1.) Valeroso v.

Court of Appeals
GR. no. 164815

Sept. 3, 2009

NACHURA, J.:
Facts: Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for the
possession of one cal. 38 Charter Arms revolver with five live ammos without
license. He pleaded not guilty. It was related that Disuanco received a dispatch
order from a desk officer to serve a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Salvador
against Valeroso for kidnapping with ransom. The team conducted surveillance.
They accosted Valeroso. However, the latter in his defense, contended that when
the officers came to his childrens Boarding house in Sagana Homes, he was forced
to the faucet while the men ransacked the room until one shouted that they found
something. He further stated that it was not done with a warrant. Contrary to the
prosecutions testimony, he was said to be arrested near the INP Central Police in
Culiat. He was found guilty by the trial court. On appeal, his sentence was lowered.
His MR was not granted.
Issue: Whether or not there is a breach of Valerosos Constitutional rights.
Ruling: Yes. The court favors the version of the Defense. Valerosos appeal is
anchored on the Constitutional right alleged to be violated thus making the
evidence against him inadmissible.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section
2, Article III of the Constitution but with certain exceptions of valid warrantless
arrest. However, in this case, such cannot be justified. For one, the warrantless
search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures
incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to to rearch and
remove from the arrestee that may be used by him to effect escape to the danger
of the officer doing the arrest and the concealment and destruction thereof. It is also
the duty of the arresting officer to search the area under his immediate control over
any weapon and also in his plain view.
In this case, it cannot be said that the area that the officers searched is in
their immediate control as the weapon was found in a locked cabinet which needed
force to be revealed. Also, it is not in plain view which could not effectively merit a
valid warrantless arrest.

2. People v. Nunez
G.R. No. 177148

June 30, 2009

QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: The operatives of St. Cruz Laguna conducted a search in the house of Raul
Nunez. They were accompanied by the Baranggay Tanod to assist in the serving of
search warrant. They showed the warrant to Nunez. They found 31 packets of
Shabu. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder,
drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were
acquired in exchange for shabu. Nunez was convicted of violating RA 6425 for
possessing the regulated drugs.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted is irregular.
Ruling: Yes. Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search,
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent: SEC. 3 . Personal property to
be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may
be seized by the authorities. In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42 specifically
authorized the taking of shabu and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle
of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be
limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there
be something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search
conducted. Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers,
electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not
encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or
manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised
their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellants
residence they believed were proceeds of the crime or means of committing the
offense. This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible.

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be

particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and
only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize

3. Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue

GR. No. 174570

Feb. 22, 2010

PERALTA, J.:
Facts: An information on the crime of Robbery was filed against Sy Tiong Gue and
others for the taking of a large amount of cash, post dated checks and other
equipments in the office of Guan Yiak Hardware in Binondo Manila belonging to Sy
Siy Ho and Sons represented by Romer S. Tan. Search warrants were applied for
stating therein the personal knowledge of the police officer of the items lost. Judge
Lanzanas Issued the Search warrants. The warrants were later served. Under
Search Warrant, three boxes containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one box
containing seven Hennessy XOs, were seized. However, the enforcement of Search
Warrant yielded negative results. Respondents filed a Motion to Quash which
petitioner opposed. The respondents received a favorable decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by RTC of
the subject search warrants.
Ruling: Yes. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property described therein and to bring it before the
court. The issuance of a search warrant is governed by Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the
following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.
Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of
a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense

has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are
in the place to be searched. It does not call for an application of rules and standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants.

4. Marimla v. People
GR. no. 158467

Oct. 16, 2009

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts: Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime
Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking
permission to search: (1) petitioners house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta.
Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta.
Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI
Lagascas request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his
personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez),
obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at
petitioners house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to seize
Shabu, Marijuana weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner, rolling papers,
and paraphernalia. Juadge Guarina found probable cause to issue the search
warrant. The officers conducted a search and found separate dried flowering tops in
different containers. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant for
it was allegedly filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the
court where the crime is committed
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders denying
petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally
Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
Ruling: No. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of
courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as
it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of
its rule-making power under the Constitution.

Rule 126 of the Criminal Prcedures on Search and Seizure states that: Sec.
2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed, (b)For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if
the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has
already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF
and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for
search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every
bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as
long as it is not inconsistent with law. We cannot find any irregularity or abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners Motion to
Quash Search Warrant.

5) Andrew Harvey vs Mirriam Defensor Santiago

G.R. No. 82544

June 28, 1988

FACTS:
A petition for Habeas Corpus. Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, both Americans, and
Adriaa Van Den Elshout (Dutch) were apprehended on 27 February 1988 from their respective
residences at Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the
CID. They were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after 3 months
of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 2 days after apprehension, or on 29
February 1988, 17 of the 22 arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country.
One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a
pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original 22, only
Harvey, et. al. have chosen to face deportation. Seized during their apprehension
were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in
salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also
posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.
They are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. On 4 March 1988,
deportation proceedings were instituted against Harvey, et. al. for being undesirable
aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case 8813). On 14 March 1988, Harvey, et. al. filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under
Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous
detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their
provisional release, the Commissioner ordered the CID doctor to examine Harvey,

et. al., who certified that the latter were healthy. On 22 March 1988, Harvey, et. al.
filed a Petition for Bail which, however, the Commissioner denied considering the
certification by the CID physician that the accused were healthy. To avoid
congestion, the Commissioner ordered Harvey, et. al.'s transfer to the CID detention
cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty
of transporting then to and from the CID where trial was on-going. On 4 April 1988,
Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a selfdeportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and
placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country."
On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of 5
days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that
the Manifestation/Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed
the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination
of
existence
of
probable
cause?
Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents?
Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners?

RULING:
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance
for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of
probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and
posters without warrant. The articles that were seized during the arrest are therefore admissible in
evidence. (Section 12, Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure).
SECTION 2 - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by a judge under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The rights granted in Section 2 are available to all persons including aliens,
whether accused of a crime or not.

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest.
2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing,
the
search
done
was
incidental
to
the
arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their
arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and
the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is
a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become
legal,
although
such
confinement
was
illegal
at
the
beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive
measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court
proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended
to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if
desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the
sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in
the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

6) Stonehill vs Diono
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

FACTS:
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their
persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons abovenamed and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business

transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

The prosecution argues that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In
short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under
the authority thereof, are valid?

RULING:
No. The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The constitution protects the peoples right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the
party
against
whom
it
is
sought
has
performed particular acts,
or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.

7) ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 170180

November 23, 2007

FACTS:
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting
the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union
together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a minibus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking
for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain
Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open

his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant
and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was
taken to the police station for further investigation.

Petitioner was found guilty by the RTC for the violation of Section 11 of RA
9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were
found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him
Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the
bus when one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the
contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the
house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During
which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal,
that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that
followed was likewise contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant
supporting the arrest and the search?
RULING:

The SC reversed the decision and acquitted the petitioner. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person may be arrested
without a warrant.

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of
these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear
to be then committing an offense.The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify
petitioners warrantless arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.Here, petitioners act
of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant

and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that
petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal
activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with
the barangay tanod when they approached him. It iss not unreasonable to expect that petitioner,
walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown
persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.

8) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, et al.

420 SCRA 280

(2004)

FACTS:
Some time on April 10, 1995, fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas,
Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC
gun ban. A motorcycle with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario),
Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were
ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which the
appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and
when appellant opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then
brought to the police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by
police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some
documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered them guilty
for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700 grams
of marijuana violated the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure?

RULING:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures

admits of certain exceptions, however. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid
for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded
as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search.
Although the
general rule
is that
motorists
and their vehicles
as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a
routine
inspection,
vehicles
maybe stopped
and extensively
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the
men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the
personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic
bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee.
In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and
even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and
nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they
passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his coappellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine
Army,
apparently
in
an
attempt
todissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed proba
blecause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that
appellants
were
offenders of the law
or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of someoffense.
As to Vinecarios allegation that his constitutional rights were violated
during the custodial investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is
relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the case at bar, the trial
court convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly those of SPO1 Hayden burge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente
Carvajal.
Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial. The defense of denial,
like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The categorical and consistent
testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong
and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely charge
appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and
unsubstantiated denial of appellants.

9.) PEOPLE v. RUBIO

G.R. No. L-35500

October 27, 1932

Facts: The chief secret service agent and a supervising agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue received a report
from a reliable source that there are prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being conducted in
Rubios house, and that he (Rubio) keeps in his possession effects and devices to wit: Fraudulent books of the
Simplex Trading Corporation & of subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation & New York Trading Corp.
Thus, a search warrant was issued. On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place indicated in
the warrant, searched the premises, and took therefrom books, invoices, and documents belonging to the Simplex
Trading Corporation of which Jose Rubio was the manager.
Rubio filed a motion to declare null and void a search warrant issued on December 26, 1930, and to have
returned to him the books of account, invoices, and records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. However, the
motion was denied.
Issues: Whether or not the search warrant was illegal?
Whether or not that the seizure of appellant's books and papers was made solely for the purpose of using
them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution and was, therefore, unlawful?
Held:

No.

The requirements of the law were substantially, and even literally, complied with in this case. Appellant's
contention that the search warrant was issued without the complainants or any witnesses having been examined, is
untenable. The depositions speak for themselves. It is also contended that the application and the warrant did not
particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified statements of the two internal revenue agents and the
warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila all describe the property sought to be seized as "fraudulent
books, invoices and records". While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in
so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. It has been held that, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized,
their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean
that no warrant could issue. Appellant has not shown that the internal revenue agents exceeded their powers under
the warranty by seizing property other than that described in the warrant question. The list of books, invoices, and
records seized by said officers is the best evidence to show that they strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by
seizing those things, and only those described in the search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, it has been shown that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed the command
of their warrant by seizing no other property than that described therein.
No.
In the first place, it is to be observed that the public has an interest in the proper regulation of appellant's
books. (Act No. 3292, section 4.) In the second place, the books belonged to a corporation of which the appellant was
simply the manager. And in the third place, the search warrant only issued on a showing of probable cause to
adopt the language alike of section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the search warrant that "fraudulent
books, invoices, and records" were "now being used in the commission of a felony." Finally, while the assertion is oftrepeated that the books, invoices, and records were taken solely for the purpose of being used as evidence against
Rubio, we find no support for this contention in the record. In the trial court, the assistant city fiscal said: "As we have
stated above, the search and seizure in this case were made under the provisions of the internal-revenue laws and
the authority of a search warrant, and not for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but with a view to seize the
instruments used in the violation of said laws committed by the defendant." On appeal, the prosecution persistently
maintains its position that the seizure was made with the object of preventing the use of the books of account,
documents, and papers in the commission of further offenses or fraud or against the Government. Not a scintilla of
evidence is to be found in the record to prove that the Government has used the books of account, documents, and
papers as evidence against the appellant, or that the Government ever had the intention of so doing. All we know is,
that an information was filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and that he
compromised another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of P100,000. On this
showing, we perforce cannot deduce that the books of account, documents, and papers were wanted solely for use
as evidence of a crime.

10.) PEOPLE v. TUAZON

532 SCRA 152
September 2, 2007

Facts: Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a confidential information that a Gemini car bearing
plate number PFC 4116 would deliver an unspecified amount ofshabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on
said tip, Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a
surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it
down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity
to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1
Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant allegedly replied it
did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3
Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno
saw five plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu.
Appellant was thereafter immediately brought to the police station.
Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment, however,
the trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict. Appellant claims
that as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the
authorities were already informed of his identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior
surveillance and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized from him should
be excluded from evidence. In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony to be
"clear and unequivocal" and should therefore prevail over appellants defense of denial. The Court of Appeals
likewise brushed aside appellants contention that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been viewed with
disfavor and has become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure was valid?

Held:

Yes.

The constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as
follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give
the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. In recognition of the
possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to justify the
warrantless search of a vehicle.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to
the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
In this case, the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by
appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision.
Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The
information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place
where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellants waist.
Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened the
polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against
appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground
that the same was obtained through a warrantless search.
11.) STEPHEN SY v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182178
August 15, 2011
Facts: PNP of the Dumaguete City Police Station received a telephone call from a concerned citizen that an illegal
drug trade was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. While walking at the pathway going to the
interior portion of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, at a distance of about two (2) meters away, they saw a man, later identified

as the [petitioner] in this case, examining a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu powder by flicking the same.
They approached the [petitioner], introduced themselves as policemen and announced his arrest for illegal
possession of dangerous drug. RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense
charged, rendered a Decision convicted petitioner of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. Upon appeal,
the CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Wether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that the right of the petitioner against unlawful
searches and seizures was not violated.
Held:

No.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Corolarilly, the 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Although probable cause eludes exact and
concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.
In the case at bar, the established facts reveal that on June 11, 2005, PO3 Faelogo, an Intelligence
Operative of the Dumaguete City Police Station, received information from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug
trade was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. Together with PO3 Paquera, PO3 Faelogo
immediately acted on the information and went to the place. While traversing the pathway going to the interior portion
of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, they saw petitioner, at a distance of two (2) meters, examining and flicking a transparent
plastic sachet containing shabu powder. The two then approached petitioner, introduced themselves as police
officers, and announced the he is being arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. While being informed of
his constitutional rights during the arrest, petitioner tried to escape by boarding his motorcycle. While wrestling with
PO3 Faelogo, petitioner dropped the sachet of shabu on the ground, which was picked up by PO3 Paquera. The
police officers eventually were able to subdue and handcuff petitioner. Upon searching his person, they also found in
his possession a disposable lighter. The seized sachet was marked on location. They then brought petitioner,
together with the items seized, to the police station and conducted a proper inventory thereof. The heat-sealed
transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug
examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug under RA No. 9165.

12.) PEOPLE v. MANUEL CRUZ

G.R. No. 187047
June 15, 2011
Facts: The prosecution witness testified that a a male informant came in with an information that a certain alias
Maning was engaged in selling illegal drugs at Sitio de Asis, Barangay San Martin de Porres, Paraaque City.
Accordingly, a buy-bust operation against alias Maning was planned and a team was formed. At around 5:00 p.m.,
the buy-bust team, together with the male informant, proceeded to the target area on board two vehicles. At this
juncture that alias Maning was arrested and was brought to the office of DAID-SOT, Southern Police District, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, for investigation and proper documentation. In the course thereof, alias Maning was
later on identified to be Manuel Cruz y Cruz, the herein appellant.
The trial court, convinced on the merits of the prosecutions case, convicted the accused with the crime of
illegal sale only. The Ca affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, and ratiocinated that accused was caught
committing the offense while he was in the act of passing the shabuto PO2 [Gallano] in exchange for P2,000.00, thus,
they were justified in arresting him and seizing the materials without warrant.
Issue:

Whether or not the arrest and seizure was lawful.

Held:

Yes.

In People v. Sembrano citing People v. Agulay, this Court held that a buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation, as in this case, deserves
judicial sanction. Moreover, in a buy-bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the same are not only authorized but also duty-bound to apprehend the violator and consequently search
him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.
In the case at bench, after the police operatives of DAID-SOT, Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig, Metro Manila, received information from their male informant regarding appellants criminal activity, an
entrapment plan was then set up. The same was made specifically to test the veracity of the informants tip and to
subsequently arrest the malefactor if the report is found to be true. The prosecutions evidence positively showed that
appellant agreed to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, who was introduced to him by the male informant. He was, in fact,
caught red-handed plying his illegal trade. Thus, the warrantless arrest of the appellant was legal and within the
confines of law. In the same breath, it cannot be doubted that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the
legitimate buy-bust operation is admissible and was properly admitted in evidence against him.
Appellants assertion that he was just framed up as the shabu seized from him was planted evidence so he
can be prosecuted for the illegal sale thereof finds no support in evidence.
13.) ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 176077
Facts: Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU received an a information about an illicit and down-right drug-trading
activities being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias
"Bokbok" and one Mic or Jojo. Immediately, a surveillance team was formed.
Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and he saw "Abe"
arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently
pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced
himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed
over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio
immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets of shabu to
their headquarters. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old. Thus, an
information was filed against the accused, and upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
The RTC convicted the accused with the crime of illegal possession of drugs which the CA affirmed in toto
upon appeal. Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic
sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason
for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. He also posits that

peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine,
rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
Issue: Whether or not peeping through a curtain is within the meaning of plain view doctrine as to justify the arrest
of the accused and the seizing of the sachets.
Held:

Yes.

Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried
out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is
subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely: 1.) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2.) Search of
evidence in "plain view"; 3.) Search of a moving vehicle; 4.) Consented warrantless search; 5.) Customs search; 6.)
Stop and Frisk; and 7.) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain
sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure
made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it
also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since
petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence
seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in
plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove
petitioners guilt of the offense charged.
14.) PEOPLE v. ROLANDO DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 174774
August 31, 2011
Facts: The arresting officers of the Intelligence and Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group of the National
Capital Region Police Office a confidential informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to commence at the
vicinity of the parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City. The officers went there and positioned
themselves for the operation. Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a white Toyota Corolla, and delos Reyes, a.k.a.
"Botong," on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside
Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and delos Reyes calling de Claro through his cellular phone; that
accused/respondent delos Reyes and de Claro then proceeded to the latters parked Mazda car where respondent
Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was taken, which de Claro handedover to delos Reyes, the latter in turn handed the box in a plastic bag to Reyes.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by the
RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged.
De los Reyes and Reyes alleged that the arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the
exceptional circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested
without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant and not because of any apparent criminal activity.
A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and seizure incidental thereto. Thus, the
shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence. Further, accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes testified that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate themselves for possession of
shabu.

Issue:

Whether

Held:

No.

or

not

the

seizure

of

the

shabu

was

incident

to

lawful

arrest?

Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible
in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations.
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest
effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
The police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched the latters persons without a warrant after
seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the
white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accusedappellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly
constitute overt acts "indicative of a felonious enterprise." SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior
knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the
suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that the
confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the
arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession,
contained shabu. The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have
reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and
Lantion-Tom "has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal
drug deal.

15. People of the Philippines vs PO2 Froilan Trestiza

GR no. 193833
November 16, 2011
Facts: Accused PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique,
both active members of the Philippine National Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a
private individual, all of them armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with one PO2 [Reynel] Jose, a member of the
Philippine National Police, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap Lawrence Yu y and Maria Irma Navarro, or otherwise deprive them of their
liberty by then and there kidnap without legal grounds for the purpose of extorting
money for their safety and immediate release as in fact said accused demanded the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as ransom money from them.
Pineda had been contacting Yu to follow up on the balance on the ransom. Pineda

was then arrested pursuant to an entrapment operation conducted in the early

morning at New World Hotel. During the investigation at Camp Crame, Pineda
revealed that Trestiza could be found at Club 5 in Makati. Pineda and Yu
accompanied the arresting team to Club 5. Yu pointed out Trestiza to the arresting
team while Trestiza was on his way to his black Hummer.

Issue: WON there is a valid warrantless arrest

Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances when warrantless arrests are lawful.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is clear that Trestizas warrantless arrest does not fall under any of the
circumstances mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113. However, Trestiza failed to make a
valid objection to his warrantless arrest.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.45 Trestiza, being a
policeman himself, could have immediately objected to his warrantless arrest.
However, he merely asked for the grounds for his arrest. He did not even file
charges against the arresting officers. There was also a lengthy amount of time
between Trestizas arrest on 16 November 2002 and the filing of the Omnibus
Motion objecting to Trestizas warrantless arrest on 11 May 2004. Although it may
be argued that the objection was raised prior to the entry of Trestizas plea of not

guilty in the kidnapping for ransom charge, it must be noted that the circumstances
of the present case make us rule otherwise. Trestiza was charged with two crimes at
the time of his arrest: kidnapping with ransom under Criminal Case No. 02-3393 and
illegal possession of firearms under Criminal Case No. 02-3394. Trestiza did not
question the legality of his warrantless arrest nor the acquisition of jurisdiction of
the trial court over his person, and fully participated in the hearing of the illegal
possession of firearms case. Thus, Trestiza is deemed to have waived any objection
to his warrantless arrest. Under the circumstances, Trestizas Omnibus Motion in the
kidnapping for ransom case is a mere afterthought and cannot be considered as a
timely objection.

16. Ison vs Galvez, Jr.

G.R. No. 173951
April 16, 2012
Facts: A Contract of Employment was entered into by and between petitioner and
respondents whereby the former agreed to work as Cook A for the latter on board
M.V. Stadt Kiel for a period of 12 months at a basic monthly salary of US$550.00.

Said contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

(POEA).
After his pre-employment medical examination, petitioner boarded the vessel in
November 1999. During the course of his employment, however, petitioner
experienced chest pains and leg cramps. Thus, when the vessel reached Miami,
Florida, he was sent to Sunshine Medical Center for a medical check-up,
electrocardiogram (ECG) and chest x-ray. The tests revealed abnormal findings with
the corresponding recommendation that petitioner consult a cardiologist.[8]
Petitioner was thereafter medically repatriated on June 24, 2000.
Upon repatriation, petitioner was referred to respondents physician at El Roi
Diagnostic Center for a medical examination and was diagnosed to be suffering
from enlargement of the heart and hypertension. For two months, he underwent a
series of treatment at respondents expense. On August 25, 2000, petitioner was
declared fit to return to work since the diagnosis of the company-designated
physician already showed controlled hypertension with the concomitant advice,
however, of continuous medication for life. Petitioner thereafter executed on
September 8, 2000, a release and quitclaim in favor of respondents wherein he
acknowledged receipt of US$1,136.67 corresponding to his sickness allowance,
thereby releasing his employer from future claims and actions.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC to claim full disability benefits.
Petitioner claimed that his illness continued to worsen despite the fit to work
assessment of the company-designated physician, rendering him unfit for sea
service and entitling him to total and permanent disability compensation.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that petitioner is not entitled to any
disability compensation as he was declared fit to return to work as a seaman on
August 25, 2000 after undergoing two months of medical treatment at respondents
expense. Respondents further claimed to have settled its obligation to petitioner
when the latter received the amount of $1,136.67 as full settlement of his claims
including sickness allowance, as evidenced by a release and quitclaim duly
executed and signed by him.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of petitioner considering that the
certifications he presented do not outweigh the company-designated physicians fit
to work assessment. According to the Labor Arbiter, the certifications of disability
issued by petitioners physicians were made long after he was declared fit to work
and were based only on petitioners single consultation with each of them. In
contrast, respondents dutifully complied with their obligations under the
employment contract by providing petitioner with medical assistance at the foreign
port, repatriating him at their expense, providing him with medical examination and
treatment, paying his sickness allowance, and assessing him to be fit to return to

work. The claims for damages and attorneys fees were also denied.
The NLRC disregarded the certification of fitness to work issued by the companydesignated physician since it found petitioners subsequent consultations with Drs.
Vicaldo and Caja as proof of the severity of petitioners illness. The NLRC went on to
declare that petitioners poor health condition, which required close monitoring and
continuous medication, resulted to the impairment of his earning capacity thereby
entitling him to disability benefits.
The CA issued a TRO enjoining the NLRC from enforcing the following issuances: a)
NLRC Decision dated February 26, 2004; b) NLRC Decision dated August 24, 2004;
c) NLRC Resolution dated February 28, 2005; and d) Writ of Execution issued by the
Labor Arbiter on May 31, 2005 in NLRC NCR OFW 01-11-2316-00. Thereafter, on
September 28, 2005, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued upon respondents
posting of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00.
The CA then rendered its Decision[22] on February 17, 2006. It found merit in the
petition and ruled that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in relying on the
certification issued by Dr. Caja instead of the fit to work declaration of the companydesignated physician who, under the POEA-SEC, is the one tasked to assess
petitioners medical condition for purposes of claiming disability compensation.
Besides, the medical certificate of Dr. Caja cannot be considered as an accurate
assessment of the illness contracted by petitioner during the course of his
employment with respondents. It was based merely on the statements given to Dr.
Caja by petitioner and same did not even provide for any justification for the rating
given. Also, the certification was made 10 months from the date petitioner was
declared fit to work and almost one year from the date of his repatriation. And the
most notable of all, petitioner consulted Dr. Caja only once. With regard to the
release and quitclaim, the CA upheld the same considering that it was voluntarily
executed by petitioner and that the consideration for its issuance was not
unconscionable and unreasonable. It ruled that respondents were already released
from liability when petitioner was declared fit to return to work and after they paid
him sickness allowance for which he even executed a quitclaim.

Issue: WON the ruling of the CA is correct

Held: We hold that the CA is correct in ruling thus. The company-designated

physician has cleared petitioner for employment resumption after two months of
continuous treatment and after medication has successfully controlled his
hypertension. As aptly held by the CA, the extensive medical attention given by the
company-designated physician to petitioner enabled the former to acquire a
detailed knowledge and familiarity of petitioners medical condition. This enabled

the company-designated physician to arrive at a more accurate prognosis of

petitioners disability as compared to other physicians not privy to petitioners case
from the beginning. It has been held that the doctor who have had a personal
knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and
regularly monitored and actually treated the seamans illness, is more qualified to
assess the seamans disability.
On the other hand, the medical reports of Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Caja were issued after
petitioner consulted each of them only once. Clearly, said physicians did not have
the chance to closely monitor petitioners illness. Moreover, Dr. Vicaldos evaluation
of petitioners illness was unsupported by any proof or basis. While he diagnosed
petitioner to be suffering from Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Concentric
Left Ventricular Hypertrophy, Lateral Wall Ischemic and suggested an Impediment
Grade V (58-96%), no justification for such assessment was provided for in the
medical certificate he issued. Similarly, Dr. Cajas medical report contained no
supporting proof but was rather based on the findings of past examinations done by
the company-designated physician, as well as on the statements supplied to her by
the petitioner. In Coastal Safety Marine Services Inc. v. Esguerra,[35] this Court
brushed aside the medical certifications upon which the seaman therein anchored
his claim for disability benefits for being unsupported by diagnostic tests and
procedures as would effectively dispute the results of the medical examination
earlier made upon him in a foreign clinic referred by his employer.
Likewise significant is the fact that it took petitioner more than a year before
disputing the declaration of fitness to work by the company-designated physician.
Petitioner filed a claim for disability benefit on the basis of Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Cajas
medical certifications which were issued after five and 10 months, respectively,
from the company-designated physicians declaration of fit to work. Unfortunately,
apart from the reasons already stated, these certifications could not be given any
credence as petitioners health condition could have changed during the interim
period due to different factors such as petitioners poor compliance with his
medications as in fact mentioned by Dr. Caja in the medical certificate she issued.
As such, the said medical certifications cannot effectively controvert the fit to work
assessment earlier made.
NO. 17
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting
surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search
warrant from the RTC, went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search
warrant to petitioner. Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid. , SPO3 Masnayon
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of

his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail. He guarded the place while his
men went to get assistance of a barangay tanod. They searched the place,
including the nipa hut, and found nothing but one of the barangay tanods was able
to confiscate from the nipa hut several plastics packs of shabu. Castillo was
charged of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. In is defense, he claimed that he
was outside that day working and that he learned from his wife that police
operatives searched his house and found nothing. He added that the nipa hut, 20
meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by
his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father. RTC found him
guilty and the CA affirmed the latters decision. He filed a petition for certiorari and
argued that the evidence gathered were inadmissible against him because the nipa
hut is no longer within the permissible area that may be searched by the police
officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the same
nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argued
that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is
applicable only against government authorities and not to private individuals such
as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of shabu inside
the nipa hut.
Issue: Whether the four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are
admissible in evidence against him?
Ruling: No. It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it
to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the present case, Search Warrant pecifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items
were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence
of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than
the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of
petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the
same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority (. Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code). The Local Government Code also contains a
provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons
in authority.
Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence. Acquitted.
NO. 18
SEC, NBI, DOJ NATIONAL v. RIZZA G. MENDOZA, CARLITO LEE, GRESHIELA
G. COMPENDIO, RAUL RIVERA, REY BELTRAN, REX ALMOJUELA, LINDA P.

CAPALUNGAN, HILDA R. RONQUILLO, MA. LODA CALMA, TERESITA P.

ALMOJUELA, RUFINA ABAD and AMADOR A. PASTRANA.
(G.R. No. 170425 April 23, 2012)
ABAD, J.:
Facts: the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, issued search
warrant covering documents and articles found at the offices of Amador Pastrana
and Rufina Abad upon application by NBI as these were used to violate Republic Act
8799, also known as the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), and commit estafa. NBI
searched the described documents and shortly after filed criminal complaint
against Mendoza, Pastrana, Abad, et al for violation of SRC. Simultaneously,
Mendoza filed a petition for prohibition and injunction before RTC of Muntinlupa ,
and Pastrana and Abad filed a Motion to Quash the subject search warrant.
RTC Muntinlupa Case:
Mendoza, et al. alleged that NBI and SEC violated Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure,[5] which required the officers who conducted the seizure to
immediately turn over the seized items to the issuing court as it took them three
months after the search and seizure to turn over the documents. They feared that
the seized articles may have already been tampered with, altered, or augmented by
those responsible for seizing them. Opposing the petition, the SEC, the NBI, and the
DOJ (the three agencies) averred that injunction may not be issued as Mendoza, et
al. should have exhausted administrative remedies available to them at the DOJ.
Writ of Preliminary of Injunction was issued. The three agencies appealed with CA.
RTC Makati Case:
Pastrana and Abad filed with the Makati RTC a motion to quash the subject search
warrant for having been issued in connection with several offenses when the Rules
of Criminal Procedure[9] require its issuance for only one specific offense. Makati RTC
rendered a decision nullifying the search warrant it issued and declaring the
documents and articles seized under it inadmissible in evidence.
CAs Decision:
For some reason, the CA did not mention the Makati RTC order and did not dismiss
the petition before it on ground of mootness. CA rendered judgment, denied the
three agencies petition, and affirmed the orders of the Muntinlupa RTC. Hence, they
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Muntinlupa RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al.s injunction action?
Ruling: Yes. Questions concerning both 1) the issuance of the search
warrant and 2) the suppression of evidence seized under it are matters
that can be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present case, no
criminal action has in the meantime been filed in court. Thus:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress

evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant
and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If
no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed
in and resolved by the court that issued the search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be
resolved by the latter court.
But the rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search warrant
proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It is not correct to
say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can
question its issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized under it. The
proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an
action where a party complains of a violation of his right by another.
Dispositive: the Court REVERSED the decision of the and ORDERED the dismissal
of the action for prohibition and injunction that respondents Mendoza et al, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the same.
NO. 19
MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .
(G.R. No. 191532 August 15, 2012)
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal DrugSpecial Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a
police informant that a certain Abdullah Sultan and his wife Ina Aderp was engaged
in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City. The
buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao.
Sultan run away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2
Masi and PO1 Mateo pursued him. In the course of the chase, Sultan led the said
police officers to his house; that inside the house, the police operatives found
Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session hence they were arrested. Ambre
and her co-accused were charge of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia and
illegal use of prohibited drugs (shabu). Ambre plead not guilty and defended that
she was inside the compound to buy malong then few minutes later the policemen
barged in and arrested her. RTC acquitted amber for the charge of illegal possession
but was found guilty for the illegal use of prohibited drugs. CA affirmed said
decision. Hence this petition.
Issues: Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was
valid? Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence?
Ruling: Yes and yes.

Syllabus: The Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be

carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the
recognized exception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful
arrest.15 In this exception, the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed
an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a
valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Application: In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught
by the police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested
without a warrant. Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior
lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even
granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in
the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of Ambre, who was
seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers.
The Court holds that Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest
for not raising them before entering her plea. 18
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search
and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate

warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those
that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

No. 20
HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION and HYMAN YAP v.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCETELEPHONE COMPANY (G.R. No. 170217)
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. HPS SOFTWARE AND
COMMUNICATION CORPORATION including its Incorporators, Directors,
Officers (G.R. No. 170694)
(December 10, 2012)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts: Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) applied for the
issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code for Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for
unauthorized installation of telephone communication equipments following
the complaint of the PLDT that they were able to monitor the use of the
respondents in their premises of Mabuhay card and equipments capable of
receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to the Philippines without these
calls passing through the facilities of PLDT. Complainants witnesses
conducted a test call using Mabuhay Card and discovered in the course of
their test calls that PLDT telephone lines/numbers were identified as the
calling party. They testified that the test calls passing through the Mabuhay
Card were being reflected as local calls only and not overseas calls thus
making the international long distance calls appear as local calls, to the
damage and prejudice of PLDT which is deprived of revenues as a result
thereof. They discovered that the lines were subscribed by Philip Yap whose
address is HPS Software Communication Corporation. The trial court issued
the search warrant and it was implemented. Subsequently, corresponding
information filed against HPS and Yap.
Yap filed a Motion to Quash and/or Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence. HPS
Corporation filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return. Both
pleadings sought to quash the search warrants at issue on the grounds that
the same did not refer to a specific offense, that there was no probable
cause, and that the search warrants were general warrants and were wrongly
implemented. Before PLDT could submit its memorandum, RTC granted to
quash the search warrant and return the things seized. Hence PLDT filed
separate notice of appeal and certiorari.
PLDTs Appeal: PLDT argued that two search warrants were improperly quashed. CA
affirmed the decision of RTC. CA concluded that no test calls using the same
Mabuhay card were actually made by PLDTs witnesses when it applied for a
search warrant against HPS C, otherwise, the Mabuhay card should have had
less than $10.00 value left in it before it was used in the test calls conducted

at the NTC-Region VII office and in open court. Hence, this petition for
certiorari by PLDT (G.R. No. 170694).
PLDTs Certiorari: PLDT alleged that they weres deprived of due process when the
trial court expeditiously released the items seized by virtue of the subject
search warrants without waiting for PLDT to file its memorandum and despite
the fact that the order was not yet final and executory. CA resolved in favor of
PLDT. HPS MR denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari by HPS (G.R. No.
170217).
Issues: (1) Whether the two search warrants were improperly quashed? (2)Whether
the subject warrants are in the nature of general warrants? (3) Whether the
release of the items seized by virtues of the subject search warrants was
proper?

Ruling:
(1) Whether the two search warrants were improperly quashed? Yes.
Syllabus:
This Court has consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant
rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be
seized. Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search
warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as
will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means
taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
that offense are in the place to be searched.
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,53 this Court held that the
quantum of evidence required to prove probable cause is not the
same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof beyond
reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be
subsequently filed. We ruled in this case that:
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application
of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, probable
cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown
trial.

Application:
This Court cannot subscribe to CAs hasty conclusion because the determination of
whether or not test calls were indeed made by PLDT on Mabuhay card cannot
be ascertained solely by checking the value reflected on the aforementioned
Mabuhay card. In fact, reliance on this method of verification is fraught with
questions that strike deep into the capability of the said Mabuhay card to
automatically and accurately reflect the fact that it had indeed been used by
PLDTs witnesses to make test calls. PLDT never represented that the
Mabuhay card had an accurate recording system that would automatically
deduct the value of a call from the value of the card at the time the call was
made. Certainly, PLDT was not in a position to make such an assertion as it
did not have a hand in the production and programming of said Mabuhay
card.
(2) Whether the subject warrants are in the nature of general warrants?
No.
Syllabus:
A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be
valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is
proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution. In Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, we explained the purpose of the aforementioned
requirement for a valid search warrant, to wit:
[A] search warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent
of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant x x x what articles
they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures
may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. x x x
Application:
This Court finds that the subject search warrants are not general warrants because
the items to be seized were sufficiently identified physically and were also
specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged which
are Theft and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of
illegal ISR activities.
(3) Whether the release of the items seized by virtues of the subject
search warrants was proper? No.
As properly pointed out by PLDT, Order of the respondent judge is not immediately
executory. It is a final order which disposes of the action or proceeding and
which may be the subject of an appeal. From the foregoing, it is clear that
execution may issue only upon motion by a party and only upon the
expiration of the period to appeal, if no appeal has been perfected.
Otherwise, if an appeal has been duly perfected, the parties would have to
wait for the final resolution of the appeal before it may execute the judgment

or final order except for instances where an execution pending appeal is

granted by the proper court of law.
Dispositive: Petition for Certiorari by HPS was denied. Petition for Certiorari by
PLDT granted.

21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ,

Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 173474

August 29, 2012

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: On March 22, 1999, at 11 oclock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina,
received a call from a male person who refused to identify himself. The caller tipped
himm off about a roberry to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila. Thereafter
he was immediately order to form a team, they positioned themselves to aforesaid
street and spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate. The
team pursued the driver, which is Belocura, signaled him to stop but was ignored
and sped off the car. Later, the team was able to blocked Becolo's path and they
approach Belocura. Duvina and his team querried Belocura about the plate no.,
confiscated his pistolthat was tucked in his waist and arrested him. SPO2 Santos
searched the jeep and recovered a red plastic bag containing a marijuana wrapped
in newspaper. On the other hand, Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks
of marijuana, saying that he only sees the marijuana for the first time in the court.
On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the bricks of
marijuana whether at the time of his arrest, or at the police precinct, or during the
inquest proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that while the drivers seat were fixed
to the jeep, the bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the drivers
seat only if pressed hard enough, but in that case the wrappings would get torn
because the wirings of the car underneath the seat were exposed. He recalled that
the wrappings of the bricks of marijuana were intact.
RTC convicted Belocura. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Belocura
argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the
incriminating bricks of marijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights
under the Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on
the illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no
probable cause to search his vehicle for anything.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search on Belocura's jeep was legal.

RULING: YES. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and

seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court;19 (b) seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle;
(d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations
(Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency circumstances.20 In these
exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No.
4139 (The Land Transportation and Traffic Code). In flagrante delicto means in the
very act of committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily
implies the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses.
Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." Even by his own
admission, he was actually committing a crime in the presence or within the view of
the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell
under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was
valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the
authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he
might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be
used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within
his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The
evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen
from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the
warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.

( wag niyo po sama to... for info of the case lang acquitted po si Belocura because
prosecution fail to prove the chain of custody. Kulang po yung evidence nila na sa
kanya nga yung marijuana.
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of
marijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from Belocuras jeep following his
arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence
in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the
specimens of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the
same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of
custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented
as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt

demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus

delicti the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited
substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established
^_^)

22. CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO., V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

LING NA LAU
G.R. No. 188526

November 11, 2013

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style
Worldwide Pharmacy, is the sole distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP
GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap for a period of ten years. Her
representative, Ping Na Lau, (Ping) wrote a letter addressed to National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), requesting assistance for an investigation on several drugstores
which were selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the general
appearance of their products. NBI found that the request of Ping was true and from
a list of drugstores who sells the whitening soap was included herein petitioners
Century Chinese Medicine Co., NBI applied for the issuance of search warrants
before RTC, Branch 143, Makati City, against petitioners and other establishments
for violations Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Section 168, in relation to
Section 170, penalizes unfair competition; while Section 155, in relation to Section
170, punishes trademark infringement. RTC granted the search warrants.
petitioners collectively filed their Motion to Quash the Search Warrants. Thereafter,
compromise agreement entered between petitioner and ping, which was approved.
Meanwhile, the Motion to quash filed by petitioner was sustain. In quashing the
search warrants, the RTC applied the Rules on Search and Seizure for Civil Action in
Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights. That at the time of the filing of the
application for the search warrants, there is yet no determination of the alleged
right of respondent over the subject trademark/tradename. On appeal, CA reversed
the RTCs ruling. In reversing the RTC's quashal of the search warrants, the CA found
that the search warrants were applied for and issued for violations of Sections 155
and 168, in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code and that the
applications for the search warrants were in anticipation of criminal actions which
are to be instituted against petitioners; thus, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure was applicable. It also ruled that the basis for the applications for
issuance of the search warrants on grounds of trademarks infringement and unfair
competition was the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; that respondent

was the registered owner of the said trademark, which gave her the right to enforce
and protect her intellectual property rights over it by seeking assistance from the
NBI. Hence, this petition. Petitioners next contend that the CA's ruling on the
applicability of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that the search warrants were issued
in anticipation of a criminal action was only based on respondent's claim which was
only brought for the first time in her appellant's brief

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search
warrants.

RULING: NO. A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of
a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place to be searched."26 And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to
facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he
may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified,
the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance
being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.
It bears stressing that the basis for the applications for issuances of the search
warrants on grounds of trademark infringement and unfair competition is the
trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Private complainant-appellant was
issued a Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881 of said trademark on August
24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office, and is thus considered the lawful holder
of the said trademark. Being the registrant and the holder of the same, private
complainant-appellant had the authority to enforce and protect her intellectual
property rights over it. This prompted her to request for assistance from the agents
of the NBI, who thereafter conducted a series of investigation, test buys and
inspection regarding the alleged trademark infringement by herein respondentsappellees. Subsequently, Ping Na Lau, private complainant-appellants
representative, issued a certification with the finding that the examined goods were
counterfeit. This prompted the NBI agents to apply for the issuances of search
warrants against the respondents-appellees. Said applications for the search
warrants were granted after by Judge Laguilles after examining under oath the
applicant Agent Furing of the NBI and his witnesses Ping Na Lau and Junayd R.
Ismael.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the
search warrants had been complied with and that there is probable cause to believe
that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with

the offense were in the places to be searched. The offense pertains to the alleged
violations committed by respondents-appellees upon the intellectual property rights
of herein private complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF under Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881, issued on
August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office

23. RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON V.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 198694

February 13, 2013

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS: At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque
(PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta),
who wereall assigned tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate
Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit
Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?" For purportedly violating Manila City Ordinance which
punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as Ramon,was
apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In the course thereof, the police
officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet which later
examined as a shabu. Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of
dangerous drugs. In defense, Ramon denied the charge and narrated that while
walking, he was approached by civilian asriving if he is Ramon Goco.Upon affirming
his identity he was immediately handcuffed. The RTC convicted him. On appeal, CA
affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search as a result of a warrantless arrest is valid.

RULING: NO. A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one
that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court14 which requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause to arresta person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure,the term
probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious

man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.

To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place,

with many people conversing with each other on the street, would constitute any of
the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance as abovequoted. Ramon was not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance,
or breach of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using personal violence
upon another; and, the words he allegedly shouted "Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?" are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could
not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of
the incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and alive with activity.

Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the warantless
search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly
seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the (unreadable portion)

24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA

G.R. No. 191263

October 16, 2013

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Marilyn Trayvilla (Trayvilla), while performing her duty as a female frisker
assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I (domestic airport) in Pasay City,
frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area 4 and she noticed
something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidias buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia
answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual
thickness.5Not convinced with Cadidias explanation, Trayvilla and her female coemployee Leilani M. Bagsican (Bagsican) brought the accused to the comfort room
inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to
remove her underwear, they discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu. On
the other hand, Candidas version, she proceeded to the departure area of the
domestic. When she passed-by the x-ray machine, two women, whom she later
identified as Trayvilla and Bagsican, apprehended her. Trayvilla and Bagsican held
her arms and asked her if she was a Muslim. When she replied in the affirmative,

the two women said that she might be carrying gold or jewelries. Despite her denial,
Trayvilla and Bagsican brought her to the comfort room and told her she might be
carrying shabu. She again denied the allegation but the two women told her to
undress. When she asked why, they answered that her back was bulging. In reply,
she told them that she was having her menstrual period. Trayvilla and Bagsican did
not believe her and proceeded to ask her to remove her underwear. They later
frisked her body but failed to recover anything. Thereafter, the two women asked
for money as they allegedly recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from
her. RTC found him guilty of charged. On a ppeal, CA affirmed the decision. Hence,
this review.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid searched.

RULING: YES. airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure

As held in similar cases of People v Johnson and People v Canton, this Court affirmed
the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of
drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in their body illegal drugs upon
airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the validity of
airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure or their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism
has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to hoard
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity or the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed. travellers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that the are
subject to search and. if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would he subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures

25. G.R. No. 161106

January 13, 2014

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 161266
PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ:

Facts: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special
Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for
warrants before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of
petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza
Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of
petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN 2103, 21/F
Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.
The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401
(Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the
National Capital Region Police Office.
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were
in the nature of general warrants. Thus, the properties (cables, modems, computers,
antennas and much more) seized under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.
The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search
warrants valid and effective
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDTs appeal despite the
following procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to
question the quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: NO CA did not err. 1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved
party personality to question an order quashing search warrants.

a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but

by the filing of an application therefor. The general rule is that under sec 5 rule 110
ROC; the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search
warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the
filing of an application therefor.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the
filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of
an appeal. So appeal was valid

26.

G.R. No. 203028

January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSELITO BERAN y ZAPANTA @ "Jose", Accused-Appellant.
REYES, J.:

On or about August 26, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer
for sale to a poseur buyer one (1) pc. plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO
THREE ZERO (0.030) gram of white crystalline substance known as SHABU
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drugs:
According to the prosecution, between three and four o'clock in the afternoon of August 26, 2003,4 a
confidential informant (CI) went to the District Anti-Illegal Drug (DAID) Office of the Western Police District
(WPD) at the United Nations Avenue, Manila, and approached Police Officer 3 (PO3) Rodolfo Enderina
(Enderina) to report that a certain Joselito Beran, alias "Jose," a pedicab driver, was selling prohibited
drugs, particularly "shabu," in the vicinity of San Antonio Street in Tondo, Manila. P03 Enderina relayed the
information to Police Colonel Marcelino Pedroso, Chief of DAID-WPD, who then ordered him to form a buybust team to apprehend the suspect. At around 5 :00 p.m., the buy-bust team, composed of PO3 Enderina,
PO3 Hipolito Francia, PO3 Benito Decorion (Decorion), PO2 Ernie Reyes, PO2 Alexander Delos Santos (Delos
Santos) and PO3 Knowme Sia (Sia), who was to act as the poseur-buyer, arrived in Tondo on board an
owner-type jeep and two scooters. In the jeep were PO3 Enderina, PO2 Delos Santos, and the CI, while the
rest of the team rode in the scooters. They parked near the Gat Andres Hospital and proceeded on foot
towards San Antonio Street. As arranged, PO3 Sia and the CI walked ahead of the others. PO3 Sia and the
CI reached the target area first, and there the CI saw Beran standing some 10 meters away near a ''poso"
or deep-well.
After recognizing and pointing Beran to PO3 Sia, the CI approached him and the two men conversed briefly.
Then the CI signaled to PO3 Sia to join them, and he introduced PO3 Sia to Beran, who then asked the CI
how much PO3 Sia was buying. The CI replied, ''piso lang," or P100, and Beran took out something from his
pocket, a small, heat-sealed plastic sachet, which he then handed to PO3 Sia. PO3 Sia took the sachet and
pretended to examine it discretely, after which he indicated to Beran that he was satisfied with its content.
He then took out a marked P100 bill which he handed to Beran; all this time the back-up members of the
buy-bust team were watching from strategic locations around the vicinity.
Thereupon, PO3 Sia executed the pre-arranged signal of touching his hair to signify to the back-up
cops that the buy-bust sale of shabu had been consummated, even as he then placed Beran under arrest.
The back-up operatives quickly converged upon Beran, with PO2 Delos Santos arriving first, to whom PO3
Sia then handed over the custody of Beran, while he kept the plastic sachet. The buy-bust team brought
Beran to the DAID-WPD office, where PO3 Sia marked the confiscated plastic sachet with the initials of
Beran, JB. He also recorded the incident in the police blotter, and accomplished the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report (Exhibit F and F-1), and the Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit G and G-1. He later
brought the seized plastic sachet to the WPD Crime Laboratory for examination, where after testing it was
found to contain the prohibited drug methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.5
In his defense, Beran vehemently denied the above incident. Testifying alone in his defense, he
asserted that on August 26, 2003 at around 2:00 p.m., while he was resting alone upstairs in his house,
five WPD policemen arrived and ordered him to come with them. He resisted and asked why they were
arresting him, but without apprising him of his constitutional rights they handcuffed and forcibly boarded
him in an owner-type jeep and brought him to the WPD Headquarters. There, two of his arrestors, PO3
Francia and PO3 Sia, demanded from him the amount of P20,000.00 in exchange for his release without

any charge. But he could not produce the amount they asked, and they trumped up a charge against him
of illegal sale of shabu.6
The trial of Beran took all of seven years to wind up, mainly on account of many postponements
allegedly due to supervening illnesses or reassignments of the subpoenaed arresting officers. The
prosecution was able to present two witnesses, PO3 Francia and PO3 Sia, but only PO3 Sia gave a witness
account of the drug buy-bust itself. PO3 Francia admitted that he served as a mere look-out to prevent any
intruder from interfering in the buy-bust operation, and that he did not witness the buy-bust transaction
itself. As for PO3 Decorion, also a member of the buy-bust team, the RTC per its Order7 dated July 29, 2009
agreed to dispense with his testimony after the parties stipulated that as the designated driver of the buybust team, he did not see the actual exchange of drug and money between Beran and PO3 Sia, nor did he
witness the actual arrest of Beran by PO3 Sia.

Ruling convicted Beran of Life imprisonment. CA affirmed and ruled that Beran was
caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a valid and legitimate buy-bust operation,
an entrapment to apprehend law breakers while in the act of executing their
criminal plan. CA Relying solely on the testimony of PO3 Sia.
CA further held that the arrest of Beran by PO3 Sia without warrant was valid under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides
that "a police officer or a private person may, without a warrant arrest a person
when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it." It also cited Section 5(a) of Rule 113, wherein it provides
that "a police officer can arrest a person without warrant when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense."
ISSUE: Whether, to establish the corpus delicti the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drug have been preserved in an unbroken chain of custody.
HELD: NO. SC found no unbroken chain of custody, and we rule that the prosecution
failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the crime charged. Beran must be set
free. Evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachet cast
reasonable doubt on its integrity.
The RTC and CA both convicted Beran on the basis alone of the uncorroborated
testimony of PO3 Sia, and despite the buy-bust team s unexplained non-observance
of the procedures laid down in Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165
(about the photography and Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment)
Also, the operatives rode in separate vehicles on the trip back to the WPD, and PO3
Sia took a scooter with another teammate, who could then have attested as to his
exclusive custody of the subject drug, but that person was not presented to affirm

this fact. So even granting that P03 Sia did mark the same sachet at the precinct,
breaks in the chain of custody had already taken place, first, when he confiscated it
from Beran without anyone observing him do so and without marking the subject
sachet at the place of apprehension, and then as he was transporting it to the
precinct, thus casting serious doubt upon the value of the said links to prove the
corpus delicti.
It has been held that "while a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible
to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the
prosecution of drug cases owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange.

27.

G.R. No. 176830

February 11, 2014

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as
Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185587
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-inCharge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 185636
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-inCharge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 190005
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
SERENO, CJ.:

Facts: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed
to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.
As a result warrants of arrest were given to the 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with
several other unnamed members.
ISSUE: 1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. W/N the warrant was legal
HELD: 1. NO. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to
be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own side of
the story cannot claim denial of due process.

The respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address
for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they
could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas.
On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and
Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and
Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given
an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas
on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due
process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their
last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the
attached documents or evidence.
2. YES. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly
examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have
inevitably dismissed the charge against them. The determination of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound
discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge as long as there is no grave abuse of
discretion. Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for
the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining
the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest. Because there is another way the
examination of the prosecutors report.
G.R. No. 203335

February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203299
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203306
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI "TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY
LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359
SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R. BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203391
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA. KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN,
ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203407
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists
of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND R. GAITE,
Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B. MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's Party,
ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE
LIMA, Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology
Office, NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the Philippine National
Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203440
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN
(all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center), Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE
MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The
DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of the Executive Department of Government), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203453
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY,
ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-PETITION
http://www.nujp.org/no-to-ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING
UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203454
PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203469
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN; JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO;
AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A.
HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT
RUBEN B. LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; HON.
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief,
Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203501
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official
capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official
capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203509
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203515
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT
INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO
LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIO, NOEMI
LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES, JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR.,
LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L.
TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND
COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.

DISINI CASE multiple cases consolidated

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cyber crime prevention act was enacted in 2012 petitioners claim that the
means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on

February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining
order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
The petitioners asked for certain provisions (with regard to our subject criminal
procedure) be unconstitutional:
ISSUE WON the pertinent such provisions violate criminal procedure/constitutional
law on searches and seizures.
HELD:
Section 12 unconstitutional that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic
data in real-time unconstitutional. RATIO: when seemingly random bits of traffic
data are gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of
activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons under
surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a persons
close associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences.
Such information is likely beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and
clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. Section 12 does not
even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a
particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of
data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or
block access to suspected Computer Data.- unconstitutional RATIO: The content of
the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates
as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all
forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds,
declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize
content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for
him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would
make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.
Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued
warrant constitutional RATIO: The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened
to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the issuance of
subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue
subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power
to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data
under a court-issued warrant

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
naccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.

constitutional
RATIO: Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will
supplant established search and seizure procedures. On its face, however, Section
15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure
the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have
been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose
any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does
not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements
them.

29.
PLDT Co. vs. Alvarez
718 SCRA 54
G R No 179408, March 5, 2014
Brion, J:
FACTS:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the grantee of a
legislative franchise which authorizes it to carry on the business of providing
basic and enhanced telecommunications services in and between areas in
the Philippines and between the Philippines and other countries and
territories. PLDTs network is principally composed of the Public Switch
Telephone Network, telephone handsets and/or telecommunications
equipment used by its subscribers, the wires and cables linking these
handsets and/or equipment, antennae, transmission facilities, the
international gateway facility (IGF) and other telecommunications equipment
providing interconnections. To safeguard the integrity of its network, PLDT
regularly conducts investigations on various prepaid cards marketed and sold
abroad to determine alternative calling patterns (ACP) and network fraud
that are being perpetrated against it.
To prevent or stop network fraud, PLDTs ACP Detection Division (ACPDD)

regularly visits foreign countries to conduct market research on various

prepaid phone cards offered abroad that allow their users to make overseas
calls to PLDT subscribers in the Philippines at a cheaper rate.
ACPDD bought The Number One prepaid card a card principally marketed
to Filipinos residing in the United Kingdom for calls to the Philippines. During
a test call placed at the PLDTACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a
PLDT telephone number (28243285) as the calling number used, the call
was originating from a local telephone in Metro Manila. Upon verification, the
ACPDD learned that subscriber of the reflected telephone number is Abigail
Razon Alvarez and further learned that several lines are installed at the same
address with Abigail and Vermon Razon among others as subscriber. ACPDD
validate its findings by conducting same test calls
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the
PLDTs Quality Control Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular inspection at 17 Dominic Savio
St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision
both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City and discovered that PLDT
telephone lines were connected to several pieces of equipment which
prompted Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz to file a consolidated
application for search warrant before Judge Francisco Mendiola for the crimes
of theft and violation of PD 401. According to PLDT, the respondents are
engaged in the form of network fraud known as International Simple Resale
(ISR) which amounts to theft under the RPC.
Judge Mendiola found probable cause for issuance of search warrants applied
for and four search warrants were issued for violations of Art. 308, in relation
to Art. 309 of RPC and of PD 401 as amended
PNP searched the premise indicated in the warrants and made a return with
a complete inventory of the items seized PLDT and PNP filed with the DOJ a
joint complaint affidavit for theft and violation of PD 401 against the
respondents. Respondents filed with the RTC a motion to quash the search
warrant on the following grounds: first, the RTC had no authority to issue
search warrants which were enforced in Paraaque City; second, the
enumeration of the items to be searched and seized lacked particularity;
and third, there was no probable cause for the crime of theft.
PLDT opposed the respondents' motion. RTC denied the respondents' motion
to quash. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued is valid
HELD:
Yes. PLDTs evidence shows, sufficiently establishes probable cause for the
issuance of search warrant for the crime of theft.
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is
that it must be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must
be in connection with one specific offense. In search warrant proceedings,
probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine
whether an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search
warrant because the personal properties that may be subject of the search
warrant are very much intertwined with the one specific offense
requirement of probable cause. Contrary to PLDTs claim, the only way to
determine whether a warrant should issue in connection with one specific
offense is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by the
applicant with the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the
search warrant.
30.
Sesbreo vs. Court of Appeals
720 SCRA 57
GR No 160689 March 26, 2014
Bersamin, J:
FACTS:
VECO was a public utility corporation engaged in the sale and distribution of
electricity within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreo was one of VECOs customers
under the metered service contract they had entered.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and that none of
it meters had been tampered with, VECO employed respondents Engr. Felipe

Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as violation of contract (VOC) inspectors. VOC

conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon,
Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo, for illegal
connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring
connections, and meter installations. Bebe Baledio, Sesbreos maid,
unlocked the gate, the VOC team inspected the electric meter and found that
it had been turned upside down. Arcilla took photographs of the upturned
electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreo and one of the maids
present, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. At that
time, Sesbreo was in his office and no one called to inform him of the
inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcias
permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of
appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical
load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which
showed the condition of the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC
Team inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test.
She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of
Sesbreo.
Sesbreo countered the inspection by VOC and contented that VOCs entry
to his house and surrounding premise was effected without his permission
and over the objections of hid maids. They threatened, forced or coerced
their way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it upside
down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric
meter. They searched the house and its rooms without his permission or a
search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two documents, making her
appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of
his personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when
they searched the house.
ISSUE:
Whether the inspection made by the VOC team was an unreasonable search
for being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done with
malice or bad faith.
HELD:
No. The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is
intended as a restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with
law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of State power.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However,
if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises
only after finding the meter of Sesbreo turned upside down, hanging and its
disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled
electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances justified their
decision, and their inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the
authorized entry. There was no question then that their ability to determine
the unbilled electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage of
electricity inside. Not being agents of the State, they did not have to first
obtain a search warrant to do so.

31.
Bayaca vs. Ramos
577 SCRA 93
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676, January 2, 2009
Leonardo- De Castro, J;
FACTS:
Complainant Bayaca was the accused in a criminal case for arson through
reckless imprudence presided by respondent judge. After trial, respondent

Judge promulgated his Decision dated April 2, 2004. Complainant appealed

the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37 of Bambang, Nueva
Vizcaya which came out with its decision affirming with modification the
decision of the MCTC.
Despite the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in the RTC decision,
respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment on Final
Sentence which led to complainants incarceration at the Solano District Jail
from August 8 to 28, 2006.
Bayaca filed a complaint alleging that respondent Judge acted without legal
basis in ordering his detention, and committed grave abuse of discretion.
Complainant added that respondents conduct was unbecoming and
inappropriate for a judge which is greatly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Judge clarified that his issuance of the
warrant of arrest against herein complainant was a mistake done in good
faith. He added that for almost sixteen (16) years it was the practice in his
sala that before acting on a motion it passed through his Clerk of Court who
studied the records to determine whether or not to grant it. If it would be
granted, the Clerk of Court would then request the stenographer to type the
order and thereafter, he would affix his initial for respondent Judges
signature. This was the procedure that they followed in the instant case
which was unfortunately the only instance that they committed a mistake.
Respondent Judge maintained that the matter was merely a case of simple
negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of Warrant of Arrest by respondent judge was a
mistake done in good faith.
HELD:
No. We hold that respondent Judge was inexcusably negligent when he
issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence despite the
deletion by the appellate court of that portion of the judgment imposing the
penalty of imprisonment. In the performance of his duties, respondent Judge
failed to observe that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law
requires in the rendition of any public service. If only respondent Judge had
exercised the requisite thoroughness and caution, he would have noted not

only the modification of the monetary awards by the appellate court, but also
the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment upon which the Warrant of Arrest
and Commitment to Final Sentence that he signed was based.
Respondent Judge cannot pass on the blame to his Clerk of Court and/or
Stenographer. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his very own court personnel. Certainly, a judge is
responsible not only for the dispensation of justice but also for managing his
court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. In the
discharge of the functions of his office, respondent Judge must strive to act in
a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond
suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a
heavy burden of responsibility. Surely, a judge is enjoined to pore over all
documents whereon he is required to affix his signature and give his official
imprimatur.The negligence of respondent Judge in this case simply c

32. DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 191023
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: Petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan. As part of the
routine security check at the pre- departure area, petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal Detector
Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male frisker on duty, a nonuniformed personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation Security Group (ASG). While
frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short pants.
When he asked petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his hands. Soriano
struggled with petitioner as the latter was nervous and reluctant to show what he brought out from his
pocket. Soriano then called the attention of his supervisor. Petitioner finally opened his right hand
revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After informing petitioner of
his constitutional rights, they brought petitioner and the seized evidence and immediately turned over
petitioner to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Airport Team. Petitioner testified that he,
together with his girl friend and her family were headed to Boracay Island for a vacation. While he was
queuing to enter the airport, he was frisked by two persons, a male and a female. On the way to the
comfort room, he was blocked by a male person who frisked him for a second time, asking for his
boarding pass. This male person without an ID card, asked petitioner to empty his pockets, which he did.
The male person then said it was okay but as petitioner proceeded to go inside the comfort room, the
male person called him again saying that this fell from you and showing him two small white
wrappings which seemed to be marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether the body search conducted on petitioner is a valid warrantless search made pursuant to a
routine airport security procedure allowed by law.

HELD: Yes, in a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be
proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the person
of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at
the airports pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants pocket
to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the slightly bulging item while frisking petitioner.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage
as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There
is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a
person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with
the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him,
he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.

33. Luz v. People GR No. 197788

SERENO, J.:
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive
and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to
flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he
and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed
that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he
told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside
it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickellike tin or metal container including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused

spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the
two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was a valid warrantless arrest and search made by the traffic enforcer.
HELD: No, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of
the one making the arrest. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza
to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The
following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case. It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners
pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless
search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.

34. People v. Villarreal

G.R. No. 201363

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: PO3 de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home he saw appellant from a distance
holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. He alighted from his motorcycle and
approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug
possession. Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the
help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellants attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board
appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscated the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession. In his defense,
appellant denied PO3 de Leons allegations and instead claimed that on the date and time of the incident,

he was walking alone when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant
approached the person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and
took his wallet.
ISSUE: Whether there is lawful warrantless arrest.
HELD: No, there is none. On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how
PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy, from a distance and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule
amount of powdery substance inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously
effect numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly
saw in appellants hands was indeed shabu.
Even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the
same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule
113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. The factual circumstances
of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably
committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not
obtain in this case.

FELICIANO GALVANTE V. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO

G.R. No. 162808

April 22, 2008

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan
del Sur, private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38
automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live
ammunitions. The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum
Receipt.
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an
Information or Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.

Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private
respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII,
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG);and a criminal case, docketed as
OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before
the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleged that upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza,
together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas, He immediately went
down of the jeep but before he could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked
his way. That the four policemen, all pointed their long firearms ready to fire. He raised
his arms and heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL,
IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN
KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing his waistline when he raised his
T-shirt. His other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and
showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding
an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came
down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but
they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements.
(HAHAHA!!! PUSIL. ANO UN? BARIL OR GUN IN ENGLISH. Heheheh..)
Pag hindi mo inedit to, masasama to sa ipapasa mo kay SIR!!! TIGNAN NATIN. :p
While we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr.
went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they
have any search warrant. That after a while they saw the super .38 pistol under the floor
mat of the petitioners jeep and asked for the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their
long arms were still pointed to them, He searched his wallet and gave the asked
document. He further alleged that he was detained by Police Chief Rocacorba for two
days having been released only after posing a bail.
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance with both the IAS and
Ombudsman absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but
maintaining the private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative
and criminal cases. The IAS then issued a Decision finding all private respondents guilty
of grave misconduct even if they were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct
of the arrest in line of duty. The RTC dismissed the case against the petitioner. On the
other hand, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against private respondents for lack
of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal complaints filed
against the private respondents.

RULING: YES!
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which
petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was proper, although
the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the
mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by
private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner
executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. Public respondents completely
overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman
as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same:
the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an
offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not
public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is
completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. The Court respects the relative autonomy of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the latter
exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman, except when
the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention,
and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The
conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two
forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the
commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding
P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall
procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the
same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the
same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or
employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile,
papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any

member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses
residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his
Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on
his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable,
is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),
GRs. 157870, 158633 and 161658 November 03, 2008
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors
office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.
He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator
must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally
infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also

violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee
deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr.,
as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
(Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not )
RULING: NO.
However, sec. 36 and (d) are valid. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec.
36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if
it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not tenable as it
enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36,
validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right
of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet
of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its
own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or
intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and
employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy
means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from
intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities.

And while there has been general agreement as to the basic

function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of the abstract

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines
for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy

yields to

certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as
has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search
or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals
privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal
context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined
by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that
matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was
referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probablecause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should
focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

POLO VS. CONSTANTIMO DAVID

G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office
No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division
(PALD) under the"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na"program of the CSC.
CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source,
making her aware that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed
personnel and directed them to back up all the files of the computers found therein.
David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are
related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing

charges. David inferred that he was willfully aiding their adverse interests and it was a
practice that he pursued regularly.
Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted
that the CSC conducted a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and
that the source of the complaint was anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of
RA 6713. After some motions filed to the CSC, he filed his motion to the CA wherein he
was ordered to be dismissed of his governmental duties. The CA ruled that the search
was legal because in their capacity as employers, the government agencies could validly
conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the
probable cause or warrant requirement for search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether there was illegal search.
RULING: NO.
The SC ruled in favor of the CSC. Basing their decision on other cases, the SC
asked whether Pollo has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer
files and was the search reasonable in its inception and scope.
On regards the first inquiry, the SC found that he had no actual expectation of privacy
on his work computer. He did not have a separate office space nor did he use a password
for his computer. He would have visitors which he let them use his computer. The CSC
also implemented a policy that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything on their office computers, and that the CSC may monitor their use.
This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer
resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
On the second inquiry, the SC said that the search Pollo's files were conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous
letter-complaint. A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified
at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.