II.

Rule 139-B (as amended by BM No. 1645, September 5, 2006)

A. Procedure for Discipline
1. Nature of Proceedings
2. Institution of Complaint
a) Private lawyers
b) Government lawyers
3. Investigation, Proceedings in court
4. Res ipsa loquitor doctrine
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Defenses
Judgment
Sanctions
Reinstatement
Cases
1. Frias v. Bautista-Lozada, 489 SCRA 345
2. Teodosio vs. Nava
April 27, 2001
3. Uytengsu III vs. Baduel
477 SCRA 621 (Dec. 14, 2005)
4. Soriano vs. Dizon
480 SCRA 1 (Jan. 25, 2006)
5. Silva Vda. De Fajardo
440 SCRA 160 (Oct. 7, 2004)
6. Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma 138 SCRA 306 (Sept. 15, 2004)
7. Ilusorio-Bildner vs. Lokin, Jr.
477 SCRA 634
8. In re: Rusiana
56 SCRA 240
9. In re: Rovero
101 SCRA 799
10. Cui v. Cui
11 SCRA 755

BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS,

A.C. No. 6656

Complainant,cralaw

(formerly CBD-98-591)

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,*chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
-versus-

CORONA,cralaw
CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and
VELASCO, JJ.
ATTY. CARMELITA S.
BAUTISTA-LOZADA,**

Respondent.
Promulgated:
May 4, 2006
x-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of our

December 13, 2005 resolution finding her guilty of violating Rules 15.03
and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully
disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals and
suspending her from the practice of law for two years.

Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), the complaint against her was already barred by prescription. She also
asserts that her December 7, 1990 loan agreement with complainant complied
with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant was fully protected.

Respondent's contentions have no merit.

Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the

Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides:

SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment,

suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2)
years from the date of the professional misconduct.

However, as early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does
not lie in administrative proceedings against lawyers. And in the 2004 case of
Heck v. Santos, we declared that an administrative complaint against a member
of the bar does not prescribe.

If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened

to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that
as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they
stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of
the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyer's Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase
the administrative culpability of a lawyer. (emphasis supplied)

The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative

complaints against lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to
regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in
the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints
against lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and principles
laid down by this Court.

Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which
provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints
against lawyers runs afoul of the settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore
be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.

Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense, respondent raised it

only at this late stage. We presume she was familiar with that rule yet she failed
to invoke it at the earliest opportunity.Instead she opted to insist on her
innocence.

On the other ground raised by respondent, we have sufficiently discussed the

implications of her loan agreement with complainant in relation to Rule 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution.
Considering
complainant,

the
the

fiduciary
nature

character
of

their

of

respondent's

agreement

and

relationship

complainant's

with

lack

of

independent advice when she entered into it, there is neither sufficient ground
nor compelling reason to reconsider our earlier resolution.

WHEREFORE, respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED

WITH FINALITY.

Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby declared null and
void.cralawSO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4673

April 27, 2001

ATTY. HECTOR TEODOSIO, petitioner,

vs.
MERCEDES NAVA, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed against petitioner Atty. Hector Teodosio for having allegedly
represented clients with conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Mercedes Nava alleged that petitioner acted as counsel for Melanie Batislaong in
several cases1 in various branches of the Iloilo City Regional Trial Court while acting as
counsel for Letecia Espinosa and Ma. Gilda Palma in cases2 filed by them against Melanie
Batislaong and herself, respondent Mercedes Nava.
In his comment, petitioner admits that Melanie Batislaong, Letecia Espinosa, and Ma. Gilda
Palma are indeed his clients with respect to the cases mentioned by respondent. He denies,
however, that his clients interests are conflicting and contends that his clients in fact have a
common interest against respondent Nava. According to him, Nava used to be the manager of
Batislaongs lending business and, in that capacity, dealt with several borrowers, including
Espinosa and Palma. Due to acts of mismanagement allegedly committed by Nava,
Batislaong, then represented by Atty. Eugenio O. Original, sued Nava for accounting and
damages (Civil Case No. 21417). In turn, Nava charged Batislaong (Criminal Case Nos.
79688 and 44181) and Espinosa and Palma (I.S. Nos. 2200-93 and 2068-93) with estafa.
While the complaints against them were pending preliminary investigation, Espinosa and
Palma hired petitioners services in seeking the annulment of certain trust receipt agreements
allegedly falsified by Nava, on the basis of which the criminal complaints against them were
filed. As a result, petitioner filed on behalf of Espinosa and Palma Civil Case Nos. 21511 and
21493 against Nava and Batislaong for annulment of contract and damages. Petitioner claims
that he impleaded Batislaong as Navas co-defendant because Espinosa and Palma wanted to
settle the balance of the amount they had borrowed from Batislaong through Nava but they
were unsure whether the payment should be made to Nava or Batislaong as the two had
parted ways. Both were, therefore, impleaded so that they could interplead who between
them should receive the payment. Petitioner claims that it was only after he had filed these
cases that Batislaong offered to hire him as her counsel not only in the civil case she had filed
against Nava (Civil Case No. 21417) but also in the two estafa cases, Criminal Case Nos.
79688 and 44181, filed against her by Nava. Petitioner claims that he agreed to represent
Batislaong in these cases only after he had explained to her the nature of the complaints filed
by Espinosa and Palma against her and Nava in Civil Case Nos. 21511 and 21493.3
Petitioner submitted affidavits executed by Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma stating that they
have no complaints in the way petitioner handled their cases and that each of them was aware
that the other was represented by petitioner. Petitioner further submitted another set of
affidavits executed by Espinosa and Palma stating in detail the extent of their knowledge of
petitioners involvement in Batislaongs cases as well as the basis of their consent for him to
act as their common counsel.4
Respondent assails the affidavits of Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma on the ground that they
were notarized by a lawyer from petitioners law firm and that they do not bear the data as to
the residence certificates of the affiants. In addition, respondent claims that petitioner failed
to ask the court to declare Batislaong in default despite the latters failure to answer the
complaints filed by Espinosa and Palma, and contends that this is proof of petitioners bias
for her (Batislaong).5
In response, petitioner claims that there was no need to declare Batislaong in default in Civil
Case Nos. 21511 and 21493 because Nava, in her Answer, had disclaimed any interest in the

offer of payment of Palma and Espinosa, making the necessity for the defendants to
interplead moot and academic as the money would logically be paid to Batislaong.6
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation. In a report, dated June 23, 1998, IBP Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.7 However, the
IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution XIII-99-23 of February 23, 1999, found petitioner
guilty of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and ordered him
suspended from the practice of law for one year. The Boards resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-23
Adm. Case No. 4673
Mercedes Nava vs. Atty. Hector Teodosio
RESOLVED to SUSPEND Atty. Hector Teodosio for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of
law for representing litigants with CONFLICTING INTERESTS.8
IBP Governor for Eastern Visayas, Kenny A.H. Tantuico, dissenting, adopted the report and
recommendation of Commissioner San Juan in view of the consent given by respondents
clients.
On April 13, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to set aside IBP Resolution XIII-99-23. The
Court referred the motion to the IBP which, on December 11, 1999, issued Resolution XIV99-286, affirming the Boards original Resolution XIII-99-23.
After receipt of IBP Resolution XIV-99-286, the Court resolved to treat petitioners motion to
set aside the questioned IBP resolution as his petition for review thereof and required
respondent to file comment. In lieu of comment, respondent filed a manifestation stating that
the points raised in petitioners motion were mere reiterations of what he had already stated
in his prior pleadings.9 Petitioner filed a Reply to respondents manifestation.10
We now deal with the issues raised in the petition for review.
First. Petitioner points out that the IBP Board ordered him suspended from the practice of
law without stating the facts and the law on which its decision is based. On the other hand,
although the report of the investigating commissioner contains findings, her recommendation
was for the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. Petitioner contends
that even the commissioners report is of doubtful validity since she failed to schedule any
hearing on the case before she submitted her report to the Board of Governors.11
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the IBPs investigation of
disbarment complaints, the report of its investigator, and the review of the latters findings by
the Board of Governors, state:
SEC. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to
answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of
the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on
his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice,
the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
....
SEC. 10. Report of Investigator. Not later than thirty (30) days from termination of
the investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact

and recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the stenographic
notes and the transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during the
investigation. The submission of the report need not await the transcription of the
stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from the
Investigators personal notes any relevant and pertinent testimonies.
....
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by
an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the
Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal
of the Investigators report.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action. (Emphasis added)
The requirement that the IBP investigator afford the respondent in a disbarment complaint
full opportunity to present his case cannot be taken lightly for it is meant to ensure that
baseless accusations against members of the Bar do not prosper.12 Similarly, the requirement
that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, serves an
important function. For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable
them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in
case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the
Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal
reasoning.13
In the case at bar, the IBP failed to observe these procedural requirements. Commissioner
San Juan appear not to have scheduled a hearing on the case nor required the parties to
submit their evidence. Similarly, the Board of Governors resolution suspending petitioner
from the practice of law does not contain any findings of fact or law upon which it based its
ruling.
Non-compliance with the foregoing procedural rules would normally result in the remand of
the case.14 Nevertheless, in instances where the controversy has been pending resolution for
quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on
appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy
disposition of cases.15 In view of the presence of such circumstances in this case, the Court
deems it advisable to do so.
Second. We now resolve the question whether petitioner is guilty of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which in pertinent part provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under Canon 6 of the previous Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer is deemed to
represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.16 The rule is designed to remove from
attorneys the opportunity to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained during the
existence of the client-attorney relation.17

Based on the facts of this case, we hold that petitioners conduct does not amount to a
violation of the rule. The records bear out petitioners contention that based on the causes of
action of the cases involving Melanie Batislaong on one hand and Letecia Espinosa and Ma.
Gilda Palma on the other, he could simultaneously represent them without any possible
violation of the client-attorney confidentiality. In the cases filed by him for Espinosa and
Palma (Civil Case Nos. 21511 and 21493), it is only Nava against whom the former have an
adverse interest as it was the latter who allegedly falsified the trust receipt agreements to the
prejudice of Palma and Espinosa. Indeed, were it not for the offer of Palma and Espinosa to
settle their obligation, there would have been no need to implead Batislaong as a defendant.
On the other hand, in the other cases in which Batislaong is a party, either as plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 21417 or as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 78200, 79688, and 44181, neither
Palma nor Espinosa are parties. Indeed, it is Nava who is the respondent in the first case and
the private complainant in the last two criminal cases. Under the foregoing circumstances,
the danger that petitioner may abuse his clients confidences to the detriment of the other is
absent.
Respondent contends that petitioners failure to ask the court to have Batislaong declared in
default in Civil Case Nos. 21511 and 21493 despite the fact that she failed to file her answer
is proof that he was favoring Batislaong over Espinosa and Palma. This contention is
untenable. As petitioner explains, with Nava disclaiming any interest in the offer of payment
of Espinosa and Palma, petitioner found no need to have Batislaong declared in default as
Navas contention meant that it was Batislaong alone who would be entitled to receive
payment. In any case, Batislaongs failure to file her answer, coupled with Navas disavowal
of interest, could only mean that the money offered in payment will be kept in the custody of
the court subject to future claims.
Third. Even granting that the interests of Espinosa, Palma, and Batislaong are conflicting,
petitioner cannot be held liable for acting as their common counsel in view of the fact that, as
stated in their affidavits, petitioner explained to them the consequences of his representation
and that they gave their consent to the same. Indeed, Espinosa and Palma stated that it was
they themselves who brought Batislaong to petitioners office so that the latter could engage
his services.18 The fact that the first set of affidavits were uniformly notarized by an associate
in petitioners law firm and that they did not state certain data relating to the residence
certificates of the affiants do not adversely affect their validity absent any proof that the
affiants did not execute them of their own volition or that their signature therein are not
authentic.
WHEREFORE, Resolutions XIII-99-23 and XIV-99-286 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are SET ASIDE and the complaint against respondent Atty. Hector Teodosio is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

TIRSO UYTENGSU III, ADM. CASE No. 5134

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, J.,

Chairman,
- versus' -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. JOSEPH M. BADUEL,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 14, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

A sworn letter-complaint[1] dated 1 July 1999[2] was filed by Tirso Uytengsu III
(complainant) against Atty. Joseph M. Baduel (respondent) for violation of Rule 1.01 [3] of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant is one of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. He and his co-heirs had a pending
patent application. He alleges that sometime in December 1998 respondent requested him to
sign a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing Luis Wee (Wee) and/or Thomas Jacobo
(Jacobo) to claim, demand, acknowledge and receive on his behalf the certificates of title
from the Register of Deeds, General Santos City, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and from any government office or agency due to complainant and his co-heirs by
reason of their application for Homestead Patent II.A. No. 37 142 (E 37 124) over Lot 924-A
Cad. II-013120-D with an area of 5.3876 hectares and II.A. No. 116303 over Lot No. 924-B
Cad. II-013120-D with an area of 5,1526 hectares, both situated in Lagao, General Santos
City.

Complainant refused to sign the SPA as he wanted to obtain the documents personally.
Subsequently though, before he could get the title and other documents, complainant learned
that respondent caused to have the SPA signed by Connie U. Kokseng (Kokseng), the former
guardian of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. Complainant maintains that the document signed
by Kokseng was the same SPA which was presented to him for signature by respondent in
December 1998. As a result, the titles and other documents were received and taken by other
persons without his or his co-heirs' knowledge and consent.

Complainant contends that the said SPA was prepared and notarized by the law office of
respondent and the latter stood as a witness to the public instrument. Complainant further
avers that respondent used to do some legal work for him and knew fully well that Kokseng
has already ceased to be his and his co-heirs' guardian when the Regional Trial Court, Branch
19 of Cebu City terminated the letters of guardianship over her youngest sibling on 30
August 1985 in the case entitled 'In the Matter of Guardianship of Tirso M. Uytengsu III,
Kathleen Anne M. Uytengsu, and Barbara Anne M. Uytengsu, docketed as SP Proc. No.
3039-R.

In essence, complainant asserts that respondent caused Kokseng to execute an SPA in favor
of Wee and/or Jacobo to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. even if
he knew that Kokseng had no authority to do so.

Respondent in his comment,[4] argues that the allegations of complainant are purely hearsay.
He stresses that complaint was instituted to harass him because he was the counsel of an
opposing litigant against complainant's corporation in an ejectment case entitled 'General
Milling Corporation v. Cebu Autometic Motors, Inc. and Tirso Uytengsu III.

On 9 August 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.[5]

Notices of hearing were sent to both parties between 11 January 2001 and 8 May 2001.
However, no actual hearings were conducted then due to the unavailability of either or both
parties. Finally, on 26 June 2001, both parties appeared before the investigating

commissioner. They were then directed to file their position papers and their respective
replies thereto.
Investigating Commissioner Tyrone Cimafranca submitted his Report and Recommendation
dated 2 April 2002, recommending the dismissal of the case. The Commissioner
characterized the evidence against respondent as hearsay. Moreover, the Commissioner
concluded that Kokseng had legal basis to execute the SPA in favor of a substitute, the
records showing that complainant and his co-heirs have constituted Kokseng as their
attorney-in-fact for the purpose of filing the homestead application.[6]

Thereafter, the IBP submitted their resolution dated 29 June 2002 approving and adopting the
report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner, dismissing the complaint
against respondent.[7] Complainant filed his motion for reconsideration[8] but was denied
by the IBP in its resolution dated 19 October 2002 on the ground that the IBP no longer had
jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to this Court.[9] This
notwithstanding, the Court remanded[10] the administrative case for immediate resolution of
the motion for reconsideration on the merits to the IBP in the Court's resolution dated 20
January 2003.[11]

On 27 February 2004, the IBP filed its resolution adopting and approving the investigating
commissioner's

report

and

recommendation

denying

complainant's

motion

for

reconsideration.[12]

Subsequently, on 1 July 2004,[13] complainant filed a petition for review on certiorari[14]

assailing the resolution of the IBP dated 27 February 2004.

In his petition for review, complainant questions the findings of the IBP that complainant's
allegations were based on hearsay and in finding that Kokseng had the authority to execute
the special power of attorney in favor of Wee and/or Jacobo.

We dismiss the complaint.

At the outset, the Court finds that herein respondent was in fact the counsel in the homestead
patent application of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. This can be deduced from the letters [15]
dated 9 October 1991 and 15 January 1993, addressed to respondent by Victoria VillasorInong (Villasor-Inong), Accounts Liquidation Officer III of the Board of Liquidators of
General Santos City.
In said letters, Villasor-Inong communicated to respondent the requirements for the grant of
the homestead patent to herein complainant and his co-heirs. From the tenor of the letters, it
would seem that respondent actively participated in representing complainant and his coheirs in their patent application for the subject land. Apparently, he stood as counsel for the
heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.

With that ostensible representation and without any evidence to show that complainant or his
co-heirs withdrew such authority from respondent, the latter himself can even claim the
certificates of titles and other documents with regard to the homestead patents.

It should be remembered that the first letter of Villasor-Inong addressed to respondent was on
9 October 1991.[16] The addressees of the said letter were 'The Heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.,
Rep. by Connie Uytengsu Kokseng, c/o Atty. Joseph Baduel.

Complainant also presented a letter[17] dated 23 September 1992 addressed to VillasorInong by the general manager of the Board of Liquidators, directing the former to personally
contact the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. to ascertain who among the persons giving conflicting
directives as to the course of the patent application is the true authorized representative of the
heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.

After four (4) months, respondent received from Villasor Inong another letter,[18] dated 15
January 1993, also attached to complainant's position paper and petition for review,
furnishing respondent the requirements needed for the homestead patent application of
complainant and his co-heirs.

Complainant himself submitted all the aforementioned letters clearly showing that
respondent was indeed the counsel or representative of complainant in the application for
patent.

The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency and the general rules of
ordinary agency apply to such relation.[19] The extent of authority of a lawyer, when acting
on behalf of his client outside of court, is measured by the same test as that which is applied
to an ordinary agent.[20]
Such being the case, even respondent himself can acquire the certificates of title and other
documents without need of an SPA from complainant and his co-heirs.

In addition, the Court agrees with the investigating commissioner that the allegations of
complainant constitutes mere hearsay evidence and may not be admissible in any proceeding.

In Marcelo v. Javier,[21] it was held that:

In all cases the determination whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely

suspended for a period involves the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, mindful
always of the fact that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary action and
should be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or
course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards. In cases
of lighter offenses or of first delinquency, an order of suspension, which is
correctional in nature, should be inflicted. In view of the nature and consequences of
a disciplinary proceedings, observance of due process, as in other judicial
determination, is imperative along with presumption of innocence in favor of the
lawyer. Consequently, the burden of proof is on the complainant to overcome such
presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence. [22]

Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent
of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof.[23]

In the case at bar, other than the bare assertions of complainant, the evidence presented by the
latter does not suffice to tip the scale of justice to his side.

It should be stressed that in administrative proceedings, complainant has the burden of

proving the allegations in the complaint. We cannot depend on mere conjectures and
speculations. There must be substantial evidence to support respondent's guilt.[24]

Complainant averred that: (1) the SPA which the respondent asked him to sign was the same
document that Kokseng executed; (2) the document was notarized by a notary public from
the office of the respondent; and (3) the respondent was a witness in the SPA.

As correctly observed by the investigating commissioner, all the aforementioned charges are
not based on his personal knowledge of the acts complained of but acquired from other
sources.

Complainant charges that respondent committed an act meriting disbarment when the
latter caused to have a special power of attorney, which the former reused to sign
earlier, executed by Mrs. Connie Kokseng, former guardian of complainant and his
co-heirs, authorizing certain individuals to secure the release from the Register of
Deeds and other government offices in General Santos City, titles and other
documents pertaining to complainant's and his co-heirs' homestead application.
However, this charge is not based on his own personal knowledge of the acts
complained of but acquired from another source. In other words, what he offered in
evidence to prove his charge is a second-hand version. Complainant identified his
source but failed to present any sworn statement or affidavit of said witness. In other
words, what he presented in evidence to prove his charge is hearsay.[25]

The hearsay rule provides that no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is
or has been open to test by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination,
except as provided otherwise by the rules on evidence, by rules of court, or by statute. The
chief reasons for the rule are that out-of-court statements amounting to hearsay are not made
under oath and are not subject to cross-examination.[26]

He did not submit to this Court or to the IBP any witness or documentary evidence to support
his claim that respondent has indeed caused the execution of the disputed special power of
attorney. Furthermore, complainant in his reply[27] to respondent's comment stated that he
has a credible witness in the person of Edward U. Kokseng, son of Kokseng, who has first
hand knowledge of Kokseng's signing of the SPA. However, he failed to present his witness

before the IBP or submitted an affidavit of his witness to affirm his allegations. Neither did
he present any witness, whether expert nor otherwise, to attest to the genuiness of the
signature of respondent which was allegedly found in the SPA, if that was his objective.

This is not to say that complainant was not given any advice by the Court to make the proper
attachment to pleadings. As early as 21 July 1999, Atty. Erlinda C. Versoza, the then Deputy
Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, sent word to complainant through a letter that

complainant's letter-complaint must be verified and the supporting documents duly

authenticated.[28]

As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations'
ei incumbit probatio, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis
probatio nulla sit.[29]

It is also worth noting that complainant's claim that he suffered damage and prejudice due to
the alleged unauthorized procurement of the certificates of titles and other documents was
not substantiated by independent evidence. Complainant's silence as to the extent of the
alleged damage and the lack of material evidence to show that his rights were impaired by
the acts of respondent would lead this Court to believe that complainant has suffered no or
minimal injury, should there be any.

As held in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tan,[30] 'no right of action is given where no
injury is sustained. A wrongful violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause
of action unless it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damage. There must be therefore,
both wrongful violation and damages. The one without the other is not sufficient.[31]

Complainant made no statement on whether or not, at present, other persons who procured
the certificates of title and other documents are still in possession of the same. He also has
not stated the direct injury that was produced by the acts of respondent.

With all the foregoing, the Court finds that complainant did not overcome the presumption of
innocence of respondent.

We need not dwell on the other factual issues of the case as it involves the presentation of
concrete evidence that, sadly, complainant was not able to offer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case against respondent is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO SORIANO,

A.C. No. 6792

' Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,

- versus -

Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:

Respondent.January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon,

filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of
respondent

for

crime

involving

moral

turpitude,

together

with

the

circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. [3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the
CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default,
and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. [4]

After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on
the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. [5] Accordingly, the CBD directed
him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. [6] Afterwards, the
case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1,

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of
the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should
result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent's conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on
his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to
Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver
overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver
of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the
influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until
the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino
Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver
and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver
forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The
taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the
taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by
now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi
driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead.
The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about
to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his
arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car
and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a
handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle
when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He

picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he

was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of
the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on
the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed
him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio
Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano
and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the
carotid artery on the left side of his neck, [9] complainant would have surely died
of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the
attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord
injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for
his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January
18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by
the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of 'the civil liabilities
imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano. [10]

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet
to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the
Court of Appeals.[11]

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that

respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such
crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character,
based on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only
because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the
same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him
out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence,
Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed
that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two
unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to
date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant. [12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP
Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as

approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.
[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands

convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has

already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that

remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated

homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as 'everything which is done contrary to

justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has
been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, [15] a labor
case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction
for

homicide.

Considering

the

particular

circumstances

surrounding

the

commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer's contention and held
that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime
would have been violative of the IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations and
indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the
attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively
whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending

on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude,
the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence
of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the
circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

'x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee]
was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove
his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim
to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was
in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his
shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold
on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times.
These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim
but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender,
plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the
circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant
when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will
not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyer's assault.

We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of

the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in
a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was
already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of
Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for
his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By
his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of selfimportance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple
traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which
he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of
superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. [19]

He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts.
We remind him that, both in his attorney's oath [20] and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to 'obey the laws of the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a
basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it
suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four
years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To
date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his
extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a
simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health,
and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the
measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise
of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. [22]
Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to
show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred
upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing them from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good
moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into
the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous

behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor
Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainant's family. [25] But when
this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it
was complainant's family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his
referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.
[27] The trial court had this to say:

The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3)

doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation
that three people including the complainant helped each other in
kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor
that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three
people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so
little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainant's version of the incident particularly when he said that
he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x. [28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is

more important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession
places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Hence,
lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all
their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be
disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed
only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,

academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. [31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they
reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he
committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of

justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be
competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our
profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would
accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot
extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly
disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that
meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for
the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and
justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a

high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly,
herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as
a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances ' not the mere fact of their conviction ' would demonstrate their fitness
to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness,
treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his

name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5113. October 7, 2004

DOLORES SILVA Vda. DE FAJARDO, complainant, vs. Atty. REXIE EFREN A.
BUGARING, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers must be completely truthful, more so when they plead their own causes against
former clients. In the present case, the lawyer misrepresented facts in his claim for attorneys
fees; hence, he must be sanctioned.
The Case

The administrative case before the Court stems from a Complaint[1 filed by Dolores Silva
vda. de Fajardo, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Rexie Efren A. Bugaring for untruthful
statements in allegedly trying to fleece her of P3,532,170 in attorneys fees. The Complaint
and respondents Comment[2 thereon were referred[3 by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maalas Report[4 recommending the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for one year was adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors in its June 21, 2003 Resolution No. XV-2003-348. On June 30, 2003, the
Notice of the IBP Resolution[5 and the records of the case -- including the Commissioners
Report -- were forwarded to this Court by Atty. Julio C. Elamparo, director for bar discipline
of the IBP.[6
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the investigating commissioner in her Report as follows:
Complainant alleged that she had known respondent since 1989 when she, together with her
co-heirs, were trying to sell [the] properties which they inherited from their predecessors,
Jose and Buenaventura Silva x x x. [They] were encountering disputes with the heirs of
Alfredo Silva Cruz (Cruz Family), then represented by one Atty. Ricardo Dantes, and with
their tenants, over x x x Lots 2434 and 2454 located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, [which they were
trying to sell] to Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation.
Atty. Bugaring was recommended by Atty. Dantes to complainant to assist her and her coheirs with the legal aspects of the disputes they were encountering. Atty. Bugaring and Atty.
Dantes were close associates and they hold and belong to the same law office of Bugaring,
Tugonon and Associates Law Offices. Whenever complainant and her companion Maria
Luisa Tamondong would go to the office of Atty. Bugaring to see him, they also see Atty.
Dantes at the same office. Thinking that Atty. Bugaring was an honest and honorable man,
complainant accepted the recommendation. At that time, complainant thought that there was
nothing wrong or anomalous in she being represented by Atty. Bugaring, who belong to the
same law office as that of Atty. Dantes, counsel of the Cruz family with which complainant
and her co-heirs were then having disputes over Lots 2434 and 2454. She did not know that it
was improper and unethical for lawyers of the same firm to handle conflicting interests of
clients.
Initially, Atty. Bugaring assisted complainant with their problems with the tenants of Lots
2434 and 2454. The tenants then had the preferential right to purchase the said properties
they were occupying x x x. [T]hey [had] verbally expressed their non-interest in purchasing
the same but refused to vacate the premises [and] demanded that they be given 1/3 of the
total land area of the two lots before they agree to vacate. Atty. Bugaring wrote, on behalf of
the complainant and her co-heirs, the said tenants and the Agrarian Reform Office.
Meanwhile, the dispute of complainant and her co-heirs with the Cruz family later led to the
filing of the case entitled Alicia Cruz, et al., vs. Dolores Fajardo, et al. with the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3472 (hereinafter the Mother
Case). The Cruz family was asserting an alleged right over Lots 2434 and 2454. Atty.
Bugaring represented the complainant and her co-heirs for purposes of this case.
Every time there was a hearing in the Mother Case in Laguna, the driver of complainant
would fetch Atty. Bugaring at 5:00 oclock in the morning from his residence/office in
Quezon City, and would likewise drive him back after the hearing. Complainant paid Atty.
Bugaring every hearing an appearance fee of P1,000.00, whether hearings were postponed or
not, treated him to lunch and used to send him off with vegetables, candies and other goodies.
Complainant had always asked Atty. Bugaring how much [he would] charge for his
professional fees, but Atty. Bugaring would just answer: Huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon.

Para ko na kayong nanay o lola. All along, complainant was swayed to believe that Atty.
Bugaring was nice and courteous.
Later, the dispute of complainant and her co-heirs with the Cruz family got worse. The
Mother Case soon branched out to more and more cases, about eleven (11) cases in all, which
were but the offshoots of the Mother Case, (Civil Case No. 3472). Atty. Bugaring continued
to represent the complaint and her co-heirs in the foregoing cases and as in the Mother Case,
whenever there were hearings, Atty. Bugaring was fetched back and forth by complainants
driver x x x, [was paid] an appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing, [was] treated to lunch
and sent x x x off [with] some goodies. In all these cases, complainant had asked Atty.
Bugaring of his professional fees, but the complainant would get the usual reply of: Huwag
na ninyo alalahanin iyon. Para ko na kayong nanay o lola. With the rate things were going on
then, Atty. Bugaring all the more earned the trust and respect of the complainant more than
anybody else.
In November 1992, complainant had a meeting with her co-heirs and the latter expressed
their discontent with the way Atty. Bugaring was handling the Mother Case and the offshoot
cases because the cases were derailing their intended sale of Lots 2434 and 2454 to Golden
Bay Realty and Development Corporation. Complainant was hounded by questions regarding
her arrangement with Atty. Bugaring to which complainant could not give any answer
because there really was no contract or agreement between her and Atty. Bugaring, who
refused to discuss any arrangement with complainant. After their meeting, complainant told
Atty. Bugaring of the discontent of her co-heirs, and Atty. Bugaring told complainant that he
can draw a fictitious Contract for his services which complainant can show to her co-heirs.
Indeed, Atty. Bugaring drew up two (2) fictitious Contract of Services both dated 11
December 1992. One specifically states that it was for the Mother Case and the other was for
the case of Catalina Roberto, et al. v. Dolores Fajardo, et al. Each of said fictitious contracts
stipulate[d] x x x an acceptance fee of P50,000.00, per appearance fee of P1,000.00 and upon
the termination of the case, an additional attorneys fee equivalent to 25% of the value of the
subject property in litigation. When the fictitious contracts were shown to complainant, she
was assured by Atty. Bugaring that the contracts were not valid and binding and told her Ito
ho ay para lamang may maipakita kayo sa kanila, pero hindi ito totoo. With that assurance,
complainant signed the contract and was given a copy of the same.
Around 1992, complainant and her co-heirs entered into separate compromise agreements
with the tenants of Lots 2434 and 2454 and with the Cruz family. The agreement with the
Cruz family was later put into writing with the execution of a Compromise Agreement dated
7 June 1992, which was submitted to the court before which the Mother Case was pending.
[I]t became the basis of the Judgment dated 22 November 1993 x x x [and the dismissal of]
all the offshoot cases x x x. [On the other hand,] the Compromise Agreement reached with
the tenants of Lots 2434 and [2454] consisted of an agreement totally ceding Lot 2454 to the
tenants as [d]isturbance [c]ompensation. Complainant and her co-heirs decided not to reveal
these agreements [to Atty. Bugaring] until they were finalized because they knew that [he]
did not want such settlement for reasons known [only] to him.
With the settlement of the disputes over Lots 2434 and 2454, the sale of the remaining
property (Lot 2434) to Golden Bay [R]ealty and Development Corporation materialized on 2
March 1994. Complainant was accompanied by Atty. Bugaring and Maria Luisa
Tam[o]ndong to the office of Golden Bay Realty when the sale was finalized. When
complainant received the proceeds of the sale, they went to see Atty. Bugaring to settle their
account with him. They tendered to Atty. Bugaring the amount of P100,000.00 which they
believed was commensurate for his services considering [that] the cases ended x x x by
compromise agreement. However, Atty. Bugaring rejected the amount. On said occasion,
Atty. Bugaring requested the companions of complainant to step out of the room first and
said he wanted to talk to complainant alone. Atty. Bugaring proposed to complainant a deal
to the effect that only P85,000.00 will be paid to him by complainant and he will charge the
estate or the complainants co-heirs the amount of P1,200,000.00. [C]omplainant vehemently

objected to [this] because the estate or her co-heirs did not have that amount of money. The
co-heirs of complainant maintained that they would only pay Atty. Bugaring P100,000.00,
which [amount] the latter rejected.
x x x [C]omplainant did not hear x x x from Atty. Bugaring [since April 1994]. [However,
almost three years later], she learned that her property in Tandang Sora was already attached
by Atty. Bugaring. Unknown to complainant, Atty. Bugaring had filed the case entitled Rexie
Efren A. Bugaring vs. Dolores Fajardo docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29422 in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, for Sum of Money and Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Attachment for x x x collection of his legal x x x fees. Atty. Bugaring
specifically prayed for the attachment of complainants properties and other assets to answer
for his claim of P3,532,170.00 plus 12% interest per annum for x x x unpaid attorneys fees,
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and such amount
equivalent to 25% from the total claim as attorneys fees plus P2,000.00 per court attendance
as appearance fee plus other proven litigation expenses.
xxx
Atty. Bugaring, by way of comment, avers that from 1991 to May 1994, complainant retained
his services as her personal legal consultant and x x x lawyer in nineteen (19) court cases.
Considering that Civil Case Nos. B-3472 and 3[8]96 before the RTC, Bian, Laguna, involved
various real estate properties, complainant asked Atty. Bugaring to prepare a written contract
for his attorneys fees, which was thereafter signed by the complainant x x x. [The] Contract
of Services dated 11 December 1992 x x x provide[d] that complainant will pay Atty.
Bugaring an (1) acceptance fee of P50,000.00; (2) appearance fee for every court appearance
of P1,000.00 and (3) attorneys fee equivalent to 25% of the value of the properties in
litigation. [As to] all the other cases [he] handled, [Atty. Bugaring charged] a minimum
amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 appearance fee [for] every court
attendance. Under these conditions, considering the complexities of the cases, Atty. Bugaring
laboriously and painstakingly represented the rights and interest of the complainant, and
thereby successfully terminated all cases, except Civil Cases Nos. B-3971 and 3[8]96, which
were still under litigation.
Due to the failure and adamant refusal of complainant to settle and pay Atty. Bugaring x x x
his accumulated professional fees, he was constrained to make verbal, and finally, written
demands on 30 April 1994 and 6 May 1994. Notwithstanding the receipts of the demand
letters, which explicitly indicated to her the computation of the amount of professional fees
demanded, complainant simply remained silent about the matter, thereby signifying her
adamant refusal to settle and pay her legitimately contracted obligations to Atty. Bugaring.
With no other extra-judicial recourse, and after Atty. Bugaring was able to save an amount
for payment of filing fees, attachment bond and other initial expenses (P100,000.00 more or
less) for a collection case on the matter, x x x Atty. Bugaring instituted an action for sum of
money with damages against complainant before RTC Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-96-29442 [on 11 November 1996]. After receiving complainants Answer to
the Complaint, the trial court set the case for [p]re-trial conference on 3 June 1997. However,
due to the failure of complainant and her counsel to appear, the court declared complainant in
default and Atty. Bugaring was allowed to present evidence ex-parte x x x on 6 June 1997.
On 15 October 1997, the court rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Bugaring. As no appeal
was undertaken by complainant, Atty. Bugaring on 14 July 1998 filed his Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution thereto which was granted by the court on 28 September 1998.
When the Writ of Execution was issued on 24 December 1998, complainant filed [a] Petition
for Certiorari with Temporary Restraining Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 49866, questioning the trial courts
orders dated 3 and 13 February 1998, as well as the resolution dated 28 September 1998. The
Court of Appeals, finding no merit in the petition, dismissed the same and affirmed the trial
courts Resolution on 4 February 1999. Complainant, finding the adverse decision of the
Court of Appeals, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 26 April 1999. Complainant also

filed a Motion dated 15 July 1999 asking for the issuance of a Cease, Desist and Refrain
Order against the [p]ublic [a]uction sale [scheduled] on 30 July 1999 [by] the deputy sheriff
of the trial court. Acting on complainants motion, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary
Restraining Order dated 29 July 1999. [H]owever, on 30 September 1999, the appellate court
finally issued its resolution denying complainants Motion for Reconsideration.[7
Evaluation and Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner Maala found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for making untruthful
statements and for misleading the trial courts on several occasions in Civil Case No. Q-9629422 and Civil Case No. B-3896. Respondent allegedly lied to and misled these courts in
the following instances:
1. When he included in his claim for attorneys fees in Civil Case Q-96-29422 25 percent of
the value of two lots (at P3,670,000 and P750,000), which were not among the properties in
litigation in the Mother Case and had already been sold in 1987 and 1968, respectively
2. When he concealed the fact that Lot 2454 had been given to complainants tenants as
disturbance compensation
3. When he failed to disclose that the Contract of Service for the Mother Case was executed
six months after it had already been settled by a Compromise Agreement on June 7, 1992
4. When he led the RTC of San Pedro Laguna (Branch 93), to believe in his Petition for
Recording and Enforcement of Attorneys Lien in Civil Case No. B-3896 that no other action
or claim was pending except his case for collection
5. When he made two inconsistent statements regarding the date when his professional
services had actually been engaged by complainant
Commissioner Maala also found that respondent had not completely been honest with the
Commission. According to his Comment,[8 he decided to forego his professional fees
amounting to P2 million in Civil Case No. B-3896; actually, those fees were included in his
collection case. It was also in the said case that he filed a Petition for the Recording and
Enforcement of Attorneys Lien.
Commissioner Maala held that respondent had violated his sworn duty to tell no falsehood in
court. Hence, she recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of IBP.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the courts. Accordingly, Rule 10.01 requires a member of the bar
not [to tell] any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Moreover, Section 20(d) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer must
employ such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law.
In his September 28, 2003 Comment/Opposition[9 to the IBP Commissioners Report and
Recommendation, respondent points out alleged distortions in the findings of fact. Upon a

review of the records, however, the Court finds the investigating commissioners conclusions
to be in order.
Falsehood
Indeed, respondent has not completely been honest when he claimed that the entire estate of
Adela Silva was the subject of litigation in the case for partition. First, it is clear that Lots
2434 and 2454 were the only properties mentioned in the Complaint[10 for partition, which
we quote:
x x x. The late Adela Silva died intestate, single and without surviving heirs except the herein
plaintiffs and defendants. She died x x x leaving as her estate the two (2) parcels of land
located at Bgy. Platero, Bian, Laguna. The first known as Lot 2434 of the Bian Estate is
covered by TCT No. RT-1702 (N.A.) while the second known as Lot 2454 of the same Bian
Estate is embraced by TCT No. Rt-1703 (N.A.) issued by the Register of Deeds (Calamba
branch) of Laguna;[11
Second, the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment in the Mother Case for partition did
not indicate that the subject of partition was the late Adela Silvas estate, but they did refer to
the other properties belonging to her, including the 73,404 square-meter agricultural land in
Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite; and the 150 square-meter residential lot in Sampaloc, Manila.
What appears from the Compromise Agreement and the Judgment is that these properties
were enumerated merely to show that Lots 2434 and 2454 were part of the said estate. That
only these lots were referred to is plain from the terms and conditions of the Judgment:
1. That the parties herein hereby agree to refrain from discussing whether their claims and
counter claims over Lot 2434 (TCT 12702) and Lot 2454 (TCT 1703) are meritorious or not,
and further agree to put an end to all their litigations x x x. Thus to this effect, all their claims
are hereby waived and abandoned subject to the following terms and conditions:
a. That the defendant Dolores Silva Fajardo hereby agree[s] to pay the plaintiffs
representative Alicia Cruz, the sum of four hundred thousand
(P400,000.00) pesos Philippine currency upon signing of this Agreement.
b. That the defendant Dolores Silva Fajardo be authorized to consummate the
sale of Lot No. 2434, and Lot 2454, covered by TCT No. 1702 and 1703,
respectively of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba branch, and to
execute all the necessary documents in favor of the Vendee, Golden Bay
Realty and Development Corporation.[12
Third, it was adequately established that the Cavite and the Sampaloc lots mentioned in the
Compromise Agreement and the Judgment had already been sold long before the advent of
Civil Case B-3472. There is no reason to doubt that respondent, as complainants counsel,
knew this fact.
Lastly, we note that the failure of respondent to include all the properties of the estate in his
claim for attorneys fees runs counter to his other claim that complainants entire estate was in
litigation. If it were so, should he not then have also asked for 25 percent of the value of all
such properties enumerated in the Judgment?
As regards his professional fees, we stress that the proper time to deal with this delicate issue
is upon the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship. In this case, respondent should
have determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees in 1991 at the latest, when
he was first retained by complainant as her counsel in the partition case. Such prudence
would have spared the Court this controversy over a lawyers compensation, a suit that should
be avoided except to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.[13

To be sure, a lawyer is entitled to the protection of the courts against any attempt on the part
of a client to escape payment of legitimate attorneys fees.[14 However, such protection must
not be sought at the expense of truth. Complete candor or honesty is expected from lawyers,
particularly when they appear and plead before the courts for their own causes against former
clients, as in this case. With his armada of legal knowledge and skills, respondent clearly
enjoyed the upper hand. More important, he had the sole opportunity to present evidence in
the collection case after complainant was declared in default, and after he was allowed to
present his evidence ex parte.
Respondent is thus reminded that he is first and foremost an officer of the court. His bounden
duty is to assist it in rendering justice to all.[15 Lest he has forgotten, lawyers must always be
disciples of truth.[16 It is highly reprehensible when they themselves make a travesty of the
truth and mangle the ends of justice. Such behavior runs counter to the standards of honesty
and fair dealing expected from court officers.
Equally without merit are respondents other arguments that the real issue herein is his claim
for attorneys fees, whose merit has already been adjudicated in court, as well as of his
allegation that complainant has engaged in forum shopping to delay the execution of the
judgment against her for attorneys fees.
To start with, this proceeding is not about the merits of respondents fees, but about his
conduct as an officer of the court. It has been emphasized in a number of cases that
disbarment proceedings belong to a class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a
criminal action.[17 In Re Almacen[18 explained this basic principle:
x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings x x x are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not -- and does not involve -- a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.[19 (Italics
supplied)
Clearly then, this disbarment case may proceed independently of the civil action for
collection, without running afoul of the prohibition against forum shopping. Moreover, the
elements of forum shopping[20 are conspicuously absent. Between these two cases, there is
no identity of parties, as the complainant is in no sense a party to the administrative
proceeding. Obviously, there is neither identity of rights asserted nor reliefs prayed for.
Lastly, the judgment in the disbarment proceeding would not bar the collection case.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Rexie Efren A. Bugaring is found LIABLE for gross
misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR, effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or of a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.,

Adm. Case No. 2474

Complainant,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR.,C.J.,
Puno,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
-

versus -

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
*AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
*CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,AND

**CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.

ATTY. LEO J. PALMA,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

September 15, 2004

X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules
of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered
after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of
suspension or removal.1

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer
and grossly immoral conduct.
The facts are undisputed:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was

a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and
respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his
growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his
personal counsel.
Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became
intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad.2 He frequented their
house and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa
Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption Convent.

On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family,

respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the next day that
respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything is
legal. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a
married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant
found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions.
Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa
to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was
persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that:(a) on the date of the supposed
marriage, respondent requested from his (complainants) office an airplane
ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong;(b) respondent
misrepresented himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong authorities to
facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)respondent was married to
Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe,
Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance,
Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition3 for declaration of nullity of the
marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq0401-P. In the Decision4 dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the
marriage null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint5 for
disbarment, imputing to respondent the following acts:

a.In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by complainant and his family and taking undue advantage of his tutoring
sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great
disparity in intelligence, education, age, experience and maturitybetween
Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an overwhelming moral
ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and

apprehensions about respondents courtship and advances, considering

that he is a married man with three (3) children;

b.Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and

even pursued her in her travels abroad under false pretenses that he was
traveling on official business for complainant. To break down the final
resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made
representations that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his
marrying;

c.With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation
that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a
second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her
into marrying him. Without complying with the requirements of Philippine
law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the advice of Maria Luisas
parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of
age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong
on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong
authorities that he is a bachelor. x x x.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground of lack of cause of

action. He contended that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath.
There is no allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill
or ignorance of the law in serving complainants interest. Anent the charge
of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants
daughter with utmost sincerity and good faith and that it is contrary to
the natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman he
sincerely loves.

In the Resolution7 dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili
conducted the investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued
in G.R. No. 645388 a Resolution9 (a) setting aside the CFI Decision dated
November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P declaring the marriage
between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding
the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date,
the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceedings10 on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case
No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding.It
was denied.
Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for
Issuance of a Restraining Order.11 In the Resolution dated December 19,
1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the
disbarment proceedings.12
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline. On October 19, 1998, Commissioner Julio
C. Elamparo issued the following order:

Considering the length of time that this case has remained

pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this
Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice,
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting
this case or supervening events have transpired which render this
case moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed
closed and terminated.13

In his Manifestation,14 complainant manifested and confirmed his

continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for disbarment against
respondent.
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing
on the ground that he needed more time to locate vital documents in
support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was
reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he
fail to appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed submitted
for resolution.15 Respondent again failed to appear on January 24, 2002;
hence, the case was considered submitted for resolution. 16
On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
submitted a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. She
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) years. Thus:

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent

committed the following acts which warrant his disbarment:

a)
Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant;

b)
His misrepresentation that there was no legal
impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second
marriage;

c)
The acts of respondent constitute deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong representing

himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the marriage certificate
stated a condition no different from term spinster with respect to Luisa.

There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law

knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a
bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by
complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to
tutor Maria Luisa.

For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed

grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and
Recommendation, but it reduced respondents penalty to only one (1) year
suspension.
Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not
prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another.17 Thus, not only his professional activities but even his
private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good

name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be
the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.18
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his
ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he acted with wanton
recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good
lawyer,19 however, professional competency alone does not make a
lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an
indispensable requirement.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has
a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification 20 from
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other
hand, the Certificate of Marriage21 from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages,
Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9,
1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second
marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin,
Elizabeths classmate and family friend.22

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a

ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery
of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.23

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have
somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral
conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.24 Measured against this
definition, respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a
bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:
1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,25 respondent entered into multiple
marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we
ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the
institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to
for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to
the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening
of our nation as a whole. As such, there can be no other fate that awaits
respondent than to be disbarred.

(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,26 respondent contracted marriage with another

married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for
thirty years.We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral conduct
and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics
of his profession, warranting respondents disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27] respondent married complainant while his
first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held
that the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary

to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral
character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from
being admitted to the bar.
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28] respondent lured an innocent woman into
a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that
respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which
at all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred
from the practice of law.
(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,29 respondent abandoned his wife, who supported
him and spent for his law education, and thereafter cohabited with
another woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of the bar. For this,
respondent was disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,30 respondent abandoned his lawful wife and
child and resumed cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled
that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a former
paramour, a married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct
warranting disbarment.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and
abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness to the complainants
family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his
intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be
complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and
courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked
when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants
resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to

marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainants

knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant
that everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of
propriety and decency.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and
since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His
reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of
marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity.31 How could respondent
perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If
he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.

Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22year old college student of Assumption Convent and was under
psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. 32 Naturally, she was an
easy prey.

Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa
has not yet been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a
prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to
say that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing
to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,33 a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him,34 or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,35 then the
judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate

him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of

proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.36

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the
lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional

Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration.
They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the
disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in
Ex Parte Wall:37

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example
to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath

which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to
practice.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of

his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his
offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme
penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE,respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately.
Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts throughout the country with copies of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER,
Petitioner,

Adm. Case No. 6554

Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and

- versus -

GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and THE December 14, 2005

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
INTEGRATED
BAR
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

xx------------------------------------------------------------------------------xx

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On petition for review is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner (petitioner)
against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 02-984.
In her complaint against respondent, petitioner alleges that on July 15, 1991, her father, the late
Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), engaged the services of the law office of Liwanag Raval Pilando
Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, [1] 'Republic of the
Philippines v. Jose L. Africa, et al., of which Ilusorio was one of the defendants.

In that civil case, the Republic was claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares in the latter corporation of which appeared to be
owned by POTC. Respondent, together with Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon, actively
handled the case for Ilusorio.

While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of Raval and Lokin
(successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin), entered into a Compromise Agreement with
the Republic which bore the imprimatur of the Sandiganbayan. [2] Under the Compromise Agreement
which, by petitioner's claim, constituted the full, comprehensive and final settlement of claims of the
parties, the Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares.

Petitioner alleges that during the special stockholders meeting of PHILCOMSAT held on August 27,
1998 which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to introduce the newly appointed
government nominees' for PHILCOMSAT to the private stockholders' of POTC, the gathering,
through the 'high-handed and deceitful maneuvers' of respondent, was suddenly and without notice

transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT
were elected.

Petitioner adds that Ilusorio contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, docketed as SEC Case No. 09-98-6086, against Manuel
Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, [3] in which SEC
case respondent appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent
conflicting interests.

Ilusorio, together with Fidelity Farms, Inc. and Great Asia Enterprises, Inc., had earlier filed with the
IBP a disbarment complaint against respondent on the same grounds as those raised in the present
case. However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the failure of his children, namely, Maximo
Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and petitioner, to establish their qualification to substitute for him, his
complaint was dismissed. The dismissal having explicitly stated that it was without prejudice to the
filing of a new complaint by Ilusorio's children or any person who knows of respondent's unethical
acts, petitioner contends that her present complaint is not barred by such dismissal.

After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan found merit in
petitioner's complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended for three months.

By the now assailed Resolution of February 27, 2004, however, the IBP Board of Governors set aside
the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the complaint.

No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner, nonetheless, learned about
the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the setting aside thereof by the Board of
Governors, prodding her to write a March 10, 2004 letter to the Board in her own name requesting
'that the Board take up the matter once more and asking for 'the remanding of the case against Atty.
Luis Lokin to the Board of Governors. In the same letter, petitioner stated that the very brief time it
took the Board to review the case and resolve it in respondent's favor confirms the information she
received that a former IBP official had been intervening for respondent.

By letter of April 16, 2004 bearing the signatures of all its members, the Board of Governors denied
what it considered as petitioner's malicious and reckless allegations, stating that it was 'constrained to

deny [petitioner's ] request for a remanding or a reconsideration of the case as there was no provision
for a reconsideration of any such case either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to Atty. Jose Anselmo
Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors and concurrently National President of the IBP,
informing him that petitioner had not been notified of any final action on her complaint, and attaching
thereto as further evidence a document for its consideration in the event that no such action had yet
been taken.

Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that the Board could no longer
act on petitioner's July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be considering the letter as a
motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the rules of procedure for cases of the kind.
And the Chairman referred petitioner's counsel to the Board's April 16, 2004 letter to her.

Atty. Divina thereupon sent a letter dated August 18, 2004 to Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, National Director
for Bar Discipline of the IBP, requesting for a copy of the Notice of Resolution of the Board of
Governors and of the Investigation Report of Commissioner San Juan, so that petitioner may appeal
the case to the Supreme Court.

Atty. Divina later sent Atty. Vinluan another letter, dated August 27, 2004, stating that upon further
reading of the August 11 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, it appeared that it was the Chairman's
intention that the said letter be treated as a Notice of Resolution and, therefore, petitioner had until
September 2, 2004 to file a Petition for Review (since the August 11 letter was received on August 17,
2004). Instead of asking for the Notice of Resolution as in his previous letter, Atty. Divina only
requested in his August 24, 2004 letter for a copy of the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan and the record, if any, of the deliberations of the IBP indicating the basis for
reversing her findings. This letter, according to petitioner, was simply ignored.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004 to which respondent has already filed
his Comment.

Before delving into the merits of this case, the procedural issues raised by respondent against the
petition will first be addressed.

Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, as petitioner
should be deemed to have received notice of the challenged IBP resolution, not on August 17, 2004
when her counsel received the August 11, 2004 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10,
2004 when she wrote the Board admitting having acquired knowledge of the reversal of
Commissioner San Juan's recommendation. Hence, respondent claims, petitioner had only until
March 25, 2004 to file a petition for review.

Respondent further contends that even on the assumption that the petition was timely filed, the same
should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it being based not on a resolution of the
IBP Board, but merely on a letter of the IBP President, contrary to Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court which states:

xxx
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction
imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition,
reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or
imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
petition of the complaint or other interested party filed with the Supreme
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the
Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)

This Court finds that the letter of the Board Chairman to petitioner's counsel may not be deemed to be
the notice of resolution required by above-quoted Section 12, Rule 139-B, paragraph (c). The notice
of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an unofficial information that may be
gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to
the official notice of resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to
all parties and transmitted to this Court. As paragraph (d) which immediately follows paragraph (c)
states:

(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all
parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court.
In its Comment to the present petition, respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent to
petitioner: 'The Board has not to date issued the notice of resolution confirming the dismissal of CBD
Case No. 02-984 for the reason that all the relevant records have yet to be completed for transmittal to
the Supreme Court. The complainant will be formally furnished a copy of the resolution upon
transmittal of the records to the Supreme Court.[4]

The IBP eventually transmitted to this Court on July 6, 2005 the Notice of Resolution. A copy was
supposedly furnished the petitioner; however, the IBP has not submitted any proof of service.

Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition was filed, as the August 11,
2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of resolution, the present
petition has been timely filed.

Parenthetically, the IBP Board Chairman erred when he stated that the Board may not act on motions
for reconsideration as there is no provision for such motions under the rules of procedure for
disbarment cases. For Pimentel, Jr. vs. Atty. Llorente[5] instructs:

x x x The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited

pleading or not under Rule 139-B, '12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.
Villanueva, in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, '12(C) makes no mention of a motion
for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests
that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within
15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such
motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this
Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to
correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidenced.
(Underscoring supplied)

In another vein, respondent claims that the petition is premature as it is not based on a notice of
resolution of the Board, hence, it should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper.

While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBP's dismissal of a disciplinary case should
await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance that the Board, despite issuing a
resolution on the subject complaint on February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to
petitioner. As borne out by the IBP's statement noted earlier, there was still no notice to petitioner as
of February 9, 2005 ' almost one year after the dismissal of the subject complaint. The IBP has given
no reason for the delay other than the nebulous explanation that records were still being completed. In
view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that her complaint was dismissed through a letter

coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding
the absence of an official notice of resolution.

Respondent also challenges the qualification of petitioner to file this case on the ground of her
purported lack of personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint. He invokes the resolution
of the IBP in the prior disbarment case against him, where petitioner ' who therein sought to be
substituted in place of her deceased father ' was held to be without the requisite personal knowledge
to pursue the complaint.

Even granting arguendo that the earlier resolution 'constitutes res judicata with respect to the finding
that Petitioner does not possess personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances for which
Respondent is sought to be administratively liable, personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a
disbarment complaint. Section 1, Rule 139-B states:

SECTION 1. How instituted. ' Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or

discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of
any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if there are any.
Oddly enough, the quotation of the same provision by the Investigating Commissioner who dismissed
the earlier disciplinary case against respondent omitted the phrase 'any person, making it appear that
complainants must have personal knowledge of the facts they allege.[6]
Moreover, the ruling of this Court in Navarro v. Meneses III[7] bears reiteration:

The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue

him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a
disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the
person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is
the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by

complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its

resolution and recommended sanctions. (Underscoring supplied)

While this Court notes petitioner's claim that she herself has personal knowledge of the facts alleged
in her complaint, a ruling on such allegation is unnecessary in light of the foregoing discussion.

Segueing to the merits of the petition, respondent admits that his firm represented Ilusorio in
Sandiganbayan Case No. 009[8] and that he represented Manuel Nieto, Jr. and Lourdes Africa in
SEC Case No. 09-98-6086.[9] The Court notes, however, that besides Nieto and Africa, respondent
represented Salvador Hizon as well, as indicated in his Memorandum submitted to the SEC [10] and
as found by the Committee on Professional Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment of the IBP.
[11]

Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC cases,
respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he proffering that, in the
first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan 'has been the personal account of Atty. Raval,
separate and apart from the accounts of the law partnership. Not only is this claim unsubstantiated,
however. It is contradicted by respondent's own evidence and statements.

Thus, respondent attached to his Comment to the present petition documentary evidence consisting
of, among other things, two letters to the PCGG, in one of which he signed on behalf of his firm, and
in the other his name appeared as counsel on behalf of his firm. [12] The subject of both letters was
the then pending negotiations between the PCGG and Ilusorio who was therein identified as the client
of respondent's firm. In connection with these letters, respondent claims: 'If by chance the signature of
the Respondent appears on some correspondences, it is only because Respondent, in good faith,
accommodated Atty. Raval upon the latter's request who, as then Deputy Secretary of the Senate of
the Philippines, is not authorized to engage in the private practice. [13] Besides being a flimsy excuse
by itself, this claim of respondent, being an acknowledgment that he signed correspondences with the
PCGG pertaining to the Ilusorio case, only shows that both he and Atty. Raval collaborated on said
case.

Furthermore, as earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in the
Sandiganbayan case.[14] In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of ethics
from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm. So this Court held in
Hilado v. David:[15]

x x x If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney

Franciso and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did
give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore
demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds
and estops him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he personally
had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. 'This is not a
mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case,
not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the
nature of his connection with

the firm is available to his associates or employers. x x x (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

Respondent denies, however, representing conflicting interests on the ground that SB Case No. 009
and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each other. He attempts to distinguish them as
follows:

36. SB Case No. 009, initiated by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan is
totally distinct and separate, and has no relation at all to SEC Case No. 09-986086. Said cases involve different parties and causes of action.
37. In Sandiganbayan Case No. 009, the opposing parties are the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as plaintiff; Atty. Potenciano
Ilusorio, as Defendant and Third party Plaintiff; and Independent Realty
Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. (MLDC).
38. The subject matter in SB Case No. 009 are shares owned by the National
Government, through IRC and MLDC, in the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC).
39. SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 involves a dispute regarding the
PHILCOMSAT election of its Board of Directors and corporate officers.[16]

The foregoing explanation fails to mention, however, that Ilusorio, a defendant in the Sandiganbayan
case, was one of the petitioners in the SEC case, and that among the grounds Ilusorio relied upon in
his petition in the SEC was the existence of the Compromise Agreement in the Sandiganbayan, which
vested in him ownership and voting rights corresponding to 673 POTC shares. [17]

Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondent's Memorandum dated September 28,
1998 filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as follows:

A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant

Petition by this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the
Sandiganbayan of the disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership
by the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This

Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement

entered into by Mr. Ilusorio. Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise
Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time.[18] '(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest hostile to
the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio.

The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by respondent's firm
in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that there was no conflict of interest
upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case 'did not in any way involve the validity of the
compromise agreement forged with the PCGG. [19]

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February

27, 2004 is SET ASIDE. Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974

In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City.
RE S O LUTI ON

ANTONIO, J.:
On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana, who was
admitted to the Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955, committed acts of misconduct as a

notary public and "has exhibited such a frame of mind and observed such a norm of conduct
as is unworthy of a member of the legal profession," ordered his disbarment.
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Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for re-admission, supported by
resolutions from members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and
reporters, members of professional and civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting
to respondent's good conduct and moral character since his disbarment, and petitioning for
his reinstatement to the legal profession.
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The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one
previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced
the Court by positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his
character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a profession
which is intrinsically an office of trust.
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The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13, 1972, he filed a verified
petition for reinstatement, submitting proofs of his honesty and integrity and other
indications of his good moral character (clearances from the City Courts and Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Police Department of Cebu City, testimonials on his character by fiscals,
lawyers, Judges of City Courts and of the Court of First Instance, resolutions of the Cebu
Lions Club, Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the Knights of Columbus, Bar Association of
Cebu, Cebu Lawyers League, Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for reinstatement on
July 18, 1972, the Court issued a resolution on July 20, 1972, to wit:
... [A]cting on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a member of the Philippine Bar,
and considering (a) that respondent movant had been disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that
since then the said respondent may be considered as having undergone adequate punishment;
(c) that he has observed exemplary conduct since then, according to credible certifications
attesting to his repentance for the offense committed by him thirteen (13) years ago, and may
be reasonably expected to scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal Ethics in the future; (d)
but that, in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should
offer some guarantee of his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the
Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby required, to
enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school, and that
upon his filing with the Clerk of this Court of sworn certificates by the individual professors
of the review classes attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their subjects,
under the same conditions as ordinary students said movant Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted
as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyer's oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this Supreme Court.
Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the Court's abovequoted resolution, as evidenced by the sworn certificates by the individual professors of the
review classes attended by him attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their
subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students, and the separate letters, both dated
February 25, 1974, of the Registrar and the Dean of the Gullas Law School, of the University
of the Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and Acting
Bar Confidant, confirming the truth of the professors' statements.
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WHEREFORE, conformably with the Court's resolution dated July 20, 1972, respondent
Carlos C. Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys after paying to this court the requisite fees.

A.M. No. 126 December 29, 1980

In re. ATTY. TRANQUILINO ROVERO, respondent.

CONCEPCION., J.:
Petition of respondent Tranquilino Rovero for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys.
The record shows that on October 24, 1952, the Court, upon a finding that the
respondent Tranquilino Rovero had been found guilty by a competent court of a
violation of Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
Smuggling and sentenced to pay a fine of P2,500.00, ordered his disbarment and
the surrender of the lawyer's certificate issued to him. 1 Almost four (4) years
thereafter, or on July 7, 1956, the said respondent filed a petition for reinstatement,
claiming, among others, that his disbarment had caused him untold misery and
mental anguish, and that he had been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon
for his crime and restored to full civil and political rights, and pledged, "on banded
knees", "not to commit the same or similar mistake in the future nor to involve
himself further in any transaction which might tend to drag down his name as lawyer
and as an ordinary dignified citizen. 2 The Court, however, denied his petition. 3
Not one to be disheartened, on March 10, 1958, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero
again implored the Court to be readmitted to the practice of law, 4 but the Court
turned a deaf ear to his plea. 5
Once more, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero, "now in his twilight years (71 years
old)" asks humbly and earnestly of the Court to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
"before crossing the bar to the great beyond." 6
To be reinstated to the practice of law, it is necessary that the respondent must, like
any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law. 7
In the instant case, it appears that since his disbarment in 1952, the respondent
'Tranquilino Rovero has honorably dealt with his citizens. He had demonstrated his
moral rehabilitation and reformation as to be fit, once more, to engage in the practice
of law. Mr. Rovero has been active in several civic and educational organizations. He
was appointed the secretary of the Provincial Board of Aklan where that province
was organized. He had also been the duly accredited delegate of the Aklan Chapter
of the Philippine National Red Cross to its Aklan Chapter of the Philippine National
Red Cross to its Second Biennial National Convention held in Manila on August 23
to 26, 1957. 8 He was president of the Quezon City Central Lions Club which he
helped organize, 9 and for a time, he was president of the Board of Trustees of the
Northwestern Visayan Colleges in Kalibo, Aklan. 10
Mr. Rovero has also held high positions of trust in commercial establishments. He
had been elected the president of the Filipino Industrial Corporation; the vicepresident of the Meteor Company, Inc., and the president of the Rural Bank of
Hermosa (Bataan), a position which he holds up to the present. 11

Testimonials have been presented regarding the high esteem accorded him in the
community to which he belongs. 12 His good conduct is certified to by the president of
the Aklan Bar Association 13 and the parish priest of Christ the King Church who
stated that Mr. Rovero "is a devoted parishioner who always gets voluntarily involved
in the various charitable activities of the parish," and "is cooperative and responsible
and gets along fine with his fellow parishioners. " 14 His conduct has also merited the
approval of the late Pres. Ramon Magsaysay who granted him an absolute and
unconditional pardon for his crime. 15
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the case of In re Marcelino Lontok, 16 the
Court, in dismissing the disbarment proceeding against the respondent therein, who
had been convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, upon the ground
that the respondent had been granted plenary pardon for his crime, applied the rule
that "a person reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt
of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out
of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it prevents any of
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as
it were, a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity."
Under the circumstances, and considering that more than 28 years had already
passed since he was disbarred, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero has been
sufficiently punished and disciplined. 17
WHEREFORE, the order of disbarment is lifted and Attorney Tranquilino Rovero is
hereby reinstated in the legal profession and restored to the practice of law. The
Clerk of Court is directed to return to him his lawyer's diploma, his certificate of
admission to the Bar, and any other certificate issued to him relative to his admission
to the Bar.

G.R. No. L-18727

August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,

ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:

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This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment
was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by
the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
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The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids,
and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act
No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with
extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of
donation executed on 2 January 1926.
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Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of
their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare
residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro
dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu,
designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui,
Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution.
En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien
tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor
Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana,
que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno
Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her
death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem.
The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro
Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a
series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator,
to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in
this decision.
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Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On
27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a
notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus
Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption
of the position.
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Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to
the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960,
the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case.
Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of
Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their
deed of donation.
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As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal
circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the
legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado
mayor impuesto o contribucion."
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The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui
holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is
not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio
Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on
29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on
10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
Hospicio de Barili.
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The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of
donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given
a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of
Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.
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We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado"
means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in
the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the
word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad
o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p.
1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a
defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A
Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English
equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the
courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
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In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of
the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court,
this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance
with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all
the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are
instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not
gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar
examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that
such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
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The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should
be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the
one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all,
because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations
for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to
which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec.
3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict
with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value - for all
of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice
the profession would be a distinct asset.
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Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the
defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member
of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation,
which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of
ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is
made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for
immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on

10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a

recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion
of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides
that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved
by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law.
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a
person of good moral character - a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take
into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
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Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,

notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the
bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission.
(7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
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The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his
duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from
his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to
the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.
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This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from
section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of
plaintiff to hold the office arose.
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Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932.
On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui,
who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's
father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in
intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was
remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not
prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement
whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser"
and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
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Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers.
First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as
of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of

administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February,
announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually,
however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after
receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner,
who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4
February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the
Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting
another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not
entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
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Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits
therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus
Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having
been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss
the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to
the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953.
On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before
President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No.
R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court,
stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court
may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the
other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff
then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again
granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a
mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28
May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal,
however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that
"the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo
warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying
the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal
was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but
no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.
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On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of
the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his
favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day
Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
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The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first
case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further
proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr.
Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto
against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the
Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims
of the parties could be ventilated in such an action - all these circumstances militate against
the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed
within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the
plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the
latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this
action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960
does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to
the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be
counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office.
Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
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Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer,
grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by
them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio
Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of
donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in
the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui,
Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera
preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration."
Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and
therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends
that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to
the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he
argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui
line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor
belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

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IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is

reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are
dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME,
AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants, vs. ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M.
GRECIA, Respondent.

PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20,
1991 by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St.
Luke's Medical Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical
practitioners. The respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection
with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage
suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.
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Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re

Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public
interests is the primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to
protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re
Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs.
Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
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Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred
for his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks
and Chinese business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court
(Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No.
2756], 155 SCRA 604).
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Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and
his promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later,
on August 20, 1991, he was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and
unethical practice. Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him
did not effectively reform him.
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The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy
Court of Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The
following are Judge Bernad's findings:
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The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at
St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and
abdominal pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of
St. Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs.
Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on
Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate
Christmas with her family.
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However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On
December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child.
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Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along
with his three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the
attending physicians of his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a
complaint entitled: "Attorney Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs.
Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned
to Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
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On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's,
as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of
Court, Avelina Robles.
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On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for
another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder
containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves.
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While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical
records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk.
They saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He
immediately returned the folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless
by his audacious act) and left the office.
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Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered
Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the
building, calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car
(presumably Grecia's car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers
which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had
seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of
them - Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico - went downstairs. Ms. Sandico
pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had
filched from medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to
her chamber. On the way back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney
Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to
come to her office.
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In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor,
Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had
passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However,
when Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly
took them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled
pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the
same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.
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After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed
in a dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained
consciousness.
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In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of
ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong
belatedly realized this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also
ordered Sandico to submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.
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A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver
who was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was
not allowed to enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be
a cousin of "SID" and asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent
home to his province by Grecia.
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He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."

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PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor
confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".
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The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court,
so much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because
of the incident, Judge Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No.
3548-V.
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On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.

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At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving
spouse of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was
Attorney Bu Castro, counsel of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two
pages from the medical folder which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting
Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for
Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk
toward a man in the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney
Castro reentered the courthouse.
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Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He
alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical
record was actually "planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.

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He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so
he was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the
courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second
floor of the building. He did not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was
allegedly a very warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He
branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would not
have done the act imputed to him, because the medical chart was the very foundation of the
civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered why the man,

alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical chart,
was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even established.
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He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had
never seen him before.
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He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court
personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that
the unidentified man remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's
chamber.
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In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee,
Maria Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and
"without any noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under
pressure of cross examination" (p. 11, Judge Bernad's Report).
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That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly
clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages
of the medical record, was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature.
Nevertheless, they had the presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge
who forthwith took appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3
Alabastro had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against the respondent.
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While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney
Grecia's "driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of
the stolen pages of the medical chart.
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Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the
man was fruitless for he was never seen again.
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Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who
stole the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an
incredible fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico,
but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to mention it during the confrontation with the man
inside Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.
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His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for
he would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for
the man to ascertain his identity.
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In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the
investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony.
Judge Bernad noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his
arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he
wore a dark blue barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp
when he was cross-examined regarding more recent events. For instance, he insisted that
Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a hearing was held on that
date as shown by the transcript.
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When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the
absence of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was
he who asked that the chart be left with the clerk of court.
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His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical
chart for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact,
the entries show that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990,
the doctors were able to stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
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On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the
charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves'
medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules
of Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .

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Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.
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Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An
incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role
of "an instrument to advance the ends of justice."
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The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the
practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly.
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and
fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
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. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law,
in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer,
although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the bar, which
puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
(Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)
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. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the
rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of court, clients and the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor
Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and
disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a
member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an
unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the
capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession
or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248,
September 18, 1992, p. 15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second
offense against the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once

more the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is
hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll
of Attorneys.
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SO ORDERED.