LUCILA S. BARBUCO vs. ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, A.C. No.

5092, 8/11/2004
Facts:

Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent

Beltran for malpractice of law.
Complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services
of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court
of Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
which adverese to the complainants interest.
On the same day, complainant, through Benito B. Sy, gave
respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the
docket fees.
However, the appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to
file Appellant's brief.
The brief was only filed by respondent 43 days after the deadline
of submission of the same.
When asked to comment, respondent tried to evade liability
by alleging that he met a vehicular accident, which
incapacitated him for several days, thus he cannot finish the
appellants brief.
Moreover, he sustained injuries in the head, which as a result
respondent lost track of schedules of hearings and deadlines for
submitting briefs.

Issue: Whether or not respondent's failure to file appellant's brief warrants

sanctions.
Held: Yes.

the SC enunciated that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers states: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of
his ability and with utmost diligence.
Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY
THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular
accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof
cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on
time considering that he was a member of a law firm
composed of not just one lawyer.
This is shown by the receipt he issued to complainant and the
pleadings which he signed for and on behalf of the Beltran, Beltran
and Beltran Law Office.

As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners in

the law office to file the Appellants Brief for him or, at
least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said
pleading.
Moreover, every member of the Bar should always bear in mind
that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
A lawyers fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever
mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him.
He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of
his client within the bounds of the law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence and he should not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. "
Lawyer suspended for failing to file appellants brief resulting to
the dismissal of his clients case. Rule 18.03 (a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable).
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of
his ability and with utmost diligence.
Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY
THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
That Respondentwas involved in a vehicular accident and suffered
physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to excuse him
from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a
member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer.
Respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office
to file the Appellants Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for
Extension of Time to file the said pleading.
Failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence
on Respondents part and his liability is further compounded by his
failure tomaintain an open line of communication with his client, in
violation of Rule 18.04 (a lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information)
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is found guilty of
negligence and malpractice and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately.

ENDAYA V OCA
TINGA; September 3, 2003
FACTS

NATURE: A complaint filed by Artemio Andaya against Atty.

Wilfredo Ocafor violation of the lawers oath and for professional
delinquencyor infidelity

Nov. 7, 1991 - a complaint for unlawful detainer wasfiled against

Endaya and his spouse, Patrosenia Endaya.
The complaint was filed by Apolonia Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez and
Dominador Hernandez
the Endaya couple filed their answerwhich was prepared by a
certain Isaias Ramirez.
A preliminary conference was conducted w/c the couple attended
w/o counsel.
During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that
plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the
land involved in the case
hereafter, the complainant couple sought services of the
public attorneys office in Batangas City wherein the
respondent attorney was assigned to handle the case
At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent
appeared as counsel; he also moved for the amendment of
the answer previously filed by the couple, but his motion
was denied
the court thereafter ordered the parties to submit their
affidavits and position papers w/in 10 days from receipt of
order but the respondent failed to do so.
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest
The plaintiffs appealed the decision.
The RTC directed the parties to file their memoranda.
Once again, the respondent failed to do so.
The courts original decision was reversed and set aside.

Petitioners' Claim

Having lost the case, the complainant filed this administrative

issue for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file
the required pleadings.
The complainants contend that due to respondents inaction, he
lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately, the case
itself

Respondents' Comments

respondent denies this and stresses that he was not the original
counsel of the couple
he avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the
continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was
for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended
answer bec, he was made to believe that it was made by a nonlawyer.

When found out that it was actually made by lawyer, he asked the
court to relieve him as the couples counsel, but he was denied.
He also asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder believing
in good faith that it wasnt anymore necessary

ISSUE: WON Atty. Oca (respondent) violated the lawyers oath through his
professional deliquency
HELD: Yes.

His failure to file the affidavits did not prejudice his clients
for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to
them. But failure to do so per se is a violation of Rule
18.03
The respondent did not submit the affidavits and position
paper when required by the MCTC.
With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he
did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in
mockery of the authority of the court
Respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again
when he did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply
The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide
every member of the legal fraternity.
From it
springs the lawyers duties and responsibilities that any
infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or
other preliminary action
Canon 18: A lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence and
diligence
Much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law
because they have a duty not only to their clients but also to the
court, to the bar and to the public.
The lawyers diligence and dedication to his work and profession
not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain
the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy
administration of cases, maintain respect to the legal profession.
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show
respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months from
notice, with the warning that a similar misconduct will be dealt
with more severely

DALISAY V MAURICIO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; January 23, 2006
FACTS

NATURE:Motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22,

2005 finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty

of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the

penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months.
Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services
as counsel in Civil Case No
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys
fees in the total amount of
P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered
legal services for her.
As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and
demanded the return of her money and documents, but
respondent refused.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the
complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings
prepared by the respondent.
She recommended that respondent be required to refund the
amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that
the complaint be dismissed.
Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the
MTC, to verify the statusof Civil Case
There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6,
2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by
complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and
the Registry of Deed.
Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against
complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172
and/or Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code.
He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.

ISSUE: WON respondent lawyer should be disciplined for failing to render

services despite payment of his client
HELD: YES.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil

Case. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new
petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a
petition for review of a decree.
Civil Case was considered submitted for decision as early as
August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13,
2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, he could
not have done anything anymore about it.
complainant refused to provide him with documents related to
the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth,
complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case
prompting him to file falsification cases against her.

COMPLAINANTS CONTENTIONS:

respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a

lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against
her;
respondent should have returned her money;
respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents
earlier if he really believed that they are falsified;
his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive
constitutes contempt.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or

advocate for every person who may wish to become his client.
He has the right to decline employment.
But once he accepts money from a client, an attorneyclient relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause.
From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
He must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latters cause with wholehearted
devotion.
Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the
amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle
Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the
performance of his duties.
As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to
show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as
counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.
Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to
show that he initiated new petitions.
Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure
from his previous pleadings.
This cannot be countenanced.
A party should decide early what version he is going to advance.
A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is
objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules,
but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due
process.
The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the
basis of respondents previous admission that complainant
engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044.
He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its
consequences.

In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents

inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court.
At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed
engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new
petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability
is unmistakable.
There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition.
The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he
should immediately return the filing fees to complainant.
In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we held that a lawyer shall account for
all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not
used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to
the client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated
demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.
Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument.
The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already submitted
for decision does not justify his inaction.
After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first
and foremost, to enter his appearance.
Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned
complainants money Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for
doing nothing.
In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility
by shifting the blame to complainant.
He claims that she refused to provide him with documents
vital to the
case. This is preposterous.
When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied
representation that he possesses the requisite academic
learning, skill and ability to handle the case.
As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the
certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law
Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of
complainants title.
It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the
case despite having been paid for his services.
This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and
taking undue advantage of his client.
Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of
complainant.
In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified
documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to
file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to
render legal services to complainant.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified

documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be
sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not.
First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who
perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding.
Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the
same Canon specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients
has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify
the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule.
Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant
and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation.
If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his
relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule.
This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render
legal service to complainant because she falsified the
documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to
the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument.
The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long
after
complainant
had
terminated
their
attorney-client
relationship.
It was a result of his active search for a justification of his
negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044.
In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins
with his or her retainer.
It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that
is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and
confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good
faith.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.
WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration.
Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory.
Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the
Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

RUIZ V SANTOS
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus
seeking that the Resolutions dated September 21, 2004[1] and December

21, 2004[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85872 be

reversed and set aside; and that the CA be directed to give due course to
the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed before it by
herein petitioners.
A brief factual background is necessary for a proper perspective in
the resolution of herein petition.
Dominga, Apolonia, Florencio, Cornelia, Tomasa and Olimpio, all surnamed
Ruiz (petitioners), were the original owners of seven parcels of land with a
total area of 194,284 square meters located in Barangay Kaytinga, Alfonso,
Cavite, covered by OCT No. P-4017 in the name of Tomasa, covering 46,235
sq. meters; OCT No. P-4018 in the name of Cornelia, 49,803 sq. meters;
OCT No. P-4288 in the name of Dominga, 19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P4289 in the name of Apolonia, 19,649 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4290 in the
name of Olimpio, 19,650 sq. meters; OCT No. P-4291 in the name of
Florencio, 19,650 sq. meters; and OCT No. P-4292 in the name of Cornelia,
19,648 sq. meters (collectively referred to as subject property).
Cirila delos Santos (respondent) is a duly licensed real estate broker.
Sometime in 1995, Olimpio gave respondent the plan of the subject
property and verbally authorized her to sell the same. Thereafter,
respondent referred in writing the subject property to Odessa Antiporda
(Antiporda), a realtor and a fellow estate broker, who had earlier informed
respondent that she had a prospective buyer interested to buy a land with
an area of about 15 to 20 hectares to be used as a retirement village.
Antiporda in turn referred the subject property to one Alfred Tantiansu
(Tantiansu). Olimpio then gave respondent a written authority to sell the
same.[3]
In May 1996, respondent introduced Olimpio to Tantiansu and they
all went together to the location of the properties. Tantiansu showed
interest in the properties and asked for the lowering of price, which Olimpio
pegged at P315.00 per square meter. Respondent asked Olimpio for the
renewal of her authority, to sell to which the former obliged. In the
authority to sell, it was specified that she would still be paid her
commission even after the said authority expired, provided she registered
in writing her prospective buyer with whom she negotiated during the
period of authority. Accordingly, respondent notified petitioners in writing
that Tantiansu was her buyer. [4]
A meeting was subsequently held among Olimpio, respondent and
Tantiansu in Tantiansu's office where the prospective buyer showed interest
in buying the properties. A few weeks later, a meeting was held between
Olimpio and Tantiansu only, without respondent. Olimpio asked respondent
to lower her commission from 5% to 2.5%; otherwise, the sale would not
push through. But respondent, through a letter sent to Olimpio, answered
that she was amenable to a commission of 4%.[5]
Respondent later learned that the properties were sold to different
corporations at P60.00 per square meter, as indicated in the deeds of sale.
Upon her verification of the articles of incorporation of the corporationbuyers with the Securities and Exchange Commission, she found out that
the corporations were owned by Tantiansu. Respondent then demanded
the payment of her broker's commission, but was unheeded.

Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275,
Las Pias City, a complaint[6] for collection of sum of money and damages
against all petitioners, alleging that it was through her effort as a real
estate broker that she was able to bring about the consummation of the
sale of the subject property, to petitioners' immense gain and benefits; that
despite the sale and her repeated demands, petitioners refused to pay her
broker's fee.
Petitioners Domingo Ruiz, et al. filed their Answer with
counterclaim and alleged as affirmative defense that at the time of the
consummation of the sale of the subject properties, there was no longer
any existing broker's agreement between them; that respondent had no
more authority from them to sell the properties or, assuming there was
such authority, the same had already lapsed or expired; that it was
petitioners' understanding at the time of the sale of the subject properties
that Tantiansu, the buyer, would be responsible for the payment of the
broker's commission, whoever the broker may be; that petitioners knew
that respondent had initially claimed her broker's commission from
Tantiansu; but after Tantiansu's death, and failing to collect any broker's
commission from said buyer, respondent commenced the present action
against them.
Issues having been joined, a full-blown trial on the merits ensued.
On September 22, 2003, the RTC[7] rendered its judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff [respondent] and
against the defendants [petitioners], ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff
jointly and severally the sum of P2,447,524.80 plus legal interest thereon
from the filing of the complaint and moral damages of P500,000.00 as well
as exemplary damages of P200,000.00 and attorney's fees of P100,000.00
and P2,000.00 per court appearance and to pay the cost.[8]
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal.[9] On November 6, 2003,
respondent filed her Comment and/or opposition thereto, alleging that the
appeal was not perfected for failure of petitioners to file the docket/appeal
fee within the reglementary period to appeal.
In an Order[10] dated January 16, 2004, the RTC denied petitioners'
appeal and considered the appeal barred for failure of petitioners to pay the
appeal fee within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It ruled that the decision had
already become final and executory, and there was nothing more to be
appealed to the CA.
With the denial of their appeal, petitioners filed a petition for
relief[11] alleging that they were prevented from awaiting themselves of an
appeal due to mistake and excusable negligence of their counsel on record,
and that they had a good and substantial defense. Attached to the petition
was the Affidavit of Merit of Atty. Mark Edsel Ang (Atty. Ang), petitioners'
former counsel, wherein he stated that when he received the decision on
September 30, 2003, he immediately sent copies thereof to petitioners by
registered mail, as four of the six petitioners live abroad while the other two
live in Cavite; that he communicated with the RTC Clerk of Court the fact
that a notice of appeal was already filed and the fees would be paid as soon
as he got the confirmation of petitioners' desire to appeal, to which the

clerk of court gave her assurance on the acceptance of the late payment of
docket fees; that he received a long distance call from petitioner Cornelia
on October 15, 2003 confirming petitioners' desire to appeal the decision;
thus, he paid the appellate fees on October 24, 2003. Atty. Ang admitted
that it was through his negligence that the appeal was belatedly filed.
In its Decision[12] dated June 18, 2004, the RTC denied the petition
for relief for lack of merit. The RTC found no merit in petitioners' contention
that the error of counsel to pay the appellate fees in due time was a
mistake constituting excusable negligence and ruled that the mistake of
counsel binds his client. The RTC held that petitioners' claim of a good and
valid defense was belied by the court's findings and conclusions contained
in its Decision dated September 22, 2003.
In an Order[13] dated June 24, 2004, the RTC granted the motion for
execution filed by respondent on the ground that the decision dated
September 22, 2003 had already become final and executory.
On July 5, 2004, notices of garnishment[14] were issued to the
different banks by sheriff Josefino Ortiz. Notice[15] of sale on execution of
the subject property was scheduled on September 3, 2004.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction with the CA, verified and certified by Dominga,
seeking to set aside the following: (1) Order dated January 16, 2004, which
denied petitioners' notice of appeal; (2) Decision dated June 18, 2004
denying petitioners' petition for relief; (3) Order dated June 24, 2004
declaring the Decision as final and executory and granting the motion for
execution filed by respondent; (4) notice of garnishment issued on July 5,
2004; and notice of sale.
On September 21, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for being procedurally flawed, at the very least, this petition
is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and consequently DISMISSED. And since
the temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is
merely an adjunct to the main case, the same must be pro tanto denied.
[16]
The reasons given by the CA dismissing the petition outright are as follows:
(1)
No motion for reconsideration was filed against the challenged
Order issued by the respondent judge on January 16, 2004. Well settled is
the rule that a filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the
institution of a special civil action for certiorari.
(2)
The names of the heirs of the petitioner Tomasa Ruiz are not
indicated, in violation of the first par. Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules,
which requires that the petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds
relied upon for the relief prayed for.
(3)
There is no special power of attorney executed by the said heirs
authorizing Dominga to sign the verification and certification in their own
behalf.[17]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated December 21, 2004, as the CA found that the arguments

put forward in the motion were a virtual rehash of those alleged in support
of the petition.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1.
WHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED
BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY
PETITIONERS BEFORE THE CA;
2.
WHETHER THE NAMES OF THE HEIRS OF THE PETITIONER
TOMASA RUIZ ARE INDICATED IN THE PETITION;
3.
WHETHER THERE IS NO SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
EXECUTED BY SAID HEIRS AUTHORIZING PETITIONER TO SIGN THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ON THEIR OWN BEHALF.
4.
WHETHER THE CA ACTED WITH HASTE ON ITS BASESLESS
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
VIRTUAL REHASH OF THOSE ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF ITS PETITION.[18]
The parties filed their respective memoranda.
Anent the first issue, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the institution of a
special civil action for certiorari.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, we agree with
petitioners.
There is no question that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the
court an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by
way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.[19]
However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availing of the
remedy of certiorari is not always a sine qua non[20] requirement, as there
are recognized exceptions: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly, or are the same as those, raised and
passed upon by the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of
the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were
ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law, or public interest is involved.
[21] We find this case falling under exceptions b, c and d.
Petitioners' notice of appeal was earlier denied by the RTC due to the late
payment of docket fees, and it ruled that its decision dated September 22,
2003 had already become final and executory and there was nothing more
to be appealed to the CA. Clearly then, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless in the light of such declaration by the RTC.
Petitioners' subsequent petition for relief from the denial of appeal was
denied by the RTC in its Decision dated June 18, 2004. The court reiterated
its disquisition found in its main decision dated September 22, 2003. In
fact, just after the petition for relief was denied on June 18, 2004, the RTC
issued an Order dated June 24, 2004 granting the motion for execution filed

by respondent. Thereafter, on July 5, 2004, notices of garnishment of

petitioners' goods, stocks, interest on stocks, shares and any other personal
properties in their control and possession were already served by the sheriff
on the different banks. Thus, petitioners sufficiently showed that there was
an urgent necessity for the filing of the petition with the CA to rule on the
issue of the denial of appeal and the petition for relief.
Anent the second issue, the CA erred in finding that the names of the heirs
of petitioner Tomasa Ruiz were not indicated in the petition. In the petition
filed before the CA, it was alleged that the petitioners are as follows:
Dominga Ruiz, resident of Kaytinga, Alfonso Cavite;
Apolonia Ruiz, resident of 105 Eagle Head Drive, Fort Washington,
Maryland, USA;
Cornelia Ruiz, resident of 12903 Turnberry Circle, Fort Washington,
Maryland, USA;
Olimpio Ruiz, resident of 4510 N. Troy, Chicago, Illinois, USA;
Florencio Ruiz, resident of Detecon Al Saudia Co. Ltd., PO Box 31443,
Jeddah, 21497;
Heirs of Tomasa Ruiz, all the above residents of the above-mentioned
addresses.[22]
In their motion for reconsideration of the CA Resolution dated
September 21, 2004, petitioners alleged that there was substantial
compliance with the requirement that the full names and actual residents
of all petitioners must be stated, since all the petitioners are the only
children of the late Tomasa Ruiz, a fact that they had sufficiently alleged in
their petition. We find such explanation plausible, considering that the
phrase heirs of Tomasa Ruiz was followed by the words all the above,
which means that the heirs of Tomasa are the persons whose names are
immediately preceding.
As to the third issue, we also find that the CA erred in finding that
there were no special powers of attorney (SPAs) executed by the heirs of
Tomasa authorizing petitioner Dominga to sign the verification and
certification on their behalf. However, an examination of the CA rollo shows
that when the petition was filed with the CA, attached were separate
SPAs[23] of petitioners Apolonia, Cornelia, Olimpio, Florencio, the heirs of
Tomasa, executed in favor of their co-petitioner Dominga, giving her the
authority to sign the required verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
Anent the fourth issue, we rule that the CA hastily concluded that
the allegations in petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated September 21, 2000, were a mere rehash of those in support of their
petition for certiorari. Notably, the motion had sufficiently stated the
circumstances which would excuse petitioners for their non-filing of a
motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision dated June 24, 2004 before
resorting to a petition for certiorari in the CA, to wit: the RTC's declaration
that its decision had already become final and executory and that there
was nothing more to be appealed to the CA; and the granting of
respondent's motion for execution as well as the sheriff's implementation of

such writ by the issuance of notices of garnishment. Petitioners also

pointed out to the CA that it had overlooked the fact that the names of the
heirs of Tomasa Ruiz were alleged in the petition and clarified that they
were the only heirs of petitioner Tomasa and that they had executed
separate SPAs in favor of petitioner Dominga.
Thus, the CA committed a reversible error in outrightly dismissing
the petition and not giving due course to it as well as in denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners further claim that the RTC should have given due course
to their notice of appeal of the RTC Decision dated September 22, 2003 to
the CA since the late payment of appellate docket fees was due to the
mistake and excusable negligence of their counsel and they had a good and
substantial defense.
Instead of remanding the case to the CA which would only unduly prolong
the disposition of the case between the parties, we shall resolve[24] the
substantive issue raised in the petition for certiorari filed with the CA, to
wit:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' petition for relief from denial of appeal.
To begin with, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the
RTC decision dated September 22, 2003 on September 30 2003. Thus,
petitioners had until October 15, 2003 within which to perfect their appeal
by filing the notice of appeal[25] and paying the appellate docket and other
legal fees.[26] On October 14, 2003, petitioners filed their notice of appeal
through registered mail without paying the appeal fees.
It is a well-settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of appeal is not
enough, for it must be accompanied by the payment of the correct
appellate docket fees.[27] Payment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory.[28] It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if
no appeal has been filed. Failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an
appeal renders the judgment final and executory.[29]
Hence, there is no question that the RTC correctly dismissed
petitioners' appeal pursuant to Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may,
motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of
time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.

However, petitioners filed a petition for relief from the RTC Order
that did not giving due course to their notice of appeal on the grounds of
mistake and excusable negligence committed by their counsel. They
contend that their counsel mistakenly erred when he relied in good faith on

the affirmation made by the trial court's clerk of court that the appeal fees
would be accepted even after the period for the filing of the notice of
appeal; that counsel also mistakenly relied on jurisprudence that technical
rules of procedure would be relaxed provided that the same were
substantially complied with; that counsel's negligence should not be
binding on them; that they have good and substantial defenses which
would result in the dismissal of the complaint or a reduction of the
monetary awards set forth in the decision.
Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. When a judgment or
final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from
taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the appeal be given due course.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence
and prudence could not have guarded against.[30] Petitioners' counsel
filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period for filing the same
without, however, paying the appellate docket fees. Counsel very well
knew that under the Rules of Court, the full amount of appellate docket and
other lawful fees must be paid within the same period that the notice of
appeal was filed, as he even allegedly communicated to the clerk of court
his request for additional time in order to consolidate the confirmation of
petitioners' desire to appeal.
The failure of counsel to pay the appellate docket fees on time constitutes
negligence. Despite receiving an overseas call on October 15, 2003, i.e.,
the last day to file the appeal, from petitioner Cornelia, who then lived in
Japan and expressed in behalf of the other petitioners their desire to appeal
the RTC decision, he paid the fees only on October 24, 2003.
It bears stressing that the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the
procedure for the perfection of appeal. The counsel of petitioners should
not have relied on the alleged assurance by the clerk of court of the
acceptance of the late payment of docket fees. As an officer of the court,
he should know that the affirmation of the clerk of court could not prevail
over the specific requirement of the rules. The rules of procedure are
meant to be followed and not to be subjected to the whims and
convenience of the parties and their counsels or by mere opinions of the
clerk of court.
Atty. Ang should not have presumed that the rules of procedure would be
relaxed in favor of his clients. His reliance on jurisprudence that the
application of the technical rules of procedure would be relaxed if the same
was subsequently complied with is not justified. The liberal application of
rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the
rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the
interest of justice.[31] Atty. Ang's negligence in not paying the docket fees
on time cannot be considered as excusable. The circumstances surrounding
this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules.

Petitioners insist that they are not bound by the mistake of their
counsel, citing De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan[32] and Samala v. Court of
Appeals.[33]
In De Guzman, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
anti-graft and corrupt practices act for his failure to account for the
P200,000.00 he received for certain training programs of the Department of
Agriculture based on the testimony of the lone prosecution witness that no
such training program was held at the designated places. Petitioner sought
to be relieved from what he considered as the serious and costly mistake of
his former lawyers in demurring to the prosecution evidence after leave
was denied, the effect of which deprived him of presenting the pieces of
documentary evidence showing due disbursement of the P200,000 received
for the training program which was actually conducted. The original
documents were all along kept in the records section of the Bureau of Plant
Industry; and these original
copies were readily available, which if
presented would have completely belied the accusation against him. We
ruled that since no less than petitioner's liberty was at stake, the higher
interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for
the costly mistake of his previous counsel.
In contrast, the present case does not involve the life or liberty of
petitioners, and they were adequately heard with all the issues fully
ventilated and evidence presented before the decision was rendered.
In Samala, the last day for filing the notice of appeal fell on a Friday,
October 13, 1995. The person to whom the filing of the notice was
entrusted suffered stomach pains and was able to file it only on the next
business day which was October 16, a Monday. We held that the delay was
only for one day, as Saturday and Sunday were excluded and, considering
the facts of the case, found the delay to be excusable.
In the case of herein petitioners, the payment of the docket fees
was done nine days after the lapse of the period to appeal. In fact, in the
affidavit of merit of petitioners' counsel attached to the petition for relief,
he stated that on October 15, 2003, which was the last day to appeal, he
received a long distance call from petitioner Cornelia who confirmed their
desire to appeal the decision. However counsel, instead of immediately
paying the appeal fee, waited for nine days before doing so.
Petitioners also allege that subsequent and substantial compliance
with the rule may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure, citing our
ruling in Jaro v. Court of Appeals.[34]
We are not persuaded.
In Jaro, the CA dismissed the petition filed before it for being
defective, as it was not in the form of a petition for review and the annexes
thereto attached were certified as true xerox copies by counsel, not by the
proper public official who had custody of the records. Petitioner
subsequently filed an amended petition in the proper form accompanied by
annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the Department of
Agriculture Regional Adjudication Board. This Court ruled that there was
more than substantial compliance, and the hard stance taken by the CA
was unjustified under the circumstances. Notably, petitioner therein
committed a lapse in the formal requirement which was curable by
amendment. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to pay the

appellate docket fees on time, which is jurisdictional and which divests the
trial court of jurisdiction to act on the appeal. The payment of the appellate
docket and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure.
[35] It is an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order
appealed from would become final and executory, as if no appeal was filed
at all.[36]
The failure of petitioners' counsel to perfect the appeal binds
petitioners. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence
and omission of their counsel.[37] While, exceptionally, the client may be
excused from the failure of counsel, the factual circumstances in the
present case do not give us sufficient reason to suspend the rules of the
most mandatory character. Petitioners themselves may not be said to be
entirely faultless.
Atty. Ang, petitioners' counsel, claims that as soon as he received
the decision, he sent copies to petitioners. Records show that at that time,
while some of the petitioners were already abroad, Dominga and Tomasa
were still living in Cavite. Cornelia who lives abroad was able to receive a
copy of the decision and was able to make an overseas call to Atty. Ang to
express her desire to appeal the decision. However, neither Dominga nor
Tomasa who only live in Cavite, took steps to call Atty. Ang at the earliest
possible time to protect their interest. No prudent party would leave the
fate of his case completely to his lawyer.[38] It is the duty of the client to
be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case.
[39] Thus, we find that there was participatory negligence on the part of
petitioners, which would not relieve them of the consequence of the
negligence of their counsel.
The Court may deign to veer away from the general rule only if, in
its assessment, the appeal on its face appears absolutely meritorious.[40]
Indeed, the Court has, in a number of instances, relaxed procedural rules in
order to serve and achieve substantial justice.[41] However, the instant
case does not warrant the desired relaxation.
Respondent has sufficiently shown that she was authorized in
writing by petitioners to sell the subject property; that respondent was
instrumental in bringing about the meeting of petitioner Olimpio and
Tantiansu and the transaction concerning the sale of subject property; and
that it was proven by evidence that the buyer of the subject property was
Tantiansu. Thus, respondent is entitled to the broker's commission as
agreed upon between her and the petitioners. Petitioners' claim that
Tantiansu had explicitly bound himself to pay the broker's commission after
the consummation of the sale would not relieve petitioners of their liability
to respondent since, as correctly held by RTC, whatever Tantiansu and
petitioners agreed relative to the payment of broker's commission is
binding only upon themselves and not binding on respondent who does not
appear to have consented thereto.
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in
denying petitioners' petition for relief, since they were not prevented from
filing their notice of appeal and payment of docket fees by mistake or
excusable negligence that would have deprived them of their day in court.
Such relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court will not be
granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the

judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise,
the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost, because of either inexcusable negligence or
counsels mistake in procedure.[42]
It bears stressing that appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory
privilege.[43] Corollary to this principle is that the appeal must be exercised
strictly in accordance with the provisions set by law.[44]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
SPS SORIANO V ATT REYES
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For alleged gross negligence in handling two civil cases, a complaint[1] for
disbarment was filed by complainant spouses Antonio and Norma Soriano
against Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes.
Complainants alleged that sometime in the latter part of 1990, they
engaged the services of respondent in a case they filed against Peninsula
Development Bank entitled, Norton Resources and Development
Corporation, et al. v. Peninsula Development Bank. The case was for
Declaration of Nullity with Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Br. 13, docketed as Civil Case No.
20-465-90.[2]
While the case was pending, respondent reassured
complainants that he was diligently attending to the case and will inform
them of the status of their case.
In 1994, complainants again engaged the services of respondent in a case
they filed against the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center entitled,
Spouses Antonio M. Soriano and Norma Soriano v. Technology and
Livelihood Resource Center for Declaration of Nullity with Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC of Davao City, Br. 16, docketed
as Civil Case No. 22-674-94.[3] During the pendency of the second case,
complainants inquired from respondent the status of the earlier Civil Case
No. 20-465-90, the latter informed them that the same was still pending
and/or ongoing.
Later, complainants learned that Civil Case No. 20-465-90 was dismissed[4]
on 16 December 1991 for failure of the respondent to file a pre-trial brief.
The dismissal reads:
On record is a pre-trial brief filed by defendant, thru counsel, Atty. Marlon B.
Llauder, and this morning a supplemental pre-trial brief was submitted by
defendants counsel. Atty. Reynaldo Reyes, counsel for the plaintiffs is
present in Court but he moved for a suspension of the pre-trial conference
this morning for the reason that plaintiffs are proposing to amicably settle
this case. Defendants counsel vehemently objected to the postponement
of the pre-trial conference and instead moved for a declaration of plaintiffs

as non-suited for the reason that up to this time, plaintiffs have not
submitted their pre-trial brief in violation of the Order of the Court, dated
October 11, 1991, wherein plaintiffs counsel was afforded five (5) days
from said date within which to submit to Court plaintiffs pre-trial brief.
The said motion is well-taken for the reason that the records failed to show
that plaintiffs filed pre-trial brief. They are thus, declared as non-suited.
This case is hereby ordered dismissed.[5] (Underscoring supplied.)
A motion[6] for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied in an
Order dated 27 April 1992.
As to Civil Case No. 22-674-94, complainants likewise found out that the
case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The order reads:
The records show that summons with a copy of the complaint have been
served upon the defendant on May 11, 1994, but plaintiffs did not file the
necessary pleadings in order to prosecute the same.
IN VIEW HEREOF, for failure to prosecute this case is ordered DISMISSED.
Furnish copy of this order, Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes, plaintiffs counsel and
defendants counsel, Atty. Francisco Figura.[7] (Underscoring supplied.)
Upon filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, though, the case was
reconsidered and reinstated[8] on 15 August 1995.
Claiming that the acts of respondent greatly prejudiced and damaged
them, complainants filed a Complaint for disbarment against respondent
before this Court.
On 20 October 1997, the Supreme Court referred[9] the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.
In his Comment,[10] respondent admitted that he was hired by the
complainants in the case against the Peninsula Development Bank in the
latter part of 1990.
He averred that Peninsula Development Bank
foreclosed the property of the complainants for failure to pay monetary
obligations amounting to several millions of pesos. He said that some of
the properties of the complainants were foreclosed in 1989, and the oneyear redemption period was to expire in the latter part of 1990. About one
week before the expiration of the redemption period, the complainants,
through the respondent, filed a case against the Peninsula Development
Bank before the RTC of Davao City, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
20-465-90. From the time of the filing of the complaint up to the present,

herein complainants are in continuous possession of the already foreclosed

properties, consisting of a Ford Econovan and farm tractors. According to
respondent, complainants are still holding office in the real properties
subject of the foreclosure and a portion thereof is being rented by a big taxi
company. He disclosed that at the time he was hired in 1990, the
agreement was that he would be paid the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) as attorneys fees in five
years.
Respondent claimed that he assisted complainants in applying for a loan to
pay off their obligations with Peninsula Development Bank but because of
the numerous estafa cases filed against complainants, said loans did not
materialize. Respondent further claimed that their agreed strategy was to
arrange a settlement with regard to Civil Case No. 20-465-90. Respondent
said he later realized that the complainants had no interest in paying their
obligations to Peninsula Development Bank, and his attorneys fees.
Respondent added that they differed in opinion with regard to the handling
of the case and that complainants did not understand that the filing of the
case had already helped them gain time to negotiate with the bank
especially on the matter of interest incurred by their loans. Finally,
respondent concluded by saying that his attorneys fees, paid in meager
installments, remain outstanding and unpaid.
In their reply,[11] complainants refuted respondents allegation of the
alleged numerous estafa cases filed
against them. Complainants
averred that the certification attached by respondent showing that there
were estafa cases filed against them has no bearing insofar as the
disbarment case is concerned. They likewise denied that respondent
assisted them in their loan application. They engaged the services of the
respondent to prevent them from losing their properties to the Peninsula
Development Bank and for no other reason.
Finally, complainants
maintained that respondent was paid his attorneys fees.
As early as 27 June 2000, the case had already been scheduled for hearing
by Commissioner Agustine V. Gonzaga of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
On 18 January 2002, after several hearings, the Commission admitted the
documentary evidence offered as part of the testimony of complainants.
On 1 March 2002, the day respondent was ordered to present his defense
evidence, he failed to appear. Counsel for the complainants moved that
the respondent be deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence
for failure to appear on scheduled hearing despite due notice. In the
interest of substantial justice, respondent was given a period of 10 days to
comment on the complainants motion and scheduled the case for hearing
on 19 April 2002. Despite due notice, however, respondent again failed to
appear, thus, the Hearing Commissioner declared that respondent was
considered to have waived his right to present his defense evidence. The
parties were given 20 days from 19 April 2002 to file their respective
memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
Only complainants filed a memorandum.

On 28 May 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found

respondent negligent in handling the cases of complainants; hence, said
Investigating Commissioner recommended that he be disbarred. The
pertinent portions of the report read:

There is no question that the respondent was engaged by the complainants

as their counsel in two cases, namely Civil Case
No. 20-465-90 and Civil
Case No. 22-674-94. The respondent accepted both cases by filing a case of
Nullity with Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the Regional Trial
Court Br. 13, Davao City, against Peninsula Development Bank and against
Livelihood Resource Center for Declaration of Nullity with Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order docketed as 22-674-94, Br. 16 RTC Davao City.
The failure and negligence of respondent in handling the aforementioned
cases is fully reflected in the Order of the Court re: Civil Case No. 20-465-90
which reads:
On record is a pretrial brief filed by defendant thru counsel, Atty. Marlon B.
Llander and this morning a supplemental pretrial brief was submitted by
defendants counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Reyes, counsel for the plaintiff is
present in court but he moved for a suspension of the pretrial conference
this morning for the reason that plaintiffs are proposing to amicably settle
this case. Defendants counsel vehemently objected to the postponement
of the pretrial conference and instead moved for a declaration of plaintiffs
as nonsuited for the reason that up to this time, plaintiff have not
submitted their pretrial brief in violation of the Order of the Court, dated
October 11, 1991 wherein plaintiffs counsel was afforded five (5) days time
from date within which to submit to court plaintiffs pretrial brief.
The motion is well taken for the reason that the records failed to show that
plaintiffs filed pretrial brief. They are thus declared as nonsuited.
This case is hereby ordered dismissed. x x x Regarding Civil Case No. 22674-94, Regional Trial Court Br. 16, Davao City in the case filed against
Technology and Livelihood Resource Center the court issued an Order dated
May 5, 1995 which reads:
The record show that summons with a copy of the Complaint have been
served upon the defendant on May 11, 1994, but plaintiffs did not file the
necessary pleadings in order to prosecute the same.
In view hereof, for failure to prosecute this case is ordered Dismissed. x x x
The records show that the real status of the cases were kept from the
complainants by respondent. Despite the dismissal of both cases due to
respondents negligence and irresponsibility he continued receiving
compensation from complainants are evidenced by the receipts and

vouchers which respondent acknowledged with his signatures. (Exhibits

F, G, H, H-1 and I). Likewise, the respondent deceived the
complainant by giving them false hopes that everything was alright and
there was no problem regarding the cases.
All the foregoing show that there is clear violation of his oath as a lawyer
particularly Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, it is submitted that Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes be meted
the penalty of Disbarment.[12]

On 21 June 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved[13]

the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
In the interregnum, a Motion to Withdraw Testimony and Evidence[14] was
filed by complainant Norma B. Soriano before this Court, stating that:
1.
That although the complainant in this case names the spouses
Antonio Soriano and Norma B. Soriano as the complainants, it is only
complainant Norma B. Soriano who has testified and presented evidence
during the hearing of this case due to the untimely demise of her husband,
complainant Antonio Soriano;
2.
That subsequently to the undersigned complainants testimony
and presentation of evidence, she has come upon information and facts
that need to be reviewed and re-examine[d] in the highest interests of
justice;
3.
That before going into those information and facts that she
came to learn after she gave her testimony before this Honorable Board, it
is important to stress the following antecedent circumstances:
(a)
That it was undersigned complainants late husband who
conferred constantly with respondent Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes;
(b)
That herein complainant was not present in a conference with
Atty. Reyes at the time his professional services were hired. So, it was only
the deceased complainant Antonio Soriano who was familiar with the scope
of professional engagement;
(c)
That undersigned complainant did not participate in the
conference between her late husband and respondent counsel on the
agreed strategy because the late husband was the one actively managing
the affairs of the family. Moreover, herein complainant was not really
knowledgeable of the facts and details involved in the cases handled by
respondent counsel;

(d)
That for example, it was only later after her testimony that she
learned that respondent was also attending to and handling the other cases
of the late complainant Antonio Soriano, especially those cases filed in
Makati, Complainant herein had the mistaken impression that the
complainant-decedent had availed of the services of lawyers in Makati.
Hence, the fees that respondent Atty. Reyes received after the cases below
were for those cases in Makati;
(e)
That it was a surprise for herein undersigned complainant to
also learn that respondent Atty. Reyes went out of his way to accompany
her late husband to a financier, who was an intimate friend of respondent,
in Quezon City for the purpose (sic) sourcing the necessary funds to pay off
our obligations to some creditors as the agreed strategy at the very start.
Thus, it appears that respondent counsel went out of his way to help the
late complainant Antonio Soriano solve his problems; and
(f)
That I likewise subsequently learned that when respondent
counsel became a city councilor of Davao City, he did what he can to help
the late complainant Antonio Soriano have a council clearance over a
parcel of land that he was selling for a memorial park.
4.
That the foregoing facts and information that herein
undersigned complainant learned after she gave her testimony seriously
prompts her to seek the withdrawal of her testimony and her evidence in
order that she can re-evaluate the same; and
5.
That complainant herein is filing the instant motion in the
interests of truth and justice as it is farthest from her intention to have this
case resolved through an inadvertent presentation of facts that do not
exactly reflect the entirety of the story and the truth, no matter how
innocently and in good faith they were presented.[15]

The above quoted motion is tantamount to a withdrawal or desistance of

the complaint.
As we have previously ruled, the affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment
case executed by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the
respondent.
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or
lack of interest of the complainant.[16] What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of negligence has
been duly proved. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any

sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.[17] Accordingly, notwithstanding the motion to
withdraw evidence and testimony, the disbarment proceeding should
proceed.
Looking into the merits of the complaint against respondent, we decide to
modify the findings of the IBP.
As to Civil Case No. 20-465-90, records show that it was dismissed for
failure of respondent to file the pre-trial brief.
Respondents failure to file the pre-trial brief constitutes inexcusable
negligence.[18] The importance of filing a pre-trial brief cannot be gainsaid.
For one, the lawyers are compelled to prepare their cases in advance. They
eliminate haphazard preparation. Since pre-trial is a serious business of the
court, preparation of the lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both
questions of fact and of law cannot be overemphasized as an essential
requirement for a pre-trial conference. They enable both parties to view the
documentary evidence of the other even before they are presented in
court. They enable the parties to know the testimonies of each others
witnesses. Pre-trial briefs also apprise the courts of the additional points the
parties are willing to stipulate upon, or the additional points which could be
inquired into for the purpose of additional stipulations. They also apprise
the court of the respective demands of the parties, thus, enabling the court
to discuss more intelligently an amicable settlement between or among the
parties.[19] The failure to submit a pre-trial brief could very well, then, be
fatal to the case of the client as in fact it is a ground for dismissal of the
case. [20] For this reason, respondents failure to submit the pre-trial brief
to the court within the given period constitutes negligence which entails
disciplinary action. Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but to the
court as well. Hence, this Court, in Spouses Galen v. Atty. Paguirigan,[21]
explained:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed
committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as

to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration
of justice.

possession of the foreclosed property is flimsy. It only shows the cavalier

attitude which respondent took towards his clients cause.

In this case, respondent did not only fail to file the pre-trial brief within the
given period. Worse, he had not submitted the required pre-trial brief even
at the time he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal
several months later. Expectedly, the motion for reconsideration was
denied by the court. Respondents negligence is apparent in the trial courts
denial of the motion for reconsideration, to wit:

Anent Civil Case No. 22-624-94, the case was indeed dismissed for failure
to prosecute although the said dismissal was later on reconsidered.
However, this does not detract to the conclusion that, truly, respondent
failed to demonstrate the required diligence in handling the case of
complainants.[24]

The court, in the exercise of sound discretion, afforded the plaintiffs who
were then present, five (5) days from October 11, 1991, within which to
submit to the Court plaintiff pre-trial brief, but despite the order, and until
December 16, 1991, a period of more than two (2) months has elapsed, yet
herein plaintiffs still failed to file or submit the required pre-trial brief, which
to the mind of this Court, is an obstinate refusal on the part of the plaintiffs
to file said pre-trial brief, despite counsels knowledge of the importance of
the same.
The plaintiffs, even in the filing of their Motion for reconsideration did not
even care to attach pre-trial brief if indeed they are sincere in their
intention to do so.
Clearly, respondent was not able to protect his clients interest through his
own fault.
A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law and procedure
and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to, not just competent
service, but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause. It is the duty
of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should
exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the interest of his
client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for
disciplinary action.[22]
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by
reason of Atty. Reyess negligence, complainant suffered actual loss. He
should have given adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is
why a practicing lawyer may accept only so many cases that he can
efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced. Once he
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and
care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyers oath.[23]
Respondents excuse that complainants, from the time of filing of the
complaint up to the time of filing his comment, were in continuous

Quite apart from the above, respondent also lacked candor in dealing with
his clients as he omitted to apprise complainants of the status of the two
cases and even assured the complainants that he was diligently attending
to said cases.[25]
In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,[26] this Court found therein respondent lawyer in
bad faith for failing to inform his client of the status of the case. In said
decision, the court has adamantly stressed that the lawyer-client
relationship is highly fiduciary.[27] There is always a need for the client to
receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on developments
affecting the case. The lawyer should apprise the client on the mode and
manner that the lawyer is utilizing to defend the clients interests.[28]
In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases, respondent failed
to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such manners of professional
employment.[29]
Time and again we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe
such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end
desired.[30]
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. The penalties for
a lawyers failure to file the required brief or pleading range from
reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and in grave cases, disbarment.
In one case,[31] the penalty for a lawyers failure to file a pre-trial brief and
other pleadings such as position papers leading to the dismissal of the
case, is suspension of six months. Therefore, we find the penalty of
disbarment as recommended by the IBP to be unduly harsh and we deem it
appropriate to impose the penalty of one (1) year suspension, taking into
account that this appears to be his first offense.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Reynaldo Reyes is

found GUILTY of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective upon finality hereof with WARNING that a repetition of the same
negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with more severely.

OFELIA R. SOMOSOT v. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA

A.C. No. 7024, 30 January 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J .)
FACTS:

In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant

alleged that she retained the servicesof the respondent as
her counsel in a collection case filed by Golden Collection
Marketing
Corporationagainst
her
and
other
codefendants.
Her defense was that it was the corporation who actually owed
herP800,000.00.
She claimed that she had the evidence to prove this defense at
the trial.
The respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered
his appearance as counsel after securing his acceptance
fee.
She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the
Complaint, the respondent failed to fully inform her of
further developments in the case.
She only heard about the case when there was already
adecision against her and her co-defendants.
She even belatedly learned that the respondent had sought his
discharge as counsel without her knowledge and consent.
Contrary to the respondent's claim that he couldno longer locate
her, she claimed that the respondent knew all along where she
lived and could have easily contacted her had he been in good
faith.
Execution of the court's decision followed, resulting in the sale of
her house and lot at public auction despite her efforts to reverse
the judgment with the help of anotherlawyer. T
hereafter, a third party to whom her property had been mortgaged
sued her. S
he found therespondent's excuse - that he could not contact her
because she had changed her office address - to beunsatisfactory.
She accused the respondent of miserably failing to comply
with his oath as a lawyer and todischarge his duty of ably
representing her.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to serve his client diligently

HELD: YES

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

Respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence required

of him as counsel.
Therespondent contended that he had good reasons not to
continue as the complainant's counsel.
He reasonedout that under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer may withdraw from a case upon a goodcause such as
when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the lawyer's
services, or fails to comply
with the terms of the retainer
agreement, or when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public
office.
Two of these possible causes applied to his situation; he was
appointed legal consultant at the BOI requiring full-time work and
the complainant had failed to pay his legal fees to him amounting
to P27,000.00.
He filed theformal notice of withdrawal without the conformity of
the complainant because he could not locate her.

We find that the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for having

fallen short of the standardsrequired of him as defense counsel.
He violated the basic rule, expressed under Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, that "a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence."
While itmay be said that the respondent did not completely
abandon
the
case,
his
handling
of
the
complainant'sdefense left much to be desired.
The complainant was never informed the development of the case
and the omission eventually ledto the grant of the plaintiff's
motion for judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to the
decision againstthe defendants.
The respondent failed to precisely allege in his
submissions how he tried to contact thedefendant on or
about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were
pending.
It appears thathe really had not; by his own admission, his attempt
to contact the complainant came in December 2001and only to
inform her of his government appointment and to collect his
billings.
It was only after thediscovery of the closure of the defendant's
office did the respondent try to contact the complainant and
herhusband by cellular phone, but they could not be reached.
Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should
not be a reason not to inform the clientof an important
development, or worse, to withhold vital information from
her.

The respondent failed toprovide details on the developments that

led to the adverse rulings on the interrogatories/admissions
andthe judgment on the pleadings.
On the matter of the respondent's withdrawal from the case, the
respondent might have had validreasons to withdraw and
terminate his relationship with his client.
As the respondent now states, he could withdraw under
paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility i.e., deliberate failure of the client to pay the fees for the services,
or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, or appointmentor
election to public office.
However, he does not appear to have cited these reasons
before the trial court.
Instead, he merely filed a Notice of Withdrawal of
Appearance, citing his client's unknown location andfailure to
communicate as reasons for his client's lack of express consent to
his withdrawal.
It is undisputedthat the trial court denied the respondent's notice
of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record burdened
with all the responsibilities that his representation carried.
What lightens the impact of the respondent's mishandling of the
case is the complainant's ownfailings as a client.
The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply
disregard.
As a rule, law practice is not a pro bono proposition and a lawyer's
sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees areunderstandable;
lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally
depend, too, on their law practice income for their living expenses.
Likewise, the respondent's appointment as a consultant should
beconsidered although it is a matter that none of the parties have
fully examined.
Both the non-payment of fees and the appoint to a public
office, however, were not reasons properly presented
before the trial courtthrough a motion that informed the
court of all the surrounding circumstances of the desired
withdrawal.
Instead, another reason was given by way of a mere notice lacking
the client's express consent.
Thus, thecourt's denial of the desired withdrawal was not totally
unexpected
.However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as the
complainant demands in light of thecomplainant's own
contributory faults.
Disbarment is an ultimate remedy in the professional world, no
lessserious and weighty as the power to impose reclusion
perpetua in criminal cases; in both, recovery from thepenalty although not totally impossible - is extremely difficult to attain.

Thus, we must at all times act withcaution and due consideration,

taking into account not only the interests of the immediate parties,
but theinterest of the public, the bar and the administration of
justice as well
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
respondent ATTY.
GERARDO F. LARA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months, effective upon receipt of a
copy of this Decision.

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEA v. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO

A.C. No. 7298, 25 June 2007, SECOND DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J .)
FACTS:

Aparicio is legal counsel for Hufana in an illegal dismissal case

filed with the NLRC against Pena
.Pena is president of MOF company.
Aparicio sought the payment of separation pay to his
client.
Penarejected the demand and sent notice to Hufana to return to
work.
Aparicio, in a reply letter to Pena,reiterated the claim of his client.
In his letter Apparicio also made threats saying that if the
claims were not paid they would filemultiple criminal
charges for tax evasion, falsification and the cellation of
Penas business license.
Becauseof this Pena filed the administrative proceeding against
Aparicio with the IBP for violation of Canon 19,specifically rule
19.01.
IBP dismissed the complaint because Pena failed to file his position
paper andcertification against forum shopping.
Aparicio filed an MR reiterating his claim for damages against
Pena(defamation) in the amount of 400M.

ISSUE: )Whether or not Atty Aparicio violated Canon 19

HELD: YES

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a

lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics
.In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shallnot present, participate in presenting
or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain animproper advantage in any case or proceeding."

Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to

fileany unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client designed to secure
aleverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw
their own cases against the lawyer's client.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of
accusation or exposure oropposition in the public prints,
obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from
makingan accusation against him, or disclosing some secret
calculated to operate to his prejudice."
In commonparlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to
and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for
the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the
exercise of an influence.
Notinfrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the
fears or the credulity, or by promises to concealor offers to expose
the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.
Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the
latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he
would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as
well as multiplecharges such as tax evasion, falsification of
documents, and cancellation of business license to operate dueto
violations of laws.
The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19,
but they also amount to blackmail.
Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for
violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more sever

SOLIDON vs. MACALALAD

Facts:
Atty. Solidon, petitioner, asked Atty. Macalalad, respondent, to handle the
judicial titling of aparcel of land wherein Atty. Macalalad received P50,000
as initial payment.
Petitioner claimed that he tried contacting respondent in order to follow-up
on the status of the case 6months after he paid the initial legal fees, but he
did not receive any communication
.Respondent did not file the petition for registration over the
property sought to be titled andclaimed that the delay in the filing
of the petition was caused by the clients failure tocommunicate
with him.
In addition, he also claimed that he could not file the petitioner
because the client was unable to furnish the necessary
documentary evidence needed anddenied that petitioner tried to
communicate with him.

Issue:Whether or not respondent committed negligence for non-filing of

the application despite thelapse of about a year from the time his services
were engaged?
Held:Yes.

Respondent committed negligence for not filing the application

despite the lapse of about a year since his services were engaged.
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides for the ruleon negligence, rule 18.03 states that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted tohim and
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The mere failure of thelawyer to perform the obligations due to the
client is considered a violation and thecircumstance that the client
was also at fault does not eliminate the lawyers liability for
hisnegligence in handling a case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the duty toserve his
client with competence and diligence, and exert his best efforts to
protect theinterest of his or her client within the bounds of the law.
In this case, the respondents negligence in failing to file the
petition for the registration of the property sought to be titled is an
outright violation of rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Codeof
Professional Responsibility
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17,
2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. We impose on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty
of SIX (6) MONTHS SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, effective upon finality of this Decision. Atty.
Macalalad is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

URBAN BANK V PENA

OCT 19, 2011, SERENO
FACTS:

Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban

Bank, Inc. (UBI).
The land was sold for P240 million.
As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants,
ISCIs lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea had to negotiate with
them for them to relocate.
But the said occupants, knowing that the land was already
transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Pea.
ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize
Pea to negotiate with the tenants.
Pea had to barricade himself inside the property to keep the
tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so that the

local cops are now sympathetic to them. Pea then had a phone
conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Pea
explained to him the situation.
In said conversation, Pea asked authorization from
Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants.
Pea also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price
or (P24 million) for his efforts.
Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that
Pea should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he
forfeits said 10% fee. Pea also asked that said authorization be
put into writing.
The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made
as regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the
written authorization released by UBI). Pea was able to settle and
relocate the tenants.
After everything was settled and the property is now formally
under the possession of UBI, Pea began sending demands to
UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed
upon, plus his expenses for the relocation of the tenants
and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3
million.
But UBI refused to make payment hence Pea filed a
complaint for recovery against UBI.
The trial court ruled in favor of Pea as it found there indeed was a
contract of agency created between and UBI and that Pea is
entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses he incurred including
litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded him P28
million.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court.
It ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Pea
is entitled to payment but applying the principle of unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit, Pea should only be paid P3
million.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28
million.
HELD: No.

The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable.

Pea is entitled to payment for compensation for services
rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the
principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.
In the first place, other than the self-serving testimony of
Pea, there was no other evidence presented to support
his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over
the phone.
The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power
granted him to negotiate with the tenants.

The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not

the existence of any agreement as to how much Pea should be
paid.
Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit
should be applied.
In this case, Pea is entitled to receive what he merit for his
services, or as much as he has earned.
In dealing with the tenants, Pea didnt have to perform any
extraordinary acts or legal maneuvering.
Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services.
He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in
securing the property, to wit, P1.5 million for the security
guards he had to hire and another P1.5 million for settling
and relocating the 23 tenants. Total of P4.5 million.
The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it
is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES Atty. Magdaleno Peas Petition for
Review dated 23 April 2004 (G. R. No. 162562) and AFFIRMS WITH
MODIFICATION the Court of Appeals Decision dated 06 November
2003 having correctly found that the Regional Trial Court of Bago
City gravely abused its discretion in awarding unconscionable
damages against Urban Bank, Inc., and its officers. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Bago City dated 28 May 1999 is hence
VACATED.
Nevertheless, Urban Bank, Inc., is ORDERED to pay Atty. Pea the
amount of PhP3,000,000 as reimbursement for his expenses and
an additional PhP1,500,000 as compensation for his services, with
interest at 6% per annum from 28 May 1999, without prejudice to
the right of Urban Bank to invoke payment of this sum under a
right of set-off against the amount of PhP25,000,000 that has been
placed in escrow for the benefit of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc.
The Complaint against the eight other individual petitioners,
namely Teodoro Borlongan (+), Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L.
de Leon, P. Siervo G. Dizon, Eric L. Lee, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., Corazon
Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel, Jr., is hereby DISMISSED.

EVANGELINA
COMMISSION
NACHURA, J
Facts:

MASMUDvs.NATIONAL

LABOR

RELATIONS

Evangelina Masmuds husband, the late Alexander J.

Masmud engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. in
a case for non-payment of benefits and damages.
In consideration of Atty. Gos legal services, Alexander agreed
to pay attorneys fees ona contingent basis, as follows:

twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settledor paid

and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal.
It was likewise agreedthat any award of attorneys fees shall
pertain to respondents law firm ascompensation.
The monetary claims of Alexander were granted except his
claim for medical expenses.
Several appeals were made by Alexanders employer to NLRC and
CA, however bothwere dismissed and the former decision was
affirmed.
Eventually, the decision of theNLRC became final and executory,
and
consequently
Evangelina
received
an
amountof
P3,454,079.20.
Out of said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of
P680,000.00.
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce
the attorneys lien allegingthat Evangelina reneged on
their contingent fee agreement.
Evangelina
paid
only
theamount
of
P680,000.00,
equivalent to 20% of the award as attorneys fees, thus,
leavinga balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the
counsel as attorneys fees
.Evangelina contended that Atty. Gos claim for attorneys fees of
40% of the tota lmonetary award was null and void based on
Article 111 of the Labor Code.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in UPHOLDing RESPONDENT LAWYERS

CLAIM OFFORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR
CASE ASATTORNEYS FEES
HELD: NO

Contrary to Evangelinas proposition, Article 111 of the Labor

Code deals with theextraordinary concept of attorneys fees.
It regulates the amount recoverable asattorney's fees in the
nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the
prevailingparty.
It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to
the lawyer byhis client for the legal services he rendered.
In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of theRules of Court should be
observed in determining Atty. Gos compensation.
The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides
for a contingent fee.The contract shall control in the determination
of the amount to be paid, unless found bythe court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract
between Atty. Go and Evangelinas husband.
The CA committedno error of law when it awarded the attorneys
fees of Atty. Go and allowed him toreceive an equivalent of 39% of
the monetary award.

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and

close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be
protected from unjust charges.
The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is
subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers.
A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees
because of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit
fails.
The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee
contract between Atty. Go and Evangelinas husband.
The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the
attorneys fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an
equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.

ATTY OROCIO V ANGULAN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition [1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Resolution [2] dated 31 October
2006, Decision[3] dated 29 January 2007, and Resolution [4] dated 27
September 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and
95946.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On 26 September 1978, the National Power Corporation Board of
Directors (NAPOCOR Board), pursuant to its specific power and duty to fix
the compensation, allowance and benefits of the NAPOCOR employees
under Section 6(c) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, passed
Resolution No. 78-119 approving the grant of a monthly welfare allowance
equivalent to 10% of an employees basic pay to all NAPOCOR employees
effective 1 October 1978.[5] Pursuant thereto, the NAPOCOR Welfare Plan
Committee, renamed and reconstituted later on as the NAPOCOR Welfare
Fund Board of Trustees (NAPOCOR-WFBT), issued and promulgated a
charter for the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund which includes the following
provisions:
ARTICLE VII
TERMINATION/AMENDMENT OF THE PLAN
Section 1. Termination/Amendment of the Plan
The Board of Directors may amend, revise, repeal any
or all of the provisions herein contained and/or terminate
the Plan, subject to the pertinent provisions of the Trust
Agreement.

Section 2. Payment of Members share In the

event of termination of the Plan, the balance to the credit
of each member and the General Reserve for Employee
Benefits shall be paid to the members in full. The
accumulated amount in the General Reserve for
Employee Benefits shall be distributed among the
members in the proportion to the amount outstanding to
their credit as of the time of termination. [6]
The NAPOCOR Board subsequently passed Resolution No. 82-172
fixing a NAPOCOR employees contribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in
a sum equivalent to 5% of his basic pay.[7]
Almost two decades thereafter, on 8 June 2001, Congress passed
Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act (EPIRA). EPIRA directed the restructuring of the power industry
which includes the reorganization of NAPOCOR. Following the directive of
EPIRA, the NAPOCOR Board passed Resolution No. 2003-43 on 26 March
2003 abolishing the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Department and other
departments, and dissolving the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund upon the
effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June 2001. [8] Consequently, some of the
employees in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Department and in other
departments (who were also members of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund)
resigned, retired or separated from service. Thereafter, the liquidation and
dissolution process for the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund commenced.
On 11 May 2004, the NAPOCOR-WFBT, with authority from the
Commission on Audit, approved Resolution No. 2004-001 authorizing the
release of P184 million (which represented 40% of the liquid assets of
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in the total amount of P462 million as of 16 April
2004) for distribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund members who
resigned, retired, or separated upon the effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June
2001 (EPIRA separated members).[9]
Pursuant to Resolution No. 2004-001, herein respondent Edmund P.
Anguluan (Anguluan), as Ex-Officio Chairman of NAPOCOR-WFBT, issued a
memorandum on 17 May 2004 to implement the release of P184 million
only to the EPIRA separated members to the exclusion of the NAPOCOR
employees (who were also members of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund) who
have resigned, retired, or separated prior to the effectivity of EPIRA (nonEPIRA separated members).[10]
This prompted Mrs. Perla A. Segovia (Segovia), former VicePresident of Human Resources and Administration and former ExOfficio Chairman of the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA
separated members and in her own personal capacity, to write a letter to
Mr. Rogelio M. Murga, then NAPOCOR President, demanding their equal
shares in the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund and access to
information and records thereof.[11]

On 13 July 2004, there being no action or response on her letter,

Segovia, together with Mrs. Emma C. Baysic (Baysic), former President of
the NAPOCOR Employees Association and former member of the NAPOCORWFBT, in their personal capacities and on behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA
separated members, filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 217, a Petition for Mandamus, Accounting and Liquidation with a
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction
against respondents NAPOCOR, the NAPOCOR Board, Anguluan (as
NAPOCOR Vice-President, Human Resources, Administration and Finance
Department) and Lorna T. Dy (as NAPOCOR Senior Department Manager on
Finance).[12] The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. Q04-53121.
Segovia, Baysic and the 559 non-EPIRA separated members were
represented in Civil Case No. Q04-53121 by petitioner Atty. Victoriano V.
Orocio under a Legal Retainer Agreement [13] dated 1 September 2004,
pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
SUBJECT: Petition
for
Mandamus
with
Damages
Temporary
Restraining
Order/Injunction,
etc.
with
the
Court
NPC
RETIREES versus NPC, NP Board of
Directors, et. al.
before the RTC
Quezon
City
for
the
payment/settlement
of
their claims for NPC Welfare Fund
(P462
Million
assets
and
other assets liquid or non-liquid).
Dear Ms. Segovia and Ms. Baysic:
In connection with the above-stated subject, hereunder
are our terms and conditions, to wit:
1.

No acceptance fee;

2.
All costs of litigation ([filing] and
docket fees, etc.), miscellaneous and out-of-pocket
expenses the prosecution of said action shall be for the
account of the clients;
3.

No appearance/meeting fee;

4.
Contingency or success fees of
fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amounts/value of
assets (liquid and/or non-liquid) are recovered;
5.
This Retainer Agreement serves as
Legal Authority for the Law Firm to receive and/or collect
its contingency/success fee without further demand.

On 22 February 2006, the parties in the above-mentioned case,

duly assisted by their respective counsels, executed a Compromise
Agreement[14] whereby they agreed to amicably settle their dispute under
the following terms and conditions:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
xxxx
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the
instant case amicably.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the parties herein have
agreed as follows:
1.
Both the NPC EPIRA separated
members (those members of the Welfare Fund
affected by the EPIRA law and ceased to be
members of the Welfare Fund anytime from June
26, 2001 [effectivity of the EPIRA LAW] to March 1,
2003 [implementation of the EPIRA law and date of
abolition of the Welfare Fund]) and NPC non-EPIRA
separated members (those who ceased to be
members of the Fund prior to June 26, 2001) are
entitled to Earnings Differential of the NPC
Welfare Fund;
2.
Corrected Earnings Differential
refers to a benefit which is a result of recomputation of Members Equity Contributions and
Earnings using the correct rates of return vis--vis
what was used when they were separated. Period
covered by the discrepancy is from 1989 to
2003. Hence, affected are WF members separated
anytime within the period 1989 to 2003;
xxxx
4.
The Corrected Earnings Differential of all
affected WF separated members shall earn 6% legal
interest per annum computed from the separation of the
members from service up to March 31, 2006 for all the
non-EPIRA separated members and May 31, 2006 for the
EPIRA separated members;
5.
As of March 2006, the estimated
Corrected Earnings Differential for the non-EPIRA
separated members is P119.196 Million while for
the EPIRA separated members isP173.589 Million

or a total of P292.785 Million, inclusive of the 6%

legal interest;
6.
In conformity with the Retainer
Agreement dated September 1, 2004 between Mrs.
Perla A. Segovia, Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic and Atty.
Victoriano V. Orocio; and Irrevocable Special Power
of Attorney dated July 20, 2005 executed by Mrs.
Perla A. Segovia and Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic in favor
of Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, counsel for
petitioners, (copies attached as Annexes A and
B respectively), 15% attorneys fees shall be
deducted from the corresponding Corrected
Earnings Differential of those non-EPIRA separated
members
who
have
already
executed
the
corresponding Special Power of Attorney/Written
Authority for the deduction/payment of said
attorneys fees, and shall be paid to V.V. Orocio
and Associates Law Office, represented by Atty.
Victoriano V. Orocio, as compensation for his legal
services as counsel for the non-EPIRA separated
members subject to deduction of applicable taxes;
xxxx
15.
The parties herein shall exert their best
effort in order that the terms and conditions of this
agreement are implemented and complied with in the
spirit of fairness, transparency and equity;
16.
This Agreement is not contrary to law,
good customs, public order or public policy and is
voluntarily entered into by the parties of their own free
will.[15]
The parties filed with the RTC the very next day, 23 February 2006,
a Joint Motion before the RTC for the approval of their Compromise
Agreement.[16] The RTC rendered a Decision on 3 April 2006 granting the
parties Joint Motion and approving the said Compromise Agreement. [17]
On 10 April 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Approval of Charging (Attorneys) Lien. Petitioner asked the RTC to issue an
order declaring him entitled to collect an amount equivalent to 15% of the
monies due the non-EPIRA separated members as his attorneys fees in
conformity with the Compromise Agreement. [18] In an Order dated 15 May
2006, the RTC granted petitioners motion and decreed that he is entitled to
collect the amount so demanded.[19]

On 20 June 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006.
[20]
Respondents opposed the motion on the ground that there was no
stipulation in the Compromise Agreement to the effect that petitioner is
entitled to collect an amount equivalent to 15% of the monies due the nonEPIRA separated members. Respondents contended that the amount
of P119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated members under the
compromise agreement was a mere estimate and, as such, cannot be
validly used by petitioner as basis for his claim of 15% attorneys fees. [21]
The RTC issued an Order on 25 July 2006 granting petitioners
Motion[22] and, accordingly, a Writ of Execution of the RTC Order dated 15
May 2006 was issued on 26 July 2006. Pursuant to the said Writ of
Execution, RTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo B. Madoloria (Sheriff Madoloria)
issued a Notice of Garnishment to Ms. Aurora Arenas (Arenas), Assistant
Vice-President and Business Manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB)NAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City, and to Mr. Emmanuel C.
Mendoza (Mendoza), Unit Head of the Landbank of the PhilippinesNAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City. [23]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order
dated 25 July 2006.[24]
On 12 August 2006, Sheriff Madoloria served to Arenas an Order
for Delivery of Money.[25]
Respondents Anguluan and Dy filed before the Court of Appeals on
22 August 2006 a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95786, assailing the RTC Order dated 25 July
2006 and praying that a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the implementation of the said
RTC order.[26] Respondent NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals on the
same date another Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95946, also challenging the RTC Order
dated 25 July 2006 and praying that it be set aside and a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
prohibiting the RTC from enforcing the said order and the corresponding
writ of execution and notice of garnishment. [27] Subsequently, respondent
NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 with CA-G.R.
SP No. 95786 which was granted by the appellate court. [28]
On 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
granting respondents application for a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction. It enjoined the RTC from implementing its Order dated 25 July
2006 and the corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment
during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 and No. 95786. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution. [29]
On 29 January 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
annulling and setting aside: (1) the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006; (2) the

corresponding Writ of Execution dated 26 July 2006; (3) the Notice of

Garnishment dated 28 July 2006; and (4) Order for Delivery of Money dated
10 August 2006. It also held that petitioner was entitled only to an amount
of P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit.
The Court of Appeals held that the amount of P17,794,572.70
sought to be collected by petitioner as attorneys fees, equivalent to 15% of
the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential for nonEPIRA separated members, was excessive based on the following
reasons: (1) the
corrected
earnings
differential
in
the
amount
ofP119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated members was a mere
estimate and was hypothetical. Thus, petitioner was unjustified in using
said amount as basis for his 15% attorneys fees; (2) there was hardly any
work by petitioner since (a) the compromise agreement was reached
without trial or hearing on the merits; (b) there was no issue regarding the
release and distribution of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund to the non-EPIRA
separated members as the enactment of EPIRA, not the efforts of
petitioner, made such distribution possible; (c) there was no issue on how
much each non-EPIRA separated members would receive because the
amount of their respective contribution was duly recorded by the
respondents; (d) respondents have already distributed the corrected
earnings differential to some non-EPIRA separated members, and have
given petitioner his corresponding partial attorneys fees amounting
to P3,512,007.32; (e) most of the non-EPIRA separated members have not
yet received their share under the compromise agreement but petitioner,
who was merely their agent, was already given partial payment as
attorneys fees; (f) the amount of P17,794,572.70 represents only less
than one fourth partial release of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund which means
that the equivalent of three-fourths more would be demanded [by
petitioner] in the future; and (3) the money claim of the non-EPIRA
separated members was settled through a compromise agreement and not
won by petitioner in a trial on the merits.
The Court of Appeals determined that petitioner was entitled only
to an amount of P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees on the basis of quantum
meruit. However, since petitioner already received P3,512,007.32 from
respondents as partial payment of his supposed 15% attorneys fees, it
ruled that such amount was more than sufficient and petitioner was not
entitled
to
claim
anymore
the
additional
amount
of P14,282,565.38. The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
the
assailed July 25, 2006 Order, the July 26, 2006 Writ of
Execution, the July 28, 2006 Notice of Garnishment, and
the August 10, 2006 Order of Delivery of Money are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
ordered, CAPPING at P3,512,007.32,
the
amount
manifested to have already been received from the
welfare fund as attorneys fees, as the maximum
amount that may be billed or collected as attorneys

fees from the whole welfare fund which amount is

NOTED to have already exceeded what this court had
fixed atP1,000,000.00 as the reasonable amount,
on quantum meruit, that may be collected as attorneys
fees, pursuant to the guidelines codified in Rule 20.01,
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [30]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
Decision but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
27 September 2007.[31]
Hence, petitioner brought the instant petition before us assigning
the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENTS EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY AND
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) ARE ENTITLED TO
[PRELIMINARY] INJUNCTION AS THEY HAVE MATERIAL AND
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS, WHICH ARE CLEAR AND
UNMISTAKABLE, i.e. RIGHTS OF BEING CLIENTS TO
QUESTION THE REASONABLENESS OF THE ATTORNEYS
FEES OF A LAWYER. THIS ALLEGED RIGHT IS NONEXISTENT AND IN FACT FABRICATED CONSIDERING THAT
THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT THE CLIENTS AT ALL OF
PETITIONER, ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%) CONTINGENCY/SUCCESS FEE OF
PETITIONER VICTORIANO V. OROCIO IS UNCONSCIONABLE
AND UNREASONABLE DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT THE SAID ATTORNEYS FEES IS AMONG THE TERMS
AND
CONDITIONS
OF
A
JUDICIALLY
APPROVED
COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
AND
COURT
ORDER
APPROVING HIS CHARGING LIEN, WHICH AGREEMENT
AND ORDER HAVE ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.[32]
In his first assigned error, petitioner assails the Resolution dated
31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals granting respondents application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. He claims that the Court of Appeals
issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents because
petitioner allegedly violated respondents material and substantial right as
petitioners clients to pay only reasonable attorneys fees. Petitioner
asserts that none of the respondents is his client in the present case; that

even respondents themselves have not alleged or claimed that they are his
clients; that the amount of attorneys fees he claimed was chargeable on a
portion of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund due his clients, the non-EPIRA
separated employees; that if anyone would be injured by his claim of
attorneys fees, it would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees,
and not respondents; that none of his clients has questioned or complained
about the amount of attorneys fees he is claiming; that respondents are
not the real parties-in-interest and at most are merely nominal parties-ininterest; that as mere nominal parties-in-interest, respondents are not
entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction under the Rules of Court; and
that the requisites for the proper issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
are lacking in the instant case.[33]
In its Resolution dated 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals
granted respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction based
on the following reasons:
This Court finds that [herein respondents]
have prima facie established [their] compliance with
strict requirements for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in this case. Under the leading case
of Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 72 (2001), the
requisites of preliminary injunction are as follows: (a) the
invasion of the right of [herein respondents] is material
and substantial; (b) the right of [herein respondents] is
clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
irreparable damage to [herein respondents].
The right of [herein respondents] alleged
to have been invaded is that a client has the right
to pay only a reasonable amount of attorneys fees
and only for services actually rendered which is
clearly and unmistakably available to all clients. What
[herein respondents] are claiming is a material and
substantial
right. This
Court
finds
that
[herein
respondents] have prima facieestablished an urgent and
paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, to avoid irreparable
injury to [herein respondents]. x x x.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the basis of the Court of
Appeals in granting the writ was petitioners alleged violation or invasion of
respondents right, as petitioners clients, to pay only a reasonable amount
of attorneys fees to, and only for services actually rendered by, petitioner.
The Court of Appeals is clearly mistaken.

It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the nonEPIRA separated members in the latters quest to claim their shares in the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Petitioner was never hired or employed by
respondents as their counsel in the cases at bar. Respondents themselves
do not claim or allege that they are clients of petitioner. In fact, petitioner
is representing the non-EPIRA separated members, the opposing party to
the respondents in the present cases.
Further, the amount of attorneys fees being claimed by petitioner
is chargeable to the P119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of his
clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. Respondents have actually
partially distributed such amount to some non-EPIRA separated members
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement. In other words, the non-EPIRA
separated members are the lawful owners/beneficiaries of the amount from
which petitioners attorneys fees had been and shall be taken.
Hence, if anyone would be injured by petitioners claim for
attorneys fees, it would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members,
and not respondents. It appears, however, that none of the non-EPIRA
separated members has questioned or complained about petitioners claim
for attorneys fees.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. [34] A
writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main
suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to preserve thestatus quo of
the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties during
the pendency of the suit. [35] For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the
applicant is tasked to establish and convincingly show the following: (1) a
right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a
violation of that right; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent act and
urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. [36]
A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law
or is enforceable as a matter of law. [37] The existence of a right violated is a
prerequisite to the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction. [38] A writ of
preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise.[39] It may be issued only if the applicant has clearly shown
an actual existing right that should be protected during the pendency of the
principal action.[40] In the absence of a clear legal right, or when the
applicants right or title is doubtful or disputed, preliminary injunction is not
proper.[41]
It is evident from the foregoing that respondents do not have a
clear right or right in esse to pay only a reasonable amount of attorneys
fees to the petitioner because such right belongs solely to petitioners
clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. There can be no violation of a
right which does not exist in the first place. Also, there was no necessity
for the writ of preliminary injunction since the non-EPIRA separated

members do not claim any damage or injury caused by the execution of the
RTC Order dated 15 May 2006. Even assuming that respondents would
probably suffer damages as administrators or custodians of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund if the writ of preliminary injunction was not granted, our ruling
would still be the same. We have held that the possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [42] Given these considerations,
we hold that the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of respondents in its Resolution, dated 31 October 2006,
was improper.
With regard to his second assigned error, petitioner maintained
that his claim for attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the P119,196,000.00
estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-EPIRA separated
members was not unreasonable or unconscionable because such amount
was expressly agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement between the
non-EPIRA separated members and respondents. The Compromise
Agreement was submitted to the RTC for approval through the joint motion
of the non-EPIRA separated members and respondents, and the RTC had
rendered a final and executory decision approving the same. By virtue
of res judicata, the Court of Appeals cannot alter or change the terms of the
Compromise Agreement by prohibiting petitioner from collecting his
stipulated amount of attorneys fees.[43]
Petitioner also avers that the amount of P17,794,572.70, which is
equivalent to 15% of the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings
differential due the non-EPIRA separated members from the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund is already the total, not partial, amount he is claiming as
attorneys fees; that the P119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings
differential due the non-EPIRA separated members from the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund is not hypothetical, such amount having been actually
computed and fixed by respondents themselves without the participation of
petitioner and his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members; that he did a
lot of legal work and utilized his legal skills on discovery procedures to force
respondents to enter into the Compromise Agreement with the non-EPIRA
separated members; that the passage of EPIRA merely paved the way for
the distribution of the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; that
if not for his legal work and skills, the non-EPIRA separated members would
not have received their lawful shares in the remaining assets of the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; and that his claim for 15% attorneys fees is
supported by jurisprudence.[44]
An attorneys fee, in its ordinary concept, refers to the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal services he has rendered to a
[45]
client.
The client and his lawyer may enter into a written contract
whereby the latter would be paid attorneys fees only if the suit or litigation
ends favorably to the client. This is called a contingency fee contract. The
amount of attorneys fees in this contract may be on a percentage basis,
and a much higher compensation is allowed in consideration of the risk that
the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. [46] In the case at bar, the non-

EPIRA separated members and petitioner voluntarily entered into a

contingency fee contract whereby petitioner did not receive any
acceptance fee or appearance/meeting fee. The non-EPIRA separated
members expressly agreed to pay petitioner contingency or success fees
of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amount/value of assets (liquid and/or
non-liquid) recovered; and authorized petitioners law firm to receive
and/or collect its contingency/success fee without further demand.
Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because
they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in
cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with
which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law,
make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of
litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the only means by
which the poor clients can have their rights vindicated and
upheld. Further, such contracts are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics.[47]
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law,
the same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. [48]
A stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for
professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the
contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated
amount to be unreasonable or unconscionable. If the stipulated amount for
attorneys fees is excessive, the contract may be disregarded even if the
client expressed their conformity thereto. [49] Attorneys fees are
unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness, or if they are so disproportionate to the value of the
services rendered. In such a case, courts are empowered to reduce the
attorneys fee or fix a reasonable amount thereof taking into consideration
the surrounding circumstances and the established parameters.[50]
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be
a basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorneys fees. Quantum
meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.
It is applicable even if there was a formal written contract for attorneys
fees as long as the agreed fee was found by the court to be
unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis ofquantum meruit, factors such as the
time spent, and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; importance of the subject matter; skill demanded;
probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proferred case; customary charges for similar services; amount involved in
the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of

compensation; character of employment; and professional standing of the

lawyer, may be considered.[51]
It appears that the non-EPIRA separated members chose petitioner
as their counsel because the latter, as former member of the NAPOCORWFBT for two terms or four years, is familiar and knowledgeable on the
operation of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. [52] Yet, according to the
contingency fee contract agreement between petitioner and the non-EPIRA
separated members, petitioner received no acceptance fee and
appearance/meeting fee when he took on the non-EPIRA separated
members case. Petitioners attorneys fees were absolutely dependent on
the success of non-EPIRA separated members claim on the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund. Despite these circumstances, petitioner worked diligently in
advocating the claims of the non-EPIRA separated members against
respondents as shown by the following: (1) petitioner took pains in verifying
the identity and claim of each of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members on
the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (2) petitioner prepared and filed a wellresearched and well-argued petition with the RTC for the claims of the nonEPIRA separated members;[53] (3) he prepared and presented several
witnesses and numerous pertinent documents before the RTC in support of
their application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction against respondents plan to exclude the nonEPIRA separated members from receiving their shares in the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund; (4) he participated, as non-EPIRA separated members
counsel, in the conduct of several hearings regarding the said application
for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction;[54] (5) he obtained a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction from the RTC which enjoined/prohibited respondents
from excluding the non-EPIRA separated members from their shares in the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund;[55] (6) he held numerous conferences with the nonEPIRA separated members wherein he apprised the latter of the status of
their claims and his legal strategies pertinent thereto; [56] and (7) he exerted
utmost efforts which eventually led to the execution of the Compromise
Agreement
between
the
non-EPIRA
separated
members
and
respondents.
By reason of petitioners dedication and persistence as can be
gleaned above, respondents finally agreed to settle amicably with the nonEPIRA separated members as regards the latters claim for shares in the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund by virtue of the Compromise Agreement.
Undoubtedly, were it not for petitioners vigilance and zeal,
respondents would not have executed the Compromise Agreement with the
non-EPIRA separated members. Hence, it is fair to conclude that petitioner
was entitled to a reasonably high compensation.
However,
petitioners
attorneys
fees
in
the
amount
of P17,794,572.70 or equivalent to 15% of the P 119,196,000.00 corrected
earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated members should be
equitably reduced.

In NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. The

National Power Corporation (NPC),[57] we awarded separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement plus backwages to several NPC employees because they
were illegally dismissed by the NPC. The NPC employees were represented
by a certain Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon (Atty. Aldon) and Atty. Victoriano V.
Orocio, (the petitioner in the instant cases) under a legal retainer
agreement which provides: (1) no acceptance fee; (2) miscellaneous/out of
pocket expenses in the amount of P25,000.00; and (3) twenty-five percent
(25%) of whatever amounts/monies are recovered in favor of said NPC
personnel contingent on the success of the case. Atty. Aldon and Atty.
Orocio filed a Motion for Approval of Charging (Attorneys) Lien pursuant to
the legal retainer agreement. Although we granted the said motion, we
reduced the amount of attorneys fees which was chargeable on the monies
recoverable by the NPC employees from 25% to 10% because:
While we duly recognize the right of Atty. Aldon
and Atty. Orocio to a charging lien on the amounts
recoverable by petitioners pursuant to our 26 September
2006 Decision, nevertheless, we deem it proper to reduce
the same. Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable. The amounts which
petitioners may recover as the logical and necessary
consequence of our Decision of 26 September 2006, i.e.,
backwages and separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement),
are essentially the same awards which we grant to
illegally dismissed employees in the private sector. In
such cases, our Labor Code explicitly limits attorneys
fees to a maximum of 10% of the recovered
amount. Considering by analogy the said limit on
attorneys fees in this case of illegal dismissal of
petitioners by respondent NPC, a government-owned and
controlled corporation; plus the facts that petitioners
have suffered deprivation of their means of livelihood for
the last five years; and the fact that this case was
originally filed before us, without any judicial or
administrative proceedings below; as well as the
fundamental ethical principle that the practice of law is a
profession and not a commercial enterprise, we approve
in favor of Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio a charging lien of
10% (instead of 25%) on the amounts recoverable by
petitioners from NPC pursuant to our Decision dated 26
September 2006.
The abovementioned case may be reasonably applied by analogy
in the instant case since they have substantially similar circumstances. In
the case before us, although the non-EPIRA separated members were not

illegally dismissed, they were, nevertheless, separated from work by reason

of EPIRA. In addition, the non-EPIRA separated members had a legal
retainer agreement/contingency fee contract with petitioner as their
counsel.
It should also be emphasized that the practice of law is a
profession not a moneymaking venture. A lawyer is not merely the
defender of his clients cause and a trustee of his clients cause of action
and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and
participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in
society. It follows that a lawyers compensation for professional services
rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not just to guarantee
that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and
commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his
attorneys oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the
authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees. [58]
Thus, taking into account the foregoing circumstances and
recognized principles, the 15% attorneys fees of petitioner should
be reduced to 10%. As such, petitioner is entitled to collect only, as
attorneys
fees,
an
amount
equivalent
to 10% of
the P119,196,000.00 or P11,919,600.00.
We note, however, that the compromise agreement was partially
implemented in the first week of April 2006 with the payment
of P23,416,000.00 to some non-EPIRA separated members. [59] Petitioner
admitted having already received an amount of P3,512,007.32 as his
attorneys fees on the said partial payment of P23,416,000.00.
[60]
Accordingly, the amount of P3,512,007.32 received by petitioner as
attorneys fees should be deducted from the fixed 10% attorneys fees or
the amount of P11,919,600.00. Per computation, petitioner is entitled to
recover the amount of P8,407,592.68 as attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 31 October 2006 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Resolution, dated
29 January 2007 and 27 September 2007, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that petitioner is entitled to recover attorneys fees in
the amount ofP8,407,592.68 on the corrected earnings differential of the
non-EPIRA separated members. No costs
Quirante vs. IAC [G.R. No. 73886 January 31, 1989]
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
FACTS:

1)
2)
3)

In the case of Dr. Casasolas claim against its erring building

contractor, the trial court ruled in favor of the former who
eventually died.
Here, petitioner Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for
the confirmation of his attorneys fees.
According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and
the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorneys fees, as
confirmed in writing by the latters surviving spouse and two
daughters to be computed as follows:
In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorneys
fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be
P30,000.00;
In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the
P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of
Dr. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmationdespite an
opposition thereto.In the petition for review on certiorari, the
respondent court (IAC) ruled that the confirmation of attorneys
fees is premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled of the attorneys fees.

HELD: NO.

Ruling of respondent court affirmed.

Since the main case from which the petitioners claims for
their fees may arise has not yet become final, the
determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount
thereof should be held in abeyance.
an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the
main litigation has beendecided and the subject of
recovery is at the disposition of the court
even if there was supposedly a contract, the provisions thereof
were made todepend on the outcome of the case i.e. if 120,000
surety bond would berecovered
even if heirs allegedly confirmed contract, court would still be in
better position todetermine basis of fees
The orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be
likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also
necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the
propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorneys fees.
The alleged confirmation to attorneys fees should not adversely
affect the non-signatories in the petition, since it is also premised
on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family.

METROBANK V CA
REGALADO; January 23, 1990
FACTS

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari impugning the decision of

CA affirming order of RTC, fixing attorneys fees and directing
petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) to
pay its attorneys, private respondent Arturo Alafriz and
Associates, the amount of P936,000 as attorneys fees on a
quantum meruit5 basis.
Private respondent handled civil cases for the declaration of nullity
of certain deeds of sale, with damages, in behalf of Metrobank
from March 1974 to September 1983.
Celedenio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by
Eustaquio Alejandro, et al.
These were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank to secure a
loan obligation of Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel
Corporation.
Obligors
defaulted
and
Metrobank
foreclosed
the
mortgages.
Alejandro brought suit against Javier and included
Metrobank as defendant, alleging deceit, fraud and
misrepresentation committed against him by Javier.
it was during the pendency of these suits that the lands were sold
by Metrobank to its sister corporation, Service Leasing
Corporation, for P600,000.
On same day, properties were resold to Herby Commercial
and Construction Corporation for P2.5M.
Herby then mortgaged the same properties to Banco de Oro for
P9.2M.
Private respondent did not have knowledge of such transactions.
private respondent then filed a motion to enter the
charging lien6 in the records of the civil cases, pursuant to
Sec 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to 25%
of the actual and current market values of the litigated
properties, as attorneys fees.
Alejandro et al filed a motion to dismiss their complaints, which
lower court granted.
private respondent filed motion to fix its attorneys fees,
based on quantum meruit.
Metrobank manifested it had fully paid private respondent.
Private respondent, however, countered that the P50,000 given by
petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a
cash advance, including P14000 paid on Dec 15, 1980.
It also appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a
compromise with Metrobank in order to avoid suit, offering a
compromise amount of P600,000 but negotiations were
unsuccessful.
RTC issued an order granting payment of attorneys fees,
P936,000, to private respondent.
Respondent CA affirmed trial courts order.

ISSUES
1. WON private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging
lien for payment of its attorneys fees.
2. WON a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien
3. WON private respondent is entitled to 25% of the actual and
current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum
meruit basis.
HELD
1. NO.

A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of

attorneys fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for
money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in
the main action by the attorney in favor of his client.
in this case, the dismissal order neither provided for any money
judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less
in favor of petitioner.
Private respondents supposed charging lien is thus
without legal basis.
an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon
money due his client form the adverse party in nay action
or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such
lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of
the litigation.
An attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as e
defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in
litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an
attorney defending the clients title to property already in the
clients possession.

A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary

petition as an incident in the main action in which his services
were rendered when something is due his client in the action from
which the fee is to be paid.
an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the
jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction
subsists until the lien is settled.
This, however, applies only where the charging lien is valid and
enforceable.

NOTE: in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services

rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
elements to be considered are generally
1. the importance of the subject matter in controversy
2. extent of services rendered
3. professional standing of lawyer .
Disposition Petition for review is granted, decision of CA is
reversed and set aside, without prejudice to appropriate
proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish
its right to attorneys fees and the amount thereof.

Research and Services Realty vs. CA

Facts:

2. NO.

Atty. Manuel Fonacier was hired by petitioner when the Carreons

and a certain PatricioC. Sarile instituted before the RTC of Makati
City an action against the petitioner for rescission of the Joint
Venture Agreement which provided that:
1. petitioner shall undertake to develop, subdivide, administer,
and promote thesale of the parcels of land owned by the
Carreons
2. The proceeds of the sale of the lots were to be paid to the
Philippine NationalBank (PNB) for the landowner's mortgage
obligation,
3. and the net profits to be shared by the contracting parties on
a 50-50 basis.
While case was pending, the petitioner, without the knowledge of
the privaterespondent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with another landdeveloper, Filstream International, Inc.
(hereinafter Filstream).
Under this MOA, theformer assigned its rights and obligations
under the Joint Venture Agreement in favor of the latter for a
consideration of P28 million, payable within twenty-four months.
March 31, 1993: petitioner terminated services of Fonacier
Petitioner had already received 7 million from Filstream
Upon knowing the existence of the MOA, Fonacier filed an action to
recover the sum of P700,000.00 as his contingent fee in the case
even if he had no participation in thenegotiation and preparation
thereof.

Issue: proper fee?

Held: No,

3.

The Court refrained from resolving the third issue so as not to

preempt or interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility of
the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper
proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.

excessive and unreasonable

P600,000.00 attorney's fees, whether on contingent basis or
quantum meruit , isexcessive and unreasonable.
Lawyers contribution was merely to ask for suspension or
postponement of proceedings

which Filstream agreed to pay the petitioner, was not a judgment

or award in favor of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 612. It was the
consideration of the assignment, transfer, and conveyance to
Filstream of all the petitioner's "rights, interest and participation
embodied and specified in the Joint Venture Agreement (Annex
"A") and in all the eight hundred seventy-five (875) parcels of land
comprising the SARANAY HOMES subdivision. . . ."
the private respondent's attorney's fee on "contingent
basis" in Civil Case No. 612 is unwarranted.
If at all, he could only be entitled to attorney's fees on quantum
meruit basis as of the expiration of his retainer contract on 31
March 1993.
Quantum meruit simply means "as much as he deserves." [24] In
no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than
what is reasonable pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
SEC. 24.
Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees.
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
to the importance of the subject-matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of
the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys
as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable.
this Court had earlier declared the following as circumstances to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of a claim for

attorney's fees: (1) the amount and character of the service

rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature
and importance of the litigation or business in which the services
were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of
money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or
involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for
in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character
and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; and
(9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized
that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is
contingent than when it is n
it was incumbent upon the private respondent to prove the
reasonable amount of attorney's fees, taking into account the
foregoing factors or circumstances. The records before us and
the trial court's 11 October 1993 order do not confirm that
the private respondent proved by either testimonial or
documentary evidence that the award of P600,000.00 was
reasonable. The private respondent's testimony thereon was
crucial. Yet, it does not appear from the 11 October 1993 order
that he took the witness stand. From the Minutes of the trial court
attached to the Rollo of CA-G.R. CV No. 44839, [26] it appears that
only Atty. Atienza and Mr. Suazo gave oral testimony on the
motion.
It necessarily follows then that the 11 October 1993 order has
insufficient factual basis, and the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in arbitrarily fixing the private respondent's
attorney's fees at P600,000.00. The affirmance of the said order
by the Court of Appeals premised on the provision in the retainer
contract regarding contingent fee is thus fatally flawed.