Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manila
Golf
Club
vs.
IAC,
237
SCRA
207
2.Encyclopedia Britanica vs. NLRC, 264 SCRA 4 [1996]
3.Carungcong
vs.
Sunlife,
283
SCRA
319
4.Ramos
vs
CA,
380
SCRA
467
5.Sonza vs. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 138051, June 10, 2004
6.Lazaro vs. Social Security Commission 435 SCRA 472
[2004]
7.Phil. Global Communications v. De Vera, 459 SCRA 260
[2005]
8.ABS-CBN vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. 164156, Sept. 26, 2006
9.Francisco
vs.
NLRC,
500
SCRA
690
[2006]
10.Nogales et. al., vs. Capitol Medical Center et al., G.R. No.
142625, December 19, 2006
1.
MANILA GOLF
petitioner,
&
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
LLAMAR, respondents.
COUNTRY
COURT
CLUB,
and
INC.,
FERMIN
NARVASA, C.J.:
The question before the Court here is whether or not persons
rendering caddying services for members of golf clubs and
their guests in said clubs' courses or premises are the
employees of such clubs and therefore within the compulsory
coverage of the Social Security System (SSS).
That question appears to have been involved, either directly or
peripherally, in three separate proceedings, all initiated by or
on behalf of herein private respondent and his fellow caddies.
That which gave rise to the present petition for review was
originally filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) via
petition of seventeen (17) persons who styled themselves
"Caddies of Manila Golf and Country Club-PTCCEA" for
coverage and availment of benefits under the Social Security
Act as amended, "PTCCEA" being
the acronym of a labor organization, the "Philippine Technical,
Clerical, Commercial Employees Association," with which the
petitioners claimed to be affiliated. The petition, docketed as
SSC Case No. 5443, alleged in essence that although the
petitioners were employees of the Manila Golf and Country
Club, a domestic corporation, the latter had not registered
them as such with the SSS.
At about the same time, two other proceedings bearing on the
same question were filed or were pending; these were:
(1)
a certification election case filed with the Labor
Relations Division of the Ministry of Labor by the PTCCEA on
behalf of the same caddies of the Manila Golf and Country
Club, the case being titled "Philippine Technical, Clerical,
Commercial Association vs. Manila Golf and Country Club" and
docketed as Case No. R4-LRDX-M-10-504-78; it appears to
have been resolved in favor of the petitioners therein by MedArbiter Orlando S. Rojo who was thereafter upheld by Director
Carmelo S. Noriel, denying the Club's motion for
reconsideration; 1
(2)
a compulsory arbitration case initiated before the
Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor by the same labor
organization, titled "Philippine Technical, Clerical, Commercial
Employees Association (PTCCEA), Fermin Lamar and
Raymundo Jomok vs. Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc.,
Miguel Celdran, Henry Lim and Geronimo Alejo;" it was
dismissed for lack of merit by Labor Arbiter Cornelio T.
Linsangan, a decision later affirmed on appeal by the National
Labor Relations Commission on the ground that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the petitioning
caddies and the respondent Club. 2
In the case before the SSC, the respondent Club filed answer
praying for the dismissal of the petition, alleging in substance
that the petitioners, caddies by occupation, were allowed into
the Club premises to render services as such to the individual
members and guests playing the Club's golf course and who
themselves paid for such services; that as such caddies, the
petitioners were not subject to the direction and control of the
(1)
refusing to suspend the proceedings to await
judgment by the Labor Relations Division of National Capital
Regional Office in the certification election case (R-4-LRD-M10-504-78) supra, on the precise issue of the existence of
employer-employee relationship between the respondent club
and the appellants, it being contended that said issue was "a
function of the proper labor office"; and
(2)
adjudicating that self same issue a manner contrary to
the ruling of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
which "has not only become final but (has been) executed or
(become) res adjudicata." 7
Before this Court, the petitioner Club now contends that the
decision of the Med-Arbiter in the certification case had never
become final, being in fact the subject of three pending and
unresolved motions for reconsideration, as well as of a later
motion for early resolution. 11 Unfortunately, none of these
motions is incorporated or reproduced in the record before the
Court. And, for his part, the private respondent contends, not
only that said decision had been appealed to and been
affirmed by the Director of the BLR, but that a certification
election had in fact been held, which resulted in the PTCCEA
being recognized as the sole bargaining agent of the caddies
of the Manila Golf and Country Club with respect to wages,
hours of work, terms of employment, etc. 12 Whatever the truth
about these opposing contentions, which the record before the
Court does not adequately disclose, the more controlling
consideration would seem to be that, however, final it may
become, the decision in a certification case, by the
very nature of that proceedings, is not such as to foreclose all
further dispute between the parties as to the existence, or nonexistence, of employer-employee relationship between them.
(a)
the promulgation of no less than twenty-four (24) rules
and regulations just about every aspect of the conduct that the
caddy must observe, or avoid, when serving as such, any
violation of any which could subject him to disciplinary action,
which may include suspending or cutting off his access to the
club premises;
(b)
the devising and enforcement of a group rotation
system whereby a caddy is assigned a number which
designates his turn to serve a player;
(c)
the club's "suggesting" the rate of fees payable to the
caddies.
Deemed of title or no moment by the Appellate Court was the
fact that the caddies were paid by the players, not by the Club,
that they observed no definite working hours and earned no
fixed income. It quoted with approval from an American
decision 10 to the effect that: "whether the club paid the
caddies and afterward collected in the first instance, the
caddies were still employees of the club." This, no matter that
the case which produced this ruling had a slightly different
factual cast, apparently having involved a claim for workmen's
compensation made by a caddy who, about to leave the
premises of the club where he worked, was hit and injured by
an automobile then negotiating the club's private driveway.
Said Courts holding that upon the facts, there exists (or
existed) a relationship of employer and employee between
petitioner and private respondent is, however, another matter.
The Court does not agree that said facts necessarily or
logically point to such a relationship, and to the exclusion of
any form of arrangements, other than of employment, that
would make the respondent's services available to the
members and guest of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2. [G.R. No. 87098. November 4, 1996]
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (PHILIPPINES),
INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER TEODORICO L.
DOGELIO and BENJAMIN LIMJOCO, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Encyclopaedia Britannica (Philippines), Inc. filed this petition
for certiorari to annul and set aside the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division, in NLRC
Case No. RB IV-5158-76, dated December 28, 1988, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision dated
December 7, 1982 of then Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Dogelio is
hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Private respondent Benjamin Limjoco was a Sales Division
Manager of petitioner Encyclopaedia Britannica and was in
charge of selling petitioners products through some sales
representatives. As
compensation,
private
respondent
received commissions from the products sold by his
agents. He was also allowed to use petitioners name,
goodwill and logo. It was, however, agreed upon that office
expenses would be deducted from private respondents
commissions. Petitioner would also be informed about
appointments, promotions, and transfers of employees in
private respondents district.
On June 14, 1974, private respondent Limjoco resigned from
office to pursue his private business. Then on October 30,
1975, he filed a complaint against petitioner Encyclopaedia
Britannica with the Department of Labor and Employment,
claiming for non-payment of separation pay and other benefits,
and also illegal deduction from his sales commissions.
Petitioner Encyclopaedia Britannica alleged that complainant
Benjamin Limjoco (Limjoco, for brevity) was not its employee
but an independent dealer authorized to promote and sell its
products and in return, received commissions therefrom.
Limjoco did not have any salary and his income from the
petitioner company was dependent on the volume of sales
accomplished. He also had his own separate office, financed
the business expenses, and maintained his own
workforce. The salaries of his secretary, utility man, and sales
representatives were chargeable to his commissions. Thus,
petitioner argued that it had no control and supervision over
the complainant as to the manner and means he conducted his
business operations. The latter did not even report to the office
of the petitioner and did not observe fixed office hours.
Consequently, there was no employer-employee relationship.
Limjoco maintained otherwise. He alleged that he was hired by
the petitioner in July 1970, was assigned in the sales
department, and was earning an average of P4,000.00 monthly
as his sales commission. He was under the supervision of the
petitioners officials who issued to him and his other personnel,
memoranda, guidelines on company policies, instructions and
other orders. He was, however, dismissed by the petitioner
when the Laurel-Langley Agreement expired. As a result
thereof, Limjoco asserts that in accordance with the
established company practice and the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement, he was entitled to termination
pay equivalent to one month salary, the unpaid benefits
(Christmas bonus, midyear bonus, clothing allowance, vacation
leave, and sick leave), and the amounts illegally deducted from
his commissions which were then used for the payments of
office supplies, office space, and overhead expenses.
On December 7, 1982, Labor Arbiter Teodorico Dogelio, in a
decision ruled that Limjoco was an employee of the petitioner
company. Petitioner had control over Limjoco since the latter
was required to make periodic reports of his sales activities to
the company. All transactions were subject to the final
approval of the petitioner, an evidence that petitioner company
had active control on the sales activities. There was therefore,
an employer-employee relationship and necessarily, Limjoco
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Private respondents De Los Santos Medical Center, Dr. Orlino
Hosaka and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez move for a reconsideration
of the Decision, dated December 29, 1999, of this Court
holding them civilly liable for petitioner Erlinda Ramos
comatose condition after she delivered herself to them for their
professional care and management.
For better understanding of the issues raised in private
respondents respective motions, we will briefly restate the
facts of the case as follows:
Sometime in 1985, petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking
professional medical help, was advised to undergo an
operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon,
who agreed to perform the operation on her. The operation
was scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at
private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC).
Since neither petitioner Erlinda nor her husband, petitioner
Rogelio, knew of any anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka
recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.
Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day before
the scheduled operation. By 7:30 in the morning of the
following day, petitioner Erlinda was already being prepared for
operation. Upon the request of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-inlaw, Herminda Cruz, who was then Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to
accompany her inside the operating room.
At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosaka had not yet arrived
so Dr. Gutierrez tried to get in touch with him by phone.
Thereafter, Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that the operation
might be delayed due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. In the
meantime, the patient, petitioner Erlinda said to Cruz,
"Mindy, inip na inip na ako, ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor."
By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still not around,
petitioner Rogelio already wanted to pull out his wife from the
operating room. He met Dr. Garcia, who remarked that he was
also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived
at the hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or more than
three (3) hours after the scheduled operation.
Cruz, who was then still inside the operating room, heard about
Dr. Hosakas arrival. While she held the hand of Erlinda, Cruz
saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr.
Gutierrez utter: "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Cruz noticed a bluish
discoloration of Erlindas nailbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz)
then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr. Calderon
attempted to intubate the patient. The nailbeds of the patient
remained bluish, thus, she was placed in a trendelenburg
position a position where the head of the patient is placed in
a position lower than her feet. At this point, Cruz went out of
the operating room to express her concern to petitioner
Rogelio that Erlindas operation was not going well.
Cruz quickly rushed back to the operating room and saw that
the patient was still in trendelenburg position. At almost 3:00 in
the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being wheeled to the Intensive
Care Unit (ICU). The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio
that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a
month. She was released from the hospital only four months
later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated operation,
Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on
August 3, 1999.1
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
civil case for damages against private respondents. After due
trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
Essentially, the trial court found that private respondents were
negligent in the performance of their duties to Erlinda. On
appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial courts decision and directed petitioners to pay their
"unpaid medical bills" to private respondents.
Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari. The private respondents were then required to
submit their respective comments thereon. On December 29,
1999, this Court promulgated the decision which private
respondents now seek to be reconsidered. The dispositive
portion of said Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate
court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in
CHIEF JUSTICE:
In other words, the comatose status was a consequence of
some acts performed by D. Gutierrez?
ATTY. GANA:
It was a consequence of the well, (interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
An acts performed by her, is that not correct?
ATTY. GANA:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Thank you.17
What is left to be determined therefore is whether Erlindas
hapless condition was due to any fault or negligence on the
part of Dr. Gutierrez while she (Erlinda) was under the latters
care. Dr. Gutierrez maintains that the bronchospasm and
cardiac arrest resulting in the patients comatose condition was
brought about by the anaphylactic reaction of the patient to
Thiopental Sodium (pentothal).18 In the Decision, we explained
why we found Dr. Gutierrez theory unacceptable. In the first
place, Dr. Eduardo Jamora, the witness who was presented to
support her (Dr. Gutierrez) theory, was a pulmonologist. Thus,
he could not be considered an authority on anesthesia practice
and procedure and their complications.19
Secondly, there was no evidence on record to support the
theory that Erlinda developed an allergic reaction to pentothal.
Dr. Camagay enlightened the Court as to the manifestations of
an allergic reaction in this wise:
DR. CAMAGAY:
All right, let us qualify an allergic reaction. In medical
terminology an allergic reaction is something which is not usual
response and it is further qualified by the release of a hormone
called histamine and histamine has an effect on all the organs
of the body generally release because the substance that
entered the body reacts with the particular cell, the mass cell,
and the mass cell secretes this histamine. In a way it is some
form of response to take away that which is not mine, which is
not part of the body. So, histamine has multiple effects on the
body. So, one of the effects as you will see you will have
redness, if you have an allergy you will have tearing of the
eyes, you will have swelling, very crucial swelling sometimes of
the larynges which is your voice box main airway, that swelling
may be enough to obstruct the entry of air to the trachea and
you could also have contraction, constriction of the smaller
airways beyond the trachea, you see you have the trachea this
way, we brought some visual aids but unfortunately we do not
have a projector. And then you have the smaller airways, the
bronchi and then eventually into the mass of the lungs you
have the bronchus. The difference is that these tubes have
also in their walls muscles and this particular kind of muscles is
smooth muscle so, when histamine is released they close up
like this and that phenomenon is known as bronco spasm.
However, the effects of histamine also on blood vessels are
different. They dilate blood vessel open up and the patient or
whoever has this histamine release has hypertension or low
blood pressure to a point that the patient may have decrease
blood supply to the brain and may collapse so, you may have
people who have this.20
These symptoms of an allergic reaction were not shown to
have been extant in Erlindas case. As we held in our Decision,
"no evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing some of
the more common accompanying signs of an allergic reaction
appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented
to the court."21
Dr. Gutierrez, however, insists that she successfully intubated
Erlinda as evidenced by the fact that she was revived after
suffering from cardiac arrest. Dr. Gutierrez faults the Court for
giving credence to the testimony of Cruz on the matter of the
administration of anesthesia when she (Cruz), being a nurse,
was allegedly not qualified to testify thereon. Rather, Dr.
Gutierrez invites the Courts attention to her synopsis on what
transpired during Erlindas intubation:
12:15 p.m. Patient was inducted with sodium pentothal 2.5%
(250 mg) given by slow IV. 02 was started by mask. After
pentothal injection this was followed by IV injection of Norcuron
4mg. After 2 minutes 02 was given by positive pressure for
about one minute. Intubation with endotracheal tube 7.5 m in
diameter was done with slight difficulty (short neck & slightly
prominent upper teeth) chest was examined for breath sounds
& checked if equal on both sides. The tube was then anchored
10
Q
So, that is about 12:13 no, 12:15, 12:17?
A
Yes, and then, after one minute another oxygenation
was given and after (interrupted)
Q
12:18?
A
Yes, and then after giving the oxygen we start the
menorcure which is a relaxant. After that relaxant (interrupted)
Q
After that relaxant, how long do you wait before you do
any manipulation?
A
Usually you wait for two minutes or three minutes.
Q
So, if our estimate of the time is accurate we are now
more or less 12:19, is that right?
A
Maybe.
Q
12:19. And at that time, what would have been done to
this patient?
A
After that time you examine the, if there is relaxation of
the jaw which you push it downwards and when I saw that the
patient was relax because that monorcure is a relaxant, you
cannot intubate the patient or insert the laryngoscope if it is not
keeping him relax. So, my first attempt when I put the
laryngoscope on I saw the trachea was deeply interiorly. So,
what I did ask "mahirap ata ito ah." So, I removed the
laryngoscope and oxygenated again the patient.
Q
So, more or less you attempted to do an intubation after
the first attempt as you claimed that it was only the
laryngoscope that was inserted.
A
Yes.
Q
And in the second attempt you inserted the
laryngoscope and now possible intubation?
A
Yes.
Q
And at that point, you made a remark, what remark did
you make?
A
I said "mahirap ata ito" when the first attempt I did not
see the trachea right away. That was when I (interrupted)
Q
That was the first attempt?
A
Yes.
Q
What about the second attempt?
A
On the second attempt I was able to intubate right away
within two to three seconds.
Q
At what point, for purposes of discussion without
accepting it, at what point did you make the comment "na
mahirap ata to intubate, mali ata ang pinasukan"
A
I did not say "mali ata ang pinasukan" I never said that.
Q
Well, just for the information of the group here the
remarks I am making is based on the documents that were
forwarded to me by the Supreme Court. That is why for
purposes of discussion I am trying to clarify this for the sake of
enlightenment. So, at what point did you ever make that
comment?
A
Which one, sir?
Q
The "mahirap intubate ito" assuming that you
(interrupted)
A
Iyon lang, that is what I only said "mahirap
intubate (interrupted)
Q
At what point?
A
When the first attempt when I inserted the laryngoscope
for the first time.
Q
So, when you claim that at the first attempt you inserted
the laryngoscope, right?
A
Yes.
Q
But in one of the recordings somewhere at the,
somewhere in the transcript of records that when the lawyer of
the other party try to inquire from you during the first attempt
that was the time when "mayroon ba kayong hinugot sa tube, I
do not remember the page now, but it seems to me it is there.
So, that it was on the second attempt that (interrupted)
A
I was able to intubate.
Q
And this is more or less about what time 12:21?
A
Maybe, I cannot remember the time, Sir.
Q
Okay, assuming that this was done at 12:21 and
looking at the anesthesia records from 12:20 to 12:30 there
was no recording of the vital signs. And can we presume that
at this stage there was already some problems in handling the
patient?
A
Not yet.
Q
But why are there no recordings in the anesthesia
record?
A
I did not have time.
Q
Ah, you did not have time, why did you not have time?
A
Because it was so fast, I really (at this juncture the
witness is laughing)
Q
No, I am just asking. Remember I am not here not to
pin point on anybody I am here just to more or less clarify
certainty more ore less on the record.
A
Yes, Sir.
Q
And so it seems that there were no recording during
that span of ten (10) minutes. From 12:20 to 12:30, and going
over your narration, it seems to me that the cyanosis appeared
ten (10) minutes after induction, is that right?
A
Yes.
Q
And that is after induction 12:15 that is 12:25 that was
the first cyanosis?
A
Yes.
Q
And that the 12:25 is after the 12:20?
A
We cannot (interrupted)
Q
Huwag ho kayong makuwan, we are just trying to
enlighten, I am just going over the record ano,kung mali ito
kuwan eh di ano. So, ganoon po ano, that it seems to me that
there is no recording from 12:20 to 12:30, so, I am just
wondering why there were no recordings during the period and
then of course the second cyanosis, after the first cyanosis. I
think that was the time Dr. Hosaka came in?
A
No, the first cyanosis (interrupted).23
We cannot thus give full credence to Dr. Gutierrez synopsis in
light of her admission that it does not fully reflect the events
that transpired during the administration of anesthesia on
Erlinda. As pointed out by Dr. Estrella, there was a ten-minute
gap in Dr. Gutierrez synopsis, i.e., the vital signs of Erlinda
were not recorded during that time. The absence of these data
is particularly significant because, as found by the trial court, it
was the absence of oxygen supply for four (4) to five (5)
minutes that caused Erlindas comatose condition.
On the other hand, the Court has no reason to disbelieve the
testimony of Cruz. As we stated in the Decision, she is
competent to testify on matters which she is capable of
observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician
and surgeon, external appearances and manifest conditions
which are observable by any one.24 Cruz, Erlindas sister-inlaw, was with her inside the operating room. Moreover, being a
nurse and Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of
Nursing at that, she is not entirely ignorant of anesthetic
procedure. Cruz narrated that she heard Dr. Gutierrez remark,
"Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan." She observed that the nailbeds of Erlinda
became bluish and thereafter Erlinda was placed in
trendelenburg position.25 Cruz further averred that she noticed
that the abdomen of Erlinda became distended.26
The cyanosis (bluish discoloration of the skin or mucous
membranes caused by lack of oxygen or abnormal hemoglobin
in the blood) and enlargement of the stomach of Erlinda
indicate that the endotracheal tube was improperly inserted
into the esophagus instead of the trachea. Consequently,
oxygen was delivered not to the lungs but to the
gastrointestinal tract. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that Erlinda was placed in trendelenburg position. This
indicates that there was a decrease of blood supply to the
patients brain. The brain was thus temporarily deprived of
oxygen supply causing Erlinda to go into coma.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally
happen absent any negligence in the administration of
anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. As was
noted in our Decision, the instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube,
were all under the exclusive control of private respondents Dr.
Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka.27 In Voss vs. Bridwell,28 which
involved a patient who suffered brain damage due to the
wrongful administration of anesthesia, and even before the
scheduled mastoid operation could be performed, the Kansas
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
reasoning that the injury to the patient therein was one which
does not ordinarily take place in the absence of negligence in
the administration of an anesthetic, and in the use and
employment of an endotracheal tube. The court went on to say
that "[o]rdinarily a person being put under anesthesia is not
rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such
anesthesia in the absence of negligence. Upon these facts and
under these circumstances, a layman would be able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
11
12
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Courtesy.
DR. CAMAGAY:
And care.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Duty as a matter of fact?
DR. CAMAGAY:
Yes, Your Honor.43
Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for the
scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of
his duty as a physician "to serve the interest of his patients with
the greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and
skill,"44 but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a
person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and
give everyone his due.
Anent private respondent DLSMCs liability for the resulting
injury to petitioner Erlinda, we held that respondent hospital is
solidarily liable with respondent doctors therefor under Article
2180 of the Civil Code45 since there exists an employeremployee relationship between private respondent DLSMC
and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka:
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While
"consultants" are not, technically employees, x x x the control
exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate consultants all
fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. x x x46
DLSMC however contends that applying the four-fold test in
determining whether such a relationship exists between it and
the respondent doctors, the inescapable conclusion is that
DLSMC cannot be considered an employer of the respondent
doctors.
It has been consistently held that in determining whether an
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the
following elements must be present: (1) selection and
engagement of services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the power
to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only the end to
be achieved, but the means to be used in reaching such an
end.47
DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage
the services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and
grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or
admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the
consultant that he or she possesses the necessary
qualifications, such as accreditation by the appropriate board
(diplomate), evidence of fellowship and references.48 Second, it
is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultants fee
for services rendered by the latter.49 Third, a hospital does not
dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose his or her
accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital.50 Lastly,
DLSMC argues that when a doctor refers a patient for
admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the
treatment to be given to said patient. The hospitals obligation
is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room
accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications
prescribed by the doctor, the equipment and facilities
necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well as the
services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks
of ensuring that the doctors orders are carried out strictly.51
After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by
DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent hospitals position on
this issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee
relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka
which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered
by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
As explained by respondent hospital, that the admission of a
physician to membership in DLSMCs medical staff as active or
visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials
Committee thereof, which is composed of the heads of the
various specialty departments such as the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the
department head of the particular specialty applied for as
chairman. The Credentials Committee then recommends to
DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the
acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician, and said
director or administrator validates the committee's
recommendation.52 Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary
13
14
15
16
17
ANGELITO L. LAZARO,
G.R. No.
138254
Proprietor of Royal Star
Marketing,
Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO,
Chairman,
- versus AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,
Members.
ROSALINA LAUDATO, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
July 30, 2004
x-------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division[2] in
CA-G.R. Sp. No. 40956, promulgated on 20 November 1998,
which affirmed two rulings of the Social Security Commission
(SSC) dated 8 November 1995 and 24 April 1996.
Private respondent Rosalina M. Laudato (Laudato) filed
a petition before the SSC for social security coverage and
remittance of unpaid monthly social security contributions
18
of
Yet, the circumstances in the 1969 case are very different from
those at bar. Ruling on the question whether jockeys were
19
20
your belief that I can very well qualify for the job having worked
with your organization for sometime now.
I shall be very grateful for whatever kind attention you may
extend on this matter and hoping that it will merit acceptance, I
remain
Very truly yours,
(signed)
RICARDO V. DE VERA, M.D.
Significantly, the foregoing letter was substantially the basis of
the labor arbiters finding that there existed no employeremployee relationship between petitioner and respondent, in
addition to the following factual settings:
The fact that the complainant was not considered an employee
was recognized by the complainant himself in a signed letter to
the respondent dated April 21, 1982 attached as Annex G to
the respondents Reply and Rejoinder. Quoting the pertinent
portion of said letter:
To carry out your memo effectively and to provide a systematic
and workable time schedule which will serve the best interests
of both the present and absent employee, may I propose an
extended two-hour service (1:00-3:00 P.M.) during which
period I can devote ample time to both groups depending upon
the urgency of the situation. I shall readjust my private
schedule to be available for the herein proposed extended
hours, should you consider this proposal.
As regards compensation for the additional time and services
that I shall render to the employees, it is dependent on your
evaluation of the merit of my proposal and your confidence on
my ability to carry out efficiently said proposal.
The tenor of this letter indicates that the complainant was
proposing to extend his time with the respondent and seeking
additional compensation for said extension. This shows that
the respondent PHILCOM did not have control over the
schedule of the complainant as it [is] the complainant who is
proposing his own schedule and asking to be paid for the
same. This is proof that the complainant understood that his
relationship with the respondent PHILCOM was a retained
physician and not as an employee. If he were an employee he
could not negotiate as to his hours of work.
The complainant is a Doctor of Medicine, and presumably, a
well-educated person. Yet, the complainant, in his position
paper, is claiming that he is not conversant with the law and did
not give much attention to his job title- on a retainer basis.
But the same complainant admits in his affidavit that his
service for the respondent was covered by a retainership
contract [which] was renewed every year from 1982 to 1994.
Upon reading the contract dated September 6, 1982, signed by
the complainant himself (Annex C of Respondents Position
Paper), it clearly states that is a retainership contract. The
retainer fee is indicated thereon and the duration of the
contract for one year is also clearly indicated in paragraph 5 of
the Retainership Contract. The complainant cannot claim that
he was unaware that the contract was good only for one year,
as he signed the same without any objections. The
complainant also accepted its renewal every year thereafter
until 1994. As a literate person and educated person, the
complainant cannot claim that he does not know what contract
he signed and that it was renewed on a year to year basis.[17]
The labor arbiter added the indicia, not disputed by
respondent, that from the time he started to work with
petitioner, he never was included in its payroll; was never
deducted any contribution for remittance to the Social Security
System (SSS); and was in fact subjected by petitioner to the
ten (10%) percent withholding tax for his professional fee, in
accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code, matters
which are simply inconsistent with an employer-employee
relationship. In the precise words of the labor arbiter:
xxx xxx xxx After more than ten years of services to
PHILCOM, the complainant would have noticed that no SSS
deductions were made on his remuneration or that the
respondent was deducting the 10% tax for his fees and he
surely would have complained about them if he had considered
himself an employee of PHILCOM. But he never raised those
issues. An ordinary employee would consider the SSS
payments important and thus make sure they would be paid.
The complainant never bothered to ask the respondent to remit
his SSS contributions. This clearly shows that the complainant
never considered himself an employee of PHILCOM and thus,
21
22
Monday Saturday
4:30 A.M. 8:00 A.M. Marlene Nazareno.
Miss Nazareno will then be assigned at the Research Dept.
From 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
The Antecedents
4:30 P.M. 12:00 MN Jennifer Deiparine
Petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) is
engaged in the broadcasting business and owns a network of
television and radio stations, whose operations revolve around
the broadcast, transmission, and relay of telecommunication
signals. It sells and deals in or otherwise utilizes the airtime it
generates from its radio and television operations. It has a
franchise as a broadcasting company, and was likewise issued
a license and authority to operate by the National
Telecommunications Commission.
Sunday
5:00 A.M. 1:00 P.M. Jennifer Deiparine
1:00 P.M. 10:00 P.M. Joy Sanchez
Respondent Gerzon was assigned as the full-time PA of the TV
News Department reporting directly to Leo Lastimosa.
23
For its part, petitioner alleged in its position paper that the
respondents were PAs who basically assist in the conduct of a
particular program ran by an anchor or talent. Among their
duties include monitoring and receiving incoming calls from
listeners and field reporters and calls of news sources;
generally, they perform leg work for the anchors during a
program or a particular production. They are considered in the
industry as "program employees" in that, as distinguished from
regular or station employees, they are basically engaged by
the station for a particular or specific program broadcasted by
the radio station. Petitioner asserted that as PAs, the
complainants were issued talent information sheets which are
updated from time to time, and are thus made the basis to
determine the programs to which they shall later be called on
to assist. The program assignments of complainants were as
follows:
2) Infor Hayupan
Exhibit "F-3"
1) Unzanith
2) Serbisyo de Arevalo
5) Abante Subu
24
6) Pangutana Lang
_________
P48,100.00
(a) Unzanith
(b) Serbisyo de Arevalo
SO ORDERED.13
3) On Saturdays
(a) Nagbagang Balita
(b) Info Hayupan
4) On Sundays:
(e) Haranahan11
Petitioner maintained that PAs, reporters, anchors and talents
occasionally "sideline" for other programs they produce, such
as drama talents in other productions. As program employees,
a PAs engagement is coterminous with the completion of the
program, and may be extended/renewed provided that the
program is on-going; a PA may also be assigned to new
programs upon the cancellation of one program and the
commencement of another. As such program employees, their
compensation is computed on a program basis, a fixed amount
for performance services irrespective of the time consumed. At
any rate, petitioner claimed, as the payroll will show,
respondents were paid all salaries and benefits due them
under the law.12
25
SO ORDERED.15
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE NLRC
AWARDING CBA BENEFITS TO RESPONDENTS.18
In the case at bar, the NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of
its discretion in giving Article 22321 of the Labor Code a liberal
application to prevent the miscarriage of justice. Technicality
should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.22
We have held in a catena of cases that technical rules are not
binding in labor cases and are not to be applied strictly if the
result would be detrimental to the workingman.23
26
Case law is that this Court has always accorded respect and
finality to the findings of fact of the CA, particularly if they
coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission, when supported by substantial
evidence.30 The question of whether respondents are regular
or project employees or independent contractors is essentially
factual in nature; nonetheless, the Court is constrained to
resolve it due to its tremendous effects to the legions of
production assistants working in the Philippine broadcasting
industry.
We agree with respondents contention that where a person
has rendered at least one year of service, regardless of the
nature of the activity performed, or where the work is
continuous or intermittent, the employment is considered
regular as long as the activity exists, the reason being that a
customary appointment is not indispensable before one may
be formally declared as having attained regular status. Article
280 of the Labor Code provides:
27
Petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Sonza v. ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation43 is misplaced. In that case,
the Court explained why Jose Sonza, a well-known television
and radio personality, was an independent contractor and not a
regular employee:
A. Selection and Engagement of Employee
Thus, there are two kinds of regular employees under the law:
(1) those engaged to perform activities which are necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and
(2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one
year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to
the activities in which they are employed.35
28
All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result
of negotiations that led to the Agreement. If SONZA were ABSCBNs employee, there would be no need for the parties to
stipulate on benefits such as "SSS, Medicare, x x x and 13th
month pay which the law automatically incorporates into every
employer-employee contract. Whatever benefits SONZA
enjoyed arose from contract and not because of an employeremployee relationship.
SO ORDERED.
9.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
29
had no daily time record and she came to the office any time
she wanted. The company never interfered with her work
except that from time to time, the management would ask her
opinion on matters relating to her profession. Petitioner did not
go through the usual procedure of selection of employees, but
her services were engaged through a Board Resolution
designating her as technical consultant. The money received
by petitioner from the corporation was her professional fee
subject to the 10% expanded withholding tax on professionals,
and that she was not one of those reported to the BIR or SSS
as one of the companys employees. 12
SO ORDERED. 14
Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not
report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal
before the labor arbiter.
30
SO ORDERED. 15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the National Labor Relations Commissions dated
April 15, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint filed by
private respondent against Kasei Corporation, et al. for
constructive dismissal.
SO ORDERED. 16
The appellate court denied petitioners
reconsideration, hence, the present recourse.
motion
for
31
for her employer. Hence, her severance from the company was
not of her own making and therefore amounted to an illegal
termination of employment.
In affording full protection to labor, this Court must ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.
Even as we, in every case, attempt to carefully balance the
fragile relationship between employees and employers, we are
mindful of the fact that the policy of the law is to apply the
Labor Code to a greater number of employees. This would
enable employees to avail of the benefits accorded to them by
law, in line with the constitutional mandate giving maximum aid
and protection to labor, promoting their welfare and reaffirming
it as a primary social economic force in furtherance of social
justice and national development.
SO ORDERED.
10.
ROGELIO P. NOGALES,
for himself and on behalf of the minors,
ROGER ANTHONY,
ANGELICA, NANCY, and
MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER,
all surnamed NOGALES,
Petitioners,
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review[1] assails the 6 February 1998
Decision[2] and 21 March 2000 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the 22 November 1993 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, finding Dr. Oscar
Estrada solely liable for damages for the death of his patient,
Corazon Nogales, while absolving the remaining respondents
of any liability. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales
(Corazon), who was then 37 years old, was under the
32
The victim was under his pre-natal care, apparently, his fault
began from his incorrect and inadequate management and
lack of treatment of the pre-eclamptic condition of his patient.
It is not disputed that he misapplied the forceps in causing the
delivery because it resulted in a large cervical tear which had
caused the profuse bleeding which he also failed to control
with the application of inadequate injection of magnesium
sulfate by his assistant Dra. Ely Villaflor. Dr. Estrada even
failed to notice the erroneous administration by nurse Dumlao
of hemacel by way of side drip, instead of direct intravenous
injection, and his failure to consult a senior obstetrician at an
early stage of the problem.
33
The Court noted that Dr. Estrada did not appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the trial courts judgment, is already final as
against Dr. Oscar Estrada.
SO ORDERED.[18]
34
The Issue
Basically, the issue in this case is whether CMC is
vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada. The
resolution of this issue rests, on the other hand, on the
ascertainment of the relationship between Dr. Estrada and
CMC. The Court also believes that a determination of the
extent of liability of the other respondents is inevitable to finally
and completely dispose of the present controversy.
Art. 2180.
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
35
for his own acts but also for those of others based on the
formers responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. x
x x[40] (Emphasis supplied)
While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the control test,
such test essentially determines whether an employment
relationship exists between a physician and a hospital based
on the exercise of control over the physician as to details.
Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have the right
to control both the means and the details of the process by
which the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his
task.[41]
36
b) Dr. Rosa Uy
Dr. Rosa Uys alleged negligence consisted of her failure
(1) to call the attention of Dr. Estrada on the incorrect dosage
of magnesium sulfate administered by Dr. Villaflor; (2) to take
corrective measures; and (3) to correct Nurse Dumlaos wrong
method of hemacel administration.
The Court believes Dr. Uys claim that as a second year
resident physician then at CMC, she was merely authorized to
take the clinical history and physical examination of Corazon.
[62] However, that routine internal examination did not ipso
facto make Dr. Uy liable for the errors committed by Dr.
Estrada. Further, petitioners imputation of negligence rests on
37
Petitioners fault Dr. Joel Enriquez also for not calling the
attention of Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, and Nurse Dumlao about
their errors.[63] Petitioners insist that Dr. Enriquez should
have taken, or at least suggested, corrective measures to
rectify such errors.
The Court is not convinced. Dr. Enriquez is an
anesthesiologist whose field of expertise is definitely not
obstetrics and gynecology. As such, Dr. Enriquez was not
expected to correct Dr. Estradas errors. Besides, there was
no evidence of Dr. Enriquezs knowledge of any error
committed by Dr. Estrada and his failure to act upon such
observation.
SO ORDERED.
38