Sri Lanka stunned?

Sri Lankas 2015

presidential poll and [un]warranted
exclamations

by Dr. Chaminda Weerawardhana

- on 01/12/2015

On 9 January 2015, Dr Oliver Walton, a

lecturer at the University of Bath, published an article entitled Sri Lanka
stunned as Rajapaksa gamble fails to pay off (emphasis mine). Walton
notes that Sri Lankans are shocked at the scale and manner of Rajapaksas
defeat, which has brought his tenure to an abrupt halt after nine highly
controversial years. In a similar vein, The Independent (UK) published
an article entitled What a surprise election victory means to Sri Lanka?
In the eyes of many political analysts in Sri Lanka and abroad, the
Rajapaksa regime may certainly have appeared to be difficult to defeat.
This was especially the widespread feeling after the 2009 military victory,
which strongly reinforced President Mahinda Rajapaksas popularity in the
Sinhalese electorate. Concerning the 2015 presidential campaign,

Rajapaksas use of state resources and presidential power was such that
many observers were left voicing the view that despite the regimes
mounting unpopularity, Rajapaksa could still pull through a victory.
However, a closer look would show that the dynamics of the election result
certainly do not come as a surprise.
Presidential campaigns: two scenarios?
At the 2015 presidential poll, the electoral calculations of each side were
made in accordance with an old theorem, which is nothing new to Sri
Lankas national-level electoral politics. There exists a time-tested rule to
win a presidential election in Sri Lanka; a landslide majority is only possible
in one of the following scenarios:
1. When a candidate benefits from a substantive Sinhalese vote (a clear
majority in predominantly Sinhala areas), coupled with the ability (using
methods far from democratic, accountable or politically correct) to
suppress the ethnic minority vote (in the electoral districts where
minorities form a majority, e.g. especially in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces).
2. When a candidate wields significant influence over Sinhalese voters, but
also simultaneously rallies the support of ethno-national and religious
minorities.
In order to play by the first scenario, a presidential candidate needs a
handsome command over the Sinhalese electorate, and measures to
prevent minority voters from casting their ballots. The results of the 2005
presidential poll provide a revealing example. The 5th Peace Process had
resulted in an unprecedented Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist backlash against
the urban, English-speaking, West-oriented lobby that upheld the peace as
market reform matrix of liberal peacebuilding. The Jatika Hela
Urumaya(JHU), the key exponent of this backlash, had emerged victorious
and highly influential at the previous years general election. The Sinhala
electorate (especially the Sinhala-Buddhist electorate in provincial Sri
Lanka) was bound to side with the candidate who received the

endorsement of the anti-peace process/anti-liberal peacebuilding/antiWestern-facilitation Sinhala nationalist lobby. Indeed, that lobbys influence
was crucial to the emergence of Mahinda Rajapaksa as a strong contender
to national leadership. Armed with a reputation as an ardent advocate of a
Sinhala-Buddhist interests, and honoured by the Buddhist establishment
(with theSri Rohana Jana Ranjana honorary title while he was still a cabinet
minister in the Chandrika Bandaranaike administration), Rajapaksas
patriotic credentials were undisputed. In the political climate of the time,
one would have expected the Sinhalese electorate to wholeheartedly vote
for him.
The minority vote: a decisive factor?
However, the election results demonstrated a more nuanced picture.
Despite difficulties of marketing himself to the Sinhalese electorate, Ranil
Wickremesinghe managed to poll considerably, (but much less than
Rajapaksa) in Sinhalese areas. Hence the argument going by the second
scenario mentioned above that Wickremesinghe would have won the
election with relative ease had he been the full beneficiary of the ethnic
minority vote. Knowing this reality too well, the Rajapaksa brothers were
quick to lure the LTTE to run an errand on their behalf, against a generous
financial reward. Consequently, the LTTE actively prevented the majority of
Northern voters from voting at the 2005 presidential election, which
resulted in depriving Wickremesinghe of a vital vote base, and facilitating a
comfortable victory for candidate Rajapaksa.
It is intriguing to note that during the 2015 presidential campaign, a
number of individuals chose at varying degrees to run the same errand
over the Northern Tamil vote. This group included an eclectic mix Ananthi
Sasitharan, Sivajilingam and intelligentsia supportive of a hard-line brand of
Tamil nationalism such as Dr Jude Lal Fernando at the Irish School of
Ecumencis at Trinity College Dublin. Their efforts to discourage the Northern
people from voting may have had differing rationales, but had the Northern

voter heeded to their pleas and stayed home on Election Day, a Rajapaksa
re-election would have been a likely prospect.
TNA and Tamil nationalism in the democratic mainstream
It is to the collective good fortune of the Sri Lankan people that the Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) - headed by the iconic man of the land, Mr Mavai
Senathirajah, guided by the wise elder of Tamil politics Mr R. Sampanthan,
ideologically enriched by the best of Tamil politico-legal scholarship through
Mr Justice C.V. Wigneswaran and Mr M.A. Sumanthiran succeeded in
upholding the Northern citizens right to vote. The argument that the
Northern voter should show his/her discontent at wartime atrocity and postwar misdemeanour is certainly not without currency. However, it certainly is
inimical to the Northern voters interests (and by extension, to the interests
of the Sri Lankan voter at large) to refrain from exercising their suffrage.
Varying strands of Tamil nationalism may have differing territorial,
ideological, political and materialistic goals. Despite the challenges faced by
the Tamil community and polity in consolidating their political aspirations,
their primary path forward lies in the political mainstream within Sri Lanka.
The TNAs position on the Northern vote was thus a vital contribution to
democratic best practice in post-war Sri Lanka as well as a vital forward
step in post-war Tamil politics. In all fairness,Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam
and Global Tamil Forum leaders were also conscious of the importance of
the Tamil vote, and their call for the Tamil voter to vote (without supporting
a given candidacy) was very much an advisable posture.
At the Northern Provincial Council election of 2013, the Northern voter
made it crystal-clear that his/her preference is, quite rightly, to be
represented in the Sri Lankan polity by an electorally influential, politically
mature, strategically tactful, and proudly Tamil nationalist lobby that
operates fully and wholeheartedly within the democratic mainstream. In the
2015 presidential poll, the TNA unambiguously further reinforced its
position asthe predominant Tamil nationalist lobby in electoral politics. In

reinforcing its strong vote base by diligently adopting a principled position

during the presidential campaign, the TNA has succeeded in handsomely
resuscitating its position of dignified influence in Sri Lankan politics, turning
the page for good from the comparative enfeebling of Tamil politics in the
immediate post-war aftermath. In that sense, the SenathirajahSampanthan-Wigneswaran-led TNA is fit to fulsomely uphold the mantle of
the distinguished Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan tradition of Sri Lankan
politics.
Maitripala Sirisena Victory: the inevitable outcome?
In terms of electoral mathematics (and as opposed to the views of Dr
Walton,The Independent and many other observers), the Sirisena success
story a manifestation of the aforementioned Scenario Two certainly does
not come as a surprise. From the outset of the campaign, it was clear, as
Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha affirmed on Al-Jazeera days before the election, that a
Sirisena victory was possible, provided free and fair elections were held.
It was the result of a basic calculation, rendered amenable, paradoxically,
by the ultra-nationalist neoconservative element in the Rajapaksa
establishment itself, primarily represented by Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Bodu
Bala Sena a radical Buddhist-monk-led group allegedly sanctioned by
Gotabaya, engaged in a spate of anti-Muslim activism, resulting in the
Muslim electorates unprecedented alienation from the Rajapaksas. As per
post-war Tamil grievances, suffice to note that social cohesion, gender
justice and social justice were put in the bin, and the Northern Voters anger
was further fuelled not only by the dynamics of a victors peace (e.g. land
grabbing, neoliberal economic policy, military bases and surveillance
society), but also by Colombos persistent unwillingness to enable the
democratically Northern Provincial Council to function with dignity.
Under such circumstances, it was not too difficult for the opposition, once it
was relatively united and influential, to approach the minority political
lobbies.

In hindsight, had there been no Gotabaya Rajapaksa element in the

Rajapaksa administration (and only a war victor-President and perhaps his
politically tactful sibling Basil), it would have been more challenging for the
common opposition to garner a solid support base among ethnic minorities.
As far as the Sinhala electorate was concerned, the common opposition was
fortunate to find the most suitable challenge to the ex-incumbent in Mr
Sirisena, a leader with undisputed Sinhala Buddhist credentials. Mr
Sirisenas appeal to the Sinhalese electorate was demonstrated in the
considerable numbers of preferential votes he polled in constituencies with
Sinhala majorities (as well as his non-negligible scores in constituencies
where candidate Rajapaksa won). The Rajapaksa campaign, in the end, had
to be fought only on a Sinhala-Buddhist platform, under the shadow of an
ultra-nationalist streak, which alone does not suffice to win a presidential
election.
A true surprise factor?
There is, however, a clear surprise factor in the Sirisena campaigns
remarkable resilience and resistance to a state-sponsored propaganda
machine, replete with mud-slinging, personal insults, countless accusations
and tremendous violence, including grievous bodily harm, destruction of
property and murder. The opposition also succeeded in thwarting lastminute efforts that could hinder the transfer of powers. Free and fair
elections were made possible as a consequence of international pressure,
especially from New Delhi. More than at any other election in the recent
past, this election was marked by a strong international dimension. The
Sirisena candidacy received much international endorsement, from the
West, the OIC and most importantly, from the Modi government. The
influential unison of Ranil Wickremesinghe and Chandrika Bandaranaike on
the common candidate initiative appears to have strongly facilitated its
international endorsement. In that respect, this electoral defeat was the
ultimate price the Rajapaksa brothers were brought to pay for the gross

mismanagement of foreign affairs, especially in jeopardising Indo-Lanka

relations in the post-war phase, taking relations with the EU to a record low,
causing unwarranted disagreements with Islamic States, taking one tactless
turn after another on vital foreign policy positions, and most importantly,
their monumentally appalling appointments to key positions in the
diplomatic corps.
If opposition leaders are to live up to the hopes ignited by the Sirisena
presidency, it is now crucial to prioritise a mode of governance marked by
the new Presidents stamp. The worst-case scenario is indeed a government
in which President Sirisena will be relegated to passively adopting a
Wickremesinghe or Bandaranaike agenda.
Dr Chaminda Weerawadhana is postdoctoral researcher at Queens
University Belfast, and Charg dEnseignements at Univertsit Lille 1,
France.
Posted by Thavam