STONEHILL VS DIOKNO

FACTS:

Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have

committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the
strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their
persons and their corporation.

The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named

and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books
of
accounts,
financial
records,
vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority
of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
1) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and
2) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law.

The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the

defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the
government blunders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al.

Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules,
thus, illegal or being general warrants.

There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the
things to be seized.

The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the

domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in

court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be
returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return
of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as
they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.
The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for
Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action.
It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation.
The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable
search and seizure. It provides;
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al
committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners.
It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the
aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books
of
accounts,
financial
records,
vouchers,
journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the

things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to

defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the
accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

PEOPLE VS MARTI
FACTS:

Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages

to a friend in Zurich.
Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can
be examined.
However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of
Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress
opened said boxes for final inspection.
From that inspection, included in the standard operating procedure and
out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents.
He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of
Investigation.
When the NBI was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in
his office, three agents went back with him.
In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages.
Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said packages.
The contents , after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be
marijuana flowering tops.
The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was
invited by the agents for questioning.
Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Issues:
1)
2)
3)
Held:

Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched

and seized. NO
Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied. NO
Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of
the appellant on how said packages came to his possession. NO
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a
private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention
and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has
been violated.
Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State.
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages.
Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search.
The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed
their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given
full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.
Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving
more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses,
or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule
131).
At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas
that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual
and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant
to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that
Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the
NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into
a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely
to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

KATZ V US
FACTS:

The petitioner, Charles Katz, was charged with conducting illegal

gambling operations across state lines in violation of federal law.

In order to collect evidence against Katz, federal agents placed a

warrantless wiretap on the public phone booth that he used to conduct
these operations.

The agents listened only to Katz's conversations, and only to the parts
of his conversations dealing with illegal gambling transactions.

In the case of Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Supreme Court

held that the warrantless wiretapping of phone lines did not constitute
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

According to the Court, physical intrusion (a trespass) into a given area,

and not mere voice amplification (the normal result of a wiretap), is
required for an action to constitute a Fourth Amendment search.

This is known as the "trespass doctrine."

Partly in response to this decision, Congress passed the Federal
Communications Act of 1933.

This Act required, among other things, federal authorities to obtain a

warrant before wiretapping private phone lines. In the case
of Silverman v. United States (1961), the Supreme Court refined
the Olmsteadtrespass doctrine by holding that an unreasonable search
occurs only if a "constitutionally protected area" has been intruded
upon.

At his trial, Katz sought to exclude any evidence connected with these
wiretaps, arguing that the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone
booth constitutes an unreasonable search of a "constitutionally
protected area" in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The federal agents countered by saying that a public phone booth was
not a "constitutionally protected area," therefore, they could place a
wiretap on it without a warrant.
ISSUE: Does the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth violate the
unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution?
HELD: YES

The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a

constitutionally protected area.

However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from
unreasonable intrusion.

Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in his person.

Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view
when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the
uninvited ear.

He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a

place where he could be seen.

A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection
of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the
words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world.

Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of

the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The Governments activities in electronically listening to and recording

the petitioners telephone conversations constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant
predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is
inadmissible.

the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Katz and held that placing of a
warrantless wiretap on a public phone booth constitutes an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The majority opinion, written by Justice Potter Stewart, however, did not
address the case from the perspective of a "constitutionally protected
area." In essence, the majority argued that both sides in the case were
wrong to think that the permissibility of a warrantless wiretap
depended upon the area being placed under surveillance. "

For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But what he seeks to
preserve as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected," the Court stated.
Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that it was the duty of the
Judiciary to review petitions for warrants in instances in which persons
may be engaging in conduct that they wish to keep secret, even if it
were done in a public place.
The Court held that, in the absence of a judicially authorized search
warrant, the wiretaps of the public phone booth used by Katz were
illegal.
Therefore, the evidence against him gathered from his conversations
should be suppressed.

BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF

FACTS:

On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the

Court of First Instance of Quezon City, issued two (2) search warrants
where the premises at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses
of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers, respectively.
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this
wise:

All
printing
equipment,
paraphernalia,
paper,
ink,
photo
(equipment,
typewriters,
cabinets,
tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and
the like used and/or connected in the printing of the WE FORUM
newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the WE FORUM newspaper.

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other

publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizationknown as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the WE FORUM

and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;
and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking Bagong Silang.

Pursuant to the said search warrants, the business premises of the

Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers were
searched.
Accordingly, office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature allegedly possessed by

Jose Burgos, Jr., publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were

seized.
Thereafter, the premises of both printing offices were padlocked and
sealed thereby preventing the publication of the aforementioned
newspapers.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following
the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin
the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants,
subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors from using the
articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et
al.
Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
petitioners came immediately before the Supreme Court without having
previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before Judge
Cruz- Pano.

ISSUES:
1)
2)
HELD:

Whether or not the immediate recourse to the Supreme Court was

proper to question the validity of the two (2) search warrants. NO
Whether or not the two (2) search warrants were validly issued. NO
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants
was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view
of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set
forth in the application.
The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in
the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court
applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling
that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not
so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of
the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the
warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the
statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of
general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and

enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did

not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.
REMEDY AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH

The correct remedy for petitioners was to file a motion to quash the
search warrants Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of
the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said
warrants in the court that issued them (Templo v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA
295 [1974]).

But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this

petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the
search of the We Forum offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and
widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.

The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to

exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules.

It is always in the power of the Supreme Court to suspend its rules or to

except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purpos es of
justice require it.
ON VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANTS

Use of evidence seized in an illegal search does not prevent a party

from questioning its validity Respondents also submit the theory that
since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some
of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do
not follow the logic of respondents.
These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds.
The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any
way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in
this petition.
A mere typographical error in a search warrant does not render
the same invalid The search warrant used to search the premises of
the We Forum newspaper at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City indicated that the articles sought to be seized
were allegedly kept at No. 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City as
contained in the warrant.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two
search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and
intent were to search two distinct premises.
It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have
issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the
addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity
that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more
apparent than real.
The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon

City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said

warrant. Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in
mind when he issued the said search warrant.
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has
been held that the executing officers prior knowledge as to
the place intended in the warrant is relevant.
This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the
affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described
in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in
the warrant as to the place to be searched.
The seizure of articles belonging to other persons not named in the
warrant does not invalidate the search warrant or the search conducted
Section 2 of Rule 126 (now Section 3 of Rule 126) of the Rules of
Court provides that a search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of
(a) property subject of the offense;
(b) property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits
of the offense; and
(c) property used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
It does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is directed.
It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under Section 2(b), one of
the properties that may be seized is stolen property.
Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the
person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and
seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession
of the property sought to be seized.
Mere unsubstantiated allegations or baseless conclusions of law do not
constitute probable cause for issuance of a search warrant
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched.
And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadillas application that petitioner
is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as

amended is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requi
rements of probable cause.
Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant must be based
on personal knowledge of the applicant or his witness Equally
insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the
statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and
Pedro U. Tango, that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit
clearly shows that the premises above-mentioned and the articles and
things above- described were used and are continuously being used for
subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective
of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement
for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement.
In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), this Court ruled that
the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause.
General warrants are unconstitutional Another factor which makes the
search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants.
In Stanford v. State of Texas the search warrant which authorized the
search for books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas, was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general.
In like manner, directions to seize any evidence in connection with the
violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise have been held too general, and
that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the
Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy] was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid.
The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
The closure of the business premises of the Metropolitan Mail and
We Forum newspapers violates the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of the press As heretofore stated, the premises searched
were the business and printing offices of the Metropolitan Mail and
the We Forum newspapers.
As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the

fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners

freedom to express themselves in print.
This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
The Supreme Court held that the Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and
20-82[b] are null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for
a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles was
likewise granted and all articles seized by virtue of such warrants were
ordered released to petitioners.

People vs. Aruta

Facts:

On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a
certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from Baguio City with a large
volume of marijuana and assembled a team.

The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus
coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa
was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents.

When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the
latter handed it out to the police.

They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked

cash katutak.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to

evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items.
In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from
Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg.
While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in
carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police.
She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman
was nowhere to be found.
Also, no search warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous
drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from
the accused.
Held: NO

The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers
are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be
committing a crime.
Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a
crime.
Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime.
It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to
the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as
the suspect.

The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for
the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant.
The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid
requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect
a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and
the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested.
Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows
that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental
to a lawful arrest.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and,
therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the
Constitution.
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which
are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely
crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom
agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no
legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there
was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and
they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible
evidence.