiyah. The second view, on the other
hand, stresses the fact that the Muhammadiyah movement
emerged as a response to the long history of ideological
antagonism within Javanese society. Hence, according to this
206
view, the impetus for the emergence of the Muhammadiyah

movement should basically be sought internally, within the
Javanese culture, far removed from any external factor. This
view places more weight on the internal societal factor
rather than the external ideological factors, as suggested
by the first view.
Though the above-mentioned factors were of substantial
importance, there was another factor of equally great import
that has suffered a degree of analytical neglect, namely,
the deep penetration of the Christian missions into the
country, and the great influence they exerted. This factor,
though consciously placed on the periphery by many
Indonesian scholars, was, it must be argued, one of the most
important factors of all those that prompted Kivai Dahlan to
found his organization in 1912.1
There have been two important reasons for the
reluctance of the Indonesian scholars to give due
consideration to the role of the "Christian missionary
activities." The first was their unwillingness to discuss an
issue that could bring to the surface the hidden antagonism
between the Muslims and the Christians of Indonesia. The
second was their extreme caution, seeking not to offend the
hypersensitivity of the government regarding any issue that
falls under the category of Sara (an abbreviation of rS1uku
1A.H. Johns, "Indonesia, Islam and Cultural Pluralism,"

216-219.
207
[ethnic], fAlaama [religion], TRIas [race] and TAlntar

Golonqan [internal group]). This was particularly crucial
when the issue relates to Christianization, since this could
be used to inflame public opinion on the grounds that Islam
was threatened by Christianity. For a government that aimed
to prevent problems and forestall disputes between religious
communities, any Sara issue that could trigger tension among
the people was, and remains strictly prohibited. There has
been speculation that because of this security-oriented
policy adopted by the government with regard to ChristianMuslim relations, Christianity has benefitted considerably
in terms of growth in the number of conversions. In 1931,
Christians were 2.8 percent of the population, as compared
to 7.4 percent in 1971, and 9.6 percent in 1990.2 This
increase in conversion, which cannot be explained in terms
of natural growth, brought the government severe criticism
in many Islamic quarters, particularly in the 1970s. The
government was accused of being too lenient towards the
Christian missions. However, before examining the "Christian
missionary factor" in detail, we will discuss the two
factors already identified, namely the influence of MiddleEast reform movements and the internal antagonism within
Javanese society.
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1995 Book of the Year, 630.
208
The Middle East Reformist Ideas
As is widely known, all questions regarding the

teachings of Islam during the life of the Prophet Muhammad
were generally referred to him. After the prophet's death,
as Islam expanded beyond its original territory, there was
no one of the same authority as the Prophet to provide
solutions for newly-arisen questions. As a result, Islam as
a doctrine developed into a number of disciplines such as
Tafslr (Qur'an interpretation), Hadith (Prophetic
tradition), and Fiah (Jurisprudence). Out of the science of
Fiah. schools of law (madhahib) emerged.
These legal schools or, school of Islamic
jurisprudence, by and large dealt with questions of religion
covering acts of worship and legal transactions, along with
all provisions, rules and particulars derived from these
questions. As a result, Islamic jurisprudence has played a
very significant role in the history of Islamic thought.
This Islamic jurisprudence is based on various sources.
Some are primary sources, such as the Quran and the Sunnah;
others are secondary. The latter, such as iima * (consensus
of opinion), givas (analogy), istihsan (appropriateness),
al-maslahah al-mursalah (general interest) fall under the
term iitihad (endeavor or independent reasoning).3 By
3For further review on the concept of iitihad. both in

the early period and in later centuries. See, Fazlur Rahman,
Islamic Methodology in History (Islamabad: Islamic Research
Institute, 1984), chapters 1 and 4.
209
virtue of its nature, this intellectual activity
(iitihad)
led the jurists to work at discovering legal solutions; this

resulted in the flourishing of Islamic jurisprudence,
especially during the early period of the Abbasid
caliphate.4 In the Sunni Islamic tradition, four major
schools of law: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. When
Baghdad fell in the middle of the thirteenth century C.E.,
intellectual activities began to diminish. Added to this
decline was the fact that the Sunni jurists unanimously
agreed to close the gate of iitihad and to be content with
the four above-mentioned legal schools. The result was
intellectual stagnation as restraint of thought and blind
imitation in jurisprudence became predominant.5
4For a good review of Islamic law and jurisprudence,
see N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1964); Kemal A. Faruki, Islamic
Jurisprudence (ed. 2nd) (Karachi: National Book Foundation,
1974), 152-165; and his Islam : Today and Tomorrow (Karachi:
Pakistan Publishing House, 1974), chap. 8 and Chp. 15. See
also, Duncan Black McDonald, Development of Muslim Theology.
Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory (New York: Russel &
Russel, 1965); Ahmad Hasan, The Earlv Development of Islamic
Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1982),
39-51; Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence. Revised edition (Cambridge: Islamic Text
Society, 1991).
5Fazlur Rahman, Islam (New York: Anchor Book, 1968),
81-89. The question of iitihad has been, however, reopened
in modern Islam with vehemence by modernist thinkers such as
'Abduh and Afghani. 'Abduh asserted that Muslim solidarity
began to decline during the Abbasid era early in the third
Muslim century. He later traced splits in the Muslim
community that led to the weakening of the Muslim world back
to the murder of the third caliph *Uthman. See, Muhammad
Abduh, Risaiah al-Tawhld (Cairo: Par al-Ma'arif. n.d.) 2630. See also, al-Urwah al-Wuthaa (Beirut; Par al-Kitab al'Arabi. 1980) 74.
210
For Muslim reformists, the closure of iitihad violated

the provisions and concepts of Islamic jurisprudence, for it
imposed upon contemporary Muslims rulings based on the
conditions that had prevailed at the time of early jurists
and forced them to follow the pattern the early jurists had
set for themselves and their generation. Therefore, they
argued, the remedy for this intellectual stagnation lies in
opening what previous jurists had closed. Only then could
restraint of thought be eliminated and freedom of
interpretation in Islamic jurisprudence be achieved. In this
view, the door of iitihad should be opened wide for anyone
qualified in the study of jurisprudence.6
In the light of the reformists' perception that most
Islamic countries had fallen behind, and that many had
experienced backwardness as a result of the stagnation of
scholarly activities, a cultural shift began to occur. While
Islamic scholarship had stagnated and departed ever further
from the Qur'anic spirit, Europe had emerged and taken
command, as the European Renaissance led to the Age of
Enlightenment. The only way to bring about improvements in
conditions for Muslims, contended the Muslim reformists, was
to return to the true principles of Islam. Muslims ought to
6For details on the Salafi claim regarding iitihad. see

David Deans Commins overview in Islamic Reform. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1990) 65-89. See also, Wael B.
Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" International
Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 3-41.
211
manage their way of life according to the spirit of Islam

and the requirements of science and civilization. Muslims
have to choose between two courses: the course of darkness
and backwardness, of ignorant imitators, or the course of
light and knowledge, as exemplified by the Prophet and the
pious predecessors.
During the closing years of the nineteenth century,
reformist ideas were initially brought to Indonesia, either
directly by the hai~i returnees who passed them on by word of
mouth, or indirectly, through various publications and
journals circulating among the santri Muslims in Indonesia.
Gradually, an increasing number of Indonesian Muslims became
aware of what was happening in the Muslim world,
particularly in Egypt. By the turn of the century, the
reformist ideas as developed by Jamaiuddln Al-Afghani (d.
1897), Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh (d.1905), and his protege
Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), began to creep into
Indonesian Muslim society.
In general, the fundamental principle of the reformists
could be traced back to at least two intertwined strands.
The first strand was the "turn to scripturalism," which
stressed the exclusive authority of the Qur'an and the
Sunnah in determining what constitutes Islamic beliefs and
practices. Scripturalism, reformism, and orthodox revival,
which had been in currency since the eighteenth century,
212
though initially introduced by certain Sufis,7 were widely

held to have been initiated by the Wahhabi movement in
Arabia.8 The followers of this strand of thought urged
rAgainst the corruption of religion and uncontrolled
popular religious practices, along with the moral
degeneration prevalent in Muslim society, Shaykh Ahmad
Sirhindi of India (d. 1625) laid strong emphasis on
Shari'ah values reinforced through Sufi practices. Through
Sufism, Islamic orthodoxy was given a new life and a new
direction. Another agent of reformism was 'Abd al-Qadir alJazairl (d. 1883), the leading symbol of resistance to the
French conquest of Algeria, who headed an independent state
between 1832 and 1847. A Sufi Shaykh of the Shadhili order,
Al-JazSirl, in his Syrian exile, contributed to the
emergence of the Salafi reform movement and brought together
Egyptian reformers and his followers among the 'ulama of
Damascus. Both Sirhindi and Al-Jazairi represented a
different strain of religious reform from that of the
Wahhabis. Furthermore, the eighteenth century Middle-East
also witnessed an intellectual orthodox revival different
from that of the Wahhabis, represented by two great Yemenite
scholars, Muhammad al-Murtada (d. 1790) and Muhammad ibn
'Ali al-Shaukani (d.1834). See, Rahman, Islam. 240-249, and
Commins, Islamic Reform. 12-36.
^ h e Wahhabi movement is named after Muhammad ibn 'Abd
al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the originator of this movement. Ibn
'Abd al-Wahhab was born into a Hanbali family residing in
Najd, Central Arabian Region. He had been a Sufi adept in
his youth, but later came under the influence of the
writings of Ibn Taymlyyah (d.1327/1328 C.E.), whose bitter
denunciation of superstitious sufi accretions had a decisive
influence upon him. In his treatise, Kitab al-Tawhxd (The
Book of Unity) 'Abd al-Wahhab attacked, among other things,
the belief in the intersession of the Prophet and excessive
veneration of the saints. In 1740 he began to call for the
reform of religious practices, and later, in 1745, he
transformed his mission into a powerful political movement
by allying himself with Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, the ruler of a
Najd town. During the following thirty years the SaudiWahhabi alliance gradually extended its dominion over all of
central Arabia and Hijaz. The Wahhabis took an
uncompromising stand against what was believed to be bid *ah
(religious innovation) as practiced by Muslims of the day.
The movement also regarded as an unbeliever (kafir) anyone
who rejected their creed. Accordingly, the Wahhabis aroused
the animosity of Muslims who considered their reform ideas
too harsh and rigid to be compatible with Islamic tenets.
213
Muslims to return to a simple lifestyle and to purify their

religion from polytheistic implications and also inveighed
against the conservatism which insisted on promulgating only
one school of jurisprudence. The second strand, which was
closely related to, and even reinforced the first strand,
was the idea of reinterpreting the Islamic teachings as
opposed to subscribing to the customary interpretations that
could no longer provide foundation for Muslim vitality.
Hence this strand of thought concerned itself with meeting
the challenge of the West.9
'Abduh, the renowned reformer, cooperated with his
mentor al-Afghani, who consistently promoted the cause of
Islamic unity in order to oppose European domination.
'Abduh, in particular, was of the opinion that Muslims could
unite only by adhering to Islam's true principles and by
abandoning the innovations generally considered part of the
religion. In addition, 'Abduh contended that the only way to
meet the challenge of the West was to make use of science
and technology for the advancement of Islamic society, while
by the same token holding fast to the original source of
Islam. 'Abduh, therefore, called on Muslim scholars, through
his rationalistic approach, to get rid of fabricated
See, Commins, Islamic Reform. 21-24. See also, Rahman,

Islam. 240-245.
90n the Wahhabi movement, see H. St. John Philby, Saudi
Arabia (New York: Praeger, 1955) 1-146; Rahman, Islam. 237260.
214
prophetic oral reports and to discredit the fatalistic

attitudes among Muslims which obstructed the voluntarist
view necessary to revival.10
'Abduh7s ideas, which developed in the context of the
late nineteenth century Egypt, found a positive response
among the religious scholars of many Muslim countries who
found in them parallels to the reality of their own
societies. Indonesian Muslim scholars, who were in need of a
strategy to meet the challenge of backwardness and Western
domination, were quick to see the advantage of these
reformist ideas. What was the impact of these reform ideas
on the Indonesian society? Before answering this question it
will be necessary to review the position of Islam in
Indonesia prior to the coming of these new ideas and
thoughts.
Islam in Indonesia did not really put down roots among
the people until it was preached by the Sufis in the
thirteenth century. During this period the Sufis had played
an increasingly important role in preserving the unity of
the Islamic world after the fall of Baghdad in 1258. Their
success was also based on their characteristic readiness to
build on the past and enroll elements of local belief and
custom into the service of Islam. It was, therefore, the
specific nature of Sufism that facilitated the absorption of
10See, al-'Urwah al-wuthaa (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab alArabi, 1980); and Risaiah al-tawhld (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif,
n.d) .
215
non-Muslim communities into the fold of Islam. During this

time, two Islamic disciplines dominated Islamic educational
centers in Indonesia: mysticism and the jurisprudence of the
Shafi'i school. The method of training in these educational
centers (pesantren^ did not produce satisfactory results in
challenging the penetration into Islam of indigenous
practices, on the one hand, and the Western and secular
trends brought by the colonial power on the other. The rise
of reform movements in the eighteenth century and of
modernism in the nineteenth, both of which led to
puritanical attacks on what were believed to be the
accretions and innovations of centuries, marked the decline
of the dominant position of the mystical trend in Indonesian
Islam. Subsequently, many Indonesians became aware that they
would not be able to meet the challenge of Dutch
colonialism, Christian penetration, and Islam's admixture of
local beliefs and its struggle for advancement unless they
introduced changes and reforms and improved the traditional
activities intended to uphold Islam.
It is worth mentioning that prior to the coming of
reformist ideas, although the Indonesian people generally
regarded themselves as Muslims, they were not all devoted
Muslims. A good number of them still practiced Islam with
some admixture of local customs, some of which, however,
derived from Islamic mystical roots. It was this phenomenon
that led
some western scholars like Geertz, Van Leur and
2 1 6
others to describe Indonesian Muslims, particularly the

Javanese, as syncretic in nature, and deeply influenced by
Hindu-Javanese traditions.11 They further asserted, to the
great annoyance of most Indonesians, that Islam was no more
than a thin veneer of symbols overlaid on what was
essentially animism. But whether Indonesian Muslims were
influenced by heterodox Islamic mysticism or by Hinduanimism, a number of corrective educational, social,
political and religious movements of reformist character
appeared in opposition, one of which was the Muhammadiyah
movement.
Historically, the seed of Islamic reformist movements
in Indonesia could be traced as far back as the early years
of the nineteenth century. Certain prominent students of
Islamic sciences who returned from Makkah brought back the
ideas of the Wahhabi movement to their respective areas in
Sumatra. They initiated the same kind of puritanism and
started to denounce the influence of local custom believed
to be at variance with the pristine tenets of Islam.
11The question as to whether the majority of the

Javanese Muslims, namely the abanqan variant, were primarily
influenced by the pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist-animistic
traditions is a moot one. Woodward strongly criticizes
Geertz in his treatment of the Javanese religious practices.
Woodward believes, with good cause, that many of those
religious practices have their roots in Islamic practices
and beliefs, particularly if we look at them from the Sufi
perspective. Mark Woodward, "The Shari'ah and the Doctrine."
See also, Mark Woodward, "The Slamatan: Textual Knowledge
and Ritual Performance in Central Javanese Islam", in
History of Religions. 28, 1, (1988), 54-89.
217
Inspired by the Wahhabis, they were able to organize and

disseminate reform ideas in such a way that they posed an
immense threat to the kaum adat (local custom).12 As a
result, an inevitable antagonism developed between the newly
introduced reformist movement and the faction favoring the
deeply rooted local customs. This antagonism between the two
conflicting parties led to an open war in both Minangkabau
and in Aceh, as was indicated in the preceding chapter.13
Thus the historical data suggest that the reformist ideas in
Islam originating from outside the geographical territory of
Indonesia had a large impact inside it.
The Factor of 'Abduh's Reform
According to those who advocate the view that MiddleEastern reformist ideas had a strong impact on Indonesian
religious life in general, and on Kiyai Dahlan in
particular,14 the birth of the Muhammadiyah was the direct
12Among those prominent scholars who were inspired by
the Wahhabi reform were Thaher Djalaluddin (d. 1927), Haji
Abdullah Ahmad (d. 1933), Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah (d.
1945), and Muhammad Jamil Djambek (d. 1947). Their fame has
never faded and their contribution to the religious reform
in Sumatra continues to be highly regarded. See, Noer, The
Modernist Muslim Movement. 30-42.
13See, foot note no. 7, chapter 3 of this dissertation.
14See, Gottfreid Simon, The Progress and Arrest of
Islam in Sumatra (London: Marshal Brothers, Ltd., 1912) 2729, and Omar Amin Hoesin, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Politik
Modern di Indonesia," Hikmah. Vol VIII No 21/22 (1955) 2426, as cited by Noer, The Modernist Movement. 28. Both
authors affirmed that 1Abduh's reform ideas had exercised
more influence among the Muslims in Indonesia than those of
218
and logical result of this influence. The reformist movement

led by Afghani and 'Abduh, which grew in the Middle East in
the last part of the nineteenth century, was regarded as the
logical extension of the early Wahhabi reform movement.
Hence, this movement, through one means or another,
contributed to the growth of Indonesian Islamic modernism.
Of the two reform figures, 'Abduh's ideas were considered to
have had the most significant and lasting influence on the
birth of the Muhammadiyah. This, perhaps, owes to the fact
that 'Abduh, like Dahlan, was concerned more with promoting
the educational rather than the political aspects of the
reform program.
Although the expounders of this view admit that there
was substantial evidence that Dahlan offered new and modern
interpretations
of certain religious issues prior to his
acquaintance with 'Abduh's works, nevertheless the latter's

Islamic rationalism and religious liberalism, to a large
degree, influenced the former.15 In the face of a situation
any other reformists of Makkah or Istanbul. See also, Robert
Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1963), 15; A.H. Johns "Islam and
Cultural Pluralism," 202-204.
15Mukti Ali, the former Minister of Religious Affairs
of the Republic of Indonesia and a leading contemporary
figure in the Muhammadiyah movement, indicated the
significant influence of the Middle-East reform ideas on
Indonesian Islam. He further suggested that Arab countries
clearly took the place that India had occupied in former
centuries in term of influence. A. Mukti Ali, Alam Pikiran
Islam Modern di Indonesia (Djakarta: 1964). Before him
Hamka, the renowned scholar and the late chairman of 'Ulama
Council of Indonesia, also affirmed 'Abduh's influence on
219
in which the realities of Indonesian, particularly Javanese

Islam was displaying syncretic and non-modernistic
tendencies, Dahlan, in addressing this predicament, was very
much influenced by the thought of 'Abduh. Such an influence
was evidenced in Dahlan's adaptation of the idea of
returning to orthodoxy, but in the sense of a modern and
culturally-absorbed Islam. This could be further seen in the
Muhammadiyah's emphasis on the creation of a new social
structure which would transform the Islamic values embodied
in the Qur'an and the Sunnah into a new Islamic culture.
Furthermore, Dahlan's agenda, in devoting his attention
almost exclusively to advancing Islamic educational quality,
was also regarded as an indication of the fact that Dahlan
had come under 'Abduh's spell or, at least, that he held
'Abduh's thought in high esteem.
Indonesian Islam. See his article Penaaruh Muhammad Abduh di

Indonesia (The Influence of Muhammad 'Abduh in Indonesia),
(Djakarta: 1961) (originally a lecture given at Al-Azhar
University in Cairo when receiving an honorary doctor's
degree on January 21st, 1958). Some, however, suggest that
the influence of Abduh over Dahlan can't be convincingly
substantiated. The fact that the two reformers appear to
have worked toward the same end could also be seen as a
logical historical development. Though 'Abduh was among the
first to open the sluice doors and exposed the Islamic
tradition to fresh currents, those who came after him might
have been subject to other influences as well. In the words
of Alfian, "Dahlan was completely in a very much different
context than that of 'Abduh; Dahlan was born in a society
where the actual role of Islam was very much lower than that
in Egypt." See, Alfian, The Muhammadiyah. 152, and Kerr,
Malcolm H., Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories
of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1966), 15.
220
It is pertinent to suggest here that the Muhammadiyah's

inclination to adopt modern ideas and methods, its views of
politics, as well as its non-oppositional nature against the
establishment, all indicated the impact of, or, at least, a
sympathetic echo of 'Abduh's ideas. These reformist ideas
were brought to Indonesia through periodicals like al-*Urwah
al-wuthaS (Indissoluble Bond),16 or al-ManSr17 (Minaret),
which articulated Muslim resentment of European aggression
and called on the *Ulam5 to purify Islam of ill innovation.
The periodicals also contained *Abduh's urging of the Muslim
community not to be left behind in the competition with the
West. These periodicals, which were suppressed by the Dutch
authorities and denied legal entry into Indonesia, reached
Dahlan through smuggling or under-cover posts.18
In addition to the above-mentioned periodicals, there
was another reformist journal by the name of al-Imam which
was instrumental in spreading the ideas of 'Abduh in
Southeast Asia. This journal was published and edited in
Singapore by a leading Indonesian religious scholar, Thaher
Jalaluddin, with the support of an Arab community with close
16Jam5l al-din al-Afghani (1839-1897), who championed

political reforms in the Islamic world, and his protege
'Abduh (1849-1905), issued and edited this periodical in
Paris in 1884.
17A monthly periodical which was first published in
Cairo on 17 March 1898, under the editorship of 'Abduh and
his disciple, Rashid Rida.
18Noer, The Modernist Movement. 32.
221
ties to their compatriots in Indonesia.19 The journal was

patterned to a large extent on the al-Man3r periodical and,
therefore, attracted a number of Indonesian scholars to the
doctrine of Islamic modernism advocated by 'Abduh. "It was
from the Egyptian modernist movement that the writers and
sponsors of al-Im5m derived, almost in totality, their
reformist ideas," suggested Roff.20
'Abduh's reformist ideas also found their ways to
Dahlan through the organization of Jamiat Kheir. As
indicated earlier, many Arab teachers were invited to teach
in the organization's school. At least two of those Arab
teachers who advocated *Abduh's ideas in Indonesia
established cordial relations with Dahlan. These were Shaykh
Muhammad Noer, who studied at Al-Azhar from 1899 to 1906,
during which time he was a student of 'Abduh, and the second
was Shaykh Ahmad Surkati, who helped to found the Al-Irshad
19Shaykh Thaher was born in North Sumatra in 1869, and

had his religious training in the Middle East. He was so
much attached to Al-Azhar University where he studied for
four years, that he added to al-Azhari to his name. In 1927
he visited his home town and was then detained by the Dutch
for six months, after which he settled in Singapore and
devoted his entire life to his school al-Iabal al-lsl5mivvah
and his journal al-Im3m. Noer, The Modernist Movement. 3334.
20William R. Roff, The Origin of Malay Nationalism (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 59.
222
reformist organization, in 1913, in jakarta,21 shortly

after his resignation from the Jamiat Kheir school in the
same year. A commonly-repeated story of an accidental
meeting between Surkati and Dahlan has also been seen as
attesting to Dahlan's admiration for 'Abduh's writings.22
It appears that it can be stated with certainty that Dahlan
was already acquainted with, or impressed by, 'Abduh7s ideas
prior to the establishment of the Muhammadiyah.23
21A1-Irsh5d was founded by Arab traders in 1913, who
left the Jamiat Kheir following a dispute among the Arab
members of the organization over the position of sveds (the
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) within the organization
and within the Muslim community in general. In line with the
fatwa of Rashid Rida, who stressed that Islam championed
equality among all humans, regardless of blood lineage, race
and wealth, Surkati did not recognize the elevated position
of a certain group before God, except through pious deeds.
Surkati, who was the spiritual leader of the Al-IrshSd. was
born in Sudan into a religious family. He arrived in Jakarta
in 1911, but for reasons alluded to above, left Jamiat Kheir
in 1913 and opened a school of his own at his residence
before he joined Al-Irsh5d. However, between 1920 to 1924,
he left Al-Irshad in order to create unity within the Arab
community in Indonesia.
22The story was widely known among the Muhammadiyah
circle, particularly among those who confirmed 'Abduh/s
influence on Dahlan: Dahlan and Surkati were on a train trip
sitting face to face without knowing each other. To
Surkati7s great surprise, he saw Dahlan was reading part of
the Tafslr al-man5r of 'Abduh. He could not believe his eyes
a native reading such a scholarly work! Surkati then
initiated a conversation with Dahlan. The story suggests
that the conversation led to a mutual pledge to work for the
spread of 'Abduh's ideas in their respective communities.
Noer, The Modernist Movement. 76.
23There is another piece of evidence for Dahlan's
active interaction with 'Abduh's reform ideas, narrated by
Djarnawi. According to him, Haji Bagir, a religious scholar
and native of Yogyakarta who had resided in Makkah since
1890, arranged a meeting between Dahlan and Rashid Rida when
both were in Makkah for pilgrimage. Djarnawi, further
223
To substantiate their argument, the advocates of this

view also sought to draw certain parallels between the ideas
and attitudes of both reformers. Aside from the "nearly"
identical reform programs24 initiated by 'Abduh and Dahlan
and their critical stance on the Christian missionary
activities,25 there were two other important issues shared
by both in the pursuit of their reform works. The first was
the non-confrontational of their relationship to colonial
rule: both reformers did not seek to impinge on colonial
affirmed that this meeting had "sowed the seed" of reform

ideas in Dahlan's heart. See, Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Dari
Jamaluddin A1-Afghani Samnai KH. Ahmad Dahlan (Yogyakarta:
Persatuan, n.d), 75. Another point of interest that
indicates Dahlan's great admiration for 'Abduh's thought was
the inclusion of 'Abduhs works in the curriculum of the
Muhammadiyah's schools. In particular, 'Abduh's RisSlat alTawhld was translated into Indonesian by Dahlan's student,
Muhammad Hani, to be used in the Muhammadiyah schools as an
important point of reference in theology and Qur'anic
exegesis. See, Mukti Ali, The Muhammadiyah Movement. 53, 78.
24'Abduh's program, as summarized by Gibb, is as
follows:
1. The purification of Islam from corrupting influences and
practices;
2. The reformation of Muslim higher education;
3. The reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of
modern thought; and
4. The defense of Islam against European influences and
Christian attacks. See, H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in
Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 33.
25While 'Abduh was engaged in writing a critical work
on the Christian missionary activities in his al-Isl5m wa
al- Nasranivvah ma 'al 'ilm wa al-madanivvah (Cairo: n.p.,
1902), Dahlan was working in the practical field by
challenging their deep penetration into Indonesia.
224
authority, and therefore, enjoyed freedom in their reform

careers.26 The second was their attitude towards Sufism.
While Western scholars tend to think that religious
reform and Sufism are diametrically opposed, both 'Abduh and
Dahlan took a milder position than has sometimes been
supposed. Both made a distinction between the ecstatic
rituals of popular Sufi orders and the "Sober" Sufism
characteristic of elite and accepted orders and individuals.
Both 'Abduh and Dahlan sought a middle position on
controversial issues regarding Sufism.27 They believed that
26Just as Dahlan did not denounce the colonial rule in
order to ensure a steady pursuit of his reform program,
'Abduh found in the British a powerful patron to support his
program for reforming Egypt's religious institutions. 'Abduh
and Rida enjoyed freedom under British rule partly because
their challenge to traditional religious authority did not
impinge on Britain's authority. Commins, Islamic Reform. 6064.
27Assessing Dahlan's words and admonitions, no one can
escape noticing his sufistic tendencies. This tendency
becomes more conspicuous as we hear the early Sufi masters'
words echo in Dahlan's statements. Just like the early
Sufis, who lived under the threat of the last judgement,
Dahlan spoke constantly about death and what ought to be
done to prepare for doomsday. This tendency of Dahlan was
clearly observed by his students. A.J. Anies, who was one of
Dahlan's students, started his quotation from Dahlan's
Teaching; Pearls of Wisdom as follows: "We humans are given
as a trust only one life in this world. After you die, you
will be either saved or damned." See, Peacock, Purifying
Faith. 39. The roots of his sayings on the fear of the day
of reckoning went back to Hasan al-Basri, (d. 728). Dahlan's
emphasis on sincerity, as reflected in his constant
admonition to stay away from riva' (hypocrisy) is traceable
to the utterances of Al-Muhasiby (d. 857), and his repeated
strong reminders about death are very much in conformity
with the aphorisms of Yahya ibn Mu'adh (d. 871). Even
Dahlan's aloofness from speculative thought and theological
discussion and, rather, his concern with practical works is
clearly parallel to the wisdom of Sahl Al-Tustari (d. 896).
225
true Sufism entails humility, sincerity and constant

alertness, but, by the same token, true Sufism never impedes
the pursuit of worldly responsibility. While both approved
of Sufi practices that observed the bounds of permissible
worship, they despised and denounced the outrageous
practices of the popular Sufi orders and radically-oriented
heterodox Sufism. While 'Abduh and Dahlan regretted that
non-Islamic ideas tainted many Sufi practices, they both had
profound experiences with Sufism as young men. Both were
raised in a cultural and intellectual milieu steeped in Sufi
Therefore, we can scarcely agree with anyone who considers

Dahlan to have an aversion to Sufism. The following saying
attributed to Dahlan, and posted beside his desk as a selfreminder, bears witness to what we suggest. It reads:
0 Dahlan, indeed the fright is more awesome (than
you can imagine), and horrifying things await you.
Nor is there a way out for you;
You shall see these things either as
one savedor
suffering injury.
Appraise yourself before God alone as you face
death, which will be followed by your standing
before God for the final reckoning:
Either to paradise or to hellfire.
See, Hadjid, Falsafah Pelaiaran Ki. h. Ahmad Dahlan
(Yogyakarta: Siaran, n.d) 8. See also, A.Schimmelle,
Mystical Dimension of Islam. 30, 31, 42, 51-54, 86. For
additional information on the Muhammadiyah's Sufi elements,
see, Mitsuo Nakamura, "Sufi Elements in Muhammadiyah?: Notes
from Field Observation," a paper read at the Fifth Annual
Conference of the Australian Association for the Study of
Religion (Canberra, Australia, 11-15 May, 1980).
226
traditions. Hence their approval of sober Sufism should not

appear strange.28
In sum, both 'Abduh's reformist ideas and the
Muhammadiyah movement were basically religious in character,
for both were rooted in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Both
championed iitihSd (independent reasoning) and denounced
taalld (acceptance of established ideas as having an
authoritative character). In addition, both made Ibn
Taymiyyah's views their prime source of reference.29 In
28It is perhaps not out of place to note that many
scholars mistakenly identify the Muhammadiyah movement as an
anti-Sufi movement and, therefore, loosely associate it with
the Wahhabi reform movement. Based on my own-albeit limitedobservation, the Muhammadiyah movement, particularly during
its formative stage, had never been an anti-Sufi movement,
let alone affiliated to the Wahhabi movement. Many
overlooked the fact that at the Third Al-Islam Congress at
Surabaya on December 24, 1924, Indonesian Muslims, both
traditionalist and reformist, convened to discuss, among
other things, the teachings of the Muhammadiyah. The
congress decided that the Muhammadiyah was not Wahhabi,
because it was considered not to have deviated from a
madhhab (legal school). Interestingly enough, what has been
mistakenly ascribed to Ibn Taymiyyah as being anti-Sufi held
true for the Muhammadiyah as well. Makdisi, in this respect,
has debunked the notion that the followers of the Hanbali
legal school reject Sufism; instead he demonstrated that Ibn
Taymiyyah himself belonged to the Sufi order of aloadiriwah. which was founded by the renowned hanbali
preacher and Sufi master 'Abdulqadir al-Jaiiant. See, Noer,
The Modernist Movement. 228, and George Makdisi, "Ibn
Taymiyyah; A Sufi of the Qadiriya Order," American Journal
of Arabic Studies 1 (1977): 118-130. Indeed Ibn Taymiyyah's
view on certain Sufi masters like al-Junaid, Sahl alTustary, al-Fudail ibn 1Iyad and even al-Ghazaii, was in
certain respects, positive. Ibn Taymiyyah himself wrote such
treatises on Sufism as al-Tuhfah al-*Iraqiwah fi al-a'mai
al-Oalbivvah. in which he explicitly exposed his sufi
tendencies.
290n Dahlan's reform ideas see, Puar, Periuanaan dan
Penaabdian Muhammadiyah. 167-174.
227
view of this, the upholders of the above theory of *Abduh's

reform factor have every reason to regard the Muhammadiyah7s
reform ideas as influenced by or having a clear relationship
to what had been propagated by Abduh7s school of reform in
Egypt.
The Factor of internal Antagonism

in the Javanese Society
Those who play down the significance of the Middle-East

Reform variable30 assert that, though Muhammadiyah7s birth
came at roughly the same time as the emergence of reformism
in the Middle-East, Indonesian religious reform, and
particularly the work of Dahlan, should be regarded as
parallel to, and not a result of the latter. To them, a
closer look at the history of the Javanese religious life
and the general state of affairs prior to the formation of
the Muhammadiyah will unravel the above assumption. To them,
the birth of this movement was no more than a result of a
long evolutionary process of antagonism between two large
groups in the Javanese community. The twin elites of the
island of Java were the lukewarm Muslims of the priyavi
30One of those scholars is Vlekke. He suggests that the

influence of Islamic reform ideas on the Muhammadiyah mainly
came from India instead of Egypt. Whether or not the modern
Islamic movements of India had any contribution to the birth
of the Muhammadiyah is an interesting issue to be explored.
See, H. B. Vlekke, The Storv of the Dutch East Indies
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 184,
228
(nobility)31 faction on the one hand, and the committed

Muslims of the santri faction on the other.32 The
relationship between the two has included both violent
confrontation and fruitful collaboration.33 However, the
dominant pattern has been one of misunderstanding and
mistrust rather than of cooperation and friendliness.34 To
shed some light on the history of this conflict it is
worthwhile to trace the process of Islamization in Java. For
31The word privavi derives from two words of para and

vavi. meaning "little siblings of the noble king." The term
later expanded its usage to include civil servants. See,
Soedjito Sosrodihardjo, Perubahan Struktur Masvarakat di
Piawa (The Change of the Social Structure in Java)
(Yogyakarta: Penerbit Karya, 1968), 18.
32For a good review of the varieties of religious
experience of the Javanese, see Roy F. Ellen, "Social
Theory, Ethnography and the Understanding of Practical Islam
in Southeast Asia," in Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. M.B.
Hooker (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983), 54-70.
33The revolt against the Dutch led by Prince Diponegoro
in 1825-30 was a perfect example of santri-privavi
cooperation in resisting the political and economic
encroachments of colonial rule.
^The contrast between the orthodox and the
"syncretist" variants of Javanese religion has commonly been
expressed in the terms of santri-abanaan variants. Geertz
has popularized these terms in his Religion of Java. For
further discussion on this issue, see, Koentjaraningrat,
"Review of The Religion of Java by Clifford Geertz" in
Madialah Ilmu-ilmu Sastra Indonesia (1963), No. 1, 188-191,
Soedjito Sosrodihardjo, Religious Life in Java: Sociographv
Indonesia and Adat (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Pembina Hukum Adat,
1963), and Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary,"
85-118. It is worthwhile to note that the use of term
shari'a-minded to stand for the term Santri. has been also
used by Marshal Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (3 vols)
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974),
vol 1, 318, 315; see also, A.C Milner, "Islam and the Muslim
State" in Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. by M.B. Hooker, 37.
229
any attempt to understand the nature of the religious reform

movement and the cultural heritage of the peoples of
Indonesia must take into consideration the role of Islam in
this society.
Historically, Yogyakarta, where Dahlan was born and
raised and later established the Muhammadiyah movement, was
also the seat of the Mataram kingdom of Java.35 The Mataram
dynasty, since the sixteenth century, had been the dominant
force in central Javanese political and cultural life. It
had shaped both popular religion and the Javanese literary
tradition. This kingdom, to which the contemporary courts of
Yogyakarta and Surakarta are heirs, was so important that
during its era the process of the Islamization of Java took
place. By the same token the seed of the above-rooted
antagonism within the Javanese society can also be traced
back to this kingdom.
When Islam penetrated the coastal areas of Java and
established itself at the center of trading ports and power
in the area, it began to contest the Hindu-Javanese
Majapahit empire. Soon after, the first Islamic states
located on the northern and eastern coasts were established.
As a result, the Islamized coastal areas succeeded in
35Mataram was a large kingdom of Java that lasted from

the late 16th century to the 18th century, when the Dutch
came to actual power in Java. Mataram was originally a
vassal of Pajang, but it became powerful under Senopati who
defeated Pajang and became the first king of Mataram.
Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 36-38.
230
freeing themselves from the authority of the Majapahit

empire and continued to pursue the process of Islamization
in the whole of Java. As the Islamized principalities grew
stronger, the power of the Majapahit empire continued to
decline, weakened by feuds within its royal family. It was
eventually overshadowed by Mataram, the last stronghold of
the Hindu-Javanese kingdom.36
Faced with the sweeping progress of the Islamized
principalities, the Mataram dynasty decided to safeguard its
mile by conversion to Islam. In the words of Alfian,
. . . the move had proven to be a very shrewd political
strategy, not only because it had saved the establishment,
but it had also opened a new outlet for further political
moves.37 This conversion, however, did not end the power
struggle between the Muslim kingdom of Demak and the
Islamized Hindu-Javanese kingdom of Mataram.
The conflict seems to have begun in the first half of
the sixteenth century with the determination of the Muslim
Woodward, Islam in Java. 8-11. For a good account on
Mataram and the Islamic states, see Ricklefs, A History of
Modern Indonesia. 29-55.
37Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 137. Interestingly enough, for
some Mataram's political move expressed by its conversion to
Islam, followed by an intensive efforts to revive preIslamic culture, much resembles the conversion of Ban!
U m a w a h . the early opponents of Islam during the Fath Makkah
(the reconquest of Makkah by the Prophet Muhammad). Both the
Mataram kingdom and the Umayyad dynasty, while claiming to
be the legal representatives of Islamic nations, sought to
revive pre-Islamic values. In the case of the latter, preIslamic Arabism and the tribal culture of nepotism were
systematically revived during their reign.
231
rulers of Demak to rule over the whole of Java. The climax

of the conflict took place in the first half of the
seventeenth century when the ruler of Mataram, Sultan Agung
(1613-1645), using Islam as his justification, took the
offensive and destroyed the Muslim coastal principalities.
As a Muslim kingdom, Mataram succeeded in unifying the whole
Javanese society and became the largest kingdom in Javanese
history after Majapahit. It was the victory of the Mataram
kingdom which was to be largely responsible for the nature
of Islam in Java and for what it bore of inner
antagonism.38
Furthermore, the committed Muslim groups who migrated
from the.coastal to the inland areas of Java greatly
expedited the Islamization of the countryside and the
villages. As they settled in those villages, they
established religious schools, gathered groups of students,
and transmitted Islamic knowledge to them. The whole complex
of learning was referred to as a pesantren. which gradually
became the heart of "orthodox" Islam. The group around it
was known as santri.39
For a good discussion on the antagonism between the

Mataram rulers and the Islam-oriented group of Demak, see,
Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 33-46; Woodward,
Islam In Java. 58-60.
39For a discussion of the santri pattern of Javanese
society, see, Harsya Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java; a
Commentary," in Madialah Ilmu-ilmu Sastra Indonesia (1973)
No. 5, 85-118.
232
While the socio-economic and religious life of Muslim

society in the coastal areas was disrupted, Mataram in the
interior enjoyed a golden age of great revival of
traditional Javanese culture and literature. These elements
from the Hindu-Javanese past were combined in court culture
with the practice of Islam. In this process of cultural
synthesis, the Mataram rulers continued to have great regard
for their Hindu-influenced culture, to the extent of
syncretizing Islam with it. As a result, they tended to aid
and abet the delution of whatever character Islam had when
it first reached the shores of Java. Innovations in
religious practices were initiated through insertion of
local and Hindu elements into Islam. From this mixture of
syncretic religious beliefs and court culture developed the
privavi way of life.
In this respect, Sultan Agung appears to have done much
to turn the tide in favor of the privavi culture. His
conquest of the coastal states eliminated the political
power of Mataram7s orthodox-centered rivals of the santri
group. At the same time, his use of the title "sultan was
an attempt to establish his religious credentials and, by
the same token, to affirm the religious legitimacy of his
kingdom/0 To complete what Sultan Agung began, and in
order further to subordinate the santri group, his son,
*G. Mudj anto, The Concept of Power in Javanese
Culture. (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1986),
20-35.
233
Mangkurat I, ordered the execution of between five and six

thousand 'ulamg (religious scholars).41 This brutal act
seems to have broken the resistance of the santri group
against the privavi Mataram. In their nominal acceptance of
Islam, the large majority of the Javanese peasant subjects
followed in the footsteps of the Mataram rulers and remained
abanaan. Consequently, the santri faction of society was in
the clear minority in comparison to the above two factions.
This reality led Hindu Javanism to prevail over the
uncontaminated teaching of Islam advocated by the santri
group.
Although the santri faction sought to restore Islamic
orthodoxy, the other two factions were reluctant to be
persuaded. This veiled antagonism not uncommonly turned into
open hostility. As the ruling privavi prevailed, the
influence of orthodox Islam almost completely waned.
Accordingly, the Mataram ruling establishment was successful
in domesticating the santri, and, by the same token, in
separating the religion of Islam from the state. Islam,
then, was made a mere subordinate to the state, as the
religious functionaries were made obedient servants of the
41B. Vlekke, Nusantara (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

1959), 175.
234
royal court.42 Javanese oral traditions describe the first

penahulu (religious functionary) as having been a grass
cutter for the sultan. Similarly, in ritual contexts, the
penahulus and other santris are ordered, not asked, to come
to the palace to pray.43
When political power passed to the Dutch in the mid
eighteenth century, the Javanese nobility turned inward,
seeking to preserve the old Javanese court culture. In this
regard, the privavi formed an important component in the
life of colonial Java, because the Dutch favored privavi
members for public offices and educational opportunities
over those of the santri groups. Thus, it is safe to say
that the Muslim coastal principalities of Demak were the
root of the santri, while the privavi faction was the
extension of the Hindu-Javanese Muslims of the Mataram
aristocracy.
42Interestingly enough, some argue that such a

condition seems to hold as well in the New Order Indonesia.
Wertheim, for example, argues that the Suharto regime
"proves itself a worthy disciple of the Dutch Islamologist,
Snouck Hurgronje, who helped to develop the Dutch Colonial
policy towards Islam." See, W. F. Wertheim, Indonesie van
Vorstenriik tot Neokolonie (Amsterdam, Mappel: Boom, 1978),
20, as cited by Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian
Islam. 145. For more than twenty years, argues Liddle, the
Suharto regime sought to place Muslim political leaders into
"the wings or off the stage entirely." R. W. Liddle,
"Indonesia's Threefold Crisis" in Journal of Democracy. Vol
3, No. 4 October 1992. Although, in our view, religious
functionaries have gained a place of respectability,
particularly during the last five years, they are still
placed in subordinate positions to the government.
43Woodward, Islam in Java. 60.
235
During the early years of the twentieth century, when

the West began to penetrate Indonesian society, it was the
privavi faction which was the first to benefit from it. They
were the first to found secular educational institutions and
to organize in the Budi Utomo. In line with the priyavi
culture, this organization was designed to have purely
secularist attitudes toward religion, along with an aim of
reviving the Javanese culture by fusing it with the Western
worldview. On the other hand, the santri group was more
discontented with colonial rule, which exhibited such
favoritism for the privavi group.
Out of this internal dichotomy emerged several theories
with regard to the study of Indonesian politics. During the
post-colonial era, more precisely during the Sukarno regime
(1945-1965) or what is presently called the "Old Order,"
some political analysts tended to identify the differences
in the political factions as a reflection of a certain
dichotomy inherent in Indonesian society, particularly the
Javanese. For instance, some put forth a theory based on
ethnic competition within Indonesian society, attributing it
to antagonism between the Javanese, as the dominant race,
and the non-Javanese.44 Others saw the dichotomy as being
between the secularist and the religionist, or between the
44This theory was put forth by Palmer in Indonesia and

the Dutch (London: 1962), and by Kahin, Nationalism and
Revolution in Indonesia.
236
communist and the anti-communist.45 Still, others cited the

influence of Javanese subcultural differences on the
political affiliation. The three groups in the Javanese
society, namely the privavi. the santri. and the abangan,
according to this theory, shaped and determined the broad
spectrum of the Indonesian political reality. The first was
associated with the nationalist faction, the second with the
Islamic, and the third with the communist.46 In the
contemporary political post-Sukarno era, or what is known as
the "New Order," Indonesia, with the absence of the
Communist Party and all its affiliated groups, the theory
seems to be of no validity, for it is no longer congruous
with the social formation. Indeed, the government party,
Golkar (Golonqan Karva or Functional Group) which was once
perceived as abangan. has become a melting pot of all
ethnic, religious and cultural groups of the society.47
Dahlan, a true representative of the santri group, was
born and raised in the religious environment in which
Islamic orthodoxy was facing a serious adversary in HinduJavanism. By the time of the founding of Budi Utomo. Dahlan
45See, for example, Robert R. Jay, Religion and
Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1963), see also Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno,
the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," in
Asian Survey. 4 (1964).
460ne of the advocates of this theory is Clifford
Geertz. See, Geertz, Religion of Java.
47Kuntowidjoya, "Religion, State, and Social Formation"
in Prisma. March, 1984, 34-46.
237
was to witness the strengthening of syncretic Islam through

the revival of privavi culture. Conditioned by this reality
and challenged by the surge of blended Islamic-Hindu
culture, Dahlan was called by his religious fervor to act
promptly to counter this wave.
For Dahlan, there was no other alternative but to
respond to the challenge. What seems to have been his
immediate response in dealing with this situation was to
establish an organization that would cleanse Javanese Islam
from the admixture of local customs and beliefs. Thus, the
birth of the Muhammadiyah was the logical response to the
"impurities" that had long been rooted in the society
created by the privavi culture. Thus, those who carefully
studied the internal antagonism in Javanese society came to
a conclusion that the main issue that prompted the emergence
of the Muhammadiyah was purification of faith more than
modernization.48
^Nakamura is one of the strong advocates of this view.
The title of his dissertation (The Crescent Arises over the
Banyan Tree) explicitly suggests the internal antagonism
between the two factions in question: the santri is
symbolized by the "crescent" while the "banyan tree" stands
for the privavi group. What Nakamura seems to suggest is
that a growing number of Javanese, both of the privavi and
the abangan variants, have moved and still are moving toward
the category of santri. A similar theory is developed by
Drewes in his article "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism,"
286. See also, Hoesein Djayadiningrat, "Islam in Indonesia"
in Islam the Straight Path: Islam Interpreted bv Muslims ed.
by Kenneth W. Morgan (New York: The Ronald Press, 1958),
384. It is interesting to point out that Geertz, who
previously suggested the superficial nature of Islam in
Java, seems to step back from his earlier thesis as he
commented on the santrinization trend among the Javanese in
238
It is important to add that, in line with the above

view that is, the significance of the internal antagonism
within Javanese society for the birth of the Muhammadiyah
some lay special stress on the rivalry between two religious
orientations which crystallized in Java soon after the
Islamization of Indonesia. These two religious orientations
were represented by the "heterodox" mysticism of the court
community of the privayi and the shari'ah-oriented Sufism of
the santri group.49
As has been alluded to above, Sufism played a
significant role in the Indonesian conversion to Islam. It
was the Sufis who actually propagated and finally made it
possible for Islam to become established among the people of
the Christian Science Monitor. January 2nd, 1986, by saying:

"I was amazed, it is strange to me, but true. The younger
generation of abanaan are becoming santri." William Liddle
also confirmed the fact that the number of santri has been
growing rapidly during the New Order, as "piety has been a
growth industry among urban Indonesians of Muslim
background, including many abangan." See, his article
"Improvising Political Cultural Change; Three Indonesian
Cases" (Athens, Ohio: Ohio Univesity Center for Southeast
Asia Studies, 1993), 24. See also, his "Media Dakwah
Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and
Action in New Order Indonesia" in Intellectual Development
in Indonesian Islam. Mark Woodward and James Rush, eds.
(Tempe: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State
University, 1993), 71-107.
490n Java and the Islamic tradition, see G.W.J.Drewes
"New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?" Biidraaen
tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde 122. 433-459. as cited by
Woodward, Islam in Java. 53. See also, S.F. Dale, Islamic
Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar
1948-1922.( London: Oxford University Press 1980), 26.
239
Indonesia.50 The success of the Sufis in spreading Islam

was mainly due to their flexibility in basing their
teachings on the traditions already in existence in the
region. However, even in doing so, they excluded what was
clearly incompatible with the basic doctrines of Islam.51
Since Islam came to Indonesia through the Indian sub
continent, the type of Sufism current in India at that time
was to influence Indonesian Islam as well. As in India,
50For the role of Sufism in the Islamization of
Indonesia, see Ismail Jakub, Seiarah Islam di Indonesia.
(Djakarta: Widjaya, 1973), 30-67; S.O. Robson, "Java at the
Crossroads: Aspect of the Javanese Cultural History in the
14th and 15th Centuries," Anthropholoqica. XXIII (SGravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 271-288; G.E. Marrison,
"The Coming of Islam to the East-Indies", JMBRAS 24, 1951,
28-37. See also, S.H. Alatas, "Reconstruction of Malaysian
History," Revue de sud-est asiaticrue. Ill (1962), 219-45;
Naguib al-Attas, Preliminary Statement.; A.H. Johns, "Muslim
Mystics and Historical Writing," in D.G.E. Hall,
ed..Historians of South East Asia (London: Oxford University
Press, 1961), 40-41.
51This view is contrary to what has been mistakenly
argued by some noted Western scholars such as Van Leur,
Schrieke, Hall, and, later, Geertz: that the Sufis'
contribution in the Indonesian conversion was essentially
their skill in syncretizing Islamic doctrines with the
existing local religious practices attendant with HinduBuddhist beliefs. Hence, they maintained that Islam in
Indonesia is no more than a thin, easily flaking layer on
the solid body of indigenous civilization. See, van Leur,
Indonesian Trade and Society. 68-69; H. Schrieke, Indonesian
Sociological Studies. I (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1957), 99;
D.G.E. Hall, "Looking at Southeast Asian History, "Journal
of Asian Studies. XIX (1960), 250; Clifford Geertz, The
Religion of Java. 125.
The fact is, Sufism has nothing to do with an attempt to
accommodate earlier beliefs in a way that may jeopardize the
doctrine of Islam. In the words of Hodgson " ... of the
Hindu past of the Muslim religious life, very little has
survived even in inner Java." M. Hodgson, The Venture of
Islam. Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Ill,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 551.
240
Sufism, from its first appearance in Indonesia, divided into

two orientations, "heterodox," theosophical Sufism, and
"orthodox" Sufism. These two distinctive currents that
invariably exist in the Indonesian society have been in
perpetual struggle for dominance,52 religiously and
politically, up to the present time.53
52Javanese tradition concerning the trial of Shaykh
Siti Jenar, who was known as the first and most important
"heretical" mystic in Java, best describes the disparity
between these two mystical orientations. Versions of, and
references to, the trial of Siti Jenar are well known in the
Javanese literature of Serat Centini and Serat Cabolek. The
text says that after Siti Jenar believed he had achieved
fana (annihilation) and attained union with God in his
mystical life, he began to neglect the ritual obligations.
As he was no longer attending the Friday prayer, his
followers took that as a denunciation of the religious
ritual observances. Siti Jenar then was put on trial by the
"nine saints" who represented the shari1ah-oriented Sufism
and condemned to death. Javanese literature bears witness to
the struggle between the then- santri group, represented by
the "nine saints," and the then-orivavi group, represented
by the "heretic mystic" Shaykh Siti Jenar. See, Alfian, The
Muhammadiyah. 74, and Woodward, Islam in Java. 102. It is
interesting to note that what happened to Siti Jenar was
almost identical to the fate of Al-Haliaj, the Muslim Sufi
who is known for his theopathic sayings. Al-Haliaj's
principle doctrines were the unity of God and man;
insistence that the saint is a perfect expression of divine
will; and the teaching that mystical union is obtained
through the desire for, and submission to, suffering. He was
imprisoned for eight years, and, after a trial lasting for
seven months, was cruelly executed and cremated in 922 C.E.
For a detailed account, see L. Massignon, The Passion of AlHallai: Mvstic and Martvr of Islam (Princeton; Princeton
53It has been suggested that the cultural dichotomy of
the Javanese society reflects the political affiliation of
each group. While the santri group were represented by the
Islamic parties, the privavi-abanaan groups were known to
belong to the nationalist and secular parties. Donald K.
Emerson, Indonesia/a Elite; Political Culture and Cultural
Politics (Ithaca: Monograph Series of Cornell University,
1967), 24.
241
Out of "heterodox" theosophical Sufism have emerged

many Javanese mystical groups that have been collectively
called Kebatinan (the Esoteric Group).54 Some of these
groups, however, reject the authority of the sharl*ah and
look at the Islamic rituals as unimportant, and even
meaningless.55
Against this religious backdrop, the santri group
represented by the Muhammadiyah movement stood up to distill
and purge Indonesian Islam of its attachment to the Javanese
cultural tradition of the privavi and the abangan group.
Thus, the advent of the Muhammadiyah must be regarded as a
development from within Javanese society rather than as a
ready-made import from the Middle East. In this view, the
birth of the Muhammadiyah constituted another expression of
the antagonism perpetually within Javanese society. Hence,
the role of the Muhammadiyah remains today, as in the past,
a persistent counter-current against the traditional
Javanese version of Islam.
54The word Kebatinan derives from the Arabic root
batin. which denotes "inward" in the sense of "the science
of the inner." Basically, Kebatinan seeks to establish a
direct relationship between the individual and God. The
radical wing of this group insist that their teachings are
based upon direct revelation from God, unmediated by any
religious law or prophet outside Java. See, H.M. Rasjidi,
Islam dan Kebatinan (Jakarta: Jajasan Islam Studi Club
Indonesia, n.d.), 75. See also, Harun Hadiwijono, Man in the
Present Javanese Mysticism (Baarn: Bosch and Keuning, 1967),
2
55J.A. Niels Mulder, "Aliran Kebatinan as an Expression

of The Javanese Worldview," Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies. II (1970), 105-116.
242
The Factor of the Christian Penetration
Those who upheld the precedence of this factor say that

the development of the Christian mission activities in Java
constituted the determining factor leading to the birth of
the Muhammadiyah. This Christian penetration started when
the authorities of the Yogyakarta court, at the urging of
the colonial government, approved the lifting of the
prohibition on the evangelization of the Javanese.56 From
that time onward, Java, which was the place of the most
concentration for the Muslim community in Indonesia, was
exposed to Christian missionary work. Beginning in the
1850s, deeper Christian penetration into the region of
Central Java was the decisive push which led to deepening
Muslim consciousness in response to these mission
activities.57
56In 1889, the colonial government finally succeeded in

imposing its desire in opening the Yogyakarta region to
Christian missionary activities, to the bitterness of the
Sultan Of Yogyakarta. The Sultan was too weak to resist the
Dutch demand motivated by religious fervor. The initial
agreement between the Dutch and the Sultan to allow the
Christian missions to operate not longer than a year was
wantonly breached by the Dutch. Suminto, Politik Islam. 23.
See also, Noer, The Modernist Movement. 167.
57A s has been mentioned earlier, the early years of the
nineteenth century in Java witnessed the arrival of
Christian missionaries. The Netherlands Missionary Society,
the first and the oldest mission society of Holland, sent
its first three missionaries to Java in 1814, and soon
thereafter they were appointed as clergymen of the State
Church of the Indies. J. Addison, The Christian Approach.
244. See also, chapter two of this dissertation.
243
Following this development, and toward the time of the

initiation of the "Ethical Policy" in the first years of the
twentieth century, Christian mission schools started to
participate in the government educational program.58 The
rise of so many mission schools awakened a Muslim religious
consciousness which changed the mood of the Muslims in the
country. The majority were disturbed by what they saw as the
imminent threat of the alien religion. For Muslims, the
Dutch admission of the preaching of the Gospel in Java was,
without a doubt, proof of the desire of the Dutch colonial
government to convert the people to Christianity.
Although the majority of the Javanese were not earnest
Muslims of the santri variety, they felt intimately
connected with Islam. Accordingly, the birth of Islamoriented organizations such as Sarekat Islam and the
Muhammadiyah were supported overwhelmingly. It was during
the peak of Christian activities in Java that the
Muhammadiyah was born.
As has been shown earlier, the Dutch attitute toward
Islam in Indonesia was characterized by ambiguity. On the
one hand, the Dutch viewed Islam as a religion toward which
58A s noted above, at the time of the initiation of the

"Ethical Policy" the Dutch home government was in the hands
of zealous Christians who supported the Christianization of
Indonesia.
244
they claimed to be neutral.59 On the other hand, they

consciously discriminated against Islam by enhancing
Christian mission activities through the flow of financial
subsidies. As further evidence of the discriminatory
attitude against Islam and the favoritism shown toward the
Christians, the Dutch did not shy away at this period from
offending the Muslims' religious sensitivity by frequently
declaring the Christian character of the colonial policy.
The Dutch proclaimed that the government of the East Indies
was a representative of a Christian nation.60
Indonesian Islam, prior to the birth of the
Muhammadiyah, was in a state of crisis due to the
backwardness of its followers, caused by its static
educational system. Both Christian mission activities and
non-Islam-based organizations seemed to have taken the lead.
This phenomenon was partly due to the increasing influence
of the Christian lobby in the Dutch government that aimed to
curb the role of Islam in Indonesia. As a result, the
59According to Article 119, section 173 of the

"Reaeerinqsreglement" (Government Regulation), the
government recognized freedom of religion and adopted a
neutral stance toward it, except when religious practices
violated the Rust en Orde (Peace and Order) laws. Noer, The
Modernist Movement. 163-64.
^The real upsurge for support to Christian
missionaries was during the tenure of Idenberg as Governor
General (1906-16) and J.H. de Waal Malefijt as Colonial
Minister (1909-13). It was after 1909 that, according to Van
Niel, "Christian mission groups rapidly extended their
activities in the archipelago." See, Niel, The Emergence of
the Modern Indonesian Elite. 83.
245
growing influence of the mission succeeded in removing

Christianity from its voluntary isolation and placing it
into the center of Indonesian life. As the influence and the
numerical strength of mission schools increased,61 many of
the prominent Indonesians sent their children to these
schools. This consequently helped the schools to acquire a
better reputation and to gain a further boost.
There was, thus, a challenge from the Christian mission
which was keenly felt by Indonesian Muslims, a challenge
which they had to face and combat by every possible means if
they wanted to keep their religion intact. The striking
success of the mission work, and its achievements in many
fields, sent a strong signal to the Muslims and made many
feel that immediate action was an imperative.62 This sense
61A s the coalition of church parties came to power in
1890, the attitude of the Dutch Government toward the
Christian mission schools began to take a favorable course.
The remarkable numerical growth of the government-subsidized
Christian schools after that time reflected this attitude.
From 1909 to 1912 the mission schools marked a record 40 per
cent increase. Van den Bosch, The Dutch East Indies. 66. It
is important to note that, prior to 1890, government
subsidies for the mission school were denied in order to
prevent any suspicion from Muslim circles. Noer, The
62The growing Islamic awareness that led Muslims to
actively challenge the Christian mission activities was one
of the concerns of the Christian Mission Conference held in
Holland in 1911. See, Vd. Spigel, "De Prediking des
Zendelings aan de Mohammaedanen", in Verslaa 25ste Algemene
Nederlandse Zendinas conferentie. 1911, 80, as cited by
Suminto, Politik Islam. 23. On the reaction of the
Indonesian Muslim to the Christian missionary's activities,
Mohammad Natsir, in his article on this theme in 1938,
acknowledged this fact. He asserted that the intense mission
246
of urgency stirred almost every Muslim concerned about the

survival of her/his religion.
The Muslims in Yogyakarta felt the urgency and were
called to found an organization that would serve to respond
to the crisis. Here the Christian mission was gradually
gaining and the influence of Islam was declining. The
Muslims of Yogyakarta felt obliged to put a halt to, or at
least to curtail, the burgeoning of the Christian mission.
The Muhammadiyah, then, was founded to offer resistance to
Christian influence.
Hence the establishment of the Muhammadiyah was viewed
as a logical development against Christian activities that
had been given extraordinary favors and strength by the
Dutch authorities.63 What the Muslims of Java did to
protect their religion was no more than what any sensible
religious group would have to do, sooner or later, in the
face of such encroachment. Christianity was generally
assumed to be competing with Islam for control of Indonesia.
activities to help educate poor Indonesians, who never had
any opportunity to study, reminded Muslims of their
religious obligation, as stated in the Qur'an and the
Hadlth, namely, to lay emphasis on people's education. See,
M. Natsir, Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia (Islam and
Christianity in Indonesia) (Bandung: Peladjar dan Bulan
Sabit, 1969), 40.
63Since the Royal Decree of 1854, which stipulated that
the church administration had the obligation to maintain the
Christian doctrine in the Indies, the Dutch government had
also maintained its support of the church authorities to
make their task a success. H. Kraemer, De Huidiqe Stand van
het Christendom in Nederlansch Indie (The Hague:
Boekencentrum N.V., 1937), 66.
247
To borrow Addison's remarks, the religious movements in

Indonesia for "four hundred years may well be regarded as a
race between Christianity and Islam."64
To substantiate the above theory, materials which offer
some clues as to the motives of
the founder of the
Muhammadiyah exist. Chief among
these clues were the
statements and public attitude of Dahlan with regard to the

Christian mission. Reading between the lines of Dahlan's
statements about what must be done by the Muslims reveals
what the actual threat posed to Muslims during his time must
have been. In one of his statements, Dahlan cautions his
fellow Muslims that if they do not react in time and let the
present situation continue without taking any action, the
situation could pass beyond the
his own words Dahlan said: " . . .
possibility of recovery.In
Although
Islam willnever
disappear from the face of the earth, it could still be

wiped out from the Indonesian soil."65 This statement
suggests that his optimism regarding the strength of Islamic
values in Java had been severely shaken by the ever more
solidified position of the Christian mission. The
seriousness of the situation made Dahlan repeatedly urge the
people around him to make sacrifices and react in time. From
^J. Addison, The Christian Approach. 243.
65This important statement of Dahlan has been quoted by
many scholars writing about the Muhammadiyah and its
founder. See, for example, Mukti Ali, The Muhammadiyah
Movement. 33. Hamka also quotes this statement in his K.H.
A. Dahlan (Djakarta: Sinar Pudjangga, 1952), 17.
248
Dahlan's words, one can elicite the grave concern that he

felt regarding the problem of Christian mission activities.
To Dahlan, it was the key issue: the ever- strengthening
Christian mission would spearhead a great Christian thrust
that might expel Islam from the region completely.
Another relevant factor should not go unnoticed. In
view of the fact that the effort of the traditional Islamic
school in countering Christian mission activities was not
fully satisfactory, a serious attempt had to be made to
oppose this influence. At this point, the Muhammadiyah
emerged to bear this responsibility by carrying out almost
the same activities as those of its Christian counter-part.
The Muhammadiyah movement viewed itself as having a Godgiven moral duty to preserve the existence of Islam in the
region by introducing reform ideas.
In spite of the paucity of documents that specifically
confirm the antagonism between the Christian mission and the
Muhammadiyah movement in its formative stage, many of
Dahlan's recorded statements display his concentration on
the missionary threat. Dahlan's emphatic insistence on
countering Christian missionary activities was further
evidenced by his characterization of the Muhammadiyah as "an
exceptionally unique movement."66 His underlying emphasis
on the unique nature of the Muhammadiyah is not altogether
surprising. Its powerful challenge to missionary activities
^Yusron, KH. Ahmad Dahlan. 52-53.
249
earned the movement a special place in Indonesian history,

unequalled by any other organization, at least not by any
such movements found by Dahlan among his Indonesian
contemporaries.67 The insistence of Budi Utomo in remaining
neutral with regard to religious affairs and remaining
keeping aloof from Islam served as one more prod to Dahlan's
decision to found the Muhammadiyah.
In addition, Dahlan's elaboration of al-Ma1an verses in
which practical and helpful affection is urged, along with
his emphasis on the implementation of these Qur'anic
injunctions in an actual community development project,
confirmed his firm resolve to compete with the activities of
67Indeed, none of the Muhammadiyah's contemporaries

seemed at all concerned with the threat of Christianization
in Indonesia. Aside from the Sarekat Islam, which was more
of a political organization, and Jamiat Kheir. which was
concerned mainly with modernizing the educational system,
Budi Utomo did not serve the Islamic cause at all. Indeed,
it was at best indifferent, and at times even hostile, to
the cause of Islam. In one statement, Wahidin, the founder
of Budi Utomo. described the period of the spread of Islam
in Java as the era of cultural decline. On an another
occasion, when a proposal was set before the Board of
Directors of Budi Utomo to the effect that the organization
should make some concession to Islam, since the vast
majority of Javanese were Muslims, the proposal was never
endorsed. Instead strong opposition came from a certain
Radjiman who asserted that Javanese culture was not Islamic.
He further affirmed that Hinduism and Buddhism had, in fact,
inspired the Javanese to create magnificent monuments,
manners and customs. Radjiman's exposition finally gained
the endorsement of the Board of Directors. See, P.I.D.
Report, no. 103, July 7, 1917, verbaal May 15, 1918, No. 64,
mail report no. 129x/17,BZ, as cited by Akira, The Dawn of
Indonesian Nationalism. 29, 115-116.
250
the Christian mission.68 By adapting the same modern modes

employed by the Christians in establishing various
institutions, the Muhammadiyah asserted its determination to
face the Christian penetration head on.69 In this respect,
Dahlan felt an urgency to vie with the Christians for the
lead in the erection of schools, orphanages, clinics and
other social institutions throughout the country. For him,
disastrous consequences would be incurred by the Muslims in
Indonesia should no one initiate such responses to Christian
missionary activities. Therefore, Dahlan's fear for the
present70 and hopes for the future of Islam in Indonesia
As repeatedly narrated by his biographers and
followers, Dahlan laid more emphasis on the practical aspect
of these verses by stressing the motto "Sedikit bitiara
banvak kerdia". which means "Less talk, more work." Asnawi
Hadisiwaja, "Kiyai Hadji Ahmad Dahlan", in Panii Masvarakat.
No. 3 (1959), 17. See also, Salam, Riwavat Hidup KH. A.
Dahlan. 51.
69Following the example of the Muhammadiyah, Mukti Ali
stated that da *wah (Islamic mission), had to follow the
example of Christian da'wah. which consisted of preaching,
teaching and healing. See, B.J. Boland, The Struggle of
Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1971), 165. The Muhammadiyah, in this respect, justly
deserves its place in the Indonesian mind as the first
religious organization to counter the Christian mission by
employing the Christians' own methods.
70Dahlan was yet more apprehensive as the Christian
missionaries established an Evangelical School in 1905 in
his home town, Yogyakarta, which was designed to produce
native priests. The school was later called Sekolah Pendeta
(School for Priests). It is important to note that in 1892
the n u m b e r of students in the mission schools in Java alone
reached 2350. See, Kruger, Seiarah Geredia di Indonesia.
184-187. See also, Paul W. Van Veur, Education and Social
Change in Colonial Indonesia (Ohio: Ohio University Center
for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1969), 1.
On the progress of Catholic mission in Indonesia, see A.
251
led him to found the Muhammadiyah. It was this organization

that restored self-respect to a new generation of Muslims
during the time when the influence of Islam in the country
was on the decline. The fact that this organization was not
only sustaining itself, but gaining new followers during its
formative stage, demonstrated its popular support against
the noticeable Christian presence.
That Dahlan was known to be tolerant to Christian
missionaries and congenial to the Dutch authorities should
not be taken to mean that he compromised his principles.
Although he acted fairly leniently outwardly, to protect the
existence of his organization, he was firm in his
determination to challenge what for him was the Christian
missionary menace to Islam. He was at no time oblivious to
this threat. He took great pains to ensure the
Muhammadiyah's commitments toward its goal during his
lifetime.
The Muhammadiyah post-Dahlan era witnessed the
movement's overt opposition against Christian mission. But
this opposition never explicitly expressed itself until the
coming of the second generation of the Muhammadiyah
leadership. It was from this time onward that stress began
to be laid on the open denunciation of missionary
activities, as well as against the doctrine of Christianity
Heukens, Seiarah Gereia Katolik di Indonesia (Jakarta:

Kursus Kader Katolik sekertariat National, 1971) 65-66.
252
itself. Dahlan's protege, Haji Fachruddin, the first vicechairman of the Muhammadiyah after the death of Dahlan, was
to become the foremost driving force of the Muhammadiyah. He
was quite vocal in voicing his concern about Christian
mission activities. His anti-colonial attitude moved him to
taking a strong stance against both Christianity and its
missionary activities. In the words of Alfian, Fachruddin's
personality reflected his "anti-Christianity, and anti-those
who had been allegedly accused of having criticized and
slandered Islam."71
At the 1925 congress, Hadjid made it clear that
"Christian doctrine is irrational in its polytheism yet its
practice is effective in social welfare. So Muslims should
learn from the practice while retaining their own
belief."72 While Dahlan never overtly denounced the
Christian mission, it is obvious that he provided his
protege with a strong ideological base from which to
preserve Islam. If anything, this indicates the strength of
Dahlan's bitterness against the threat of the Christian
mission, which he wanted to be taken very seriously. In
addition, this firm stance which was shown by the second
generation of the Muhammadiyah proved the consistency of the
movement in safeguarding Indonesian Islam from being
corrupted by an alien culture. The growing missionary
^Peacock, Purifying Faith. 84.
253
activities had long been the subject of the greatest concern

on the part of the Muhammadiyah. As we will see will be
demonstrated in the coming chapter, the Muhammadiyah never
deviated from its one primary aim: to challenge the
Christian missions.
Much has been said about the Dutch policy of favoring
missionary work, reflected in the enormous government
subsidies, as well as other support manifested by the
government officials' stances and attitudes. In addition,
there were at least three other variables that could be
subsumed under the Christian mission factor which should not
go unnoticed. Although these variables may not have direct
relevance to the birth of the Muhammadiyah, yet they helped
to arouse bitterness of the Muslims in Java in general, and
of Dahlan in particular. These factors were:
1. the Dutch "Guru ordonnantie11,
2. Dutch infringement on local custom, and
3. the establishment of Freemasonry in Indonesia.
What follows are some concrete examples of how these
variables indirectly contributed to the birth of the
Muhammadiyah.
Guru Ordonnantie (Teacher's Ordinance)
As has been mentioned earlier, the renewed influence of

Islam brought from Makkah began to be evident during the
second half of the ninteenth century. To stem the tide of
254
this growing influence, which was manifested in

proliferating Islamic educational institutions championed by
the religious scholars, the Dutch government instituted a
new ordinance in 1905 concerning religious teachers. This
regulation was designed to get some control over these
educational establishments which were seen by the Dutch as a
potential threat to their regime. The Guru Ordonnantie
stipulated that
written permission from the authorities was
required before any religious instruction could be given.

The list of pupils also had to be attached to the permit
application.
The issuing of this ordinance was the culmination of a
series of events that occurred in the two decades prior to
its initiation. Initially, this ordinance was suggested as a
reaction to the peasant revolt against the Dutch in 1888 in
Cilegon, Banten.73 In the aftermath of this uprising, which
was allegedly instigated by the religious teachers, K.F.
^This uprising erupted as a reaction to a Dutch

circular aimed at prohibiting people from gathering in the
central mosque of Cilegon to recite salawat (a kind of
supplication or eulogy for the Prophet). What aggravated the
situation was that, along with the circular, the Dutch also
instructed the people to demolish the "aging minaret of the
mosque. From the perspective of safety, and to prevent
possible unrest, the Dutch might have been right in both
their measures. However, for the people, such an approach
was extremely offensive. Whatever justification was
presented by the Dutch for prohibiting any religious
practices, let alone damaging the minaret, the symbol of the
house of Allah, it was unacceptable to the people. Hence,
these offenses were responded to by the people in the form
of a revolt. See, Husein Djajadiningrat, "Islam in
Indonesia", 49-79.
255
Holle (d. 1896), the Honorary Adviser for Indigenous Affairs

strongly urged that the religious teachers be kept under
strict surveillance. The people's uprising was then used by
the Dutch to justify their overt support of the Christian
missionaries.
Consequently, the government's neutral attitude on
religion, as stipulated in article 199 of the 1885 Dutch
constitution, was consciously disregarded.74 The appeal of
the Dutch Minister of Colony, Keuchenis, in the year when
this upheaval occurred (1888), was a clear manifestation of
this trend. He urged all missionary organizations to
cooperate strenuously for the expansion of Christian
influence and for resistance to Islam.75 In the same
spirit, J.T. Cremer, another colonial minister, exhorted the
promotion of missionary activity, since, according to him,
it yielded "civilization, welfare, quiet and order."76
The Christianization trend went on apace until it
reached its high point when Abraham Kuyper, the head of the
Christian Anti-Revolutionary Party, became Prime Minister of
the Netherlands in 1901. During this time, many Dutch
parliamentarians pressured the government to curtail the
influence of Islam. Van Bylant, for example, warned the
74The Reqeerinasrealement (Government regulation), as
quoted by Noer, The Modernist Movement. 165.
^Noer, The Modernist Movement. 167.
76Van Kol, Nedelandsh Indie in the Staaten General (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1911), 156.
256
government of the danger of Islamic propagation, while

urging the acceleration of Christian activity. W. H. Bogat
launched a bitter campaign against Islam and blamed it for
the "moral laxity" of the people.77
Another indication of this trend is clear in the
imbalanced government subsidies granted to religious
institutions.78 In addition, the recruitment policy of the
government was also indicative of the support for
Christianization. Of one thousand registered employees in
the Department of Religious Affairs on the government
payroll, not a single person was a Muslim. All were
Christians attached to different churches.79 The imbalance
in the Dutch attitude was also apparent in the underpaid
salaries of the Muslim personnel. For almost the same
profession, a Christian clergyman's salary was ten times
higher than that of a Muslim penahulu (religious functionary
^Suminto, Politik Islam. 22.

78In 1917, for example, the government subsidies for
missionary institutions were nearly ten times as large as
that for the Muslim institutions. The former received Florin
1.235.000.00 while the latter were only granted Florin
127.029.00. For a detailed breakdown of the government
school subsidies, see W.H. Alting von Geusau, Netraliteit
der overheid in de Nederlandsche Kolonien ieaen
Godsdiensaken (Harlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1917),
97-130, as quoted by Suminto, Politik Islam. 32-34. See
also, Noer, on the Dutch subsidies in the years 1936 through
1939, which suggests a policy of favoritism, The Modernist
Movement. 170.
^Regeerina Almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indie. as quoted
by Suminto. Politik Islam. 27-28.
257
or judge). The former's annual honorary pay was FI. 6,000,

while the latter only received Fl. 582.80
Other actions also attest to the clear violation by the
Dutch of their so-called "neutral" attitude toward religion.
These include the government subsidy for the construction of
a mission hospital in Surakarta, and the admittance of the
Christian missionaries to the region of Surakarta, which had
been closed to mission activities since the Dutch first set
foot on Java.81
On the issue of Guru Ordonnantie. in 1904 Snouck
Hurgronje proposed that the government form a special
committee, whose task would be to limit the activity of the
religious teachers. Hurgronje proposed further that a
special licence to be required of all religious schools
prior to their operation, and granted only upon fulfillment
of certain conditions, including the submission of the names
of all teachers and pupils, as well as their current
see, Indische Staatsblaad, 1860, no. 3, article 8 b,

as quoted by Suminto, Politik Islam. 35. For another proof
of the discrepancy between theory and practice as regards
the Dutch "neutral" attitude toward religion, one might well
refer to the Haji ordinance. This ordinance was instituted
to control travel to Makkah for pilgrimage. It was said that
this ordinance was decreed on account of the growing Dutch
fear of popular unrest like that of the Mutiny rebellion
which erupted in British India in 1857. Alb. C. Kruyt who
worked in the Nederlands Bybelgenootschap in 1890, insisted
that all that benefits Islam would always harm the Dutch
regime. Therefore, he argued, Christianization was the
correct response to this danger. See, Suminto, Politik
Islam. 26 (f.n 70-71).
81Wignjo Darmodjo, Utusan Hindia. January 14, 1913.
258
curriculum. A year later, on November 1905, the Guru

Ordonnantie came into force.
The Dutch hoped that through this ordinance they could
exercise supervision over the activities of both teachers
and pupils. The ordinance was meant to virtually curtail the
movement of the Muslim religious teachers in particular, and
to hamper the progress of Islam in general. The requirements
of this ordinance caused great dismay among religious
teachers. The lack of records maintained at the traditional
schools, along with the complicated permit procedures, made
this ordinance problematic and burdensome for the Muslim
teachers, because even those who were able to comply with
all required procedures still ran the risk of disapproval on
subjective or trivial grounds.
Although there is no evidence of immediate82 tangible
protest against this decree whose adverse impact on the
advance of Islam is unquestionable, this cannot be taken as
an indication of complete surrender to the Dutch decree. Nor
should it be viewed as "a sign of a low level of
consciousness" on the part of the Muslims, to borrow Daliar
Noer's expression.83 Rather, it contributed in great
measure to the sense grievance felt by Muslims, which lay
the
The
all
The
82It was not until 1917 that a strong protest against

Dutch educational policy was voiced by Sarekat Islam.
Sarekat Islam strongly requested the Dutch to abolish
regulations which impeded the advance of Islam. Noer,
^See, Noer, The Modernist Movement. 175.
259
just beneath the surface, and contributed effectively to

setting the scene for the birth of the Muhammadiyah. The
Guru Ordonnantie. which evoked only a silent protest and
deep dissatisfaction in the heart of many Muslims goaded
Dahlan to establish his movement to challenge the decree.
But what resulted in the ensuing years bore witness to the
depth of Muslim outrage over the Guru Ordonnantie. though it
was not until 1928 that this silent protest transformed
itself into a powerful and articulated one through the
second generation of the Movement. It was Fachruddin, the
Vice Chairman of the Muhammadiyah from 1923 to 1929, who
vigorously demanded the repeal of the Ordonnantie.84
This ordinance, and its results, could not have been
devoid of effect on the mind of such a determined person as
Dahlan. Two years before the birth of the Muhammadiyah,
Alexander Idenburg, the Governor General from 1906 to 1916.
^Fachruddin expressly voiced his dismay when he

pointed out that, beginning from the initiation of this
ordinance, the advance of Islam was almost stagnant, and
under the pretext of this ordinance, Islam was well-nigh
suppressed. A good example of this can be seen in the decree
of the Dutch advisei for the outer territory, in which he
strictly prohibited any stay beyond 24 hours by any Muslim
in the Christian region of Tapanuli, Sumatra. See, Lance
Castles, "The Political Life of Sumatran Residency," Ph. D.
diss. 1972, Yale University, (1972), 94-97. See also,
Suminto, Politik Islam. 36, 53. Other evidence is the fact
that, at one point, R.A. Rinkles, the Adviser for Native
Affairs from 1913-1916, was reluctant to allow Muslim
laborers to observe the mandatory Friday prayer. See, Arsip
National Republik Indonesia (The National Archive of the
Republic of Indonesia), Penerbitan Sumber-sumber Seiarah
(Publication on Historical Sources), no. 7 (Jakarta: 1975),
228.
260
explicitly declared the intent of the Dutch ". . . not to

leave the Indies before they had transformed it into a
Christian nation."85 Dahlan's religious fervor flared up in
the face of such provocation.86 In this respect, Geertz
seems to have hit the nail on the head when he commented on
the strong campaign waged by the Dutch against Islam.87 He
suggested that the fiercer the attack waged on the
Indonesian Muslims, the stronger and more united they would
become.88 This view seems to be confirmed by the experience
of Dutch missionaries, most strikingly articulated at the
Dutch Missionary Conference in 1911. A collective voice of
dismay demanded to know
"Why has God allowed such an
intimidating opponent in the face of Christianity?"89 One

85This statement was quoted by the daily Medan
Muslimin. January, 10th, 1925, as cited by Suminto, Politik
Islam. 22.
it is most likely that it was this dangerous
statement that led Dahlan to warn the Muslims about the
gloomy future of Islam in Indonesia should they remain in
their slumber. See, footnote 65 above.
87In his 1906-1907 annual report, the Mission Consul
acknowledged the government's frequent support of Christian
missionary activities. The report also indicated that
of ten times the Dutch government requested the Mission
Consul to open branches in particular places. Two cases in
point were the branches of Simalungun, opened in 1904, and
Pakpaklanden, in 1906. Suminto, Politik Islam. 190.
clifferd Geertz, " The Javanese Kijai: The Changing
Role of Cultural Broker," 239.
89Vd. Spiegel, "De Prediking des Zendelings aan de
Mohammaedanen", in Verslaq 25ste Alqemene Nederlandse
Zendinqsconferentie. (1911), 80, as quoted by Suminto,
Politik Islam. 25. See also, Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism,
98.
261
year after this Christian Mission Congress, the Muhammadiyah

appeared on the scene.
The Dutch Infringement on the Local Culture

Prior to the coming of Dutch colonial rule, the
relationship of the adat (broadly, meaning "custom") and
Islam in Indonesia was described as a mixture. While some
scholars characterized this mixing as imminscible,90 or
evidence of interference on the part of Islam,91 others
viewed it as complementary.92 It is not necessary to
90To R. Ellen, adat and Islam are conceptually opposed
to each other, but this does not necessarily entail conflict
between the two. The reason is that a great many Indonesians
are unaware of the subtle differences between the two. For
some, certain adat practices are thought of as being part of
Islam, or, at best, Islam is simply the perfection of adat.
Roy Ellen, "Social Theory, Ethnography and Practical Islam",
64-67.
91For example in the Minangkabau area, the adat
specific rules of inheritance run counter to those of Islam.
According to the adat. harta pusaka (ancestral property
items) are inherited matrilineally, while Islam does not
distinguish between those items and the joint earnings
acquired by the marriage. Also, adat recognizes the right of
an adopted child to inherit, while Islam does not. See, M.
B. Hooker, "Adat and Islam in Malaya" in Biidr. tot de Taal.
Land-en Volkenk 130, (1974), 70-71, 83-84, as cited by
Ellon, "Social Theory and Ethnography and Practical Islam",
70. For a good survey on this topic, see D.J. Banks, "Islam
and Inheritance in Malaya" in American Ethnologist 3 (4)
(1976), 573-586.
92Taufiq Abdullah asserts that intrinsically there is
no conflict between adat and Islam. The conflict that took
place in Sumatra, however, was more of two distinct groups:
between nobles and commoners and between traditional
authorities and religious teachers. The first group was
identified with the adat. the second with Islam. Taufik
Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau World: West
Sumatra in the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century," in
262
discuss in detail these differing views, except insofar as

they have some relevance to the infringements of the Dutch
colonial rule.93
As part and parcel of the policy of "divide and rule",
the Dutch, who saw a potential conflict between the adat and
Islamic groups, decided to interpose between them. For the
Dutch, a strong pluralistic adat tradition could devastate
or at least weaken Islamic influence and therefore well
served their desire for a smooth rule over the country.
Islam, conversely, was seen as a latent and potential threat
to the colonial regime, as it was able to create a solid
ground for incipient nationalism. In many areas of the
country the colonial forces found that they faced a
formidable enemy fighting under the banner of Islam.94 It
was only logical, then, that the Dutch tried to fan the
existing conflict between the two groups and took sides with
the adat faction. Under the guise of preserving the past
cultural heritage of the people, the Dutch successfully
Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. C. Holt (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1972), 204. It is
worthwhile to note that adat itself is a word of Arabic
derivation referring to custom or customary practice. It is,
therefore, the case that adat and Islam are generally quite
clearly connected in local thought.
93For an expanded treatment on the competition between
adat law and Islam, see Taufik Abdullah, Modernization in
the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the early decades of
the twentieth century, in C. Holt (ed.), Culture and
Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University
Press, 1972).
94Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia. 134.
263
removed the influence of Islam. The textbook case in point

was the Padri war, alluded to earlier.95 The colonial
rulers relied upon the adat chiefs (the penahulusi to
counter act what they saw as Islamic fanaticism. The Dutch
thereby artificially enhanced the fine distinctions between
the adat law and Islam. In this respect, Roy Ellen made a
good point when he ascribed the intensified adat-Islam
conflict to the partiality of the colonial government.96
In their struggle to impose hegemony over the Indies,
the Dutch had no other choice but to confront Islam, which
was often viewed as a staat in den staat (state within a
state),97 As the Dutch favored the adat law, they had two
goals to accomplish. The first was to eliminate the
influence of Islam by trying to impose, or at least to give
preference to, the adat law.98 The second was to pave the
^See, footnote 7, page 81 above for a discussion of

the Padri War.
96Roy Ellen, "Social Theory, Ethnography and Practical
Islam", 69.
97H.T. Damste, "De Mohammedansche Wet in Indie", in
Koloniaal Tiidschrift. 27 (1938), 138, as cited by Suminto,
Politik Islam. 43.
98Daniel Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia (Berkeley,
Los Angeles, London, 1972), 10. It is worth noting that
Hurgronje, who based his view on the nature of the low
degree of Javanese attachment to Islam, criticized the Dutch
government for its policy of changing the Islamic law to
adat law. For Hurgronje, the Javanese Muslims would
eventually abandon their religion as they begin to enjoy a
Western education. Hence, to him the Dutch policy was
nothing more than a guise to facilitate the evangalization
of the region. See, Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam
264
way for Dutch law to replace customary law. This particular

approach of the Dutch was shrewd. In their view, the radical
shift from the prevalent Islamic law to European law would
have been more difficult an undertaking than to take a
course of a gradual shifting.99
To trace the Dutch endeavor to impose European law in
place of the existing adat law, one should go back to 1848
when the discussion came up for the first time as to the
place of the adat law within the law-policy of the colonial
regime. The theme of the discussion revolved, particularly,
on the extent to which the adat law could serve Dutch
colonial purposes, and the degree to which it could be
fitted into the framework of the Dutch policy. When this
issue was discussed, the interest or the will of the
Indonesian people was of no consideration. As was customary,
the colonial authorities had from time to time exerted
pressure upon the people and manipulated village
affairs.100
In 1900, J.T. Cremer, the Minister of Colony, argued
for partial codification of adat law. However, a radical
shift of law policy took place when Kuyper Abraham became
Prime Minister in 1901. In November 1904 he introduced a
(Leiden: 1915), trs. Gunawan, Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta:
n.p. 1973), 59.
"Benda, "Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia", 89.
19.
265
bill to revoke what his predecessor had initiated. Kuyper

proposed to replace the adat law with European law. His
intent was neither to maintain the unwritten adat law nor to
accept its codification.101 In his new bill, Kuyper aimed
to secure the interests of the Dutch government by placing
the entire population of Indonesia under the unification of
the law along Western lines.
In 1914 the Dutch government published a draft civil
code for all population groups. This law policy was
introduced based on the consideration that the unwritten
adat law had been the source of confusion, as it gave rise
to legal insecurity. For Indonesian nationalists, however,
European law was not in consonance with the living religious
sensibility of the Indonesian, and they regarded submission
to it as a form of de-nationalization.102
In 1919 a government decree was released to the effect
that customary law should gradually be replaced by Statutory
law.103 The actual purpose behind this policy was no more
101R. Supomo, "The Future of Adat Law in the

Reconstruction of Indonesia" in Southeast Asia in the Coming
World, ed. Philip W. Thayer (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
Press, 1953), 220.
102Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 191-192.
103During this time, European civil and commercial law
became applicable. For instance, a married man must have the
consent of his wife prior to his second marriage. See,
Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. 189-191.
266
than, as Supomo104 affirms, . . .
a consequence of a
policy of Christianization which asserted that adat Law was

wholly incapable of fulfilling the needs of the twentieth
century."105
It goes without saying that in the face of such policy,
Muslims should have been conscious of the gravity of the
situation. The Dutch infringement upon Islamic as well as
customary laws was enough to arouse the resentment of all
the people. The Muslims were particularly embittered, but
there was nothing they could have done except to mobilize
their efforts to form a resistance to the colonial regime
that sponsored and promoted Christian-inspired106 law.107
104Prof. Supomo was the Minister of Justice of
Indonesia. He was appointed by Sukarno in his first cabinet
on August 31, 1945, two weeks after the proclamation of
Indonesian Republic. B. R. Anderson, Some Aspects of
Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation 1944-1945
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 112-119.See also,
S. Finch, Republic of Indonesia Cabinets. 1945-1965 (Ithaca:
Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press, 1965)
105S. Supomo, "The Future of Adat Law", 221.
106For more information on the assertion that the
European law is motivated by Christian thoughts and values,
see Rus Walton, One Nation Under God (Old Tappan, NJ:
Fleming H. Revel Co., 1980), 37-38.
107In the first decade of the twentieth century, during
the time when the Muhammadiyah was established, C. van
Vollenhoven waged a strong campaign to prevent adat law from
being overcome by Western law, through his famous book The
Adat Law of the Dutch East Indies, in which he systematized
the adat law so that it could be used as a practical system.
He succeeded in forcing back the clock between 1923-1927 and
made the government accept the application of adat law to
the Indonesian community. On this development, there has not
been a thorough study of the role of the Muhammadiyah or
other nationalist groups in driving van Vollenhoven to
267
The birth of the Muhammadiyah, therefore, was one of the

concrete responses to expose the veiled and hidden
objectives of the Dutch.
The Foundation of Freemasonry
Modern Freemasonry is an early eighteenth century

European phenomenon. Its roots, however, go back to the
medieval stonemasons' guilds and an ancient mythical
past.108 Freemasonry in the Netherlands emerged as a
national order in 1756. In 1762, the first Masonic Lodge in
Batavia (what is now Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia) was
established by F. Radermacher the son of the first grand
master of the order in the Nederlands.109
Although the growth of Masonry in Indonesia was modest
in its early years, an accelerated expansion took place
around 1870. Toward the end of the nineteenth century,
almost all major towns of Java and some of the larger
oppose the colonial legal policy. See, Neil, The Emergence

of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 248. See also, Ter Haar,
"Halfway the New Adat Policy," in Colonial Studies. 1939, 1.
108The transformation into modern Freemasonry occurred
when lodges of stonemasons in England began to attract
prominent figures interested in architecture. In June 1717 a
Grand Lodge was founded on the Feast Day of St. John the
Baptist. Five years later, a Masonic Book of Constitution
was instituted. James E. Craig , A History of Freemasonry
(New York: The John Day Co., 1927), 207, 222-232.
109Paul W. Van der Veur, Freemasonry in Indonesia from
Radermacher to Soekanto. 1767-1961 (Colombus Ohio: Center
for International Studies, Southeast Asia series, 1983), no.
40, 4.
268
European centers in Sumatra and Sulawesi witnessed the

founding of Freemasonry lodges. The influence this movement
had on the Dutch government was also noticeable. Its
membership list included high government and military
personnel, as well as religious functionaries.
What concerns us in this context is the religious
aspect of the society. Although the society did not overtly
set for itself an agenda to promote a certain religious
doctrine, as was evidenced by the religious diversity of its
members, still the vast majority were Christians. Nearly one
half of the membership belonged to the Protestant group, and
the remainder, though Christians, indicated no affiliation
with any particular church. Furthermore, those who directed
the policy of the society were conspicuously prominent
Christians. Rev. Carpentier Alting, for instance, was
responsible for carrying out the founding of a Masonic
journal in an effort to achieve unity among the membership
in striving to achieve their objectives.110
The society's chief objective was to extend a helping
hand to its members, as well as to the people at large.
During its formative stage (1770-1870) the Society put a
strong emphasis on philanthropic activities. It sought to
110It is important to note that in 1902, a foundation

under the name of Rev. Carpentier Alting was established in
Indonesia. The foundation, among other things, engaged in
providing elementary school for girls, secondary schools,
and teacher training colleges. See, Van der Veur,
Freemasonry in Indonesia. 22-23.
269
raise funds in the form of organized charity. Initially, it

directed its interest toward elevating the educational and
professional standard of the poorer Eurasians. But soon this
interest was widened to cover a broader segment of the
society.111
The early years of the twentieth century marked the
rapid expansion of the society, both in membership and
activities. As a result of the increasing membership, the
society made headway in establishing socio-educational
institutions. Vocational and technical training schools were
founded to allow the members to develop their skills.
In cooperation with the Protestant churches, Indonesian
Freemasonry made an important contribution to the operation
of social and educational activities. They founded
kindergartens, small libraries, loan banks, orphanages and
several recreational facilities. Echoing the spirit of the
Dutch Ethical Policy, the 1911 Masonic Congress highlighted
the educational issues of the Indies, anticipating
a greater role in the future.
It is undeniable that the Freemasons of Indonesia were
run some Christians who were also concerned with the spread
of the gospel. As time progressed, the Society became ever
stronger and was able to attract more converts. It succeeded
in drawing several prominent Indonesians into its fold and

13.
270
thus affected the thinking of the various segments of the

upper strata of the society.112
Realizing that the expansion of Freemasonry and the
spread of Christianity were mutually supportive, Muslims
began to take an earnest interest in coping with this
emerging danger to Islam. What aggravated the situation and
added to the grievances of the Muslim was the active
involvement of Panaeran (Prince) Notodirodjo in the Society.
He was the uncle of the Paku Alam VII of Yogyakarta and the
administrator of the House of Paku Alam (Yogyakarta Court)
from 1901 to 1907. He was, along with many others,113
a leading member and prime motivator in the expansion of
Indonesian Freemasonry. As a result, the Paku Alam Study
Fund, with the assistance of the Freemasons, was able to
provide educational facilities to many Javanese,
particularly the nobility. It was during the Masonic
Congress in 1911 (one year before the birth of the
Muhammadiyah), that Notodirodjo urged the Society to take an
active role in providing a better education for the
Javanese.114
218.
113Among the prominent Indonesians were Raden (nobility
title) Soebroto, the Major of Madiun; Raden Pandji
Onggowidjoya; Raden Pandji Tjokronegoro, Regent of Surabaya.
See, Supomo, Freemasonry in Indonesia. 16, and Neil, The
Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. 48.
48; and Supomo, The Freemasonry in Indonesia. 22-23.
271
It is safe to say that Dahlan, along with the other co

founders of the Muhammadiyah, was not unaware of this
phenomenon that developed right before his eyes and in the
very region in which he resided. Dahlan and his colleagues,
in attempting to preserve and strengthen the Islamic faith
among their fellow Javanese Muslims, sought a way out of
their formidable predicament.115 Partly, in response to
this situation, the idea of establishing the Muhammadiyah
was born. Hence, the birth of the Muhammadiyah cannot be
separated from the existence of Freemasonry.
Thus, there were a number of variables that relate to
the Christian mission factor, which are linked to one
another to form a solid foundation for the establishment of
the Muhammadiyah. In an attempt to substatiate the above
thesis, we will further examine the influence of the
Christian factor by presenting some concrete examples of the
encounter between the Muhammadiyah and the Christian
mission. The following chapter will address this issue
extensively.
115It was not until February 27, 1961 that the Society
had to declare its demise in Indonesia, in the wake of the
government ban, on the grounds that it was not in accord
with the national identity. See, A. Lewin, "Opgricht
Verboden in Indonesia," in Alaemeen Maconniek Tiidschrift.
xv, 21 (August 1, 1961), 455.
CHAPTER VI
THE ENCOUNTER OF THE MUHAMMADIYAH
WITH THE CHRISTIAN MISSION
Without pretending to offer a complete account of the

Muhammadiyah's encounter with the Christian missions, as we
cannot go extensively into the historical details, in this
chapter we will seek to highlight a few important events
pertinent to the issue in question. In our treatment, it
will be necessary to cover a time span of almost a century,
beginning with the first generation of the Muhammadiyah up
to the present time. The account of this encounter,
therefore, has been divided into three stages. The first
stage deals with the Muhammadiyah in its formative period up
to the final days of colonial rule, the second stage covers
the Sukarno era, while the third stage encompasses the
contemporary era of "New Order" Indonesia.
Before analyzing the Muhammadiyah's encounter with the
Christian missions, it is important to touch briefly on
Christian-Muslim relations in general and the particular
interactions between Christians of the West, especially the
Dutch, and Muslims in Indonesia. As we all know, the
encounter between Christians and Muslims is as old as Islam
273
itself.1 Generally, Islam considers Christians to be

"People of the Book" who should be respected. During the
course of history, however, this relationship, which has
been a source of mutual benefit, has also been one of
misunderstanding, mistrust, and conflict.
Except in Spain, contact between the Christians of
Western Europe and Islam was relatively little prior to the
twelfth century C.E. It was only during the Crusades that a
distorted knowledge of Islam began to creep into the Western
world. From that time forward, this distorted image that
carried with it fear, prejudice and mistrust, according to
Daniel, "continued to be part of the Western mind."2
Although this unfavorable image of Islam has undergone some
positive changes during the second half of the twentieth
1This relationship began with the revelation received

by the Prophet Muhammad in 610 C.E. in Makkah. Waraqa ibn
Nawfal, a Christian monk, according to the Islamic
tradition, congratulated Muhammad on the latter's being a
chosen Messenger of God. In addition, the Christian King
(Negus) in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) is reported to have
protected and treated the Muslims well when they migrated to
the Negus' kingdom to seek refuge. See, Bernard Lewis, The
Arabs in History. 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson University
Library, 1964), 40. These two examples illustrate the
cordial relations which existed between Christians and
Muslims during the first century of Islam.
2On the Western image on Islam, see Norman Daniel,
Islam and the West. 1, 271. On the same lines, R.W. Southern
affirmed the stream of prejudices in the West regarding
Islam in his Western View of Islam in the Middle Ages
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 108-109.
274
century, traces of it still remain in many writings,

especially popular ones.3
An actual encounter between Indonesian Muslims and the
Christian colonialists did not take place prior to the
Islamization process in Indonesia in the early seventeenth
century C.E. From that period on, a really successful
encounter has never occurred. The causes of conflict have
been many. But the most important factor was that the
starting point of each side made any harmonious interaction
almost unreachable. The primary cause of the strained
relations between the two communities of faith may go back
to the superior-inferior attitude of interaction. Adherents
of both faiths claim to belong to a superior religion, and
3Aside from the declaration of the Council of Vatican

II, some sympathetic approaches to and appreciation of Islam
can be found for example in the writings of Christian
scholars such as:
1. Montgomery Watt, in his Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1953); Islamic Revelation in the Modern
World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969); and
Islam and Christianity Today: A Contribution to Dialogue
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
2. Kenneth Cragg, The Event of the Quran: Islam in its
Scripture (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971); Muhammad and
the Christian: A Question of Response (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, and Maryknoll, 1984).
3. Hans Kung, Christianity and the World Religions: Paths of
Dialogue with Islam. Hinduism and Buddhism, trans. Peter
Heinegg (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986).
4. R.C. Zaehner, The Citv Within the Heart (London: Unwin
Paperbacks, 1980). There are, certainly, many other scholars
who were instrumental in positively changing the distorted
image of Islam. Notable among them was Louis Massignon, who
pleaded for a recognition of the conditional authority of
the Qur'an and the prophethood of Muhammad. See, Jacobus
Waardenburg, "Massignon: Notes for further Research." in The
Muslim World 56 (1966).
275
hence each stated that theirs is the only acceptable

religion and the sole way through which humanity can attain
salvation.4 In each faith, the underlying assumption has
been that other religions do not lead to salvation.
Although religious adherents of both faiths have always
been missionary-minded, the Christians appear to have had
the upper hand in terms of missionary work in Indonesia in
the modern period. They have had the financial resources,
the skills, and facilities to ensure success to a greater
degree than the Muslims. In addition, the Dutch government's
backing, morally and financially, made their task of winning
new converts easier and smoother for the Christians than for
their Muslim counterparts.
It should be noted, therefore, that the unbalanced
stance against the Muslims, and the continuous encouragement
of the Christians on the part of the colonial rulers, marked
the beginning of conflict between Muslims and Christians in
Indonesia. As has been pointed out above, with the blessing
of the Dutch, Christian missionaries were vigorously active
throughout the country. As a result, Muslim leaders
protested, considering that giving permission to Christian
missionaries to evangelize publicly was an intrusion into
4Both present themselves as the final message of God;

therefore, it is their duty to evangelize or to invite
others to adopt their respective religions. See, for
instance, Qur'an, 3; 19 and 3:85; and Mt. 28:19-20 and Acts
4:12, 16:31. The interpretation of these verses has also
been a necessary condition of this exclusivism.
276
Muslim religious life. Consequently, the hostility and

suspicion between these two groups did not change; indeed,
if anything, they increased.
As we return to the issue of the encounter of the
Muhammadiyah with the Christians, the above must always be
borne in mind. However, the encounter between the two
religious communities, prior to the emergence of the
Muhammadiyah, will for the most part be left out.5 Our main
focus will be the encounter between the Muhammadiyah and
Christians on its two levels, namely, the official encounter
at the level of the organization as an institution, and the
informal one at the level of the individual interactions of
prominent members of the Muhammadiyah who, although they
spoke for themselves, were inseparably attached to the
organization.
5In general, the encounter between the Christian Dutch

and the Indonesian Muslims went through several stages.
Initially the Dutch were quite appreciative of Muslim'
morality, although they considered Islam to be a false
religion. The second stage was when the Dutch came with a
preconceived negative view of Islam along with the
prejudices which were prevalent in Europe. The third stage
was when Muslims were seen as the greatest danger to Dutch
security. The final stage started when the Dutch had already
subdued the Muslims. As the fear and danger of the Muslims
had been removed, the feeling of superiority over the
Muslims emerged. The patronizing attitude toward the
inferior uneducated Muslims then prevailed. It was during
the last stage of this encounter that the Muhammadiyah began
to surface. For further details on this issue, see,
Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam. 20-24.
277
The Formative Stage of the Muhammadiyah
For the formative years of the Muhammadiyah, we are

somewhat limited by a dearth of materials. Aside from a few
sketchy biographies of Dahlan, most of which contain merely
personal interpretation or speculative accounts, there has
been virtually no serious scholarly study of the
Muhammadiyah during colonial rule. Even Dahlan himself,
unlike many other reformers, did not leave writings
describing his life and his ideas in any useful detail.6
Hence, our access to direct information has been restricted
to those who have written about the Muhammadiyah in the
recent past. Nevertheless, from what we have gathered, we
can distinguish two remarkably different forms of encounter
with the Christians that marked the formative stage of the
movement. While during the life of Dahlan the encounter
could well be described as good and smooth, it took a new
turn in the aftermath of the founder's death.
During Dahlan7s era, the Muhammadiyah maintained good
relations with most of the Christians. Any indication of
animosity that did exist is scarcely worth comment. The
^h e reason why no Dutch or Western scholars during
Dahlan7s life seem to have been interested in writing or
making any serious report on Dahlan and the Muhammadiyah
that they were viewed by the Dutch as having been of no
potential threat against the colonial regime. The gentle
nature of the Muhammadiyah and its founder made it less
noteworthy for the writers than the politically inclined
movements. The Muhammadiyah, during its formative years, was
not considered as an oppositional force, let alone as a
troublemaker that needed special attention. See, Alfian,
The Muhammadiyah. 136.
278
reason, as has been indicated earlier, was that Dahlan

sought to avoid confrontation with any party, including the
Christian missionaries. Instead, he set his sights beyond
anything that could hamper the progress toward his
objective, namely to increase Islamic awareness among his
people. Therefore, for Dahlan, this encounter was expressed
in the competition of establishing educational and religious
institutions rather than in engagement in any kind of direct
confrontation.
Although the Christian missionary organizations were
making large strides and having a significant impact in the
country, from Dahlan's point of view, to try to challenge
the mission's activities and halt their penetration by
direct confrontation would be of no avail. What was more
important was to alert the Muslims to the repercussions of
the missionary work. Hence, building the infrastructure of
the movement took precedence over engaging in a face-off
with the Christians. In so doing, Dahlan aimed at enabling
the Muslims to cope with the increasing influence of the
Christian missions. This earned the Muhammadiyah the
opprobrium of some for seeming to cooperate with colonial
rule, or, at least, for lack of opposition to it.7
7Boeah Conares Muhammadiiah Seperemnat Abad (The Fruit

of 25th Annual Congress of the Muhammadiyah)
(Djogjakarta:
Hoofdcomte, Congres Muhammadiyah, 1936), 33. See also,
Hadisiswaja, Asnawi, "K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, Panii Masiarakat.
1, No. 3, (1959), 18.
279
Despite the scanty records of Dahlan7s encounter with

the Christians, there are some narrative accounts of his
direct interactions with prominent Christians. These
accounts, which are repeatedly retold by writers on Dahlan
and the Muhammadiyah, seem to smack a bit of exaggeration.
In these narratives, Dahlan is portrayed as exhibiting a
good deal of familiarity with the Christian doctrine and a
striking ability to overcome his Christian counterpart.
It is reported that Dahlan7s most frequent encounters
were with the Christian missionary, Domine Baker. According
to the above account, which suggests more of a positive
praise, Dahlan challenges Baker to abandon Christianity
should he find the truth to be within Islam. Reportedly
Baker was reluctant to meet the challenge, supposedly
because Baker "was afraid of the outcome of the debate."
Consequently, he decided to pack his suitcase and return to
Holland forever. However, the account goes on to say that as
a result of this encounter, two of Baker7s followers left
Christianity to embrace Islam.8
There is another account, of similar pattern, in which
Dahlan was supposed to have challenged Dr. Zwemer, the
famous American missionary, who was assigned to spread the
gospel among the Asians9, including Indonesia.10 In
8Yusron, Kivai Haii Ahmad Dahlan. 72.
9A s part of his campaign against Islam, Zwemer made a
comment on the issue of the inferior position of women in
Islam. On this issue, he quite mistakenly says that the
280
addition to the above, Dahlan's exchange of views with

another Christian missionary, Dr. Laberton, was also
reported in the same triumphalist manner.11
Aside from portraying Dahlan as triumphing over his
debate partners, none of the various biographies of Dahlan
appears to provide any authentic accounts of his actual
encounters with Christians in Indonesia. Some, however,
Arabic word bikr (virgin) shares the same root as the word
bagr, which means cow, which he then offers as an indication
of their similar lowliness. Yusron, Kvai Hadii Ahmad Dahlan.
105.
10This account exhibits Dahlan's talent as an able
defender of Islam with Dr. Zwemer. The account further
suggests that when the latter was invited to respond to
guestions and speak about Christianity before a large
audience, he declined to come (though another account about
this particular event confirms his presence). In any case,
the account seems to suggest the intellectual superiority of
Dahlan over Zwemer, resulting in Zwemer's disappearance from
the scene. The account concludes by referring to an article
allegedly written by Ki Hajar Dewantara (the Founder of
Taman Siswa school), in which he commented on that
particular event by saying: "Dr Zwemer falls short in
meeting Dahlan's challenge". See, Yusron, Kvai Hadii Ahmad
Dahlan. 73; Solichin Salam, "Riwayat K. H. Achmad Dachlan",
in Makin Lama Makin Tiinta: Muhammadiyah Setenaah Abad 19121962 (Djakarta: Department Penerangan R.I., 1962), 148-150.
11Dahlan is reported to have extended an offer to Dr.
Laberton, a Christian missionary, in the form of a challenge
by saying: "Provided that, after listening to your
exposition on your religion, I should be convinced of its
truth, I am prepared to submit to Christianity, but how
would you react if you find the truth in Islam? Are you
willing to compromise your faith?" According to the account,
Laberton declined to give a definite response. As the
meeting between the two was nearly over, Laberton, who was
depicted as having been impressed by the truth of Islam,
made the following statement; "Sorry, but I would not
convert, I would rather remain with the religion of my
ancestors, for it is my duty to do so". Yusron, Kvai Hadii
Ahmad Dahlan. 73-74.
281
suggest with greater likelihood that Dahlan's relations with

Christians were cordial rather than confrontational.
Certainly there are sufficient signs to indicate
Dahlan's peaceful attitude and sincere tolerance towards
Christians. He successfully established close contact and
friendship with many Christian clergymen. When he invited
Christians to his forum or accepted invitations to visit the
churches either to speak in a private talk or to conduct a
public discussion, he did so without regret or shame,
despite the prevailing atmosphere of sharp antagonism
between Islam and Christianity. All indications, then, are
that Dahlan employed a moderate and soft approach in his
encounter with Christians.
However, unlike Dahlan, his immediate successors, the
new leadership of the Muhammadiyah believed that the
encounter with Christians should take an altogether
different tack.
Dahlan's immediate successor was the soft-spoken and
highly-respected Haji Ibrahim, Dahlan's brother-inlaw. He
was a religious scholar who was first trained in the
traditional school in Java, and then at the center of
orthodoxy, Makkah. His personality and moderation were very
much in the mold of Dahlan. But unlike Dahlan, the
charismatic leader and executor, Ibrahim was merely a
figurehead for the movement. The real mover was the young
and energetic Fachruddin, the first Vice-Chairman of the
282
Muhammadiyah. He was assisted by his three brothers and

other committed individuals.12
Prior to his engagement in the leadership of the
Muhammadiyah, Fachruddin was a journalist. His determined
personality and his active role in the Sarekat Islam13, won
him the label of "an extreme radical" by the Dutch
authorities.14 However, through his association with
Dahlan, his "radicalism was transformed into a strong
religious fervor, which was to translate into a zeal against
the Christian missions and against those who stood in the
way of Islam in Indonesia. In the words of Salam,
"Fachruddin was constantly ready to pounce on his
adversary.,|1S
The period of Fachruddin (1923-1929) was probably the
most dramatic stage in terms of the Muhammadiyah's encounter
12Fachruddin's three brothers were Haji Sudjak, Haji

Zaini and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo. The other board members were
Haji Muchtar, Haji Hisjam, Haji Hadjid, Muhammad Yunus Anis,
and Kyai Haji Mas Mansur. See, Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 200.
13In 1919, Fachruddin was appointed by the Central
Board of the Sarekat Islam as its representative from
Central Java. In 1920, he was promoted, and entrusted to be
the treasurer of the organization. He was also instrumental
in the process of purging the communist-oriented members of
the Sarekat Islam during its crisis. Bintang Islam. Nos
7,8,9, June, 1927, as cited by Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 202.
14A report on Sarekat Islam prepared by the Office for
Native Affairs of the Dutch colonial administration, as
cited by Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 202.
15Solichin Salam, Muhammadiyah dan Kebanaunan Islam di
Indonesia (The Muhammadiyah and the Awakening of Islam in
Indonesia) (Djakarta: N.V. Mega, 1965), 139.
283
with the Christian mission. By now the Muhammadiyah had

become more hostile toward the Christian mission, which was
considered to be inimical to Islam. Inspired by Fachruddin's
aggressive nature, the Muhammadiyah became increasingly
assertive and militant in its open criticism of the
Christian mission.16
In fact, even while Dahlan was in charge of the
organization, Fachruddin had demonstrated bitterness against
the Christian missions through his articles in the
periodical Sri Diponeqoro. of which he was the editor.17
However, under the direct supervision of his mentor, the
tolerant Dahlan, the young Fachruddin never launched any
direct attack against the Christian missions. Only after
Dahlan's death did he unveil the grievances that lay deep in
his heart. As a result, under his leadership the
Muhammadiyah was to shift gears drastically.
The fact that the Muhammadiyah witnessed remarkable
support and rapid growth during Fachruddin's leadership has
led many to speculate that Fachruddin's strong opposition to
the Christian missions was the dominant reason for the mass
appeal of the Muhammadiyah. During his tenure the number of
the Muhammadiyah branches burgeoned from fifteen to one
16See, footnote 70, page 250 above, in chapter five.

17Alfian, Muhammadiyah. 162, see also, Salam, The
284
hundred and fifty-three in Java and Madura alone.18

Therefore, the growth and the strength of the Muhammadiyah,
as well as its aggressiveness towards the Christian
missions, was certainly inseparable from the characteristic
nature of the Muhammadiyah leadership of the time.
Amid the intense activity of the Christian missions,
the annual congress of the Muhammadiyah was held in 1924 in
Yogyakarta. The fierce animosity against the Christian
missions on the part of the Muhammadiyah was clearly
evident. Among others, Haji Hadjid warned the members not to
be easily persuaded by the alluring methods employed by the
Christian missions in their attempts to convert people to
Christianity. During this Congress, a nearly-virulent tone
was used against Christianity.19
Another important event that reflected the antagonism
of the Muhammadiyah toward the Christians was when Haji
Sudjak, in 1925, bitterly attacked both the Dutch Resident
and the Sultan of Yogyakarta for having reduced by half the
amount of subsidies granted for the Muhammadiyah's clinic
18The Muhammadiyah Publication; Pemandanaan Alam Islam
dan Muhammadiyah. 1932-1933 (Yogyakarta; Hoofdbestuur
Muhammadiyah, n.d.), 88-98, 106. Fachruddin's passionate
spirit of zeal for Islam and his reckless approach toward
the Christian mission exhausted all his energy and was
probably the cause of his early demise. He lived less than
40 years.
19Haji Hadjid, for example, spoke openly of the
superiority of Islam over Christianity. See, Verslaa van het
Konqres der Vereenianinq Moehammadivah aehouden te
Jogjakarta van 12 to 17 Maart 1925 (Muhammadiyah Congress
held in Yogyakarta from 12 to 17 March, 1925), 21.
285
and poor-houses. Instead, the Sultan endorsed the shift of

the fund's allocation to his own poorhouse, which was run by
a Christian hospital. This decision was viewed by the
Muhammadiyah as an indication of his favoring of
Christianity over Islam.20
Furthermore, the Muhammadiyah leadership strongly
questioned the neutrality of the Dutch as regards the Guru
Ordonnantie and demanded its repeal. The Dutch finally
submitted to the pressure of the Muhammadiyah and agreed to
replace the 1905 ordinance with the modified 1925 one. In
1929, Anies repeated the Muhammadiyah demand for the repeal
of the Guru Ordinance altogether, following the Dutch
postponement of the imposition of the Guru Ordonnantie in
Minangkabau area in the wake of its strong rejection of the
Minangkabau branch of the Muhammadiyah.21
In 1932 the Muhammadiyah again took the lead in
protesting against a new colonial ordinance called "The
Ordinance for the Supervision of Private Education," which
20Mailrapport 569 X/25, a letter from the Hoofdbestuur
of Muhammadiyah dated May 25, 1925, as cited by Alfian,
Muhammadiyah. 210. On this issue, Boesquet traces the
aggressiveness of the Muhammadiyah's leadership to the
active missionary work of the Dutch Resident of Yogyakarta,
Dingemans. See, Bousquet, A French View. 3.
21Mohammad Yunus Anies "Pemandangan diatas Kemadjuan
Agama Islam dan Pergerakan Muhammadiyah Hindia Timur Tahun
1928" (The View on the Progress of Islam and the
Muhammadiyah movement in the East Indies in 1928) Almanak
Muhammadiyah 1348 (1929-1930). Xlll. For a detailed account
of the resistance of the Muhammadiyah ulama against the
ordinance in the Minangkabau area, see, Suminto, Politik
Islam. 56-57.
286
was intended to control and supervise private "wild"

schools. This ordinance was viewed by the Muhammadiyah as a
way to promote Christian mission schools and to obstruct the
advancement of non-Christian schools under the guise of
law.22
On the phenomenon of the drastic change in the attitude
of the Muhammadiyah during the post-Dahlan era, Kraemer
offered two external factors, besides the remarkable success
of the mission work in Java, that contributed to its
emergence, namely, the arrival of the Ahmadiyah movement
from Pakistan, and the adoption of the non-cooperation
policy of the Sarekat Islam, both of which occured at almost
the same time. On the first, Kraemer was of the conviction
that the interaction between the Ahmadiyah movement and the
Muhammadiyah transmitted the character of animosity toward
Christianity from the former to the latter. Ahmadiyah,
through its exposition of the Christian mission's danger to
Islam, led the Muhammadiyah to alter its tolerant attitude
toward the Christians. Furthermore, the intimate
relationship and the close cooperation between the
Muhammadiyah and the Sarekat Islam made the Muhammadiyah
lean to the latter's policy of non-cooperation with the
Christian Dutch. As a way of showing solidarity and support,
22Pembela Islam. No. 55 (1932), 23.
287
the Muhammadiyah took a parallel stance toward the

Christians.23
As has been pointed out above, Kraemer seems to have
overlooked or ignored the Muhammadiyah's consistent
challenge to the Christian mission activities. Based on
this, and without down-playing the double factors set forth
by Kraemer, we have no reason to concur with his conviction
here. We would argue that the Muhammadiyah throughout its
career, from its inception to the present time, no matter
what may have been the dictates or personalities of the
time, has always trodden the same path. Although Dahlan used
concilliation and a friendly spirit to permit him to gain
his ends, and did not have a zealot's personality, he was no
less firmly committed to the goals of opposing Christian
penetration and building Islamic consciousness in Indonesia.
In 1932 Haji Hisjam took charge of the Muhammadiyah
leadership. No tangible change in policy took place during
his tenure. He virtually followed in the footsteps and
continued the policy of his predecessor. In 1937, Kiyai Haji
Mansur,24 a native of Surabaya (Eastern Java), became the
23Carl F. Hallencreutz, Karemer towards Tambaran: A
Study in Hendrik Kraemer's Missionary Approach (Uppsala:
Alonqvist & Wiksells, 1966), 163.
24He was raised in a religious environment. His father,
Kiyai Haji Ahmad Marzuqi, was a renowned religious scholar
in East Java. He spent some time in Makkah before proceeding
to Egypt for religious training. He was known for his
organizational skill and sense of politics. Along with
Sukarno (the first President), Hatta (the first Vice
President) and Ki Hadjar Dewantara, he founded a solid body
288
Chairman of the movement replacing the diseased Haji Hisjam.

Mansur was the first chairman of the Muhammadiyah to come
from outside Yogyakarta.
Under Mansur, the Muhammadiyah continued to be the
Muslims's rallying point against the activities of the
missions. Mansur succeeded in transforming the
Muhammadiyah's role into a commanding one within the Muslim
community.25 The rapid expansion of the movement throughout
Indonesia bore witness to the outstanding performance of
Mansur.26 Although the Muhammadiyah's contribution to
establishing educational and religious as well as other
social institutions was still far behind the
accomplishments of Christian missions, the psychological
impact on the Muslim community of the Muhammadiyah's
performance was unquestionable. During Mansur's career
(1937-1942), the activity of the Muhammadiyah was more
focused on internal consolidation and organizational and
to fight the colonial rule. For further information on his

role both in the Muhammadiyah and in the struggle for
independence, see, Salam, Muhammadiyah dan Kebanaunan Islam.
136-137.
25In 1939, the Muhammadiyah's educational achievement
was crowned by the establishment of an advanced school of
theology at Surakarta (Central Java). See, Bousquet,
A French View. 4.
26Salam, Muhammadiyah dan Kebanaunan Islam. 67;
Bousquet, A French View. 3.
289
managerial refinement.27 There were, however, no unusual

Muhammadiyah encounters with the Christians that deserve
mention in this period except the "Ten Berge Affair," as
almost all Indonesian movements were engaged in the struggle
against the Dutch prior to and after the Japanese occupation
of Indonesia from 1942 to 1945.
Before we move to the second stage of the Muhammadiyah
encounter with the Christian mission establishment, it is
important to mention the "Ten Berg Affair" which deeply
disturbed Muslims in general and the Muhammadiyah in
particular. The "Ten Berge Affair" began in 1931 when the
Jesuit priest J.J. Ten Berge published two articles
commenting on certain verses of the Qur'an in which he
explicitly offended the religious sensibility of Muslims.28
This incident triggered the anger of Muslims and sowed more
rancor against the Christians. The Muhammadiyah and the
27Mansur was instrumental in formulating the new
khittah Periuanaan Muhammadiyah (The Work Plan of the
Muhammadiyah). See, Salam, Muhammadiyah dan Kebanaunan
Islam. 71-72.
280n the verse 5:75 of the Qur'an ("Christ, the son of
Mary, is no more than an apostle: other apostles have
preceded him and his mother was a truthful woman. They both
ate food [the implication here is that they ate and vacuated
like any other human beings], "Ten Berge commented: "One can
see that according to Muhammad, Christians conceive of a
father and a mother and a son in a sexual sense. How would
it have been possible for him, the anthropomorphist, the
ignorant Arab, the gross sensualist, who was in the habit of
sleeping with women, to conceive of a different and more
elevated conception of Fatherhood?" (the emphasis is mine).
J.J. Ten Berge, "De Koran en 'Evangelie en Koran'." Studien.
Tiidscift voor Godsdienst. Wetenschap en Litteren (1931),
302, as cited by Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 118-119.
290
Persatuan Islam (The Unity of Islam), another Islamic

modernist movement, took the lead in counter attacking the
anti-Islamic articles of Ten Berge.29 Subsequently, mass
meetings of protest were held in a number of cities
organized by these Islamic organizations.
In the face of massive protests, the colonial
government appeased the Muslim community by seizing all
copies of the article. The affair continued to absorb
popular attention as the Catholic community, under the
leadership of Mgr. Willekens, rejected the government's
measures as unjustified.30 However, as many other similar
cases had occurred, the matter was repeatedly brought up by
Muslim leaders as proof of the Dutch mission's hostility
toward Islam. The mild treatment given in such cases by the
colonial government only caused a worsening of relations
between the two communities.
The above discussion has, it is hoped illustrated the
strong consistency of the Muhammadiyah in its challenge to
the Christian Missions. It should be noted, however, that
towards the end of the first stage of this encounter the
antagonism between the two communities had lessened
relatively, due to the overall political climate that led to
the Second World War. It was only after the independence of
29M. Natsir, Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia (Bandung:

Diponegoro, 1969), 87-94, 158-161.
30Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism. 120.
291
Indonesia that the antagonism between the two communities

begun to intensify again.
The Sukarno Era
The prediction of some Dutch scholars about the bright

future of the Christian mission after the independence of
Indonesia seemed possible to be true. The areas which were
off-limits to missionary penetration during the colonial
rule were opened wide after independence.31 Contrary to the
unfavorable view of Christianity under the Dutch rule, when
the religion was associated with the colonial and oppressive
power, after the independence of Indonesia Christianity
enjoyed the same privileges as Islam and all other
religions. Furthermore, Christianity, like other recognized
religions, was enhanced by the Constitution, which
stipulates that the State safeguards the religious freedom
of the citizens and preserves their right to observe their
religious rites. In addition, Indonesia does not grant
special privileges to a particular religion (read Islam),
even if it constitutes the religion of the majority. Hence,
31A s was observed earlier, initially Java and other

parts of Sumatra were restricted areas for Christian
missionary activities, the reason being that the Dutch were
cautious of a possible people's uprising that could endanger
the existence and interest of the Dutch. This was clearly
reflected in the Dutch Article No. 177, which regulated
Christian mission activity in Indonesia. See, Howard M.
Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth
Century Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1979), 104-105.
292
Christianity was given an equal place among the family of

recognized religions in the country.32
In light of the above, the encounter between
Christianity and Islam in Indonesia took a new turn.
Christianity was no longer seen as the agent of colonial
rule, as there were many Christians who had played an active
role in the struggle for independence along with their
Muslim fellow citizens, and subsequently held prominent
positions in the newly-proclaimed Republic. During this
time, the Christian-Muslim encounter involved the issue of
determining the nature of the State. It was one of the most
heated issues within the new Republic, which was only
resolved with much pain.33
Pertinent to the above, it is necessary to highlight
some important events that heated the controversy over the
"Djakarta Charter" (the Preamble of the Constitution of
32Robert Erny, "Variety and Harmony Mark Fast-Changing

Indonesia" in Pulse. Vol. 19, No. 6, (March, 1984), 4.
33The representatives of the Indonesian people at the
time of independence were divided into two main groups. On
the one hand, there were those who proposed that the newlyborn State should be based on Indonesian nationalism without
any specific reference to religious ideologies. And on the
other hand, there were those argued for Islam as the basis
of the State. Thus a certain bipolarization is evident in
the Indonesian people's Weltanschauung beginning with the
emergence of Indonesian nationalism in the early years of
the 20th century and culminating in independence. Saifuddin
Ansari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: History of the
Gentleman's Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular
Nationalists in Modern Indonesia" M.A. Thesis, Montreal:
McGill University, 1976, 7.
293
I n d o n e s i a ) T h e issue which confronted the Indonesian

leaders at that time continued to be referred to in almost
every subsequent Christian-Muslim debate. It was an issue
that marked the first strain in the relationship
between
Christians and Muslims during the post-colonial era, one

which nearly wrenched apart the integration and the unity of
the country. Though the Muslims in this encounter were not
represented only by the Muhammadiyah, we shall highlight the
role played by the Muhammadiyah leaders.
In order to sketch the heated encounter between the
Muslims and the Christians on the issue of the "Djakarta
Charter", attention must first be paid to the role of Japan,
the occupying power between 1942 to 1945, in enhancing the
position of Islam in Indonesia.35 Japan had used Islam as a
means to penetrate the life of the people and to achieve
34For a detailed discussion on the "Jakarta Charter",

see, S. Ansari, "The Jakarta Charter", Chap. 3, 39-51.
35Among other things, Japan abolished the Dutch "Office
of Native Affairs," replacing it with the Office of
Religious Affairs. Japan also helped initiate the formation
of the Masvumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims),
in which both the Muhammadiyah and the N.U. (Nahdah alUlama), two leading Islamic organizations, actively
participated as the successors of the Mailis al-Isiami alA 1la (The Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam). In addition,
Japan also endorsed the formation of the Hizb AllSh (The
Party of Allah), which was the nucleus of the Indonesian
National Army. General Sudirman, one of the founders of this
organization, and the father of the Indonesian national
army, was a Muhammadiyah member. In general, the Muslims
benefitted greatly in the enhancement of their position visa-vis the Christians during the short Japanese occupation.
Boland, Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhof, 1971), 9-10.
294
Japanese ends. Indonesian Christians were put on the

periphery, as they were considered to be agents of the
Western colonial ruler and thus aligned with the enemy.
In September 1944, and again in March 1945, the
Japanese government promised Indonesian independence. In
response, the Muslim leaders of the Masvumi called its
members to convene to prepare for this event. Subsequently a
committee of sixty-two members of different ideological
backgrounds was set up to plan the steps necessary for the
preparation for independence.36 The first task of the
committee was to determine the basis for the coming
Indonesian state.
Two contending views developed among the committee
members regarding the nature of the coming state. The
question arose as to whether Indonesia should become an
Islamic state or a unitary state that separates state
affairs from Islamic affairs. Sukarno, in his effort to seek
a compromise, set forth his Pancasila (The Five Principles)
as the basis of the new state. According to Sukarno's view,
Pancasila. which contains common spiritual values,37 could
^Bruce Grant, Indonesia. 24-25.

37These principles were Faith in One God; Humanity;
Nationalism; Representative Government (Democracy); and
Social Justice.
295
be agreed upon by all, because by adopting it, Indonesia

would become neither an Islamic nor a secular state.38
Sukarno's middle-ground proposal did not conclude the
matter, however, as the debate intensified, now between
those who advocated Islamic principles and those who
endorsed the Pancasila. A group of nine members,39 out of
the previous committee of the sixty two, was formed under
the chairmanship of Sukarno to look for a solution. After a
long and thorough discussion, the group succeeded in coming
up with a compromise in the form of a political document as
a Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution. This was called
the "Djakarta Charter."
When the Preamble was presented to the committee, a
sharp disagreement arose regarding the article on religion.
Although Sukarno reminded the meeting of the negative
consequences should there be an omission or change on the
Preamble text, the Christians and some of Western-educated
"liberal" Javanese strongly rejected what was later to be
known as the "seven words" of the Preamble. The crucial
^Sukarno's speech was later published under the title
of "The Birth of the Panti asila."(Jakarta; The Ministry of
Information, 1950). See also, Kahin, Nationalism. 122-127.
39The nine members and signatories of the Djakarta
Charter were Sukarno, Muhammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin,
Maramis, and Ahmad Subardjo, representing the nationalist
group and Abdul-Kahar Muzakkir, Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim,
and Abikusno from of the Islamic group. Among the nine
members, only Maramis was a Christian. According to Boland,
Maramis was never known as a representative of the Christian
community. He was there to represent the national group.
Boland, Struggle of Islam. 27.
296
statement in the Preamble which stands for the "seven words"

was as follows: "With the obligation for adherents of Islam
to practice the shari1ah (Islamic law)," which follows the
sentence "The state is to be founded on belief in God."
Without going into a detailed account on the heated
debate over the "seven words", the upshot was that the sixty
two members of the Preparatory Committee for Independence
finally endorsed the Preamble. At the request of Sukarno,
the Chairman of the Committee, everyone was to stand up to
exhibit the unanimous acceptance of the preamble.40
Putting their differences aside, and moved by Sukarno's
remarks, in which he emphasized the theme "Greatness lies in
sacrifice,"41 te representatives felt obliged to transcend
their group interests in order to preserve the unity of the
motherland. Some dissenting views, however, surfaced prior
to the committee's endorsement of the Preamble. Latuharhary,
who was considered the representative of the Christians,
explicitly rejected any compromise. Husein Djayadiningrat
also expressed disagreement on the grounds that the "seven
words" would only lead to religious fanaticism.
Wongsonegoro, another nationalist from Java, expressed his
fears that possible misinterpretation of the "seven words"
would have the state enforce Islamic law on Muslims. On the
40Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiaoan Undancr-Undang Dasar
1945 (The Text of the Draft Constitution of 1945) (Djakarta:
Departmen Penerangan, 1959), vol. 1, 396.
41Sukarno's speech, in Yamin, Naskah. I, 396.
297
other hand, the Muslim factions went as far as to suggest

that only Muslims could be elected as President and Vice
President. Otto Iskandardinata, on the other hand, suggested
a compromise solution: to keep the "seven words" while
omitting the condition of faith in Islam for the country's
President and Vice President. Despite all these debates, the
Muslims' demand prevailed. The "seven words" and the
condition of being Muslims for the top leadership remained
untouched.42
Everything seemed to have gone on well when the new
Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia was
set up on August 14, 1945. Beside Sukarno and Hatta, the
Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Committee
respectively, nineteen other prominent figures joined them
as members. Among these were Kivai Bagus Hadikusomo,
Chairman of the Muhammadiyah, Kivai Wahid Hasjim of N.U.,
and Latuharhary of the Christian group, along with many
other well-known figures.43 On August 17, 1945, Sukarno and
Hatta (later to become the President and the Vice-President
of Indonesia) proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on
behalf of the people. However, on the following day, August
18, 1945, the Christian community of the eastern part of
42For details on the political development and events
surrounding the Proclamation of Independence, see, Benda, The
Crescent, 169-194; Kahin, Nationalism. 122-127; and Yamin,
Naskah. Vol 1., 220-240.
43A complete list of names is to be found in Yamin,
Naskah, I, 399, 427.
298
Indonesia sent what Mohammad Natsir (later to become the

Prime Minister of Indonesia from 1950 to 1951) described as
an ultimatum to the newly-born Republic of Indonesia.44
They demanded the omission from the Preamble of the "seven
words" and removal of the condition of allowing only Muslims
to hold the positions of both President and Vice President
of Indonesia, or else they would hold back their support for
the Republic of Indonesia.45 As a result, an emergency
meeting of the committee was called in order to prevent an
unavoidable clash between Muslim and Christian groups.
Muhammad Hatta was from the nationalist group. But he
was much trusted by the Muslims for his personal commitment
to Islam. He held a thorough consultation with some
influential Muslim figures on the committee (K. Bagus
Hadikusumo, Teuku Muhammad Hasan of Aceh, and K. Wahid
Hasjim) to find an immediate solution to the crisis. The
solution reached was to 46 delete the "seven words" and to
remove the condition of adherence to Islam for the President
44Lukman Hakiem, editor, Facta dan Data; Usaha-usaha
Kristenisasi di Indonesia (Facts and Data on the
Christianization Efforts in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Majalah
Media Dakwah, 1991), 18. See also Husein Umar, "Intoleransi
Kaum Nasrani Terhadap Ummat Islam" (The Christian
Intolerance toward the Muslims) in Facta dan Data. 27-28.
45 Lukman Hakiem, Facta dan Data. 16-17.
Âlamsyah Prawiranegara, an army general, who was the
Minister of Religious Affairs from 1978-82, described this
solution as a gift by the Muslims to preserve the unity of
the country. This statement has been repeatedly mentioned in
several occasions when Alamsyah speaks of the birth of the
Republic of Indonesia.
299
and the Vice President. In addition, the words Allah and

Muaaddimah. which smack of Islam, were changed into
Indonesian words of "Tuhan" . meaning God and Pembukaan
meaning introduction.47
In order for us to discern the rigorous stance
exhibited by the Muhammadiyah leaders toward the Christians
regarding the above issue, it is appropriate to refer to the
statement of Kivai H. Bagus Hadikusumo, who was then the
Chairman, and thus the legitimate representative of the
Muhammadiyah. He not only insisted on keeping the "seven
words" in the text of the Preamble, but went even further,
demanding the implementation of Islamic law for all
citizens. He proposed that the text should read as follows;
"The state is founded on belief in God, with the obligation
to practice the Islamic law." He based his argument on the
belief that a dual legislation, one for Muslims and another
for non-Muslims, was unrealistic.48
In the light of the above, one may elicit from
Hadikusomo's exposition that he wished to move in the
direction of founding an Islamic state and in engaging the
state to enforce Islamic law. However, Hadikusumo7s stance
did not find general acceptance among other committee
members, including the Muslims, let alone from the
nationalists and the Christians. However, it is obvious that
47see Yamin, Naskah. I, 399-473.
48Boland, Struggle of Islam. 30-32
300
the Muhammadiyah displayed strong Islamic fervor which would

not accomodate Christian interests.
Considering the strong and passionate commitment to
Islam among the Muslim group in general, and the
Muhammadiyah in particular, with regard to the proposed
Indonesian Constitution, it is not surprising to observe an
equally powerful resistance on the part of the Christians.
From the Christian perspective, there was no alternative but
to emphatically reject the controversial "seven words" in
order to prevent any possibility of Muslim hegemony.
For the Christians the text in question, which carries
considerable legal weight, can be taken as a point of
departure from which to work in the direction of
establishing an Islamic state. Such an assumption
or fear
on the part of the Christians was legitimated by the
powerful Islamic stance of the Muhammadiyah presented by

Hadikusumo. The Christians apparently anticipated the worst,
assuming that the Muslim majority would go as far as to
transform the state into a Muslim nation, in which religious
minorities in general would become second class citizens,49
49There was a common belief among Christian

missionaries that when a nation is run by Islamic
principles, religious tolerance will cease and thus the
existence of other religions is in danger, see, Peter
Polamko, Indonesia Since Sukarno (Hammondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books, 1971), 182-183.
301
and Christians in particular would have only a minor role to

play in the government.50
Although the Muslim group sought to clarify its
intention not to establish an Islamic state other than
through democratic procedures, the Christians insisted on
rejecting the "seven words" in their entirety, threatening
that otherwise they would form a separate state. The long
antagonism between the two communities of faith certainly
played an important role in aggravating the situation. The
ensuing years would bear witness as to how the "seven
words," which led to this bitter encounter between Muslims
and Christians, recurrently surfaced.51
50What strengthened the Christians' impression of the

intention of the Muslim group to form an Islamic state was
the fact that some resolutions passed by the Masvumi
assemblies pointed in that direction. Masvumi laid a great
emphasis on forming both an Islamic society and an Islamic
state. Part of its resolution that mentioned the necessity
to strengthen the principles of the Constitution (Pancasila)
reads as follows: "in order to realize an Islamic society
and an Islamic state". Abubakar Atjeh (ed.), "Sediarah Hiduo
K.H.A. Wahid Hasiim dan Karanaan Tersiar (The Bioghraphy of
Wahid Hasjim and His Published Articles) (Djakarta; n.p.,
1957), 357, as cited by Boland, Struggle of Islam. 43-44.
51Still in the Sukarno era, the great debate in the
Constituent Assembly between the nationalist and religious
factions, which was simplified into a choice between a state
based on the Pancasila and a state based on Islam, ended in
going nowhere. Sukarno threw his weight against the Islamic
faction in 1953 and said; "The state we want is a national
state consisting of all Indonesia. If we establish a state
based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic
will secede." This speech, if anything, only added to the
fear that lingered in the minds of the Christians about the
Islamic threat. See, Herbert Feith, The Decline of
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
302
The period between the proclamation of the new Republic

in 1945 and the year 1950 witnessed an intense struggle
against the Dutch, who wanted to recolonize Indonesia.
During this time, the tension between the contending Muslim
and Christian groups temporarily abated amidst the physical
confrontation with the common enemy. The Muslim-Christian
antagonism was transformed into a fellow-feeling of unityin-the-struggle. Both groups felt the urgency of the fight
for freedom which overshadowed any other battle. For almost
all Indonesians, the fight against the Dutch for liberation
was considered to be both a struggle for the country and for
religion.52 At this crucial juncture, therefore, the
relations between Muslims and Christians within the Republic
of Indonesia turned in a more cordial direction.
It was only after the recognition of Indonesian
sovereignty by the Dutch in 1949 that the old, unhealed
Christian-Muslim wound started to reopen. As the danger of
the Dutch recolonization vanished, bickering between MuslimChristian groups resumed.53 For the Christian community,
thanks to the new republic, some parts of Indonesia which
52Benda, The Crescent. 176.

53Deliar Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimensions of
Islam" in Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. M.B. Hooker, 184.
303
were previously restricted areas for the missionaries now

were open.54
The Christians' preaching effort was intensified by the
establishment of the Dewan Geredia-qeredia di Indonesia
(DGI) (The Church Council of Indonesia) by the Protestants
in May 1950. Their chief aim was to assist member churches
in their programs, particularly in the areas of witness and
service, and to co-ordinate efforts among the Protestant
churches throughout the country.55 In addition, in 1961
Pope John XXIII initiated the first Catholic ecclesiastical
hierarchy in Indonesia. Although only five Indonesians were
named out of the total thirty three bishops and perfects,56
from that time onward, all activities of the Catholic Church
were discussed and planned by the bishops at the Maielis
54A s was alluded to above, the distribution of

missionaries among the Protestant and the Catholic
denominations was regulated during the colonial rule. Under
the Dutch regulation, for instance, the island of Flores,
South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi were only open to
Catholic missionaries, whereas the Batak area was restricted
to Protestants. After independence missionaries were allowed
to work in throughout the country. M.P.M. Muskens, Partner
in Nation Building: The Catholic Church in Indonesia
(Aachen: Missio Aktuell Verlag, 1979), 93-94.
55Rifyal Ka'bah, Christian Presence in Indonesia
(London: The Islamic Foundation, 1985), 11. See also Frank
L. Cooley, Indonesia: Church and Society (New York:
Friendship Press, 1968), 110.
56Pro Mundi Vita. "Indigenous and Foreign Religions in
Indonesia" (Belgium: PMV, Centrum Informationis, No 35,
1971), 5-6, as cited by Rifyal Ka'bah along with a detailed
account on the development of Catholics and their churches
in Indonesia, Christian Presence. 12-13.
304
Wali Geredia (MAWI) (The Conference of Bishops of

Indonesia).
To help spread their message, the Christians of
Indonesia had embarked on many social services. Many of
these activities were still in their infancy during the
Sukarno era. But as time passed, owing to their large
financial resources, the Christian missions flourished
rapidly in almost all of their endeavors. As with many
churches in the world, the Indonesian churches were heavily
funded by foreign sources. With the increased presence of
the Christian communities, the Muslim reaction was also more
evident. It is worth noting that the actual process of
reaping the fruits of the Christians' long missonary
endeavors did not occur before the advent of the Suharto
"New Order" regime, which effectively ended the influence of
communism in the country.
The "New Order" Era
The period between 1965 (when the aborted coup of the

communists took place) and 1971 was considered by church
circles as the time of great blessing for Christianity in
Indonesia. A great number of Indonesians thronged to embrace
the Christian religion, as the churches offered protection
to those who had been suspected of involvement in communist
305
activities.57 This phenomenon aroused suspicion and fear

among the Muslim groups who sought a means to cope with it.
There was a speculation that the government,
indirectly, was the dominant factor of this mass conversion
to Christianity. This assumption was based on the fact that
in order for the government to cut off the influence of
communism, it sought to encourage former communists, who
were believed to be atheists, to embrace any formal and
recognized religion. Since the Muslims were part of the
extermination campaign against the communists, it was
logical that the latter would seek refuge in any religion
but Islam, any religion that was prepared to extend a
helping hand and safe protection for them and their
families. They found that sanctuary in the religion of
Christ. Furthermore, by granting the opportunity for the
Christian missionaries to convert the former suspects of
communism and/or their families, the government was able to
hit two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it could
diminish the influence of communism. On the other hand, it
57While it was not easy to determine the number of new

converts to Christianity, some have speculated that it
reached around two million. Others have exaggerated the
figure, suggesting three million or more. Goldsmith, for
instance, believed that by 1980 the number of Christians in
Indonesia had reached 25 to 30 million people. Martin
Goldsmith, Islam and Christian Witness (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1982), 145.
306
could minimize the penetration of Islamic ideas into

Indonesian politics.58
It is obvious that the developments after 1965 led to
manifest conflict between Muslim and Christian groups. Aside
from the Muslim struggle for an Islamic state, which
produced grievances and counter-reactions on the part of the
Christians, the mass conversion of the communist-oriented
Javanese to Christianity added to the mounting tensions
between the two communities. For the Muslims, the church's
protection of the former communists who turned Christian was
an act of taking advantage of the political situation
fishing in troubled waters. The churches took this
opportunity to increase the number of their followers. For
the Christians, however, although the former communists'
entrance to the church created strong criticism, and not
only from the Muslims, they had no other choice but to
accept them as part of their religious duty in order for
"the Gospel to be preached to all men" (Matthew 28:19).
Heated debates and polemics between Christians and
Muslims ensued, as the soil for conflict had been prepared
by the controversy over the right of converting others. On
the one hand, Christians believed that every single citizen
has the constitutional right to adhere to or change religion
if she/he so desired. For Muslims, on the other hand,
58 Avery T. Willis Jr., Indonesian Revival (South

Pasadena, California: William Carey Library, 1978), 102-103.
307
converting others would only lead to hostility and tension

within the community of faith. In this respect, the Muslims
seemed to be deeply worried that more people would draw
closer to Christianity as a result of the sophisticated
methods of conversion using non-spiritual means adopted by
the Christian evangelists.
M. Rasjidi, a prominent Muhammadiyah figure, enumerates
the Christian missionaries' methods in exploiting the
economic and political situation in bringing new converts to
their fold. Among others, churches were being built in the
midst of Muslim villages and in strategic areas in big
cities, even at high cost; financial and natural aid in the
form of money, staples, and scholarships were extended to
the poor to draw them to Christianity; and members of the
outlawed communists who were detained in captivity were
approached and promised financial assistance and protection,
should they convert to Christianity. A "Foster Parents"
system for students was introduced to influence them for
conversion. Houses of Muslims were visited in the door-todoor method of evangelism to attract members of the
household to Christianity.59
59 For detailed information on this issue, see,

Muhammad Rasjidi, "Christian Mission in the Muslim World:
The Role of Christian Missions, The Indonesian Experience"
in International Review on Missions. Vol. 65 (1976), 427428. In another book, Rasjidi criticizes the "New Order"
government for being lenient toward the Christianization
effort of the missionaries in the country. See, the preface
of his book, Kasus R.U.U Perkawinan. Dalam Hubunoan Islam
308
Consequently, a stream of apologetic and polemical

publications from both sides flooded the community of faith.
From the Muslim side, the Muhammadiyah took the lead in
challenging the Christian Faith60 in an effort to open the
minds of uninformed and poorly educated Muslims to the
"truth of Islam." Two treatises were released in 1965 by the
Muhammadiyah, written by Haji Djarnawi Hadikusomo, a member
of the Muhammadiyah board of directors, entitled Sekitar
Kristolooi (Christology) and Perdiandiian Lama dan
Periandiian Baru (The Old and New Testament). In these
treatises, the author arrives at the conclusion that there
is a lack of authenticity in the basic Christian doctrines.
The treatises also seek to present critical remarks on the
reliability of the commonly accepted Christian doctrine
quoted from a Jehovah's Witnesses source.61
dan Kristen (The Marriage Bill within the Islam-Christian

Relations) (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1974), 7-8.
^There were other publications which originated from
non-Muhammadiyah sources that aimed at the same goal.
Mention should be made of the JAPI, Yavasan Penviaran Islam
(Foundation of the Spread of Islam) publications which
engaged in discussion of some Christian topics. Among the
more popular books was one by Omar Hashim, M.D., entitled A
Complete Response to Rev. Dr. J. Verkuvl. Verkyul was a
Dutch theologian who lived in Indonesia for many years, and
wrote a treatise in the Indonesian language entitled An
Exposition of the Christian Faith to the Muslims. Boland,
The Struggle of Islam. 228.
61The book in question was an old publication of
Jehovah's Witnesses entitled New Heavens and a New Earth,
published by the International Bible Students. In this book,
a critical exposition of dates and authors of the Bible was
presented which was then quoted by Hadikusumo to prove the
309
An equally important publication in the form of a

pamphlet written in the spirit of absolutism, and coupled
with a vehement attack on the activities of the Christian
mission, was released by the Muhammadiyah in 1964.
Initially, this pamphlet aimed to function as an eye-opener
for Muslims to the threat of the Christian missionary
activities in Java. The pamphlet put particular stress on
what it called "a scheme to Christianize the Indonesian
people." In this respect, the pamphlet alluded to an
anonymous paper distributed in Java regarding the conference
of Roman Catholic and Protestant churches held in East Java
in 1962. The conference, allegedly, had schemed to
Christianize Java in twenty years, and the whole of
Indonesia in fifty years. As a means to achieve the above
goal, the conference urged that Christian education be
intensified, mixed marriages of Christian girls to Muslim
boys encouraged, and more importantly, that Christian
doctrines should strike root in the society.62
In response to a book written by the Christian
missionary F.L. Bakker, entitled The Lord Jesus in Islam.
Hasbullah Bakry, a Muhammadiyah scholar, wrote a somewhat
parallel book entitled Jesus in the 0ur/5n and Muhammad in
the Bible. Bakry sought to substantiate his belief in the
unreliability of the Christian texts. Boland, Struggle for
Islam. 226-227.
62Bisjron A. Wardy, Memahami Kegiatan Nasrani (To Be
Aware of Christian Activities) (Jogjakarta: Muhammadiyah,
1964) .
310
truth of the Prophet Muhammad's revelation by demonstrating

the Bible's prediction of the coming of Muhammad.63 On the
same lines, Ahmad Shalaby of Egypt, who came to Indonesia to
teach religion in several Islamic institutions, wrote a
number of treatises and a book on comparative religion. In
the Christian section he tried to invalidate the
authenticity of the New Testament by referring to the Gospel
of Barnabas which was "rejected and hidden by the Christian
because it renders the true teachings of Jesus; therefore,
it represents the only reliable gospel."64
Aside from the intended goal of these publications
to open the eyes of the Muslims to what they believed to be
the "inauthentic" nature of Christian doctrine
they were
intended to keep the Muslims holding fast to their religion

in the face of the deep penetration of the Christian
mission. For that reason, it was not surprising to find that
some of their contents originated from sources both
unrecognizable and unacceptable to Christians. A good
example is the commonly quoted source that confirms the
coming of the Prophet Muhammad from the Gospel of Barnabas,
ostensibly dated from the late first or early second century
^Boland, The Struggle of Islam. 228-229.

64Ahmad Shalaby, Perkembanqan Keaaamaan Dalam Islam dan
Masehi (The Religious Development in Islam and Christianity)
(Djakarta; 1964), 51-67.
311
C.E. This text is considered inauthentic and has no

recognized status among Christians.65
Soon after, this war of words turned to occasional
deplorable incidents that deepened the Muslim-Christian
wounds. Many conflicts between adherents of the two
religions flared up throughout Indonesia. These conflicts
mainly erupted as a result of the accelerated efforts of the
Christians to erect new churches to attract new converts.
Consequently, much heat was generated in the Muslim
community with regard 'to the missionary efforts to convert
Muslims to Christianity. The Christian Missions, in many
instances out of their religious ferver, ignored the
Muslims' objections to the erection of new churches in areas
mostly inhabited by Muslims. This and other factors combined
to cause outrage among Muslims, thus accelerating the
existing feeling of animosity between the two communities.
As the tensions reached an uncontrolable level,
physical confrontation and destruction of religious
facilities began. This disturbing response was clearly
manifested in 1967 with Muslims destroying churches in Aceh
65It was Rashid Rida, who had the Gospel of Barnabas
translated into Arabic in 1908, wrote an introduction
presenting it as an authentic gospel. Since then, this text
has spread throughout the Muslim world as a true
representation of Jesus's teachings. For Christians, this
text is a late work by a Morisco forger, by the name of
Ibrahim al-Taybili, who wrote it as a revenge against the
Christians who expelled the Moriscos from Spain. See, JeanMarie Gaudeul, Encounter & Clashes; Islam and Christianity
in History (Rome: Pontificio Instituto di Studi Arabi e
Islamici, 1990) Vol.l, 207-208, 268.
312
and Ujung Pandang, as well as the crushing of a Christian

school in Jakarta.66 In 1969 similar incidents flared up in
a suburb of Jakarta, where a Protestant church was destroyed
by Muslim youth. Such incidents also shocked the Christians
in Djatibarang of West Java and Purwodadi of Central
Java.67 After this series of events, the government felt
the need to step in to ease tensions.
Much debate followed in an attempt to surmount the
problems. Muslims put the blame on Christian activities
which were considered provocative and offensive. Muslims
complained that Christian missionaries invaded their areas
and converted their children through Western education,
which promoted Christian values. At times, economic power
was utilized by offering or granting those in need a variety
of material aids. This aid, asserted the Muslims, was too
66M. Natsir, Mencari Modus Vivendi Antar Ummat Beraqama

di Indonesia (In Search of Means of Communication Among
Religious Communities in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Media Da'wah,
1983), 7; Lukman Hakiem, Facta & Data. 17-18.
67Boland, The Struggle of Islam. 230-231. According to
Lukman Harun, the board member of the Muhammadiyah, the
"Meulaboh Incident" which happened in 1967 in West Aceh, was
caused by the erection of a church in the heart of a Muslim
community where no Christian lived. Similar incidents also
happened in other areas, such as Ujung Pandang, Jakarta,
Bukit Tinggi and others. See, Lukman Harun's paper
"Endeavors to Create Religious Harmony Among Believers of
Different Religions in Indonesia" presented at the
Indonesia-Australia Conference entitled "Understanding
Neighboring Faiths," February 2-5, 1991 at Monash
University, Melbourne, Australia.
313
alluring to be resisted by the poor, who became easy prey to

this material power.68
The Christians, on the other hand, seemed to disregard
Muslim sensibilities and considered these reactions
necessary challenges to be faced in the pursuit of their
religious duty. The Christians insisted that, since
Indonesia is a democratic and multireligious state, people
should have the freedom to embrace any religion they choose.
To deny this right is to negate the state's Constitution.
The Christians further complained about what they perceived
as an intolerant attitude on the part of the Muslims for not
allowing them to evangelize in some areas or to erect
churches in others. In such an environment, one wonders how
there could be any cooperation between these two groups when
each group seemed to hold tenaciously to its own logic. This
heated encounter led the government to initiate a dialogue
between the two communities.
It should be noted, in this regard, that the
Muhammadiyah, through one of its board members, Lukman
Harun, who was then a member of the House of
Representatives, proposed an interpellation on July 10, 1967
on the issue of the Christian-Muslim conflict. The
interpellation, which was supported by some thirty other
House of Representatives members from several factions, was
approved. In the interpellation, Lukman Harun urged the
^Noer, "Contemporary Political Dimensions", 197.
314
government to take decisive measures to control and to

regulate the procedures of the building of places of
worship, as well as to direct appropriate ways for religious
propagation. In addition, the members of the House of
Representatives also demanded that foreign aid, in the form
of funds and material goods, should be channeled through
government agencies. As it is evident, the whole purpose of
the interpellation was specifically aimed at curbing the
activities of the Christian missions in Indonesia. This
interpellation indicates clearly the role of the
Muhammadiyah in countering Christian missions.
It was partly in response to the parliamentarians'
demand, and partly in an effort to ease the strained
relations between various religious communities,
particularly between the Christians and the Muslims, that in
November 1967 the Minister of Religious Affairs, K.H.
Muhammad Dachlan, on behalf of the government presided over
a Conference on Interreligious Dialogue.69 At the
Conference, President Suharto appealed to all religious
leaders to avoid any interaction that could lead to conflict
and disunity. He further urged all parties concerned to
sincerely exercise religious tolerance which is the goal of
every religion, as well as of Pancasila. He also warned the
parties not to concern themselves only with increasing the
69Lukman Hakiem, Facta & Data. 29.
315
number of adherents at the expense of disharmony and

misunderstanding between religious communities.
Again, the role of the Muhammadiyah in this dialogue
was unquestionably significant. Of the many Muslim
participants, the Muhammadiyah representatives were the most
articulate and assertive. To borrow Boland's remark in
commenting on the Muslim participants' speeches, "Rasyidi's
speech in particular was rather sharp."70
It should be pointed out, however, that in spite of the
noble intention of the government to bank the fires, the
dialogue ended unsatisfactorily. The idea of confining
religious missionaries' preaching activities to their
adherents and those who had not yet submitted to any
recognized religion was rejected by the Christian
leaders.71 What was agreed on as a meager result of the
70Boland, The Struggle of Islam. 235. The same
assessment of Rasyidi's sharp tongue was offered by
Hadikusuma, a prominent Muhammadiyah leader, in an article
entitled "Prof. Rasjidi, The Sharp Critic." See, Djarnawi
Hadikusuma, "Prof Rasyidi, Pengeritik Tajam" in 70 Tahun
Prof. Dr. Rasiidi (70 Years of Prof. Dr. Rasjidi) ed. Endang
Basri Ananda (Jakarta: Harian Umum Pelita, 1985), 137-148.
71It was only in August 1978, that the Minister of
Religious Affairs, Alamsyah Prawiranegara, signed Government
Decree No. 70 on this particular issue. Another decree, no.
77 issued in the same year, stipulated that all religious
institutions should report any financial aid received from
abroad. These two decrees, however, remained loosely
implemented, as Christians expressed objections to them.
See, Husein Umar, "Intoleransi Kaum Nasrani Terhadap Ummat
Islam" in Facta & Data. 32-33. See also Noer, "Contemporary
Political Dimensions", 197. On Christian objections, see,
Tiniauan Menaenai Keoutusan Menteri Aaama No. 70 dan 77
Tahun 1978 dalam Ranaka Penvelenaaaraan Kebebasan Beraqama
dan Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Nasional (Review on the Minister
316
dialogue was a communique of insignificant weight, stating

that a Committee of Inter-Religious Consultation would be
formed to help the government in overcoming religious
tensions. Nowhere in the communique was it indicated that
the two groups had removed mistrust or eliminated
misunderstanding between them. What was hoped by the
government
parties
to bridge the gap between the contending
was still, at that time, a far-fetched goal. The
potential conflict that smoldered underneath the surface of

the fragile quietism seemed to be too strong to be
contained. Following this dialogue, issue after issue came
to the fore and generated new tensions.
In 1973 a marriage bill of national character was
introduced by the government. It was clear from the start
that although the bill did not explicitly serve the
Christian cause, it was strongly backed by the Christians
and the secular nationalists. It was, however, viewed by the
Muslims as partly incompatible with the Islamic principles
adhered to by the majority of the population, and therefore,
the draft was rejected.
The crucial point in the Bill is Article 10, Subsection
2, which stipulates that "differences in nationality,
of Religious Affairs' Decree No. 70 and 77 of 1978 in the

Context of the Implementation of the Religious Freedom and
the Maintenance of National Harmony) (Jakarta; General
Secretary of the Council of Churches and the Supreme Council
of Bishops of Indonesia, 1978)
317
ethnicity, country of origin, place of origin, religion.72

faith and ancestry should not constitute an impediment to
marriage."
For Muslims, difference in religion can be a big
inpediment for any marriage.73 Therefore, the Muslim group

strongly demanded that this article be modified.
It is interesting to note that long before the
government's presentation of the marriage Bill to the House
of Representatives, in February 1969, the Catholic faction
in the House of Representatives issued its basic views in
which it voiced strong concern about the proposed bill of
Marriage.74 Later, in the midst of the intense debate on
the Bill, several memoranda were released by the Christian
groups.75 Along with these memoranda, the Protestant DGI
Ûnderlining is mine.
Îslam regulates the institution of marriage for its
adherents. According to Islam, a Muslim girl is not allowed
to marry any man except her co-religionist. See, Qur'an. S.
2 : 221 .
74Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Fraksi Katolik vana Menvanakut

Undana-Undana Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Perkawinan dan
Rancanaan Undana-Undana Tentana Peraturan Pernikahan Umat
Islam (The Basic Thoughts of the Catholic Faction Regarding
the Proposed Marriage law for the Muslim Community), signed
by Harry Tjan Silalahi as chairman and F.X. Soedijono as
secretary. See, M. Rasjidi, Kasus RUU Perkawinan. 32-39.
Â memorandum of the Komite Aksi Generasi Muda
Indonesia (The Action Committee of the Young Generation of
Indonesia) released in Jakarta on December 11, 1973, by
eleven signatories. On the same day another memorandum was
released by Komite Kesatuan Nasional Generasi Muda Indonesia
(The National Unified Committee of the Young Generation of
Indonesia) signed by nine persons. Basically, both memoranda
urged the government to draft the bill of marriage in
congruence with the spirit of Pancasila; and that the
national interest should not be dictated by "certain group
318
fDewan Gereia-Gereia di Indonesia) (the Council of Churches

of Indonesia) in cooperation with MAWI (Maielis Aaunq Wali
Gereia Indonesia) (The Higher Hierarchy of the Catholic
Church in Indonesia) presented their fundamental views on
the bill in a paper entitled "Negara Perlu Berikan Ruang
untuk Kawin Sah Menurut Hukum Negara" (The State Ought to
Provide Room for a Legitimate Marriage Based on a National
Law). The chief concern of the Christian factions was to
prevent any enactment of law inspired by religious
principles. To borrow the words of the chairman of the
Catholic faction in the House of Representative, in
justifying their stance:
"...
It is not that we oppose the Islamic principles on
marriage; our stance will be the same in the event of facing

a bill that is inspired by Christian principles."76
For the Muslims, however, the Christian stance was
viewed as an effort to block any attempt by Muslims to give
Islamic meaning to the law. This is because the
controversial "seven words" of the Djakarta Charter were
brought up again by the Christians in an attempt to remind
interests" (read: Muslims); the state could recognize the

legitimacy of marriage based on religion, but should not
impose any religious norm upon adherents of any religion in
observing religious teachings including marriage life. For a
detailed account, see, the Jakarta daily evening newspaper
Sinar Harapan. December 12, 1973. It is worth noting that
Sinar Haraoan was known for its affiliation with the
Protestant denominations.
76Rasjidi, Kasus RUU Perkawinan. 33.
319
the Muslims of their alleged desire to establish an Islamic

state in Indonesia. The Muslims, furthermore, argued that
the
conclusion of the Christian stance enhanced the above
assumption, for it presented two alternatives for the future

of Indonesia in the context of this Bill. These two
alternatives were, either to maintain the unity of the
Republic by adopting the 1945 constitution in which the
Pancasila is the fundamental component, or to undermine the
state constitution, and thus destroy the republic by taking
religion as the main source for the national law. For the
Muslims, this view implies the following: those who take
into account religious principles in the formulation of law
(in this case, the Muslims), aimed to destroy the Republic
of Indonesia. However, in the face of these persistent
rejections on the part of the Christians, the Muslims
exhibited strong determination and insisted on their demand
to take into account Islamic principles.77
Faced with the strong criticism of Islamic
organizations, in which the Muhammadiyah played an active
role,78 the government retreated and agreed to the request
^Hussein Umar, "Intoleransi Kaum Nasrani", 31-32.
780ne of the strongest critiques against both the
government and the Christians was launched by Rasyidi in an
article which appeared in a Jakarta daily paper entitled
"Kristenisasi Dalam Selubung; Ummat Islam tidak akan Dapat
Menerima RUU Perkawinan (The Veiled Christianization;
Muslim Community Will Never Accept the Marriage Bill), Abadi
August 20, 1973. In the same spirit, Prof. Haji Kasman
Singodimedjo rebuked the Christian view which endorsed the
bill because "it introduces a uniform law to be applied to
320
of the Muslims to modify the bill.79 The bill was finally

passed in 1974, to the Christians' dissatisfaction.80 Even
so, were it not for the President's endorsement of certain
changes in the Bill,81 along with the support of the army
faction in the House of Representatives, the new bill,
perhaps, would not have passed.
Another important event attesting to the Muhammadiyah's
ongoing controversy with the Christians was manifested by
all religious communities." Kasman's article, appeare in the

Muslim daily paper Abadi of January 10, 1973, and was meant
to respond to an editorial in the Christian daily paper,
Kompas. on December 17, 1973.
79M. B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978), 87-88, 91-110.
in its editorial, under the title Hakekat RUU
Perkawinan (The Reality of the Marriage Law) the Christian
daily paper, Kompas, bitterly deplored the endorsement of
the bill and stated that Indonesian history will record the
following:
1. The Indonesian people, at the present time,
have proven their failure to unite themselves as
members of one nation. 2. 28 years after declaring
its independence, Indonesia has, on the contrary,
exhibited a decline in terms of the spirit and
aspirations inherent in the Preamble of the 1945
state constitution.
3. The House of Representatives proves its lack of
independence, dignity and effectiveness.
81In a meeting with the ulama in Palembang, Sumatra,
President Suharto expressly stated that "We should feel more
sinful if we offend the Qur'an and the Hadlth than to
violate human-invented laws." See, Kasman Singodimedjo, "UUD
45; Tidak Boleh Diselewengkan dalam Pembuatan Per-undangundangan Apapun, Termasuk Perbuatan UUP" (The 1945
Constitution Should not be Corrupted in Any Enactment of a
Law, Including the Marriage Law), ABADI. January 10, 1973.
321
the firm stance of Dr. Hamka,82 a prominent figure of the

Muhammadiyah and the first general Chairman of the M.U.I.
(Mailis Ulama Indonesia)(The Ulama Council of Indonesia),
regarding the prohibition of Muslims attendence at the
Christmas celebration. This was clearly expressed in a Fatwa
(religious legal decree) issued by M.U.I. in 1981.84 It was
Hamka was a leading Muslim author and a prolific

writer. Among many of his publications are: Tafsir al-Azhar
(A thirty-volume commentary on the Qur'an), Tasawwuf Modern
(Modern Tasawwuf), Seiarah Ummat Islam (History of Islamic
Community), and many others.
The Council of Indonesian 'Ulama was established in
1975 to implement the resolution of the Indonesian ulama
conference held in July 1975. Mukti Ali, the then-Minister
of Religious Affairs, inaugurated the first executive board
members of the M.U.I. on July 27, 1975. The chief functions
of the M.U.I., beside providing advice and issuing fatwas.
was to become the mediator between the Muslim community and
the government, and the Muslims' representative in
interreligious dialogue. According to the present General
Chairman, Hasan Basri, the M.U.I functions "as a watchdog to
ensure that there will be no laws in the country that are
contradictory to the teachings of Islam." Atho Mudzhar,
"Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian 1Ulama: A Study of
Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia, 1975-1988. Ph.D. diss.
University of California, Los Angeles: 1990, 112.
^The Fatwa reads as follows: The Council of Indonesian
'Ulama decided that:
1. Christmas celebration in Indonesia, though
meant to celebrate and honor the Prophet Jesus,
peace be upon him, cannot be separated from the
issues described above.
2. Attending joint Christmas celebrations for
Muslims is haram (unlawful)
3. So that Muslims do not fall into shubuhat and
God's prohibition, it is suggested to them not to
participate in activities related to Christmas
celebrations.
For the original text of the Fatwa, see, Majlis Ulama
Indonesia, Kumnulan Fatwa Mailis Ulama Indonesia (The Fatwa
Collections of the Indonesian 'Ulama Council) (Jakarta:
Pustaka Panjimas, 1984), 81-89.
322
under the chairmanship of Hamka that the Fatwa was released,

to the dissatisfaction of the government. From the
government's perspective, the Fatwa could do more harm than
good for Christian-Muslim relations in particular, and would
undermine the government's efforts to advance an
interreligious harmony among various religious communities
in the country in general.
The M.U.I. under Hamka, on the other hand, seemed to be
increasingly worried by the fact that formal celebrations of
Christmas held by Christians were attended by Muslims under
the pretext of advancing religious tolerance.85 For Hamka,
Indonesian Muslims should be protected from being involved
in the rituals of any other religion.86 For that purpose,
It is worth mentioning that this Fatwa was the most
elaborate one ever issued by the M.U.I. Recently the
chairman of the M.U.I. reminded Indonesian Muslims to abide
by the Fatwa. See, Tempo, Agama, January, 1st, 1994, 35.
85In the words of Mudzhar, "For many Muslims, Christmas
celebrations are similar to mawlid al-Nabi. a celebration of
the birth of the Prophet Muhammad." Muzhar continuessaying
that for the Christians, Muslims' attendance at the
celebrations was a "good excuse for exposing them to
Christianity." But for the *ulama. such attendance
"constituted a direct threat of Christianization." See
Mudzhar, "Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama", 92.
^ h e Fatwa explicitly points out the presence of
ritual activities during the Christmas celebrations. While
the origin of Christmas celebrations can be traced back to
the various folk customs and festivals, it, however, was
adopted by the church and, therefore, is filled with
Christian rituals. Accordingly, the celebrations have
acquired sacred meanings and have been elevated in status,
without which Christians may feel disloyal to Christ. In the
words of Harvey, ". . .O f all the festivals which crowd the
Christian calendar, there is none that exercises an
influence so strong and universal as that of Christmas."
323
they must be informed, in order not to fear from being

accused of intolerance, should they decline to accept
invitations to attend Christmas celebrations.
As the Chairman of the M.U.I., and the official
spokesperson of the Indonesian Muslims, Hamka's burden and
religious duty was unquestionable. In addition, the fact
that Hamka had been brought up in the Muhammadiyah's
environment87 made the issuance of such Fatwa. during his
tenure, not surprising. What happened in the aftermath, in
which Hamka exhibited an uncompromising stance against the
government's request to revoke the Fatwa. proved his deeprooted commitment to the principles adhered to by the
Muhammadiyah movement. Faced with the strong pressure of the
government, Hamka opted to resign his post as the Chairman
of the 'Ulama Council rather than to downplay the importance
of the Fatwa.88
See, Thomas K. Harvey, The Book of Christmas; Descriptive of
the Custom. Ceremonies. Traditions. Superstitions. Fun.
Feeling, and Festivities of the Christmas Season (New York:
George P. Putnam, 1948), 81. For more elaborate discussion
on the origin of Christmas and its ritual aspect, see,
Clement A. Miles, Christmas in Ritual and Tradition.
Christian and Pagan (London: Adelphi Terrace T. Fisher
Unwin, 1912), 20-23; T.G. Crippen, Christmas and Christmas
Lore (London: Blackie and Son Ltd., 1923), 6-10.
87A s alluded to earlier, Hamka's father, Haji Abdul
Karim Amrullah, who was known as Haji Rasul, was the first
reformer to introduce the Muhammadiyah in the Minangkabau
area in 1925 upon his return from Yogyakarta. See, Noer, The
MAs the Fatwa reached the mass publications and thus
started a widespread controversy, the government requested
Hamka to withdraw the Fatwa. Hamka clung to his convictions
324
There were two other issues that came to the fore that
generated great tension between Muslims and Christians First
was the debate on the enactment of Law No. 7 of 1989, on
Religious Court of Law (read: Islamic courts). The second
was the controversy over the Bill regarding Law No 2 of 1989
on the National Education System. In the latter case,
religious education was affirmed to be a sub-system of the
National Education System, and therefore religious
instruction was made compulsory at all public schools and
universities.
Prior to the passing of these bills, Indonesia
witnessed an intense debate among people of all walks of
life regarding the substance of the bills. The debate was
not merely confined to the official level in the Indonesian
House of Representatives, which was in charge of reviewing
the government proposal, but it deeply penetrated into the
public sphere where both scholars and religious
functionaries got actively involved.
Both bills were emphatically opposed by the Christians
and some secularists on the grounds that they contradicted
the Pancasila. the state ideology. They further argued, as
they did in the 1970s regarding the Marriage Bill, that
these bills could lead to the resurgence, or at least carry
on the spirit, of the "seven words" of the Jakarta Charter.
and instead submitted his resignation two months after the

release of the Fatwa. Muzhar, "Fatwas of the Council," 127.
325
Again, the same old rejections were repeatedly uttered by

the Christians. And again the Muslims joined the government
in opposing the Christians/secularists' assumptions. Their
logic ran as follows: Since the overwhelming majority of the
population is Muslim, why not have a bill which embodies
Muslim tradition and principles?
In rejecting the "seven words" of the Djakarta Charter
and later the 1970 Marriage Bill, the Christians argued that
every attempt to apply only one specific religious criterion
by which they meant Islam
even if "religious freedom"
is mentioned at the same time, will ipso facto, discriminate

against those who are not adherents of that religion. In
this event, the state, they argued had clearly violated the
basic principle of the Pancasila.89
As far as the Bill of the National Education System was
concerned, the Christians objected to Article 28, Subsection
2, along with its explanations. The article in question, and
its explanation, read as follows: "To qualify as a teacher,
the educator should have faith in the Almighty God, be
equipped with a wide perspective of Pancasila and the 1945
State Constitution and possess the necessary instructional
skill; the religious affiliation of the instructor who
89This argument was set forth by Walter Bonar Sidjabat,

Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study
Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the
Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and
Christianity (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1965), 75
326
teaches religion should be the same religion as that of

his/her students."
This article, particularly its explanation, generated a
heated debate between Muslims and Christians in the House of
Representatives. It goes without saying that the Christian
group, which operates an enormous number of schools, was
deeply concerned about the negative impact of the article on
their educational institutions. For, according to the
article, these Christian schools must provide Muslim
instructors on Islam to teach the Muslim students90 who
study at these institutions.91 Thus, the Christian
rejection of the article, even after the Bill passed, was
not surprising.
In addition, the article also undermines the unique
character of private schools, particularly the Christian
schools, which seek to promote Christian doctrine and values
among their students. As a result, the Catholic youth of
Indonesia declared: "The Bill contradicts the spirit of
Pancasila, and for that reason the explanation of Article 28
90In the Christian schools, Christianity was the only
religion taught, even to Muslim students. Prior to
admission, parents of every Muslim student were required to
sign a statement of consent declaring the right of the
school to teach Christianity to their son or daughter. See,
the weekly periodical Tempo. February, 18, 1989.
91In Jakarta and its vicinity alone, during the time
when the bill was discussed, there were 360 elementary and
secondary Christian schools with around 125.000 students,
65% of whom were Muslims. See, Lukman Harun, Muhammadiyah
dan Undana-Undana Pendidikan ( The Muhammadiyah and the
Education Bill) (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1990), 84.
327
is legally void."92 In the same spirit and letter, A.M.W.

Pranarka, Chairman of the Taman Siswa Cultural Research
Center, who was a Catholic, urged the Minister of Education
to delete the explanation of the article, as it could lead
to a "national conflict."93
In the face of the persistent Christian objection to
the Bill, the Muhammadiyah, through its spokesman and ViceChairman, Lukman Harun, warned all parties that "any attempt
to undermine or to alter Article 28 of the National
Educational Law and its explanation could result in the
disturbance of the national security." Harun went on to
criticize those who considered the explanations of Article
28 not binding.94
Perturbed by the overt Christian objection to the
Education Law, the Muhammadiyah leadership made a courtesy
call on President Suharto on May 29, 1989. In the meeting
the Muhammadiyah voiced its concern over the Christian
stance. The Muhammadiyah appealed to the government to
ensure the enforcement of the Education Law along with its
explanations.95
92See, the daily Protestant affiliated paper, Suara

Pembaharuan. March 13, 1989.
93See, L. Harun, Muhammadiyah dan Undana-Undana
Pendidikan. 84.
94Daily news paper Terbit. March 14, 1989.
^L. Harun, Muhammadiyah dan Undana-Undanq Pendidikan.
88.
328
As for the religious judicial bill, in response to the

Christian rejection the government argued that the existence
and the recognition of the Religious Court of Law as an
independent court of law is constitutional.96 This is the
case because the bill serves as the realization of the
stipulation contained in Law No. 14 of 1970 on the Judicial
Authority, in which the Religious Court of Law is equal to
the other three courts of law: Public Court, Administrative
Court, and Military Court.97 An intense debate took place
inside and outside the House of Representatives between the
main contending parties, the Muslim and Christian groups.
In this debate, the role of the Muhammadiyah in
overriding Christian objections was clearly evident. In an
official statement98 signed by its Vice Chairman, Ismail
Sunny,99 the Muhammadiyah affirmed that the considerations
of the bill are based on the principles of the Pancasila.
96For an elaborate account of the Bill and views
related to it, see, Hadari Djenawi Taher, Pokok-Pokok
Pikiran Dalam Undana-Undana Peradilan Aaama (The Basic
Ideas on the Religious Court of Law) (Jakarta: Alda, 1989)
97See, the Minister of Religious Affairs' statement on
this issue in Muslim's Interests are Better Served in the
Absence of Muslim Parties: Indonesian Experience (Jakarta:
The Department of Religious Affairs, 1992), 2-3.
98Suara Muhammadiyah (The Voice of the Muhammadiyah),
Sekitar RUU PA (Regarding Religious Court Bill) No. 11, 12,
13/ 69 (Jakarta: June 1, 1989).
"Prof. Ismail Sunny is a professor of legal theory at
the graduate school of the University of Indonesia, and
Chairman of the National Law Development Institute. He is
currently holding a government position as the Ambassador of
Indonesia to Saudi Arabia.
329
The statement of the Muhammadiyah, therefore, rejected the

Christian argument that the state does not have the right to
regulate the fulfillment of religious duties by Muslims. The
Muhammadiyah asserted that such an argument was "groundless
and unconstitutional." The Muhammadiyah pointed to the
resemblance between the bill in question and Law No. 1 of
1974, which regulates marriage among Muslims.100
In his press release, another Vice-Chairman of the
Muhammadiyah, Lukman Harun, asserted that the current debate
on the Religious Court Bill constituted a test case for
Indonesian readiness to display religious tolerance for one
another. While the urging of religious tolerance had been
constantly directed at Muslims, why, asked Harun, in this
particular instance are our non-Muslim brothers (read:
Christians) not willing to exhibit tolerance for the
establishment of the religious court? Harun concluded his
statement by appealing to all parties to resolve the dispute
in a constitutional way.101
During the debates on the above-mentioned bills, the
issue of the "Djakarta Charter" and the "Islamic state"
constantly surfaced. The Christians sought to remind the
people of the post-colonial history of Indonesia, in which
certain Muslim groups sought to unconstitutionally alter the
100I. Sunny, The Voice of the Muhammadiyah. 12/69/1989.

101The daily newspaper Terbit, June 19, 1989.
330
ideology of the state from the Pancasila into Islam.102 In

so doing, the Christians attempted to rouse the suspicions
of the people against Muslims.
The afore-mentioned were among the most important
issues that engendered confrontation between the two
communities of faith, the Christians and the Muslims.
Looking at the issues from the Christians' perspective, the
Christians' abounding suspicion of the Muslims can be well
understood. This is especially true in light of the fact
that, from the outset, when the Republic of Indonesia was
still in its infancy, the goal of many Muslims in Indonesia
was to establish an Islamic state, or, at least, to revive
102The manifest example of such intention was the case

of S.M. Kartosuwiryo (1905-1962), of Javanese descent, who
obtained Western medical training and was influenced by
Tjokroaminoto's Islamic ideals. He initially organized a
Muslim group to fight against the Dutch in West Jawa, and
later officially proclaimed the existence of the Islamic
State of Indonesia, D5rul-Isl5m. on August 7, 1949, as an
alternative to the Republic of Indonesia. Another Muslim
fighter associated with Darul-Isiam was Kahar Muzakkar
(1920-1965), of a Buginese origin, who organized guerilla
activities, first against the Dutch, and later joined the
Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State and accepted an appointment as
Sulawesi commander of Kartosuwiryo's Islamic Army of
Indonesia. For Indonesian Christians, any action which might
revive the spirit of D5rul-Isl5m was a matter of caution.
This is especially true if one considers an unconfirmed
report of the act of forced conversion to Islam of the
Christian Toradja by one Muzakkar's groups. See, Boland, The
Struggle of Islam. 55-68; H. Feith, The Decline of
Constitutional Democracy. 214; For further information on
Kartosuwirjo's movement, see, C.A.O Van Nieuwenhuize, Aspect
of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve
Ltd, 1958), 161-179.
331
the Jakarta Charter.103 This was particularly expressed in

the platforms of leading Islamic political parties in the
1950s. However, the attempt of the Muslims to achieve their
goal engendered some opposition from non-Muslims and from a
group of Javanese Muslims. Contrary to the expectations and
hope of the Muslims, the Islamic parties were comparatively
unsuccessful in the 1955 General Election. As a result, the
Islamic parties got less than half of the total seats in
both the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly.104 From
that time onward, the Christians regarded almost every such
issue with utmost suspicion.105 The chief threat, from
their perspective, has been the issue of the Djakarta
Charter which has proven to be the source of never-ending
antagonism between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia.
103When Sukarno decided to return to the Constitution of

1945, following the failure of the Constituent Assembly to
reach an agreement on the State Constitution, the Muslim
parties insisted that the Djakarta Charter should be
included. For, according to the spokesman of the Muslim
parties, H.A.N. Firdaus, the Djakarta Charter and Pancasila
cannot be separated from each other, just as the spirit and
the body cannot be separated from one another. See, W.
Sidjabat, Religious Tolerance. 69-70.
104Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Election of 1955
(Ithaca: Department of Far Eastern Studies Cornell
University, 1957) 65.
105In his repudiation of the Religious Court Bill,
Father Florentines Subroto Wijoyo wrote an article with the
suggestive title Tiada Toleransi Untuk Piaaam iakarta (No
Tolerance of the Jakarta Charter), in which he charges the
material source of the Bill (Islamic principles) as alien to
Indonesian soil. See, Catholic periodical, Hidup. No. 7,
1989, 50, as cited by Husein Umar, "Intoleransi Kaum
Nasrani", 36-37.
332
To downplay any further confrontation which could lead

to interreligious disharmony, the government favored a
pattern of indirect encounter between the religions,
particularly on sensitive theological issues. Consequently,
there has been strong disinclination on the part of the
religious communities to conduct mutual discussions on
matters of faith. Therefore, any intensive religious
dialogue is now lacking in Indonesia, as both Christians and
Muslims alike have opted to keep a careful distance from one
another. What is really happening in the world of ChristianMuslim encounter in Indonesia is a form of, to borrow
P. Knitter's expression, "lazy tolerance"106 that calls
upon all recognized religions to accept each other's
validity and then to ignore each other as they go their own
self-satisfied way. Only in the event that a particular
religion "offends" another religion does a direct encounter
take place.
The Cause of Christian-Muslim Controversy
It is our contention that the real issues that caused

the disagreements that have manifested themselves in the
history of Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia in
general, and the Muhammadiyah-Christian mission controversy
in particular, basically lie in the long history of mutual
mistrust. That the self-understanding and the nature of both
106Knitter, No Other Name?. 9.
333
religions as being "universal" has only nurtured this

feeling of animosity is evident. In general, each
understands itself as the absolute religion which cannot
recognize any other religion beside itself as of equal
value. Each maintains firmly that it is the religion, the
unique, the superior, the normative, the salvific and the
one and the only valid revelation of the one living God.107
Given this kind of basic outlook, mistrust is bound to grow
deeper and confrontations are nearly inevitable.
Aside from Christianity's universalistic nature, in
that it affirms its truth is not only meant for Christians
but is for all of humanity and must be shared with all, a
missionary, or even any Christian who is involved in mission
work is always seen by Muslims as reopening the wounds of
the past. Even if a person works not for the purpose of
conversion, but genuinely in a spirit of love and service to
others, such work is still seen as questionable. Christian
service in a non-Christian environment is perceived as an
underhanded way of conducting missionary work. The wounds
left by the Dutch colonial rule are far too deep for any
healing efforts.
107Cf, the doctrine of the Church as the exclusive

source of salvation "extra ecclesiam nulla salus" and
cf, the Qur'an, 3:19 and 3:85 "Surely the (true) religion
with God is Islam. . . " and, "Whoever seeks a religion
other than Islam, it shall not be accepted from him, and in
the hereafter he shall be among the losers>" For a good
discussion on this issue, see, Mahmoud Ayoub, "Roots of
Muslim Christian Conflict," The Muslim World. (1987), 25-45.
334
What exacerbates the matter further is the evangelical

attitude of most of the churches operating in Indonesia.
These attitudes, which grow stronger and more stridently
voiced and which stress the necessity of mission so that all
can "come to salvation,1,108 are clearly manifested by the
soaring numbers of organized churches and denominations in
the country.109 Through this host of denominations numerous
activities are carried out which are indicative of the depth
of Christian penetration into the real life of Indonesian
society.
On the other hand, the Christians are deeply concerned
about the desire of many Muslims to institute the sharl1ah
in certain aspects of Indonesian life, such as marriage,
inheritance and endowment laws. For Christians, these laws
can become a symbol of increasing consciousness and a
renewed sense of Islamic identity on the part of the Muslim
108This uncompromising evangelical stance is reflected
in a joint protest launched by the Catholic churches and the
Protestant denominations against the Government Decrees No.
70 and No. 77 of 1978 to regulate Christian "mission
activity" and the "foreign aid to religious institutions."
The Christians believed that the decrees were meant to
narrow their activities, thus representing a threat to
religious freedom, and hence a clear violation of the
Pancasila. See, Ahmad von Denffer, Indonesia: Government
Decrees on Mission and Subsequent Developments (Leicester,
U.K: The Islamic Foundation, 1979).
109There were 270 Christian denominations operating in
Indonesia up to 1980. In addition, there were 65 North
American church organizations. See, World Christian
Encyclopedia (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982);
Samuel Wilson, ed., Mission Handbook: North American
Protestant Ministeries Overseas (Montovia, California: MARC,
1979).
335
majority. This, for Christians, is but a step in the process

that leads toward the Islamization of the nation. They
seriously question whether the Christian minority will enjoy
the same standard of security, economic well-being and
social equality in such a political and religious
environment.
In an atmosphere in which both communities charge one
another with being intolerant, both are encountering the
challenge of the whole concept of "religious tolerance."
Without having to sacrifice basic religious principles, both
communities must have the goodwill to listen to one another.
Unless both communities are ready and willing to encounter
other faiths with understanding and respect, the existing
impasse will never change, except perhaps for the worse.
Equally important is the fact that both communities
have to be self-critical and more aware of their joint
responsibilities in the light of the forces of disbelief,
cynicism, injustice and moral degeneration that are taking
place in the cultural and social environment. Only when both
sides are able to transcend their historical animosities and
engage together in promoting the basic values that both
religions stand for, can these and other problems be
resolved.
From the theological perspectives leaders of both
religious groups should seek valid theological foundations
336
which are abundant in both religions
on which to build
religious tolerance. From the social angle, leaders of both

groups should decide how their followers could apply their
faith in the light of the religious tolerance that is a
central ideal encouraged and advanced by the state. At the
same time, it is imperative that the priests, the imams, the
pastors, and the community leaders be exposed to a much more
open worldview, accepting of the pluralistic nature of the
nation, and searching their own traditions for support for
such pluralism. Only through such education will the
community leaders, and their followers, learn not only to
understand the other, but meaningfully to live and work with
one another as believers.
Important steps toward the concept of religious
tolerance and constructive dialogue have been taken. This is
especially apparent in the "radical change" in the Catholic
attitude toward other religions as reflected in the 1965
Declaration on Non-Christian Religions of the Second Vatican
Council. The Church's imbalances of the past have begun to
shift toward an effort to come to a more positive theology
of other religions. Whether or not this positive sign can be
translated to Indonesia, where the Protestant denominations
are double the size of the Catholics,110 remains to be
seen. Thirty years after the Second Vatican Council made its
110While 9.6 % Christian population in Indonesia, only
3.6 % of Indonesians are Catholics. Britannica Book of The
Year 1995 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1995), 630.
positive statement on Islam, the efforts in this direction

have not gone very far. There is still much to be done in
the way of achieving greater understanding. Let our glimmer
of hope overcome our despair in anticipating the dawn of a
bright future in which religion will become the solution of
conflict, rather that its source.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this dissertation is not to dig in the
dust of Indonesia's past religious history but to highlight
the major causes of tensions between Muslim and Christians
and to suggest means through which these tensions could be
reduced, if not eliminated completely. As we have observed,
both religions competed for influence in the country. Ever
since the introduction of Christianity during the colonial
era, continuing through the period of the revival of the
Islamic movement and even after the advent of new Republic
of Indonesia, numerous tensions existed between the two
religious communities. As a result, the idea of dialogue has
been launched with the hope of diffusing tension, but there
is still a long way to go. It is hoped that by understanding
the causes of these tensions, both groups can find a better
way of living and working together in peaceful co-existence
and cooperation under the canopy of the mother country,
Indonesia. Therefore, any effort in bringing Muslims and
Christians together should not be discouraged but rather
highly supported.
It may be concluded from the foregoing investigation
that the presence of Christian missions and their
penetration into the country, as well as the influence they
exerted, constitute the main motivating factor which served
339
as the prod to arouse Dahlan's religious fervor, which led

in turn to the founding of the Muhammadiyah. This Christian
presence and penetration had been, for the most part, the
work of Dutch colonialism which had nurtured the spirit of
the Christian missions.
Out of their misperception of Islam as a spiritually
and ethically wanting religion, the Dutch encouraged the
spread of the ideas in Indonesia of Western civilization
along with the Christian faith. As a result a strong
cooperation and mutually beneficial relationship between the
Christian missions and the Dutch colonial rule was solidly
established. Because of this cooperation, the Muslim people
of Indonesia became suspicious of all missionary works,
regardless of their motives. What the Muslims of Indonesia
saw as the missionaries' primary aim was to win converts by
means of education, medical services and monetary gifts.
Therefore it was considered to be part of an overall plan to
destroy their religion. As a result many Muslims were unable
to distinguish between Christian missionaries who were
sincerely interested in sharing their faith and helping the
people without any ulterior motives, and those with more
a "negative intent.
One cannot understand this situation without placing it
in its socio-historical context. When the Dutch colonizers
came to Indonesia they discovered that the Indonesians were
already predominantly Muslims. Christianity came to
340
Indonesia with the colonialists. Undoubtedly this is why

Christians had great difficulty in establishing cordial
relation with Muslims. Incidents of true friendship between
the two communities of faith were extremely rare
In the face of the painful experience of injustice and
the fear of lost religious identity caused by the Dutch
colonial policies, and enhanced by Colonial-Mission
cooperation, the Muslims initiated concerted efforts to
challenge this threatening phenomenon. The birth of the
Muhammadiyah was one of the clear manifestations of this
resistance to the Colonial-Mission mutual collaboration.
Although the tension and controversy between the
Muslims and the Christians basically lie in the long history
of mutual mistrust between the two faith communities, the
feeling of animosity grew deeper as the colonial rulers took
sides, favoring the Christians over the Muslims. As a result
the scars left by Dutch colonial rule were too deep to allow
much receptivity on the part of the Muslims. Had it not been
for the close Dutch association with the Christian missions,
relations between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia would
have been far less distorted. Indeed, Christianity would
have had a brighter history on Indonesian soil had it not
been tarred by the same brush as the colonialists.
Depending on the future orientation within both Islam
and Christianity, Christian-Muslim relations can either
improve or deteriorate. The more moderate and progressive
341
the orientation on both sides the less likely their

interrelations will deteriorate. In this respect the role of
the religious leaders in keeping their followers from the
zeal that leads to "fanaticism" is imperative for creating
any harmonious relationship.
Hence, the future of Muslim-Christian relations in
Indonesia rests on the willingness of both Christian and
Muslim communities to repair the damage of the past and look
forward to the future. Both communities must commit
themselves to building a community of concern as people of
faith, determined to create a greater understanding of one
another through the fellow-feeling of being Indonesian. Both
the spirit of Christ for Christians and the Qur'an and the
Sunnah for Muslims should always remain a beacon guiding
each community.
Our research further indicates that it is misleading to
assume that because the Muhammadiyah sought to create a
"purer" Islam in Indonesia, purging religious syncretism, it
should be regarded as a puritanical and salafi movement
affiliated with the Wahhabi reform movement of Saudi Arabia.
The Muhammadiyah, in fact, possesses a sophisticated amalgam
of characteristics corresponding to its diverse objectives
and goals, which underwent changes in response to the need
of the hour.
Since its advent, the Muhammadiyah has presented itself
as a reform movement incompatible with the Wahhabi movement
342
in certain respects, particularly in its view of Sufism.

Dahlan, the founder of the movement, and subsequent
generations of the Muhammadiyah leadership, unlike Wahhabi
leaders, took a mild position regarding Sufism and, indeed,
displayed certain Sufi tendencies in their admonitions.
In addition, although the Muhammadiyah movement,
overtly vowed from its inception not to engage in politics,
its reform ideas and actions did ultimately have profound
political implications in the Indonesian political arena.
This important role of the Muhammadiyah, as the study shows,
has not ceased to play its part in the contemporary
political life of Indonesia.
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This manuscript has been reproduced from the m icrofilm master. U M I

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TEMPLE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE BOARD

THE MUHAMMADIYAH MOVEMENT

AND ITS CONTROVERSY WITH CHRISTIAN MISSION

Date submitted to Graduate Board: ............

THE MUHAMMADIYAH MOVEMENT

UMI Number: 9600080

UNI Microform 9600080

My first contact with Temple University, Department of

who, despite his heavy engagements has found time to

read, correct and give his insightful suggestions, which

Khalid Blankinship, whose corrections and valuable advice

member of my committee and for having given of his time,

INDONESIA: AN HISTORICALOVERVIEW .........

THE CONSOLIDATION OF CHRISTIANITY........

The Introduction of Christianity and

III: THE DUTCH COLONIAL P O L I C Y ...............

Structure of the Colonial Government . .

THE MUHAMMADIYAH M O V E M E N T ...............

The Cultural M i l i e u .....................

THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE BIRTH OF

The Middle East Reformist Ideas .........

THE ENCOUNTER OF THE MUHAMMADIYAH WITH

Formative Stage of the Muhammadiyah .

VII: CONCLUSION.................................. 338

Six thousand inhabited islands, with over 190 million

This period of hinduized empires lasted

until the demise of the Javanese kingdom of Madjapahit in

As a result, two groups of different degrees of attachment

Muslim world. Although Indonesia was situated on the

founded religious schools

when they returned home. Thus they were able to spread

but also as an active movement that has stimulated a yreat

Indonesia,- and was chiefly inspired by the Middle East

and modernism aiming at purging Islamic practices of

Significance of the Study

to play an influential role not only in the region of

2The "New Order" here is meant the Suharto regime.

Muslim intellectual society, and in 1991 he went on his

Scope of the Study

This study is mainly concerned with the birth of the

groups, this dissertation will seek to underscore the

Review of Related Studies

James L. Peacock, Purifying Faith: The

is mainly concerned with the educational and

Alfian, Muhammadiyah; The Political Behavior of a

Syamsuddin, M Siradjuddin, Religion And Politics

Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in

describes the historical roots of the prominent

In addition to the above works, Mukti Ali (the

Mitsuo Nakamura, in his book The Crescent Arises

In addition to the above, there are several works which

biographical in nature. The more outstanding of these works

appears to be political. The Indonesian government has been,

Sources and Methodology of the Study

The present study will employ a number of approaches.

established these roles, the next step will be to assess and

In order for the study to discern the underlying motives of

3Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. trans. Joel

Synopsis of the Dissertation

responsible for both enhancing the position of Christianity

for the emergence of the Muhammadiyah are presented prior to