ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR., vs. ATTY. JOSELITO C.

FRIAL,
VELASCO, JR., J.: A.C. No. 7820
September 12, 2008
FACTS:

complainant Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr. charged respondent Atty.

Joselito C. Frial with violating his Lawyers Oath and/or gross
misconduct arising from his actuations with respect to two
attached vehicles.

Complainant, owner of the vehicles in question, asked that Atty.

Frial be disbarred.

The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo v.

Ricardo Salomon et al., , in which a writ of preliminary attachment
was issued in favor of Lucy Lo, Atty. Frials client.

The writ was used to attach two (2) cars of complainant-a black
1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra.
PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS

According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead

of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, turned them
over to Atty. Frial, Los counsel.

Atty. Salomon claimed that on several occasions, the Nissan

Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized individuals.

For instance, barangay captain Andrew Abundo saw the Nissan

Sentra in front of a battery shop at Quezon City

Architect Roberto S. Perez and three others saw and took video
and photo shots of the same car while in the Manresa Shell station
at, Quezon City.

M. Perez, complainants driver, saw the said car in another Shell

station near Kamias Street.

Arlene Carmela M. Salomon spotted it driven by bondsman

Ferdinand Liquigan allegedly with Atty. Frials consent.

As Atty. Salomon further alleged, when the misuse of the car was
reported, paving for Liquigans apprehension, Atty. Frial, in a letter,
acknowledged having authorized Liquigan to bring the car
in custodia legis to a mechanic.

As to the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty.

Frial deliberately withheld information as to its whereabouts.

As it turned out later, the Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but
the court was not immediately put on notice of this development.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS

Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars thru his own
undertaking, without authority and knowledge of the court.

The subject vehicles, according to him, were first parked near the
YMCA building in front of the Manila City Hall where they remained
for four months.

He said that when he went to check on the vehicles condition

sometime in December 2005, he found them to have been
infested and the wirings underneath the hoods gnawed by rats.

He denied personally using or allowing others the use of

the cars, stating in this regard that if indeed the Nissan Sentra
was spotted, it could have been the time when the car was being
transferred from the YMCA.

The sightings, so Atty. Frial claimed, possibly occurred when the

Nissan Sentra was brought to the gas station to be filled up.

He said that the car could not have plausibly been spotted in
Project 3 on December 13, 2006, parked as it was then in front of
Liquigans house for mechanical check-up.
ISSUE: whether or not Atty. Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of
the attached properties.
HELD: YES

In the Report, the following were deduced from the affidavits of

Andrew Abundo, Roberto Perez, Robert Perez, and Dante Batingan:
1. at no time was Atty. Frial seen driving the Sentra;
2. Abundo learned that at that time the car was spotted at
the battery shop, the unnamed driver bought a new
battery for the car which was not inappropriate since a
battery was for the preservation of the car;
3. Atty. Frial admitted that the Nissan Sentra was seen
gassed up on February 18, 2006 and in June 2006 and
there was no reason to gas up the Nissan Sentra on those
times unless it was being used;
4. Roberto Perez said the Nissan Sentra was used to buy
goats meat; and
5. photos of the Nissan Sentra in different places obviously
showed it was being used by others.

while there is perhaps no direct evidence tying up Atty.

Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact
remains that it was being used by other persons during the
time he was supposed to have custody of it.

drove the Nissan Sentra on those occasions must have received

the car key from Atty. Frial.

When Atty. Frial took custody of the Nissan Sentra and Volvo cars,
he was duty bound to keep and preserve these in the same
condition he received them so as to fetch a good price
should the vehicles be auctioned.

As to the burnt Volvo, Atty. Frial admitted receiving it in excellent

condition and that there was no court order authorizing him to
remove the car from the YMCA premises.

Admitted too was the fact that he secured the release of the Volvo
on the strength alone of his own written undertaking; 3 and that the
car was almost totally destroyed by fire on while parked in his
residence.
He could not, however, explain the circumstances behind
the destruction, but admitted not reporting the burning to
the court or the sherif.
While the burning of the car happened before the mediation
hearing, Atty. Frial, upon inquiry of Atty. Salomon, did not give
information as to the whereabouts of the cars.
The destruction of the Volvo in Atty. Frials residence was
not an ordinary occurrence; it was an event that could
have not easily escaped his attention.
there is a strong reason to believe that Atty. Frial
deliberately concealed the destruction of said vehicle from
the court during the hearings in, which were the opportune
times to reveal the condition of the Volvo car.
A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from
disposing of the attached property, thus securing the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any
proper party.
When the objects of the attachment are destroyed, then the
attached properties would necessarily be of no value and the
attachment would be for naught.
there is no question that Atty. Frial is guilty of grave misconduct
arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics that states:
o
11. Dealing with trust property
o
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby
for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
o
Money of the client or collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances
be commingled with his own or be used by him.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is
expected to respect the courts order and processes.
Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer.
He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued.
Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care
of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan
Sentra car by persons who had no business using it.

He did not inform the court or at least the sherif of the

destruction of the Volvo car.
What is worse is that he took custody of them without so
much as informing the court, let alone securing, its
authority.
we find Atty. Frial guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached
cars and grave misconduct. The Court, nevertheless, is not
inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. With the view we take of the case, there is no
compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial intended to
pervert the administration of justice for some dishonest purpose.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Frial is adjudged guilty of grave
misconduct and infidelity in the custody of properties in custodia
legis. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR., vs. ATTY. MINERVO T. LANGIT

CARPIO, J.: A.C. No. 7057
July 25, 2006
FACTS:

David L. Almendarez, Jr. ("complainant") filed this complaintaffidavit1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Minervo T. Langit ("respondent") for acts
unbecoming a lawyer.

Complainant, as attorney-in-fact of his mother Pura Lioanag Vda.

de Almendarez, was the plaintiff in an ejectment case Respondent
served as complainant's counsel.

While the case was pending, defendant Roger Bumanlag

("Bumanlag") deposited monthly rentals for the property in dispute
to the Branch Clerk of Court.

the trial court rendered a decision in the ejectment case based on

a compromise agreement executed by complainant and
Bumanlag.

the trial court issued an alias writ of execution for the satisfaction
of the decision.

A court order2 granted the Omnibus Motion for Execution and

Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as
complainant's counsel.

Respondent filed a second motion for withdrawal of deposited

rentals, which the trial court also granted

complainant learned that respondent was able to withdraw

the rentals deposited by Bumanlag.

Felicidad Daroy ("Daroy"), Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court,

confirmed this to complainant who received from Daroy copies of

the two withdrawal slips drawn from the trial court's savings
account.

respondent received a total of P255,000, as evidenced by two

receipts5 signed by him.

The withdrawals were made through Daroy's authorized

representative Antonia Macaraeg, but Daroy personally delivered
the money to respondent.

Respondent did not inform complainant of these

transactions.

Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent

respondent a final demand letter for the accounting and return of
the P255,000.6

Respondent failed to reply.

Hence, complainant filed this case for disbarment against

respondent for failing to account for complainant's funds.

Complainant further accuses respondent of neglecting to pursue

the implementation of the writ of execution issued in the
ejectment case.

IBP Report and recommendation considered complainant's

evidence "clear and convincing" enough to justify disciplinary
action against respondent for violation of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 16.01 of CPR
HELD: YES

Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath

when he received the sum of money representing the
monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting
for and returning such sum to its rightful owner.

Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for

complainant.

Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant.

The Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") states:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to
the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant

of the trial court's approval of the motion to withdraw the
deposited rentals.
Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could have
collected any lien which he had over them in connection
with his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to
complainant.
A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his
client's money for himself by the mere fact that the client
owes him attorney's fees.
Respondent's failure to turn over the money to
complainant despite the latter's demands gives rise to the
presumption that he had converted the money for his
personal use and benefit.
it renders respondent liable not only for violating the Code but also
for contempt, as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt
When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of
his client after it has been demanded he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings
under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.
Additionally, respondent failed to observe Canon 1712 of the Code,
which obligates the lawyer to take up the cause of his client with
entire zeal and devotion.
It seems that after respondent received the withdrawn deposits,
he never contacted complainant again. He did not pursue the
implementation of the writ of execution issued in the ejectment
case, to the prejudice of complainant.
By his inaction, respondent violated the trust and confidence
reposed in him. For in agreeing to be complainant's counsel,
respondent undertook to take all steps necessary to safeguard
complainant's interest in the case.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring
utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney.
Respondent miserably failed in this regard.
Instead, he demonstrated a lack of integrity, care, and devotion
required by the legal profession from its members.
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Minervo T. Langit GUILTY of violating
Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two years

effective upon finality of this Decision. We ORDER respondent

to RESTITUTE, within 30 days from finality of this Decision,
complainant'sP255,000, with interest at 12% per annum from 30
June 2003 until fully paid. We DIRECT respondent to submit to the
Court proof of payment within 15 days from payment of the full
amount
ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, vs. ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA,
JR.,
PER CURIAM: A.C. No. 4904
August 12, 2004
FACTS:

Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged

Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross
professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.
Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now
deceased husband Chua Yap Ans legal counsel and adviser upon
whom they reposed trust and confidence.
They were in fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street,
Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondents family,
and another property, situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan
City (Melencio property), also owned by respondents family
whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their house.
These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner,
respondents mother Felicisima Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs.
Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a
loan she obtained.
As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank,
respondent convinced complainant Ana Chua and her husband to
help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her obligation in consideration
for which the Melencio property would be sold to them
at P850.00/sq. m.
Accommodating respondents request, the spouses Chua and their
business partner, herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled
Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40.
A Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the Melencio property
for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose
name appears therein as "Felicisima M. Melencio," in favor of
complainants.
As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains
tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it.
Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute
Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity
of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax.
As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again

appears therein as "Felicisima M. Melencio," in favor of

complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to
be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses "in the
redemption of the MESINA properties," Mrs. Mesina was found to
have "an existing balance" due the spouses in the amount
of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent
about it.
Respondent, by Affidavit, "acknowledged such obligation" to be his
and undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued a title over the Melencio
property.
Not long after the execution of Deed of Absolute Sale, one Juanito
Tecson (Tecson) filed an Affidavit5 charging respondents mother,
the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the
said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document
and violation of the Internal Revenue Code.
In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee
of the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses,
supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the
property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to
his exclusion.
Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not
reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated
"to evade payment of capital gains tax."
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification
charge against Mrs. Mesina et al.
He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of
sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it
to Mrs. Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to "Felicisima M. Melencio" the
Melencio property for P85,400.00.
A new title was accordingly issued in the name of "Felicisima M.
Melencio," the owners copy of which was entrusted to
complainants.
Tecson subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance alleging that
his filing of the criminal complaint "arose out of mere
misunderstanding and difference" with herein complainants and
their co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against
them.
Some years later, respondent approached complainants and told
them that he would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title
with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs.
Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in
complainants favor.
In fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking

I promise to and undertake to have the Deed of Sale of

the above-mentioned property in favor of Ana Chua and
Marcelina Hsia to be signed by Mrs. Felicisima
Mesina, within four (4) months from date hereof so that
the above-mentioned property and title maybe
transferred in the name of Ana Chua and Macelina Hsia.
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died "in the early part of 1991."
Despite respondents repeated promises "to efect" the
transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so.
Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was
being offered for sale to the public.
The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus a
Complaint9 against respondent and his
noting that the copy of the Resolution requiring respondent to
comment on the complaint sent to him at his office address was
returned unserved with the notation "Moved," considered the
Resolution of July 13, 1998 served on respondent by substituted
service pursuant to Rule 13, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Respondent was accordingly deemed to have waived the filing of
the required comment.
The IBP, acting on the complaint, issued a notice of hearing
On the scheduled date of hearing, complainants personally
appeared with their counsel
another hearing but copy of notice was returned unserved
o

ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 16.01 of CPR

HELD: YES

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of

Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital
gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and
legal processes,31 and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law;32
That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party
but the government is aggravating.33
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute
another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein
they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio
property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.34
Third, respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua
spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his
mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would,
in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother
in favor of complainants, he likewise committed
dishonesty.

That the signature of "Felicisima M. Melencio" in the 1985

document35 and that in the 1979 document 36 are markedly
different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or
the 1985 document or even both.
A propos is this Courts following pronouncement in Nakpil v.
Valdez37
o
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his
client but the business transaction must be characterized
with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good
faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his
dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is
required in business dealings where the parties trade
at "arms length." Business transactions between an
attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by
the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these
transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a
lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public
policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy
position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance
of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or
improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys
favor.38
Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the
reconveyance of the Melencio property to complainants,
consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such
promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the purpose,
the issue there being one of ownership while that in the case at
bar is moral fitness.39
In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more
specifically, the following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
o
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
o
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
o
Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
o
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
o
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,

FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
o
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
o
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for
gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED
o

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S.

HERNANDEZ, JR., vs.ATTY. JOSE C. GO,
PER CURIAM: A.C. No. 1526
January 31, 2005
FACTS:

For resolution is the verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment

against Atty. Jose C. Go filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now
deceased).

complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S.

Hernandez, Jr.

Shortly thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors

demanded payments of his loans.

Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her

properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for
sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal
services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.

Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear,

embarrassment, and social humiliation.

He advised her to give him her land titles at Zamboanga

City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her
creditors.

He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his

favor without any monetary or valuable consideration.

Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and

from the proceeds pay her creditors.

Complainant also owned Lots, which were mortgaged to her

creditors.

When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots.

Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving

those lots in his favor.

As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all

the lots belonging to complainant.

complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her

lots as agreed upon.

Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had
her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her
real properties worth millions.1a\^/phi1.net

Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion

to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is premature
since there is pending before the then Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City 17812 for recovery of ownership and declaration
of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him
involving the subject lots.

a Resolution denying respondents motion and requiring him to

submit his answer.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint.

He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to

various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration.

On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to

complainant and even invited her to live with his family.

His children used to call her "Lola" due to her frequent visits to his
residence.

He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a

cause of action.
IBP FINDINGS:

It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who
notarized the documents involving the said properties redeemed
or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which ended
up in respondents name like in the deed of sale executed by
Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez

a lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by the

respondent.

It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed

report to the complainant on how he paid complainants creditors
without selling her properties.

Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his

own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the
purchasers of complainants properties in utter disregard of their
agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent
concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 16.02 of CPR
HELD: YES.

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal

source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides:"A
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession."

Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for

himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by any
standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous
wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error
in judgment.3
He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.4
Canon 17 of the same Code states:"A lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him."
The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of
trust and confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged
his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him
to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used
to pay her creditors.
Respondent, however, abused her trust and confidence
when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself
and spent his own money to pay her obligations.
respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the
complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the
amounts paid to her creditors.
Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could
have earned more.
Records show that she did not receive any amount from
respondent.
Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his
duty as complainants counsel.
Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best
efforts and ability to protect the interests of his clients.
A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not
only protects his clients cause; he also serves the ends of justice
and does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that
a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of
the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers
oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior

court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without

authority to do so.10
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name
is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY.

ERLINDA R. TAROG, vs. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT,

A.C. No. 8253
March 15, 2011 PER CURIAM:
FACTS:

complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought

against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for his failure to account for and to
return the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of
the civil action to recover their property from a foreclosing banking
institution he was handling for them.

The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda
R. Tarog, substituted him upon his intervening death.

the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles

regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in the
Bicol Region.

Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for

that purpose.

Thus, they went to see Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal

Miralles, their friend who was a brother of Atty. Miralles. 1

They ultimately engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on

account of his being well-known in the community, and
being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University
where their son was then studying.

Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required

the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave to him.2

He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to

counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the
foreclosed property.

After they informed him that they had onlyP60,000.00, he required

them to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti).3

To raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a

loan from one Sia with the guarantee of his brother Atty. Miralles.
Sia issued a check in that amount in the name of Arnulfo.4

the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver
the P65,000.00.

When Arnulfo said that he had first to encash the check at

the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the
check to him instead so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be
the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court.

On that representation, Arnulfo handed the check to Atty.

Ricafort.5

After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify

the status of the consignation.

Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the

amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to
return the money, plus interest.

Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be

returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from
Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands.

The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, in Sorsogon (RTC), had required the parties to file their
memoranda. Accordingly, they deliveredP15,000.00 to Atty.
Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the
memorandum.6

When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would

not make good his promise of returning theP65,000.00, plus
interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter that Atty. Ricafort
return theP65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid
for the filing of the memorandum.7

No reply from Atty. Ricafort.

two versions about the transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs
insisted that the amount was to be consigned in court for purposes
of their civil case; on the other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that
the amount was for his fees under a "package deal" arrangement.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be

deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment
for his legal services under a "package deal," that is, the
amount included his acceptance fee, attorneys fee, and
appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of
sale until judgment, but excluding appeal.

He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the
value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the
labor, time, and trouble involved, and his professional character
and social standing;

that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood,

and agreed to the contents of the complaint, which did not
mention anything about any consignation;8 and

that Arnulfo, being a retired school principal, was a learned person

who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they
depicted against him.

Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount

of P65,000.00 was paid to him by the complainant as acceptance

fee on a package deal basis and under said deal, he will answer
the filing fee, attorneys fees and other expenses incurred up to
the time the judgment is rendered.

He presented a transcript of stenographic notes wherein it was

stated that complainant himself did not consign the money in
court.

Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer

agreement and that he issued only receipt because the
late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued.

he claims that he put something in the receipt that will describe

the nature of legal work which he will undertake considering that
he have considered thisP65,000.00 as his attorneys fees

Why he is not responding to Arnulfos demands? Atty. Ricafort

stated that he did not receive the letter and it was
received by their helper who did not forward the letter to
him.

the respondent Atty. Ricafort just denied the allegation that he

received the P65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also denied
that Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for follow-up the
reimbursement.

Is there animosity between him and the Tarogs and Miralles?

respondent stated that we have been very good friends for
the past ten (10) years and he said that in fact he was
surprised when the complaint was filed against him

The main defense of the respondent is that the

complainant in this case testified that the total amount to
redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked
whether he consigned the money to the court to redeem
the property he answered in the negative.

The amount of P65,000.00 is very much close to the amount of the

principal obligation of the complainant and it is not surprising for a
non-lawyer to hold on to the belief that with the filing of the case
for annulment of foreclosure his case would be strengthened by
making a deposit in court hence, the motivation to produce the
deposit was logical and natural insofar as the complainant is
concerned. and truthfulness of complainants narration that of Mrs.
Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles.10
IBP FINDINGS:

Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of

complainant Erlinda Tarog and his collaborating witness, we find
their statements to be credible.

Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03
of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking
advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being

dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the

amount of P65,000.00 to them.

Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to

prove that the amount ofP65,000.00 had been part of his
attorneys fees;

that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by

not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had
insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter
had not given it to him; and

that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also

promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but
Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several
resettings to allow him to settle his obligation.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 16.02 of the CPR
HELD: YES

Version of the complainants was more credible than

version of Atty. Ricafort

Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded

the Tarogs on the need for that amount to be deposited in
court for purposes of their civil case.

Being non-lawyers, they had no idea about the requirement for

them to consign any amount in court, due to the substantive and
procedural implications of such requirement being ordinarily
known only to lawyers.

Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricaforts representations

about the requirement to consign that amount in court was
entirely understandable in view of their awareness of Atty.
Ricaforts standing in the legal community of the place.

it was not far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount

close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be
deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering their
property.

Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos

demand letter was incredible.

He already initially admitted receiving the letter through a

househelp.18 His denial came only subsequently and for the first
time through his motion for in which he completely turned about
to declare that the Gemma Agnote who had received the letter
was unknown to him.20 .

Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of

the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 issued to
the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most
instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it

behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt."21 But

such explanation does not persuade us.
Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and
imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to
keep copies of the receipts for his own records.
He was all too aware that he was accountable for the
moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only
means of ensuring accountability was by issuing and
keeping receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential
relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was burdened with the
legal duty to promptly account for all the funds received
from or held by him for them.22
Tarogs could not have conjured or invented the need for
consignation. The consignation was a notion that could
have emanated only from him as their lawyer.
In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty.
Ricafort only P60,000.00 for the consignation, but that Atty.
Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount.

Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted serious

breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney
Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust
any money and property of his clients that came into his
possession,26 and he needed to be always mindful of the
trust and confidence his clients reposed in him.27
Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of
his professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such
funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon
demand.281avvphi1
Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive
obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart
from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit:
o
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.
For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his
personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and
not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the

memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00

upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary
duties as their attorney.
He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients
showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes
intended.29
He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the
moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and
in violation of the clients trust reposed in him. 30
WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty
of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar
Confidant is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the
sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus interest of six percent
per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3,
2002, within twenty days from notice.

LOURDES R. BUSIOS, , vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT,

PER CURIAM: A.C. No. 4349 December 22, 1997
FACTS:

In a sworn complaint for disbarment, complainant Lourdes R.

Busios charged respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing
lawyer in Oas, Albay with having committed the crime of estafa
under Article 315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code by
misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00.

Of this amount, P30,000.00 was entrusted to respondent for

deposit in the bank account of complainant's husband,
while P2,000.00 represented the amount respondent
demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in Civil
Case, when no such bond was required.

we required respondent to comment on the complaint.

He failed to comply twice and was again ordered to file a comment

and was fined.

respondent transmitted the fine of P1,000.00 by way of postal

money order, but asked for five (5) days from date to file his
comment.

As respondent still failed to so file, we then declared, that

respondent was deemed to have waived his right to file his
comment,

Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands charged with

having misappropriated the sum of P30,000.00 intended
for his clients as well as having deceived his clients into

giving him the sum of P2,000.00 purportedly to be

deposited as a bond in the case he was handling.
Complainant Lourdes R. Businos is one of the heirs of
Pedro Rodrigo who are the defendants in Civil Case
involving the properties of the late Pedro Rodrigo, father of herein
complainant.
Respondent was the counsel of record for the defendants in the
said case.
complainant, representing her co-heirs, executed a special power
of attorney, appointing and constituting respondent and/or Pedro
Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true and lawful attorney-in-fact
the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Br. 12 issued an order,
directing the Clerk of Court "to release any and all deposits of
rentals made in connection with this case to the defendants Heirs
of Pedro Rodrigo through Lourdes Rodrigo Businos who were
receiving the rentals from Oas Standard High School prior to the
institution of this case."
the Clerk of Court of RTC, Ligao informed herein
complainant that respondent had already received the
rental deposit of P25,000.00 on even date
Respondent also received from Oas Standard High School
on August 17, 1994 the sum of P5,000.00 as payment for
rental of school site for the month of July 1994
The said sum was entrusted to respondent with an
obligation on his part to deposit the same in the account of
complainant's husband at PNB, Ligao Branch. Instead,
however, of depositing the money, respondent converted
the money to his own personal use, and despite several
demands, he failed to return the same to complainant.
She was thus constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and an
administrative case for disbarment against him.
Complainant further accuses respondent for demanding
and receiving P2,000.00 from her which he said will be
used for the bond in Civil Case, but said amount was never
used as intended since no bond was required in the said case.
Thus, respondent merely pocketed the said amount.
Complainant, upon questioning by the undersigned, testified that:
She authorized respondent to withdraw the money
amounting P35,000.00 representing the rental fee paid of
Oas Standard High School from the Clerk of Court, with the
instruction to deposit the same in her savings account at
the PNB.

After she was informed by the court that respondent had already
withdrawn the money, she expected in vain to receive the money
a week later in Tarlac as respondent failed to effect the deposit of
the said sum in her account.

She demanded from him to give her the money, but he informed
her that he had already spent the same.

He promised, though, to pay her the said amount

She clarified that respondent withdrew only the sum of P30,000.00

from the Clerk of Court, while the P5,000.00 was withdrawn by
respondent from Oas Standard High

Despite several demands, both from her and her lawyer,

respondent failed to make good his promise to give her the
money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard
High School

She further testified that respondent demanded from her the

sum of P2,000.00 for the bond required in the civil case.

Respondent did not give her a receipt for the said amount.

Respondent gave back the P2,000.00 to complainant.

He paid complainant a total of P60,000.00 representing the

money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas
Standard High School, the P2,000.00 he got from
complainant and attorney's fees, which he undertook to
foot as a way of settlement.

On their third hearing of the estafa case, respondent came with

the money and paid complainant inside the courtroom

Because of this development, she did not anymore pursue the

estafa case against respondent but She has no intention, however,
of withdrawing the instant complaint
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of violating Rule 16.03 of CPR
HELD: YES

There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of having used the

money of his clients without their consent.

Respondent's illegal use of his client's money is made more

manifest [by] his letters to complainant, all promising the latter to
make good his promise to pay the money he withdrew from the
Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School

It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself

not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients.

He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that

has come into his possession.

He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for

his personal purposes without his client's [sic] consent.

Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor

of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over
to them
Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his
own personal use without their consent, and by deceiving
the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00
purportedly to be used as a bond which was not required
is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct.
His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and
fraudulently obtained do not relieve him from any liability
if only to impress upon him that the relation between an attorney
and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature
Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
o
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.
When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of
his client after it has been demanded he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings
under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.
o
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
o
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
o
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
o
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
o
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.
o
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
unlawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical

behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and
16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and consistent with
the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high
standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished
public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court
Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from
the practice of law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.

CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ

AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS AGAWAN, VS
ATTY. SANTIAGO R.
ROBINOL,
PER CURIAM: A.M. No. 2144 April 10, 1989
FACTS:

The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short)

used to own a parcel of land at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala,
Quezon City.

Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said

land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the
Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743
square meters as a possible development site.

Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966.

the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to

Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house
for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social
Movement.

Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc

broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating or selling
the land cheap to the squatters.

Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an

organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate
with Father Escaler.

Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang

Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with
Bernabe Martin as President, who was entrusted with the task of
negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them.

But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin

went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he
connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other
Samahan members.

the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square

meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price
of the land in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square
meter.
It was evident that Father Escaler had been made to
believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the
property.
Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone.
thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case with
the principal prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a
deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement
by the latter of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the
Colegio.
the court dismissed the case
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R.
Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's
fees
Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the
land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would
pertain to each of them.
Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision
To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of
Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs
occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of
title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by
little, P 2,500.00 from each head of family.
the sum of P 75,000.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the
officers;
After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no
payment had been made to Rivera.
When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an
intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of
Execution had not yet been issued by the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City.
However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had
already been dismissed.
After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave
other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at
all.
The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto
R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel

1.

Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a

letter informing the latter of their decision to terminate his
services and demanding the return of the P 75,000.00
deposited with him
Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand.
Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case as
counsel for the plaintiffs
Atty. Montemayor then filed a Motion for Execution praying that
the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a
deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs
At the hearing of the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol
manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his
substitution by Atty. Montemayor
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first
consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document labelled the
"second consensus" was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting
held for the purpose to the effect that they had decided to change
Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed paying for
their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
their favor.

Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan

officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court
requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to
return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its
power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice
law.
ROBINOLS CONTENTIONS:

Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to

appeal their case to the Court of appeals after they had lost in the
lower Court;

that their agreement as to attomey's fees was on a contingent

basis if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court Decision, they wig
give him a portion of the property subject matter of the litigation
equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-16433;

that he did not receive P 70,000.00 from Complainants but only P

56,470.00;

that he prepared and signed the receipt showing that he received

P 70,000.00 only to save complainants from embarrassment and
shame should their co-plaintiff ask for proof that they
(Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have not;

that the correct amount in his possession is only P 62,470.00-it

would really be P 75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their

2.

shares in the amount of P 12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one

Fortunate Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00;
that he had the right to hold the money in his possession as
guarantee for the payment of his attomey's fees of get a portion of
the property that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his
portion converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion is
P 50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals
85 square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P 500.00 up per
square meter);
that considering that P 50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/ 2)
per cent of the total value of the property, which is more than a
million pesos, such amount is not unreasonable;
that he is ready to give back the amount of P 12,470.00,
representing the difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount
of P 62,470.00 in his possession;
that complainants cannot make this Court a collection agency and
that while this Court has the exclusive disciplinary power over
members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot pass
judgment on Complainants' plea that the amount deposited by
respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be
ventilated in an ordinary action;
that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the
money in his possession (P 62,470.00) for himself, but he is
holding it until his attomey's fees are satisfied there being no
guarantee for its satisfaction because of Complainants' adamant
refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to him of his
discharge; and
that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols
formal withdrawal and conformity.

Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed a complaint

for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for
alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that
Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his (Robinol's)
formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there
was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their
counsel.
.MONTEMAYORS CONTENTIONS

For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees
agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were purely on a
contingent basis, the truth being that the attomey's fees were
payable on a cash basis of P 2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced
by the receipt signed by Atty. Robinol, plus whatever amount is
adjudicated as attomey's fees by the Court of Appeals;

that the contingent fee referred to by Atty. Robinol was the result
of his insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil
Case was already final, as shown by the date of the agreement

that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan

signed the agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a
substitute counsel, which is a majority of the membership and,
therefore, a valid consensus;

that he agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the growing belief

of the Samahan that most members of the Philippine Bar are
unprincipled; that although there was no formal Motion for
substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of
appearance in Civil Case No, the written consent of the clients
notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution nonobjection by Robinol of his appearance as counsel and implied
consent of the Court to the substitution as shown by its Order

that his professional and personal actuations as counsel for the

plaintiffs in Civil, do not cause dishonor either to himself or to the
Philippine Bar; and

that the Complaint against him should be dismissed.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 16.03 of CPR
HELD: YES
1. Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol

After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision

favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's
funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to
convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land
equivalent to that of each of the plaintifs to P 50,000.00,
which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area.

Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate

his clients' money not only because he is bound by a
written
agreement
but
also because,
under
the
circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done
so.

His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out
an existence

They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P

2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be
deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of
money, heart lessly took advantage of them.

Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly

dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the
money in his possession.

2.

Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as

counsel.
His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously
engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests,
which he was duty-bound to protect.
Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any
legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a
specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands obliged to
return the money immediately to their rightful owners.
We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence
on this score is the more credible and that he had, in fact,
received the total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the
share of P 12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the Somalian
He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for
money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients.
Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor
he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical
conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve
as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case
Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient
to make the said consensus binding.
Robinol is estopped from questioning because he was informed
and he also manifested no objection
ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago
R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's
oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation
between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to
continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical
actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to
attomey's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P 75,000.00
to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant
in the aforementioned Administrative Case.
2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, vs. ATTY. EDWIN T. QUIOCHO,

CALLEJO, SR., J.: A.C. No. 5925
March 11, 2003
FACTS:

Ruby Mae Barnachea filed a verified complaint for breach of

lawyer-client relations against respondent Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho.

It appears that respondent had not been in the private practice of

the law for quite some time.
However, he decided to revive his legal practice with some
associates.
Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent for
the latter to cause the transfer under her name of the title
over a property previously owned by her sister, Lutgarda
Amor D. Barnachea.
The latter sold said property to complainant under an unnotarized
deed of absolute sale.
Complainant drew and issued Check in the total amount of
P41,280.00 for the expenses for said transfer and in payment for
respondents legal services.
Respondent enchased the checks.
However, despite the lapse of almost two months, respondent
failed to secure title over the property in favor of
complainant.
The latter demanded that respondent refund to her the
amount of P41,280.00 and return the documents which she
earlier entrusted to him.
However, respondent failed to comply with said demands.
complainant received a letter from respondent informing her that
he had failed to cause the transfer of the property under
her name and that he was returning the documents and
title she had entrusted to him and refunding to her the
amount of P41,280.00 through his personal check (post
dated)
Respondent told complainant that he needed more time to fund
the check.
However, respondent failed to fund the check despite the
demands of complainant.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

respondent denied that complainant contracted his legal services.

Although respondent admitted having received the two checks
from complainant, he claimed that said checks were intended to
cover actual and incidental expenses for transportation,
communication, representation, necessary services, taxes and
fees for the cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411 under the
name of complainant and not for legal services.
He asserted that he acted in good faith as shown by the fact of his
return of complainants documents with an explanatory letter and
his issuance of a personal check for P41,280.00.
He insisted that he would not compromise for such meager
amount his personal standing as well as his membership in the
legal profession.

His failure to transfer the title of the property under the name of
the complainant was caused by his difficulty in making good the
claimed amount, compounded by his affliction with diabetes and
the consequent loss of sight of his right eye.
Respondent further alleged that he was a licensed real estate and
insurance broker and had been a freelance business management
consultant.
that he gave up the practice of his profession as a lawyer and
subsequently managed to put up a business center with fellow
insurance underwriters for their common insurance underwriting
practice.
He further claimed that an insurance client introduced
complainant as an insurance prospect to him. In the course of their
dealing, complainant intimated to respondent her willingness to
consider respondents insurance proposal provided the latter
would help her facilitate the cancellation and eventual transfer to
her name the property covered by TCT No. 334411 in the name of
complainants sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea.
Respondent agreed to help complainant in the transfer of the title
to her name, with the condition that no diligent study or
verification of complainants documents, nor preparation of any
additional document or any application or petition whatsoever, will
be made by respondent.
He explained to complainant that his task was merely to go
through the regular process of presenting the available
documents, paying the taxes and fees, and following up the
processing for the cancellation and issuance of the certificate of
title.
In other words, respondent ofered to complainant services
which a non-lawyer familiar with the procedure and the
related offices can perform and provide to the complainant
with respect to the transfer of the title of the property in
her name.
Respondent asserted that, he discovered and became aware for
the first time that the original copy of TCT No. 334411 with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City was destroyed in a fire in Quezon
City Hall several years earlier and that complainants copy of the
title needed to be reconstituted before it can be cancelled and
transferred.
the working relations of respondent in the business center with his
non-lawyer associates had become difficult and strained, impelling
him to sever his business relations with them and cease from to
going to the business center.
Consequently, telephone communications between respondent
and complainant at the business center was cut.
Communications became much more limited when, apart from the
fact that respondent did not have a landline at his residence,
respondents mobile phone was stolen.

IBP FINDINGS:

Respondent is not able to meet his financial obligations due to

financial difficulties, and that respondent is in good faith in his
failure to meet this obligation.
The Investigating Commissioner gave credence to the claim of
complainant that she engaged the legal services of respondent
and paid him for his services and that respondent failed in his
undertaking and refund the amount of P41,280.00 to complainant
despite her demands and that respondent appeared to be evading
the complainant.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 16.04 of CPR

HELD: YES

Respondents claim that complainant did not retain his

legal services flies in the face of his letter to complainant.
DEAR RUBY,
I AM SORRY I AM RETURNING YOUR DOCUMENTS WITHOUT
CHANGES.
I HAD A SERIES OF MONEY PROBLEMS RIGHT AFTER YOU GAVE ME
THE TWO CHECKS AND COMING WITH THE AMOUNTS WITH
PERSONAL FUNDS.
I WAS REVIVING MY LEGAL PRACTICE ONLY FOR TWO MONTHS
WHICH WE MET AND HAD JUST SET UP THE OFFICE WITH TWO
ASSOCIATES
WHICH
A
FEW
WEEKS
LATER
WE
HAD
DISAGREEMENTS AND DECIDED TO DISBAND. I WILL HAVE TO
REFURBISH MY OFFICE. I AM ISSUING MY PERSONAL CHECK TO
GUARANTEE THE AMOUNT I TOOK. I NEED A LITTLE TIME TO
COVER THE AMOUNT. THANKS FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING.

In this case, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking for

almost two months.
Worse, despite demands of complainant, he failed to refund
the amount of P41,280.00 and to return to complainant the
deed of absolute sale and title over the property.
He failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove that his
telephone at the business center was cut or that his mobile
phone had been stolen.
Even then, respondent could have easily contacted the
complainant at her residence or could have written her a letter
informing her that the original copy of TCT No. 324411 in the
custody of the Register of Deeds was burned when the Quezon
City Hall was gutted by fire and that there was a need for the
reconstitution of said title.

Neither did respondent adduce evidence that he was a life

insurance underwriter for Insular Life or that he had been sick with
diabetes and had lost his sight in his right eye.

The Court is led to believe that respondents failure to cause

the transfer of the title of the property under the name of
complainant was due to a financial problem that beset him
shortly after he received the checks from complainant.

It can easily be inferred from respondents letter that he

used complainants money to alleviate if not solve his
financial woes.

What compounded respondents unethical conduct was his

drawing of a personal check and delivering the same to
complainant without sufficient funds in his bank account to
cover the check.

A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client

that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and
property.5
He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.

Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as

for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds
and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real
property under the name of his client if not utilized, must
be returned immediately to his client upon demand
therefor.

The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his

client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.7

In this case, respondent intransigeantly refused to return to

the complainant the amount of P41,280.00 which he
received for the expenses for the transfer to her of the
title of the property and for his professional fees.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Respondent Atty. Edwin T.

Quiocho is found guilty of violation of Canons 15 and 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for One (1) Year with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. He is DIRECTED to restitute to the complainant the full
amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of
payment of said amount within ten (10) days from said payment. If
Respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the aforesaid
period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of three (3)
months for every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall
have paid the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of
suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be
necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his
one year suspension and the subsidiary penalty. This is without

prejudice to the right of the complainant to institute the

appropriate action for the collection of said amount
RUBIAS V BATILLER
G.R. No. L-35702
Facts:

May 29, 1973 TEEHANKEE

Francisco Militante claimed that he owned a parcel of land located

in Iloilo.
He filed with the CFI of Iloilo an application for the registration of
title of the land.
This was opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director of
Forestry, and other oppositors.
The case was docked as a land case, and after trial the court
dismissed the application for registration.
Militante appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Pending that appeal, he sold to Rubias (his son-in-law and a
lawyer) the land.
The CA rendered a decision, dismissing the application for
registration.
Rubias filed a Forcible Entry and Detainer case against Batiller.
In that case, the court held that Rubias has no cause of action
because the property in dispute which Rubias allegedly bought
from Militante was the subject matter of a land case, in which case
Rubias was the counsel on record of Militante himself.
It thus falls under Article1491 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether the sale of the land is prohibited under Article 1491.
Held: YES

Article 1491 says that The following persons cannot acquire any
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another. (5) Justices, judges,
prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession.
The present case clearly falls under this, especially since the case
was still pending appeal when the sale was made.
Legal effect of a sale falling under Article1491? NULL AND
VOID.CANNOT BE RATIFIED.

Manresa considered such prohibited acquisitions (which fell under

the Spanish Civil Code)as merely voidable because the Spanish
Code did not recognize nullity.
But our Civil Code does recognize the absolute nullity of contracts
whose cause, object or purpose is contract to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy or which are expressly
prohibited or declared void by law and declares such contracts
inexistent and void from the beginning.
The nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent,
and cannot be cured by ratification.
The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not
permit of compromise or ratification.
In this aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial
officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the
first three cases of guardians agents and administrators(under Art
1491).
As to their transactions, it has been opined that they may be
ratified by means of and in the form of a new contract, in which
case its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at
the time of execution of such new contract.
In those cases, the object which was illegal at the time of the first
contract may have already become lawful at the time of the
ratification or second contract, or the intent, or the service which
was impossible.
The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its
execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first
contract.
Decision affirmed.

Cantiller vs. Potenciano

Facts:

Humberto V. Potenciano is a practicing lawyer and a member of

the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862.
He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also
with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an
officer of the court.
An action for ejectment was filed against Peregrina Cantiller.
The court issued a decision against the latter.
A notice to vacate was then issued against Cantiller.
Cantiller then asked the respondent to handle their case.
The complainant was made to sign by respondent what she
described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and
haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment.
The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Manila.
Respondent demanded from the complainant P l,000.00 as
attorney's fee.

However the judge of the said court asked the respondent to

withdraw as counsel by reason of their friendship.
Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the
latter which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who
will issue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not
succeed in locating the judge.
Complainant paid P 10,000.00 to Potenciano by virtue of the
demand of the latter.
The amount was allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's
Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and P 1,000.00
to cover the expenses of the suit needed in order for the
complainant to retain the possession of the property.
But later on Cantiller found out that the amounts were not
necessary to be paid.
A demand was made against Potenciano but the latter did not
answer and the amounts were not returned.
Contrary to Potencianos promise that he would secure a
restraining order, he withdrew his appearance as counsel for
complainant.
Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement.
Hence, the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed.

Issue: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of

Cantiller.
Held: YES

When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that

he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion.
The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a
client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the
client had reposed on him.
The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary
principles of professional ethics.
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in
protecting his client's interests.
Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by
the presiding judge to withdraw his appearance as counsel by
reason of their friendship.
Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a
replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and
beyond reproach in dealing with their clients.
The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business
proposition.
It is a matter of public interest.
His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to
protect with utmost dedication the interest of his client

and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his

client. 9
More so in this case, where by reason of his gross
negligence complainant thereby sufered by losing all her
cases.
WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances
present in this case, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano
to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he
can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to
resume the practice of law.

ALISBO V JALINDOON
GRINO-AQUINO; July 18, 1991
FACTS

Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his counsel

in an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased sps
Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma w/c had been adjudicated to
him under the judgment of CC No. 4963 because Alisbo failed to
file a motion for execution of judgment in his favor w/in the
reglementary 5-year period.
The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services
(Exhibit A) between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the
following:
1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the
recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share
2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and
3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value of
the property recovered.
respondent prepared a complaint w/ Ramon, Teotimo, and Pacifico
Alisbo as plaintiffs and Carlito Sales as defendant signed by him
alone (CC No. 9559);
on the same day, he withdrew it and replaced it with a complaint
w/ Ramon as sole plaintiff and Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as
defendants w/c respondent and Atty. Pablo signed as counsel
an amended complaint was filed w/ Ramon, his judicial guardian
Norberto, and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by Atty. Pablo alone
(10 years after final judgment)
defendant Sales filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
action had prescribed
the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription (though Ramon filed the complaint w/in the ten-year
prescriptive period, it was null and void since Ramon was insane
and hence w/o capacity to sue)
complainants charged Jalandoon w/ having deliberately caused the
dismissal of CC No. 9559 and concealing the fact that he had been
the former legal counsel of Sales

Jalandoon claims he only discovered his previous professional

relationship with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972

ISSUE: WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse or

conflicting interest
HELD: YES

Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews w/ Ramon

and Norberto re: CC No. 4963
He must have done research on the court records of CC No. 4963
For CC No. 9559, he had to inform himself of the personal
circumstances of defendant Sales
w/ this knowledge, he should have declined employment by Alisbo
due to conflict of interest
The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and
2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide:
ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the
client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any
interest in or connection with the controversy, which might
influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (pp. 1415, Solicitor General's Report.)
Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking
the court to resolve the pending incidents in CC No. 4963.
The first complaint w/ Ramon and his brothers was only partially
defective due to Ramons insanity; by making Ramon the sole
plaintiff in the second complaint, it was rendered wholly defective
and ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period
Jalandoon alleges to have only found out about Ramons
incapacity on July 17, 1971, he only amended the complaint
impleading his guardian as plaintiff 5 months later when it had
prescribed
The surrounding circumstances leave us with no other
conclusion than that Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his
client Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause
with that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a
lawyer is obligated to give to every case that he accepts
from a client.
There is more than simple negligence resulting in the
extinguishment and loss of his client's right of action;
there is a hint of duplicity and lack of candor in his

dealings with his client, which call for the exercise of this
Court's disciplinary power.
Disposition It was more than simple negligence; the Court found
respondent guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity and was
suspended for a period of 2 years.

NGAYAN V TUGADE
PER CURIAM; February 7, 1991
FACTS

NATURE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Violation of

subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court
Respondent, Atty. Faustino Tugade, had been complainants
(Fulgencio, Tomasa and Bella Aurora Ngayan) counsel for a number
of cases prior to this complaint.
Complainants asked Atty. Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used
as basis for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano
and Robert Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized
entry into complainants' dwelling.
Without thoroughly reading the same, Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan
allegedly signed it because she was rushed to do the same.
After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not
mention Leonido was with Soriano when both suddenly barged into
complainants' residence.
Mrs. Ngayan allegedly told respondent about his omission and in
front of her, Atty Tugade crossed out the paragraph she
complained about and promised to make another affidavit.
Respondent was subsequently discharged by complainants as
counsel.
After discharging respondent they found out that the name of
Robert Leonido was not included in the charge.
This omission was however remedied by their new counsel. When
the adverse their case against herein complainants, Soriano and
Leonido presented Ngayans first affidavit which contained herein
respondents omission.
This was allegedly made by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former
classmate of respondent. It appears then that Atty. Tugade
submitted an affidavit to the Court favorable to the cause of
Soriano and Leonido.
Further, it was found out that herein respondent attorney was also
a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance
company.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Tugade failed to uphold the trust and confidence
conferred to him by his clients
HELD: YES.

Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as

exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano advancing facts
prejudicial to the case of his former clients demonstrates clearly
an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative of
the first part of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rate 138, Rules of Court.
Likewise, respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in
celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case against
them shows not only his bias against the complainants but also
constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer.
It was meant only to titillate the anger of complainants.
Respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his
failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting
resistance to lawful order, of the court and illustrate his
despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138,
Rules of Court
In the case at bar, complainants claim that respondent
furnished the adverse parties in a certain criminal case
with a copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them
to use it as evidence against complainants.
This actuation constitutes betrayal of trust and confidence
of his former clients in violation of paragraph (e), Section 20,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Inasmuch as respondent failed to
answer the complaint filed against him and despite due notice on
four occasions, he consistently did not appear on the scheduled
hearing set by the Office of the Solicitor General, this claim
remained uncontroverted.
Besides, We tend to believe the said claim of complainants when it
is taken together with their other claim that respondent's
actuations from the beginning tend to show that he was partial
to the adverse parties as he even tried to dissuade
complainants from filing charges against Robert Leonido.
This partiality could be explained by the fact that respondent is
the former classmate of Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, the adverse
parties' counsel and the fact that respondent is the lawyer of the
brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Faustino F. Tugade is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective from receipt of this resolution.

In Re: Suspension From the Practice of Law in the Territory of

Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera
B.M. No. 793, 30 July 2004, En Banc (Tinga, J.)
FACTS:

Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year

suspension from practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid
ground for his suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippines.

On August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain

Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case.
Atty. Leon Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case.
Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958.
he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam.
Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be
sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to
Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over
the property for one year.
The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount
of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period.
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for
Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro
was adjuged to pay him.
Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in the civil
case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with
Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter.
Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying
Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his
name.
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee
(Committee) conducted hearings regarding Maqueras alleged
misconduct. On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered
its Decision suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam
for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the MultiState Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that
period.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP
concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for
misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that Maquera
committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines.
However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his
failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977,
which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10,
Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred
or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction.
HELD:

Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year

suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also

valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippines.
Such acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity
toward his clients.
They are also violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that [a]
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him; and Rule
1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a
continuing requirement to maintain ones goods standing in the
legal profession.
The Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering Maqueras
suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts
which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the
basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction.
Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only
constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a
lawyer.
More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the
opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and
documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be
conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be
notified of the charges against him.
It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the
respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation
that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.
Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be
suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the
disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam
and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.

DOLORES D. PARIAS, vs. ATTY. OSCAR P. PAGUINTO,

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

A lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and time to

every case he accepts. A lawyer impliedly warrants that he
possesses the necessary diligence, learning and skill to handle

each case. He should exert his best judgment and exercise

reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or
defense of his client's cause.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2001, complainant Dolores Dryden Parias
("Parias") engaged the services of respondent Atty. Oscar P.
Paguinto ("Paguinto") to annul her marriage to Danilo Soriano.
They agreed that for the legal services, Parias would pay
Paguinto an acceptance fee of P25,000, the filing fee of P2,500
and other incidental expenses.
On 2 December 2001, Parias paid Paguinto P10,000 in cash as
partial payment of the acceptance fee. An acknowledgment
receipt evidenced this payment.1 Parias gave Paguinto a diskette
containing a narration of what happened between her and her
estranged husband Danilo Soriano. Parias also furnished
Paguinto with a copy of her marriage contract with Soriano. Before
the end of December 2001, Parias gave Paguinto P2,500 for the
filing fee.
Sometime between January and April 2002, Parias inquired from
Paguinto on the progress of her annulment case. Paguinto
informed her that the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 64 ("RTC-Manila, Branch 64"), before Judge
Ricaforte and that the hearing was scheduled on 25 April 2002.
Before the hearing, Parias requested for a meeting with Paguinto
but the secretary informed her that the hearing was cancelled.
The secretary further informed Parias that the judge reset the
succeeding hearings originally scheduled on 29 May 2002 and 26
June 2002 because the judge was sick or out of town.
On the first week of July 2002, Parias went to the trial court to
inquire about her case but the court personnel in RTC-Manila,
Branch 64 informed her that there was no such case filed in their
court. Parias asked Paguinto for the case number, date of filing,
copy of the petition and the court where the annulment case was
pending. Paguinto told Parias that the records were at his office
and that he was in Malolos, Bulacan attending to a case. It turned
out that there was no annulment case filed in RTC-Manila, Branch
64. Paguinto promised to return the money that Parias paid as
down payment. However, Paguinto returned the P10,000 only
after Parias filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline ("CBD")
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") the present
complaint for disbarment.
In the Order dated 14 February 2003, 2 the CBD directed Paguinto
to answer the complaint. Paguinto asked for an extension of 15

days to file his Answer. The CBD granted the extension in the
Order dated 19 March 2003. 3However, Paguinto failed to file his
Answer within the extended period and thus the CBD declared him
in default in the Order dated 15 July 2003.4 After the hearing,
Parias submitted her Position Paper praying that the CBD declare
Paguinto guilty of violation of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
On 10 September 2003, Parias filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal 5 of
the complaint. Parias stated that Paguinto "personally explained
exhaustively the reasons why he failed to comply with his
obligations" and she realized that the complaint arose due to a
"misapprehension
of
facts,
misunderstanding
and
miscommunication." Parias manifested that she was withdrawing
the complaint, as she was no longer interested in pursuing the
case.
On the same date, Paguinto filed a Manifestation and
Motion6 explaining that he failed to attend the hearing on 30 July
2003 because he was in Tabuk, Kalinga attending a hearing in a
criminal case for frustrated homicide. He apologized to Parias for
his actuations claiming "himself solely to be blamed." He further
declared that he failed to timely prepare and file the petition for
annulment because he spends his time mostly in Gen. Mariano
Alvarez, Cavite where he practices law catering to those "clients
who have less in life."
Commissioner's Report & Recommendation
The
IBP
designated
Atty.
Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala
("Commissioner") as Commissioner to conduct a formal
investigation of the case. The Commissioner found Paguinto
negligent in performing his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of
the court. The Commissioner declared that a lawyer has the duty
to give adequate attention, care and time to his cases, accepting
only as many cases as he can handle. Paguinto failed to comply
with this duty. The Commissioner recommended the suspension of
Paguinto from the practice of law for six months.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commissioner.
Parias gave Paguinto P10,000 cash as partial payment of the
acceptance fee. Parias also gave PaguintoP2,500 for the filing
fee. Paguinto led Parias to believe that he had filed the
annulment case. Paguinto informed Parias that the case was filed
with the RTC-Manila, Branch 64, before Judge Ricaforte. However,
Parias later found out that Paguinto never filed the annulment
case in court.

Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("the Code")

provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected for or from the client. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the client's cause. 7 Money entrusted to a lawyer
for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure
to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on
demand.8 Paguinto returned the money only after Parias filed this
administrative case for disbarment.
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the
cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance
is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite
academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer
has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or
defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable
and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the
case.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his
case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not
true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as
much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his clients'
interests will suffer.9 It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter. He must also give
adequate attention to his legal work.
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and
ability in handling his cases. A license to practice law is a
guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses
sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage their
cases.10 The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance
and attention expected of a good father of a family.
In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara,11 we ruled:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He shall serve
his client with competence and diligence, and his duty of entire
devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles him to
employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is
justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to
enable the latter's cause to succeed. An attorney's duty to
safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until
his effective release from the case or the final disposition of the
whole subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is

expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as

his client's interests may require.
And failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code.12
Rule 18.01 of the Code is clear. A lawyer shall not undertake a
legal service that he is not qualified to render. Rule 18.02 of the
Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. He has the duty to prepare for trial
with diligence and deliberate speed. Rule 18.03 of the Code also
provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence shall render him liable.
One last point. Parias executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal 13 of the
complaint stating that she was withdrawing the administrative
complaint against Paguinto after realizing that "said complaint
against the respondent arose due to misapprehension of facts,
misunderstanding and miscommunication." Paguinto, on the other
hand, submitted a Manifestation and Motion apologizing to Parias
for his actuations and admitting that he was "solely to be
blamed."
A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not
terminate
an
administrative
complaint
against
a
lawyer,14 especially in this case where the lawyer admitted his
misconduct.
Parias's affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does not
exonerate Paguinto in any way. We reiterate our ruling in RayosOmbac v. Rayos15 that
[A] proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken solely for the public welfare. x x x The attorney is
called upon to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto GUILTY
of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we penalize Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto with SUSPENSION for SIX (6)
MONTHS from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this
Decision.

EMMA V. DE JUAN, vs. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III,

[A.C. No. 5817. May 27, 2004]
FACTS:

Petitioner was terminated without notice or explanation so she

filed a complaint before the NLRC against the company for illegal
dismissal.
In search of a lawyer, she asked the assistance of BBC which
assigned respondent to handle her labor case.
On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of complainant.
The Company appealed to the NLRC.
In a decision promulgated on September 24, 2001, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter and declared there was no illegal
dismissal.
Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said that she
came to know of the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision when
she called respondent in October 2001.
When she asked the respondent what they should do, respondent
answered, Paano iyan ihaehhindi ako marunong gumawa ng
Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable

negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainant a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC.
Held: YES

FINED with WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt

with severely.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Further, among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle
that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to
carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and
executory.
A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his
services without reasonable cause and only upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.
Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects the client.
This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the NLRC such that the said decision
eventually had become final and executory.
Respondent does not refute this.
His excuse that he did not know how to file a motion for
reconsideration is lame and unacceptable.

After complainant had expressed an interest to file a motion for

reconsideration, it was incumbent upon counsel to diligently return
to his books and re-familiarize himself with the procedural rules for
a motion for reconsideration.
Filing a motion for reconsideration is not a complicated legal task.
We are however, not unaware that respondent had been forthright
and candid with his client when he warned her of his lack of
experience as a new lawyer. We are also not unaware that he had
advised complainant to get a new lawyer. However, his candor
cannot absolve him.
Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as
counsel, respondent remains counsel of record and whether or not
he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot just do
so and leave his client out in the cold.
An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written
consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice
and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the
name of the new attorney is recorded in the case. Respondent did
not comply with these obligations.
Negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted
to them for handling shall render them liable.

RIZALINO FERNANDEZ v. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR.Mendoza, J:

Facts:

Rizalino Fernandez and others filed a disbarment case against Atty.

Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for alleged patent and gross neglect in the
handling of their civil case against the Bacolod City Water District.
The complainant imputed that the respondent did not attend the
scheduled hearing nor seek a postponement, for which reason the
trial court considered respondent to have waived further
presentation of his evidence and directed him to formally offer his
exhibits.
However, respondent failed to formally offer his exhibits,
prompting the trial court to order the dismissal of the case.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal however he did not file his motion within the
reglementary period.
He even tried to shift the blame on complainant by claiming that
the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last
witness.
The truth was that complainants sister had already testified
The respondent submitted his Answer and averred that the
complaint filed against him was baseless, purely malicious and
speculative considering the fact that it was not made under oath.
He contended that complainant engaged his legal services after
the first counsel had withdrawn and he had no knowledge of what
had happened in the case before he handled it because

complainant did not furnish him with the records and stenographic
notes of the previous proceedings despite his repeated requests.
He alleged that he failed to formally offer the exhibits because
complainant tried to take over the handling of the case by insisting
on presenting more witnesses who failed to appear during trial.
The Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a report finding
respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending his suspension.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines also submitted a report and
recommendation for the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross neglect in the handling

of the civil case
Held:

The records clearly show that respondent has been negligent

in the performance of his duties as complainants counsel.
His failure to file his formal ofer of exhibits constitutes
inexcusable negligence as it proved fatal to the cause of his
client since it led to the dismissal of the case.
To compound his inefficiency, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration outside the reglementary period, which was thus
accordingly denied by the trial court for being filed out of time.
Hence, the order issued by the trial court dismissing the case
became final.
Respondents acts and omission clearly constitute violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides in pertinent
parts:
o
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
o
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
o
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation.
o
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
The Supreme Court held that a counsel must constantly keep in
mind that his actions or omissions, evenmalfeasance or
nonfeasance would be binding on his client.
A lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost prudence and
capability in that representation.

The respondents attempt to evade responsibility by

shifting the blame on complainant due to the latters
failure to turn over to him records and stenographic notes
of the case only highlights his incompetence and
inadequacy in handling the complainants case.

The respondent Atty. Novero is found guilty of neglect of his

clients case and is Suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
month with Warning that repetition of the same negligent act will
be dealt with even moreseverely