RENATO M. MALIGAYA vs. ATTY. ANTONIO G.

DORONILLA, JR
CORONA, J.: A.C. No. 6198
September 15, 2006
Facts:

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate Generals

Service is administratively charged of unethical conduct for
having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of a
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778, an action for damages filed by
complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military
officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel.
At one point, during the civil case hearing on Feb 19, 2002 he
stated that there was an agreement between the parties that
if they withdraw the case against Dr. Maligaya, the latter will
also withdraw all the cases against his clients.
So, with that understanding, Dr. Maligaya even retired and is
now receiving pension.
The presiding Judge Daway, ordered Atty. Doronilla to put
his
statements in
writing
and file
the appropriate
pleading.
Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading
or anything else to substantiate his averments.
Thus, on April 2002 a complaint was filed against Atty.
Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline for committing a violation of:

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS,

AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor

consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
During the investigation, Atty. Doronilla admitted there is no
agreement but there was a proposal to dismiss and to
withdraw all the cases.
He said that he said it to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial. In due time,
investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a
report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of
purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending
that
he
be
suspended
from
the
government military service as legal officer for a period of
three months.
This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of
Governors.

Issue: WON Atty. Doronilla is in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and WON the suspension is proper.
Held:

Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical

conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyers oath to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, of which
Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements.
His act infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law.
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only
for its speciousness, cannot absolve him.
There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among
disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any
circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not
true.
The suspension referred to in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, means only suspension from the practice of
lawit would be improper for the Court, as a penalty for a
lawyers breach of legal ethics and the lawyers oath, his
suspension from his employment in the Judge Advocate
Generals Service.
After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to
determine Atty. Doronillas liability as a member of the legal
profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military
service.
There were also mitigating circumstances considered such as
his admission to his deceit, the fact that there was no material
damage to the complainant and it being his first offense.
Thus, the penalty was amended to suspension from practice
of law for two (2) months, with warning against repetition of
similar misconduct.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct
shall be dealt with more severely.

YOUNG V BATUEGAS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; May 9, 2003
NATURE: Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS

On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young, private prosecutor in

People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending in
RTC Manila, filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment
against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino
for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and
violating the lawyers oath.
On December 13, 2000, Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for
accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that
the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority.

As such, he is now under detention. Upon personal verification

with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused
Arana allegedly surrendered, Young learned that he surrendered
only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of
Detention
Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, calendared the
motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity
and other formal defects, namely
> lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant
> violation of the three-day notice rule
> failure to attach the Certificate of Detention

According to respondents on December 13, 2000, upon learning

that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they
immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the
NBI to voluntarily surrender but due to heavy traffic, they arrived
at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of
detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December
14, 2000 TF there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in
the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and
was detained at the NBI.
WRT the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that Young was not
entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and
City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing
thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is
allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.
In August 13, 2001, referred to IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner VillanuevaMaala submitted a report and recommended Atty. Ceasar G.
Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended
from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the
Bar for a period of six (6) months

ISSUE: WON Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood

HELD: YES.

To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is

a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn.
They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if
it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under
detention.
Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court
and thereby contribute to injustice.

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission

to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients.
a lawyer should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the
facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion- courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them
while a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights
and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his
clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually
surrendered to the police authorities on the same date
tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the application
for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no
bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent
judge from administrative liability considering that he
should not have accorded recognition to the application
for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were
devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief
from the court.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of

hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled
date.
Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents
failed to show any good cause to justify the nonobservance of the
three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
Disposition: Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood.
Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Manuel S. Sebastian v. Atty. Amily A. Bajar

AC No. 3731, September 7, 2007; Carpio, J.

FACTS:

Atty. Bajar is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance

(BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform who represented
Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases which raised the
same issues.
Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land owned by Manuel
Sebastians wife and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners
filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco (tenant) on the basis of a
conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering
Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance
compensation.
The RTCs judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court.
Atty. Bajar, as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for Specific
Performance to produce the conversion order.
The RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of
cause of action.
Atty. Bajar filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance
compensation.
Atty. Bajar has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since she misused the rules of procedure through
forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of justice.
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring
Atty. Bajar to comment on the complaint lodged against her.
After the Second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment,
Bajar submitted her comment.
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring Bajar to
file a Rejoinder within 10 days from notice.
On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered Bajar to show cause why
she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for failure to
comply with the Courts 25 March 1992 Resolution.
The Court also required respondent to Comment on the
complainants 2 June 1992 Manifestation.
In February 1993, Bajar filed a Court Manifestation that she
substantially complied with the Courts order as to her defences.
Bajar advised the Court that she had transferred to the Public
Attorneys Office and since she was no longer a "BALA lawyer, "the
cases involved in this proceeding had become moot and academic.
On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the
administrative case against respondent "has not been mooted and
nothing set out in her Manifestation excuses her failure to obey
this Courts Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October1992."

The Court had also resolved to impose a fine of P500 or

imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to
complywith the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the
arrest of Bajar for detention at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that Bajar should comply
with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992Resolutions.
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI
detained respondent for five days and released her on 25
October1993.
On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for hearing and
decision.
On 11 November 1993, Bajar filed a Rejoinder. Bajar claimed that
complainant had no legal personality to file this case. Bajar also
alleged that she was merely protecting the interest of Tanlioco as
she was sworn to do so in her oath of office.
Bajar contended that "she had comported herself as [an] officer of
the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the latter if only to
impart truth and justice."
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose
(Investigating Commissioner Jose) submitted his report and
recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose
enumerated respondents violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue the practice of
law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which
amounted to an obstruction of justice.
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts.
3. The duplication or multiplication of suits should be avoided,
and respondents acts were tantamount to forum-shopping
which is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and
proceedings.
4. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at
everybody during the hearing on 25 May 1995. The want of
intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language used.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bajar is guilty of the wilful disobedience of the
order of the Court which is sufficient cause forsuspension or disbarment.
HELD: Yes.

The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply

with the Courts lawful orders in two instances:
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was
required to file a rejoinder within 10 days from notice.
However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November
1993 after she was detained at the NBI for five days for failure
to heed the Courts order.

2.

In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was

required to comment on complainants manifestation. She
instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or
almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation,
respondent alleged that she had substantially complied with
the Courts orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993
Resolution stated that nothing set out in respondents
manifestation excused her failure to obey the Courts
Resolutions.
Bajar s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution.
Bajar s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A
Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."
Bajar s obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not
only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is
only too deserving of reproof
Bajars failure to comply with the Courts directive to file a
Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross
misconduct.
The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable,
shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to
the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause."
It is a "conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, or intentional purpose.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds
of the law.
It is evident from the records that Bajar filed other cases to thwart
the execution of the final judgment in the Ejectment case.
Clearly, Bajar violated the proscription in Canon 19.
Bajars acts constitute gross misconduct and wilful disobedience of
lawful orders of a superior court. Bajar also violated Canon19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Her suspension is consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE , respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE YEARS
effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely

THE
INSULAR
LIFE
ASSURANCE
CO.,
LTD.,
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU V THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
CASTRO; January 30, 1971

NATURE: Appeal by certiorari to review a decision and resolution of the

Court of Industrial Relations dismissing the Unions complaint
FACTS

The following UNIONS (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees

Assn-NATU; FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees AssnNATU; Insular Life Bldg Employees Assn-NATU) while still members
of the Federation of Free Workers, entered into separate collective
bargaining agreements with these COMPANIES (Insular Life
Assurance Co. Ltd; FGU Insurance Group)
Lawyers of the Unions include Enaje and Garcia (Sec-treasurer of
FFW).
When they left FFW, the Companies then hired them and Garcia
became Asst. Corporate Sec and Legal Asst in the Legal Dept, and
Enaje became personnel manager of the Companies.
He was also made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Co. in
the CBA with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals for a modified renewal of their
respective CBA contracts w/c were due to expire on 9/30
negotiations were conducted but snagged by deadlock on issue of
union shop; Unions then filed on 01/27/1958 notice of strike for
deadlock on collective bargaining
Unions dropped their demands regarding security but the
Companies still refused to negotiate
They tried negotiating but with no satisfactory results
Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they
considered as unfair labor practices
Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of Insular Life Bldg
Companies through the Acting Manager Olbes sent to each of the
strikers a letter specifying incentives should they decide to go
back to work
Garcia and Abella (Chief of Personnel Records Section) tried to
penetrate the picket lines.
When Garcia approached the picket line, he engaged into a fight
with one of the strikers and both of them suffered injuries.
Companies organized 3 bus-loads of employees, including a
photographer who succeeded in penetrating the picket lines
causing injuries to picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured, the Companies filed
criminal charges against strikers and they also filed a petition for
injunction.
CFI Mla granted injunction. Companies sent individually to the
strikers another letter which states If you are still interested in
continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are
no criminal charges against you, we are giving you until June 2 to
report for work at the home office. Otherwise, we may be forced to
obtain your replacement.

All of the more than 120 crim charges, except for 3, were
dismissed. But employees decided to call of the strike and to
report back to work on June 2.
Before readmitting, Companies required them to secure
clearances from the City Fiscals Office and to be screened by a
management committee
CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
CIR dismissed the complaint Relevant to the assigned topic (read
pages 277-280!)
Martinez, the Presiding Judge of the CIR, misquoted a SC decision
in the case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication Employees Assn:
a. 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT
appear in the original;
b. Martinez used For it is settled that...; the original reads,
For it must be remembered...
c. Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of Martinez is
actually part of the immediately succeeding paragraph in
the SC decision.
In the respondents brief, counsels for respondents quoted the
CIRs decision

ISSUES
1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice a) In sending out letters individually directed to the strikers
b) For discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the
matter of readmitting employees after the strike
c) For dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them
the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side
2. WON the officials and members of the Unions are to be reinstated with
full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to date of actual reinstatement
3. WON Presiding Judge Martinez and counsels of respondents are to be
cited for contempt for misquoting a Supreme Court decision
HELD
1.a) YES.

It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a

collective bargaining agreement to negotiate with his employees
individually, in connection with the changes in the agreement.
Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under the
obligation to bargain with the union as the employees bargaining
representative.
It is an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all
employees notifying them to return to work at a specific time,
otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs.
The first letter contains promises of benefits to employees; the
second letter contains threats to obtain replacements.

Free speech protection under the Constitution isinapplicable where

the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a
promise of benefit, or threats or reprisal.
The circumstance that strikers later decided to return to work on
account of injunction cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters
which tended to interfere with the employees right to engage in
lawful concerted activity in the form of strike.
Totality of Conduct Doctrine: Expressions of opinion by an
employer, though innocent in themselves, were held to be
culpable because of the circumstances under which they were
uttered.
a. Before Unions submission of proposals for renewal of
CBAs, respondents hired former legal counsels of
petitioners;
b. After notice to strike was served on the Companies, they
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors, compelling
them to resign from unions;
c. During negotiations in Dept of Labor, they refused to
answer the Unions demands en toto;
d. Strikers were individually sent letters inducing them to
return to work with promises of special privileges;
e. Three truckloads of nonstrikers crashed through the
picket line, which resulted in injuries on the part of
picketers;
f.
Criminal charges were brought upon picketers;
g. An injunction was obtained from CFI;
h. Another letter was sent individually and by registered
special delivery mail threatening them with dismissal if
they didnt report for work on June 2;
i.
When they did report for work, a screening committee
refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on ground of
pending criminal charges;
j.
When almost all were cleared by fiscals office, they were
still refused admission; but all non-strikers were
readmitted immediately.
It is clear that the main reason for the strike was when it became
clear that management will not negotiate in good faith.

1.b) YES.

The companies are guilty of discrimination in their process of

rehiring.
They refused to readmit strikers with pending criminal charges,
even after these employees have secured the required clearances.
At the same time, the Companies readily readmitted non-strikers
who also had criminal charges, without requiring clearances.
They even separated active from the less active unionists on the
basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines.

There are 3 conditions for readmission of the strikers:

1. he must be interested in continuing his work with the
companies;
2. no criminal charges against him;
3. report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be
replaced.
All employees are considered to have complied with first and third
condition.
In an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of
discrimination in rehiring, they even delegated the power to
readmit to a committee composed of Abella and Garcia.
Both were involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers
during the strike, and the mere act of placing the power of
reinstatement in their hands is a form of discrimination.

ATTY. BARANDON, JR v. ATTY. FERRER, SR.

(A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010)
FACTS:

1.c) YES.

The Companies refused to take the employees back on account of

their acts of misconduct even if all, except three, were able to
secure the required clearances. Record shows that not a single
dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself
against the supposed charges.

2.. YES
The members and officials of the Unions went on strike because of the
unfair labor practices committed by the Companies.
They are now entitled to reinstatement with back pay because when they
reported back for work, upon the invitation of their employers, they were
discriminatorily dismissed.
3. NO.

The misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a

deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead.
Counsels of respondents have the prima facie right to rely on the
quotation as it appears in the Judges decision, to copy it verbatim
and to incorporate it in their brief. Import of sentences in the
quotation is substantially the same as the cited decision.
In citing SCs decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of
courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same wordfor-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark.
This is because only the decisions of this Honorable Court
establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. (Miiranda
v. Imperial)
Ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted,
the decisions and rulings of SC may lose their proper and correct
meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public
who may thereby be misled.

Also, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on

misinformation, and be saved precious time in finding out whether
citations are correct.
Disposition Decision of the CIR is reversed and set aside.
Respondents are ordered to reinstate the dismissed members of
the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar
positions with back wages.

On January 11, 2001 Atty. Barandon filed a complaint-affidavit with

the IBP seeking the disbarment, suspension or proper disciplinary
action against Atty.Ferrer, Sr. for offenses such as the use of
offensive language when insinuating that the complainant
presented a falsified document in court, filing a fabricated charge
against Atty. Barandon, the usage of threatening phrases before
the start of a hearing such as patayan kung patayan,
kasamaang lahat ng pamilya., accusing Atty. Barandon without
bothering to check the facts and lastly the plethora of cases he
was facing that time predominantly the one that deals with sexual
harassment.
Atty. Ferrer filed an answer concomitant with his motion to dismiss.
In his answercontains the improbability of the charges against him
because he could have not said those remarks without being
reprimanded while the court was in session.
Also, the offended party in the falsification case vouchsafed that
her thumbmark in the document has been falsified and other
conflicting stories against what Atty. Barandon filed.
While there was this constant clash between the complainant and
the respondent on December 29, 2000, Atty. Barandon boarded a
taxi that was owned by defendants son a nd it was involved in an
accident, the incident was shady because no help was given to the
victims and that respondent denied knowing the driver of said taxi.
Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the
accident to the proper authorities.
On October 10, 2001 the IBP investigation commissioner
recommended the suspension of respondent for two (2) years
because they have found enough evidence to prove his violation of
Canon 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP board of governors accepted the
recommendations of the investigation commissioner with the
reduction of one (1) year from the suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 7 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes

Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 7, particularly rule 7.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.
Ferrer uttered the invectives against Barandon with intent to
annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit the former.
A lawyers language should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that such kind of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect for it.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the
high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of
these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which commands all lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness sand candor towards their fellow lawyers
and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel, specifically,
in Rule 8.01.
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified
language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our
legal system.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of
the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that enjoins lawyers to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03
which prohibit lawyers, whether in public or private life, to behave
in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the
courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly.
Atty. Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
and misconduct in the performace of his duties both as a lawyer
and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a
patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold.
The Supreme Court affirmed the suspension of Atty. Ferrer for one
year as ordered by the IBP-CBD.

NG vs ALAR Case Digest

[Adm. Case No. 7252 (CBD 05-1434), November 22, 2006; AUSTRIA
MARTINEZ]
FACTS

Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for the complainants in a labor

case filed with the Labor Arbiter which dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, NLRCs First Division upheld the dismissal.
In his Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),
Atty. Alar used improper and abusive language full of diatribes
castigating the Labor Arbiter and the ponente of the NLRC
decision.
Johnny Ng, one of the respondents, filed a disbarment case against
Alar before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for such
misbehavior.
Alar contended, inter alia, that the Rules of Court/Code of
Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC
when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary
matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it and that Rule
X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions
against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases
before it.
Finally he asserted that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC,
the latter not being a court and that LAs and NLRC Commissioners
are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct
similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alar violated the CPR.

HELD: Yes.

The motion he filed contained insults attacking the NLRC, casting

doubt on itsmoral and intellectual integrity, implying that the NLRC
can be bought.
He used improper and offensive language, which cannot be
justified.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it must
always be dignified and respectful. He deserves not only a warning
but also a fine of P 5,0000. The counter-complaint is dismissed
because there was no position paper submitted to substantiate the
claims
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC,
attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with
implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence.
Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings
that does not admit any justification.
The assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners,
not being judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary

and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not

apply to them, is unavailing.
In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held that respondent became
unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless
remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law,
whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics.
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics
perception of the legal profession.

Spouses Sangalang vs. IAC and Ayala Corporation,

[G.R. No. 71169. August 30, 1989. SARMIENTO]
Facts:

The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt

against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses
Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang.
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring,
among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory
language." On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for
reconsideration, particularly, . . . The Court not only put to serious
question its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its
own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably pervading
the judiciary . . . disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for.
His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and
corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but
comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and
integrity.

IN RE ALMACEN
CASTRO, J
FACTS:

Issue: Whether or not the counsels act constitutes malpractice in violation

of the Codes (CPR) provision on the use of scandalous offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Held: YES

In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before

it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much
less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former
judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation,
one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of
bribery by the other party.
He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done
an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and
to the stability of the administration of justice in general.

Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult

the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta
ad hominem . In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to
preserve the honor and dignity . . . and to safeguard the morals
and ethics of the legal profession."
The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution, they sought to hold
Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting
language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the
meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term
is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil

case.
They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to
indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion.
Hence, his motion was denied.
He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it
agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration.
Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the
Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions
as unconstitutional.
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his
lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
continue practicing his profession when members of the high court
are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.
He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was
made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he
became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy.
He also stated that justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition
as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his
certificate.

Almacen did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he

now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may
be permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public
hearing.
He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is
the complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however
unapologetic.

ASEAN Pacific Planners vs. City of Urdaneta,

QUISUMBING,J. GR No. 162525, September 23, 2008
FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes.

The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are

needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or
write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High
Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional
duties.
The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved.
It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts
denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court
regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory.
It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well
as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced.
As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the
time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be
entertained by the court.
He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client
lost.

Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts

with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary
restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his
capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and
Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA
Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented
by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and
Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D.
Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E.
Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design,
construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema
commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of
public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor
was allegedly paid P95 million.
In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are
valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the
citys Answer, joined in the defense and asserted that the
contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with
prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an
Answer with compulsorycounterclaim and motion to dismiss on the
ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as
counsel for Urdaneta City In its Order dated September 11, 2002,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan,
Branch45, admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law
Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City
Prosecutor.
It also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and
admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillos
complaint, and directed the defendants to answer thecitys
complaint.
It also granted Capalads motion to expunge all pleadings filed by
Atty. Sahagun in his behalf.
Capalad was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by
Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the
complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Sahagun violatedrule 11.04 of the Code of Prof.

Responsibility.
HELD. Yes.

At first, Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the

contracts are valid.
On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the
contracts.
Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting
interests.
Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty.Sahagun in
behalf of Capalad Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive
language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun andAntonio B.
Escalante in their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals.
They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a court of technicalities
for validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition.
They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view,
an incompetent judge.
In explaining the concededly strong language, Atty. Sahagun
further indicted himself.
He said that the Court of Appeals dismissal of the case shows its
impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived
slight on it s dignity and such dismissal smacks of retaliation and
does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded
of the appellate court.
Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio
B. Escalante a fine of P2,000 each payable to this Court within ten
days from notice and we remind them that they should observe
and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and judicial
officers; abstain from offensive language before the courts; and
not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record.
Similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE , we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the
Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 andFebruary 4, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of
appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388 and
EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of UrdanetaCity; (4)
ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil Case
No. U-7388; (5) AFFIRM theRTC in admitting the complaint of
Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from
representingCapalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in
behalf of Capalad.Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on
Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalantefor their use of
offensive language, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Decision

LACUROM vs. JACOBA

Facts:

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by Judge

Ubaldino A. Lacurom against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F.
Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,1
11.04,2and 19.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments
rendered in favor of Veneracion.
Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is
entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB
The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very
questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and
SUDDENREVERSAL
Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an
ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process.
-In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba
claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared
the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel
did not actually or actively participate in this case."
Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to
degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court-Judge
Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized
her with imprisonment for five days
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration order. She recounted
that onher way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty.
Ellis Jacoba("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito
kasi last day na, baka mahuli
She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in
"trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she
"entrusted her whole life and future
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty
of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge
Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her
imprisonment despiteher status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP
Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother
many times over."
Judge Lacurom issued another order this time directing Jacoba to
explain why he should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied
by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he
denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion.
IBP Commissioner recommended the suspension IBP Board of
Governors adopted Recommendation, except for the length of
suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.

Issue:
WON
respondents
ProfessionalResponsibility.

liable

under

the

Code

of

Held: YES

There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba

appears .
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect
certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it
was not for the purpose of delaying the case.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the motion
onlybecause of her husbands request but she did not know its
contents beforehand.
By Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Sec 3
of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts,
which is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action-We now
consider the evidence as regards Jacoba.
His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts
the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him
as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook
his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain
adenial of his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted
authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and
fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic
and monumental."
we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for
two reasons:
a. her reaction to the events was immediate and
spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised
only after a considerable time had elapsed from the
eruption of the controversy;

b.

Jacoba filed a Manifestation praying that JudgeLacurom

await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before
deciding the contempt charge against him.
This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the
premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacobas handiworkRespondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying
that every remark motion was warranted.
We disagree
Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case
according to supporting law and jurisprudence.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignifiedand respectful, befitting the dignity of
the legal profession.
The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to
promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.-Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion
but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting
two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom-Courts attention
is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these
administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the
cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative
cases before this Court.
In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the
practice of law for a period of six months
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of
law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We
also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law
for two(2) months effective upon finality of this Decision