Cerezo v.

Tuazon
G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004

TORTS: Presumption of Negligence: Employer's Vicarious

Liability v. Subsidiary Liability

provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary

capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action
where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are
established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court's
jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is
separate and independent from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was
no need to reserve the filing of a separate civil action. The purpose of
allowing the filing the of an independent action based on quasi-delict
against the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.

FACTS:
Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided
with a tricycle in Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a
complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her
husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.
According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the
proper lane. There was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After
the complaint was filed, alias summons was served upon the person of Atty.
Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.
In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction because there was no service of summons on Foronda.
Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages in the criminal action.
ISSUE:

Cerezo vs Tuazon
Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver
Tuazon filed acomplaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the
bus line, her husband AttorneyJuan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver
Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").His complaint that the driver of the Country
Bus willfully, unlawfully, and feloniouslyoperate the said motor vehicle in a
negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without dueregard to traffic rules
and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to preventloss
of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to
severe damageto the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus
making him unable to walk andbecoming disabled, with his thumb and
middle finger on the left hand being cut.Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as
a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issuedsummons against Atty. Cerezo
and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses"). The Cerezo spousesfiled a
comment with motion for bill of particulars and granted by the court. Atty.
Elpidio B.Valera appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. Valera filed an
urgent ex-parte motion

Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

for the issuance of newsummons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper
service in accordance with the Rules of Court.The trial court issued an order

HELD:
Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal
law but on quasi-delict under the Civil Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict
under Art. 103, RPC, or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under
Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies.
An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the
criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability
arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The
choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the
procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.
Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's
liability.
Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention.
An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action
in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is
possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict
is solidary. Where there is a solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as
in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation
of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other
is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from
either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and
direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.
The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to
the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the
character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180
originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may
sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law
presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in
not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law
condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for
the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable
directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due
diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the
employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another) without including the author of the act. The action against the
principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a
prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense
that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act
or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary
liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as

urgent ex-parte motion. The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted

testimony of theplaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this
case as a pauper under existingrules.Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for reconsideration. The trial courtdenied the motion for
reconsideration. The trial court issued an order directing the Cerezospouses
to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The Cerezo
spousesdid not file an answer. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo
spouses in default. The trialcourt issued an order declaring the Cerezo
spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to presenthis evidence.After
ial and documentary evidence, the trial

trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for thedamages sustained by
Tua
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision.
She filed before the trial court a petition forrelief from judgment on the
grounds of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence." Testifyingbefore the
trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of
hearingsand of orders of the court.Tuazon did not testify but presented
documentary evidence to prove the participation of theCerezo spouses in
the case.The trial court issued an order
denying the petition for relief from judgment. The trialcourt refused to grant
relief from judgment because the Cerezo spouses could have availed of the
remedy of appeal. The Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud,
accident, mistake orexcusable negligence by conclusive evidence, they also
failed to prove that they had a good andsubstantial defense. The trial court
noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because theyrelied on an
expected settlement of the case.The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari.
The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court of appeals a petition for review
on
certiorari
the Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on
certiorari
for failure toattach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition and failed
to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. Undaunted,
the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of judgment, with prayer for restraining order. The Court
of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution
records show that thepetitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the
remedy of an annulment of judgment is nolonger available.Issues:(1)
Whether or not the case needed to be reviewed(2)
Whether or not the lower courts and the court of appeals gravely erred in
renderingdecision(3)
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages

Held:(1)
The Supreme Court held that the petition has no merit. The issues are
interrelated. Anexamination of the records of the entire proceedings shows
that It is either by sheerignorance or by malicious manipulation of legal

technicalities that they have managedto delay the disposition of the present
case, to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon.For these reasons, the
present petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Theissues raised
in the present petition to clear any doubt about the correctness of
thedecision of the trial court.(2)
The lower courts and the court of appeals did not erred in rendering their
decision, andwas infact competent to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and
against Mrs. Cerezoeven in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs.
indispensable party to the present
case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reservethe filing of a separate
civil action because he opted to file a civil action for damagesagainst Mrs.
Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence.
thiscourt affirms the decision thereto.(3)
There is a modification that the amount due shall earn legal interest at 6%
per a
nn
um

presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the

master or employer either in selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily
that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he
is relieved from liability.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of

extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the
only fact upon which his action is based; while on
the contrary, in a case of negligence which
presupposes the existence of a contractual
obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and
that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him
to prove negligence.
The test by which to determine whether the
passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is
that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person,
of the age, sex and condition of the passenger,
would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care
has been defined to be, not the care which may or
should be used by the prudent man generally, but
the care which a man of ordinary prudence would
use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.
o Women, it has been observed, as a
general rule are less capable than men of
alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing
apparel obstructs the free movement of
the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the
place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff
as it was his daily custom to get on and of
the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind
with regard either to the length of the
step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was
alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to
alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a
month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he
has suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown
that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a
fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his
permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25
for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental
expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

Cangco vs Manila Railroad

January 20, 1915 around 7 to 8 p.m.: Jose

Cangco arose from his seat in the 2nd class-car
where he was riding and, making, his exit through
the door, took his position upon the steps of the
coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support
As the train slowed down another passenger and
also an employee of the railroad company Emilio
Zuiga got off the same car alighting safely at the
point where the platform begins to rise from the
level of the ground.
When the train had proceeded a little farther Cangco stepped off
but 1 or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons so his feet slipped from under him and he fell
violently on the platform.
o His body rolled from the platform and was drawn
under the moving car, where his right arm was badly
crushed and lacerated.
the car moved forward possibly 6 meters
before it came to a full stop
He was bought to the hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was
amputated
o operation was unsatisfactory so he had
second operation at another hospital was
performed and the member was again
amputated higher up near the
shoulder expending a total of P790.25
It is customary season for harvesting these melons
and a large lot had been brought to the station for
the shipment to the market
CFI: favored Manila Railroad Co. (MRR)Cangco had failed to use due caution in alighting
from the coach and was therefore precluded form
recovering

ISSUE: W/N MRR should be held liable.

HELD: YES. lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered
plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25

It can not be doubted that the employees of the

railroad company were guilty of negligence. It
necessarily follows that the defendant company is
liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each
of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary
responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be
separately examined
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extracontractual obligations or to use the technical
form of expression, that article relates only
to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual
o article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract
two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a

Cangco vs Manila Railroad

Cangco, herein plaintiff, was an employee of the defendant in this
case, Manila Railroad Company. Upon the occasion in question,
plaintiff was returning home by train from his daily labors. As the
train drew up to the station, plaintiff arose from his seat. As the train
slowed down, plaintiff stepped off, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons. As a result, his feet slipped from
under
him
and
he
fell
violently
on
the
platform.
The accident occurred between 7-8 oclock on a dark night as the
railroad station was lighted dimly, objects on the platform were
difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
Plaintiff sued the defendant company for damages. The latter
interposed the defense that the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by the plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in
failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before
alighting.
ISSUE:
Should

Manila

Railroad

be

held

liable?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower

court holding that it was important to note that the foundation of the
legal liability of the defendant was the contract of carriage, and that
the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered
arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the
failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
was to say, its liability was direct and immediate, differing essentially,
in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code,
which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their
selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extracontractual obligations, or to use the technical form of expression,
that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.

said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the
criminal act of said minor who was living in their company.
Libi vs IAC
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from
a single gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner
Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against
the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the
lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Anns parents.
Issue:

Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and

1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was
also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon
article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between
"culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the
source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by
any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."

Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by
the respondent Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Held:

Libi vs IAC

Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not
diligently supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting
in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of
their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime
by means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because
they have not regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock, but
learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime
had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their
minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not
subsidiary.

FACTS:

Libi vs IAC

On the railroad companys defense of contributory negligence on the

part of Cangco, the Court held that the plaintiff was ignorant of the
fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melds
piled on the platform existed. Moreover, the place was dark or dimly
lighted. Thus, there was failure on the part of the defendant to afford
to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains.

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former
broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible
and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie
so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead
from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The
parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised
Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasidelict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that
responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However,
Wendells mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses
had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun
was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten
hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he
has free access of the mothers bag where the key was kept. The spouses
failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to
prevent such damage.
Libi vs IAC
FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he
turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the parents of Julie Ann filed
against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA
reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.
RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor
children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The
parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall
ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good
father to prevent damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the
activities of their son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they
allegedly discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and that the gun
used in the shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box.
Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to

Torts and Damages Vicarious Liability of Parents Murder-Suicide of

Minor Lovers
Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers.
In December 1978, Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell because the
latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give Wendell his second
chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors were found dead inside Julie
Anns house. Both were only 18 years of age (age of majority that time was
21).
Apparently, Wendell used his fathers gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he
committed suicide.
The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case
for recovery of damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
parents of Wendell (Cresencio and Amelia Libi).
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?
HELD: Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis
had been negligent in safekeeping their gun. Wendell gained access to the
gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know that their son had possession of said
gun. They only found out about it when the shooting happened. Further,
they were not even aware that their son is a drug informant of the local
Constabulary (police force at that time). Clearly, the parents were negligent
and were not acting with the diligence required by law (that of a good father
of a family) in making sure that their minor children shall not cause
damages against other persons.
What is the nature of their liability?
In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability
of parents in cases like this is not merely subsidiary. Their liability is
primary. This is whether or not what the damage caused by their minor
child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This is also the reason
why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to show that they have
acted with the diligence required by law because if their liability is merely
subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of diligence of a good father of
a family.

Libi vs IAC
Julie Ann Gotiong, daughter of respondent spouses, and Wendell Libi, son
of petitioners, were sweethearts for more than two years before their
death. Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and
irresponsible character. Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with demands
for reconciliation but her persistent refusal caused him to threaten her. 14
January 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot
wound of the same firearm. Private respondents claimed that it was

Wendell who deliberately caused their daughter's death, and his,

respectively. Spouses Libi contended that a third party, probably a person
related to Wendell's work as a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU)
agent, must have caused his death and Julie's. Gotiong spouses filed a civil
case against the Libi spouses to recover damages arising from the latter's
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed
plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of the evidence, and denied
defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient merit. On appeal to
respondent court, the lower court's decision was set aside.
Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of
respondent court promulgated on 2 January 1985 sentencing defendantsspouses Libi to pay to plaintiff P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00
for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code reads:

Issues:

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)

Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial

court in accordance with established decisional laws; and
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious
liability.
Held:
The court ruled that the Libi spouses are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and
who lives in their company. It is also proven that defendants-appellees
utterly failed to exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias in
preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the
gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi
for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock,
but learned that it was missing from safety deposit box only after the
crime
had
been
committed.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
Tamargo vs CA
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur by
petitioners, parents of Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelbertos
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto, who was
acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad
acted without discernment.

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
xxx xxx xxx

The natural parent spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and
the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which
shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read
in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.

Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto before the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis
of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, claimed

that not they, but rather the adopting parents were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody
of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:

The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which
was later denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners
went to the CA on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the
trial courts decision. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners
had lost their right to appeal. Hence this petition for review
ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor
Adelberto, his natural parents or adopting parents?
HELD: Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the
Decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners
complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case
is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings
Natural parents.
It is not disputed that Adelbertos voluntary act of shooting Jennifer with an
air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
NOTES:
(On why this petition was accepted by the SC) In view, however, of the
nature of the issue raised in the instant petition, and in order that substantial
justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the
application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the
notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and
the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner
in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the
policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.

Tamargo vs CA
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The
petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages
against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time
of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto
Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic
incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect
so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.

known as a haven for prostitutes, pimp and drug pushers and addicts, had no
connection to petitioners business,; neither had it any relation to his duties as
petitioners manager. Rather, using his service car for personal purposes is a form
of fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Castilex vs CA
Companys car driven by its manager collided with a motorcycle resulting
to death of the latters driver.
Held: The mere fact that an employee is driving the companys car at the
time of the accident is not itself sufficient to charge the employer liable for
the negligent operation of the car unless the employee is acting within the
scope or course of his employment. vicarious liability of employer for acts
of its employees.

HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and
responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during
the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged
with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to
the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at
the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial
custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time
of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural
parents of Adelberto.
Petition for review was hereby granted.
Tamargo vs CA
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints
for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto.
The petition was granted in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura
were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted
to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses
Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and
granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses
Tamargo's petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions
committed by Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other
persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to
the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental
authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time
the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption
so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit
or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Castilex vs CA
SUMMARY:
At dawn, Vasquez was driving his motorcycle at a
rotonda
when Abad, manager of petitioner Castilex IndustrialCorporation, with a
company pickup, driving against the flow of traffic, collided with him.
Vasquez eventually died. An action for damages was filed by his parents.
Trial court and CA found Vasquez and his employer CASTILEX liable, the
latter under Art. 2180 par.5. CASTILEX appealed to SC on the ground that
Vasquez was not acting within the scope of his employment when the
collisionoccurred but for personal reasons.
SC:
absolved the company from liability, ruling that Abad was not acting within
the scope of thefunctions entrusted to him when the incident happened. As
such, its burden to prove that it was diligent did not arise.
DOCTRINE:
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so long asthey were acting within the
scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service
of the branches nor on theoccasion of their functions.
NOTE:
Circumstances surrounding the incident were considered to determine
whether Abad was acting within his assigned tasks at thetime of the
incident. These include the fact that the area was a "lively place," and a
woman shouting "daddy, daddy," when Abad wasonly 29. Steps: 1)
Establish EE; 2) Establish negligence; 3) Establish WON employee was
acting within scope (burden on plaintiff); 4)Defense of employer of due
diligence in selection and supervision
Lanuzo vs ping
Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 as it involves pure
legal questions.
On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847)
by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and
operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-57266, and his driver,
Salvador Mendoza. As alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the
afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the
truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed
into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house
and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to
plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by
reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of
livelihood from the store which used to give him a monthly income of
P300.00.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action,
Criminal Case No. 4250 for Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua,
Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause.
Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an
express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for
damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.
The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.

Castilex vs CA
Jose Benjamin Abad was a Production Manager of petitioner. Abad was given a car
owned by petitioner since he sometimes does overtime work at the petitioners
office. While leaving a restaurant after work, he figured in a vehicular accident which
led to the death of Vasquez, a side walk vendor and respondents son. Thereafter
respondents and Cebu Doctors Hospital sued Abad and petitioner for damages.
HELD: The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the
accident is not itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said car unless it appears that Abad was operating the vehicle within
the course/ scope of his employment. The facts surrounding the case showed that
Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not
in line with his duties at the time the accident occurred. 2:00 am was way beyond
Abads normal working hours as well as his overtime work. His being at a place

On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in

plaintiff's favor, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a)
ordering the defendants to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P13,000.00 as
damages, resulting to the loss of the store
including the merchandise for sale therein, the
residential house of mixed materials, furnitures,
clothing and households fixtures; (b) ordering
the said defendants to pay jointly and severally

P300.00 monthly from July 24, 1969 which

represents plaintiff's monthly income from his
store until the whole amount of P13,000.00 is
fully paid; and (c) for attorney's fees an amount
equivalent to 20% of the total amount claimed by
the plaintiff, plus the costs of this suit.

We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For

his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and
operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily
liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the
liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct
under Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides:

Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and To

Set Aside Order of Default" was denied.
Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 48399-R) they urged that the civil action was
prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3, providing in part
that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." Additionally, they contended that even assuming
their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in
holding them jointly and severally liable.

Employers shall be liable for the damages

caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal
presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this
employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by
the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his
liability is primary and solidary.

On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this
instance on pure questions of law.

... What needs only to be alleged under the

aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil Code)
is that the employee (driver) has, by his
negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to
make the employer, likewise, responsible for the
tortious act of the employee, and his liability is,
as earlier observed, primary and solidary 9

We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early

as the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 2 that:
A distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa-extracontractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create
an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which
remedy to enforce.
Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal case
of his right to institute a civil action separately is quoted hereunder in
full:
UNDERSIGNED offended party in the aboveentitled case before this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges:
1. That this action which was commenced by the
Chief of Police included in the complaint the
claim of the undersigned for civil liability;
2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to
institute the civil action for damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6847 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, against accused
herein and his employer;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that
reservation be made of record therein and that
the civil aspect of the above-entitled case be not
included herein.
xxx xxx xxx 3
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out
a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from the recitals in
plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship
between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and
store were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the
truck "recklessly, with gross negligence and imprudence, without
observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the
safety of persons and property", and praying that appellants be held
jointly and solidarity liable for damages. These are, basically, what
should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4
As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim
for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with
this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot
have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. 5
And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed
independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case, 6
except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or commission of the defendant. 7
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the institution of the
criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for
damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from his
employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will have to pay
the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim

Marchan vs Mendoza
Petitioners, the driver of the passenger bus responsible for the injuries
sustained by respondent for which he was duly prosecuted and thereafter
convicted for serious, less serious, and slight physical injuries, and the bus
firm, the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, seek the reversal of a Court of
Appeals decision of December 14, 1964 and a resolution of March 31,
1965, holding them liable both for compensatory and exemplary damages as
well as attorney's fees. It is the contention of petitioners that errors of law
were committed when, in the aforesaid decision, it was held that there was
an implied contract of carriage between the petitioner bus firm and
respondents, the breach of which was the occasion for their liability for
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals follow: "In the evening of
February 22, 1954, between 9:00 and 9:30 o'clock, a passenger bus No. 141
of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, bearing Plate No. TPU-708 which was
then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio
Malanday, Polo, Bulacan, while travelling on its way to Manila; as a result
of which plaintiffs-appellees Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child,
[respondents in this proceeding], who were then inside the bus as
passengers were thrown out to the ground resulting in their multiple
injuries. Plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which
damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities which
up to the time when this case was tried he continued to suffer. The
physician who attended and treated plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza opined that
he may never walk again. Consequently the driver of said bus Silverio
Marchan [now petitioner] was prosecuted for serious, less serious and slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Polo Bulacan, and thereafter convicted as charged on June
29, 1956 ..., which judgment of conviction was subsequently affirmed by
the Court of First Instance of same province ... In this present action before
us, plaintiffs-appellees Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child sought to
recover damages against defendant-appellant Arsenio Marchan, then the
driver of bus No. 141 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, and from
defendants-appellants Bienvenido P. Buan and Natividad Paras in their
capacity as administrator and administratix, respectively of the estate of the
late Florencio P. Buan, doing business under the style name of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, predicated not only on a breach of contract of
carriage for failure of defendants operator as well as the defendant driver to
safely convey them to their destination, but also on account of a criminal
negligence on the part of defendant Silverio Marchan resulting to plaintiffappellee's multiple physical damages."1
The Court of Appeals in the decision under review found that there was a
preponderance of evidence to the effect that while respondents Arsenio
Mendoza, his wife, Leonarda Ilaya, and child, Zenaida Mendoza "were
waiting for a passenger bus on January 22, 1954 at about 9:00 in the
evening at Malanday, they boarded defendants-appellants' bus bearing No.
141 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines with Plate No. TPU-708 bound for
Manila. And they were treated as passengers thereto, for they paid their
corresponding fares. As they travelled along the highway bound for Manila,
said bus was traveling at a high rate of speed without due regard to the
safety of the passengers. So much so that one of the passengers had to call
the attention of Silverio Marchan who was then at the steering wheel of said

bus to lessen the speed or to slow down, but then defendant Silverio
Marchan did not heed the request of said passenger; neither did he slacken
his speed. On the contrary, defendant Silverio Marchan even increased his
speed while approaching a six-by-six truck which was then parked ahead,
apparently for the purpose of passing the said parked truck and to avoid
collision with the incoming vehicle from the opposite direction. But, when
appellant Silverio Marchan veered his truck to resume position over the
right lane, the rear tires of said truck skidded because of his high rate of
speed, thereby causing said truck to fall into a ditch. Substantially, the
happening of the accident' resulting to the multiple injuries of plaintiffsappellees, was explained by defendant Silverio Marchan who declared that
while he was driving his bus from Barrio Malanday bound towards Manila
on a road test, he suddenly noticed an oncoming vehicle. He thus shifted his
light from dim to bright. Just then, he noticed a six-by-six truck parked on
the right lane of the road where he was driving. Confronted with such
situation that if he would apply his brake he would bump his bus against the
parked truck he then increased his speed with the view of passing the said
parked truck, and thereafter he veered to negotiate for the proper position on
the right lane, but in so doing he swerved to the right in order to avoid
collision from the oncoming vehicle the rear portion of the bus skidded and
fell into the ditch."2
Hence the finding of negligence in the decision under review. Thus: "From
the facts as established preponderantly by the plaintiff and substantially
corroborated by the defendant Silverio Marchan, it is clear that the cause of
the accident was the gross negligence of the defendant Silverio Marchan
who when driving his vehicle on the night in question was expected to have
employed the highest degree of care; and should have been assiduously
prudent in handling his vehicle to insure the safety of his passengers. There
is no reason why he could not have stopped his vehicle when noticing a
parked truck ahead of him if he was not driving at a high speed. His
admission to the effect that if he would apply his brake he would bump or
hit the parked truck ahead of him, since there was no time for him to stop
the bus he was driving, is a patent indication that he was travelling at a high
rate of speed without taking the necessary precaution under the
circumstance, considering that it was then nighttime. It is our considered
view that under the situation as pictured before us by the driver of said bus,
he should not have increased his speed and by-passed the parked truck
obviously with the view of preventing a collision with the incoming vehicle.
Any prudent person placed under the situation of the appellant would not
have assumed the risk as what appellant did. The most natural reaction that
could be expected from one under the circumstance was for him to have
slackened and reduced his speed. But this was not done simply because
defendant-appellant could not possibly do so under the circumstance
because he was then travelling at a high rate of speed. In fact, he had
increased his speed in order to avoid ramming the parked truck without,
however, taking the necessary precaution to insure the safety of his
passengers."3
On the above facts, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of December 14,
1964, affirmed the amount of P40,000.00 awarded by the court below as
compensatory damages modifying the appealed lower court decision by
holding petitioners to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
and sustaining the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
Then came the resolution of March 31, 1965 by the Court of Appeals,
where the motion for reconsideration of petitioners was denied for lack of
merit.
In their brief as petitioners, the first error assigned is the alleged absence of
an implied contract of carriage by the petitioner bus firm and respondent.
On this point, it was the holding of the Court of Appeals: "Since it is
undisputed by the evidence on record that appellant Silverio Marchan was
then at the steering wheel of the vehicle of the defendant transportation
company at that moment, the riding public is not expected to inquire from
time to time before they board the passenger bus whether or not the driver
who is at the steering wheel of said bus was authorized to drive said vehicle
or that said driver is acting within the scope of his authority and observing
the existing rules and regulations required of him by the management. To
hold otherwise would in effect render the aforequoted provision of law
(Article 1759) ineffective."4 It is clear from the above Civil Code provision
that common carriers cannot escape liability "for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence and willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders..." 5 From Vda. de Medina v.
Cresencia,6 where this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stressed the
"direct and immediate" liability of the carrier under the above legal
provision, "not merely subsidiary or secondary," to Maranan v. Perez,7 a
1967 decision, the invariable holding has been the responsibility for breach
of the contract of carriage on the part of the carrier. According to the facts
as above disclosed, which this Court cannot disturb, the applicability of
Article 1759 is indisputable. Hence, the total absence of merit of the first
assignment of error.
The next two errors assigned would dispute the holding of the Court of
Appeals in imposing liability in the respective amounts of P40,000.00 for
compensatory damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages. Again,
such assignments of error cannot be looked upon with favor. What the
Court of Appeals did deserves not reprobation but approval by this Court.

As to why the amount in compensatory damages should be fixed in the sum

of P40,000.00 is explained in the appealed decision thus: "Likewise, it is
our considered view that the amount of P40,000.00 awarded by the court
below as compensatory damages is quite reasonable and fair, considering
that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza had suffered paralysis on the lower
extremities, which will incapacitate him to engage in his customary
occupation throughout the remaining years of his life, especially so if we
take into account that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza was only 26 years old
when he met an accident on January 22, 1954; and taking the average span
of life of a Filipino, he may be expected to live for 30 years more; and
bearing in mind the earning capacity of Arsenio Mendoza who before the
happening of this accident derived an income of almost P100.00 a month
from the business of his father-in-law as Assistant Supervisor of the small
[fairs] and his income of P100.00 a month which he derived as a
professional boxer."8 Considering that respondent Arsenio Mendoza was
only in his middle twenties when, thru the negligence of petitioners, he lost
the use of his limbs, being condemned for the remainder of his life to be a
paralytic, in effect leading a maimed, well-nigh useless existence, the fixing
of such liability in the amount of P40,000.00 as compensatory damages was
well within the discretion of the Court of Appeals. 1wph1.t
As to the finding of liability for exemplary damages, the Court of Appeals,
in its resolution of March 31, 1965, stated the following: "We now come to
the imposition of exemplary damages upon defendants-appellants' carrier. It
is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate this exemplary
damages since there was no allegation nor prayer, nor proof, nor
counterclaim of error for the same by the appellees. It is to be observed
however, that in the complaint, plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further
relief as this Court may deem just and equitable." Now, since the body of
the complaint sought to recover damages against the defendant-carrier
wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for the damages they suffered
as a result of the negligence of said Silverio Marchan who is appellant's
employee; and since exemplary damages is intimately connected with
general damages, plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express
term the kind of damages they are trying to recover against the defendant's
carrier. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for
such other relief and remedies that may be availed of under the premises, in
effect, therefore, the court is called upon the exercise and use its discretion
whether the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not
expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint."9
In support of the above view, Singson v. Aragon was cited by the Court of
Appeals. 10 As was there held by this Court: "From the above legal
provisions it appears that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory
damages, but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the discretion of the court. It further appears
that the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, because its
determination depends upon the amount of compensatory damages that may
be awarded to the claimant. If the amount of exemplary damages need not
be proved, it need not also be alleged, and the reason is obvious because it
is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as
compensatory damages. Unless and until this premise is determined and
established, what may be claimed as exemplary damages would amount to a
mere surmise or speculation. It follows as a necessary consequence that the
amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint
because the same cannot be predetermined. One can merely ask that it be
determined by the court if in the use of its discretion the same is warranted
by the evidence, and this is just what appellee has done.".
Such a principle has been repeatedly upheld. 11 In Corpuz v. Cuaderno, 12
this Court, again through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, made clear that the amount
"lies within the province of the court a quo, ..." It must be admitted, of
course, that where it could be shown that a tribunal acted "with
vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise of honest judgment,"
then there is room for the interposition of the corrective power of this
Tribunal.
No such reproach can be hurled at the decision and resolution now under
review. No such indictment would be justified. As noted earlier, both the
second and the third assignments of error are devoid of merit.
Nor is there any occasion to consider further the fourth assigned error,
petitioner being dissatisfied with the award of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees
to respondents. On its face, such an assignment of an alleged error is
conspicuously futile. 1wph1.t
The judgment, however, must be modified in accordance with the ruling of
this Court in Soberano v. Manila Railroad Co. 13 Respondents are entitled
to interest for the amount of compensatory damages from the date of the
decision of the lower court and legal interest on the exemplary damages
from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, as thus modified, the decision is affirmed, petitioners being
liable for the sum of P40,000.00 in the concept of compensatory damages
with interest at the legal rate from and after January 26, 1960, and the sum
of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest at the legal rate from and
after December 14, 1964, as well as for the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's

fees, likewise earning a legal rate of interest from and after January 26,
1960. Costs against petitioners.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a
road,negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was
clear.

Victory Liner vs Malecdan

Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer. While crossing the National Highway
on his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane
stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However, as Andres was
crossing the highway, a busof petitioner Victory Liner, driven by Joson
bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing,respondent hit the old man and the
carabao on which he was riding. As a result,Malecdan was thrown off the
carabao, while the beast toppled over. The Victory Liner bus sped past the
old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping
him.

According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights

nearly hitthem so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision.
Upon swerving,they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the
vehicle, but they did notstop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved
towards the pedestrian, PotencianoKapunan who was walking in his lane in
the direction against vehicular traffic, andhit him.

The incident was witnessed by Malecdan's neighbor, Lorena, who was

resting in anearby waiting shed after working on his farm. Malecdan
sustained a wound on hisleft shoulder, from which bone fragments
protruded. He was taken by Lorena andanother person to the Hospital where
he died a few hours after arrival.
The carabaoalso died soon afterwards. Subsequently, a criminal complaint
for recklessimprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was
filed against the Victory Liner bus driver Joson.

Private respondents brought this suit for damages in the Regional Trial
Court, which, in a decision rendered on July 17, 2000, found the driver
guilty of grossnegligence in the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner,
Inc. also guilty of grossnegligence in the selection and supervision of Joson,
Jr. Petitioner and its driver were held liable for damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Victory Liner as employer of the driver Joson is vicariously liable for
theheirs of the victim Malecdan.HOLDING & RATIO
DECIDENDI VICTORY LINER IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE
NEGLIGENCE OFITS EMPLOYEE DRIVER.

Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasidelictcommitted by an employee. The responsibility of employers for the
negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is primary
and, therefore, theinjured party may recover from the employers directly,
regardless of the solvency of their employees.

Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their

employeesacting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can
show that "they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." For thispurpose, they have the burden of proving that they
have indeed exercised suchdiligence, both in the selection of the employee
and in the supervision of theperformance of his duties.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to

examine themas to their qualifications, experience and service records. With
respect to thesupervision of employees, employers must formulate standard
operating procedures,monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for breachesthereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.

In the instant case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.'s

writtenexamination, actual driving tests, x-ray examination, psychological
examination, NBIclearance, physical examination, hematology
examination, urinalysis, student drivertraining, shop training, birth
certificate, high school diploma and reports from theGeneral Maintenance
Manager and the Personnel Manager showing that he hadpassed all the tests
and training sessions and was ready to work as a professionaldriver.
However, as the trial court noted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson,
Jr. had nine years of driving experience
Filamer Christian vs IAC
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitionerFilamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he
was assigned toclean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the
morning of each school day.

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan

Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his
way home one lateafternoon.

The place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school
president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was
allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.

Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. At
the timeof the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one
functioning headlight.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where
both Allanand Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the
petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so
he can use it to fetchstudents in the morning of the next school day.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan'shouse, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
not driving forthe purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for theservice for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school.

Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in

taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his
employer for whichact the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was donebeyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of theirassigned tasks" for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer,includes any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of theemployer or for the account
of the employer at the time of the infliction of theinjury or damage.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Filamer is liable as Funtechas employer.HOLDING & RATIO

DECIDENDI Yes, Filamer is liable

There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extracontractualobligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of
a person "whoseacts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
other(s) who are in a positionto exercise an absolute or limited control over
(him)."

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an

officialappointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be
heldresponsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act
of driving atthe time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.
Hence, the fact thatFuntecha was not the school driver or was not acting
within the scope of hisjanitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting thepresumption
juris tantum
that there was negligence on its part either in the selectionof a servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed toshow
proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary

disciplinecalled for in the performance of any act indispensable to the
business and beneficialto their employer. In the present case, the petitioner
has not shown that it has setforth such rules and guidelines as would
prohibit any one of its employees fromtaking control over its vehicles if one
is not the official driver or prohibiting thedriver and son of the Filamer
president from authorizing another employee to drivethe school vehicle.
Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it hadimposed sanctions
or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by personsother than
the driver.

The actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party
defendant inthe civil case for damages. As far as the injured pedestrian,
plaintiff PotencianoKapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the
one driving the vehicle andpresumably was one authorized by the school to
drive. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing
circumstances, it is enough that theplaintiff and the private respondent heirs
were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship
between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and thefact that Funtecha was
engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his ownbut in
furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility
onthe part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated
Filamer Christian vs IAC

Labor Standards Human Resources Development Torts Section 14,

Rule X, Book III, IRR (Labor Code)
NOTE: This case reversed Filamer vs IAC (October 16, 1990)
Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the
school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was
the son of the school president and at the same time he was the schools
jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving
the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and
thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students
early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they
usually go home together. Funtecha had a student drivers license so Masa
let him take the drivers seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally
hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days.
Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on
Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is
subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay
for damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision
and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code
IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence
there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta;
that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to
him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The
CA denied Filamers appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer.
Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs
cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section
14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide
guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the
provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the
provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to
the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It
invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the
patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by
an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of
the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official
appointment for a drivers position in order that Filamer may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of
driving the jeep from the school to Masas house is beneficial to the school
because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the
morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of
the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in
the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan.

Filamer Christian vs IAC

Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a
scholar of petitioner Filamer. having a student driver's license,
Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take
over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late
afternoon.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving
down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that
the road was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit
them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision.
Resulting to the death of Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in
his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security
guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no
specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students

home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and

then drive home using the same vehicle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code should be applied?
HELD:
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer.
It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by
the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee
and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on
labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an
official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner
may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the
school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties
does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either
in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised
the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth
such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees
from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle.
Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed
sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by
persons other than the driver.
Baliwag Transit vs CA
On April 10, 1985, a Complaint for damages arising from breach of contract
of carriage was filed by private respondents, the Spouses Sotero Cailipan,
Jr. and Zenaida Lopez, and their son George, of legal age, against Baliwag
Transit. The Complaint alleged that George, who was a paying passenger on
a Baliwag bus on December 17, 1984, suffered multiple serious physical
injuries when he was thrown off said bus driven in a careless & negligent
manner by Leonardo Cruz, the authorized bus driver. As a result, he was
confined in the hospital for treatment, incurring medical expenses, which
were borne by his parents in the sum of about P200,000.00 plus other
incidental expenses of about P10,000.00.
On February 5, 1986, Baliwag filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer,
which was granted by the RTC. The Amended Answer incorporated the
affirmative defense that on May 16 1985, George bad been paid all his
claims for damages arising from the incident subject matter of the complaint
when he signed the following Release of Claims, witnessed by his brother
Benjamin L. Cailipan, a licensed engineer:
For and in consideration of the payment to me/us of the sum of EIGHT
THOUSAND TWENTY and 50/100 PESOS ONLY (P8,020.50), the
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I/we, being of lawful age, do
hereby release, acquit and forever discharge Fortune Insurance and/or
Baliwag transit, Inc. his/her heirs, executors and assigns, from any and all
liability now accrued or hereafter to accrue on account of any and all claims
or causes of action which I/we now or may here after have for personal
injuries, damage to property, loss of services, medical expenses, losses or
damages of any and every kind or nature whatsoever, now known or what
may hereafter develop by me/us sustained or received on or about 17th day
of December, 1984 through Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Physical
Injuries, and I/we hereby declare that I/we fully understand the terms of this
settlement and voluntarily accept said sum for the purpose of making a full
and final compromise adjustment and settlement of the injuries and
damages, expenses and inconvenience above mentioned. (Rollo, p. 11)
Opposing to petitioners affirmative defense, Sotero Cailipan, Jr. testified
that be is the father of George, who at the time of the incident was a student,
living with his parents & totally dependent on them for their support; that
they (the parents) shouldered the expenses for his hospitalization; and that
they had not signed the Release of Claims.
In an Order dated 29 August 1986, the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 20, ruled
that since the contract of carriage is between Baliwag and George L.
Cailipan, the latter, who is of legal age, had the exclusive right to execute
the Release of Claims despite the fact that he is still a student & dependent
on his parents for support. Consequently, the execution by George of the
Release of Claims discharges Baliwag and Fortune Insurance.

The Spouses appealed to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision on October

22, 1987 setting aside the appealed Order and holding that the Release of
Claims cannot operate as a valid ground for the dismissal of the case
because it does not have the conformity of all the parties, particularly
Georges parents, who have a substantial interest in the case as they stand to
be prejudiced by the judgment because they spent a sizeable amount for the
medical bills of their son; that the Release of Claims was secured by
Fortune Insurance for the consideration of P8,020.50 as the full and final
settlement of its liability under the insurance policy and not for the purpose
of releasing Baliwag from its liability as a carrier in this suit for breach of
contract. The Appellate Court also ordered the remand of the case to the
lower Court for trial on the merits and for George to return the amount of
P8,020.50 to Fortune Insurance.

ISSUES:
What is the legal effect of the Release of Claims executed by George during
the pendency of this case?
HELD:

Since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the Release of
Claims executed by him, as the injured party, discharging Fortune Insurance
and Baliwag from any and all liability is valid. He was then of legal age, a
graduating student of Agricultural Engineering, and had the capacity to do
acts with legal effect (Article 37 in relation to Article 402, Civil Code).
Thus, he could sue and be sued even without the assistance of his parents.
The contract of carriage was actually between George, as the paying
passenger, and Baliwag, as the common carrier. As such carrier, Baliwag
was bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, and is liable for injuries to them through the
negligence or wilful acts of its employees (Articles 1755 and 1759, Civil
Code). Thus, George had the right to be safely brought to his destination
and Baliwag had the correlative obligation to do so. Since a contract may
be violated only by the parties thereto, as against each other, in an action
upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as
defendant, must be parties to said contract (Marimperio Compania
Naviera, S.A. vs. CA, No. L-40234, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 368).
A real party-in-interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real
party-in-interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation
whose act/omission violates the legal right of the former (Lee vs. Romillo,
Jr., G.R. No. 60973, May 28, 1988). In the absence of any contract of
carriage between Baliwag and Georges parents, the latter are not real
parties-in-interest in an action for breach of that contract.
The general rule of the common law is that every action must be brought in
the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed. 15
Enc. P1. & Pr. p. 484. For the immediate wrong and damage the person
injured is the only one who can maintain the action. Id. p. 578. The
person who sustains an injury is the person to bring an action for the injury
against the wrongdoer. Dicey parties to Actions, 347. (Cited in Green v.
Shoemaker, 73 A 688, 23 L.R.A., N.S. 667).
There is no question regarding the genuineness & due execution of the
Release of Claims. It is a duly notarized public document. If the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control
(Article 1370, Civil Code). The phraseology any and all claims or causes
of action is broad enough to include all damages that may accrue to the
injured party arising from the unfortunate accident.
The Release of Claims had the effect of a compromise agreement since it
was entered into for the purpose of making a full and final compromise
adjustment & settlement of the cause of action involved. A compromise is a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced (Article 2028, Civil
Code).

ISSUE: W/N the contract signed by George during case

pendency is valid discharging Fortune Insurance and
Baliwag from any and all liability
HELD: YES. CA SET ASIDE

Baliwag Transit vs CA

December 17 1984: George, who was a paying

passenger on a Baliwag bus (Baliwag) he was
thrown off by the bus driven in a careless and
negligent manner by Leonardo Cruz, authorized
bus driver, along Barangay Patubig, Marilao,
Bulacan
o suffered multiple serious physical injuries
o confined in the hospital for treatment,
incurring medical expenses, which were
borne by his parents, Spouses Sotero
Cailipan, Jr. and Zenaida Lopez, in the

sum of about P200,000.00 plus other

incidental expenses of about P10,000.00
April 10 1985:
o Baliwag: solely attributable to his own
voluntary act in that, without warning and
provocation, he suddenly stood up from
his seat and headed for the door of the
bus as if in a daze, opened it and jumped
off while said bus was in motion, in spite
of the protestations by the driver and
without the knowledge of the conductor
o Baliwag then filed a Third-Party Complaint
against Fortune Insurance & Surety
Company, Inc., on its third-party liability
insurance in the amount of P50,000.00
Fortune Insurance claimed
limited liability, the coverage
being subject to a Schedule of
Indemnities forming part of the
insurance policy.
November 14 1985 and
November 18 1985: Fortune Insurance and
Baliwag each filed Motions to Dismiss on the
ground that George, in consideration of the sum of
P8,020.50 had executed a notarized "Release of
Claims" dated 16 May 1985. - denied as they were
filed beyond the time for pleading and after the
Answer were already filed so Baliwag amended its
answer to include such
RTC: dismissed the Complaint and Third-party
Complaint, ruling that since the contract of carriage
is between Baliwag and George L. Cailipan (of legal
age) had the exclusive right to execute the Release
of Claims despite the fact that he is still a student
and dependent on his parents for support
October 22 1987: setting aside the appealed Order
and holding that the "Release of Claims" cannot
operate as a valid ground for the dismissal of the
case because it does not have the conformity of all
the parties, particularly George's parents, who
have a substantial interest in the case as they
stand to be prejudiced by the judgment because
they spent a sizeable amount for the medical bills
of their son
Baliwag filed Petition for Review on certiorari

George is of legal age, a graduating student of

Agricultural Engineering, and had the capacity to
do acts with legal effect (Article 37 in relation to
Article 402, Civil Code)
o could sue and be sued even without the
assistance of his parents
George had the right to be safely brought to his
destination and Baliwag had the correlative
obligation to do so
Since a contract may be violated only by the
parties thereto, as against each other, in an action
upon that contract, the real parties in interest,
either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties
to said contract:
o real party-in-interest -plaintiff - who has a
legal right
o real party-in-interest-defendant - who has
a correlative legal obligation whose act or
omission violates the legal right of the
former
In the absence of any contract of carriage between
Baliwag and George's parents, the latter are not
real parties-in-interest in an action for breach of
that contract
general rule of the common law is that every action
must be brought in the name of the party whose
legal right has been invaded or infringed
The phraseology "any and all claims or causes of
action" is broad enough to include all damages that
may accrue to the injured party arising from the
unfortunate accident.

The Release of Claims had the effect of a

compromise agreement since it was
entered into for the purpose of making a
full and final compromise adjustment and
settlement of the cause of action involved.
compromise - contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced (Article 2028, Civil
Code).

Baliwag Transit vs CA
On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia,
boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by
Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers
saw a cargo truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the
national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the
shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A
kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a
warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat
tire.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to
notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiagos
passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago
even carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving.
When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers
shouted Babangga tayo!. Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too
late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and
the trucks helper, and injury to several others among them herein
respondents.
Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio
Recontique for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. The trial court ordered
Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique to pay jointly and severally the
Garcia spouses the following: (1) P25,000.00 hospitalization and
medication fee, (2) P450,000.00 loss of earnings in eight (8) years, (3)
P2,000.00 for the hospitalization of their son Allan Garcia, (4) P50,000.00
moral
damages,
and
(5)
P30,000.00
attorney's
fee.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by
absolving A & J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of
attorney's fees to P10,000.00 and loss of earnings to P300,000.00,
respectively.
ISSUE:
Is the amount of damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to the Garcia
spouses
correct?
HELD:
Yes.
The propriety of the amount awarded as hospitalization and medical fees.
The award of P25,000.00 is not supported by the evidence on record. The
Garcias presented receipts marked as Exhibits "B-1 " to "B-42" but their
total amounted only to P5,017.74. To be sure, Leticia testified as to the
extra amount spent for her medical needs but without more reliable
evidence, her lone testimony cannot justify the award of P25,000.00. To
prove actual damages, the best evidence available to the injured party
must be presented. The court cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony
whose truth is suspect, but must depend upon competent proof that
damages have been actually suffered. Thus, we reduce the actual damages
for
medical
and
hospitalization
expenses
to
P5,017.74.
The award of moral damages is in accord with law. In a breach of contract
of carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the carrier, through its
agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The evidence shows the gross
negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which amounted to bad faith.
Without doubt, Leticia and Allan experienced physical suffering, mental
anguish and serious anxiety by reason of the accident.
Metro Manila Transit vs CA
At about 6am of August 28, 1979, Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying
passenger apublic utility jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ Pilipinas 1979,
then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant
Victorino Lamayo, boundfor her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, where she then worked as a machine
operator earning P16.25 a day. While thepassenger jeepney was travelling
at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig,Metro Manila another fast
moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC,for short) bus
bearing plate no. 3Z 307 PUB (Philippines) "79 driven by
defendantGodofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road,
Bicutan, Taguig, MetroManila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As both

vehicles approached theintersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road

they failed to slow down andslacken their speed; neither did they blow their
horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between
them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the
MMTC bus. The collision impact causedplaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio
to hit the front windshield of the passengerjeepney and (he was thrown out
therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical
injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital whereshe regained
consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined
fortwenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for
three andone half months (31/2).

Assisted by her parents (for she was then a minor), Custodio filed a
complaint fordamages against the drivers and owners of the two vehicles.
The said defendants were passing the blame to one another. MMTC
established its defense of having exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees through thetestimonies of its training
officer, Milagros Garbo, and transport supervisor,Christian Baustista.

The lower court ruled in favor of Custodio and held all of the defendants
solidarily liable (with Calebag being declared in default) with the exception
of MMTC on theground that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing
and screening applicantsfor job openings but was also strict and diligent in
supervising its employees. WithCustodios MR denied, they appealed to the
CA, which modified the decision andheld MMTC solidarily liable with the
other defendants. MR denied.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Was MMTC able to establish its due diligence in the selection

andsupervision of its employees?HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO.
Respondent court was definitely correct in ruling that ". . . due diligence
inthe selection and supervision of employee (is) not proved by mere
testimonies tothe effect that its applicant has complied with all the company
requirementsbefore one is admitted as an employee but without proof
thereof."

A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case reveals that
theconclusion of respondent Court of Appeals is more firmly grounded
onjurisprudence and amply supported by the evidence of record than that of
the courtbelow. It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove
his ownaffirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. In
civil cases, thedegree of evidence required of a party in order to support his
claim ispreponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party
which is moreconclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is,
therefore, incumbent onthe plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his
case. Corollarily, defendant mustlikewise prove own allegation to buttress
its claim that it is not liable.

Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that
testimonialevidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary
evidence, or evensubject evidence for that matter,
inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelton mere generalities, we
cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was
observance of due diligence in the selection andsupervision of employees
. Petitioner's attempt to prove its
diligentissimi patris familias
in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must
failas it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object
ordocumentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony.

Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been

observedby petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in
the caseat bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that
there isenough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of
negligence,and for failure to submit all evidence within its control,
assuming the putativeexistence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the
consequences of its owninaction and indifference.

Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for

screening jobapplicants and supervising its employees in the field, through
the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian
Bautista, as its transportsupervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly
testified for MMTC. It thenconcluded with its sweeping pontifications that
"thus, there is no doubt thatconsidering the nature of the business of
petitioner, it would not let any applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted without
undergoing the rigid selection and training process with the end (in) view of
protecting the public in general and its passengersin particular; . . . thus,
there is no doubt that applicant had fully complied with thesaid
requirements otherwise Garbo should not have allowed him to undertake
thenext set of requirements . . . and the training conducted consisting of
seminars andactual driving tests were satisfactory otherwise he should have
not been allowed todrive the subject vehicle. These statements strike us as
both presumptuous and in


3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES
Page 204 of 528
the nature of
petitio principii
, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their
verity. As earlier observed, respondent court could not butexpress surprise,
and thereby its incredulity, that witness Garbo neither testified norpresented
any evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had undergoneall
the clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate.
Thesupposed clearances, results of seminars and tests which Leonardo
allegedly submitted and complied with were never presented in court
despite the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in the possession and
control of petitioner.
Discussion on the vicarious liability of employer

The basis of the employer's vicarious liability has been explained under
thisratiocination: The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue
of a presumption
juris tantum
of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under thearticle,
derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the actsof
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Negligence is
imputedto them by law, unless they prove the contrary. Thus, the last
paragraph of thearticle says that such responsibility ceases if is proved that
the persons whomight be held responsible under it exercised the diligence
of a good father of afamily (
diligentissimi patris familias
) to prevent damage. It is clear, therefore, that itis not representation, nor
interest, nor even the necessity of having somebody else answer for the
damages caused by the persons devoid of personalit
y, but itis the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and prudence
imposedupon the persons who become responsible by civil bond uniting the
actor tothem, which forms the foundation of such responsibility.

The above rule is, of course, applicable only where there is an employeremployee relationship
, although it is not necessary that the employer be engagedin business or
industry. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, theemployer
under Article 2180 is liable for torts committed by his employees withinthe
scope of their assigned tasks. But,
it is necessary first to establish theemployment relationship. Once this is
done, the plaintiff must show, to holdthe employer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of hisassigned task when the tort complained of
was committed. It is only thenthat the defendant, as employer, may find it
necessary to interpose thedefense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.
Thed i l i g e n c e o f a g o o d f a t h e r o f a
f a m i l y r e q u i r e d t o b e o b s e r v e d b y
e m p l o y e r s t o p r e v e n t d a m a g e s u n d e r
A r t i c l e 2 1 8 0 r e f e r s t o d u e
d i l i g e n c e i n t h e s e l e c t i o n
a n d s u p e r v i s i o n o f e m p l o y e e s i n
o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e p u b l i c .

With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the

defendant driverand of an employer-employee relation between him and his
co-defendant MMTC inthis instance, the case in undoubtedly based on a
quasi-delict under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to
his own negligence while performing hisown duties, there arises the
juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent,rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.For failure to rebut
such legal presumption of negligence in the selection andsupervision of
employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, thebasis of
the liability being the relationship of
pater familias
or on the employer's ownnegligence.

It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of employers to observe

duediligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not to be
considered as anempty play of words or a mere formalism, as appears to be
the fashion of the times,since the non-observance thereof actually becomes
the basis of their vicariousliability under Article 2180.

On the matter of selection of employees, Campo vs. Camarote, supra,

laysdown this admonition:. . . . In order that the owner of a vehicle may be
considered as havingexercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not havebeen satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license;he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as tohis qualifications, his experience and record of service.
These stepsappellant failed to observe; he has therefore, failed to exercise
all duediligence required of a good father of a family in the choice or
selectionof driver.

Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand,

includesthe formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance
of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protectionof the public and persons with whom the employer has relations
through hisor its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures uponemployees in case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to theiremployer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of theemployer, acting through dependable supervisors who should
regularlyreport on their supervisory functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on
hiring andsupervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the
burden of proving that ithas been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actualsupervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring proceduresand supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient toovercome presumption

Metro Manila Transit vs CA

FACTS: Liza Rosalie Rosales died due to a vehicular accident involving petitioner
MMTCs vehicle driven by Pedro Musa. Her parents sued MMTC and Musa for
damages. According to MMTC, it has exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family with respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial
evidence on its hiring procedure. Thus, it should not be liable for damages. HELD:
The evidence presented by MMTC to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees and thus avoid the
vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employees is insufficient to overcome
the presumption of negligence against it. MMTC is thus primarily liable for damages
arising from the negligence of its employee in view of A.2180, NCC. It can recover
from its employee but does not make the latters liability subsidiary. They are
solidarily liable. The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle
for damages arising from the tortious acts of its driver is primary, joint and
direct with the driver.
City of Manila vs Teotico
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta
and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall,
Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against
the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of
Manila
to
pay
damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos
Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Ruling:
Decision
affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good
conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the
officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos
Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."
City of Manila vs Teotico
orts and Damages Liability of municipal corporations in certain cases
In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a
jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This
caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article
2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the
city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila
ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila
should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of
the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be
liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing
the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil
Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national
highway.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a
general law; that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil
Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each
law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from
liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense
that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. There is
no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. On the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the
effect that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalities liable for the
damages caused to a certain person by reason of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision.
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the Citys motion for reconsideration in the Court
of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it
is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not
the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the
Citys control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason
of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they
have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City
alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the citys
roads, P. Burgos included.

City of Manila vs Teotico

Issue and Ruling: Teotico a manager, sustained a laceration on his left
eyelid and contusions on his left thigh, sued Manila city for negligence
citing Art. 2189 of the Civil Code. In defense, Manila City cited RA 409, its
Charter. Which provision of law should prevail? In terms of territorial RA
409 applies but with regards to subject matter for negligence in general,
Art. 2189 prevails making cities liable for injuries sustained due to
defective streets in particular.
Amadora vs CA
Alfredo Amadora is a student of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos. While he
was in theschools auditorium he was shot to death by a classmate in the
name of PablitoDaffon. The latter was then convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence.

The victims parents sued for damages under Art. 2180 against the school,
theprincipal, dean for boys, the Physics teacher, the accused, his parents and
someother students along with their parents.

Later, the complaint against the other students and their parents were
dropped. The Amadoras contend that the presence of Alfredo was by reason
of a Physicsexperiment, hence the student is still under custody of the
school at the time of theincident.

The school, however, denies liability since his presence was merely to
submit thePhysics project and that the semester had already ended.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N private respondents are liableHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINo

.

Article 2180 applies to schools whether academic or non-academic. The

student isdeemed in the custody of the school as long as he is under the
control and influenceof the school and is within its premises, whether the
school semester has just begunor has ended.

the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the
fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence
through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.
Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody
because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation
(submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities
of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and
the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence
exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held
liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a
student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear
negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with
the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the
provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is
made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the
facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
Amadora vs CA
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon
while in the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the
semester ended. He was there to submit a graduation requirement in
Physics.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally,
the herein petitioners, as the victims parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the CC against the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their
respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing
death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, MD, ED and AF.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and
all the defendants were completely absolved. Hence this petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts
and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as
the semester had already ended.
ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case

The liability of the article is by the head superior in-charge to the student
and not by the school who could be liable under respondeat superior. Both
have the defense of bonus pater familias. In this case the evidence did not
support who the in-chargeteacher was other than the fact he submitted his
Physics report.

HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and
the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice

And even if the Physics teacher was in fact in charge there is no showing
that he wasnegligent in the supervision and discipline of the accused. The
private respondentsproperly adduced evidence to prove they exercised
bonus pater familias

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.

Amadora vs CA
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit
by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was
convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victims parents,
herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics
teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the
students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants
completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons: 1.
Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of
arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since

xx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under
Art. 2180, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of
schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause of
establishments of arts and trades should apply only to heads and not
teachers.
But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate
himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last
paragraph.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable
not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that
the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be
liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the
law for the act of the student under him regardless of the students age
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature,
may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof
under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may
exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of
a bonus paterfamilias.The school can show that it exercised proper
measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant
to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents
and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close
thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the
period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period
before the commencement exercises [During such periods, the student is
still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider
himself released altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view of the
Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company
of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of
the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
NOTES:
The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for
students between academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the
fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a
closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans
apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on
the technique and secrets of their craft. By contrast, the head of the
academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as
now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while
he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the
school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the
Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking

into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to
enact the necessary amendment.

Amadora vs CA
Facts: A few days before graduation, Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed
when his classmate, Pablito Daffron fired a gun in the auditorium of their
school. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Additionally, petitioners, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180
of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the
high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together
with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The
complaint
against
the
students
was
later
dropped.
Issue: Whether or not the school may be held liable for the acts of its
students.
Held: As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student constitutes.
Teachers shall be liable for the acts of their students. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury, he can exonerate himself from liability.
Amadora vs CA
Apri l 13, 1972: Alfredo Amad ora, a high school graduating
student of Colegio de San Jos e -R e c o l e t o s w e n t t o s c h o o l
to finish a Physics experiment. However, while he
w a s i n t h e auditorium, his classmate Pablit o Daffon fired a
gun that hit him. He died at 17. Daffon wa s convicted of homicide
thru reckless imprudence.

Amadoras parents fi led a civil action for damag es under CC

Art. 2180 against the school, its rector, HS principal, dean of boys &
Physics teacher, plus Daffon & 2 other students thru theirparents.
Complaint against students was later dropped.

CFI C ebu: defendants were lia ble in the sum of P294,984.00

(death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation,
funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages & attorneys fees)

CA: reversed, all defendants absolved completely.1.As per Rules of

Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC Art. 2180 is not applicable since
the school was an academic institution of learning & not a school of arts
& trades.2.Students were not in custody of the school at the time of the
incident since the semester hadalready ended.3 . N o c l e a r
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e f a t a l g u n . 4.Def endants exercis ed
neces sary dili gence in preventi ng injury.

Petitioners claim their son was still under schools custody because he went
to school to

comply w/a requirement for graduation.

Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physics report & he was

no longer intheir custody since the semester was over.

A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, dean of boys, from Jose Gumban
on April 7,1972. It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later on returned to
Gumban w/o reportingsuch to the princi pal or taking further
action. Gumban was on e Daffons companions when the incident
happened. Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son
w/crespondents rebutted by saying there was no proof that they were one
and the same.
ISSUE & RATIO: WON respondents are liable. NO.

Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student of Balintawak Elementary School &

a boy scoutattended a Rizal Day parade on city school supervisors
instructions. Afterwards, Capunoboarded a jeep & drove it
reckless ly that it turned turtle killing 2 passengers.
SCexcu lpated school in obiter dictum (it was not party to the
case) since it was not aschool of arts & trad es. Som e justices
dissented claiming that liability under CC Art. 2180 applied to
teachers in general & heads of schools of arts & trades in particular.

Mercado v. C A: a student cut a classmate w/a razor b lade at

the Lourdes Catholic School, QC. Exconde ruling reiterated. Custody
requirement was defined as a situationwhere student lives & boards
w/teacher such that control, direction & influences on pupilsupersede those
of parents.

Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student was killed by a classmate w/fist

blows in the labof Manila Technical Institute. Court ruled that even if
offender was already of age & notboarding in the sch ool, the head
& t eacher -in-charge were s olidarily liable w/him. Custody was
defined as the protective & supervisory custody that school, its heads

& teachers exercise over students for as long as they are at the attendance in
the schoolincluding reces s time. No such requirem ent as actual
living & boarding in the school before such liability is attached. It set
aside Mercado ruling. Even students of age weres t i l l c o v e r e d b y
provision since theyre equally in custody of school
& s u b j t o i t s discipline.

CC Art. 2180 applies to all schools whether academic or non-academic. In

the former,teacher-in-charge of student is the person responsible (general
rule). Whereas in thelatter (arts & trades), it is the head (exception). SC
agrees w/dissent in Exconde, sayingthat while the child is in school, parent
is not supposed to interfere w/discipline of schoolnor w/authority &
supervision of teacher. W/o authority, there can be no responsibility.N o
reason to differentiate the vigilance expected from
t e a c h e r s f r o m a c a d e m i c institutions and non-academic ones.
History of disparity:a . h e a d o f s c h o o l o f a r t s & t r a d e s
e x e r c i s e d c l o s e r t u t e l a g e o v e r h i s students who
apprenticed to their master, th e school h ead. He wa s personally
involved in teaching his students who usually boarded w/him& thus he
exercised constant control, supervision & influence.b . H e a d o f
academic school: exercised only administrative
d u t i e s o v e r teachers who were directly dealing w/students. Thus,
teacher is liable.

CC Art. 2180s custody requirement is not limited to boarding

w/schoola u t h o r i t i e s . I t s n o t c o - t e r m i n o u s w / s e m . I t
i n c l u d e s p e r i o d s o f registration or before graduation during w/c,
student is still subj to thedisciplinary authority of the school. There is
custody for as long as hesunder control & influence of school & w/in its
premises regardless of t i m e a n d f o r a s l o n g a s s t u d e n t c a n
s h o w t h a t h e i s i n s c h o o l i n pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, exercise & enjoyment of alegitimate student rt/privilege. It
includes relaxing in the campus.

Under similar circumstances, teacher-in-charge should be liable for

hisstudents torts. He need not be physically present or in a position
toprevent the injury. Custody refers more to his influence on the child
& the discipline instilled. Applicable as well t o head of
school of arts & trade. Teacher is liable regardless of students age.
Teacher should beliable & not sch ool itself unless he can prove
that he exercis ed the d i l i g e n c e o f a g o o d f a t h e r s u c h a s
b y e m p l o y i n g s u f f i c i e n t n o . o f security guards, etc.
This defens e is made avai lable to the teacher considering that his
responsibility/influence over the child cannot beequated to that of the
parents. Parents can expect more obedienc efrom the child
since kid depends more on parents. Parent can instill more
lasting discipline on child than teacher & thus, should be held toa greater
accountability for tort committed by kid. WRT liability for kidso f t h e
age of majority, leniency should be observed in
a s s e s s i n g teachers responsibility considering that parents are no longer
liable forthe acts of their emancipated children.
HOLDING: Petition denied.
1. Rector, principal & dean not liable because they are not teachers-incharge. They only had generalauthority over students.2 . T e a c h e r in-charge: not disclosed by evidence. Just
b e c a u s e A m a d o r a w e n t t o s c h o o l i n connection w/a
physics report doesnt necessarily make physics teacher the teacher-incharge.Besides, theres n o showing that the teacher was
negligent in any manner. He was not even required to report to
school on that day thus, his absence cannot be considered as negligence.On
the contrary, they have proven that they exercised due diligence.3.Dean of
boys no proof that the gun he releas ed was th e sam e gun
that killed Amadora. 4 . S c h o o l o n l y t e a c h e r o r h e a d i s
responsible
Amadora vs CA
Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and Academic Schools Liability of
Teachers and Heads of School
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San JoseRecoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a
gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of
Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
because of the schools negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the
principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly
liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened,
the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the
semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a
school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article
2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not
academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic

school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of
its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision
on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as
they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the
above law due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction
between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said,
the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held
liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or
not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who
should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because
historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer
administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short,
they are more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be
directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the
head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the
school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the
happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the
provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for
the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher,
exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and
the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named,
and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-incharge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the
foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.

Amadora vs CA
The setting is the Colegio-de San Jose Recoletos, which was NOT a school
of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. A few days before
the commencement exercises, student Alfredo Amadora went to school to
finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite for graduation. When he was
in the auditorium, he was shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.
Pablito was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Alfredos parents filed a civil action for damages under NCC 2180 against
the school, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics
teacher, together with Pablito and two other students, through their parents.
The complaint against the students was dropped.
CONTENTIONS ON CUSTODY

PETITIONERS:
AMADORA
UNDER
SCHOOLS
CUSTODY. He was in school to show his physics experiment
as a graduation prerequisite.
RESPONDENTS: AMADORA NOT UNDER SCHOOLS
CUSTODY. Semester already ended.

THE GUN ISSUE

Days before the incident, the dean of the boys confiscated from Gumban
an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report
to the principal or taking any further action. PETITIONERS contend that
this was the same pistol, as Gumban was one of Daffons companions when
the latter fired the gun that killed Amadora, and that Amadora would not
have been killed if the gun was not returned by the dean of the boys.
RULING OF COURTS

CFIheld the remaining defendants liable. CA, however, reversed CFI and
all defendants were absolved. CA found that NCC 2180 was not applicable
since the school was not a school of arts and trades. It also held that the
students were not in the schools custody at the time of the incident since
the semester already ended. In addition, there was no clear identification of
the gun, and that the defendant exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing injury.
ISSUES & HELD (aka QUICK SUMMARY OF FINDINGS)
1.
2.

3.

1.

Does NCC 2180 also cover establishments that are NOT schools
of arts and trades? YES
When is the offending student supposed to be in the schools
custody? As long as he is under the control and influence of
the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended. Alfredo still under custody
Who is liable for the injury? None of the respondents is
liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito on Alfredo

RULING
The school CANNOT be held directly liable under NCC 2180.
Three cases were cited: Exconde, Mercado, and Palisoc.
What you need to know in Exconde

Student boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it

recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting to the death of two of its
passengers.
This decision, penned by Justice Angelo exculpated the school
on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades.
Justice Reyes said that the school authorities should be held
liable.
o Liability was imposed on teachers in general, and
heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The
clause of establishments of arts and trades should
apply only to heads.

What you need to know in Mercado

A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time

in school.
Exconde was reiterated in this case (the school was exculpated
on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades).
The custody requirement was not proved as it contemplates a
situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil
supersede those of the parent.

What you need to know in Palisoc

A student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the

laboratory of the school.
The head of the school and the teacher-in-charge were held
liable together with the wrongdoer, even though the latter was
not boarding in the school.
The ponencia, Justice Teehankee, said, There is nothing in the
law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live an board in the
school, as erroneously held in Exconde and Mercado.

The case at hand Amadora

The school has been directly impleaded unlike in Exconde and

Mercado.
The school is an academic institution of learning, unlike in
Palisoc wherein the school was an arts and trade school.

Q: Does NCC 2180 also cover establishments that are NOT schools of
arts and trades? YES
GENERAL RULE. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of the student, following the first part of
NCC 2180. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
that should be answerable as an exception to the general rule.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, teachers
should apply to the words pupils and students and heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices.
On the differences between academic and non-academic schools
There is no substantial distinction between the academic and the nonacademic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The teacher should not be able to excuse
himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where,

2.

on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were nonacademic.
HOWEVER, why is it that for academic schools, the teacher is
the one held liable, while for non-academic / arts and trade schools, the
head is the one held liable? The answer can be traced to the fact that
historically, the head exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the
head of an academic school because of the apprenticeship system they
employed. This distinction no longer holds at present but until NCC 2180 is
changed, it should be interpreted according to its clear and original
mandate.
At the time the incident occurred, Alfredo was still in the custody of the
school authorities.
Q: When is the offending student supposed to be in the schools
custody? As long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has
already ended
On the teacher-in-charge and custody
The teacher-in-charge, who is the one designated by a superior to exercise
supervision over pupils for a particular subject or section, is the one who
must be held liable, in the same way that parents are responsible for the
child when he is in their custody. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher is physically present to be in a position to prevent it.
Custody refers to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him because of such influence. For the injuries caused by the
student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the
tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when
its authority could be validly exercised over him.
The rector, high school principal and the dean of boys
CANNOT be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
defined, and they were only exercising general authority over the student
body. Evidence did not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of Pablito was.
The mere fact that Alfredo went to school to finish / submit his physics
project DID NOT necessarily make the physics teacher the teacher-incharge.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of
boys who should be held liable, since there was evidence that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and returned it to the latter
without reporting to authorities. HOWEVER, it has not been showed that
said gun was the same that Pablito used to shoot Alfredo; hence, said fact
does not necessarily link the dean to the shooting.
On the defense of exercising due diligence of a good father of a family
The school, teacher-in-charge, or the head may exculpate themselves by
proving that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family or
bonus paterfamilias. The school can show this in selecting the head or its
teachersand the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and
instruction of the pupils pursuant to the rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them.
Such defense is also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by
the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate
himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180. The teacher will be held
liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent,
who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless
of the students age. The Court is disposed not to expect from the
teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for
their influence over the child is not equal in degree. The parent can
expect more obedience from the child because the latters dependence on
him is greater than on the teacher.
However, assuming that the physics teacher was the teacher-incharge, there is NO SHOWING that he was negligent in enforcing
discipline upon Pablito or that he waived observance or condoned the nonobservance of school rules and regulations. Respondents have proved that
they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
OPINIONS
Concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Melencio-Herrera

Disagrees with the restricted meaning given to the term teacher

as teacher-in-charge
o The philosophy of law is that whoever stands in loco
parentis will have the same duties and obligations as
parents whenever in such a standing. As long as
pupils and students remain in their custody, they shall
be held liable for the formers tortious acts.

Concurring opinion of Justice Gutierrez

There is a need for a major amendment, if not a complete

scrapping, of the paragraph in NCC 2180 that refers to teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades in relation to pupils
and students or apprentices
o No more masters, apprentices in schools of arts and
trades
o Teachers are often no longer objects of veneration
who are given due to substitute parents