Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
De Leon
Assignment #1
1.
2.
5 elements
a.
PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August
9, 1973. When ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term
was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31,
1979.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the
National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by
the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing,
among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan
City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and
major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion
program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of
the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement
a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for
the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a nonoperational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November
16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of
MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of
MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land.
Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.
ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view
of the expiration of ISAs term.
RULING: Yes
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally
associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD
No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in
fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the
Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate
form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,
sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly
vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the
Republic.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of
the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested
with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously
described as legal personality.
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
MMCN
its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding
them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by
LDB.
Without LDBs Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the
CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the
same.
ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiters decision is appealable to the CA and not
the SC
HELD: The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
YES. The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel
of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter.
The (d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission Hence, while there is
an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic
Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator
is, more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition for
certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the
CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary
burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise
that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that
the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence,
their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that a
voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity. Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator,
whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasijudicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his
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the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act
No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or award
of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the CA, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic
Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a
special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or
submission, or if none be specified, the RTC for the province or city in
which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the
arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator
with that of the RTC. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that
award or decision, the CA must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction
with the SC. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to
the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
NOTES:
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thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear
and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by
said arbitrators decision.
2. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original
jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and
(2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to
exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has
jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties
for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes,
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
4.
MMCN
5.
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
v.
TERESITA
PAYAWAL
and
COURT
OF
FACTS:
On August 31, 1982, a complaint was filed by Teresita Payawal against
Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
plaintiff alleged that Solid Homes contracted to sell to her a subdivision
lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and
that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid Solid Homes the total
amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid
Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to
deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated
demands because the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith
to a financing company. Payawal asked for delivery of the title to the lot
or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest.
She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the
costs of the suit. Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the
National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied.
The RTC ruled in favor of Payawal and ordered Solid Homes to deliver to
her the title or failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus
interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also
awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P
10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. The CA affirmed
the decision.
MMCN
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost
or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than
twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).
This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail
regardless of the dates of their enactment. The fact that one law is
special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a
general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case.
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the
general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later,
it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior
general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be
construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed
expressly or by necessary implication. It is obvious that the general law
in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law. Also, the RTC
and NHA does not have a concurrent jurisdiction over the case.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is
part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear
and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman."
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help
in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular
fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or
the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be
liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in
accordance with the legislative purpose.
b.
MMCN
CGA v. Ignacio
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
1.
2.
3.
4.
MMCN
Teodoros claim that, on September 26, 1938, that there was shortage
of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily
lay off 89 members of the NLU is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Account of native
dealers in leather and was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of a bond despite the breach of Teodoros contract with the
Philippine Army;
the National Workers Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or
employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal;
in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining,
majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable;
the provisions of the Civil Code which had been the principal source of
dissenssions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be
made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a
modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has
always been the rule;
5.
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5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
MMCN
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to
be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play;
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish his rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented, otherwise
such rights is vain - such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
notice or consideration;
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded i.e. that of
having something to support it is a nullity, aplce when directly
attached this emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere since law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power;
The evidence must be substantial i.e. such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion to free
7.
7.
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MMCN
establish the correct common boundary. Ago alleged that "its eastern
boundary should be the provincial boundary line of Agusan-Surigao as
indicated in the green pencil in the attached sketch of the areas as
prepared by the Bureau of Forestry. As per the findings of Forester
Feliciano Cipriano, the claim of Ago would increase the area of Lansang
to 12, 360 hectares and would reduce the area of Lianga to 107,046
hectares instead of the area granted which is 110,406 hectares. Such
being the case, it is reiterated that distance and bearings control the
description where an imaginary line exists. The decision fixed the
common boundary as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached.
Ago appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural
(DANR) and its Acting Secretary, Jose ruled that the common boundary
line should be that indicated by the green line on the same sketch. Lianga
appealed to this decision before the Office of the President. The then
Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., affirmed the decision of
the Secretary of DANR. On motion for reconsideration, the then Assistant
Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit overturned the decision of the then
Acting Secretary and affirmed in toto the decision of the Director of
Forestry. Ago filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
Office of the President.
Thus, Ago filed a case before the Court of First Instance of
Agusan, against Lianga, Leido, Duavit and Director of Forestry, for
"Determination of Correct Boundary Line of License Timber Areas and
Damages with Preliminary Injunction" and insisting that "a judicial review of
such divergent administrative decisions is necessary to determine such
question. Judge Enage of said court issued a TRO enjoining defendants
from carrying out the order of the Office of the President. Lianga moved
for dismissal of the case alleging the there is no cause of action and that
the court has no jurisdiction over the public officials and Lianga. Its motion
for dismissal and subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied.
Hence, this appeal was made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of Forestry has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the common boundary and that the decision of
the Office of the President is final and executory?
HELD: YES. Judge Enage erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed
by Ago for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of
Forestry, the Secretary of DANR and the Office of the President,
administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly
belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the
Bureau of Forestry the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation and
use of all public forests and forest reserves. The Secretary of DANR, as
department head, may repeal or modify the decision of said Director when
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2.
b.
c.
d.
Define
a.
b.
c.
MMCN
The
government
is
seeking
to
adjust
INDIVIDUAL
CONTROVERSIES because of some strong social policy involved.
(NLRC, Employees Compensation Commission, SEC, DAR, COA)
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
3.
MMCN
Issues:
WON the dismissal of Larin from office is valid.
Who has the power to discipline the petitioner?,
Were the proceedings taken pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164
in accord with due process?,
What is the effect of petitioners acquittal in the criminal case to his
administrative charge?
Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue
the questioned E.O. NO. 132?,
Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad
faith?
Held:
No, the dismissal of Larin from office is NOT valid.
The President has the power to discipline Larin.
The proceedings taken pursuant to MO 164 are in accord with due
process.
The position of the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the
Career Executive Service. Under the law, Career Executive Service
officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent
rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are
all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed
as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President
Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to
career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he
comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is
in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by
4.
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5.
6.
MMCN
Dario v. Mison
FACTS: On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated
Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT
THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC
RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING
FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures to achieve
the mandate of the people to:
(a)
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MMCN
the
nature
and
extent
of
this
government
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
3.
Sec 7, Art 14
Sec 14, Book 3 Chap 10, Admin Code 1987 ! Sec. 31. Continuing
Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. - The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
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RULING:
*SC first notes procedural flaws: Disregard of hierarchy of courts,
non-exhaustion of admin remedies, but deems it necessary to address
the issues because it is in the interest of the State that questions re:
status and existence of a public office be settled without delay
A.
B.
RULING
A.
"
Eleven years after (January 7, 2000), President Estrada issued EO No.
191 which deactivated the EIIB on the ground that the functions of
the EIIB are also being performed by other agencies. Meanwhile, Erap
issued EO 196 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Taskforce
Aduana.On March 29, 2000, Estrada issued EO 223 which provided
that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be
deemed SEPARATED FROM SERVICE effective April 30, 2000 pursuant
to the said reorganization.
MMCN
ISSUE(S)
Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive
department?
How should the reorganization be carried out?
"
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
B.
Legal bases:
Section 77 of RA 8745 or the General Appropriations Act (budget)
for the fiscal year 1999. Section 77 of the said law provides that
UNLESS otherwise provided by law or DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, no changes in key positions or organizational
units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their
respective organizational structures in their respective organizational
structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act. This
provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect
organizational changes in the department or agency under the
executive structure.
Section 78, RA 8760: the actual streamlining and productivity
improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected
pursuant to circulas or orders issued for the purpose by the Office of
the President.
Section 31, Book III of EO 292 (Admin Code of 1987): the president,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency shall have the continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.
Canonizado v. Aguirre: reorganization involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundanchy of functions. It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the department of
Finance. It falls under the OP.Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize.
Validity of reorganization
Reorganization is valid provided they are pursued in good faith (if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient).
RA 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be evidence of
bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of
reorganization. Petitioners claim the deactiviation was done in bad
MMCN
a.
16
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
b.
c.
b.
c.
d.
e.
supersede,
and/or
render
Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not
increase. Rather, it decreased from 1,125 positions to 750. It is thus
natural that ones position may be lost through the removal or
abolition of an office.
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(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the
Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office
of the President from other departments and agencies.
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. The succeeding
numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly
limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to
reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section
31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the
Presidents power to restructure the internal organization of the
Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while
Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of
the President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
and vice- versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency and vice- versa.
MMCN
Crisostomo v. CA
18
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conversion of PCC to PUP. The case was then remanded to the RTC
for determination of the amounts due.
In this petition, Crisostomo argues that PD 1341, which converted
the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if
the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have
specified that the PCC was being abolished rather than converted
and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law
would have said it was being created. He claims that PUP is merely
a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be
reinstated to his former position as president.
On ruling that PUP and the PCC are not one and the same
institution but two different entities and that since Crisostomos
term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC, his term
expired upon the abolition of the PCC, CA took into account the
following:
a) After Crisostomos suspension, P.D. No. 1341 was issued
providing that PUP covers not only PCCs offering of programs
in the field of commerce and business administration but also
programs in other polytechnic areas. Being a university, PUP
was conceived as a bigger institution absorbing the entire PCC.
b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university
head is substantially different from that provided by the PCC
Charter. PUP President shall be appointed by the President
upon recommendation of the Secretary of DECS after
consultation with the University Board of Regents. The
President of PCC was appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees.
c) The composition of the new universitys Board of Regents is
likewise different from that of the PCC Board of Trustees. The
NEDA Director-General, the Secretary of Industry and the
Secretary of Labor are members of the PUP Board of Regents.
d) That all the properties
transferred to PUP.
owned
by
PCC
shall
stand
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not PD 1341 abolished PCC
(2)Whether or not Crisostomo may be reinstated to his position as
President?
HELD: (1) NO. PD 1341did not abolish, but only changed, the former
PCC into what is now the PUP, in the same way that earlier in 1952,
RA 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of
Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place
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Definition:
a. Powers which is bound or which it is ones business to do.
2.
Sources of powers
b.
MMCN
3.
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
Issues:
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasijudicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue
a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aquaculture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Held:
a.
FACTS:
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Taule v. Santos
Ruperto Taule vs. Secretary Luis Santos and Governor Leandro
Verceles
August 12,1991 Gancayco, J.
FACTS: On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay
Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their
capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils in their
respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members
in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga,
Vicente Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran
and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants
was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P.
Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and
Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5)
of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election
Supervisor walked out. The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO
Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as members of the Board of
Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales. Thereafter, the
following were elected officers of the FABC:
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new
elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and
direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the
barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments.
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local
governments. This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code
wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." To deny the Secretary
of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of
officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of
promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority
to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such
issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. This is compatible
with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which
as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which grants the
Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is
silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent
Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local governments,
it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. Any
doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local
affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest
filed by respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the
FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in
excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the
jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the
recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.
c.
4.
Classification of power
a.
Nature
Investigatory powers
Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory powers
b.
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
b.
Cario v. CHR
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800
public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who
were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA)
and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted
actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latters attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of
Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights
violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say,
determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues
which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education
and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned,
declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said
MMCN
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot
and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved
in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to
do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.
6.
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two
days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath of office as such after
having been informed of his nomination by then Acting Assistant Executive
Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed
to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman
of the Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the
latter informed the former of the findings made by his Committee concerning
alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the
Motor Vehicles Office which are summed up in the letter, as follows: (1)
malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government; (2) failure to
correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating
thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence to remedy
unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings. Congressman Roces
recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio de
Leon as well as the complete revamp of the offices coming under the Motor
Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be appointed thereafter; that having
been officially informed of the content of said letter, then Secretary of Public
Works and Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof requiring him
to explain within 72 hours why no administrative action should be
taken against him relative to the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner
answered the letter as required wherein he explained and refuted in detail each
and everyone of the charges contained in the letter of Congressman Roces; that
on February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended
petitioner as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon created
an investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the charges
against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and to undertake the
investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor Emilio
A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee submitted its report to
the President of the Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No.
332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of
petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting
administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this
was denied, he filed the instant petition before this Court.
Respondent averred that the President of the Philippines, contrary to petitioner's
claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential
appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
HELD:
The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against petitioner because the authority of said
Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal can
only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the
classified service to which classification petitioner does not belong.
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as
the investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned,
even if he is under the control and supervision of the Department of Public Works,
in view of the reason we have already stated that he is a presidential appointee
who comes exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President.
With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against
petitioner which led to his separation are illegal simply because the charges
preferred against him by Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by
Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260, this much we can say: said proceedings
having been commenced against petitioner upon the authority of the Chief
Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be
commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to
Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, the pertinent provisions of which are is
follows:
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or
employee by the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or
upon complaint of any person which shall be subscribed under oath by the
complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the
complainant, the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned may in his
discretion, take action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances
of the case, so warrant.
a.
Initiation of investigation
HOW: (a) complaint (b) own motion
Examine, inquire, explore
Who?
Power of control of President = investigate
b.
Conduct of investigation
Allegations or suspicion
PRIVATE
Harmful publicity will not be used in lieu of sanctions provided by
law
Issue:
Whether the Commissioner of Civil Service is with jurisdiction to hear and decide
the administrative charges filed against petitioner.
MMCN
i.
Ruiz v. Drilon
25
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
FACTS: The Court NOTED the sixth motion for extension of time to
submit a comment to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, (G.R.
No. 101666) filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public
respondents Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the DECS, and
Resolved to DISPENSE with the comment required of the public
respondents, considering that the pleadings and other papers already
filed by the other parties in this case are adequate to enable the Court to
act upon the present petition.
On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued AO No. 218
dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as
President of the Central Luzon State University (CLSU). 1
In 2 orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive
Secretary, acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first
and second MR therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for
being pro forma. Consequently, AO No. 218 became final and
executory. 2
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a TRO with the CA. Petitioner there sought to annul
President Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991 appointing Dr.
Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU President, as well as DECS
Undersecretary Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991
directing petitioner to turn-over the CLSU Presidency to Dr.
Battad. CA issued the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 4
On 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with SC the present petition (G.R.
No. 101666) for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
TRO for the purpose of annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion,
the issuance of AO No. 218 as well as of the orders of the Executive
Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom. 5 The
Court did not issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 6 This
petition made no mention of the petition for prohibition with prayer for
TRO filed 8 days earlier with CA.
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September
1991 having gone into effect on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a
manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992, where for the first
time, he disclosed to this Court the other judicial proceedings which he
had commenced in connection with the issuance of AO No. 210. 7
On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the CA promulgated its
decision in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165, dismissing the petition for
lack of merit and finding the same to be a case of forum
MMCN
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Moreover, during the period when the proceedings in G.R. No. 101666
and CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 were simultaneously pending action before
two (2) different for a petitioner created for himself a situation where he
could hope to get (after the 20-day life of the Court of Appeals TRO) a
judicial order from either forum which could stop the execution of AO No.
218 with more permanency (i.e., either a TRO with an indefinite lifetime
from the Supreme Court or the grant of his petition for prohibition by the
Court of Appeals). Thus CA, aware of the institution of G.R. No.
101666, 1 2 committed no reversible error in considering the
action before it as another, independent case and as an
instance of forum shopping.
AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner
was removed from office. Those findings included the facts that (a)
petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President, offered new
academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in
wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval of the
Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of
chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned
by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales
agreement in favor of a company where he was holding a directorship;
and (d) he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students
in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 5546. 1 8 These acts
constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal
basis for dismissal from the public service.
SOJ v. Lantion
FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said
Treaty.On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
27
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
iii.
Pefianco v. Moral
FACTS:
Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of
the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division
(FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and
supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal
authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical
documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National
Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the
complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of
28
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion
or order the amendment of the pleading.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS
Resolution, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order. Moral
moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of
the warning Order that the denial of the request for the production of
the Investigation Committee Report was final.
As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dismissing
her
from
the
service.
Instead,
she
instituted
an
action
for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against
Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined
from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the
said report.
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for
lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the trial court.
In its assailed Decision the appellate court sustained the trial court and
dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of
Appeals on 13 January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition
for review.
MMCN
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that
the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor.
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily
denying motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition
often creates difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the
aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher
court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial court falls short of the requirements
prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of
mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions
of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners
motion to dismiss was being denied. We are reproducing hereunder for
reference the assailed Order Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the
discussion therein on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by
petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., lack of cause of action, and the
dispositive portion of the order. The order only confused petitioner and
left her unable to determine the errors which would be the proper subject
of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting
29
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for
their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the
action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its
order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration
before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to
expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in
his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict
compliance with the rules was justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion
for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the
imputed errors on its act or order. However, this rule is not absolute and
is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of
the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory
provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration may
be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of
the lower court directly on certiorari.
In fine, the trial courts Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss is
not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because,
to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the
provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss
should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent
is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the
DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule
which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with
a copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a
cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely
interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to
annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
c.
MMCN
informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was
using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the
building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground
floor, the inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit
an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection
because the inspector lacked a search warrant.
The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and
appellant again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed
ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney's office. When
appellant failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on
November 22. They informed appellant that he was required by law to
permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code:
"Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City
departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the
performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper
credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building,
structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon
them by the Municipal Code."
Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment
without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him
with refusing to permit a lawful inspection. [2] Appellant was arrested on
December 2 and released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal
complaint was denied, appellant filed this petition for a writ of
prohibition.
Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal
officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without
probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists
therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted for
refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by 503.
The District Court of Appeal held that 503 does not violate Fourth
Amendment rights because it "is part of a regulatory scheme which is
essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section
creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be
exercised under unreasonable conditions."
ISSUE: Whether administrative inspection programs violate Fourth
Amendment rights.
HELD:
30
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his
refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold
without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding
immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to
the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to
search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was
unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits
of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the public
portion of the building with the consent of the landlord,
through the building's manager, We therefore conclude that
appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the
inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may
not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to
the inspection.
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
[12]
Salazar v. Achacoso
FACTS:
A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the
complainants PECC Card, it was further alleged that Salazar did not
posses a license to operate as a recruitment agency. POEA through its
Director on Licensing and Regulation, issued a warrant of arrest and
seizure against the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure is valid?
MMCN
HELD:
Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest." Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a
mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process.
d.
Accounts, records, reports, statements at all reasonable time, have access to, for
the purpose of examination and the right to copy, any documentary
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against.
i.
Cartura v. CIR
CATURA V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
37 SCRA 303
FERNANDO: January 30. 1971
NATURE: Petition for review
FACTS:
- On December 27, 1966, a complaint against Pablo Catura and Luz
Salvador, the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a legitimate
labor organization duly registered was filed by the prosecution division of
the respondent Court, the principal complainants being now respondent
Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than
ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization.
- In the complaint, it was charged that during the tenure of office of
petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer, they were
responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with
complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966
demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial
transaction of the union and to make the book of accounts and other
records of the financial activities of the union open to inspection by the
members," only to be met with a refusal on their part to comply.
- It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor
organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership
meeting so that petitioners could be confronted about the status of
union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as President, cancelled such
meeting.
32
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Atty. Gallant Soriano
33
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
e.
f.
Carbonell v. CA
g.
Santiago v. Morales
Carmelo v. Ramos
IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS,
JESUS L. CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe
Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitionerappellant,
vs.
ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
Facts:
The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies
involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License
Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License
and Permits Division of the said office. He named Jesus Carmelo as
chairman.
The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen
working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear
MMCN
34
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any
one who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued
under the authority of the preceding paragraph or who, appearing before
any individual or body exercising the power therein defined, refuses to
make oath, give testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when
thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of
contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body
exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of first
instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law.
First and foremost, , it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580
of the Administrative Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these
pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government.
Also, one who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he
has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply
to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.
There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor
creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that
the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies
involving certain city employees.
Carmelo contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to
investigate city officials and employees appointed by him to the end that
the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials
of employees may be justly and fairly exercised.
SC held that the Mayor of Manila has such power to investigate, however,
a delegation of such power to investigation does not imply a delegation
of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose
appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena.
Thus, the mayor (of Manila) cannot delegate or confer the
powers to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."
In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power
to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted
earlier, is that the Mayor cannot delegate this power to a body like the
committee of the petitioner
ii.
Masangcay v. Comelec
G.R. No. L-13827; September 28, 1962
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner vs. COMELEC, respondent
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
In 1957, Benjamin Masangcay, then the provincial treasurer of Aklan, with
several others, was charged before the COMELEC with contempt for
having opened three boxes containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of Aklan, in violation of two resolution, inasmuch as he
opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of
MMCN
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Bedol v. Comelec
BEDOL VS COMELEC
LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 179830/ December 3, 2009
fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an
excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written report
was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative
proceedings and due to failure and refusal to submit a written
explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a
contempt charge by COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine
National Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29,
2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during
the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.
FACTS:
As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the
province of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his
official functions and was able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its
ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the
twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the
burdensome and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial
Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring
province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled
canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of
Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was
slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission,
en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the
election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for
Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor
and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain observations on
the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the
certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the
alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for
May 30, 2007, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.
Respondents [petitioner] contention:
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007
fact finding activity that, while in his custody and possession, the
election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some
MMCN
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Rules of procedure and evidence technical rules of procedure and evidence NOT
strictly applied
Flexibility
Not governed by technical rules
i.
Gaoiran v. Alcala
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, Petitioner, v. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA,
Retired Chairman, Commission on Higher Education, ESTER
ALBANO GARCIA, now Chairman, Commission on Higher
Education, FELIPE S. AMMUGAUAN, SR., Vocation School
Superintendent I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, EDMOND
M. CASTILLEJO, Administrative Officer I, Angadanan AgroIndustrial College, and DIOSDADO TELAN, Instructor I & Head
Teacher III, OIC Designate, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College,
Angadanan, Isabela, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by Florian R. Gaoiran, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477. In
the assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the Decision dated
February 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan, Isabela,
Branch 20, nullifying the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of Hon. Angel C.
Alcala, then Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
dismissing petitioner Gaoiran from the service for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
37
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
SO ORDERED.7
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano
Although the respondent did not elect a formal investigation, one shall
MMCN
42