Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164110
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant or any person acting in her behalf to
vacate and deliver the possession of the area illegally occupied to the plaintiff; ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the MCTCs ruling in a Decision dated October 22, 2001, the
dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the RTCs decision. The Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case
because respondents entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry. 12The Court of
Appeals decision further held that petitioners remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with
the appropriate forum. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision
dated 22 October 2001 as well as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Taal,
Batangas, Branch 86, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is
entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 71-T.
SO ORDERED.13
After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated June 11, 2004, she
filed the instant petition.
Raised before us for consideration are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID
LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE PREMISES OWNED
PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER
THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED
UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE
OTHER CO-OWNER.14
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION BY MEANS OF SIMPLE STRATEGY.15
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court of Appeals decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a
house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that
person.
In her memorandum,16 petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the
action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to
any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum17 counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because
her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further
argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one
of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by
another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have
held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. 18 In
our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent
the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be
changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned
in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by
one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate
relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will
injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent
to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any
act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration.19 The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling
under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her
house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The
consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent
any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification "through strategy or
stealth."
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondents entry into the property was not through
strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping
conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and
clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry
into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by
stealth.20 Moreover, respondents act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing
the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the
co-owned property. As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.
Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The
one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned
about it.21 Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it
when she visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a
favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time
petitioner learned of the construction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
TEODORA SANTOS, assisted by her husband DONATO DE CASTRO, JOSEFINA SANTOS, assisted by her husband
Santiago Rodriguez and EMILIANA SANTOS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LEONCIO SANTOS, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, and NATIONAL AIRPORTS
CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.
and eviction to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. If the Torrens title does not show such shares of the plaintiffs in the parcel of
land sold by Leoncio Santos to the National Airports Corporation, then the action would not lie against the National Airports
Corporation or its successor, the Civil Aeronautics Administration of land and of their natural or civil fruits of which they had been
deprived by the sale and conveyance of the whole parcel of land to the National Airports Corporation by Leoncio Santos. The
accounting of rentals received would not affect the Civil Aeronautics Administration, because it would be the exclusive liability of
Leoncio Santos.
The order appealed from dismissing the complaint as to the Civil Aeronautics Administration is reversed and the case remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law. No cost shall be taxed.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuazon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labardor, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44426 February 25, 1982
SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA CACABELOS, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court reverses the appellate court's decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
declaring plaintiffs-respondents the lawful owners of the land in question and ordering defendant (herein petitioner) to pay P30.00
monthly rentals until possession of the property is surrendered to respondents, for unless there is partition of the estate of the
deceased, either extra judicially or by court order, a co-heir cannot validly claim title to a specific portion of the estate and send the
same. Title to any specific part of the estate does not automatically pass to the heirs by the mere death of the decedent and the
effect of any disposition by a co-heir before partition shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the dissolution
of the communal estate. What a co-heir can validly dispose of is only his hereditary rights.
Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had instituted a complaint before the Court of First Instance for ejectment and
recovery of possession against herein petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1163, alleging that they are the owners in fee simple
of a parcel of commercial land, pro-indiviso, consisting of 150.8 sq. meters, more or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan,
having bought the same from Evaristo G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on April 15, 1964. They also
demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the property all P40.00 until the property is surrendered to them.
The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. qmeter land originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his wife, both dead.
After their death their five children, namely: Maria, Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the ownership of
the whole lot.
Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children. Petitioner alleges that he
purchased the northern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique
and that the southern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique and
that the southern one-half portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique. The land subject of the controversy is the most southern
portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique children which petitioner claims he had bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and
which respondents claim they had bough from Evaristo on April 15, 1964.
Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, docketed therein as Civil Case No. T-966.
The Court finds merit in the petition for setting aside respondent appellate court's decision finding for respondents-plaintiffs, for the
following considerations:
The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in the lower court is premature, for what must
be settled frist is the action for partition. Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite
portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or
determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by
an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical adjudication. 3 An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or
claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by
agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. 4 What a co owner may
dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to
him upon partition. 5 Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights. 6
In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. qqqEspique in favor of respondents and the sale executed by
Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or
invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are
limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the
estate 7 subject to provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser
provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code. 8 Respondent court's ruling that the sale by Estefanio in favor of
petitioner is not valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs is erroneous. Such notice in writing is not a
requisite for the validity of the sale. Its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale of a portion of
the estate, for them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the New Civil
Code, that is, the right to redeem the property sold within one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by a co-heir. (There is nothing in the record to indicate that such right of subrogation
was in effect sought to be exercised upon the co-heirs' having learned of the sale, which is not in issue
here.)
Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for the use of the property in dispute. Until the
partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of
each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the
part in dispute.
Accordingly, respondent court's judgment is set aside and judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint of respondentsplaintiffs in the court below. No pronouncement as to costs.
Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., took no part.