DIGESTS IN

AGRARIAN REFORM CASES

SUBMITTED BY:
ALICER, DIANA JEAN
LAW 2B

SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. ROWENA FALCULAN-MARI
INSTRUCTOR

G.R. No. 174647/ December 5, 2012

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Rosa and Pedro Costa

Facts:
Respondent spouses are the registered owners of a a parcel of land in
Sorsogon which they voluntarily offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform
( DAR ) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Land Bank computed
and valued the respondents land at Php 104, 077.01. However, respondents
rejected their valuation and sought the determination of just compensation with the
Provincial Adjudication Board of the DAR. The PARAD rendered a decision in favor of
the respondents, valuing the property at Php 468,575.92. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition
for Determination of Just Compensation before the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian
Court ( SAC ). The SAC rendered a decision finding the valuation made by the
PARAD as the more realistic appraisal of the subject property. LBP then sought
recourse before the Court of Appeals but said court affirmed the decision of the
SAC. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the compensation fixed by the PARAD as affirmed by SAC is
in accordance with the valuation factors mandated under Sec.17 or R.A. 6657.

Ruling:
Ruling in the affirmative the Supreme Court said that the responsibility of
determining the value of the land placed under land reform and the compensation
to be paid for their taking under the voluntary the voluntary offer to sell or
compulsory acquisition arrangement is initially lodged with LBP but in the event that
the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR Adjudicator
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who
disagrees with the decision of the DAR Adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as the Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just
compensation.
In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider the
following factors as provided in Sec. 17 of R.A. 6657:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The acquisition cost of the land.

The current value of like properties.
The nature, actual use, and income of the land.
The sworn valuation by the owner.
The tax declarations.
The assessment made by government assessors.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers,
farmworkers, and the government to the property.
8. The non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution of the said land, if any.
Considering all these factors, the valuation made by the Provincial
Adjudicator of Sorsogon, and the potentials of the property, the Court considers the
findings of the Provincial Adjudicator as the more realistic appraisal which could be
the basis for the full and fair equivalent of the subject property while the Court finds
that the valuation of the petitioner LBP in this particular agricultural land is
unrealistically low. The Courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to
factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and
expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Petition is denied.

G.R. No. 181370/ March 9, 2011

Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo vs. Remedios Loyola

Facts:
Remedios Loyolas mother, Cristina Hugo, was awarded by the DAR, under
R.A. 6657, a parcel of land located in Cavite covered by a certificate of Land
Ownership Award ( CLOA ) and a Transfer Certificate of Title. Julian Lebrudo, now
deceased and represented by his son Reynaldo, alleged that sometime in 1989 he
was approached by Loyola to redeem the lot which was then mortgaged by Loyolas
mother to a certain Trinidad Barretto and to help her in obtaining title to the lot in
her name by shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of title of the lot from her
mother. In exchange for his help, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half
portion of the lot. Thereafter, title to the said lot was transferred to Remedios
Loyola. She then allegedly executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, waiving and
transferring her rights over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. Upon
refusal by the respondent to make good on her promise, the petitioner sought the
assistance of the Sangguniang Barangay, the PNP, and the DAR to mediate.
However, despite the steps taken to amicably settle the issue, no settlement was
reached. This prompted Lebrudo to file an action against Loyola. The PARAD of
Trece Martirez, Cavite decided in favor of the petitioner but the DARAB reversed
said decision in an appeal seasonably made by the respondent. The Petition for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was likewise denied. As a result, Lebrudo
filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the DARAB and consequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the
present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the petioner is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot
covered by R.A. 6657 on the basis of a waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the
alleged Sinumpaang Salaysay.

Ruling:
Resolving the issue in the negative, the Supreme Court said that a certificate
of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted

or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and
conditions provided in R.A. 6657 and other applicable laws. Sec. 27 of R.A. 6657,
as amended by R.A. 9700, provides that lands acquired by beneficiaries under said
ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary
succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries
for a period of ten years. It is clear from the foregoing provision that lands awarded
to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program ( CARP ) may
not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of ten years. However, the law
enumerated four exceptions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Through hereditary succession;

To the government;
To the Land Bank of the Philippines;
To other qualified beneficiaries.

Any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights within the ten year
prohibitory period is void, except as provided by law, in order to prevent a
circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In the present case, petitioners claim is
untenable as the law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or conveyance by farmerbeneficiaries of the land reform rights within ten years from the grant by the DAR.
The law provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the
exceptions. Furthermore, the Court cited DAR Administrative Order No. 3 which
enumerated the qualifications of an agrarian reform beneficiary, to wit:
1. The beneficiary must be landless;
2. He must be a Filipino citizen;
3. He must be an actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or
head of the family at the time of the filing of the application;
4. He must have the willingness, ability, and aptitude to cultivate and make
the land productive.
Herein petitioner does not qualify as beneficiary because he was a previous
awardee of a landholding under the CARP and, therefore, not landless. Moreover,
Lebrudo is not an actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the
application.
Petitioners basis for his claim, the two Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly
executed by the respondent in his favor, were illegal and void ab initio for being
patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by the agrarian
laws.
The main purpose of the Agrarian Reform law is to ensure the farmerbeneficiarys continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land he tills. To
do otherwise is to revert back to the old feudal system whereby the landowners
reacquired vast tracts of land and thus circumvent the governments program for
freeing the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.

Petition is denied.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Honeycomb Farms Corporation

G.R. No. 166259/ November 12, 2012

Facts:
Honeycomb Farms Corporation ( HFC ) was the registered owner of a parcel of
land which it voluntarily offered to the DAR for coverage under R.A. 6657 for Php
581,932. Subsequently, the LBP fixed the value of the land at Php165,739.44 and
sent a Notice of Valuation to HFC. The HFC rejected LBPs valuation and it filed a
petition with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for a summary administrative
determination of just compensation. Pending resolution by the DARAB, HFC filed a
Complaint for Determination and Payment of Just Compensation with the RTC.
Meanwhile, on May 1998 the DARAB issued a decision affirming LBPs valuation. On
the other hand, the RTC rendered a judgment fixing the just compensation at
Php931,109.20. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. HFC claimed that the
RTCs valuation is not supported by the evidence on record and presented evidence
which shows that the market value of the land at the time of the taking is Php113,
000 per hectare while the LBP raised the issue of whether the RTC (SAC) had
jurisdiction to hear HFCs complaint in view of the pending DARAB proceedings. It
further argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it took judicial notice of
the propertys roadside location, its proximity to a commercial district, its
incomplete development as coconut and corn land, and its condition as grassland to
determine just compensation and it further questioned the award of consequential
damages and attorneys fees for lack of legal and factual basis. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC decision and dismissed HFCs complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. On HFCs Motion for Reconsideration, the CA
recalled its previous decision and reinstated the RTCs decision with modification
that the award of attorneys fees in favor of HFC is deleted. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the complaint filed by HFC
pending determination by the DARAB of the same issue.
2. Whether or not HFC committed forum shopping.
3. Whether or not the RTC and the CA committed serious error when it took
judicial notice of the propertys roadside location, its proximity to a
commercial district, its incomplete development as coconut and corn land,
and its condition as grassland to determine just compensation.

Ruling:
On the first issue:
The SAC properly acquired jurisdiction over HFCs complaint for the
determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the DARAB
proceedings. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. Under
Sec. 57 of R.A. 6657, the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. It would
subvert this original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original
jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an
appellate court for the review of the administrative decisions. In accordance with
the settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR
to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation of the lands taken
under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts.
The taking of property under R.A. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which
is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
The Court further ruled that LBPs argument that HFC failed to exhaust
administrative remedies had no merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply when the issue has been rendered moot and academic. In
the present case, the issue is already moot and academic considering that the
valuation by the LBP had long been affirmed in toto by the DARAB in its May 1998
decision.
On the second issue:

The Court ruled that HFC is not guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping is
the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in
different for a, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a
favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. To determine whether a party
violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in
one case would amount to res judicata in another. The Court, in Yu vs. Lim, has laid
down the requisites of forum shopping, as follows:
1.
2.
3.

Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the

same interests in both actions;
Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts;
Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in two cases,
such that any judgment that maybe rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other case.

In the present case, HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third
element of litis pendentia is lacking. The DARABs valuation is only
preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner or any interested parties. The SAC will still have to review with
finality the determination, in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.
On the third issue:
The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the land in question without the
requisite hearing. The SAC erred in concluding that the subject land is commercial in
nature. The parties must be given the opportunity to present evidence on the
nature of the property before the court can take judicial notice of the commercial
nature of a portion of a landholding. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution and within the clear boundary provided by Section
3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the
trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
Petition was granted and the assailed amended decision of the Court of
Appeals was reversed and set aside. The special civil case for the determination of
just compensation is remanded to the RTC of Masbate.

G.R. No. 170685/September 22, 2010

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Enrique Livioco

Facts:
Respondent was the owner of a parcel of sugarland in Pampanga which was
adjacent to residential subdivisions and an international paper mill as indicated in
his voluntary-offer-to-sell form submitted to the DAR. Livioco offered his sugarland
for acquisition under the CARP. Following Sec. 17 of R.A. 6657 and DAR AO No. 17,
series of 1989, as amended by AO No. 3 series of 1991, the LBP set the price at
Php827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco was then promptly informed of the valuation
and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds had been kept in trust pending his
submission of the ownership documentary requirements. Apparently, Livioco did not
act upon the notices given to him by DAR and LBP. Sometime in 1991, LBP issued a
certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has earmarked
Php827,943.48 as compensation for Liviocos 26-hectare land. Two years later,
Livioco requested for a reevaluation of the compensation. The DAR denied the
request on the ground that there was already a perfected sale. Subsequently, the
DAR took possession of Liviocos property and awarded it to 26 qualified farmer-

beneficiaries. Livioco then filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to
recover the property but the same proved futile.
Issue:
Whether or not the just compensation was determined in accordance with law.

Ruling:
No. The valuation of the property was unlawful. The SC ruled that the value
of respondents property should have determined by its character and its price at
the time of the taking.
As to the character of the property, the SC ruled that the land should have
been valued as an agricultural land. The lower courts erred in ruling that the
character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential,
because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for
conversion to other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate
and to approve land use conversions so as to prevent fraudulent evasions from
agrarian reform coverage. Even reclassification and plans for expropriation by local
government units (LGUs) will not ipso facto convert an agricultural property to
residential, industrial or commercial. Thus, in the absence of any DAR approval for
the conversion of respondents property or an actual expropriation by an LGU, it
cannot be said that the character or use of said property changed from agricultural
to residential. Respondents property remains agricultural and should be valued as
such.
As to the price, Section 17 of RA 6657 provides:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors
to determine its valuation.
As to the time of the taking, the SC ruled that the value of the property must
be valued at the time of taking, which is the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred to the Republic.

G.R. No. 93100/June 19, 1997

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 97855/June 19, 1997
PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF
HONORABLE SECRETARY
REFORM

FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC. vs. THE

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN

Facts:
Petitioners are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and
prawn farms. They assail some sections in RA 6657 as well as the implementing
guidelines and procedures contained in AO Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of
DAR as unconstitutional considering that CARL extends to aquaculture lands when
the constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands and that questioned
provisions similarly treat aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are
differently situated and differently treat aquaculture lands and industrial lands,
when they are similarly situated.

Issue:
Whether or not the questioned provisions are unconstitutional insofar as they
include in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly
fishponds and prawn farms.

Ruling:
The constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and
academic with the passage of RA No. 7881 expressly stating that fishponds and
prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of the CARL. While the court will not
hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional
issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the
government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act.
The petition was dismissed.

G.R. No. 103302/August 12, 1993

NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP. vs

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR.
WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV

Facts:
Petitioner Natalia Realty is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land
located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal with a total of 125.0078 hectares. On 18 April
1979 Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as
townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis and the Natalia
properties were within the areas proclaimed as reservation townsite. EDIC corp.
developed the Natalia properties into low-cost housing subdivisions and
reservations, thus, the Natalia properties later became Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On
15 June 1988, RA 6657 or CARL, went into effect so the MARO issued a notice of
coverage on the undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia
immediately registered its objection to the notice of Coverage. On 17 January 1991,
SAMBA filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC corp. before the DAR Regional
Adjudicator to restrain the petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by
the SAMBA members. The Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners
from proceeding with the development of the subdivision. Petitioner move to
dismiss the complaint, however, it was denied and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued. Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but DARAB merely remanded
the case to the Regional Arbitrator. Petitioners also wrote a letter to the Secretary to
set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither the Director nor the Secretary took action
on the protest-letters. Hence a case filed in the SC alleging grave abuse of
discretion against respondent for including the undeveloped areas within the
coverage of CARL.
Issue:
Whether or not lands classified for residential, commercial or industrial use as
approved by HLURB prior to 15 June 1988 covered by RA 6657 or CARL.
Ruling:
No. Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its
Revised Rules and Regulations DAR itself defined "agricultural land" as those lands
which are devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified
as mineral or forest by the DENR and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in
town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the HLURB and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,commercial or industrial
use." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural

lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Furthermore, the Secretary of Justice even noted in an Opinion that lands covered
by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are
part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human
settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural
lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657." Not being
deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.
G.R. No. 178046/ June 13, 2012
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Montinola-Escarilla and Co., Inc.
Facts:
Respondent MECO was the owner of a parcel of agricultural land in
Agusan del Sur. A portion of the whole lot was acquired by the government in 1995
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. 6657). Petitioner LBP
initially valued the land at Php823, 204.08 but the same was rejected by the
respondent. Pending summary administrative proceedings for the determination of
just compensation before the DAR Regional Adjudicator (RARAD), MECO filed a
complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC which constituted
a four-member Board of Commissioners to evaluate and appraise the just
compensation of the subject property. Meanwhile, the RARAD rendered a decision
fixing the just compensation at Php823, 204.08. On the other hand, the Board of
Commissioners were not able to come up with a unified valuation of the property.
The RTC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation at Php7, 927. 660. 60.
Petitioner LBP and DAR Secretary filed separate motions for reconsiderations which
were both denied. LBP appealed to the CA, averring that the RTC erred in
disregarding R.A. No. 6657 and its implementing guidelines, DAR Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, in valuing the subject land. It
contended that the valuation heavily banked on present considerations or future
potentials of the subject property instead of its value at the time of taking. T he CA
set aside the RTC's valuation for failure to give due consideration to the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. It adopted the Commissioners' Report
submitted by the two commissioners as the only unbiased determination of just
compensation. However, it deleted the award of attorney's fees for being improper.
Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in adopting the valuation in the Commissioners
Report.

Ruling:
Ruling in the negative, the Court held that the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking.

In the implementation of R.A. No. 6657, Section 17 provides the manner by which
just compensation is determined, thus:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land,
the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
The potential use of the expropriated property is only considered in cases where
there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property,
but should never control the determination of just compensation.
Under DAR A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994, the landowner shall not be
compensated or paid for improvements introduced by third parties such as the
government, farmer-beneficiaries or others. Hence, it was erroneous to reclassify
the acquired property into cornland and cocoland based on plaintiff's (MECO)
evidence considering that the improvements were introduced by the farmerbeneficiaries.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the case was
remanded to the RTC for the determination of the proper just compensation.

G.R. no. 175055/ June 27, 2012

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Heirs of Maximo Puyat and Gloria Puyat
Facts:
Respondents are the heirs of Maximo and Gloria Puyat and the pro indiviso
owners of the subject property. The records do not disclose when the DAR placed
the Puyats land under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27. It is however
clear that the DAR issued several emancipation patents in favor of various farmerbeneficiaries in December 1989. The Puyats did not receive any compensation for
the cancellation of their title over the awarded portions of the subject property. Two
years after the DAR awarded the property to farmer-beneficiaries, the LBP received
DARs instruction to pay just compensation to the Puyats. Respondents received
LBPs initial valuation together with the notice of acquisition and valuation form but
rejected the valuation. The heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for determination and
payment of just compensation with the RTC of Cabanatuan City. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the respondents. Upon LBPs motion, the trial court modified the
compensable area to the actual area acquired by the DAR. LBP appealed the
modified decision to the CA which rendered a decision affirming the decision of the
lower court. LBP moved for a reconsideration which was denied. Hence the present
petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using the
factors appearing in Sec. 17 of RA 6657.
2. Whether or not it is proper to impose 6% legal interest per annum on the
unpaid just compensation.
3. Whether or not the case should be remanded to the RTC for the
computation of just compensation using Sec. 17 of RA 6657 as amended
by RA 9700.

Ruling:
On the first issue:

Ruling in the affirmative, the court held that when the government takes a
property pursuant to PD 27, but does not pay the landowner just compensation until
RA 6657 has taken effect it becomes more equitable to determine just
compensation using RA 6657. In the case at bar, respondents title to the property
was cancelled and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries on March 1990. In 1992 LBP
approved the initial valuation for the just compensation that will be given to the
respondents. Both the taking of respondents property and the valuation occurred
during the effectivity of RA 6657. When the acquisition process under PD 27
remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, the process should be completed
under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having suppletory effect only.
On the second issue:
Resolving the issue in the affirmative, the SC held that the LBPs claim that
the imposition of 6% interest by the trial and appellate courts constitutes a double
imposition of interest is unwarranted. The 6% interest reate imposed by the trial
and the appellate court would be a double imposition of interest had the courts
below also applied DAR AO No. 13 series of 1992. But the fact remains that the
courts below did not apply DAR AO no. 13. In fact, that is precisely why the LBP
appealed the trial courts decision to the CA, and the latters decision to this Court.
Therefore, the LBP is cognizant that the lower courts imposition of interest cannot
constitute a double imposition of a legal interest.

On the third issue:

Ruling in the negative, the court held that RA 9700 took effect at a time when
this case was already submitted for resolution. All the issues had been joined and
the parties had argued exhaustively on their various contentions. The issue
regarding the applicability of RA 9700 to the instant case was not among those
discussed in the partys memoranda. To rule that RA 9700 decrees a remand of the
case would be abhorrent to the rules of fair play. With respect to land valuation, all
Claim Folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009, shall be valued in accordance
with Sec. 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700. In the instant case, LBP
received the claim folder for the respondents property in 1992, which was long
before the effectivity of RA 9700 in 2009. Further, DAR AO no. 02-09 makes clear
distinctions with respect to the laws that should govern the valuation of lands to wit:
1. The compensation of lands covered under RA 9700 shall be:
a. The amount determined in accordance with the criteria in section 7
of the said law and existing guidelines on land valuation.
b. All previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to
challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved
pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 6657, as amended.

Lands yet to be acquired and distributed by the DAR when RA 9700 took
effect shall be valued using RA 9700, while lands already acquired but unpaid when
RA 9700 took effect shall be valued using Sec 17 of RA 6675. The trial and appellate
courts arrived at the just compensation with due consideration for the factors

provided in Sec. 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700. Petition was

denied for lack of merit and the decision of the CA was affirmed.