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number of inputs and uses this brute force approach to produce behaviour
in which Dennett style patterns are rife. Or you may prefer my own
example, the Quantum Fluke Being:' a cosmic accident creature which
gets all the behaviours right but does so by an increasingly unlikely (but
never 100 per cent impossible) series of accidents. Its innards are disorganized mush, yet it exhibits nice patterns in gross behaviour. Or you
may prefer Lycan's Zombies (Lycan, 1988, pp.518-519),or Chris
Peacocke's Martian Marionettes (peacocke, 1983). The moral is the
same: the folks' commitments don't stop at the surface of the skin.
So where do they' stop? Davies had a neat story (Section 1 above) in
which the lack of re-usable syntactic entities corresponding to the semantic items of the folk story torpedoed look-up tables and their ilk. But we
found it too. demanding. Bennett (1991) offers, interestingly, an almost
diametrically opposed thought, viz. that genuine intentionality requires
not just a behaviour pattern susceptible to an intentional description but
also that that pattern should not be the result of the operation of a single .
. mechanism. Instead, Bennett argues, we have genuine intentionality only
when the intentional description reveals a unity which is not visible at the
mechanistic level. Bennett thus insists on what he calls a unity position
which posits, as a necessary condition on genuine intentional descriptions,
that the -description depicts as conceptually unified some set of facts
which cannot be so unified by reference to the underlying mechanistic
story. Thermostats fail the test, as a .single mechanistic explanation can
replace the ones citing desires to achieve certain temperatures etc. By
contrast, Bennett expects that there will be no single mechanism which
mediates all the behaviours which we might describe in a higher animal
using' a generalization 'such as "it is doing :x because it thinks x will bring
food." Why? Because the range of behaviours which might fall under this
rubrIc includes different kinds of bodily motion and responses to different
inputs. Hence "We are soberly entitled to suppose that no one mechanism
explains all this behaviour" (Bennett, 1991, p.180).
Bennett thus insists that the true believers innards be fragmentary
relative to the folk description. What Davies saw as downright inimical
to the proper use of the folk talk, Bennett seems to depict as essential!
My own view is that the whole approach of counting mechanisms is
importantly misguided -not least because it depends on some very slippery notion of how to individuate mechanisms (when is it right to speak
of one mechanistic route mediating an input/output pattern, and when of
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two etc. I doubt if there are principled answers to such questions). The
view developed in Section 1 is rather that the inner story may be fragmentary OR non-fragmentary (relative to the folk ontology) without
thereby compromising the integrity of the folk talk. In short, I count the
Davies/Bennett lines as orthogonal to the question of the commitments of
the folk discourse .
. Dennett himself does not propose any form of mechanism counting
as a response to the worries we raised. But he does feel driven to concede
that (Dennett, 1988, pp.542-543):
"If one gets confirmation of a much too simple mechanical explanation-this really does disconfirm the fancy intentional level account."
This is clearly the kind of intuition which Bennett sought to make precise
by insisting on a multiplicity of mechanisms underlying each genuine
intentional generalization. But it is hard to justify. Why should the possession of relatively simple innards unfit a being for the ranks of the True
Believers? Simplicity per se is not a crime. And suppose it did turn out
that a simple inner mechanism was mediating all of a certain sub-set of
my behaviours. Why should that, in and of itself, work against an intentional/folk psychological description of those behaviours? The various
moves in the debate, it seems to me, are curiously unmotivated: More an
ad hoc attempt to regiment intuitions than to explain or justify them. Pure
ascriptivism, just about everyone (including Dennett) agrees, won't quite
do. But the shape of an alternative remains elusive.
4.
To get a better (workable) grip on the conceptual bonds linking the folk
discourse and scientific studies of cognition, we need to give up a certain
obsession. What has to go, I believe, is the obsession with reductive
relations between types of description of complex systems. Both Davies'
and Bennett's attempts to pin down the nature of the folk's inner commitments revolve around attempts to specify the necessary shape of reductive
relations between individual items in the folk ontology and inner mechanisms. But a better tack, I suggest, may be to concentrate rather on the
broad properties which the folk ascriptions assume and then to ask (of
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5. The
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NOTES
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ANDY CLARK
between levels applies just so lmig as the 'marching in step of the two kinds
of description does not appear as a 'miraculous coincidence. But from that
perspective, there exists a perfectly 'Intelligible Connection (the capital
indicates Cussins semi-technical term) between e.g. the innards of the
Look-up Table being and the folk level of descriptions of its behaviour. It
is no coincidence -but it is not an acceptable implementation because it is
UNINTELLIGIBLE (my, non-technical sense) how the folk cotn.mitments
to normativity (see text) can be met by such a being.
For an argument against such an outcome, see Patricia Churchland (1986).
For an argument in favour, see Lahev (1993).
In a reply to Dennett, reprinted in Churchland (1989), p. 127.
REFERENCES
Bennett J. (1991), Folk Psychological Explanations. The Future of Folk
'Psychology, ed. J. Greenwood: Cambridge University Press.
'Churchland P. M. (1989), The Neurocomputational Perspective.
Cambridge, MA: MIT IBradford Books.
Churchland P.S. (1986), Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the
Mind-Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark A. (1993), Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts and Representational Change. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Cussins A. (1990), The Connectionist Construction of Concepts, in The
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, 'pp. 368-440, ed. M. Boden. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Davies M. (1991), "Concepts, Connectionism and the Language of
Thought." Philosophy end Connectionist Theory, pp. 229-258, eds; W:
Ramsey, S. Stich arid D. Rumelhart. Hilisdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Denn,ett D. (1987), The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett D. (1988), Precis of the Intentional Stance (and Authors Response),
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2, pp. 495-546.
Ellis A. and Young, A. (1988), Human Cognitive Neuropsychology. London: Erlbaum.
Elman J. (1991), Incremental Learning or the Importance of Starting Small,
Technical Report 9101, Center for Research in Language, University
of California: San Diego.
Evans G. (1982), The Variaties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Fodor J. (1987), Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
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