Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project

Performance
Evaluation Report
Cambodia: Provincial Towns

Improvement Project
Independent
Evaluation
Performance Evaluation Report

December 2014
Cambodia:
Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement
Project
This document is being disclosed to the public in accordance with the Asian Development Bank's
Public Communications Policy 2011.
Reference Number: PPE: CAM 2014-19

Loan Numbers: 1725-CAM(SF) and 2013-CAM
Independent Evaluation: PE-778
Notes
Notes
(i)
The fiscal year of the Government of Cambodia ends on 31 December.
(ii)
In this report, $ refers to US dollars.
Director General
Director
Team leader
Team members
V. Thomas, Independent Evaluation Department (IED)

W. Kolkma, Independent Evaluation Division 1, IED
G. Rauniyar, Principal Evaluation Specialist, IED
P. Lim, Evaluation Officer, IED
V. Melo-Cabuang, Senior Evaluation Assistant, IED
The guidelines formally adopted by the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) on

avoiding conflict of interest in its independent evaluations were observed in the
preparation of this report. To the knowledge of IED, there were no conflicts of interest
of the persons preparing, reviewing, or approving this report.
In preparing any evaluation report, or by making any designation of or reference to a
particular territory or geographic area in this document, IED does not intend to make
any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
Abbreviations
ADB
CSHAP
EIRR
FIRR
HDPE
IED
JICA
M&E
MDG
MIME
MPWT
NGO
NRW
O&M
PCR
PIU
PMU
PVR
PPTA
PPWSA
RRP
UMC
WACC
WMU
WSS
WWTP
Asian Development Bank

Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program
economic internal rate of return
financial internal rate of return
high density polyethylene
Independent Evaluation Department
Japan International Cooperation Agency
monitoring and evaluation
Millennium Development Goal
Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy
Ministry of Public Works and Transport
nongovernment organization
nonrevenue water
operation and maintenance
project completion report
project implementation unit
project management unit
PCR validation report
project performance completion report
Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority
report and recommendation of the President
urban management committee
weighted average cost of capital
wastewater management unit
water supply and sanitation
wastewater treatment plant
Currency Equivalents
Currency unit Riel (KR)
KR1.00
$1.00
=
=
At Appraisal
31 October 1999
$0.00025
KR3,950
At Project Completion
31 March 2007
$0.00024
KR4,155
Weights and Measures

km
l
lpcd
m3
kilometer
liter
liters per capita per day
cubic meter
At Evaluation
31 October 2014
$0.00025
KR4,076
Contents
Acknowledgments ................................................................
................................................................................................
....................................................................
.................................... vii
Basic Data ................................................................
................................................................................................
.................................................................................
................................................. ix
Executive Summary ................................................................
................................................................................................
...................................................................
................................... xi
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................
.............................................................................................
............................................................. 1
A.
B.
C.
Evaluation Purpose and Process ......................................................................... 1

Expected Results and Project Objectives............................................................. 3
Project Completion and Validation Reports Assessment .................................... 3
Chapter 2: Design and Implementation ................................................................

......................................................................
...................................... 5
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
Formulation ....................................................................................................... 5
Rationale............................................................................................................ 6
Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements ................................................... 6
Procurement, Construction, and Scheduling ...................................................... 8
Design Changes ................................................................................................. 8
Outputs ............................................................................................................. 9
Consultants...................................................................................................... 12
Loan Covenants ............................................................................................... 13
Chapter 3: Performance Assessment................................................................

..........................................................................
..........................................14
..........14
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Overall Assessment .......................................................................................... 14

Relevance ......................................................................................................... 15
Effectiveness .................................................................................................... 16
Efficiency ......................................................................................................... 20
Sustainability ................................................................................................... 22
Chapter 4: Other Assessments................................................................

...................................................................................
...................................................25
...................25
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Impacts ............................................................................................................ 25
Water Consumption......................................................................................... 26
Health Impacts ................................................................................................. 27
Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice ................................................................... 27
Affordability and Willingness to Pay ................................................................ 28
ADB, Development Partners, and Borrower Performance ................................. 29
Technical Assistance......................................................................................... 30
Chapter 5: Issues, Lessons, and FollowFollow-Up Actions .....................................................

.....................................................31
.....................31
A.
B.
C.
Issues ............................................................................................................... 31
Lessons ............................................................................................................ 33
Follow-up Actions ............................................................................................ 33
Appendixes
1.
Project Framework
2.
Project Costs at Appraisal, Reappraisal, and Completion
3.
Economic and Financial Analysis
4.
A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries
5.
Suggested List of Actions for the Government of Cambodia
37
43
44
46
61
Supplementary Appendixes (Available on request)

A.
Technical Evaluation of the Provincial Towns Improvement Project
B.
Summary of Physical Accomplishments under the Project
C.
Status of Compliance with Loan Covenants
D.
Acknowledgments
This report is a product of the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). Ganesh Rauniyar, Principal Evaluation Specialist, led
the evaluation, with support from Patricia Lim (Evaluation Officer) and Valerie Anne
Melo-Cabuang (Senior Evaluation Assistant). The team acknowledges the valuable
inputs from consultants recruited for this studyTse Yau Shing and Bunrith Seng.
The evaluation team acknowledges the support provided by the Cambodia
Resident Mission. The team benefited from discussions with officials of the Government
of Cambodia, particularly senior project management staff at the two central executing
agenciesthe Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy; and the Ministry of Public Works
and Transport, and with other development partners active in water supply and
sanitation in Cambodia during the field visit. The team is also grateful to staff of the
provincial waterworks, the wastewater treatment plant, and Cambrew for sharing their
experiences and candid views on project design and implementation and for providing
support during the field visit. Feedback from sample respondents of the four provincial
towns who participated in the willingness-to-pay and knowledge-attitude-practice
survey strengthened the study.
The report was peer reviewed by Tomoo Ueda, Principal Evaluation Specialist,
IED. The evaluation team is grateful for the valuable comments on the draft report
made by the Southeast Asia Department and an external reviewer M. Fortin.
The report was prepared under the overall guidance of Vinod Thomas, Director
General, IED; and Walter Kolkma, Director, Division 1, IED. IED retains full responsibility
for the report.
Basic Data
Loans 17251725-CAM (SF) and 20132013-CAM: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
Key Project Data ($ million)

Total project cost
ADB loan amount/utilization
Loan 1725-CAM
Loan 2013-CAM
ADB loan amount/cancellation
Loan 1725-CAM
Loan 2013-CAM
As Per ADB Loan

Documents
26.30
20.00
6.26
Actual
46.13
20.84
6.70
0.15
0.00
ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Key Dates
Appraisal mission
Inception mission
Expected
Original Loan (1725(1725-CAM [SF])

Loan negotiations
Board approval
Loan agreement
Loan effectiveness
Loan closing
31 Dec 2005
Months (effectiveness to completion)
Supplementary Loan (2013(2013-CAM)
Loan negotiations
Board approval
Loan agreement
Loan effectiveness
Loan closing
30 Jun 2006
Months (effectiveness to completion)
Borrower
Executing Agency
Actual
617 Sep 1999
2428 Apr 2000
1718 Nov 1999

17 Dec 1999
2 Feb 2000
11 Apr 2000
12 Dec 2007
92
89 Sep 2003
28 Oct 2003
18 Dec 2003
2 Jan 2004
17 May 2007
40
Kingdom of Cambodia
Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy
Ministry of Public Works and Transport
Type of Mission
Fact finding
Appraisal
Inception
Review
Project completion review
Independent evaluation mission
Number of
Missions
1
1
1
12
1
1
Number of PersonPersonDays
3
9
2
77
27
13
Executive Summary
This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the Provincial Towns
Improvement Project in Cambodia, supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
It provides lessons and recommendations for future water supply and sanitation (WSS)
interventions in Cambodia, and in other countries with similar development contexts.
A mission visited project sites in March 2013. The evaluation assessed the projects
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, as well as its impact and the
performance of ADB and the borrower.
ADB approved a loan of $20.00 million for the Provincial Towns Improvement
Project on 19 December 1999, and a supplementary loan of $6.26 million on
28 October 2003 to cover project cost overrun. The first of these loans closed nearly
2 years later than originally envisaged and the second 11 months later.
The project aimed to expand access to WSS for the population in seven
provincial towns in Cambodia: Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kampot,
Pursat, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng. The project was expected to help Cambodia
progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets
associated with improved access to water and basic sanitation.
ADB prepared a project completion report (PCR) in November 2008 and the
Independent Evaluation Department (IED) finalized a PCR validation report (PVR) in
December 2012. The PCR rated the project successful, but the PVR rated it less than
successful.
Overall Assessment
The evaluation rated the overall project performance less than successful,
consistent with the earlier PVR rating. The project was rated relevant, less than
effective, less than efficient, and less than likely sustainable.
The project was rated relevant. It was consistent with Cambodias development
priorities and with ADBs country and sector strategies to improve access to water and
wastewater management in provincial towns. Improved access to water supply for the
population in provincial towns positively contributed to Cambodias progress towards
MDG 7C (improved access to water supply and basic sanitation). Notwithstanding, the
project design was weak in some respects and this prevented the evaluation from
rating the project highly relevant. It would have benefited from more extensive
stakeholder consultations and geotechnical and topographical surveys during project
design, thereby avoiding some of the later witnessed implementation delays, design
changes, and project cost overrun. More attention for capacity development would
have helped deal with the weak institutional capacity of provincial waterworks and
Sihanoukville wastewater treatment plant (WWTP). Better design would also have taken
into account the very high cost of land purchase for the WWTP in Sihanoukville in the
cost estimates. The best design would have taken out the WWTP altogether, and
perhaps set it up as a separate project.
The project was rated less than effective. The project contributed to
improvements in access to piped water in the six provincial towns and wastewater
treatment in Sihanoukville. The proportion of nonrevenue water (NRW) declined
xii
Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project

significantly across the six provincial towns, from 30% in 2005 to 17% in 2013.
However, the coverage of piped water in these provincial towns was less than
envisaged at appraisal and remained grossly inadequate. As of 2013, only 39% of the
towns population (141,003) were connected to the water supply compared with a
project target of 350,000. The number of wastewater connections in Sihanoukville had
increased from only 580 at project completion to 1,326 in 2013 but this was still below
the project appraisal target of 3,344. Cambrew, a company producing beer and soft
drinks, envisaged as a primary client during project design, did not connect to the
WWTP until 2010, when it was forced to by regulatory requirements. Since then,
Cambrews production has expanded significantly and it is expected to exceed the
capacity of the WWTP in 2014. In addition, several new industries producing garments
and shoes have become prime candidates for WWTP connection. This makes it unlikely
that the originally foreseen 3,344 beneficiary households will all be connected.
The project was rated less than efficient. The cost overrun was significant,
as was the implementation delay, and the 3-year delay in the connection of Cambrew
to the WWTP. The economic internal rate of return of all six waterworks at evaluation
remained lower than at appraisal, reappraisal, and project completion, due to
construction cost overruns and a lower number of household connections than
anticipated at appraisal. The economic internal rate of return of three of the
six waterworks were below 12%. The expensive Sihanoukville WWTP alone accrued half
of the project cost with, due to lack of data, unknown economic return.
Project outcomes were rated less than likely sustainable. The financial internal
rate of return (FIRR) at evaluation for Battambang was negative (indicating that the
waterworks were not viable), while that of Kampot was below the weighted average
cost of capital (WACC) (5%). These two waterworks accounted for 48% of water
production, 46% of water sale, and 66% of NRW. Four other waterworks (Kampong
Cham, Kampong Thom, Pursat, and Svay Rieng) were financially viable with FIRRs
ranging from 5.9% to 6.7%, above the WACC. However, the waterworks and the
WWTP faced continued operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The financial position
of the WWTP was not sustainable, and remains so as long as Cambrew is paying only a
nominal fee for its use.
There was no consistency among the six provincial towns as to the amount of
connection fee charged or water tariff levied. Each waterworks levied its own tariff
scale for domestic, institutional, and commercial users. There was no tariff standard for
industrial users, as industries sourced their own water and were not supplied by the
waterworks. While the water tariff was generally low, the connection fee, at $100
$150 per household, proved prohibitive for poorer households. Meanwhile, full
recovery of the cost of the Sihanoukville WWTP is unlikely unless the Wastewater
Management Unit can enter into an agreement with Cambrew and other industrial
users regarding a price based on volume and quality of discharge. Only a small
proportion of consumers were willing to pay for a substantial increase in water tariff,
although there was general support for tariff increases of up to 10%.
The overall project impact was moderate. The prevalence of diarrhea for
children under 5 years of age (a proxy measure for improved health status) declined
from 16.4% in 2000 to 13.2% in 2010 in the six project towns. The achievement,
however, remained below that of Phnom Penh (11%) and well below that of Siem Reap
(4%). Due to a lack of in-house expertise in the two executing agencies, the projects
community health awareness component did not receive adequate attention. As a
result, there was a wide gap between knowledge and practice. Except for the practice
of hand washing after use of the toilet, which was wider spread in the project area,
Introduction
the awareness of health and hygiene between project and non-project areas was not
markedly different.
ADB's performance was satisfactory. ADB responded to project needs when
required. The Borrowers performance was found less than satisfactory. It was
satisfactory at the start-up stage; however, several issues surfaced during
implementation and the waterworks were unable to get full support from the Ministry
of Industry, Mines and Energy. While the government agreed to adopt administrative
and legal reforms, the recommendations of the study aimed at strengthening the
institutional capacity of the project were not implemented. Moreover, some of the key
loan covenants were only partially complied with.
Issues
The key issues facing urban WSS in Cambodia underscore the need to:
(i)
address institutional disconnects between water supply and sanitation,
which failed to consider the symbiotic relationship between the two;
(ii)
devolve decision making and financial authority to provincial and
municipal governments to expand financial revenue sources, carry out
O&M, undertake capital replacement, and improve the quality of urban
services;
(iii)
develop master plans for the urban centers with an aim to tackle water
supply, wastewater management, and sanitation challenges in an
integrated way;
(iv)
institute tariff reform measures to promote full cost recovery and
ensure the long-term sustainability of waterworks and the WWTP;
(v)
address arsenic contamination in the water supply of provincial towns;
and
(vi)
identify new and innovative technologies and treatment processes that
optimize land use for future WWTP expansion.
Lessons
The evaluation provides the following lessons:
(i)
Project preparation should allow for sufficient time for consultation
and active involvement of key stakeholders during project design and
redesign to strengthen ownership and to capture local knowledge and
experience.
(ii)
Upfront assessment of institutional capacity of executing and
implementing agencies is important at the design stage, supported by
measures to address critical training needs. Failure to do so leads to
less than satisfactory implementation of the project.
(iii)
ADB and the executing agencies need to supervise and critically assess
consultants performance during implementation to ensure proper
knowledge transfer takes place between the consultants and national
and local staff.
(iv)
An equitable tariff structure based on quantity and type of users
(household, commercial, industrial) is necessary to ensure project
sustainability.
xiii
xiv
FollowFollow-up Actions
The evaluation notes that there have been positive developments in the WSS
sector in Cambodia, since the evaluation mission in March 2013. These include ADBs
re-engagement in the WSS sector, the establishment in 2014 of a Ministry of Industry
and Handicrafts responsible for urban water supply, and which takes over from the
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, and the close coordination of ADB with other
development partners regarding the WSS sector, including with the Japan International
Cooperation Agency, the French Agency for Development (Agence Franaise de
Dveloppement), and the World Bank. ADB has approved the Urban Water Supply
Project in December 2014, which will include rehabilitation and improvement of works
in five of the six towns of the project evaluated here, and prepare another more reform
oriented water and wastewater project to be approved probably in 2017. In this
context, the report offers the following recommendations for ADB:
(i)
ADB, in partnership with other active development partners, should
support a number of WSS assessments and master plans for major
provincial towns including those supported under this project. The
plans should include delivery of safe water supply to consumers,
treatment of wastewater, and solid waste management.
(ii)
ADB should support capacity development of provincial town WSS
initiatives through dedicated technical assistance.
(iii)
ADB should encourage the government to adopt technical and
administrative solutions to ensure continuation of current project
benefits and scaling up of these benefits to wider areas, with support
from development partners active in Cambodia.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported the Provincial Towns
Improvement Project in Cambodia, which aimed to expand access to water supply and
sanitation (WSS) for the population of seven provincial towns (Battambang, Kampong
Cham, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Pursat, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng). The project was
expected to help Cambodia progress towards achieving the Millennium Development
Goal (MDG) targets associated with improved access to water and basic sanitation. This
report evaluates the projects relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability
based on evaluation guidelines and a field mission that visited all seven towns in March
2013.1
A.
Evaluation Purpose and Process
2.
The evaluation assessed performance 6 years after project completion in 2008,
because it was deemed that the project would be mature and delivering the intended
benefits to provincial towns. At the time when the project completion report (PCR) was
made, intended benefits were just emerging, but the extent of progress could not be
fully determined. With additional data, and more water connections installed after the
cessation of ADB support, the evaluation was able to properly assess project results and
come up with some lessons.
The PCR was completed in 2008 and it rated the project relevant, less effective,
efficient, and likely sustainable. The overall rating of the project was successful.2
3.
The PCR, however, did not assess some of the components of the project, such as
community sanitation and health awareness initiatives. It also cited inadequate
technical due diligence carried out for a supplementary loan to the project. At project
completion, only 20% of Sihanoukvilles households and businesses were connected to
the wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) constructed with project support.
4.
The PCR validation report (PVR) prepared in 2012 by the Independent
Evaluation Department (IED) downgraded the project to less than successful. The PVR
assessed the PCR quality to be less than satisfactory based on data inconsistencies,
conflicting statements, inadequate reasoning and evidence supporting the conclusions,
and non-reporting of progress against the targets set in the project design and
monitoring framework (Appendix 1).3
2
3
Independent Evaluation Department. 2006. Guidelines for Preparing Performance Evaluation Reports for
Public Sector Operations. Manila: ADB.
ADB. 2008. Completion Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia. Manila.
ADB. 2012. Validation Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia. Manila.

5.
A review of project documents, the PCR, and PVR noted the following:
(i)
non-achievement of a key policy dialogue agenda on decentralization
and devolution of urban functions to provincial and municipal
governments;
(ii)
a large discrepancy in the number of beneficiary households of the
Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program (CSHAP) in the
original loan document (1,500) and the supplementary loan (3,500);
(iii)
lack of clarity on the changes in planned physical outputs under the
project and inadequate technical due diligence carried out for the
supplementary loan (which led to high cost overruns);
(iv)
inadequate explanation for low water supply coverage at the end of
the project (99,000 connections against a target of 350,000
households);
(v)
underachievement of the intended reduction in nonrevenue water
(NRW) and lack of clarity on the reasons for rerouting some pipelines
during implementation;
(vi)
lack of clarity on the reasons for the cessation of the community
sanitation committees, very low uptake (only 20%) of connection to the
Sihanoukville WWTP at project completion, and design changes to the
waterworks funded by the supplementary loan;
(vii)
discrepancies in the computation of economic internal rates of return
(EIRR) and financial internal rates of return (FIRR) for water supply and
wastewater management between the PCR and the PVR; and
(viii)
insufficient operation and maintenance (O&M) funds due to low tariffs,
raising concerns about project sustainability.
6.
The evaluation followed a three-step process: (i) review of project documents
including back-to-office reports, aide-memoirs, PCR, and PVR; (ii) field visits to all seven
provincial towns covered by the project and discussions with key stakeholders; and
(iii) analysis of additional data obtained by the evaluation team during the field visits.
The evaluation team also benefited from discussions with senior project management
staff at the two central executing agenciesthe Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy
(MIME) and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT)and other
development partners active in WSS in Cambodia.4
7.
The evaluation team conducted a willingness-to-pay and knowledge-attitudepractice survey in four of the seven provinces (Battambang, Kampong Cham,
Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng) covering 448 project and 448 non-project respondents.
The team also collected data and information for the economic reevaluation of the
project. Water companies provided financial data. The team held an in-depth interview
with a senior official of Cambrew, a company that produces beer and soft drinks, which
is now connected to the WWTP.5 The team assessed project assets in all seven provincial
towns (Supplementary Appendix A) and reevaluated the costs and benefits of
six waterworks. Data limitations did not allow an economic reevaluation of the WWTP.
8.
The project sustainability analysis was based on financial data of the operators,
results of the willingness-to-pay survey and an assessment of the institutional capacity
of the executing agencies and operators, and an analysis of the policy environment for
promoting access to safe water and basic sanitation in selected towns.
4
These were the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); PLAN International; the United Nations
Childrens Fund (UNICEF); Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Enterprise Development (WaterSHED); and the
World Bank.
Cambrew was not connected to the wastewater treatment plant at the time of PCR preparation.
Introduction
B.
Expected Results and Project Objectives

Objectives
9.
ADB approved a $20.00 million loan for the project on 19 December 1999, and
a supplementary loan of $6.26 million on 28 October 2003 to cover project cost
overrun.6 The Asian Development Assistance Facility of New Zealand provided a grant
of $0.23 million for initial project management support. The first loan closed on
12 December 2007, nearly 2 years later than intended, and the supplementary loan
closed on 17 May 2007, 11 months later than envisaged.
10.
The project comprised five components: (i) community sanitation and health
awareness in three towns (Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Sihanoukville); (ii) water
supply improvement in six towns (Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom,
Kampot, Pursat, and Svay Rieng); (iii) wastewater management in Sihanoukville;
(iv) local governance and resource mobilization at the local level; and
(v) implementation assistance through the provision of consulting services, project
administration, equipment and facilities, incremental administrative costs, and training.
11.
The supplementary loan was approved to cover cost overruns due to design
changes, which included construction of new water intake and treatment facilities
rather than rehabilitation of existing infrastructure; installation of generators rather
than reliance on the grid to provide electric power; an increased sewer pipe diameter
because of changes in layout and incomplete topographical surveys; a change in the
lining of wastewater ponds due to higher than expected groundwater levels and
unstable soil conditions; and generally higher unit prices for pipe materials.7
The supplementary loan preparation replaced the midterm review.
C.
Project Completion and Validation Reports Assessment
12.
The PCR rated the project performance successful, but the PVR assessed overall
performance as less than successful.8 The Southeast Asia Regional Department
requested a more detailed evaluation of the project in December 2009. The final
validation report also recommended that IED may consider preparing a project
performance evaluation report. The validation report downgraded the efficiency rating
from efficient to inefficient on the ground of (i) lower economic benefits based on
recomputed EIRR, (ii) project delays, and (iii) non-achievement of the devolution of
urban functions to provincial and municipal governments. It downgraded the
sustainability rating from likely sustainable to less than likely sustainable because future
tariff levels may not be sufficient to cover O&M costs and non-viability of the WWTP.
13.
ADB approved the project based on environmental Category B and it envisaged
positive social impacts. The PCR noted that there were no significant adverse
environmental impacts, and assumed that the environmental management plans had
addressed negative environmental impacts during implementation.9 However, it did not
specify if the environmental management plan was effectively implemented as
envisaged in the project design. It further stated that the social impact of the project
6
ADB. 1999. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to the
Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial Towns Improvement Project, Manila; and ADB. 2003. Report and
Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Supplementary Loan to the
Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial Towns Improvement Project. Manila.
7
8
9
Footnote 2, para. 8.

had been moderate because water connections were still being established and the
number of beneficiaries was below the target at the time of the PCR review mission.10
Furthermore, the lessons presented in the PCR related to weaknesses in the project
design that made it less suitable for the local context, which could have been
addressed with due diligence at the time of project preparation. The PCR also stated
that the government did not support the findings of a planned study on local
government reform. The findings raised an important question for the evaluation: How,
and to what extent, did the project improve public health in the towns, and ensure
equitable access to WSS services by limiting the cost for the poor who had no access to
safe water before the project? This evaluation attempted to address that question.
14.
The validation report rated the project impact modest for the following
reasons: (i) failure to sustain the sanitation committees will likely reverse any initial
impact of the CSHAP component, (ii) the water supply component will provide positive
benefits but only 40% of those under the maximum coverage can enjoy these benefits,
(iii) any impact of the wastewater component will be limited because of the low
connection rate, and (iv) failure to achieve institutional reforms and decentralization.
10
CHAPTER 2
Design and Implementation

15.
This chapter draws on a review of documents relevant to the project; discussion
with key informants at ADB and in Cambodia; and data provided by the executing
agencies (MIME and MPWT), the waterworks in six provincial towns, and the WWTP at
Sihanoukville. It discusses project formulation and the rationale behind the project and
summarizes project costs, financing and implementation arrangements, procurement,
construction and scheduling, and design changes justifying additional financing. It also
highlights key outputs achieved under the project, reviews consultant performance,
and updates loan covenants associated with the project.
A.
Formulation
16.
The water supply systems in the six project towns were constructed in the
1920s, and their production capacity had become insufficient to meet the growing
demand. The systems were also in a state of disrepair; water pipes in the distribution
networks were leaking. There was no comprehensive system for wastewater or storm
water management in Sihanoukville prior to the project. By improving water supply and
wastewater management in these provincial towns, the project was expected to
contribute to poverty reduction in both rural and urban areas. These towns served as
economic centers for the surrounding rural areas and linked the rural and urban
economies. They were considered an immediate market, transportation depot, and
processing center for agricultural products in their respective provinces.
The development of these towns was expected to help absorb rural migrants and
reduce pressures on the urban environment, infrastructure, and employment in the
capital city of Phnom Penh; promote tourism in Sihanoukville; and bring about long-term
positive social and environmental impacts in and around the project areas.
17.
The projects five components were generally appropriate to address the needs of
the towns, given their growth potential at the time of project formulation.
The involvement of two line ministries was also appropriate based on their operational
jurisdictions. However, the coverage and design of the WWTP was limited, mainly
targeting the brewery, Cambrew and 3,344 private properties, including small
businesses in Sihanoukville town.
18.
The PCR noted that project design changes, and part of the cost overrun, could
have been avoided if the project appraisal had conducted more stakeholder
consultation and completed geotechnical and topographical surveys.11 Investment costs
were underestimated during project appraisal. This led to ADB approving a
supplementary loan in 2003 to address design shortcomings.12
11
12
B.
Rationale
19.
The report and recommendation of the President (RRP) provided a strong
rationale for the project,13 which included: (i) the deterioration of water supply systems
and environmental sanitation during the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of war,
ineffective management, and poor maintenance; (ii) a rapid influx of population from
rural areas to the provincial towns; (iii) the deterioration of environmental and public
health conditions in urban areas due to inadequate potable water; and (iv) high child
mortality and hospitalizations associated with waterborne diseases.14 It also noted a
very high leakage rate (60%) in the water supply, and groundwater contamination due
to environmental pollution, poor drainage, and high siltation in wells. Furthermore,
residents without a piped water connection incurred very high costs for potable water
(2.5 to 4.0 times compared to those with a piped water connection). The RRP also
highlighted sanitation and environmental problems arising from untreated sewage
flowing into rivers and water bodies, haphazard dumping of solid waste, and overflow
of soakaways during the rainy season. In addition, poor institutional capacity at both
national and provincial levels, lack of incentives for provincial or municipal
governments, and poor cost recovery figured prominently in the project rationale.
20.
The project was consistent with Cambodias development priorities.
ADB support was appropriate as the water supply infrastructure in the six towns prior
to the project was in a less-than-satisfactory state and did not meet public
requirements for safe drinking water. The wastewater infrastructure in Sihanoukville
was lacking. The project was consistent with ADBs country and sector strategies in
improving access to water and wastewater management in provincial towns for a
better urban environment.
21.
According to the PCR, the selection of provincial towns factored in ADBs
previous support, economic growth potential, the status of cost recovery, and
institutional capabilities of the provincial towns. For example, Kampong Cham,
Kampot, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng were covered under ADBs first Rural
Infrastructure Improvement Project (Loan 1385-CAM).15 Battambang, Kampong Thom,
and Pursat were along the major national highways, to which ADB provided financial
assistance. Battambang was located near the Cambodia-Thailand border and along
national highway 5, was the largest provincial town, and had the potential to become
the major trade center in northern Cambodia. The seaport and tourist resources made
Sihanoukville the fastest growing town in the country. Kampong Cham was the capital
town of what was traditionally the countrys richest province, and could become the
major center of agro-industries. Hence, the project-supported towns had economic
growth potential. Given the prevailing socioeconomic conditions, the project rationale
remained sound during implementation and at the time of this evaluation.
C.
Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements
22.
At appraisal, the project cost was estimated at $26.30 million, of which ADB
financed 76%after the supplementary loan ADBs support also remained at the same
13
14
15
Footnote 6, paras. 49.

Almost 20% of children died before reaching the age of five, and waterborne diseases accounted for about
30% of hospitalizations.
ADB. 1995. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan and
Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project.
Manila.
level (76%). At completion, the actual project cost stood at $46.15 million equivalent,
of which ADB financed $24.88 million in foreign exchange, including a service charge
of 0.46 million and $2.65 million in local currency costs. ADBs support amounted to
60.5% of actual project costs. Appendix 2 provides details of appraisal, reappraisal, and
actual project costs. The wastewater treatment component alone absorbed 48% of the
total project cost, followed by water supply, taking 35% of the cost.
23.
When the project was reappraised, cost estimates overlooked the land
acquisition cost for the WWTP in Sihanoukville. Also, an incorrect estimate of
construction contracts led to a further 50% cost overrun after reappraisal. According to
the PCR and reconfirmation from key informants, the project encountered cost
overruns for parts B (water supply component for six towns) and C (WWTP in
Sihanoukville) due to underestimation at appraisal and technical shortcomings. Total
loan proceeds available at completion were $27.68 million, against which ADB
disbursed $27.53 million and cancelled $0.149 million. Likewise, contract awards
amounted to 98.3% of the total loan amount.
24.
Substantial deviations needed to be made from the appraisal estimates.
The project did not recruit an international consultant for community sanitation and
health awareness, spent only 40% of funds on television and radio campaigns, and
30% less on the construction of latrines (Part A). It incurred an overrun of 50%
compared to the original estimates for water supply (Part B). The project did not expect
to incur substantial land acquisition costs ($11.34 million) during appraisal and
reappraisal stages for the WWTP in Sihanoukville (Part C). It spent only 5% of the
amount set aside for local governance and resource mobilization at the local level
(Part D). Lastly, it incurred 60% more costs for implementation assistance and
incremental administrative costs (Part E) from the governments internal resources.
25.
At appraisal, the MPWT was to be the executing agency for parts A, C and D;
MIME for Part B; and both agencies were to implement their respective components for
Part E. ADB approved a change in implementation arrangements on 6 October 2000,
transferring all of Part A implementation from the MPWT to MIME. The change was for
ease of project management after the inception mission following an assessment of the
project management unit (PMU) responsibilities, workload, and institutional capacity of
the two executing agencies and the resource requirements of each part of the project.
As such, the MPWT became the executing agency for parts C and D; MIME for parts A
and B; and both agencies implemented their respective components for Part E.
26.
For Part B (water supply), each of the provincial or municipal governments in
the project towns set up a project implementation unit (PIU) or urban management
committee (UMC) to be responsible for (i) coordinating implementation of the project
in the provincial towns; (ii) jointly approving the engineering designs with MIME;
(iii) supervising the progress and quality of construction; and (iv) mobilizing local
financial resources for O&M of the project components. For Part C (wastewater
management), a PIU was set up in Sihanoukville to oversee the day-to-day project
implementation and coordinate with the local government office and residents affected
by the construction.
27.
Some PIU or UMC members were senior operators and had been retained at
the waterworks or wastewater management unit (WMU). Most of the personnel
trained under the project had stayed on with the waterworks and WMU, which was
good for the sustainability of the project. The project documents such as study reports,
progress reports, design reports, O&M manuals, etc. were in English. According to PIU

and UMC staff trained, insufficient technical support was extended by the PMU or
consultants to the waterworks for them to understand the reports, and as such, they
could not constructively offer their comments during the planning and design stages.
D.
Procurement, Construction, and Scheduling
28.
Local competitive bidding was adopted for Part A. For parts B and C
contractors were firstly prequalified and then invited to participate in international
competitive bidding. The lowest compliant bids were then awarded in accordance with
ADBs Procurement Guidelines (2013, as amended from time to time). One main civil
contract package was awarded for each of the water and wastewater components, and
their scope included equipment.
29.
The PCR noted that the performance of the joint ventured contractor for the
water component was unsatisfactory, due to (i) delays in starting construction;
(ii) limited equipment and qualified staff; (iii) noncompliance of constructed works with
the contract requirements; and (iv) delays in submitting payment certificates. Problems
reported to the evaluation team included (i) widespread quality issues on the treatment
equipment installed across all the six waterworks, and (ii) poor construction planning.
30.
The PCR stated that the performance of the civil works contractor for the
wastewater component was satisfactory and the civil works quality was good, although
internal squabbling over various matters by the joint-venture partners often had to be
dealt with by the consultant in order to ensure timely workflow. There were also some
delays in initial mobilization and material procurement, but this did not lead to the
overall delay in construction completion.
31.
The actual contract award for the civil works of parts A, B and C was delayed
for about a year because it took longer than expected to recruit consultants. While the
Part A construction period was shortened by a year to catch up with delays, parts B and
C encountered 22.5 years of overall delay in completion. Civil works contracts for parts
B and C were extended by 1.5 years due to higher than expected bid prices for the
original works. Such delays necessitated extensions in the project and loan closings.
E.
Design Changes
32.
The following design changes were made:

(i)
Generators were installed for waterworks.16
(ii)
The iron removal treatment works were replaced by an iron bacteria
filter in Svay Rieng waterworks.17
16
17
One of the reasons for the cost overrun of Part B (water supply) was that the anticipated extension of the
power grids had not taken place at the time of construction. The installation of generators as additional
works was therefore required to provide power for the waterworks. At the time of this evaluation, grid
power supply was available, three waterworks (Battambang, Kampot, and Svay Rieng) had switched to
using the grid supply and the generators were retained for emergency use. The other three waterworks
(Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Pursat) were still generating their own electricity, with cost savings
quoted as a reason.
According to the O&M manual, the filters are supposed to be operated as biological filters to use bacteria
to remove dissolved iron and manganese. This alternative design was supposed to do away with aeration
and chlorination upstream of filters in the original design (both aeration and chlorination were originally
for oxidation of the dissolved iron into particulates). However, pre-chlorination just at the inlet of the
biological filters was also practiced. The pre-chlorination and biological filtration combination is
incompatible. Chlorine disinfects and would inhibit the biological reactions in the filters. The present
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
F.
A new raw water pipe was laid to serve 200 households to replace
leaking asbestos cement pipes in Kampot.18
Stage I capacity of the WWTP in Sihanoukville doubled from 6,900
m3/day, to 13,800 m3/day in Stage II.19
A high density polyethylene (HDPE) lining was placed on top of the
concrete slabs on the pond slopes at the WWTP.20
The WMU started to require new household connections to sewers to
include a septic tank and grease trap.21
Outputs
1.
Improved Community Sanitation and Health Awareness
33.
The Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program (CSHAP) aimed to
educate communities on sanitation issues and improve the sanitation conditions in the
poor communities of Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Sihanoukville provinces
through community participation in project design, cost sharing, and O&M. It intended
to benefit 1,503 households supported by 15 sanitation committees, and construction
of 1,500 household latrine substructures and 75 public and school latrines.
34.
The PCR states that the intended output was completed during May 2002 to
June 2004, but the CSHAP was no longer monitored by the executing agency. During
the field visit, the evaluation team was unable to trace any functioning sanitation
committees and it could not access a list of households that benefited from latrine
substructure construction. The evaluation team did not find any official records within
the executing agency and there was no institutional memory about this output. Hence,
the evaluation was unable to determine the actual achievements the CSHAP.
18
19
20
21
arrangement appears to be depending solely on chlorine to oxidize, and the filters operating as regular
sand filters to trap the iron precipitates.
However, to limit costs, eventually the asbestos cement pipe was retained to serve as the supply pipe.
While this saved capital costs, problems associated with the retention of the pipe included (i) the loss of
treated water through the leaking pipe; and (ii) low pressure supply for 200 households. Since project
completion, a hydropower dam has been built upstream of Kampots intake at the Teuk Chhou River.
While the quantity of raw water for Kampot can now be more secured, the river level depends on the
release from the new reservoir. The river intake for Kampot has been lowered and extended some 6 m
towards the middle of the river in order to extract water when the river level is low.
The eventual WWTP has a reported capacity of 5,700 m3/day. Land has not been secured for the Stage II
extension. Such design changes are believed to be for cost-saving reasons. The deletion of sludge drying
beds imposes O&M restrictions in pond desludging. The pond system requires a large footprint and
expansion potential is now limited as land has not been reserved. Insofar as the WWTP is concerned, the
as-constructed works include just the basic pond system. All the ancillary works such as flow meters, water
supply, administration building, and sludge drying, have not been provided.
As constructed, a HDPE lining is on top of the concrete slabs on the pond slopes. This appears to be an
inappropriate design. HDPE lining in a pond system is typically used to minimize wastewater seepage into
the ground. Concrete slabs are typically laid on top of HDPE lining so that vehicles can be driven down the
pond slope into the ponds during desludging without damaging the HDPE lining. In the Sihanoukville
design, concrete is used to line the sides and base of the anaerobic ponds, but they do not offer protection
to the HDPE lining. Now that the lining is on top of the concrete, any cracks would trap sewerage gas and
promote hydrogen sulfide corrosion of the concrete slabs.
The initial house connections under the ADB project were made directly into the sewers. However,
frequent sewer blockages were encountered due to solid waste and heavy oil and grease contents in the
local sewage. The new arrangement is a good approach towards protecting the sewerage system.
The municipal sewage has undergone a certain degree of primary treatment before entering the sewers
and then into the wastewater treatment plant. However, the practice of disposing of the septic tank
contents back into the pond system is unnecessarily loading the plant with solids. Consideration could
have been given to allowing the pump-out to dewater in some form of sludge drying bed.
10

2.
Improved Water Supply
35.
The evaluation found that the scope of water supply work was consistent with
the appraisal estimates. It noted that higher capacity equipment had been provided at
all six waterworks. In addition, works undecided at appraisal (repair or replacement)
were generally replaced with new equipment. The data provided by the waterworks
revealed significant improvement in the output measures between the PCR and this
evaluation. The number of connections had doubled and the length of network had
expanded two to three times, depending on the province. There was sufficient scope
for expanding additional connections in all provincial towns, since capacity utilization
ranged from 39% in Svay Ring to 77% in Battambang. A summary of key outputs is in
Table 1. Detailed assessment of outputs at each waterworks is in Supplementary
Appendix B.22
Table 1: Outputs Generated by the Project:
Project: Water Supply Component (Part B)
Output/Stage
Battambang
Production (m3/day)
At design (planned)
11,520
At completion
4,500
At evaluation
8,877
Length of Network (km)
Before the project
20
At completion
66
At evaluation
124
Number of Connections
Before the project
4,614
At completion
4,999
At evaluation
9,877
Kampong
Cham
Provincial Town
Kampong
Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay
Rieng
Total
9,000
1,675
6,043
5,760
1,174
2,534
5,760
3,092
3,971
5,760
1,102
3,619
4,800
453
1,850
42,600
11,996
26,894
14
28
81
28
41
66
29
40
80a
17
32
96
4
29
45
112
211
492
1,632
2,927
5,714
796
1,459
3,177
1,570
2,352
4,248
1,452
2,172
5,016
303
851
1,792
10,376
14,760
29,824
Approximate number of connections in Kampot. Actual figure could not be obtained from the waterworks.
Source: Provincial waterworks data collected by the Independent Evaluation Department team.
36.
At individual waterworks, technical inspection by the evaluation team
confirmed most of the activities undertaken by the project. Wherever possible, repairs
were undertaken, and where not possible, new equipment was provided. Some
activities surpassed the target envisaged in the original loan document. For example, in
Battambang, three new raw water pumps of 240 m3/hour capacity were installed
instead of two pumps with 200 m3/hour. Likewise, two generators were provided
instead of one planned in the same town.
37.
The PCR noted that NRW was 28% against the target of 35%. At the time of
this evaluation, the NRW had declined to 17% from 32% at appraisal.
3.
Improved Wastewater Management
38.
The project supported construction of a WWTP in Sihanoukville, a rapidly
growing provincial town with a port and booming tourism industry. It intended to
connect 3,344 properties to the plant. However, at the time the PCR was prepared, only
22
The output figures reported in the PCR (Table 1) are substantially different from what was provided by
each of the six waterworks. For example, the PCR reported that in total 19,116 water supply connections
were established, while data provided by waterworks stood at 14,760 connections. Likewise, at the PCR
stage, water production according to the waterworks data remained 35% less than the volume reported in
the PCR. While the source of discrepancies could not be established, it may have occurred due to
aggregation errors at the project level.
665 (20%) of the properties had been connected to the WWTP. Despite low uptake,
treatment efficiency was considered high and effluent quality was within an acceptable
standard.23 The PCR also noted that since Cambrew had its own treatment plant, it was
not willing to connect to the projects treatment plant; although, it was expected to do
so at the time of project formulation.
39.
At the time of this evaluation, the situation had changed. The production
capacity of Cambrew had significantly increased, and as a result of environmental
regulatory requirements, it had connected to the treatment plant in 2010.
The evaluation team noted that the construction of the plant had been accomplished
as per the original plan, with some minor adjustments.24
40.
There were several other industries, such as leather and garment factories that
produced a large amount of wastewater, but these were yet to be connected to the
treatment plant. Household connections are still low (around 25%) and part of the
problem stemmed from their low lying locations relative to the wastewater pipes,
which suggested design error.
41.
The gravity sewerage and pond system required minimum O&M effort and
almost no power consumption. As such, the current tariff collection, though low, was
sufficient to cover regular O&M costs including staff salaries. The number of household
connections remained low. The wastewater facilities, however, were overloaded by one
single industrial discharger, Cambrew. The pond system requires a large footprint and
expansion potential was limited as land has become scarce and expensive, particularly
at Sihanoukville. Sludge removed from septic tanks was disposed of at the anaerobic
ponds, unnecessarily loading the ponds with solids. The pond system required regular
desludging to ensure continual performance but this had not been diligently carried
out. The design was not conducive for desludging and sludge drying.
4.
Improved Local Governance and Resource Mobilization
42.
The project commissioned a study on local government reform that reviewed
the legal and administrative structure of the provincial governments of Battambang,
Kampong Cham, and Sihanoukville. While the study was completed early on in
June 2002, the government did not support its recommendations and as a result they
were not implemented.
43.
A review of potential revenue sources for provincial towns and municipalities
recommended increased revenue collection to cover: O&M costs, provide performance
incentives to waterworks staff, and generate internal funds to expand the system.
The PCR noted that all waterworks were able to generate positive cash flows. At the
time of evaluation, four of six waterworks had positive cash flows; while two could not
keep up with the rising O&M cost structure.
44.
Initially, the revenue base for the WWTP was limited, largely due to the small
number of connections. The situation improved with the Cambrew connection.
However, the evaluation notes that the lump sum annual fee agreed between the plant
operator and Cambrew was too low. As a result, the plant was not likely to generate
23
24

The only minor discrepancy was that the RRP envisaged a 1.44 ha wetland for treated effluent discharge.
This had not been provided.
11
12

positive cash flow in the foreseeable future, unless the tariff structure was set taking
into account volume and type of wastewater discharge.
45.
Two recent developments have had some positive impact on Cambodias tariff
setting policy: (i) Kampong Cham started a scheme to offer subsidized connection to
very poor and poor households and (ii) on instruction from local government,
Battambang waterworks started collecting wastewater discharge fees in the same bill
as the water tariff, on behalf of the local government. This was a first step in the right
direction, and forms a basis for Cambodia to levy tariffs for both water supply and
wastewater management.
G.
Consultants
46.
The PCR noted that the performance of the consultants was satisfactory, and
their working relationship with PMUs and other agencies was effective. The evaluation
team, however, noted certain issues with their performance, which are outlined in
paras. 4751.
47.
The performance of the project preparatory technical assistance (PPTA)
consultants was not always satisfactory. One of the reasons for cost overrun in the
water supply component, leading to the supplementary loan, was that reconstruction
of new facilities was necessary rather than rehabilitation of some of the old structures.
This reflected inadequate due diligence prior to loan appraisal. Kampong Cham
Waterworks reported that during the TA stage, the consultants visited Kampong Cham
for only 1 day, during the rainy season. Part of the town area was flooded and was
therefore not visited. As such, the issue that existing dug wells were of insufficient
depth was not identified. That area was therefore not included as part of the service
area in the project. After that single visit, Kampong Cham Waterworks was not
consulted until the project was in its implementation stage.
48.
Secondly, the evaluation team also noted oversight and mistakes on the part of
the implementation consultant in initiating or reviewing changes in the course of the
project. These included: (i) under sizing of degritting, flocculation, and clarification
tanks; (ii) no lightning protection other than for the elevated water towers; (iii) the
approval of an incompatible design change at Svay Rieng proposed by the contractor;
and (iv) retention of the old leaking asbestos cement raw water pipe for Kampot.
49.
Thirdly, the waterworks staff complained that the consultant who served as
supervising engineer was not sufficiently diligent in safeguarding the interests and
contractual rights of the employer (i.e., MIME). All waterworks reported problems with
the quality of equipment supplied and installed by the project. Some of the defects
were noticeable before turnover, while some manifested during the 1-year defect
liability period. However, insufficient support was provided by the supervising engineer
resulting in the waterworks accepting defective constructed works right from the
beginning. Some waterworks recalled having only one site engineer deployed by the
supervising engineer during construction. This level of construction supervision was
insufficient as different engineering disciplines were required in completing a water
treatment project together with extensive pipe laying works. The supervising engineers
on site were also not diligent in checking and approving the contractors method
statements, or were not effective in monitoring the contractors civil works.
50.
Fourthly, training of local staff by consultants in O&M and laboratory testing
was insufficient and not tailored to suit the low educational level of the waterworks
personnel. As such, some waterworks were unable to conduct meaningful water quality
testing after project completion. This deficiency had only been partly rectified, with the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) offering more in-depth and extensive
laboratory training to the responsible personnel. The O&M manuals and equipment
catalogs were mainly in English. The O&M manual was believed to be rarely (if at all)
referred to by the operators. Although the contractor was responsible for O&M training
and preparation of O&M manuals, the implementation consultant was responsible for
reviewing and approving such outputs.
51.
Lastly, consultants conducted subsoil investigation to arrive at the pond design
for the WWTP. This led to design changes during construction to account for the poor
subsoil conditions, which resulted in cost overruns in Part C (WWTP). In the consultants
design, provisions had not been made for (i) future extensions; and (ii) regular O&M.
Now that land has become more valuable in Sihanoukville, treatment plant expansion
would face increasing objections and difficulties. Wastewater infrastructure should
have been designed with provisions for convenient O&M. Provisions for pond
desludging and dewatering of dredged material should have been made, to make it
more convenient to carry out such operations.
H.
Loan Covenants
52.
Not all covenants were included in the RRP of the original loan. A list of
18 clauses was included in the supplementary loan RRP, and this list was used as the
basic list by the evaluation team. The PCR, however, provided a status for only 15, not
entirely identical, clauses. The discrepancy was due to the fact that the supplementary
loan RRP did not take account of the changed situation in its covenant list.
53.
The status of compliance with loan covenants is shown in Supplementary
Appendix C. The PCR reported that three covenants related to (i) water supply tariffs,
(ii) water collection and financial ratios, and (iii) WWTP cost recovery were only partially
complied with. Small improvements had been made in relation to these three issues
since the PCR. Some other clauses were found by the evaluation to be partially
complied with rather than complied with as assessed in the PCR, and they were also
generally tariff related.
13
CHAPTER 3
Performance Assessment
54.
This chapter assesses the projects performance based on established core
criteriarelevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. These criteria are based
on the guidelines developed by IED and approved by ADB (footnote 1).
A.
Overall Assessment
55.
The evaluation rated the overall project performance less than successful, which
is consistent with the PVR rating given earlier. The project contributed to improvements
in access to piped water in the six provincial towns and the WWTP in Sihanoukville.
However, the coverage of piped water in these provincial towns was less than intended
and still remains grossly inadequate, although the government is seeking external
support from development partners to address this problem. The WWTP was facing
capacity constraints largely due to rapid expansion of Cambrew and the emergence of
several small industries, such as garment and shoe factories. Incentives for wastewater
connections were inadequate in the absence of an effective regulatory framework and
the enforcement of environmental regulations.
56.
Even nearly 7 years after project completion, waterworks and the WWTP face
weak technical and managerial capacity, although capacity varies across the towns.
Faulty water meters, poor-quality water pipes, and lack of funds for regular and
periodic O&M have hampered full capacity utilization of the infrastructure developed
under the project. Without legal and administrative reforms and devolution of power
to waterworks and the WWTP, the viability of utilities remains questionable. The core
evaluation criteria assessed by the evaluation team is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Assessment of Overall Performance

Criterion
Relevance
Effectiveness
Weight
(%)
25
25
Efficiency
25
Sustainability
Overall
25
Assessment
Relevant
Less than
effective
Less than
efficient
Less than likely
Less than successful
Rating Valuea
2
1
Weighted Rating
0.50
0.25
0.25
0.25
1.25
The rating values are: 3 = highly relevant/highly effective/highly efficient/most likely sustainable; 2 =
relevant/effective/efficient/likely sustainable; 1 = less than relevant/less than effective/less than efficient/less
likely sustainable; and 0 = irrelevant/ineffective/inefficient/not likely sustainable.
Source: Independent Evaluation Department assessment.
B.
Relevance
57.
The evaluation rated the project relevant, consistent with both the PCR and PVR
ratings. The project was consistent with Cambodias development priorities25 and with
ADBs country and sector strategies in improving access to water and wastewater
management in provincial towns for a better urban environment. Improved access to
water supply for the population in provincial towns had positively contributed to
Cambodias progress toward achieving part of the MDG pertaining to ensuring
environmental sustainability (MDG 7C) in terms of improved access to safe water for
the wider population. ADB support was appropriate in improving the water supply
infrastructure in the six underserved provincial towns. This resulted in improved access
to drinking water in six towns and wastewater treatment in Sihanoukville.
58.
The water treatment process design was in general appropriate for the
individual towns. Where the raw water was from a river source, a full spectrum of
conventional treatment processes were called for to settle out larger particles and filter
out the fine particulates. As such, waterworks at Battambang, Kampong Thom,
Kampot, and Pursat were provided with flocculation, clarification, filtration, and
chlorination processes. As the ground water source for Kampong Cham was of a good
quality, only chlorination was required to render the water potable. The ground water
source for Svay Rieng, on the other hand, was high in iron, and an iron removal process
was appropriately specified. The technical skills required for operating and maintaining
the waterworks were not difficult. A purely gravity-based sewerage system was
provided for in Sihanoukville such that no electricity was required for pumping. The low
cost and near-zero power consumption sewage conveyance and wastewater treatment
design required very low maintenance efforts. The technical skills required for O&M
were low. The project should have introduced a tariff structure based on type and
volume of use for water supply and source, type, and quantity of discharge for WWTP
connections.
59.
A water tariff system was already established in each of the six towns, which
formed a basis for future refinement of the fee mechanism for (i) connection to the
supply network and (ii) the amount of water consumed. Similarly, there was already an
established wastewater tariff system in Sihanoukville that charged lump sum fees for
connection to the sewerage network, and monthly flat rates for wastewater treatment.
However, the tariff system did not take into account the amount and types of
wastewater generated by the clients.
60.
The evaluation team noted feedback from the officials at provincial waterworks
regarding the TA teams inadequate consultations with the technical staff, which could
have strengthened the project design and enhanced the relevance of the project to the
intended stakeholders (paras. 6771). According to the respondents, the TA engineers
spent very little time in the field. The PCR also noted that more consultations with
stakeholders and thorough geotechnical and topographical surveys during the design
phase could have provided better project cost estimates, avoided design changes, and
prevented cost overruns, supplementary loan financing, and implementation delays.26
25
26
Cambodias Rectangular Strategy (Rectangular-II) para. 84 states that the Royal Government will pay
more attention to the rights of people to clean water supply to ensure food safety and better livelihoods in
accordance with the Cambodia MDGs and will also preserve the ecosystem of unpolluted water and clean
environment, cited in Overview on Urban Water Supply Sector in the Kingdom of Cambodia, SubTechnical Working Group for Urban Water Supply, Infrastructure and Regional Integration Technical
Working Group (IRITWG), Phnom Penh, January 2012.
15
16
61.
The CSHAP was relevant to the stakeholders in terms of public health
outcomes. However, due to lack of expertise in the two executing agencies, it did not
take off. The program lacked ownership and wound down prematurely without any
visible footprints. The evaluation mission did not find any evidence supporting such
activities in any of the project towns even though funds were spent. There was no
serious ownership for implementing this component. Involvement of a competent
nongovernment organization (NGO) and/or health ministry staff for this purpose could
have helped implement the activities under the program. Overall, efforts to address
sanitation challenges were deemed grossly inadequate.
62.
Improved local governance and resource mobilization was relevant for
Cambodia at the time of project formulation given weak institutional structures.
However, the governments commitment to implement reform measures was not clear
at the outset, partly due to uncertainty about the envisaged ramifications of such
measures. Inadequate consultations and varied expectations from stakeholders
demonstrated that envisaged measures were externally imposed.
63.
The institutional capacity of provincial waterworks and Sihanoukville WWTP
was found to be weak. None of the provinces had the adequate technical and
managerial capacity to expand the program as envisaged in the project design.
The support from the executing agencies to provincial towns was limited.
64.
The project design rightly identified the need for including a cost recovery
mechanism, implementation of a community awareness and education program to
encourage community participation in environmental sanitation, and institutional
strengthening and capacity building. The identification of these needs formed the basis
for two key project componentsCSHAP and local governance and resource
mobilization. However, the implementation modalities for these components were
poorly understood or owned by the government.
65.
The inclusion of Sihanoukville in the project scope was misplaced. The project
could have either covered another provincial town or Sihanoukville municipality for
improving water services. Given that Sihanoukville was included largely to cover
Cambrews wastewater treatment, a separate initiative would have been more relevant.
Due diligence carried out for Cambrews inclusion in the project was inadequate.
Cambrew had its own treatment plant and it was not willing to connect to the WWTP
during project implementation. The company eventually connected to the WWTP
following rapid expansion but only after project completion and when regulatory
measures were enforced.
C.
Effectiveness
66.
The evaluation rates the project as less than effective, which is consistent with
the PCR and PVR ratings. Despite improvement in water supply coverage in six towns
and sewer connection coverage in Sihanoukville since project completion, the full
potential of the project benefits have not been met even at the time of evaluation.
67.
Water supply. Table 3 summarizes improvement in access to water supply in
the six provincial towns. Overall, the population in these towns increased by 23%
during 20082013, with significant variations across the towns served. Over the same
period, the number of water supply connections and the population served nearly
doubled. However, this achievement still accounts for only 39% of the population of
17
the towns (141,003 against a target of serving 350,000 people). This would imply that
either the targets were set too high or institutional capacity to expand continued to
remain weak. Nevertheless, there was enough scope to expand access to the remaining
61% of people in these towns.
Table 3: Access to Provincial Waterworks at Project Completion and Evaluation
Kampong
Kampong
Waterworks
Battambang
Cham
Thom
Kampot
Population in Service Area
At completion
135,539
42,302
29,883
39,621
At evaluation
171,605
47,379
31,998
46,899
Change (%)
27
12
7
18
Number of Connectionsa
At design
4,614
1,632
796
1,570
At completion
4,999
2,927
1,459
2,352
At evaluation
9,877
5,714
3,177
4,248
Change (%)
98
95
118
81
Population Served
At design
At completion
24,020
14,615
6,860
11,490
At evaluation
40,217
30,284
16,037
20,940
Change (%)
67
107
134
82
Coverage (Population Served/Total Population in Service Area)
At completion (%)
18
35
23
29
At evaluation (%)
23
64
50
45
Change (%)
5
29
27
16
Svay
Rieng
Pursat
28,406
46,347
63
21,895
21,113
(7)
297,646
365,341
23
1,452
2,172
5,016
131
303
851
1,792
111
10,376
14,760
29,824
102
10,880
25,080
131
4,160
8,445
103
350,000
72,025
141,003
96
38
54
16
19
40
21
24
39
15
() = negative number, = data not available.

a
Funding for network extension after project completion came from various sources, including a loan from
the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), UNHabitat, and domestic allocation. The funding allocation for such extension and improvement works is not
evenly spread across the six towns; some towns such as Battambang and Pursat have received more funding
than the others, such as Kampong Thom.
Source: Independent Evaluation Department evaluation mission data collected by the evaluation team from
provincial waterworks.
68.
All six waterworks reported an impressive reduction in NRW since project
completion (Table 4).27 The target of reducing NRW to 35% by 2004 and 30% by 2005
has been exceeded. The average NRW in 2013 was assessed to be 17%, down from
32% in 2007. The reduction was mainly realized due to (i) replacement of leaking water
pipes; (ii) replacement of inaccurate water meters; (iii) more diligent meter reading and
billing; and (iv) replacement of old or leaking water pipes. Further improvement in NRW
reduction would have been achieved through active leakage detection and control.
More advanced training in leakage control and network management, conducted by
the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA), for relevant waterworks staff would
have further helped in this endeavor.
69.
Several quality issues were reported on plant, equipment, pipe fittings, and
water meters installed under the project. Frequent breakdowns were affecting the
performance of all the waterworks to a varying extent. The inherent quality issues in
the waterworks required budget allocation to enable more robust water supply.
All equipment requires periodic inspections, servicing, and change of parts, and
overhaul after some years of operation. Such servicing schedules should have been
clearly indicated in the O&M manual for the operators reference. However, since the
27
Total
Para. 15 of the validation report noted that the NRW for two towns was high55% for Kampong Cham
and 47% for Pursat. However, the quoted NRW figures should have been 18% for Kampong Cham and
27% for Pursat, and these were not high. The validation report misquoted the water supply coverage
percentage of the two towns as the NRW levels.
18

O&M manuals were in English, they were rarely referred to. Staff capabilities varied
significantly across the six waterworks. Continuous tailored training and skill
development for the operators was necessary to help ensure sustainability in O&M of
the supply systems. However, this was not done. Experience gained at any one of the
waterworks was not shared with the others. A structured framework for sharing
mutual experience was needed to better promote the sustainability of the project.
Table 4: Water Production, Sales,

Sales, and Nonr
Nonrevenue Water in Provincial Towns
Kampong
Kampong
Waterworks
Battambang
Cham
Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay Rieng
Total
Production (m3/annum)
At design
4,204,800
3,285,000
2,102,400
2,102,400
2,102,400
1,752,000
15,549,000
At completion
1,642,500
611,375
428,510
1,128,580
402,230
165,345
4,378,540
At evaluation
3,240,105
2,205,695
924,910
1,449,415
1,320,935
675,250
9,816,310
Water Sales (m3/annum)
At completion
1,165,770
499,437
308,049
626,921
291,666
78,606
2,970,449
At evaluation
2,576,986
1,946,561
767,715
1,178,629
1,096,583
577,794
8,144,268
NRW (m3/annum)
At completion
508,663
112,094
120,617
501,699
110,494
86,774
1,440,341
At evaluation
663,196
259,025
157,203
270,789
224,243
97,690
1,413,380
NRW (%)
At design
30
At completion
29
18
28
44
27
52
32
At evaluation
20
12
17
19
17
14
17
= data not available, NRW = nonrevenue water.
Source: Independent Evaluation Department evaluation mission data collected by the evaluation team from provincial
waterworks.
70.
Water quality. The waterworks were reported to be generally able to meet
Cambodias 2004 national drinking water standard (Table 5). Water quality testing was
carried out once or twice a day at each waterworks: (i) at the inlet; (ii) after
clarification; (iii) after filtration; and (iv) in the treated water tank to test for
temperature, pH, turbidity, free chlorine, total dissolved solids, conductivity, color, and
alkalinity in water. Such a regime would have been sufficient only if carried out
regularly and faithfully. However, water quality records at the waterworks laboratories
had many blank data fields suggesting that due diligence in waste quality sampling for
testing and monitoring remained inadequate. Lack of trained staff and operating
expenditure limitations contributed to this.
Table 5: Cambodia Drinking Water Standard
Water Quality
Parameter
pH
Color
Turbidity
Ammonia
Chloride
Unit
TCU
NTU
mg/l
mg/l
2004 Standard
Value
6.58.5
5
5
1.5
250
Water Quality
Parameter
Hardiness
Iron
Manganese
Sodium
Total dissolved solids
Unit
mg/l
mg/l
mg/l
mg/l
mg/l
2004
Standard
Value
300
0.3
0.1
200
300
NTU = nephelometric turbidity unit, TCU = true color unit.

Source: Ministry of Mines, Industry and Energy, Phnom Penh.
71.
For example, in Svay Rieng, tests for concentrations of iron and manganese
were additionally required as indicated in its standard water quality recording format.
However, the two parameters were not routinely tested. According to staff at Kampong
Cham, training in water sampling and testing during project implementation was
insufficient and not tailored to suit the low educational level of the personnel. Only a
2-day training at Battambang was organized for all six waterworks. After the laboratory
was set up by the contractor, no further training was conducted. This shortcoming
should have been immediately addressed by ADB during project implementation.

As such, the waterworks was unable to conduct meaningful water quality testing.
This deficiency was partly rectified, with JICA offering an in-depth and extensive
training to the laboratory staff.
72.
Wastewater management. The wastewater collection system in Sihanoukville
was purely a gravity system with a total length of 65.7 km and no pumping stations.
The trunk sewer is 900 mm in diameter, discharging wastewater into the pond system.
There had been no extension of the system since project completion. The initial house
connections under the ADB project were made directly into the sewers. However,
frequent sewer blockages were encountered due to solid waste and heavy oil and
grease contents in the local sewage. The WMU had only one functional high-pressure
water jetting machine to clear the blockages.
73.
The number of wastewater connections in Sihanoukville was only 580 at
project completion, and had grown to 1,326 in 2013 (an increase of 129% since project
completion) but was still below the project target of 3,344 connections. While the
towns population had increased substantially over the last 5 years on the back of a
tourism boom, wastewater connection remained low, which was largely attributable to
lack of awareness by households, the lack of a proper awareness campaign, relatively
high connection fees as perceived by the residents, and the absence of an effective
regulatory framework to address waste disposal and pollution control in the town.
Coastal and other low lying areas in Sihanoukville were lower than the sewers. These
areas were not connected to the sewerage networks, and could not be connected
unless pumping was provided.28
74.
Since 2007, all new connections were required to include a septic tank and a
grease trap. The new arrangement was reported to be very effective in minimizing
sewer blockages and thus maintenance efforts. The households would clear the grease
traps themselves once in a while; restaurants have to clear the traps about every 2 days.
Households would call the WMU when their septic tanks were full. The WMU then sent
a vacuum truck to pump out the contents of the septic tank, charging a fee. The truck
then disposed of the pump-out into the anaerobic ponds of the WWTP.29 Since the
WMU had only one vacuum truck, with a steadily increasing number of septic tanks,
they could not keep up with demand, which led to a delay in desludging services.
75.
The anaerobic ponds had not been desludged since 2011 and only three of the
four ponds were operating, but they appeared to perform reasonably well.30
The maturation ponds had not been desludged since project completion and were fairly
full with solids at the upstream end of the ponds. The municipal sewage had
undergone a certain degree of primary treatment before entering the sewers and then
the WWTP. However, the practice of disposing of the septic tank contents back into the
pond system was unnecessarily loading the WWTP with solids. Furthermore,
as observed on site, an HDPE lining was put on top of concrete slabs on the slopes of
the anaerobic ponds, and on top of rip-rap at the other ponds. This is an inappropriate
design.31
28
29
30
31
If pumping was introduced, it would have faced challenges such as (i) additional land requirements;
(ii) increased need for plant and equipment; (iii) greater power consumption; (iv) increased O&M demands;
and (v) environmental impacts associated with sewerage facilities.
The WMU has only one vacuum truck, which was still functioning well.
Due to algae growth, one pond was not used.
Placing HDPE lining on top of rip-rap makes in susceptible to puncture by the stones, and once punctured
it would no longer prevent seepage into the ground.
19
20
76.
A 400 mm diameter sewer served Cambrew. The PCR reported that the sewer
was dedicated to the brewery, but according to the WMU the sewer was also collecting
sewage from some households and a dyeing factory. Cambrews water demand stood
at about 4,900 m3/day in 2013.32 Wastewater from the brew house, soft drink factory,
and packaging plant is combined, and since 2010 has been discharged into the
Sihanoukville sewerage system.33 The discharge was estimated at 1,500 m3/day in 2010,
and a lump sum treatment tariff of KR4 million (or about $1,000) per year was levied.
This was equivalent to only KR90/m3.
77.
The WWTP apparently could not cope with the increased flow and heavy
pollution loads, leading too much of the solids escaping from the anaerobic ponds into
the facultative ponds. The WMU then instructed Cambrew to install a pretreatment
plant.34 The discharge in 2013 was estimated at 2,652 m3/day. While the WWTP is rated
at 5,700 m3/day, the actual flow quantity into the system was not monitored.35
According to the WMU, the total flow from Cambrew was high, but there was no flow
meter or water quality monitoring system at the discharge point for Cambrew.
The brewerys wastewater was expected to increase from about 2,652 m3/day to
6,000 m3/day in the near future as a result of massive expansion of the plant,
surpassing the WWTPs capacity.
D.
Efficiency
78.
The evaluation rated project performance less than efficient.36 The assessment
of post-completion progress has been taken into consideration in determining the
projects efficiency rating.
79.
The PCR assessment was largely based on EIRR computations, although such an
assessment was not undertaken for the WWTP. The PVRs inefficient rating, was based
on (i) a much lower recalculated EIRR (compared to the PCRs EIRR calculation),
(ii) 17 months implementation delays due to design changes, and (iii) lack of
government support for devolution of urban functions to provincial and municipal
governments. The project encountered nearly 2 years of delay (two extensions), largely
due to design and capacity issues in provincial and municipal governments. Wastewater
management alone accounted for almost half of the total project cost.
80.
32
33
34
35
36
The
projects
efficiency
improved
considerably
after
completion
as
The WMU reported that the sewer was insufficient to cope with the flow, and manhole covers would at
times be blown open by the excess discharge. As a stopgap measure, the WMU reduced Cambrews
connection to a 200 mm pipe, so as to restrict the flow entering the 400 mm sewer. However, by doing so,
any excess partially treated wastewater would leak into the environment.
Raw beverage wastewater was initially discharged into the pond system without any treatment.
The pretreatment plant was being commissioned in 2013, and partially treated beverage wastewater was
already being discharged into the Sihanoukville WWTP. It was rated at 6,000 m3/day and designed to
produce a treated effluent for sewer discharge and not for direct discharge into the sea. There was only
one unit each for each treatment step (e.g., one anaerobic tank and one clarifier); there was no standby or
redundancy to deal with any major breakdown of any of the treatment process steps.
According to the design report, sewers were designed to flow at a maximum velocity of 0.9 m/s. As such,
the 400 mm sewer was expected to carry an average flow of not more than 5,000 m3/day. The MPWT
subsequently confirmed that the 400 mm sewer was intended to carry 1,600 m3/day of wastewater.
This evaluation notes that the PVR incorrectly linked water supply coverage and wastewater generation
under the project. The sites are in different provinces and, hence, the following statement from the PVR
(para. 17) is inaccurate: since water supply coverage appears to be greater (40%) than the connections to
the sewage system (20%), there is an issue as to whether the wastewater treatment capacity is adequate
to treat the incremental wastewater generated from operation of the projects water supply components.
21
demonstrated by the significant reduction in NRW. Likewise, capacity utilization also

improved considerably post completion (Table 6). No major improvements or
upgrading of infrastructure had taken place at any of the waterworks after project
completion. There were, however, quality issues in the installed equipment at the water
treatment plants, causing the waterworks to operate in a less efficient manner.
Table 6: Capacity Utilization of Waterworks at Project Completion and Evaluation
Assessment at
Completion (%)
Evaluation (%)
Battambang
39
77
Kampong
Cham
19
67
Kampong
Thom
20
44
Kampot
54
69
Pursat
19
63
Svay
Rieng
9
39
Overall
28
63
Source: Data collected by Independent Evaluation Department evaluation team from the provincial waterworks.
81.
As shown in Table 3, there is still a huge shortfall in meeting demand for
drinking water. The evaluation team learned during the field visits that JICA was
considering supporting new waterworks in Battambang and Kampong Cham, while
MIME was considering supporting waterworks expansion in Pursat from internal
resources to address excess demand. ADB has approved a new water supply project for
Cambodia which will aim to rehabilitate five of the six waterworks of the project.
82.
Economic efficiency.
efficiency Table 7 summarizes EIRR computations at different stages
of the project. Overall, the EIRR at evaluation was lower than at appraisal, reappraisal,
and project completion. Lower EIRR values at evaluation were primarily the result of
construction cost overruns and lower than expected achievements (i.e., fewer
connections than anticipated at appraisal). At the operational phase of the project, the
lower EIRRs were primarily because of increasing operating costs but no increase in
water tariff (other than Pursat) since 2007. The EIRRs of Battambang (9.2%) and Svay
Rieng (10.8%) were below the standard opportunity cost of capital of 12%. Kampot, at
11.8%, was also marginally below this threshold. While Kampong Cham, Kampong
Thom, and Pursat were higher than the 12% threshold, their EIRRs were very much
lower than calculated at appraisal. The economic performance of the six waterworks
was rated satisfactory at the border line (average 11.8%). Pursat, at 13.8%, was the
best performer among the six waterworks, largely due to an increase in the water tariff
in 2010 to KR1,600/m3, the highest among the six towns. The project economic analysis
is presented in Appendix 3.
Table 7: Economic Internal Rate of Return of Project Waterworks at Different Stages
Project Town
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay Rieng
Appraisal
15.6
34.6
16.6
25.0
20.2
15.9
Reappraisal
17.1
22.7
15.5
23.9
15.4
14.7
EIRR (%)
Project
Completion
13.3
16.1
12.1
13.8
14.9
12.3
Performance
Evaluation
9.2
12.4
12.9
11.8
13.8
10.8
EIRR = economic internal rate of return.

Source: Independent Evaluation Department computation.
83.
No comparative figures were available to compute the EIRR of the WWTP.
Neither the RRP nor the PCR estimated the EIRR for this component. Given the
significant cost of the WWTP, the likely effect is that the project becomes less than
efficient.
22
E.
Sustainability
84.
The project was rated less than likely sustainable, unless more funds are
allocated by the executing agencies for O&M, repairs, replacements, upgrades, or
extension of the project assets on a regular basis. The tariff structures are not yet
conducive to achieving reasonable cost recovery. This assessment was consistent with
the PVR rating. The PVR, based on an update from the Cambodia Resident Mission in
2012, also reported that long-term project sustainability was unlikely. The financial
status of each of the six waterworks (see Appendix 3) suggests that under the current
water tariff structure financial viability is less likely since there is resistance to increasing
water tariffs.
85.
The FIRR for each of the waterworks is given in Table 8. The FIRR for
Battambang waterworks was negative, and the FIRR for Kampot is well below the
WACC. Based on available data, this evaluation considers Battambang waterworks not
viable and Kampot waterworks less viable. The negative FIRR for Battambang
waterworks was largely associated with increasing operating costs and a very low
water tariff. These two provincial towns (Battambang and Kampot) accounted for 48%
of water production, 46% of water sale, and 66% of NRW. Kampong Cham, Kampong
Thom, Pursat, and Svay Rieng were financially viable, with FIRRs ranging from 5.9% to
6.7%, higher than the WACC of 5%.
Table 8: Financial Internal Rate of Return for Project Waterworks at Different Stages
Project Town
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay Rieng
Appraisal
6.6
9.5
4.4
4.5
5.5
4.2
Reappraisal
6.7
7.8
7.9
3.3
5.8
6.0
FIRR (%)
Project
Completion
5.4
6.7
5.4
7.5
5.5
5.3
Performance Evaluation
(2.8)
6.6
6.0
3.9
5.9
6.7
() = negative number, FIRR = financial internal rate of return.

Source: Independent Evaluation Department computation.
86.
Waterworks had to refer to MIME for a review of connection fees and water
tariffs. There was no consistency among the six towns (Table 9) in terms of the level of
connection fee or unit water tariff. Every waterworks levied its own tariff scale for
domestic, institutional, and commercial users in its own service area. There was no
tariff standard for industrial users, as they source their own water and were not
supplied by the waterworks. While the water tariff was generally low, the connection
fee at $100150 is prohibitive for poorer households. Kampong Cham has recently
started a scheme to offer subsidized connections to very-poor and poor
households.37 A similar subsidy scheme could have been considered in other provincial
towns, based on a proper identification of eligible poor households. However, any such
cross-subsidization must be carefully examined so that the balance sheet of waterworks
remains healthy.
37
In water pricing, a lifeline tariff is normally set below cost to provide the poor with inexpensive water.
Higher prices are charged to richer customers and companies who are known to use more water and have
a greater ability to pay.
23
Table 9: Water Supply Connection Fee and Water Tariff Levied by Provincial Town Waterworks
Kampong
Waterworks
Battambang
Cham
Connection Fee (KR/connection)
At completion
200,000
200,000
At evaluation
600,000
440,000
Domestic Water Tariff (KR/m3)
At completion
1,400
735
At evaluation
1,500
876
Source: Independent Evaluation Department evaluation team.
Kampong
Thom
Kampot
Pursat
200,000
400,000
58,748
452,000
370,000
370,000
200,000
420,000
1,0001,300
1,500
1,200
1,400
8001,300
1,600
900
1,200
87.
The sewer and WWTP design did not give due consideration to future flow
increases. The capacity of the WWTP was already insufficient to cater for more flow.
The coverage of the sewerage system was only 40%, necessitating some form of
upgrade. Otherwise, no further improvement of the water environment could be
realized. If the volume of Cambrew discharge continues to increase, the quality of
effluent discharged from the WWTP will deteriorate. WWTP expansion using the
currently employed technology would take up too much land, but adopting a different
treatment process for the extension to optimize land use, would require additional
O&M resources, including different skill sets. The WWTP desperately requires
desludging, but the current design is not conducive for desludging and sludge drying.
Furthermore, cost recovery is unlikely, unless the agreement with industries such as
Cambrew is based on volume of discharge at appropriate pricing to ensure
sustainability.
88.
On instruction by the local government, Battambang waterworks has started
collecting wastewater discharge fees in the same bill as the water tariff, on behalf of
the local government. This was a first step in the right direction, and forms a basis for
Cambodia to levy tariffs for both water supply and wastewater management. Some
households were unwilling to pay or could not afford to connect to the sewerage
system, according to the survey conducted for the evaluation (see Appendix 4 for key
findings). Thus, connected properties had to deal with the unhygienic conditions of
unconnected neighbors. In addition, the immediate benefits of the wastewater system
were not provided to the most popular tourism areas. The beaches for which
Sihanoukville is famous were in low lying areas that would have required pumping in
order to be connected to the existing sewers.
89.
Both the connection fee and monthly lump sum wastewater tariff were
generally low. While the low connection fee was conducive to achieving more
connections, there was no effective pollution control regulation to prohibit illegal
wastewater discharge. As such, the number of voluntary household and business
connections remained low. Charging a higher connection fee to the industrial and
commercial dischargers to subsidize poor household connections was required in the
loan covenants, but this did not happen. The existing fixed rate wastewater tariff
structure was not sustainable. It needed to be equitable and refinement was needed to
correlate wastewater disposal to the actual volume and type of discharge.
90.
One of the key features of the project design was improved local governance.
However, government did not implement the recommendations of a study on legal and
administrative structures for a model local government with fully decentralized
authority for urban development.38 Had proper decentralization of waterworks taken
place, waterworks authorities would have paid more attention to enhancing technical
and economic efficiency, further reduction of NRW, ensuring a sustainable basis for
38
The study was completed in June 2002 (footnote 2, para. 22).
Svay Rieng
24

retaining trained technical staff, and administering water pricing based on production
and distribution costs.
91.
One loan covenant called for comprehensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
of the projects technical performance and social and economic benefits, in particular
benefits for disadvantaged social groups. The supplementary loan RRP noted that for
MIME, initial development of an M&E program, delivery of an M&E training program,
and the baseline surveys were carried out in two provinces during September 2000. PIU
staff in the four other provinces were trained in August 2002, under the guidance of
the project implementation consultants. An initial M&E report was to be submitted to
ADB by September 2003. For the MPWT, it was agreed that an M&E program was to be
submitted to ADB by September 2004, after receiving and reviewing the O&M manuals
to be prepared by the construction contractors. However, there was no further update
on the projects M&E program. The evaluation team learned that this activity was not
carried out, although this covenant was reported as complied with in the back-tooffice report. Hence, the M&E covenant was deemed only partly complied with.
CHAPTER 4
Other Assessments
92.
This chapter covers assessments of other non-core evaluation criteria: (i) project
impacts, (ii) performance of ADB, (iii) performance of the borrower, and
(iv) performance of the technical assistance provided for preparing project design.
A.
Impacts
93.
The RRP stated that the project was classified as environmental category B and
positive social impacts were expected.39 The evaluation concluded that the overall
project impact had been moderate, and this was consistent with the PVR assessment.40
The PCR did not provide a rating on project impacts. According to the PCR, (i) the
project did not have significant adverse environmental impacts, (ii) proper
environmental management plans were designed with specific mitigating measures
that included traffic rerouting, phasing of construction works, and appropriate design
and construction methods, including guidelines for groundwater protection
measures.41 However, the PCR did not explain how these conclusions were arrived at.
Moreover, there was no clarity as to whether the environmental management plans
were effectively implemented and monitored.
94.
Similarly, the PCR also stated that the project improved peoples health by
providing safe WSS, and ensured equitable access to these services by limiting the cost
for the poor who had no access to safe water. It reported that the project had positive
socioeconomic impacts, including increased access to improved WSS, a reduction in
waterborne diseases, and increased hygiene awareness and more hygienic practices,
resulting in improved health and quality of life for the communities. The PCR
acknowledged that the social impact had been only moderate because the connections
were still being established and the number of beneficiaries was below target. This was
confirmed by the number of connections established at completion (Table 3).
95.
The PCR, however, lacked evidence to support these socioeconomic impact
claims. The PCR confirmed that all affected people were compensated as reported by
the Resettlement Unit of the Ministry of Economics and Finance. However, it did not
report the number of affected people compensated. At a bare minimum, some
statistics on this should have been incorporated in the report.
96.
The evaluation team visited all waterworks sites and based on its assessment,
found that the operation of the waterworks generally had little negative impact on the
39
40
41
The project was expected to improve the environmental conditions in the project towns by introducing
appropriate sanitation measures, and rehabilitating and expanding water supply systems and a sewerage
system. Expected social impacts included equitable access to water and sanitation services (footnote 6,
paras. 6061).
The PVR rated project impact modest for the following reasons (i) failure to sustain the sanitation
committees will likely reverse any initial impact of the CSHAP component; (ii) the water supply component
will provide positive benefits, but only 40% of those under the maximum coverage can enjoy these
benefits; (iii) any impact of the wastewater component will be limited because of the low connection rate;
and (iv) failure to achieve institutional reforms and decentralization.
26

environment. Only three minor negative impacts were identified: (i) noise pollution
caused by pumping plants and blowers for the filters; (ii) risks due to the delivery,
storage, and use of chlorine, which is a poisonous gas; and (iii) clarifier sludge and filter
backwash generated as wastewater from the treatment processes being discharged
into a nearby river without any treatment. Addressing the risk of chlorine usage, forced
ventilation is provided in the chlorine plant at each works to diffuse any accidental
spills. An emergency shower and eye wash system is also provided, although such
provisions were found to be not working in most of the works (except in Kampong
Cham). With regard to wastewater from the treatment process, such discharge
containing pollutants (removed from the raw water and carry-over water treatment
chemicals) increased turbidity and chemical contents in the surrounding water
environment. However, it is recognized that the potential capital and running costs of
sludge treatment facilities are high, and such provisions are not yet considered
appropriate for the economic conditions in Cambodia.
97.
The project enabled a significant amount of wastewater to be collected and
treated, thereby reducing pollution released into coastal waters. Such positive
environmental benefits outweigh the unavoidable negative visual and odor impacts of
the pond system on the environment. The current wastewater generation from
Cambrew was overloading the sewerage and treatment system, and an increased flow
was expected. The stopgap measure of restricting Cambrew discharge was causing an
overflow of partially treated or untreated wastewater into the environment. The WWTP
desperately required a responsible and cost-effective approach to regular desludging.
B.
Water Consumption
98.
While the water supply tariff schemes provide drinking water and convenience
to the residents, they also promote higher water usage. In designing the schemes, a
unit consumption of 120 liters per capita per day (lpcd) was adopted. This was
equivalent to approximately 84 lpcd of actual consumption, allowing for losses.
As shown in Table 10 the per capita consumption had steadily increased across all six
towns, far exceeding the project design estimate of 84 lpcd. This may mean that some
households were sharing their connections with their unconnected neighbors. As such,
the per capita consumption figure was either unrealistic or, after the initial investment
of paying for the water connection, most households found that the water tariff was
affordable and were willing to pay for the convenience of having water from the taps,
with little consideration for conserving water or making savings in the water bills. Some
public education would have been appropriate during implementation to remind
consumers of conserving the water resource despite the relatively low water tariff
levied.
Table 10
10: Per Capita Water Consumption in Provincial Towns at Project Completion and Evaluation
Kampong
Kampong
Svay
Waterworks
Battambang
Cham
Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Rieng
Total
Per capita consumption (liters/day)
At design
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
At completion
133
94
123
149
73
52
113
At evaluation
176
176
131
154
120
187
158
Source: Independent Evaluation Department computations based on data collected by the evaluation team from the
waterworks.
Other Assessments
C.
Health Impacts
99.
In absence of a results-based M&E system, it was difficult to ascertain the
actual contribution of the project to the improvement in the overall socioeconomic
status of the beneficiaries. Moreover, many other factors would have led to
improvements over time.
100.
While the PCR claimed that the project contributed to an improved health
status, including a reduction in waterborne diseases, the project did not collect any
data on this. Hence, as a proxy measure, the evaluation relied on Cambodia
Demographic Health Survey data for three time points2000, 2005, and 2010. Data
presented in Table 11 confirms that the prevalence of diarrhea for children under 5
years of age in the six project towns declined from 16.4% in 2000 to 13.2% in 2010,
which represents a 20% decline in diarrhea prevalence.
Table 11
11: Prevalence of Diarrhea in Children Under 5 Years of Age
(%)
Provincial Town
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay Rieng
Sihanoukville
Overall
Phnom Penh
Siem Reap
Overall urban
Overall rural
2000
3.92
0.00
11.59
0.00
26.56
25.00
18.75
16.41
22.06
15.69
17.54
20.71
Year
2005
15.12
19.05
24.56
10.53
24.29
6.25
11.11
15.11
16.07
11.24
17.22
19.27
2010
16.33
16.92
7.04
7.58
6.15
12.28
17.54
13.15
11.36
3.60
11.25
15.68
Source: Cambodia Demographic Health Survey data 2000, 2005, and 2010.
101.
The achievement was significantly less than that for the two big cities: Phnom
Penh recorded a reduction from 22.1% in 2000 to 11.4% in 2010 (a 50% reduction)
and Siem Reap from 15.7% in 2000 to 3.6% in 2010. The prevalence rate in 2010 for
the project-supported provincial towns was still higher than other urban centers
(13.2% vs. 11.3%). Likewise, rural areas showed higher prevalence than urban areas.
According to key informants, the achievement in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap was a
result of health promotional initiatives by NGOs active in the towns. Survey data
collected by the evaluation team for this evaluation (based on 2-week recall) did not
show statistically significant difference in the incidence of diarrhea between the project
and non-project areas, implying that any reduction in the incidence of diarrhea was
largely due to other factors, such as the improving economic condition of the
population over the period, and possibly other initiatives undertaken independently of
the project.
D.
Knowledge, Attitude,
Attitude, and Practice
102.
A survey of sample households was carried out in April-May 2013 for this
evaluation; results are presented in Appendix 4. The survey revealed that knowledge
about the consequences of an unsanitary environment was reasonably high among
both project-supported and non-supported households (Table A4.10). Almost three-
27
28

quarters (74% of households in the project area and 76% in the non-project area) of
respondents were aware that an unsanitary environment and drinking unclean water
made their family members sick. However, less than a quarter of the respondents
believed that these factors spread disease (23% in project and 22% in non-project
areas) and insect growth in the surrounding areas (19% in project and 21% in nonproject areas). Diarrhea was cited as the most prominent health issue resulting from
drinking unclean water (95% of project and 93% of non-project respondents).
However, awareness about other waterborne diseases such as cholera and scabies was
very low.
103.
More than 80% of the respondents stated that keeping the surrounding
environment clean and drinking clean water were effective disease prevention
measures (Table A4.11). Sanitary practices varied across the four sample towns42 with
the exception of washing hands before eating, which was practiced by almost all
respondents. However, practices associated with general cleaning and hand washing,
other than before eating, remained very low (Table A4.9). Hand washing after going to
the toilet was practiced by 41% of respondents in the project area compared to 30% in
the non-project area.43
104.
The method of getting drinking water out of containers varied significantly
between project and non-project households (Table A4.7). Key differences were
scooping with a drinking cup (62% project vs. 77% non-project), using a tap attached
to the container (35% project vs. 13% non-project), and using a long handled scoop
(6% project vs. 14% non-project).
105.
Among the households with no access to piped water or water in their
household premises, back strain was the most common problem (49%), followed by
long distance traveled to fetch water for daily use (25%) (Table A4.6).
106.
Soak away pits and surface seepage comprised the two most common methods
of wastewater discharge by the non-project households (Table A4.8). Only a handful of
households relied on watercourse ponds, open channels or other methods. Only a
quarter of the households surveyed (25.5%) were connected to a sewer system.
This was a marked difference between the project and non-project areas.
107.
The conclusion is that the project may have raised awareness on the
importance of hand washing, but larger awareness changes were absent. It is assumed
that this was related to the rather limited effort that the project had made in
awareness campaigns. Nevertheless, the water connections may have improved the
lives of the people who received them in several ways.
E.
Affordability and Willingness to Pay
108.
The response from the sample survey shows that the affordability of increased
water tariffs remained low. About 38% of those with a water supply connection and
one-third of those willing to connect to water supply services stated that they would
not be able to afford any increase in the water tariff beyond what was currently
charged. About 45% of households in the project area were willing to absorb a small
increase in the water tariffof up to 10% (Table A4.14).
42
43
The survey was conducted in four of the six provincial towns: Battambang, Kampong Cham, Sihanoukville,
and Svay Rieng.
Statistically significant at 1%.
Other Assessments
109.
The survey asked respondents in non-project areas about their willingness to
connect to the water supply system. The findings indicated that the majority were
willing to connect, provided that the water tariff remained low (Table A4.12). Of those
who were not willing to connect (35% from the non-project area), 43.5% felt that they
could not afford the connection and 21.3% responded that connection costs were
prohibitive (Table A4.13). This means that 15%-20% of the population of the provincial
towns is reliant on communal sources of water rather than individual water
connections.
110.
In Sihanoukville municipality, where the WWTP is located, only 9% of
households were connected to the WWTP (Table A4.15). An average connection cost
about KR400,000 (about $1,000) and a monthly fee amounted to less than one dollar.
In the non-project area of the town, the likelihood of connection would have been
higher if connection charges were lower. For example, 70% of households were willing
to connect to the system, but could only afford a connection fee of less than $250
(Table A4.16). When it came to monthly wastewater collection and treatment charges,
two-thirds in the project area and one-third in the non-project area were not willing to
pay any increase (Table A4.17).
111.
The awareness of waste collection and proper disposal was higher in the
project serviced areas of the provincial towns but it tended to vary across the four
towns. Nearly 65% of households in the project areas were willing to use a waste
collection service, compared to only 28% in the non-project areas (Table A4.18).
Those that were not willing to use such a service perceived their quantity of waste to
be very small (49%) and, hence, they could dispose of it easily, either by burning or
dumping rubbish on common ground. About 18% did not see any benefit from an
organized waste disposal system (Table A4.19).
112.
The general perception was that the provision of WSS services was a
government responsibility and hence should be provided at minimum cost or for free.
F.
ADB, Development Partners, and Borrower Performance

1.
Asian Development Bank
113.
The overall performance of ADB was rated satisfactory. ADB addressed
implementation issues and fielded an adequate number of missions during the
implementation period.44 It responded to project needs when required, including
approval of additional financing for completing the project. The executing and
implementing agencies also informed the evaluation team that they were satisfied with
ADBs support as and when needed.
114.
ADB could have played a more effective role in some areas. The project design
teams consultation with technical staff at waterworks proved inadequate. The record
keeping practice during project implementation was somewhat lacking. There were
discrepancies, confusion, or oversight in (i) the number of covenant clauses (see para.
52), (ii) the number of projected beneficiaries (para.94), and (iii) the WWTP land cost.
These, and many other discrepancies, were mainly due to a weak due diligence
exercised by ADB in preparing the supplementary loan RRP. ADB should have critically
44
There is a discrepancy in the number of missions fielded and it could be either 17 or 21. The PCR reported
20 missions.
29
30

assessed the performance of consulting services during implementation. Better
supervision by the consultants would have helped the project to take remedial action as
needed.
115.
The evaluation concluded that for the WWTP component, ADB performance
was less than satisfactory. The evaluation team encountered difficulties in locating
project documents, such as the technical assistance reports, design reports, list of
covenants in the original loan, and other documents. Technical due diligence was
deemed inadequate as a proper assessment of demand and supply had not been done.
2.
Borrower Performance
116.
The performance of the borrower is rated less than satisfactory, which differs
from PCR and PVRs satisfactory assessment. The evaluation concurs with the PCR that
the borrowers performance was satisfactory at the start up stage. However, during
implementation several issues surfaced and waterworks were unable to get full support
from MIME. The PCR notes: Project accounting activities by the PIUs were not as well
organized and controlled at the PMU level, despite the existence of dedicated
accounting staff at the PIU. Payment to the contractors and consultants were generally
late, causing cash flow problems for all parties contracted by the Borrower and
executing agencies.45
117.
At the time of evaluation, the waterworks were getting only limited support
from MIME. In particular, the technical support needed by the waterworks was not
forthcoming, largely due to capacity limitations and funding constraints. During
implementation, more support could have been extended to waterworks staff.
While the borrower agreed to implement needed administrative and legal reforms,
it did not implement the recommendations of the study aimed at strengthening the
institutional capacity of the project. Also, some of the covenants were only partially
complied with by the borrower.
118.
It is true that the borrower was actively seeking support from other
development partners, including ADB to further expand access to WSS. Support from
JICA for technical training for operators at some of the waterworks was appreciated by
provincial staff. However, financial sustainability still remained a question for the
majority of the waterworks and support from the governments internal resources was
not forthcoming in response to their needs.
G.
Technical Assistance
119.
The project design was based on technical assistance approved in October
1996 for preparing an urban development project to meet the demand for basic urban
services.46 The consultants submitted the final report in January 1998. According to the
staff at the waterworks and the WWTP, the project design teams visit to the project
sites was too short and lacked due consultation with relevant stakeholders.
This contributed to design shortcomings, resulting in cost overruns and implementation
delays, which adversely affected project performance. The evaluation rates the technical
assistance less than successful.
45
46

CHAPTER 5
Issues, Lessons, and FollowFollowUp Actions

120.
This chapter highlights key issues facing Cambodias urban WSS subsector and
lessons derived from the project design, implementation, and completion, and
recommends follow-up actions for ADB.
A.
Issues
121.
Water supply and sanitation disconnect. The project design envisaged water
supply and wastewater treatment not to be connected and hence six provincial towns
received support for water supply and Sihanoukville for the WWTP. While the
intervention model appeared simplistic, it did not address the necessary symbiotic
relationship between water supply and wastewater treatment and sanitation. Due to a
lack of in-house expertise in either of the two executing agencies, one of the key
components on community health awareness did not receive adequate attention. As a
result, there was a wide gap between knowledge and practice. Except for the practice
of hand washing after going to the toilet, which was more prevalent in the project
area, the awareness and practices pertaining to health and hygiene were not markedly
different in project and non-project areas. This calls for engagement of NGOs in this
endeavor.
122.
Evaluation noted that the institutional link to address health outcomes through
the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation was weak. Urban administration
was functionally divided between two line ministries, which had corresponding
departments in the provincial and municipal governments. MIME was in charge of
water supply in provinces and municipalities other than Phnom Penh, and the MPWT
was responsible for all other public works in provincial towns, including sanitation and
wastewater. All budgeting and investment decisions were made at the central
ministries in Phnom Penh. A coordinating mechanism at the central level between the
two ministries is needed in addressing the problem.
123.
Governance structure.
structure. The provincial offices of the line ministries were
essentially their executing arms, but the provincial governments had very little decisionmaking power for urban infrastructure investments. Neither O&M funding nor technical
backup support from MIME and the MPWT were forthcoming when needed.
124.
The project design duly recognized the constraints in the urban sector, in terms
of lack of financial and human resources and weak institutional capacities. This was to
be addressed by strengthening project management. It assumed that over time the
waterworks would gain financial and administrative autonomy to ensure with needed
reforms. However, since the government did not adopt suggested reforms, the
institutional arrangement provided little authority and limited incentives for the
provincial and municipal governments to expand their financial revenues, undertake
O&M responsibilities, or improve the quality of urban services. Part D of the project,
among other things, was to review the local government structure and develop a legal
32

and administrative model for local government with fully decentralized authority for
urban development and management. The Part D study was completed in June 2002,
but the recommendations were not implemented due to lack of government support.
The target of developing a new legal and administrative government model was
therefore not achieved. The older, inefficient model is still in use. There is a need to
address the institutional disconnect between water supply and sanitation.. In addition,
there is also a need to develop a master plan for each urban center with an aim to
tackle water supply, wastewater management, and sanitation challenges based on an
integrated approach.
125.
Cost recovery. Administrative and legal reforms envisaged under the project
could have provided a feasible cost recovery framework, initially for O&M and later for
capital replacement costs. However, the government opted not to implement the
reform measures. Overall, the financial status of two of the six waterworks and the
WWTP was weak. Only one of the six provincial towns (Pursat) has adjusted the water
tariff. Under current arrangements, the project remains less viable overall, unless crosssubsidization from other sectors and/or tariff reform is accepted. With improved
services, however, certain segments of the population were willing to absorb a modest
increase in water and wastewater tariffs. There is a need to institute tariff reform
measures to promote full cost recovery and ensure the long-term sustainability of the
waterworks and the WWTP.
126.
Sustainability of the physical infrastructure. The low quality of works and
equipment were affecting the sustainability of the waterworks. The piecemeal reactive
maintenance and repairs were ineffective and were adding costs over time. There was a
need for a detailed asset evaluation at each waterworks to determine a capital
replacement plan. Likewise, the overwhelming wastewater discharge from Cambrew
was overloading the Sihanoukville sewerage system. A sewerage master plan for
Sihanoukville, with sewage management options for residential, commercial, and
industrial development would have been helpful. While NRW reduction had been
achieved, it was largely due to replacement of faulty water meters and more diligent
water meter reading and billing. Active leakage control had not been practiced.
127.
Arsenic in water supply. In a 2009 United Nations Children Fund report, arsenic
contamination was reported in Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham, among other
provinces.47 Other than groundwater, surface water of the Mekong, Bassac and Tonle
Sap rivers were also suspected of arsenic contamination. The project had not addressed
this. In the future, this needs to be addressed.
128.
Technology.
Technology Floc formation was less than satisfactory with flocculation and
clarification. Where used, clarification tanks were undersized and unable to render
sufficient clarification. Pre-chlorination was practiced as a routine at all waterworks
with flocculation and clarification. Only elevated water towers had lightning protection.
Other buildings, equipment and power generators had no such provision, which made
the equipment and machinery vulnerable to damage. This needs to be addressed.
129.
The Sihanoukville WWTP desperately required desludging but the design was
not conducive for desludging and sludge drying. Furthermore, wastewater generation
from Cambrew was overloading the sewerage and treatment system. Unless some form
of upgrade was carried out, effluent discharge would continue to deteriorate. This
47
UNICEF. 2009. Arsenic in Cambodia. http://www.unicef.org/cambodia/As_Mitigation_ in_Cambodia_2009.

pdf
Issues, Lessons, and Recommendations

evaluation noted that expansion using current technology would require too much
land. However, adopting a different treatment process for the extension, to optimize
land use, would have required a new O&M team with different skill sets. This highlights
the need to identify new innovative technologies and treatment processes that
optimize land use for future WWTP expansion.
B.
Lessons
130.
A lack of in-depth investigations during project preparatory technical
assistance, particularly during preparation of the detailed design, has had a significant
impact on the finished products. More time should have been given for project design,
particularly since the project involved scattered locations and an inconvenient transport
system. Furthermore, ensuring ownership of the investment through adequate
consultation with local stakeholders is vital to sustainable outcomes.
131.
Proper due diligence is required while assessing institutional capacity at the
executing and implementing agencies. Training needs should be adequately assessed
and established for all groups of stakeholders. Practical refresher training opportunities,
both technical and managerial, are needed for applying relevant knowledge and
achieving greater efficiency in operations. Basic training in procurement, contract
administration, and construction management should be provided to personnel of the
executing and implementing agencies and waterworks, and site staff appointed by the
consultant.
132.
More rigorous efforts should be made in ensuring that the quantity and quality
of consultants deployed by consulting firms is adequate for specialized tasks.
Consultants performance should be critically assessed during and after the project by
executing agencies and ADB, and appropriate action taken to ensure that consulting
services are available for the right purpose, at the right time, and in the right forms.
133.
While recognizing the affordability issue associated with water supply and
sewerage connection for the poorer households, an equitable tariff structure based on
quantity and purpose of use is needed to ensure sustainability of infrastructure and
project benefits over the projects economic life.
C.
FollowFollow-up Actions
134.
The sector situation in Cambodia has changed considerably since 2007, and
particularly in the past 2 years or so. ADB re-engaged in the urban water supply sector
after discussions with the Ministry of Economy and Finance in 2012, and has been
actively working with MIME (now Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts since the
beginning of 2014). A PPTA was prepared in 2013/2014 and the Urban Water Supply
Project was approved in December 2014 covering nine towns (new works in Stung
Treng and Siem Reap plus rehabilitation and improvement works in seven townsfive
of which were included in the project evaluated).48 A subsequent loan is planned for
2017 to expand coverage in the five towns where only rehabilitation is provided), PPTA
to be processed in early 2015 will consider sector reform and improved links to
wastewater projects. Close coordination is being established with JICA, the French
Agency for Development (Agence Franaise de Dveloppement), and the World Bank.
48
ADB. 2014. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to the
Kingdom of Cambodia for the Urban Water Supply Project. Manila.
33
34

135.
The government has committed to making all provincial waterworks financially
autonomous by 2018 and this is being driven by Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts'
new management which is focusing on the following main areas: (i) improving the
financial and operational efficiency of the provincial waterworks, (ii) tariff reform,
(iii) increasing piped supply coverage, and (iv) improving water quality.
136.
The evaluation recommends three key follow up actions to be taken by ADB:

(i)
ADB, in partnership with other active development partners, should
support the assessment of the water situation and the preparation of
urban WSS master plans for all provincial towns, including those
supported under this project. With the rapid pace of urbanization,
urban WSS infrastructure will continue to experience increasing
demand pressure and even at full capacity will not be able to cope with
rising demand. The master plan should be holistic and integrate water
supply, sanitation, wastewater management, and solid waste
management.
(ii)
ADB should suggest the specific actions listed in Appendix 5 to the
government to ensure continuation of current project benefits and
scaling up of these benefits to wider areas, with support from
development partners active in Cambodia, if required.
(iii)
ADB is planning a sector reform CDTA to support areas not covered by
JICA and to assist with sector reform and capacity development at
central level, enhancing its regulatory function. ADB should consider
two TA projects to strengthen WSS initiatives in Cambodia:
(a)
The first TA should focus on capacity development of provincial
town urban WSS initiatives. The project may include, among
other things, a detailed asset evaluation at each waterworks to
determine what equipment should be repaired and what
should be replaced; and a capital replacement plan to ensure
the smooth supply of water to consumers, with due
consideration for sufficient fund allocation from MIME or via
support by other agencies. The project should also include:
support for further NRW reduction through active leakage
detection and control, based on more advanced training in this
effort organized by the PPWSA for staff at waterworks; support
for improved consumer awareness in water conservation to
reduce high per capita consumption, to be offered by the
PPWSA; organization of a series of refresher courses every 6
months in O&M for waterworks operators following a training
needs assessment by the PPWSA; translation into Khmer of the
O&M manual for each waterworks; establishment of a
structured framework for sharing mutual experience across
waterworks to better promote project sustainability; and
initiation of a water resource study for each river source for
Battambang, Kampong Thom, and Pursat on the longer term
availability of raw water.
(b)
The second TA project should support the preparation of a
sewerage master plan for all provincial towns, including one for
Sihanoukville, and study options for managing sewage from
existing
and
projected
residential
and
commercial
developments. For example, in Sihanoukville, the coverage
could be expanded to include other potential industrial growth
factors in addition to Cambrew. Given the tourism
Issues, Lessons, and Recommendations

development potential and industrial development in and
around the municipality, the government may explore an
alternate model. Considering the low household connection
rate to the sewerage system, the current model is not
sustainable and hence innovative mechanisms, including
regulatory measures, will have to be designed and
implemented to expand connections. Furthermore, cost
effective methods should be explored to address pond
desludging without adversely impacting the environment.
35
Appendixes
APPENDIX 1:
1: PROJECT FRAMEWORK
Design
Summary
I. Sector Goal
Improve the
quality of life in
the project
towns
Promote
economic and
social
development in
the project
towns
Original
Loan
Project Targets
Supplemen
tary Loan
PCR
Monitoring Mechanisms
Supplemen
Original
Loan
tary Loan
PCR
Cleaner urban No change

environment,
better health,
more
productive
time, higher
income, and
less medical
expenses
No change
Central and
No change
local
government
statistics and
reports
No
change
More
investment in
the project
towns, higher
employment
rate, higher
fiscal
revenues, and
more social
development
programs
No change
Government No change
statistics,
studies or
reports of
bilateral and
multilateral
agencies and
NGOs
No
change
II. Project Objectives

Improve urban
Complete
services and
project
environment in
components
the project
by 2005
towns in a
benefiting
sustainable
about
manner and
500,000
contribute to
people,
poverty
generate
reduction
adequate
O&M funds
No change
Complete
project
components
by 2005
benefiting
about
350,000
people,
generate
adequate
O&M funds
Same as that
in the
supplementa
ry loan
Project
progress
reports, loan
review
missions,
monitoring
and
evaluation
indicators,
and PCR
No change
No
change
Assumptions/Risks
Supplemen
Original Loan
tary Loan
PCR
Political stability
No change
Continued
political
stability
Political stability
Confidence of
foreign and
domestic
investors
No change
No change
No change
No change
Further
improvement in
legal and policy
environment
No change
No change
Continued
improvement in
governance,
improvement in
capacities of
concerned
institutions
No change
No change
PPER
Comment
Project
components
completed in
2007. The
water
component
benefiting
about 148,000
people.
Generally
generating
funds for daily
O&M but not
geared for full
cost recovery
38
Original
Loan
Improve
resource
mobilization
of the local
governments;
develop
institutional
capacities for
local urban
development
and
management
Project Targets
Supplemen
tary Loan
PCR
Resource
Same as that
mobilization in the
by local
original loan
governments
improved;
institutional
capacities
for local
urban
development
and
managemen
t developed
Ill. Components/ Outputs

Improve the
Upgrade river
provincial water intakes,
supply
treatment
plants, and
reticulation
networks;
provide O&M
training, spare
parts, and
maintenance
equipment;
construct
office and
laboratories
(350,000
beneficiaries)
Improve
wastewater
management in
Sihanoukville
Install
interceptor
and sewerage
network, and
construct a
sewage
treatment
River intakes,
treatment
plants, and
distribution
networks
constructed
or upgraded;
O&M
training,
spare parts,
and
maintenance
equipment
provided;
office and
laboratories
constructed;
and 24-hour
safe water
supply to
about
270,000
beneficiaries
provided
Interceptor
and
sewerage
network
installed,
and a
sewage
Supplemen
Original
Loan
tary Loan
PCR
Project
No change
No
progress
change
reports, loan
review
missions,
and PCR
Assumptions/Risks
Supplemen
Original Loan
tary Loan
Timely legal and No change
institutional
actions by the
government,
effective
enforcement of
local revenue
collections
Same as that
in the
original loan
Project
progress
report, loan
review
missions,
and PCR
No change
No
change
Timely
recruitment of
consultants by
the project
executing
agencies
No change
Recruitment
of
consultants
by the
project
executing
agencies is
timely
River intakes,
treatment
plants, and
distribution
networks
constructed or
upgraded;
O&M training,
spare parts,
and
maintenance
equipment
provided; office
and
laboratories
constructed;
and 24-hour
safe water
supply to about
141,000
beneficiaries
provided
Same as that
in the
original loan
Project
progress
report, loan
review
missions,
and PCR
No change
No
change
Available
counterpart
funds
No change
Counterpart
funds
available
Interceptor and
sewerage
network
installed, and a
sewage
treatment plant
with a capacity
PCR
Legal and
institutional
actions by
the
government
are timely,
enforcement
of local
revenue
collections is
effective
PPER
Comment
Appendix 1
Design
Summary
Assist the
government in
developing policy
and institutional
reforms to
decentralize
urban functions
to local
governments
Design
Summary
Implement the
CSHAP
Original
Loan
plant with a
capacity of
5,700 m3/day
and serving
150,000
beneficiaries
Project Targets
Supplemen
tary Loan
treatment
plant with a
capacity of
5,700
m3/day
constructed,
serving
about 3,300
connections
(80,000
beneficiaries)
Assumptions/Risks
Supplemen
Original Loan
tary Loan
PCR
PPER
Comment
of 5,700 m3/day
constructed,
serving about
1,326
connections
(about 7,000
beneficiaries
and one
brewery)
Not in PCR
Not in
original loan
Tourism
Not in
Statistical
PCR
Report Year
Book,
Ministry of
Tourism; PCR
Same as above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Statistics not
referred to, but
Sihanoukville is
now a buzzing
tourism town
attracting a
large number
of tourists and
providing
business and
job
opportunities
to the locals
and floating
population
Same as that
in the
original loan
Project
progress
reports, loan
review
missions,
and PCR
No change
Same as above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Environmental
sanitation
education
conducted and
low cost
latrines or
tertiary sewers
installed in
Battambang,
Kampong
Cham, and
Sihanoukville
(reported in
PCR to be for
No
change
Project Framework
Not in original In 2006

loan
2020, about
2.8 million
foreign
tourists are
expected to
arrive, stay
an average
of 3.5 days,
and spend
$76.5 per
day per
head; about
2.7 million
local tourists
are expected
to benefit
from clean
beaches
Conduct
Environment
environmental al sanitation
sanitation
education
education and conducted
install lowand low cost
cost latrines
latrines or
or tertiary
tertiary
sewers for the sewers
urban poor
installed in
with the
Battambang,
assistance of
Kampong
NGOs in
Cham, and
Battambang, Sihanoukville
Kampong
(3,500
PCR
Supplemen
Original
Loan
tary Loan
PCR
39
40
Original
Loan
Cham, and
Sihanoukville
(1,500
households)
Improve local
governance and
resource
mobilization
Expand
revenue
sources of
provincial and
municipal
governments
to be able to
at least cover
O&M
expenses;
develop core
skills for
urban
management
in selected
project towns
Engineering
design,
construction
supervision,
community
development,
local
governance,
municipal
finance,
accounting
and auditing,
and training
Provide project
implementation
assistance
Project Targets
Supplemen
tary Loan
households)
PCR
Supplemen
Original
Loan
tary Loan
PCR
Assumptions/Risks
Supplemen
Original Loan
tary Loan
The
Same as that
municipality in the
of
original loan
Sihanoukville
able to
manage the
sewage
treatment
systems with
increasing
cost recovery
Project
progress
reports, loan
review
missions,
and local
government
budgets
Project
progress
reports, loan
review
missions,
and PCR
Same as
that in
the
supplem
entary
loan
Continued
government
willingness to
implement and
enforce the
revenue
expansion
recommendatio
ns
No change
Project
progress
reports, loan
review
missions,
and PCR
No change
No
change
Consultants
No change
recruited early in
accordance with
the appraisal
schedule
Assistance
provided in
engineering
design,
construction
supervision,
community
development
, local
governance,
municipal
finance,
accounting
and
auditing,
and training
No change
PCR
Government
remains
willing to
implement
and enforce
the revenue
expansion
recommenda
tions
No change
PPER
Comment
1,503
households and
75 public
locations and
schools)
Revenue
sources of
provincial and
municipal
governments
are able to
cover daily
O&M expenses,
but not for
major
equipment
repairs and
replacements
Quality of
engineering
design,
construction
supervision,
and training
unsatisfactory
Appendix 1
Design
Summary
IV. Activities
General
For Physical
Construction
For CSHAP
V. Inputs
Supplemen
tary Loan
No change
PCR
No change
No change
No change
Engineering
design
Prequalification
No change
No change
No change
No change
Bidding
No change
No change
Awarding
contracts
Construction
supervision
Commissionin
g inspection
and training
Reporting
No change
No change
Local
governance
and resource
mobilization
TV and radio
campaigns
Civil works
No change
No change
Water supply
No change
No change
Sewage
treatment
No change
No change
CSHAP
Develop
detailed
program
Engage an
NGO
No change
No change
Equipment
Engage
program
facilitator
Same as
that in the
original
loan
Community
development
Education
campaign
No change
No change
No change
No change
Project design No change

and costing
Contract
No change
preparation
and awarding
Construction No change
supervision
No change
Equipment for
local
governance
and resource
mobilization
Other
equipment
Incremental
administration
and training
Physical
contingencies
Price
contingencies
Commissionin No change
No change
No change
No change
PPER
Comment
Consulting
services
Engineering
design and
construction
supervision
CSHAP
Interest
during
construction
Total:
VI. Cost
Original
Loan
$4.36
million
$3.14
million
Supplementary
Loan
$4.59 million
$3.12 million
$0.34
million
$0.56
million
$0.27 million
$0.32
million
$18.93
million
$12.05
million
$6.45
million
$0.60 million
$0.43
million
$1.16
million
PCR
$0.60 million
$24.63 million
PPER
Comment
Incorrect
figures were
included in the
project
frameworks in
the
supplementary
loan document.
The same
figures as in the
original loan
were copied
into the project
frameworks in
the PCR
$0.27 million
$14.75 million
$9.61 million
$0.36 million
$0.20
million
No
breakdown
$0.96
million
$1.30
million
No
breakdown
$0.40 million
Not
provided
Not
provided
$1.34 million
$0.57
million
$1.45 million
$26.32
$34.56 million
$1.81 million
Same as
that in
the
original
loan
Project Framework
Original
Loan
Select
consultants
Establish
project office
and accounts
41
42
million
No change
No change
No change
No change
Recommendat No change
No change
ion
Implementati No change
No change
on
Training
No change
No change
Reporting
No change
No change
CSHAP = Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program, NGO = nongovernment organization, O&M = operation and maintenance, PCR = project completion report,
PPER = project performance evaluation report.
Sources: ADB. 1999. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial
Towns Improvement Project, Manila; ADB. 2003. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Supplementary Loan to the
Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial Towns Improvement Project. Manila; ADB. 2008. Completion Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Project in
Cambodia. Manila; and evaluation teams assessment.
Appendix 1
For Local
Governance
and Resource
Mobilization
g inspection
Reporting
Situation
assessment
APPENDIX 2: PROJECT COSTS AT APPRAISAL, REAPPRAISAL, AND COMPLETION ($ million)

At Appraisal
Foreign
Local
Component
Exchange
Currency
A. Base Cost
Part A: Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program
Community sanitation improvement
international consultant
0.17
0.00
Domestic consultants
Sanitation facilities
TV and radio campaign
Subtotal
Part B: Water Supply
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay Rieng
Subtotal
Part C: Wastewater Management
Land
At Reappraisal
Total
Cost
Foreign
Exchange
Local
Currency
At Completion
Total
Cost
Foreign
Exchange
Local
Currency
Evaluation
Remarks
(Deviation from
Reappraisal) (%)
Total
Cost
0.17
0.17
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.00
No international consultant
appointed
120
Lessspent (31)
Lessspent (63)
(37)
37)
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.19
0.10
0.36
0.25
0.71
0.10
0.36
0.27
0.90
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.19
0.10
0.36
0.25
0.71
0.10
0.36
0.27
0.90
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.03
0.22
0.22
0.10
0.54
0.22
0.25
0.10
0.57
2.36
1.32
0.99
1.11
1.45
1.24
8.47
0.68
0.30
0.22
0.35
0.39
0.34
2.28
3.04
1.62
1.21
1.46
1.84
1.58
10.75
2.92
1.46
1.63
1.97
1.94
1.55
11.47
0.89
0.36
0.38
0.63
0.53
0.50
3.29
3.81
1.82
2.01
2.60
2.47
2.05
14.76
3.00
1.77
1.60
1.78
2.05
1.44
11.64
1.05
0.62
0.56
0.99
0.71
0.80
4.73
4.05
2.38
2.16
2.77
2.76
2.24
16.37
6
31
6
7
12
4
11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
11.34
11.34
Sewerage system
3.17
2.39
5.56
5.50
4.11
9.61
Subtotal
3.17
2.39
5.56
5.50
4.11
9.61
Part D: Local Governance and Resources Mobilization
Subtotal
0.69
0.06
0.75
0.54
0.06
0.60
Part E: Implementation Assistance
Consulting services
2.08
0.40
2.48
2.29
0.83
3.12
Equipment
0.20
0.07
0.27
0.35
0.05
0.40
Incremental administration
0.23
0.80
1.03
0.30
0.98
1.28
Training
0.00
0.06
0.06
0.00
0.06
0.06
Subtotal
2.51
1.33
3.84
2.94
1.92
4.86
Total Base Cost
15.03
6.77
21.80
20.64
10.09
30.73
B. Contingencies
Physical contingencies
1.53
0.68
2.21
1.21
0.61
1.82
Price contingencies
1.22
0.53
1.75
1.15
0.30
1.45
C. Interest during Construction
0.57
0.00
0.57
0.57
0.00
0.57
Total
15.03
6.77
21.80
20.64
10.09
30.73
() = negative number.
Source: ADB. 2008. Completion Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia. Manila.
7.83
7.83
3.34
14.68
11.17
22.51
Substantial land cost was

unforeseenat reappraisal
16
134
0.00
0.04
0.04
(93)
93)
3.87
0.83
0.20
0.00
4.90
24.39
0.04
0.03
1.13
0.10
1.31
21.30
3.91
0.86
1.33
0.10
6.21
45.69
4
115
4
67
26
49
0.00
0.00
0.46
24.39
0.00
0.00
0.00
21.30
0.00
0.00
0.46
46.15
(19)
Appendix 3: Economic and Financial Analysis

1.
This appendix provides details on economic and financial analysis of the waterworks in project
towns. Whenever possible, updated data have been applied. Results are presented in tables A3.1 and
A3.2. Data sheets for the computation of economic internal rate of return (EIRR) and financial internal
rate of return (FIRR) are in Supplementary Appendix D.
A.
Approach to Evaluation
2.
Economic analysis was undertaken for Part B (water supply) during appraisal in 1999,
reevaluated in 2003 due to significant cost increases, and then carried out again for preparing the
supplementary loan. The project completion report adopted the same methodology and recalculated
the EIRR and FIRR for each of the six subprojects on a standalone basis. The methodology followed
Asian Development Bank (ADB) guidelines for financial and economic analysis, as well as its framework
for appraising urban development projects.
3.
Based on updated project data collected from the six waterworks for their operations for 2008
2012 the project performance evaluation team repeated the financial and economic analysis using the
same model for a direct apple-to-apple comparison. Data collected from the waterworks and used in
the evaluation include water sales, water tariffs, revenues, and operating costs. The operating costs
include expenses for personnel, electricity, chemicals, administration, and other operating expenses.
Electricity expenses include the costs of electricity or diesel directly required for the production of
water. Expenses for electricity and chemicals are assumed to increase in direct proportion to the
increase in the volume of water produced, plus an annual inflation factor.
4.
Similar assumptions adopted in the previous analyses are again employed, such as (i) the
project life is 30 years (till 2031) with no salvage value thereafter; (ii) the economic opportunity cost of
capital is 2%; (iii) the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 5%. Income statements and cash
flows are projected to assess the future financial performance.
B.
Economic Analysis
5.
The economic costs of capital works were previously computed from the actual disbursements
for the project with the following adjustments: (i) taxes, duties, and subsidies were excluded; (ii)
tradable input was valued at the domestic price numeraire using a shadow exchange rate factor of
1.11; and (iii) unskilled labor was subjected to a shadow price of (65%) of the market price to reflect
the level of underemployment of unskilled labor in Cambodia. These have been adopted in the
evaluation.
6.
The EIRRs of the six subprojects were previously all assessed to be above 12%, though there
had been a reducing trend since appraisal as a result of construction cost overrun. This trend of
reducing EIRR continues, with the exception of Kampong Cham, which had improved since project
completion. The lower EIRRs were primarily because of increasing operating costs and fixed low water
tariff (other than Pursat) since 2007.
The EIRRs of Battambang (9.2%) and Svay Rieng (10.8%), were well below 12%. Kampot, at
11.8%, was marginally lower than the standard opportunity cost of capital of 12%. While Kampong
Cham, Kampong Thom, and Pursat were higher than 12%, their EIRRs were very much lower than
originally anticipated. The economic performance of the six waterworks was unsatisfactory. Pursat at
13.8% was the best performer among the six waterworks, largely due to an increase in the water tariff
in 2010 to KR1,600/m3, the highest among the six towns.
7.
45
Table A3.1:
A3.1: Economic Internal Rates of Return of Provincial Waterworks
Waterworks
Project Town
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay Rieng
Appraisal
15.6
34.6
16.6
25.0
20.2
15.9
Reappraisal
17.1
22.7
15.5
23.9
15.4
14.7
EIRR (%)
Project Completion
13.3
16.1
12.1
13.8
14.9
12.3
9.2
12.4
12.9
11.8
13.8
10.8
EIRR = economic internal rate of return.

Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
C.
Financial Analysis
8.
Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Pursat, and Svay Rieng were found to be financially viable
with FIRRs ranging from 5.9% to 6.7%, higher than the WACC of 5%. Battambang and Kampot were
found to be unviable. Battambang at -2.8% is particularly poor, due mainly to its increasing operating
costs in recent years. An urgent increase in water tariffs is called for across all the project towns.
Table A3.2:
A3.2: Financial Internal Rates of Return of Provincial Waterworks
FIRR
(%)
Project Town
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Kampong Thom
Kampot
Pursat
Svay Rieng
Appraisal
Reappraisal
6.6
9.5
4.4
4.5
5.5
4.2
() = negative number, FIRR = financial internal rate of return.

Appraisal
6.7
7.8
7.9
3.3
5.8
6.0
5.4
6.7
5.4
7.5
5.5
5.3
(2.8)
6.6
6.0
3.9
5.9
6.7
Appendix 4: A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries

1.
The Independent Evaluation Department (IED) conducted a sample survey of household heads
using semi-structured questionnaire to understand knowledge, attitude, and practice associated with
hygiene, as well as willingness to pay for safe water supply and sanitation services in the provincial
towns of Battambang, Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, and Sihanoukville. The first part of the survey
covered hygienic practices, which included activities associated with water, sanitation, and surrounding
environment. The second part of the survey sought respondents views on their willingness to pay and
their perceptions on the affordability of connecting to piped water supply and sanitation services.
The survey was conducted during AprilMay 2013 with randomly selected respondent household
members of both project supported and non-project supported areas. The survey focused on water
supply in the first three towns and wastewater management in Sihanoukville.
A.
Methodological Approach
2.
The methodological approach involved a three-step process. First, with the stated objectives in
mind, the evaluation team comprising technical and survey specialists designed a questionnaire for the
survey. The questionnaire was pre-tested in an urban area of Battambang with six respondents. Based
on the feedback, the survey instrument was revised, finalized, and translated into Khmer. Secondly, the
survey was administered by local Khmer speaking enumerators in the selected towns. Thirdly, the
collected data was verified and entered into an Excel database. Data verification was done on hard
copies to ensure consistency and completeness and the team applied a double entry method to ensure
accuracy of data. Some inconsistencies were detected in the process and clear outliers were omitted
from the analysis. Thirdly, the team undertook a descriptive data analysis, the results of which are
presented in this appendix.
B.
Sampling Method and Sample Size
3.
The project supported towns varied substantially from each other. However, given time and
resource constraints, the team decided to cover an equal number of respondents from each of the four
towns (n=112 per town) and these respondents were randomly selected for interviews. For the noncoverage service areas (treated as a comparison group), the prime consideration was potential
expansion of water supply distribution and the wastewater collection network in the future. These
areas were located in a suburb of the town (inside the town territory and the surrounding communes).
A roughly equal number of respondents from respective non-coverage areas comprised the comparison
group. In total, 896 respondents (224 per town) participated in the survey. The sample size distribution
of the respondents appears in Table A4.1.
Table A4.1:
A4.1: Sample Size Distribution of Survey Respondents
District/
Town
Battambang
Sangke
Banan
Thma Koul
Subtotal
Kampong Cham
Kampong Cham
(water supply)
Kampong Siem
Subtotal
Svay Rieng
Svay Rieng
(water supply)
Svay Chrum
Svay Teab
Provinces
Battambang
(water supply)
Number of Respondents
Not Connected to
Connected to the
the
Project
Project
Infrastructure
Infrastructure
87
52
25
35
0
10
0
15
112
112
112
31
0
81
112
112
112
90
0
8
0
10
Total
139
60
10
15
224
143
81
224
202
8
10
Provinces
Sihanoukville
(wastewater
treatment)
District/
Town
Svay Toea
Subtotal
Sihanoukville
Number of Respondents
Not Connected to
Connected to the
the
Project
Project
Infrastructure
Infrastructure
0
4
112
112
112
112
Subtotal
112
Grand total
448
C.
112
448
Total
4
224
224
224
896
Characteristics of Respondents
4.
The selected socioeconomic characteristics of the project and non-project respondents are
summarized in Table A4.2. About two-thirds of the respondents were female in both groups. The
majority of the respondents belonged to the mature age group (3564 years), while elderly
respondents comprised a small proportion. Project supported respondents had more years of education
than those from non-project areas. However, as the majority of respondents had lived through the Pol
Pot regime, they received relatively few years of education10.6% did not have any schooling, 55.2%
had primary education or lower, 19.2% had completed lower secondary school, 9.4% had completed
upper secondary school, and 5.6% had studied beyond high school.
Table A4.
A4.2: Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents
Connected to
Project
Infrastructure, %
(n = 476)
Attributes
Gender
Male
33.6
Female
66.4
Age Group (Year)
18-34
25.6
35-64
64.1
65 and over
10.3
Education Level
Leve
None
6.5
Primary (not completed)
28.8
Primary (completed)
20.4
Lower Secondary (completed)
22.1
Upper Secondary school (completed)
12.6
Beyond high school
9.7
Annual Income ($)
<1,500
5.2
1,501-3000
14.5
3,001-4,500
17.4
4,501-6,000
15.1
over 6,000
47.7
Annual Expenditure ($)
<1,500
9.9
1,501-3000
35.9
3,001-4,500
29.2
4,501-6,000
13.9
over 6,000
11.1
Not connected to
Project
Infrastructure, %
(n = 420)
Total
33.6
66.4
33.6
66.4
21.4
73.1
5.5
23.7
68.3
8.0
15.2
44.0
18.1
16.0
5.7
1.0
10.6
35.9
19.3
19.2
9.4
5.6
14.5
27.4
19.3
10.2
28.6
9.6
20.5
18.3
12.8
38.7
26.2
42.4
12.4
5.2
3.8
22.2
39.0
21.3
9.8
7.7
5.
About one in five respondents (20%) in the project areas and over two-fifths (42%) of
households in the non-project areas had an annual income of $3,000 or less. About 48% of project
respondents had a household income above $6,000, in contrast to only 29% in the non-project areas. It
47
48
Appendix 4
is fair to say that the distribution of respondents from the project areas is skewed towards the higher
income group, while those from the non-project areas tended to be relatively evenly distributed across
income bands. Likewise, 45% of project and 69% of non-project respondent households incurred an
annual expenditure of up to $3,000. In general, however, the income and expenditure data tended to
be underestimated because of difficulties associated with recall, lack of written records, and reluctance
to report for fear of taxation by the authorities. Hence, caution should be exercised in interpreting the
data.
D.
Access to Water
6.
The waterworks were located in the center of the provincial towns. Hence, the piped water
service was available only within the town jurisdiction. A summary of waterworks services is presented
in Table A4.3. In 2013, Battambang and Sangkae districts connected 9,919 households to the water
supply, covering only 18.6% of the provinces households. Population coverage with piped water access
stood at 73% in Kampong Cham and 21% in Svay Rieng. In the three towns with project support,
population coverage in 2013 remained at only 25%.
7.
In all, 672 people were interviewed from the three provinces. Of the respondents, 50% were in
the service area, while 50% were in the non-service area. Almost all (97%) of the respondents in the
service area were connected to the water supply, of which 52% used only tap water for their daily
activities, while 48% of them also used alternative water sourcesmainly bottled water, rain water,
and well water (Table A4.4). The respondents gave various reasons for not using solely tap water and
these included interest in reducing water charges, water unavailability in their proximity, and use of
harvested rain water during the rainy season. On the other hand, the households living in the nonwater supply service area used a variety of water sources depending on the availability of the water in
their area. Six alternative water sources were observed in the study area, of which private ground water
(dug wells and boreholes) was the dominant source, in particular in Svay Rieng and Kampong Cham.
Most of the households throughout preferred to boil water before drinking.
E.
Source of Drinking Water
8.
About three-quarters of the households with access to public water supply depended mainly on
tap water for drinking (74%), 22.0% used bottle water, and 4% used either rain water or private
ground water (Table A4.5). Bottled water consumption was associated with suspicion about the water
quality supplied by waterworks. The respondents who consumed bottled water preferred to boil tap
water before consumption but opted to use bottled water due to time constraints.
Table A4.
A4.3: Summary of Current Waterworks
Waterworks Services in Sample Survey Districts and Towns
District/
Provinces
Town
Battambang
Battambang
Sangke
Kampong Cham Kampong Cham
Svay Rieng
Svay Rieng
Total
Householda
Network Length
(m)
Populationa
Number of
Connections
Population
Served
Monthly
Water Tariff
(KR)
Connection Fee
(KR)
50,110
266,706
245,823
9,919
49,595
600,000
1,500
8,496
9,329
67,935
41,468
45,020
353,194
80,347
45,050
371,220
5,714
1,867
17,500
30,284
9,355
89,234
440,000
200,000
900-1,500
1,200
KR = Khmer real, m = meter.

a
Source: Commune Database , 2011.
Table A4.
A4.4: Water Source of Residents
Residents in the Sample Study Provinces
(Number of Households)
Not Connected to Water Supply
Provinces
Battambang
Kampong
Cham
Svay Rieng
Total
77
35
Rain
Water
1
Private
Ground
Water
5
Bottled
Water
1
River/
Stream/
Canal
4
Pond/
Reservoir
8
Others
2
MultiMultiWater
Sources
More
than 2
Water
Sources
90
22
67
14
112
224
One Water Source
Water
Seller
112
Subtotal
112
Total
224
58
54
112
79
33
112
224
174
162
336
23
151
11
137
336
672
51.8
48.2
100.0
100.0
6.8
0.3
44.9
0.3
1.2
2.4
3.3
40.8
100.0
(%)
Table A4.
A4.5: Sources of Drinking Water for Residents
Residents in the Sample Study Area
Provincial
Water
Supply
70
Connected to Water Supply

Private
Rain
Ground
Bottled
Water
Water
Water
9
0
33
Provinces
Battambang
Kampong
Cham
87
1
0
24
Svay Rieng
92
2
1
17
Total
249
12
1
74
(%)
74.1
3.6
0.3
22.0
Subtotal
79
88
95
262
100.0
Water
Seller
9
Rain
Water
37
Private
Ground
Water
14
31
0
40
11.9
1
4
42
12.5
68
100
182
54.2

River/
Bottled
Stream/
Pond/
Water
Canal
Reservoir
26
10
14
2
8
36
10.7
0
0
10
3.0
0
0
14
4.2
Others
2
Subtotal
112
Total
191
10
0
12
3.6
112
112
26
100.0
200
207
288
Connected to Water Supply

MultiMultiWater
Sources
Subtotal
Provincial
More than
Water
2 Water
Supply
Sources
39
73
112
One
Water
Source
49
50
Appendix 4
9.
The households without access to the piped water supply used a variety of water sources,
including private groundwater (54.2%), rain water (12.5%), water sellers (11.9%), bottled water
(10.7%), and other water sources (10.7%). Private groundwater from wells was the main source of
water for drinking, in particular in Kampong Cham and Svay Rieng, while rain water and bottled water
were preferred in Battambang. These different choices were because of the availability of the
groundwater in two of the studied sites (Kampong Cham and Svay Rieng are located near a big river)
and the socioeconomic status of the households (Battambang had more respondents with a higher
income than the other two provinces).
10.
The majority of households did not have problems getting water into their house as they
connected to either the provincial water supply, direct purchase from water sellers, used an electric
pump for groundwater extraction, or used other services provided directly to the house. Male and
female household heads were mainly responsible for getting daily water. However, 28.0% of the
households with no access to piped water supply faced difficulties such as back strain, having to travel
some distance from home to the water source, the high cost of water collected, heat stroke, time
constraints, safety issues in collecting water, and others (Table A4.6).
Table A4.6:
A4.6: Difficulties Encountered in Getting Water for Daily Use in Areas
Areas without Access to Piped Water
Provinces
Battambang
Kampong
Cham
Svay Rieng
Total
%
Distance
13
10
0
23
24.5
Time
Cost
2
Safety
0
4
1
7
7.4
11
2
18
19.1
2
0
2
2.1
Back
Strain
12
Heat
Stroke
3
Other
5
23
11
46
48.9
4
1
8
8.5
2
8
15
16.0
Total
Count
40
Total
Sample
33
56
23
119
39
22
94
100.0
Note: Multiple response was allowed for this question.

F.
Knowledge, Attitude,
Attitude, and Practice Associated with Safe Drinking Water
11.
Overall at least 96.4% of the household respondents knew what safe drinking water is; 3.6%
lacked knowledge about it. More than 96.7% of the households with access to piped water supply had
safe drinking water for their daily consumption, 0.9% of them complained about tap water quality
(visible particles), and 2.4% of them did not know whether they had safe drinking water. However, all
of them used clean boiled water (without any sedimentation) for their daily consumption (Table 10).
12.
For the households without access to the piped water supply, the majority reported that they
had safe drinking water (78.6%), but 16.7% of them did not have access to safe drinking water and
4.8% of them did not know whether they had safe drinking water. The level of understanding of
residents about safe drinking water was somewhat limited, in particular in the outskirts of towns.
On the other hand, it was clear that the household respondents in both service and non-service areas
were well aware of the need to make water safe before drinking it (98.1%)by boiling it, letting it
stand and settle, adding chlorine, using commercial water filters, or other means of purification.
Water boiling and use of commercial water filters were practiced in all study areas.
13.
The practices for storing drinking water were very similar across the study areas. Of interviewed
households, 98.7% stored their drinking water in various containers; while the remaining households
(1.3%) stored water in roof tanks or cisterns (mainly those households with no access to the piped
water supply). Tapped containers, including containers connected to taps, appeared to be the most
popular option (50.7%), as these were a common container for water filter devices. Containers with a
wide mouth, including cooking pots, cool boxes, and water buckets, were the second most popular
51
(34.7%); while containers with narrow mouths, such as water bottles, were almost as popular (33.9%).
At least 98.8% of water containers were covered with hard covers and kept up off the ground. Drinking
cups were the main tool used to take water out of the containers, while pouring from narrow-necked
containers (mostly directly drinking from water bottles) was the second most common practice.
This was followed by pouring from the tap. Table A4.7 shows the methods used for getting water out
of the containers.
14.
The survey findings suggest that respondent households overall had sound knowledge about
safe drinking water and they had a positive attitude towards keeping water safe for drinking.
The majority of them also took the best available measures to keep water safe for drinking. However,
the level of understanding varied across widely across the seven provincial towns and hence effective
health and sanitation awareness campaign is needed.
G.
Access to Sanitation
15.
The survey data as a whole provided an insight into sanitation practices in the study area.
However, the analysis of topics related to the wastewater treatment system in Sihanoukville was given
particular attention, as it was a component of the project that required assessment.
16.
Availability of toilet
toiletss. A relatively high percentage of the survey households had toilets in their
household premises (88%). Sharing toilets with other households was not common, as only 0.4% had
this arrangement. Households used their own resources in most cases (96%) for toilet construction.
About 86% of households had a flush toilet with septic tank or pit and 13% had a flush toilet
connected to the sewer system. Pit latrine and flush toilets with an open drain were not common
(less than 1%). According to key informants, pit latrines were less practical in the study area.
17.
On the other hand, 12.1% of households had no access to a toilet at all. The problem of
affordability was cited as the main reason (11.4%), followed by lack of space (0.3%), no water
connection (0.2%), and other reasons (0.1%). Those who could not afford a flush toilet relied on pit
latrines.
H.
Wastewater
18.
Wastewater from the toilet (black water), and from the kitchen and bathing (grey) were
discharged by various means depending on the availability of facilities in the house. Since almost all
households used a septic tank, pit latrine and/or sewer system, black water discharge was not seen as a
major problem. However, discharge of grey water into the ground, into ponds, and into open channels
appeared neither sanitary nor environmentally acceptable (Table A4.8).
19.
The majority of respondents (71%) believed that prevailing discharge methods were acceptable,
while 27% thought that it would make the local environment unsafe. Only a handful (2%) did not have
an opinion. Based on field observation, respondents did not understand well the basic impacts of
improper wastewater discharge (both black and grey). They had a feeling that when wastewater was
not seen, it was safe. As wastewater was discharged without any treatment by storing in soak away
pits or discharging it into the ground, ponds, or open channels, there is the potential for contamination
of both surface and ground water (waterborne diseases). There is also the risk of other unsanitary
outcomes, such as food chain contamination, fly breeding, etc.
52
Battambang
Connected to
Water Supply
Method Used
Kampong Cham
Not
Connected to
Water Supply
Connected to
Water Supply
Svay Rieng
Not
Connected to
Water Supply
Overall
Not
Connected
to Water
Supply
Connected to
Water Supply
Not
Connected
to Water
Supply
Connected to
Water Supply
Drinking cup
60.7
72.3
60.7
79.5
63.4
78.6
61.6
76.8
Long-handled scoop
Tap attached to
container
Pour from narrow neck
container
15.2
17.9
1.8
17.9
0.9
5.4
6.0
13.7
29.5
17.0
43.8
12.5
31.3
8.0
34.8
12.5
39.3
34.8
39.3
34.8
41.1
47.3
39.9
39.0
163
162
153
156
478
477
n (sample)
162
159
Appendix 4
Table A4.
A4.7: Methods of Getting Drinking Water out of Containers
(% Respondents)
Table A4.
A4.8: Wastewater Discharge Method in Survey Areas
(Number of Respondents)
Wastewater
Discharge
Method
Battambang
Not
Connected
to
connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Kampong Cham
Not
Connected
to
connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Svay Rieng
Not
Connected
to
connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Sihanoukville
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Overall
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Soak away pit
85
69
55
43
252
Surface seepage
Water course
pond
105
106
95
43
349
10
11
27
Open channel
22
Other
Connected to
sewer
15
17
186
83.0
57
25.4
167
74.6
112
50.0
112
50.0
229
25.5
20
36
Total
22
202
38
%
9.8
90.2
17.0
Source: Independent Evaluation Department Survey data, 2013.
51
107
214
667
74.5
53
20.
In Sihanoukville, with the availability of the sanitation facility, all households connected to the
sewer system discharged their wastewater (black water) either directly or indirectly (from the outlet of
the septic tank) into the collection network. Whereas, the households without access to the sewer
system used septic tanks or pits to store wastewater and kept it for infiltration or desludging once the
tank was full. The grey water resulting from kitchen and bathroom use were discharged in various
ways, based on local practices and the availability of facilities.
I.
Solid Waste Management
21.
More than half of the respondents reported that they managed their garbage by burning
(62.5%). Other methods of disposal included depositing for collection (33.1%), dumping on empty
plots nearby the house (1.8%), dumping at a designated place (1%), burying (1%), scattering (0.2%),
and other means (0.3%). None of the household respondents mentioned that they gave rubbish to
their animals or composted their garbage. This finding implies a need to educate local communities on
good sanitation practices.
J.
Hygiene and Health
22.
Frequency of changing clothes. Personal cleanliness behavior of project and non-project
respondents turned out to be similar. All respondents stated that they bathe daily. This was not
surprising due to the hot and humid weather. In addition to bathing, 22% of the respondents changed
their clothes daily, 18.0% brushed their teeth daily, 13% washed their hands daily, and 2% trimmed
their nails regularly. Details appear in Table A4.9.
23.
Hand washing
washing. All household respondents were aware of the importance of washing hands, in
particular, before eating and after contacting fecal matter (Table A4.9). Almost all of the respondents
(98%) stated that they washed their hands with soap or detergent. Other prevailing practices include
washing with just water, ash or crushed coal, sand, and other materials. After washing, they used
multiple ways to dry their hands. More than three-quarters of respondents dried their hands with a
clean towel (77.1%); other methods included drying with other clothes (36.5%), with tissue paper
(6.8%), on their shirt or trousers (3.8%), and air drying (0.1%). Hand washing commonly practiced
before eating and after using the toilet.
24.
The majority of respondents had a relatively good understanding of the negative consequences
of drinking unclean water (Table A4.10). Diarrhea and cholera were the two main diseases mentioned
during interviews. However, a number of respondents (about 100 out of 896) were not aware that
drinking unclean water can cause influenza, skin diseases, coughs, sore throat, appendicitis, stomach
diseases, and other minor problems. This means that the community needs further health and
sanitation education to fill the gap.
54
Method
Battambang
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Kampong Cham
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Svay Rieng
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Sihanoukville
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Overall
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
A. General Cleaninga
Changing clothes daily
24.1
19.6
26.8
15.2
35.7
36.5
10.7
7.1
23.5
20.5
Brushing teeth daily
16.1
11.6
25.9
16.1
19.6
20.5
16.4
17.9
19.3
16.4
6.3
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.0
2.7
1.4
0.0
2.1
1.2
Washing hands
22.3
12.5
7.3
13.4
13.4
18.9
8.6
4.8
12.6
12.9
Clean with soap
36.0
24.1
6.3
0.9
8.9
1.8
17.1
17.9
9.5
10.7
Nails trimmed
Other
0.9
n (sample)
(sample)
112
112
112
112
112
112
140
84
0.2
0.0
n (responses)
193
189
187
164
200
202
216
124
476
420
Before eating
99.1
99.1
100.0
100.0
99.1
100.0
97.9
100.0
98.9
99.8
After using the toilet
37.5
33.0
48.2
17.0
53.6
41.1
27.1
28.6
40.8
30.0
Before cooking
36.6
18.5
21.4
18.8
22.3
23.2
14.3
20.2
23.1
20.2
4.5
14.3
5.4
7.1
4.5
3.6
7.9
13.1
5.1
9.3
Other time
48.2
31.3
25.0
26.4
34.8
27.7
35.0
23.8
5.7
27.6
n (sample)
112
112
112
112
112
112
140
84
476
420
224
190
240
219
256
156
973
785
B. Hand Washing Practices
Before going to bed
n (responses)
253
220
a
All take a bath daily.
Appendix 4
Table A4.
A4.9: Hygienic Practices Adopted by Respondents
(% Respondents)
Table A4.
A4.10:
10: Knowledge about the Consequences of an Unsanitary Environment and Drinking Unclean Water
(%)
Battambang
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Svay Rieng
Connected
to
Not Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
21.4
78.6
23.2
45.5
17.9
20.5
74.1
13.4
29.5
19.6
12.5
71.4
26.8
42.9
23.2
22.3
76.8
24.1
36.6
20.5
0.9
112
210
112
176
0.9
112
199
93.7
1.8
3.6
9.0
26.8
0.0
112
156
94.6
8.9
1.8
3.6
22.3
1.8
112
149
94.6
2.7
0.0
14.3
35.7
0.0
112
165
Sihanoukville
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
Overall
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
112
203
16.4
60.0
26.4
57.1
15.7
1.4
1.4
140
250
11.9
77.4
14.3
54.8
13.1
0.0
0.0
84
144
21.0
73.7
23.3
44.7
18.9
0.6
0.8
476
872
19.3
76.2
21.7
35.2
21.2
0.2
0.2
420
731
93.8
8.9
3.6
13.4
32.1
0.9
112
171
97.1
3.6
0.0
10.7
21.4
0.0
140
186
91.7
4.8
1.2
10.7
25.0
1.2
84
113
95.4
3.4
1.7
16.2
29.8
0.2
476
698
93.3
8.6
2.9
9.8
32.4
1.0
420
621
A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 55
A. SelfSelf-reflection observations
Looks bad
34.8
20.5
Makes family members sick
88.4
76.8
Spreads diseases
16.1
33.0
Foul odor
30.4
25.0
Insect growth
19.6
29.5
Rat infestation
Others
0.9
0.9
n (sample)
112
112
n (responses)
213
208
B. Problems Caused by Drinking Unclean Water
Common diarrhea
92.0
92.9
Malaria
5.4
10.7
Scabies
3.6
4.5
Cholera
31.3
11.6
Others
37.5
48.2
Don't know
0.9
0.0
n (sample)
112
112
n (responses)
191
188
Kampong Cham
Not
Connected
to
Connected
Water
to Water
Supply
Supply
56
Appendix 4
25.
Public health.
health 1 About 12.9% of the surveyed households suffered from one of the above
diseases (5.2% were households with access to the piped water supply and 7.7% were households
without), while 87.1% had no health problems (Table A4.11). Out of the 12.9% of households who
suffered from health problems, 10.5% were due to common diarrhea, 0.1% was due to scabies and
2.3% were due to other diseases, of which about half were not related waterborne diseases. It was also
seen that the households with access to the sewer system suffered less from these diseases compared
with those households with no access. This meant that the sewer system was helping to reduce disease
occurrence and improve public health in the area (Table A4.11). Of preventive measures to control
primary diseases, keeping the surrounding environment clean and drinking clean water were the most
widely accepted practices (Table A4.12).
Table A4.11: Suffering Experienced With and Without Water Supply and Sewer Connection
Connected to
Water Supply
Suffer from
Not suffer
disease
from disease
Connected to sewer system

Not connected to sewer system
Total
17
(1.90)
30
(3.34)
47
(5.24)
183
(20.4)
246
(27.46)
429
(47.88)

Suffer from
Not suffer
disease
from disease
1
(0.00)
68
(7.59)
69
(7.70)
34
(3.8)
317
(35.38)
351
(39.18)
Total
235
(26.23)
661
(73.77)
896
(100.00)
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage values of the total.

Table A4.
A4.12:
12: Disease Preventive Measures Considered by the Survey Respondents
(%)
Keep surrounding environment clean

Drinking clean water
Washing hands before meal
Washing hands after defecation
Bathing regularly
Washing clothes daily
Others
n (sample)
n (responses)
Battambang
Kampong
Cham
Svay
Rieng
Sihanoukville
75.4
75.9
23.2
1.8
13.8
10.7
29.0
224
515
80.8
85.7
16.5
0.0
31.7
14.3
23.6
224
566
81.7
82.1
17.0
1.8
30.8
20.1
17.0
224
561
87.1
79.0
9.4
0.0
24.6
10.3
24.1
224
525
Overall
81.1
80.7
16.5
0.9
25.2
13.8
23.4
896
2,167

26.
Sanitation and hygiene education.
education About 73% of respondents did not know any health and
hygiene education took place in their communities; while 27% had heard about such a program and
58% of them had attended at least one session. Only two respondents recalled attending a training
offered under an Asian Development Bank project, but they appeared unsure about the Provincial
Towns Improvement Project. One of the two respondents recalled attending training on reproductive
health (certainly not associated with the subject project). While a small percentage of the respondents
attended some health and hygiene education, 34.6% of the respondents had seen some kind of health
and hygiene leaflets produced by nongovernment organizations or government entities. Once again,
it was not possible to associate these leaflets with project output.
Survey data on incidence of diarrhea was found to be unreliable and, hence, the study used data available from the
Demographic Health Survey reported in Table 11 of the main report.
K.
57
Willingness to Pay and Affordability of Water and Sanitation Services

1.
Water supply
27.
Nearly two-thirds of respondents living in the non-project service areas expressed a willingness
to access piped water (64.3%) while 35.7% of them did not want to be connected, although the water
supply service would be available in their area (Table A4.13). This was largely because they had reliable
alternative water sources for their daily use, and/or they could not afford to pay for a water connection
and monthly water fees.
Table A.4
A.4.13:
13: Respondents Willingness to Connect to the Town Water Supply
Service Area
Not
Connected
Connected
Subtotal
NonNon-service Area
Not
Connected Connected Subtotal
Total
Battambang
112
116
75
33
108
224
Kampong Cham
112
117
71
36
107
224
Total
112
336
2
11
63
209
47
116
96.8
3.2
64.3
35.7
110
325
100.
0
224
672
Percentage
Percentage of subtotal
114
347
100.
0
51.6
31.1
17.3
48.4
100.0
Svay Rieng
Percentage
50.0
1.6
Percentage of total sample (%)
28.
The survey findings suggested that the respondents were aware of the water connection fees
and were willing to connect (Table A4.14). However, more than half of them responded that they could
not afford to pay the current water connection fee, which was KR600,000 in Battambang, KR440,000
in Kampong Cham, and KR420,000 in Svay Rieng (Table 9). According to respondents, they were only
willing to pay up to KR200,000 (about US$50).
Table A4.
A4.14:
14: Reasons Associated with Respondents' NonNon-willingness to Connect to Water Supply
Battambang
NonCoverage
NonService Coverage
Area
Area
3
11
2
15
1
12
6
38
4
33
Kampong Cham
NonCoverage
NonService Coverage
Area
Area
2
6
3
15
2
16
7
37
5
36
Connection is expensive
Cannot afford
Others
Total count
count
Total sample (not
willing to connect)
Svay Rieng
NonCoverage
NonService
Coverage
Area
Area
2
6
1
28
0
16
3
50
2
47
Total
30
64
47
141
127
%
21.3
43.5
35.2
100
29.
Similarly, households were also aware of water consumption fees and they were willing to pay
them. As the socioeconomic status of households living on the outskirts of towns was low, they were
mostly willing to spend KR2,50020,000 per month for about 216 m3 of water per month. However,
this amount of water might not be sufficient for the households daily consumption, as each household
has an average of five members. Ninety-five percent of the households willing to connect to the water
supply confirmed that they could afford to pay for their water consumption fee.
30.
To gain further insight into respondents perspectives on water tariffs, a question on whether
they were willing to pay if the water tariff was increased was asked to the households with access to
the piped water supply and those willing to connect to the system. More than half of the respondents
were willing to pay a higher water rate (64.0%) while 36.0% of the respondents did not agree with an
increase of water tariffs. Table A4.15 shows the perspectives of the respondents on the possibility of
58
Appendix 4
increasing water tariffs. Households in non-project service areas who purchased from the vendors paid
on average KR 2,000 to KR4,500 per month depending on their need and availability of alternate
source to meet partial water requirement. This was largely limited to drinking water.
Table A4.
A4.15:
15: Affordability of Water Tariffs
Tariffs Reported by Survey Respondents
(%)
(n = 127)
Tariff increase by:

No increase
<5%
Battambang
Connected
to Water
Willing to
Supply
Connect
33.0
37.3
Kampong Cham
Willing
Connected
to Water
to
Supply
Connect
41.1
28.2
Svay Rieng
Connected
to Water
Willing to
Supply
Connect
39.3
34.9
Overall
Connected
to Water
Willing to
Supply
Connect
37.8
33.5
13.4
0.0
1.8
0.0
0.9
3.2
5.4
1.1
5%
18.8
18.7
23.2
25.4
17.9
23.8
20.0
22.6
10%
22.3
13.3
17.0
18.3
20.5
17.5
19.9
16.3
15%
1.8
5.3
1.8
1.4
5.4
11.1
3.0
5.7
20%
0.9
6.7
2.7
4.2
1.8
0.0
1.8
3.8
8.9
18.7
11.6
21.1
8.0
6.3
9.5
15.8
>25%
2.
Wastewater
31.
The Sihanoukville Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) covered 16.2 ha, with a network of
65.739 km of sewers, encompassing a 221.5-ha service area. It targeted 3,344 connections for
residents in three communes in addition to Cambrew. Table A4.16 summarizes its performance.
Table A4.
A4.16:
16: Status of the Wastewater Treatment Plant in Sihanoukville
Sihanoukville
Number of
Householdsa
Total
Populationa
Sewer Line
(km)
Number of
Connections
Population
Served
Connection
Fee
(KR)
Monthly
Fee
(KR)
Commune 1
3,358
15,667
65.74
63
315
400,000
3,500
Commune 2
2,015
9,883
0.00
406
2,030
400,000
3,500
Commune 4
5,236
24,017
0.00
865
4,325
400,000
3,500
Commune 3
4,226
20,466
0.00
Total
14,835
70,033
65.74
Commune Database, 2011.
1,334
6,670
32.
The survey covered 224 household respondents (66% in project and 34% in non-project areas).
About 76% of the households under the project coverage area had been connected to the sewer
system, while 24% were not connected. About 70% of the respondents in the non-project area
expressed a willingness to connect to the sewer system, if the system was to expand its service area. Of
those not willing to connect to the system, the greatest number opined that their households did not
produce much wastewater, followed by problems with the affordability of the connection. Some
households could not connect because their locations were below sewer lines. A handful of
respondents depended on rain water drainage.
33.
The respondents in Sihanoukville were well aware of the sewerage connection fee. All of them
were willing to pay a connection fee, but the amount they could afford (KR10,00020,000) was far
lower than the current connection fee (the basic fee was KR400,000). Table A4.17 shows the range that
households would be willing to pay for a connection. About 72% were willing to incur up to
KR100,000, while less than 4% were willing to go beyond the current fee.
59
Table A4.
A4.17:
17: Wastewater Connection Affordability in Sihanoukville
(Non-service Areas)
Range
Percentage
(KR)
Frequency
(%)
Less than 100,000
39
72.2
100,000200,000
11
20.4
200,001400,000
2
3.7
400,001600,000
2
3.7
Total
54
100.0
34.
All respondents (connected and willing to connect to the system) were willing to pay for the
connection. More than half of them were willing to pay a basic fee of about KR3,500 (57.0% of the
cost), about 6.1% were willing to pay less than the basic fee, and about 37.0% were willing to pay
higher than the basic fee. This finding showed the potential for wastewater system expansion.
However, incentives might need to be introduced in order to encourage residents to connect to the
system. Furthermore, about two-thirds of the respondents with access to the sewer system and a
willingness to connect were willing to pay a higher rate (64.5%) while 35.5% of respondents were not
willing to do so. The distribution of households who were willing to pay a higher rate is presented in
Table A4.18. The results imply awareness is there and a two-pronged strategy may be needed to
promote sewer connection by cross-subsidizing the connection costs using revenue from connections
to businesses and industries, and demonstrating health benefits through mass awareness program.
Table A4.
A4.18:
18: Willingness to Pay High Wastewater Collection and Treatment Fees
Increment Range
No increase
Increase
5%
6%-10%
11%-15%
16%-20%
> 20%
Subtotal
Total
Service Area
(Connected)
Number
%
40
67.8
7
18
16
9
22
72
112
NonNon-service Area
(Willing to Connect)
Number
%
19
32.2
63.6
56.3
76.2
81.8
68.8
69.3
4
14
5
2
10
35
54
36.4
43.8
23.8
18.2
31.3
32.7
Total
Number
59
11
32
21
11
32
107
166
%
35.5
64.5
3.
Solid Waste
35.
The solid waste collection service was similar to that of the water supply and wastewater
services, in that it was available only in the urban area, in particular limited to the more densely
populated areas. This was mainly because the densely populated areas were more profitable than
scarcely populated areas on the outskirts of town. From the 896 interviewed households, 51.2% of
them were in the service area; while 48.8% were in the non-service area. The majority of the
households living in the service area had been using the solid waste collection service, except in Svay
Rieng. Table A4.19 presents the households willingness to use this waste collection service.
60
Appendix 4
Table A4.
A4.19:
19: Household Willingness to Use the Waste Collection Service
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Svay Rieng
Sihanoukville
Total
Percentage
Percentage of total
(%)
Yes
70
73
36
119
298
Service Area
No
50
31
52
28
161
Subtotal
120
104
88
147
459
Yes
31
20
26
45
122
64.9
35.1
100.0
27.9
NonNon-service Area
No
Subtotal
73
104
100
120
110
136
32
77
315
437
72.1
Grand
Total
224
224
224
224
896
100.0
36.
About three-quarters of the respondents in the non-service area were not willing to use the
solid waste collection service even if the service would be available in their area. The reasons for such
unwillingness included a general belief that they did not produce much waste. Another reason cited
was that they have enough space to individually dispose their household waste, and some households
believed that there would be no benefit from using the collection service (Table A4.20).
Table A4.
A4.20:
20: Reasons for Unwillingness to Use the Waste Collection Service
Battambang
Kampong Cham
Svay Rieng
Sihanoukville
Total
Service
Fee is
Expensive
3
4
4
2
13
Do not
See any
Benefit
85
0
0
0
85
Not Much
Waste
1
87
106
39
233
Have
Space to
Dispose
44
63
94
19
220
Others
17
14
7
11
49
Total
Count
150
168
211
71
600
Total
Sample
(Not Willing
to Use)
123
131
162
60
476
37.
The household respondents were well aware of the waste collection fee. All households having
applied for the service paid the monthly fee to the service provider. No household paid less than
KR3,000 but the majority of them paid in the range of KR3,0008,000 (85.2%). Similarly, all households
willing to apply for the service were also willing to pay for the waste collection fee if the collection
service would be available in their area. However, about 14.8% of those households were willing to pay
less than KR3,000, 71.3% were willing to pay in the range of KR3,0008,000, and 13.9% of them were
willing to pay higher than KR8,000.
L.
Conclusions
38.
The survey findings imply that efforts are needed in ensuring consumers are getting not only
clean, but also safe water which could potentially reduce water costs to the households. Since an
overwhelming majority of consumers are consuming boiled water, this may not be necessary if they are
convinced that they can drink safely from the running taps. In the areas covered by water supply, mass
awareness is needed towards sustainable water use. As such, per capita consumption is quite high and
potentially it may be due to low cost of water. A combination of awareness campaign and tariff
increases may be needed. In some urban pockets where affordability is an issue, provision of
community taps could be considered along with limited cross-subsidization. Mass awareness is needed
towards sanitary practices in addition to hand washing before meals and after using toilets so that
other undesirable health outcomes can be restricted. Wherever possible, provincial authorities need to
look into wastewater treatment.
APPENDIX 5: SUGGESTED LIST OF ACTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT OF
CAMBODIA
The findings of this evaluation suggest that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) can encourage
the government of Cambodia to take a number of actions with the aim of improving the performance
of the waterworks and wastewater treatment plant. Some actions are straightforward, while others
may require the government to seek external assistance. Some of the actions suggested can be adopted
in the newly approved project and those in the pipeline. These are:
(i)
Regular water quality sampling and testing should be carried out in all waterworks with
the objective of trouble shooting and process optimization.
(ii)
A water treatment chemist experienced in jar tests should be commissioned to optimize
pH adjustment of raw water and coagulant type and dose for Battambang, Kampong
Thom, Kampot, and Pursat.
(iii)
The continuous pre-chlorination operation should be changed to slug dosing to
minimize trihalomethane (THM) formation at Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot,
and Pursat waterworks.
(iv)
Backwash filters at Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, and Pursat should be
changed more frequently to achieve a better polishing effect on the clarified water.
(v)
A cost differential analysis should be undertaken between the electricity tariff and
diesel costs, taking into consideration the reliability and other risk factors and switching
to power based on reliable supply and cost considerations at Kampong Cham,
Kampong Thom, and Pursat.
(vi)
The water supply tariffs should be reviewed considering the cost of water production
and supply, and also affordability and willingness to pay, in order to institute a
provision for periodic tariff adjustments as a basis for full cost recovery. Kampong
Chams scheme to offer subsidized connection to very poor and poor households
should be reviewed to see if a similar scheme can be replicated in other towns, with
due consideration for a proper identification of eligible poor households. Its experience
in offering subsidized connection fees to poor households should be shared with other
waterworks.
(vii)
Battambangs combined water and wastewater billing system should be reviewed to
see how a wider application can be replicated across Cambodia. Battambang
waterworks experience in implementing combined water and wastewater billing
should be shared with other waterworks.
(viii)
The recommendation put forward in the 2002 study on administrative and legal reform
should be revisited and an updated set of measures developed and adopted.
(ix)
Improvements in project supported waterworks could be achieved by:
(a) retrofitting the undersized clarification tanks to convert them into the lamellar
type, with parallel plates or tubes to increase clarification efficiency for
Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, and Pursat;
(b) increasing the treated water storage capacity at Battambang, Kampong Cham, and
Kampong Thom;
(c) installing earthing at all waterworks buildings and structures to offer the necessary
lightning protection; and
(d) thickening and dewatering clarifier sludge and filter backwash generated from the
treatment processes for managed disposal, instead of discharging them back into
the nearby river without any treatment.
(x)
Kampot waterworks should:
(a) discuss with the upstream hydropower plant operator to agree on the minimum
release of water;
62
Appendix 5
(xi)
(xii)
(xiii)
(xiv)
(xv)
(b) commission a study to see if the reservoir can directly supply water to Kampot
without the need for intake pumping, as raw water pumping consumes about 40%
of the energy at Kampot waterworks;
(c) commission a study to see if there are any impacts of the hydropower reservoir
development on the raw water quality; and
(d) lay a new supply pipe to replace the leaking old asbestos cement (AC) pipe that is
serving the 200 households between the waterworks and the intake.
In Kampong Cham:
(a) existing wells should be deepened or new deeper wells added, such that a more
reliable water supply can be assured during dry seasons;
(b) one more pump should be provided at each of the two dug wells;
(c) the raw water source and treatment process for the proposed Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) waterworks should be reviewed.
(d) instead of extracting raw water directly from Mekong River, consideration should
be given to the use of dug wells that can provide natural filtration.
Pursat waterworks should:
(a) carry out de-silting of the river local to its intake every 36 months to ensure proper
operation of the intake and minimize grit intrusion into the intake pumping
station; and
(b) expand coverage to meet the expected increase in water demand.
Svay Rieng waterworks should:
(a) review the process to decide if biological or physical removal of dissolved iron is
more efficient and easier to operate;
(b) undertake regular water quality sampling and testing, including iron and
manganese concentrations with the objective of trouble shooting and process
optimization; and
(c) provide one more pump at each of the three tube wells.
Kampong Thom should look into the feasibility of making the connection to the power
grid, such that it may have an option of either using the grid supply or generating its
own electricity.
The capacity of the wastewater management unit in Sihanoukville needs strengthening
to monitor the quantity and quality of discharge at Cambrew and other industrial
plants.

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