Maria Glenna

ASSESSMENT OF THE MALIAN CONFLICT - WORLD BANK CAF

SOCIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS
Social and economic cleavages along geographical lines
Impact on conflict: High, increasing. Link to poverty: High, increasing, direct.
The Government of Mali has failed to bridge the development gap between the north and the
south for decades. The lack of implementation of recovery plans has sharpened the social and
economic divisions between the more affluent south and groups in the north.
Ethnic cleavages
Impact on conflict: High, increasing. Link to poverty: High, increasing, direct.
The largest ethnic group in northern Mali, the Tuareg people, has grown increasingly
disillusioned with the governments ability and sincerity to develop the north and has adopted
violent means to fight for autonomy and social and economic development. Following Malis
independence in 1960 a Tuareg rebellion against the state began. Because the underlying
grievances that triggered the rebellions were never solved, the rebellion resurfaced in the 1990s,
early 2000, and between 2006 and 2009. The Tuaregs formed groups, most notably Mouvement
National pour la Libration de l'Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine, who claimed control over
increasingly larger areas of northern Mali. While the goal of the secular MNLA is independence
for northern regions from the Malian state, Ansar Dine is seeking to instate a theocracy in Mali
and impose sharia law.
GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Stability of governance & political institutions
Impact on conflict: High, increasing. Link to poverty: High, increasing, direct.
Despite democratic governance Mali has weak political and security structures. The government
has been accused of despotism, irresponsibility, misappropriation of international aid assigned
for developing the north, and being too lax in regards to controlling northern Mali. The
geographic and social conditions in northern Mali provide a suitable base for traffickers of
people, drugs, and weapons, as well as other illicit trade. The governments lack of control in the
northern territories has also enabled terrorist groups to seek safe haven in Mali.
Equity of governance
Impact on conflict: High, increasing. Link to poverty: High, increasing, direct.
Within the army accusations abound regarding linkages between military and political leaders
and involvement in drug and hostage trafficking. The President was perceived to favor senior
officers and give unjustifiable financial opportunities to his close associates. In response to these
inequities within the military and the government a group of younger officers mutinied and
overthrew the president in March 2012. The coup further weakened the states territorial control
over northern Mali which is illustrated by the governments loss of control over northern Mali to
MNLA and Ansar Dine one week after the coup.

Maria Glenna
EXTERNAL FACTORS
Regional conflicts
Impact on conflict: High, increasing. Link to poverty: Low, increasing, indirect.
In 2011 the dynamics in Mali changed following the demise of Colonel Qaddafi. The former
dictator served as a major political broker and patron in West Africa by facilitating dialogue
between armed groups in the region and their respective central governments, as well as by
integrating rebels into his army. After the fall of Qaddafi, Tuaregs and other immigrant workers
became increasingly unpopular in Libya because they were suspected of supporting the regime
and as a result were compelled to leave Libya. The influx of Tuareg fighters and Libyan weapons
from Qaddafis arsenal fuelled the already tense situation in northern Mali and precipitated the
Tuareg rebellion in 2012.
In 2003 the Salafi-jihadist militant group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) established
itself in Mali. AQIM originates from the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, and the group was
granted relative immunity on Malian territory in exchange for the release of Western hostages in
southern Algeria. The group aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic
state, and has carried out a number of large terrorist attacks in Algeria since its inception. AQIM
is also heavily involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, smuggling and other criminal
activities as a means to fund their activities. Despite the threat that AQIM represents for the
region, the Malian government has been ineffective at curbing the groups operations. Instead the
lack of government control in northern Mali has enabled AQIM to operate freely from Mali to
the extent that neighboring states and Western partners suspect that the group operates with the
knowledge and consent of the Malian government.
International involvement
Impact on conflict: High, increasing. Link to poverty: Low, increasing, indirect.
Following the continuing fighting in northern Mali, and responding to the risk for the conflict to
spread to neighboring countries, the UN Security Council approved a multinational military
force in December 2012. This force is scheduled to become operative in September 2013, but
critics have portrayed this date as overly optimistic.
Following an expansion into the central region of Mali by Islamist groups, including Ansar Dine
and AQIM, in early January 2013, the Malian government called for assistance from the
international community. Fearing that West Africa would become a safe haven for terrorist and
radical elements, France intervened with military force in Mali on January 14. By the end of
January they were joined by the African intervention force for Mali (AFISMA) with troops from
Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Niger and Chad. At this point Malian and allied
forces have recaptured large parts of northern Mali. The Islamist groups are believed to have
retreated to the mountainous areas in northern Mali which provide ideal hiding places. There are
also signs that the groups are starting to use guerilla techniques similar to those employed by alQaeda and the Taliban against US forces in Afghanistan. For these reasons it is unlikely that the
conflict in Mali will end sooner rather than later.