Professional Documents
Culture Documents
investigativework. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for arestraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is notinvestigatorial in character but prescinds from anadjudicative power that
it does not possess.
The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same
was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice.
HELD: YES
petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right
to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is
also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment
Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Dimaano with abuse of authority
inrefusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of
theMunicipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on peace and
orderconditions of the municipality.
Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official
courtrecords but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where
andhow they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an
improperuse or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation
is notserious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site
orpromote public scandal.
Case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing,
TaalMayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and
cooperationamong officers. This motion was denied by Investigating Judge but he recommended
theexoneration of respondent.
Investigating Judges report avers that complainant was aware of the motion to dismiss and he
wasin conformity with it. Communications between complainant and respondent reveal that
respondentallowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of the respondent under
certainconditions and under his control and supervision.
Under the conditions, the Court found that the respondent has not committed any abuse of
authority
Issue
: WON respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises (when he allowed the complainant to open
andview the docket books of respondent)
Held
: No. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
respondentunder certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown
that the rules andcondition imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public
records is predicated onthe right of the people to acquire information on public concern.
Rules/Principles:
In People ex rel. Title Guarantee & T. Co vs. Railly, the Court said:What the law expects and
requires from his is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, bywhich all persons
resorting to the office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in an orderlymanner, shall
be secured their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner inwhich
the relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by searches,
abstracts,or copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the
purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosityItis not their prerogative to see that
the information which the records contain is not flaunted before publicgaze, or that scandal is not
made of itIt is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy.
The President also cannot call the military to enact laws such as laws on family, corporate
laws, obligations and contracts, etc. Under the PP 1017, she can only call out the military to
suppress lawless violence
The President is authorized to declare a state of national emergency. However, without
legislation, she has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of
the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress
Decision:
PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL as far as the calling out of the military to suppress lawless
violence. However, the military cannot enforce other laws
PP 1017 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL when it comes to promulgating Decrees. Only the 2
Houses of Congress can legislate laws
Warrantless arrests and seizures conducted without proof that they are part of rebellion,
lawless violence, and takeover is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Note: Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent was brought to this country from Shanghai as a
Japanese spy and was arrested upon liberation of this country from the Japanese regime.
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding
general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before
the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military
and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.
2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid
HELD:
1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by
the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an
instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian)
guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and
customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the
rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because
its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.
party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be considered as a person claiming under
Ramos and Mangahas.
When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C-120, which had
long become final and executory, could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a
party thereto. We found that the houses on the subject lot were formerly owned by Mangahas and
Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn sold them to Medina. Under the
circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus
Medina could be reached by the order of execution and writ of demolition issued against the two.
As to the lot under dispute, we sustained Magbanuas ownership over it, she being the holder of a
Torrens title. We declared that a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the
land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued
and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or other title
existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing
with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears
on its face.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina
acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was
commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot
before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right over the disputed land of
the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful
authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government
in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of the
predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Third,
petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while the petitioner in
Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her
alleged ownership of the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the
Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not
go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.[9] It is our view here that the petitioners,
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the
Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de
Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer
in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the
time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property.[10] The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which
generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review. An exception is
when the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[11] The instant case is covered by this exception
to the general rule. As found by the Court of Appeals and not refuted by private respondent,
petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising.[12] Civil Case No. Q-12918
was commenced sometime in 1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of
the land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words, the sale to
petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably
rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any
third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners
acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We note that this is
the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could not be done. Fair
play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal
issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and even during proceedings before
the Court of Appeals.[13] Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be resolved now, to avoid
circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that
petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is
ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.[14] As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the
land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards,
they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City
tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private
respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of
such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject
property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon.[15] Consequently,
private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to
do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party
and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant
thereto.[16] In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious
cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28,
1999, and its resolution dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. Q12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners. Costs against
private respondent.
Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due
to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in
the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the
Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects
from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued
the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both
premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation,
and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party.
The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things
seized from the offices and the premises).
Hongkong vs olalia
Juan Muoz was charged before a Hong Kong Court with several counts of offenses in violation of
Hong Kong laws. If convicted, he faces a jail term of 7 to 14 years for each charge. After Juan
Muoz was arrested in the Philippines, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Juan Muoz. On December 20, 2001, Judge X of
RTC-Manila allowed Juan Muoz to post bail. However, the government of Hong Kong alleged that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting him to bail because there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. May Juan
Muoz, a potential extradite, be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that he
is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. In a unanimous decision the SC remanded to the Manila RTC, to determine whether Juan
Muoz is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If Muoz is not entitled to
such, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After
all, both are administrative proceeding where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in
issue, the Court said.
Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, the Court
saw the need to reexamine its ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge
Purganan which limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. (visit
fellester.blogspot.com)
It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right under the Constitution.
It further said that even if a potential extradite is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition. It added that extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. (GR
No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, Jr. and
Muoz, April 19, 2007)
Facts. Hill (Plaintiff), his wife, and five children were held hostage in their suburban Philadelphia
home by three escaped convicts. Plaintiff and his family were released without any harm but the
story made the front pages of the newspapers. Plaintiffs then moved to Connecticut. Time, Inc.
(Defendant) published an article that told of a new Broadway thriller, The Desperate Hours. The
article said Plaintiff and his family rose in heroism in the time of crisis. The article included pictures
of scenes from the play that was to be reenacted in Plaintiffs Philadelphia home. Plaintiff sued
under Sections 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights Law; Defendants publication of the issues gave
the impression that the play was true when in fact it did not accurately recount Plaintiffs actual
experience and Defendant knew the article was false and untrue. Defendant answered that the
article was a subject of a legitimate news article. The trial judge denied Defendants motion to
dismiss and the j
ury awarded Plaintiff $50,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue. Does a publication of a false report on a matter of public interest need only meet the New
York Times test of actual malice to permit recovery in a lawsuit for false light?
Hudgen vs NLRB
Brief Fact Summary. Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was located
within a shopping mall. The general manager of the mall threatened the picketers with arrest for
trespassing if they would not leave.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and,
therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution).
Facts. Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the nine retail
locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center,
owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After the picketers had been marching for about half
an hour, the general manager of the shopping center threatened to have the strikers arrested if
they did not leave.
Issue. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the public?
JMM Promotions vs CA
Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists
to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of
DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record Book which a
performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers
of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge
existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to
bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department
Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate
that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute
ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would
only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the
method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from
them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens
the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works
and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government,
the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to
prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
PMMSI vs CA
Petitioner now comes to this Court via this petition for review,[19] alleging the following grounds:
As a last recourse, petitioner contends that the interest of substantial justice would be served by
giving due course to the appeal. However, we must state that the liberality with which we exercise
our equity jurisdiction is always anchored on the basic consideration that the same must be
warranted by the circumstances obtaining in each case. Having found petitioners explanation less
than worthy of credence, and without evidentiary support, we are constrained to adhere strictly to
the procedural rules on the timeliness of submission before the court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 23,
1998 and February 26, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The denial of the
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 56325 due to the late filing of the Appellants Brief pursuant to Rule 50
(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is hereby declared FINAL.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MMDA Case
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the
attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of
pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a
scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. But amidst hard evidence
and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective
offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our
internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies
and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national
priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving,
if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic
efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities,
but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of
people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
Facts:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment
Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but
also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal
system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life
in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up
and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free
flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end
up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to
actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other nonbiodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies
and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila
Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive
departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a
need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined
for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former
splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks
ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take
responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men
and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to
keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be
a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision
of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks
outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.