AGUIRRE VS RANA

FACTS:

Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Examinations.
On May 21, 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking
of the successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Mae Aguirre filed against respondent a petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of
law,
grave
misconduct,
violation
of
law
and
grave
misrepresentation.
Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an election
candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls
of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only provide
specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law.
He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer.
The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its
findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of
the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding
and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.

HELD: NO

The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized

practice of law.
It held that all the activities he participated during that time
involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a
member of the Bar.
The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to
those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but
is a privilege.
It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust
since a lawyer is an officer of the court.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply
by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license.
It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character
of its members.

Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorneyat-law.

Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.
Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted
in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath,
he was denied admission to the bar.

IN RE JUDGE JAIME VS QUITAIN

FACTS:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.
Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received confidentialinformation that administrative and criminal
charges were filed against Judge Quitain in hiscapacity as then
Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM),Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which
he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.
In Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the JBC judge quitan
declared that there were 5criminal cases filed against him before
the Sandiganbayan, all were dismissed.
No Administrative Case was disclosed by Quitan in his PDS
Deputy Court administrator Christopher Lock requested certifie
true copies of the criminalcases relative to the administrative
complaints filed against Quitan, particularly AdminisrativeOrder
180 which dismissed Quitan from service.
In a letter dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the
Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183
showing that respondent Judge was indeeddismissed from the
service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the
amountsreflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim
for reimbursement of expenses.
The Administrative order stated that Quitan was dismissed from
service with forfeiture of payand benefits, this was signed by
President Ramos himself.
In a letter dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge
Quitain denied havingcommitted any misrepresentation before the
JBC.
He alleged that during his interview, themembers thereof only
inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the
NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the
administrative casesimultaneously filed against him.

He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the

President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the
service.
The DCA Lock directed Quitan to explain within 10 days from notce
why he did not includein his Personal Data Sheet (PDS), which was
sworn before a notary public , the administrativecases filed
against him and the fact that he was dismissed from service.
The respondent said that during the administrative case by the
NAPOLCOM one of itsmembers suggested to him that he will no
longer be persecuted if he tendered his resignationfrom the
NAPOLCOM.
The Secretary of the DILG accepted the resignation.
Quitan said that he did not disclose the administrative charge
because he was of the honest belief that he had no more pending
administrative case by reason of his resignation.
This did not persuade Administrator Presbitero Velasco and DCA
Lock that he should not beheld administratively liable. They
submitted a Memorandu, to then Chief Justice Davidewhich read:
An examination of the PDS submitted by Quitan with the JBC he
concealed materialfacts and even committed perjury in having
answered yes to question 24, but withoutdisclosing the fact that
he was dismissed from government service.
Question 24: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or
otherwise imposeda sanction for the violation of any law, decree,
ordinance or regulation by any court,tribunal or any other
government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippinesor
in any foreign country or found guilty of an administrative offense
or imposed anyadministrative sanction?
In the Mindanao Times quitan said: I was dismissed from the
NAPOLCOM office withoutdue process
In the Mindanao Daily Inquirer: Quitan vowed to clear his name.
The OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case
against respondent be docketed as an administrative matter;; and
(2) that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits except accruedleave credits.
Quitan contended that before he filed his application for RTC Judge
with the JBC, he had noknowledge that he was administratively
dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as the case was secretly
heard and decided.
OCA submitted its Memorandum dated stating therein that it was
adopting its earlier findingscontained in its Memorandum. Based
on the documents presented, it can not be denied that atthe time
Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of
A.O. No. 183dismissing him from government service.

Issue: W/N Judge Quitan concealed his Administrative Charges and

Dismissal in the PDS and filedhis application with knowledge of those
preceedingly mentioned.
Held: YES

Judge Quitan did not comply with the requirements that were set
by Article VII Section 7(3)of the constitution.
Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively
charged and dismissed from theservice for grave misconduct per
A.O. No. 183, 1995 by no less than the former President of the
Philippines
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that
Judge Quitan was dismissedfrom public service and that he
deliberately withheld this information.
Resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against himwhile he was still in service.
Netither does his resignation render the administrative caseMoot
and Academic.
Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was
found guilty of gravemisconduct. His dismissal from the service is
a clear proof of his lack of the requiredqualifications to be a
member of the Bench.
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is
guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his
dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the
pendencyof this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of
P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet toapply for his retirement
benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS
the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which
Judge Quitain may be entitled to,and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any
branch,instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA

FACTS

The Court has emphasized that the judgment of suspension

against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the
basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction.
The judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon

which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based.
If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are
likewise unethical under Philippine law.
On April 11, 2005, Zoilo Antonio Velez filed a complaint for the
suspension and/or disbarment of Atty. Leonard De Vera based on
the latter's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension
order rendered against him by the State Bar of California.
Velez averred that Atty. De Vera lacked the moral competence
necessary to lead the country's most noble profession.
It appears that Atty. De Vera handled an insurance case in
California involving a certain Julius Willis III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. He was authorized by the elder Willis
(father of Julius) for the release of the funds in settlement of the
case.
He then received a check in settlement of the case which he
deposited to his personal account.
An administrative case was filed against him before the State Bar
of California and it was recommended that he be suspended from
the practice of law for three years.
Thereafter, Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which
resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.
On April 15, 2005, Atty. De Vera filed a letter-request with the
Court for his oathtaking as IBP National President.
In a regular meeting on May 13, 2005, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote,
resolved to remove Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and
as EVP.
Atty. De Vera allegedly made untruthful statements, innuendos
and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National
Convention of Lawyers on April 22, 2005, making it appear that
the decision of the IBP Board to withdraw the Petition questioning
R.A. 9227, was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme
Court, thereby bringing the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole in
public contempt and disrepute, in violation of Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates
that a lawyer shall observeand maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.
It appears that the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the
Petition filed before the Court to question the legality and/or
constitutionality of R.A. 9227, authorizing the increase in the
salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.
Atty. De Vera also allegedly instigated and provoked some IBP
chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board in order to
coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid Petition.
Moreover, he was alleged to have falsely accused IBP National
President Cadiz, during the said Plenary Session, of withholding
from him a copy of the Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal

of the aforesaid Petition, thereby creating the wrong impression

that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus
compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National
President and the IBP as a whole.
On May 13, 2005, the IBP issued a Resolution removing Atty. De
Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.
Thereafter, IBP National President Cadiz informed the Court of the
election of IBP Governor Jose Vicente Salazar as EVP and
requested that the latter's election be approved and that he be
allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. De
Vera was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or
should his removal from the IBP Board and as EVP be approved by
the Court.
Atty. De Vera vehemently insists that there is no proof that he
misappropriated his client's funds as the elder Willis gave him
authority to use the same and that the latter even testified under
oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few
days."
He also questions his removal from the IBP Board on the ground
that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by
the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to
answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right
to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing.
He protests the fact that he was not able to cross examine the
complainant, IBP Governor Romulo Rivera and that the latter voted
as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time.
Atty. de Vera emphasizes the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting on his own motion.
However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion
as the necessary 2/3 vote could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera
asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his
own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present
during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard
Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no
longer necessary.
Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough
that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the
charges imputed against him.
They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the
complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on May
13, 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the
agenda.
Therein he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact,
Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there is substantial proof that Atty. De Vera violated
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
2) Whether or not Atty. de Vera was removed for just and valid cause
3) Whether or not Atty. De Vera was denied due process when he
was removed from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP
HELD:

Atty. De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years.
His letter-complaint praying for the disapproval of the Resolution
removing him from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP is DISMISSED.
The election of Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP for the remainder of the
term 2003- 2005 is AFFIRMED and he is DIRECTED to immediately
take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the IBP for the
term 2005-2007.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. De
Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension by the
hearing officer of the State Bar of California.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.
No final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against
Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three
years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case
could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
The Court has emphasized in the case of the Suspension from the
Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera
that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension
or disbarment in the Philippines. Judgment of suspension against a
Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of
suspension in the
Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. The judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. Considering that
there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of
unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by
substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by
the hearingofficer was based. If he is successful in this, he must
then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine
law.
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence of malpractice on the
part of Atty. De Vera independent of the recommendation of
suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California.

By insisting that he was authorized by the elder Willis to use the

funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of his client's
funds for his own personal use.
This admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of
malpractice.
Consequently, Atty. De Vera now has the burden of rebutting the
evidence which he himself supplied.
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's
funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property

collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Atty. de Vera's act of holding on to his client's money without the
latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and
propriety.
It is clear that he, by depositing the check in his own account and
using the same for his own benefit, is guilty of deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and unethical behavior.
He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession
to which he belongs.
For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the
profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
profession betrays their trust and confidence.
Atty. De Vera violated his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his client. That the elder Willis "expected de Vera might
use the money for a few days" was not so much an
acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. De Vera of his
client's funds.
Rather, it was more an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de
Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not
speak well of the character of
Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the
court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court
and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.
The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power
of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer.

The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be

restricted.
However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.
Considering the amount involved here - US$12,000.00 - the
penalty of suspension for two years is appropriate.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and
valid cause.
The IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its
members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws,
under which a member of the IBP Board may be removed for
cause by resolution adopted by % of the remaining members of
the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.
Conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not
animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but
especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they
agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization,
is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for
then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks
through the
Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in
an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's
prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general
public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be
adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from [he
stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made
public.
Therefore, the IBP Board was well within its right in removing Ally,
de Vera as the latter's actuations during the 10th National IBP
Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the
governing body of the IBP.
When the IBP board is not seen by the bar and the public as a
cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the
Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal
practice as well as improve the administration of justice.
The IBP Board observed due process in the removal of Atty. de
Vera as IBP Governor.
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty
and property. It cannot be said that the position of IBP EVI1 13
property within the constitutional sense especially since there is
no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, .ill that
is required to remove any member of the board of governors for
cause is a resolution adopted bof the remaining members of the
board-

Even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in

administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply
the opportunity Lo explain one's side.
Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right
to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law, the
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing
before a regularly established administrative agency Or tribunal. It
is not essential thathearings be had before the making of a
determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal
before which all objections and defenses lo the making of such
determination may be raised and considered. One adequate
hearing is all that due process requires. The right to crossexamine
is not an indispensable aspect of due process.
Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and
that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the May 13, 2005 meeting
wherein he was removed, it is patent that he was given fair
opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by
Atty. Rivera.

In Re: Argosino
FACTS:

Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was

denied of taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide from a hazing incident.
Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court.
He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be
allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys.
As a proof of the required good moral character he now possess,
he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others
from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious order.
In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted,
organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers
Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.
HELD: YES.

Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof
that he possessed the required good moral character as required
before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys,
the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not
inherently in bad moral fiber.
In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally
reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not merely a ceremony or

formality before the practice of law, and that the community

assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the
more unfortunate members of the society.
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special education qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so
far as the general public and proper administration of justice is
concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into
in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who
would seek admission to the bar must be a necessity more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral
duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good
moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must
be demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to
take the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath
of office.

IN RE EDILLON
FACTS

Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to non-payment of his IBP

dues, hence the petitioner on this case.
He claimed that the provisions of Sec. 10 of Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court is unconstitutional as he is being compelled, as a
precondition in maintaining his good standing as a lawyer, to pay
and settle his dues to the IBP.
Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take and refused to admit full
competence of the court in this matter.
But after some time in realization, his recalcitrance and defiance
were gone in his subsequent communication with the court. He
appealed that his health, advanced age, and concern to his former
clients welfare be considered in his prayer so that he can again
practice law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the

bar.
HELD: YES.

Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure

to abide entails loss of such privilege. Considered in addition was
the two (2) years Atty. Edillon was barred to practice law, and the
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban that the
power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should
be exercised in a preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
After contrition on the part of the petitioner, the court finds
reinstatement in order.

Issues: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal

to pay his membership dues?
Held:

It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial

A. Edillon should be as he ishereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutionalfreedom to associate. Integration
does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he isnot
already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations.
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-definedbut unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or notattend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as hechooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. TheSupreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashionbe shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program - the lawyers.
Moreover,there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court,
under its constitutional power and duty topromulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of thePhilippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution), from requiring members of aprivileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong.
It is quite apparent that the fee is indeedimposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives
andpurposes of integration.
Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under
thenecessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right topractise law before the courts

of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation

andinquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penaltydesigned to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is notvoid as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
It is sufficient to state then that the matters of
admission,suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and theauthorities holding such are legion.
Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rulesconcerning pleading, practice ... and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...
(Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain amember of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court

ZALDIVAR VS GONZALES
FACTS

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the

Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the
case.
Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
Constitution.
The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain
from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly
claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the
Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the
Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get
his petition to be given due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez.
The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side.
Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true;

that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is

entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he
feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even
attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme
Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar
and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes.

The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute

contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court.

His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme

Court betrayed their oath of office.

Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the

Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade
the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.

What

Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of

expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests.

One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of

the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice.

There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of

the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is

also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to
the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and
the repository of the judicial power in the government of the
Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing
lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his
criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements,
particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar
case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the

practice of law.

SANTUYO V HIDALGO
NATURE
Administrative case in SC for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty
FACTS

Petitioners Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused

respondent Atty. Edwin Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and notarial law

In Dec 1991, couple purchased parcel of land covered by deed of

sale

It was allegedly notarized by Hidalgo and entered in his notarial

register

Six years later, couple had dispute with Danilo German over
ownership of said land; German presented an affidavit executed by
Hidalgo denying authenticity of his signature on deed of sale
Petitioners' Claim

Hidalgo overlooked the fact that deed of sale contained ALL the
legal formalities of a duly notarized document (including
impression of his notarial dry seal)

Santuyos could not have forged the signature, not being learned in
technicalities surrounding notarial act

They had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and
they could not have made any imprint of his seal or signature.
Respondents' Comments

He denied having notarized any deed of sale for disputed property.

He once worked as junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law

Office; and admitted that he notarized several documents in that
office.

As a matter of procedure, documents were scrutinized by senior

lawyers, and only with their approval could notarization be done.

In some occasions, secretaries (by themselves) would affix dry

seal of junior associates on documents relating to cases handled
by the law firm.

He normally required parties to exhibit community tax certificates

and to personally acknowledge documents before him as notary
public.

He knew Editha, but only met Benjamin in Nov 1997 (Meeting was
arranged by Editha so as to personally acknowledge another
document)

His alleged signature on deed of sale was forged (strokes of a lady)

At time it was supposedly notarized, he was on vacation.

ISSUES
1. WON the signature of respondent on the deed of sale was
forged
2. WON respondent is guilty of negligence
HELD

1. Yes.

The alleged forged signature was different from Hidalgos

signatures in other documents submitted during the investigation.

Reasoning Santuyos did not state that they personally appeared

before respondent. They were also not sure if he signed the
document; only that his signature appeared on it.

They had no personal knowledge as to who actually affixed the

signature.
2. Yes.

Ratio He was negligent for having wholly entrusted the preparation

and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the office
secretaries, including safekeeping of dry seal and making entries
in notarial register.

Reasoning Responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive,

and respondent should have been more discreet and cautious.

Disposition Atty. Hidalgo is suspended from his commission as

notary public for two (2) years for negligence in the performance
of duties as notary public.
SICAT V ARIOLA, JR.
NATURE
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
FACTS

In an affidavit-complaint, complainat Arturo Sicat, a Board Member

of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent
Atty. Gregorio Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal
with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly
the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) purportedly
executed by one Juanito C. Benitez

According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez

executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the
latter had already died on October 25, 2000.

He alleged that prior to notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had

entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical
Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of lowcost houses(project worth=11M).

For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta

issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of 3.7M,
payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management
and/or Cesar Goco.

The check was received and cashed by the the latter by virtue of
the SPA notarized by Ariola.
Respondents' Comments

Respondent explained that as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had

already signed the SPA.

He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4,

2001 that he was able to notarize it.

Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was

not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in
favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000.

Therefore, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it.

Moreover, the suit should be dismissed for forum shopping since

similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission
and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

Which complaints were dismissed because the assailed act

referred to violation of the IRR of the Commission on Audit.

The Court, in its resolution dated March 12, 2003, referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation. The IBP recommended that
respondent's notarial commission be revoked
and that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUES
WON acts of respondent amounted to a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD

The act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed by

the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically

Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibits engaging in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct..

The undisputed facts show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000.
The notarial acknowledgment of respondent declared that Benitez
appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was
his clear and voluntary act. Clearly respondent lied and
intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement.

Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was

superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate
him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public
document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the
legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness
of every notarial act.

Disposition WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is

found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of
respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the
Ombudsman.
UI V BONIFACIO

NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS

Mrs. Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against

Atty. Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying
on an illicit relationship with her husband Mr. Ui.

In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,

Atty. Bonifacio attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that
said that she and Mr. Ui got married in 1985, but according to the
certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department
of Health, they were married in 1987.

She claims that she entered the relationship with Mr. Ui in good
faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful,
flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference.

She fell in love with Mr. Ui whom she believed to be single, and,
that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways
with him.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law
HELD No.

The practice of law is a privilege.

A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations.

It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due

process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics.

One of the conditions prior to the admission to the bar is that an

applicant must possess good moral character.

More importantly, possession of good character must be

continuous as a

requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice.

Otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such

privilege.

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, which has

been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community.

Lawyers, as keepers of the public faith, are burdened with a higher

degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their affairs
with great caution.

Atty. Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.

However, the fact remains that her relationship with Mr. Ui,
clothed as it was with what she believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral.

Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral

norms of society.

Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the

same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.

A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only

required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also
behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Atty. Bonifacios act of immediately distancing herself from Mr. Ui

upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she fad no intention of flaunting the
law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.

On the matter of the falsified certificate of marriage, it is contrary

to human experience and highly improbable that she did not know
the year of her marriage or that she failed to check that the
information in the document which she attached to her Answer
were correct.

Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the bar, free
from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.
FIGUEROA V BARRANCO, JR.
FACTS

In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon Barranco, Jr. be

denied admission to the legal profession.

Barranco passed the 1970 bar exams on the fourth attempt.

Figueroa avers that she and Barranco had been sweethearts, that
a child was born to them out of wedlock and that respondent did
not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

Figueroa and Barranco were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo and were

steadies since 1953.

Figueroa first acceded to sexual congress in 1960.

A son, Rafael Barranco, was born on Dec 11, 1964.

Barranco promised to marry Figueroa after he passes the bar

exams. Their relationship continued, with more than 20 or 30
promises of marriage.

Barranco gave only P10 for the child on Rafaels birthdays. In

1971, Figueroa learned Barranco married another woman.

From 1972 to 1988, several motions to dismiss and comments

were filed.

On Sept 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyers oath.

Nov 17, 1988, the Court, in response to Figueroas opposition,

resolved to cancel Barrancos scheduled oath-taking.

June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the IBP.

On May 17, 1997, IBP recommended the dismissal of the case and
that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath
ISSUE WON the facts constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of Barranco from the legal profession
HELD No.

To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must

not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.

A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to

constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.

It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless acts which shows a moral

indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.

Barrancos engaging in premarital sexual relations with Figueroa

and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his
part but it does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.

Barranco and Figueroa were sweethearts whose sexual relations

were evidently consensual.

Respondent, at the time of this decision, is already 62.

Disposition Petition is dismissed. Simeon Barranco, Jr. is allowed to

take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of proper fees.
BARRIOS V MARTINEZ
FACTS

Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of BP 22

Complainant submitted Resolution dated March 13, 1996, and the

Entry of judgment dated March 20, 1996 in an action for
disbarment against Martinez

July 3, 1996 the Court required respondent to comment on

said petition within 10 days from notice

February 17, 1997 a second resolution was issued requiring

respondent to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for failure to comply with the earlier Resolution
and to submit Comment

July 7, 1997 the Court imposed a fine of P1000 for respondents

failure to comply with previous resolution within 10 days

April 27, 1998 the Court fined the respondent an additional

P2000 and required him to comply with the resolution under pain
of imprisonment and arrest for a period of 5 days or until his
compliance

February 3, 1999 the Court declared respondent Martinez guilty

of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3(b) of the 1997 Rules on Civil

Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with

the aforesaid resolution
April 5, 1999 NBI reported that respondent was arrested in
Tacloban City on March 26, 1999 but was subsequently released
after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of
February 17, 1997 and April 27, 1998 by remitting the amount of
P2000 and submitting his overdue Comment:
1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated
February 17, 1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical
treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte
2. Complainant passed away sometime in June 1997
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which
was decided in respondents favor.
Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the execution
of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of
complainant, the latter filed the present administrative case
September 11, 1997 Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution
Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to the First Division Clerk
of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in
another estafa case before the RTC of Tacloban
City, as well as a civil case involving the victims of the Dona Paz
tragedy in 1987 for which the RTC of Basey, Samar rendered a
decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by
the CA.
June 16, 1999 the Court referred the present case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation
The report of IBP stated:
1. Respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the complainant died and that
dismissal is warranted because the case filed by him does
not survive due to his demise as a matter of fact, it is
extinguished upon his death. The IBP disagrees, pursuant
to Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the
SC or the IBP may initiate the proceedings when they
perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when
their attention is called by any one and a probable cause
exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which
requires disciplinary sanctions.
2. Propensity to disregard orders of the SC, as shown by
respondent, is an utter lack of good moral character
3. Respondents conviction of a crime of moral turpitude
clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration
of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of
sanctions against him

4. It is recommended that respondent be disbarred and

his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately
September 27, 2003 the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner
December 3, 2003 Atty. Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation
January 14, 2004 the Court required the complainant to file a comment
within 10 days
February 16, 2004 complainants daughter sent a Manifestation and
Motion alleging they have not been furnished with a copy of respondents
Motion
ISSUE WON the crime respondent was convicted of is one involving
moral turpitude
HELD Yes.

Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to

justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private

duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.

The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount

to a deprivation of property without due process of law is also
untenable.

The practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for

disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise

his important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable;

men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no

redress for private grievance.

They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare,
and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministrations of persons unfit to practice them.

The court is also disinclined to take respondents old age and the
fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his
favor.

If at all, the respondent was held to a higher standard for it, for a
judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence, and his conduct should be above reproach.

The Court based the determination of the penalty from previously

decided cases, holding that disbarment is the appropriate penalty
for conviction by final judgment for a crime of moral turpitude.

Disposition Respondent was disbarred and his name stricken from

the Roll of Attorneys.
Donton vs Tansingco
Facts:

On May 20, 2003, Peter T. Donton(complainant) filed a criminal

complaint for estafa thru falsificationof public document against
Duane O.Stier, Emelyn A. Maggay, and respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O.Tansingco, as the notary public whonotarized the
Occupancy Agreement.

Subsequently, respondent Tansingco filed a counter-charge for

perjuryagainst complainant.

The affidavit-complaint stated that:

The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was

prepared and notarized under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner andlong-time resident
of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street,Bgy.
San Roque, Murphy, Cubao,Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S.
citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in
his name agreed that the property be transferred in the
name of Mr. Donton,a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr.Donton, requested me
to prepare several documents that would guarantee
recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr.
Donton
.D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free
and undisturbed use of the property for his residence
and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT
was tied
up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.

Thereafter, complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred in

violation of the Code for the act of preparing the Occupancy
Agreement, despite the knowledge that Stier was disqualified to
own a real property for being a foreign national.

On Oct 1, 2003 the Court referred the matter to the IBP for
investigation and on Feb 26, 2004, Commissioner San Juan found
respondent liable for taking part in a scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in

th ePhilippines and recommended respondents suspension

from the practice of law for 2 years and cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public.

On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report
with modification and recommended respondents suspension
from the practice of law for 6 months.

Then on July 28, 2004, respondent filed a motion for

reconsideration before the IBP stating that his practice of law is his
only means of supporting his family and 6 minor children.
Issue: WON respondent is guilty of violation of Canon I and Rule 1.02 of the
Codeof Professional Responsibility.
Held: YES

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client
which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to
uphold.

Respondents knowledge that Stier, a US citizen, was disqualified

from owning real property and his preparation of Occupancy
Agreement that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the
actual owner of the property, aided in circumventing the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands.

Thus, he violated his oathand the Code when he prepared and

notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful

end.

Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he

may be suspended.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco

GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
IN RE TERREL
Facts:

Terrel was ordered to show cause why he should not be suspended

as a member of the bar of the city of Manila

He assisted in the organization Centro Bellas Artes Club, after he

had been notified that the organization was made for the purpose
of evading the law

He acted as attorney for said club during the time of and after its
organization, which was known for the purpose of evading the law

In US vs. Terrel, he was charged with estafa. The court reviewed

his testimony and decided that the charges were true and made

an order suspending him from office as lawyer in the Philippine

Islands.
Issue: Whether or not the court was justified in suspending Terrel.
Held: Yes, suspended for one year

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects,

for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime
constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer
of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
office, and for which he may be removed or suspended.

The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to

be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which
justify disbarment.

HOWEVER, Terrel was acquitted in US vs. Terrel on the charge of

estafa. While unprofessional, is not criminal in nature. Hence,
Terrel is suspended for one year (as opposed to permanent
suspension).

ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN
NATURE
RESOLUTION of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court
FACTS

Joseph Estrada, through Atty Alan Paguia, filed a Petition for

Certiorari under the Rules of Court against Sandiganbayan, which
prayed
1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the
members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves
from hearing and deciding the petition;
2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be
vacated and set aside; and
3.That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No.
26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.

Atty Paguia, speaking for Estrada, asserted that the inhibition of

the members of the SC from hearing the petition is called for
under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting
justices or judges from participating in any partisan
political activity which proscription, according to him, the
justices have violated by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and
by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner contended that the justices have thereby prejudged a

case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President
Arroyo.

The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo is,

according to petitioner, a patent mockery of justice and due
process.

The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit (Sandiganbayan

committed no grave abuse of discretion) and the SC warned Atty
Paguia of his conduct -- his attacks on the Court and making public
statements on the case (violating Rule 13.02 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility).

He was given 10 days SHOW CAUSE why he should not be

sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.

On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with

the show-cause order.

In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of

defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against
the members of the Court (for discussion on political partisanship
please see original case), and continued to make public
statements about Estradas case.
ISSUES WON Atty Paguia should be suspended from the practice of law
HELD: YES.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that

the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others.

In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning

the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce
criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well founded,
can truly have constructive effects in the task of the

Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of the peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by
those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.

The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate
of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting
a member of the bar from making such public statements on a
case that may tend to arouse public opinion for

or against a party.

Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts wellmeant admonition. The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on
pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave

responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.

Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

Disposition Atty Paguia indefinitely suspended from the practice of

law