Herodotus's Account of The Battle of Salamis

Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
Author(s): Benj. Ide Wheeler

Source: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 33 (1902),
pp. 127-138
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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Vol.xxxiii.] Herodotus's Accountof Battle of Salamis.
VIII.
I27
Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis.

BY PRESIDENT BENJ. IDE
UNIVERSITY
WHEELER,
OF CALIFORNIA.
OUR chief sources of knowledlgeconcerningthe battle of

Salamis are Aeschylus,Persians, 345 ff.,and Herodotus VIII,
70-95. Of only secondary value-possibly, as some have
thought,of no independentvalue-are Diodorus (Ephorus)
VIII, 17, 2-19, 2, and Plutarch in the Thcmistocles.1The
vulgate account, basing upon Herodotus, and placing the
battle inside the straits,was firstseriouslycalled in question
by Loeschke, Ja/rb.f: P/il. 1877, pp. 25 ff. Finding Aeschylus and Herodotus in discord, he prefersto follow the
former,who was an eye-witness,and prepares an account of
the battle which he believes to be supported by the statements of Aeschyius and in harmonywith those of Diodorus.
He makes no attemptto lharmonizethe statementsof Herodotus, except to suggest a correctionof the text at the point
of most serious discrepancy. The battle he believes to have
occurredoutside the narrowsmade by the point of Cynosura
and the opposite headland of Attica. His main points are
the following:
(i) It is not crediblethatthe Persian ships the nightbefore
the battle could have entered the straits 2000 metres distant
fromthe Greeks withoutbeing observed by them.
(2) Psyttaleia was evidentlyexpected by Xerxes to be in
the midst of the impendingbattle,E'Vyadp8&)wrpdp Tr)q PavC'E70
vI?
7/ ,?EXXovO-s? 6'aEa-Oat E''O
qos (Herod.VIII, 76);
AaXt,qai,
hence the disembarkationof troopsthere. If the battlewere
fought inside the sound, it would be too far away to be
sought as a refugeby the Greeks (cf. Aesch. 450 ff.).
(3) Aeschylus confirmsDiodorus when he indicates (Pers.
366-68) that one detachmentof ships was sent around the
southof Salamis to block the northwestpassage, and the rest
l Cf. Perrin, B., Plutarch's Themis/oclesazn.] Ar4is/ides; note pp. 206 ff.

I28
Benj. Ide Wheeler.
[I902
in three ranks were set to guard the straitat Psyttaleia. If

the Greeks were surrounded by a movement of Persian
ships inside the straits,there were no need of this outside
manoeuvre.
(4) The Persians are representedby Aeschylus as having
heard the Greeks,theirpaean, the trumpetblast, the stroke
of the oars, before they saw them. This can only be explained on suppositionthat Cynosura intervened. The Persians in question were thereforeat the southwest passage
between Psyttaleiaand Cynosura. The Greeks became visible as theybent around the point of Psyttaleia. Hence the
rightwing was seen first.
(5) The Ezva-revw'(Aesch. 4I3) refersto thenarrowsbetween
Cynosura and Attica. The turningpoint of the battle was
the confusioninto whichthe Persians fell when forcingtheir
way into this strait.
(6) The statementof Hlerod.VIII, 85 that the Phoenicians
occupied in the Persian line the wing towardEleusis and the
west, and the Ionians that "toward the east and Peiraieus"
is from Loeschke's point of view unintelligible. It yields
be substituted
meaning for him, however,if only EaXap4zvos,
for 'EXEuo-'YoW,so that the Phoenicians be assigned the wing
towardSalamis and the west.
Loeschke, therefore,arranges both lines across the straits
fromshore to shore,- fromeast to west.
solutionis attemptedby W. W. GoodA somewhatdifferent
win in Vol. I, Papers Amer. Schloo, pp. 239 ff. Starting
with an acceptance of Loeschke's criticism of the vulgate
theory,he joins with him in thinkingit incredible that the
Persians should have taken up their position,on the night
beforethe battle,withinthe straits. He does not, however,
follow Loeschke in amending the text of Herodotus, but
rather seeks to harmonize Herodotus's account with the
others by a differentinterpretationof the vexed passage
Herod. VIII, 85. He seeks, namely,to locate the struggle
withinthe straits,but makes the Persians enter in the morning, and ascribes their defeat to the fact that they were
attacked before they had formedtheirline, and beforethey

Vol. xxxiii.]
Herodotus's Account of Battle of Salamis.
129
had recovered fromthe confusion incident to passing the

narrows.
His main points,additionalto those of Loeschke, are:
(i)
"A.eschylus beyond doubt representsthe Persians as
enterin1g
thestraitsafterdaybreak." So Diodorus and Plutarch.
(2)
"Their line (called by Aeschylus pE'/,ua)fell into some
confusionin enteringthe narrows; and theyneversucceeded
met by
in regainingtheirorderof battle,being immedliately
the Greeks as they passed the long point of Salamis."
(3) "SThere is nothing inconsistentwith this view of the
battle except the common interpretationof two passages of
Herodotus": the firstof these, VIII, 76, which represents
"the Persians as bringing up their west wing to Salamis
KCVKXOv,uLevot
during the nighitbefore tfe battle," he explains as
referringto the sending of ships around the south of the

island to close the northwestpassage (cf. Diod. XI, I 7; Plut.,
I2);
and the second passage, VIII, 85, he explains
Themnist.
by applying the points of the compass to the order of the
Persian line as it entered the straits,i.e. it entered end on
with the rightwing leading, so that the rightwing thus lay
to the west or northwest. The Greeks are made to take a
position at firstacross the sound, between Magoula and the
Perama (correspondingto Diodorus's statement), i.e. south
to north,and then, by advancing their right wing first,to
assume a position southeast to northwestsufficientto bring
them near to the desired line, i.e. withtheirleftwing slightly
west of north.
Professor Goodwin's statement gives a clear, consistent
story of the battle, and has the merit of establishing an
apparentlycomplete reconciliationbetween the accounts of
Herodotus and Aeschylus. It is, however,ratheran attempt
at reconciling with the Aeschylean account two conflicting passages in Herodotus than any attempt at reconciling
the two accounts taken as a whole. To Aeschylus, as
an eye-witness,must be given undoubtedlythe preference
in case of ultimate conflict. We submit,however,that the
account of Herodotus must be interpretedas a whole. It
can scarcely be doubted that Herodotus, who certainly

130
Bcnj. Ide Wleeler.
[I902
visited the scene of the battle within thirty-fiveyears

after its occurrence,must have had when he wrote a selfwhether that plan
consistent plan of the battle in nmind,
was rightor wrong. We believe that a reviewof Herodotus's
account as a whole will show that the two passacges cited
above are not the only ones which appear to be inconsistent
with the plan suggested by ProfessorGoodwin; we believe
that it will also appear that he misunderstandsAeschylus.
The essential featuresof Herodotus's account may be discussed in the chronologicalorderas he gives them.
In the forenoonof the day beforethe battle the Persian
(i)
ships were beached at Phaleron, and the leaders were in
council. So soon as it was decided to give battle,the ships
T v laXapva
were pushed off and headed for Salamis, 'rVb
(? 70), just as the land troops were at niohtfallbeaded c'rb
In
i7V HfEXO7rOlVJJ7cTvO.Contrast 7rpoS Tr7V YaXaaitva,? 75.
the open sea off Peiraieus the ships were sorted out and
arrangedKaT' ?'o-vXtyv.As nightwas, however,approaching,
it was foundnecessaryto postpone battle untilthe next day.
At nightthe Persian armybroke camp and startedalong the
shore toward the Peloponnesus. Hence it was in the midst
of his army,already on its slow march,that Xerxes had his
QV
(Lo apzrt'ov1aXa/.t,Voq (? 90).
seat the next morning vT7ro\ ope
The whole Attic shore was Persian.

(2) The Greeks, especially the Peloponnesians,seeing how
completelytheywould be isolated in case of a naval defeat,
were in great perturbation,and the withdrawalof the Peloponnesian contingent,or perhaps even of the whole fleet,to
the Isthmuswas all but determinedupon. Themistocles sent
Sikinnos to warnXerxes of the proposedmovement. Xerxes
believed. The storywas probableenough,forit seemed surely
the wise course forthe Greeks to pursue. Why should they
at great risk of completeisolationof the armystay to defend
a countryalreadylost ? Xerxes acted promptly. His purpose
was to preventthe withdrawalof the Greek fleet.
v-cv llpp-e'av
First, lhe immediatelydisembarked7roXXo)t0v
upon the island of Psyttaleia,thus securingwith troops this
slhore,as he had already the Attic shore. This marks the

Vol. xxxiii.] Herodotus's Accountof Ba/tle of Salamis.
I3I
proposed line of his battle. Ancient naval battles were by

preference,as Duncker (Gesch. d. Altert.)has shown, fought
from shore to shore, i.e. from friendlyshores respectively,
the
and not with the wings reposing,the one upon a friendly,
otherupon an unfriendly,
shore. The Greeks wereat Salamis
and held the island, and if, as seems a priori natural, the
Persians were proposingin general to make the Attic shore
theirbackground,Psyttaleiawould be at the end of theirleft
and, as lying in the face of the strait,could well be viewed as
/LeXXovT7)9 eOco-Oat(? 76), and as
CE 77oppo TI' vavuaX7,9qT
affordinga finevantage point fromwhich to succor friends
or hew down foes according as the refugeesfromeitherside
mightseek it.
The second part of Xerxes's movementtook place at night
and concerned the fleet. It consisted of two distinct manoeuvres (
-ie
Be
Firstly,az'vq2yov/ezy ro&'a -pr'Epuv idKpaq1cvKov/LEvO1w7rpoq

r\vIaXaFitva; secondly,a'4yov &e ot a,uO\r\vKe'ovreK
Ic r
Kvvo'o-ovpav TeTay/LJevot,
xaTer%ov
T'fl?
ToZ 7Vop9f,loP
VXVCr.
Te /1%pI MouvVX611
adzrza
Concerningthe firstof these manoeuvres,two difficulties

face the interpreter:(a) Which is the west wing? (b) Was
the movement one around the south of the island or inside
the sound ?
ProfessorGoodwin's interpretationmakes Herodotus use
" west wing" in ? 85 of the rig-ht
wing and in ? 76 of the left
wing,and this in a connected account of the samc battle.
Regarding the wings as named by their tenporaryposition,
he naturallyis forced by the specificationthat the other or
eastern wing was at,a,u T7L Ke'o0 TE Kxa T 7P Kvvo'o-ovpavto
locate the west wing out along the shore of the island,though
no possible ratio forleading the fleet over there can be discovered. Dr. Lolling (Meerenge zvonSalamis, Aufsdtze an
Curtizus
gewidinet)attemptsto solve the diifficulty
by reading
Leros forKeos. This is impossible,not only forgrammatical
reasons (viz. the use of -re ca\,and the necessityof making-e
balance LeLP,
while 8e introduces a parentheticalclause), but
forthe plain reason that if the Persian ships were already at

132
Benj. Ide Wheeler.
[I902
Leros, the Greeks were already surrounded,and there was

no need of doing anything further(cf. Hauvette, Herod.,
p.
4I2).
The whole difficulty

finds a readysolution when we take
into account that we are dealing here with a continuous,
consistent,and well-consideredaccount in which the Persian
fleetis always spoken of in termsof the Attic shore against
which it was located on the day before the battle, before
which it was drawn up on the day of the battle,and which
was regarded as its permanent"point of departure." Precisely the same thingis done in ? 85, where,if I may anticipate somewhat,it will be shown that the wings are again
named in terms of the trend of the Attic shore. The 7pos
&'7repDsIcdpa9is throughoutthe rig/twing.
The movementdescribed by Herodotus as KvKXoVF,EJVot
7rpo
T\)v 2aXa/uva is by some understood as within the sound
toward a position by the Perama, by others as a circumnavigation of the island. No one gives a propervalue to KVKXOV,/evot. If, now, this movementconsisted in sending-a part
of the righlitwing around the island, KVKXOv,)ueVoL
is the per-
fectlynaturaldescriptionof the movementwhich sends this

detachment of the rightwing-around behind the left wing.
It seems to me probable that such a detachmentwas sent
reasons
around the island, and forthe followinig
(a) Aesch. Pers. v. 368, aXXa9 8\ Ac6KXa v-ooV A1tavroq
7rwpt(rTdat) seems to referto such a movement; if not, it
refersto somethingotherwiseunmentionedin our sources.
(b) DiodoruLsXI, 17 says: He sent out the naval force of
the Egyptianswithordersto close the straitbetween Salamis
and the land of Megara. The same is implied by Plutarch.
Two hundcredis just the number of ships assigned by
HerodotLusto the Egyptians. For this see Goodwin,p. 248.
The Egyptians would naturallybelong in the rightwingwith
the Phoenicians.
(c) The enemy's ships,which Herodotus reportsAristeides
as having seen in his passage fromAegina, may well have
belonged to this detachment. See Goodwin,p. 251.
(d) The objections which have been raised on the score

Vol.xxxiii.] Herodotus's Accountof Batle of Salamis.
I33
of the distance and the darkness of the night are not of

weight. The weather,as usual in September,was probably
calm; the triremeswere moved by oars and were swift; the
distance was not such as to require over fouror five hours;
i.e. the triremeswould reach the straitsbeforedaybreak.
(e) The movementwas an exact parallel to that of sending
two hundredships around Euboea with the design of shutting
up the Greeks in the Euripus.
(f) The flightof the CorinthianAdeimantus throughthe
sound to the west may be a base libel, but the veryintroduction of the storyshows that Herodotus did not think of a
Persian fleetas posted offSt. George. The second manoeuvre
of the fleetconsisted in bringingthe leftwing-over to enter
and occupy the strait. In consonance with his general way
of viewingthe plan of battle, Herodotus here also expresses
this occu'pationin termsof the Attic coast,-" occupied clear
down to Munychia all the strait with the ships." The
temptationto justifyan oracle cited later undoubtedlyaided
in dictating the choice of word. If these ships had been
already lying offthe straits,as is shown by a',u4l Tr7)vK6ov TE
ecatTrRvKvvo'oovpav, something,new must have happened,somethingradicallynew. The theoryof ProfessorGoodwin
really leaves nothingto be done. That Herodotus believed
the ships occupied the straits inside and were posted along
the shore facing the bay of Ambelaki, we think certainly
proven by what follows. If he did not thinkthey did something of this sort,why should he specificallyadd, "They did
this in silence, that those on the otherside might not know
of it"? (? 76). It is, indeed, only by what I must think a
misinterpretationof Aeschylus (Pers. 382) that Professor
Goodwin refuses to think that the Persians began entering
the straits before daylight. Aeschylus says (1. 38X): they
sail offeach to his appointed station,and (11.382-3) all the
nightkeep sailing throughi
until(11.384-5), when the nightis
passed, no place is left for the Greeks to sail out. The
- tcac9to-raro
antithesisof &tdw7Xoov
eca9io-raoavand 'cX7rXovv
is too apparent; the word-play(tcaOt(o-aro) points it out; note
also 7rXe'ov-t- ad7rXoov- e'c7rXovv. Professor Goodwin's

I34
Beej. Ide Wheeler.
[1902
interpretationof 1. 382 is given on p. 246, "the Persian ships

are kept rowing about all night." Aside from the common
meaningof the language and the implicationof the antithesis,
therearises the consideration: how were theysailing to their
appointed stationsby "rowing about all night"? The interpretationof thispassage is not, however,of primeimportance
to us, -to ProfessorGoodwin and his theoryit is of fatal
importance. Loeschke and Goodwin lay great stress upon
the impossibilityof effectingsuch a movementin the face of
theirattention. Goodwinin the
the enemywithoutattractingr
firstplace is surelymistakenin assertinc,thatit was a moonlit
night. The statementof Aesch. v. 365 is against this,and
Busolt, Gr. Gesc.2 (II, 702, note 2), shows that at the time
of the battle the moon must have been well advanced in its
last quarterand probablydid not rise beforeabout two o'clock.
The Greeks were deep back in the bay of Ambelaki some
four miles from the opposite Attic coast. That there was
doubtless danger of attractingthe attentionof the Greeks is
shown by the fact that the Persians moved in silence, but
that it was possibleto do it under cover of the darkness must
be undoubted. That the south passage, i.e. that between
Cynosuraand Psyttaleia,was not entirelyblockedis suggested
by the arrivalof the Aeginetan triremethe next morning.
Herodotus's account turns now in ? 78 to the Greeks.
They were busy in discussion. "They did not know yet
that the barbarianswere surroundingthemwith their ships,
but supposed them to be in the same positions as they saw
themby daylight." Accordingto ProfessorGoodwin'stheory,
they would be, except for the ships sent around the island.
Then follows the arrival of Aristeides,l from whom as an
" eye-witness" Themistocles firstlearns that the Persians
have moved as he desired.
Not until Aristeides's reportis confirmedby the Tenian
deserters do the Greek leaders really believe they are surrounded. Once convinced,they directlyprepare for battle.
1 Aristeidesmayhave landed on the southshoreofCynosura,
whencea fiveor
ten minutes'walk overthe ridgewould have taken him to the Greek camp,or
he mayhave roundedthe point.

Vol. xxxiii.]
Herodotus's Account of Battle of Salzamis.
I35
The dawn is breaking,. The men are assembled to hear some

words of exhortation. They hurry to their places on the
ships. The triremewiththe blessing of the Aeacidae arrives.
They push off. Hardly are theyoffwhen the barbariansare
upon them. At firstthe Greeks recoil,and some were just
beaching their boats again, but Ameinias on the leftpushes
ahead, joins fight,and the rest follow. The fightbegins off
the mouth of the bay of Ambelaki. Mr. Goodwin's plan
makes it begin at the other side or the middle of the sound,
before the Persians have reached their position and formed
their line. The Greeks, according to his plan, would have
been obliged to back water at at least i miles beforebeaching. In ? 89 Herodotus says Greeks whose ships were lost
swam ashore. If the Greek line had been across the sound,
this were unlikely. Near those of the leftwing would have
been a hostile shore. Most of the otherscould have reached
shore only by swimmingby and around manyfriendlyships.
Passing to the details of the battle, H-erodotus,? 85, makes
the statement: "Opposite the Athenians had been arranged
the Phoenicians,for they held the wing toward Eleusis and
the west; opposite the Spartans the Ionians; they had the
wing toward the east and Peiraieus." As we have already
seen, this statementhas given rise to abundant controversy,
but yet it is just the statementthat it was most naturalfor
Herodotus in accordance with his entire conception of the
plan of battleto make. He viewedthe Persian line as arrayed
before the Attic coast. This coast opposite the mouth of
the bay of Ambelaki lies exactlyeast and west. Herodotus
had not studied out the battle on a map, but on the spot.
It was of slight matter that the map shows Eleusis to be to
the northwest. The plain fact is that the shore runs east
and west, and the west end of the sound opens toward
Eleusis, the east end toward Peiraieus. A fleet arrayed
along this shore has thereforeits rightwing toward the west
and Eleusis, its lefttowardthe east and Peiraieus.
The storyof the battle,aside fromthe personal incidents,
is brief. The Greeks preservedtheirorder,but the Persians,
as they crowded down to fall upon the Greeks in their nar-

I36
Beny. Ide Whecler.
[1902
rowerposition,interfered
witheach other,rakingone another's
oars, and making themselvesan easy prey. The position of
the Greeks forced the Persians into narrowerquarters, cz'
crTsC, so Aeschylus puts it. The result could not have been
different,
as Herodotus says. The ancient naval battle was
a ramming match. A fully equipped triremecarried only
eighteen fightingmen to I70 oarsmen. The great consideration was speed, and the abilityto drivethe ioo feetlong barge
against the enemy's ship and disable it. Once the Persians
were crowded upon each other,the battle was settled. This
was the reason why the Greeks kept the shelter of their
narrow bay. It is inconceivable that they should, as Mr.
Goodwin would have them, leave the shelter of a friendly
shore,and lean theirleftwing upon a hostileshore.
The confusionof the Persians was increased by the ambition of those in the rear lines (Aesch. says theywere drawn
up three deep) to make a good showingunder the eye of the
king wlhosat on the shore behind them. The Phoenicians
were drivenback by theAthenians(e 7'v rypv
Plutarchsays),
and Herodotus tells of their coming up to rnake a certain
complaintto the king. The flightbecame general. All the
ships pushed for the north passage. Here the Aeginetans,
who had moved forwardfrom their position on the right
Greek wingrat the tip of Cynosura,were waiting for tlhem,
and taking them in the flank made havoc of the fug-itives,
earningthemselvesthe chiefgloryof the day.
This is Herodotus's perfectlyintelligibleand self-consistent
account. From it it seems to us clear that he thoughtof the
Persians as already drawn up at daybreak along the Attic
shore and closing the north passage of the strait,so as to
extend from Psyttaleia on the Attic shore opposite it to a
point westwardtherefromopposite the northerncape bounding Ambelaki bay. This makes a line of 21 miles, or if
extended to the Perama, of 4 miles. The Persian fleet,after
the withdrawalof the 200 Egyptian ships, could not have
exceeded 6oo ships. Aeschylus says these were drawn up
three deep. This allows, on the basis of a 21-mile extent
of line, 65 feet waterwayfor each ship, considerablymore

Vol.xxxiii.] HIerodotus'sAccountof Battle of Salamis.
I37
than was necessary to operate it, being more than double the
width covered by ship and oars. The Greek fleet of about
300 ships, probablydrawn up in double line, had frompoint
to point(east and west) of Ambelaki bay a space of i- nmiles,
affording 50 feet per vessel. The whole sea-room was
IO,OOO,OOOsquare metres,or reckoningIOOO
ships, IO,OOO
square metres per ship.

It is chieflyin deferenceto certainstatementsof Aeschylus
that Loeschke and Goodwin have constructedtheir theories
of the battle. These theories are in certain and unreconcilable conflictwith Herodotus. They are too inherently
improbable. Loeschke locates the battleat the southpassage,
which is narrowand brokenby an island and by shoals. Not
to fiftyships could have passed it abreast.
over thirty-five
He is chieflyinfluencedin selecting this position by belief
that Aeschylus's statement that the Greeks were not seen
till the last momentrequiredthem to be hidden by Cynosura.
This implies that the Greeks entered battle by a complete
wheeling of their line, whichwould not only be difficult,
but
would expose the flank. It would furthermorebe the left
wing,and not,as Aeschylus says,the right,whichthe Persians
would see first. Goodwin's plan oblig,esthe Persians to enter
battle througha waterway of less than three-quartersof a
mile in width,where not over fiftyto seventy-fivetriremes
could move abreast. Though off the strait all night, and
wide awake, and though a shore held by their own troops
invited their entrance, they are made to await the risk of
daylightto accomplish this dangerous movement. And yet
Herodotus says -ETETXaT7-o.
Two or threepresumedimplicationsof Aeschylus'slanguage
are all that remain of the supposed reasons for positing this
hypothesis,contraryas it is to the entiretyof Herodotus's
account as well as to all good reasons in general. These are:
(a) Aeschylus says that the Greeks suddenly appeared in
view (Pers. 390). When the sun had risen there burst out
fromthe camp of the Greeks the sound of the paean echoed
over the wave from the island cliffs,smiting dismay to the
hearts of the Persian host. For, lo, this blessed note of the

138
Bcnj. Ide Wlieeler.
[1902
paean was not the song of men who meditated flight,but

rather of men hastening in inspired courage to the battle.
Then the blare of the trumpet set all the air afire, and
straightwaycame the dash and the swish of the oar as it
smote the brine to the boatswain's call. And with a rush
theywere all beforetheireyes.
This fits Herodotus's account. The Greeks tarried in
council till day was dawning. Then came late the decision
to fight. The sailors were addressed just as the sun was
rising. With an enthusiasmtheyare offto theirboats. The
trumpetgives the signal for launching. Suddenly they are
off,and way down in the recesses of the bay fourmiles away,
where just before all had been quiet in the gray of twilight,
the Persianssee thewatercoveredwiththeadvancingtriremes.
(b) The expression p'evi4ais believed by Goodwin to refer
to the columnarorder of the Persians in passing the straits.
The cause of their confusionwhich resulted in their defeat
was, accordingto his view,thatin passing the straits(ev Trev5)
they were obliged to narrowthis column. They were then
attacked before they recovered fromtheir confusion. This
is not what Aeschylus says. He says the reverse. "For
the firstthe stream of the Persian host held on its way, but
when the mass of the ships had been crowded togetherinto
close quarters,they were no help to each other,but rathera
hindranceand destruction,etc.," and then the Greeks smote
them hip and thigh. This crowdingezv 7evjOicomes at the
end, not at the beginning. Compressedinto a narrowerbed,
what had been a steady stream now becomes a confusionof
waters. It is the same thingwhichHerodotus describes. As
they came down upon the Greeks in their narrowerposition
offthe mouthof the bay, theycrowdedtogether,touchedoars,
and were disabled.
Herodotus's account is not only self-consistent; it is in
entireconsistencywith the otheraccounts.


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Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis

Author(s): Benj. Ide Wheeler

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Vol.xxxiii.] Herodotus's Accountof Battle of Salamis.