[A.M. No. P-03-1690.

April 4, 2003]

JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner, vs. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. April 4, 2003

EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner, vs. Judge ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, respondent.

[A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC. April 4, 2003]

[In Re: Use by Atty. Renerio G. Paas as an Office in His Private Practice of His
Profession the Office of His Wife, Pasay City MeTC Judge Estrellita M.
Paas.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M.
Paas administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with
discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty,
solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil Service Law. The
case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P.
In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his coemployees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and
around the court premises despite order to do so, thus amounting to insubordination; was,
and on several instances, habitually absent from work or made it appear that he reported
for work by signing the logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day;
asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their
Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was necessary for the purchase of
stamps and pocketed the difference; once failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000
and kept for his own use the amount given to him for the purpose; and divulged
confidential information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a
monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
[1]

Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit,
and members of the court staff, by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed to
maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in
dealing with Judge Paas and his co-employees. Doctoleros affidavit also corroborated
[2]

[3]

Judge Paas allegation that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the morning and
thereafter stay out of the office.
Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000,
attested that the alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not
included in the list of registered mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date.
[4]

Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both
assigned to the Pasay City Jail, by their respective affidavits, attested that on several
occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in
consideration of the release of their Release Orders.
[5]

Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000, denied Judge Paas charges, and
alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she
suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital
indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any information from him, she resorted to calling him
names and other forms of harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him the
following invectives before the other employees of the court: Walang kuwenta, ahas ka,
driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa
ko, ulupong; and she insisted that he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which
he was not able to keep.
[6]

Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following incidents
of oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the Judge to her
chambers where she berated him as follows: Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi
ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong resignation letter, kung
hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification; the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told
him Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes; and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called
him again to her chambers and told him Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito,
gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil driver kita.
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing
incidents to Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him to
report the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a
sworn statement-complaint against Judge Paas and went to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who
then told him that they should forget all about it.
[7]

On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in exchange
for the release of court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and Macabasag executed
their respective affidavits because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective

weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted to the Judge for helping him cover-up the
escape of a detainee under his charge; the courts mail matters were always sealed
whenever he received them for mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the
alleged unmailed printed matter was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11,
2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail, because the money given to him for the
purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the office, he was actually
performing personal errands for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him
as their personal driver and messenger.
As further proof of Judge Paas oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez claimed
that she ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated September 7, 2000,
even if he had no history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by
the test results of his examination.
[8]

[9]

The Court treated respondents Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas

and docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the
OCA, which assigned them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch
114 for investigation.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed that
Judge Paas husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wifes office as his
office address in his law practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of
Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the
Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs. Louie Manabat, et al. (GR Nos.
140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay
City, the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.
[10]

Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme
Court to motu proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this Court
resolved to docket the matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M.
OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363.
[11]

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution of the Court en banc, Judge
and Atty. Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit wherein they vehemently
denied the charge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as
his office address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad
Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his
wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutors
Office, or when he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special
[12]

[13]

occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and
Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal
activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas
law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula attesting that he is
holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay
City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel attesting that Atty. Paas visits to the court are
neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the practice of his
profession.
[14]

[15]

[16]

On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit wherein she
admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for notices and orders in
Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 98-1198, People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and
Raymond dela Cruz y Salita, (now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37),
lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of
those notices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office
address in Escolta.
[17]

By Resolution of February 12, 2002, the Court referred the matter to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
[18]

After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28,
2002.
[19]

On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated
March 1, 2002.
[20]

I. OCA Findings and Recommendations

A. On the charges against Almarvez:
The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against
Almarvez of exacting money from detainees, violating confidentiality of official
communication, absence without official leave, discourtesy and insubordination. Given
Almarvez unsatisfactory performance ratings for three rating periods covering January to
June 2000, July to December 2000, and January to April 2001, however, the OCA
recommended that he be duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his
official duties with One (1) Month suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as
warranted under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having failed to
observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of employees from the rolls, which
procedure is quoted at the later portion of this decision.
[21]

[22]

[23]

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:

With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of
supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment,
harassment and verbal abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas had used her
administrative power of supervision and control over court personnel for her personal
pride, prejudice and pettiness when she issued her September 7, 2000 Memorandum
ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had already filed an administrative case
against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in
ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support the
administrative case she had already filed against him.
[24]

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple
misconduct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
II. This Courts Findings:
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge of
violation of confidentiality of official communicationagainst Almarvez. The charge against
Almarvez in Judge Paas complaint-affidavit which reads:
That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which is
confidential in nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the release of
Court Order and Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving undue advantage or
favor to the paying party detrimental to the due administration of justice,
[25]

in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently

meet the same.
As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were
echoed in the affidavits of court personnel, they are also too general to support a
conviction and are contrary to what is reflected in his performance rating that he
cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.
On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act):
Absent any evidence to support the charge, the affiants-jail officers who claimed to have
witnessed Almarvez receive money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release
of their Release Orders not having been presented, hence, their claim remains hearsay,

Almarvez categorical denial and counter-allegation that these affiants executed their
affidavits only out of fear of or favor to Judge Paas gain light.
As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would thereafter
leave the office, again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro
C. Doctolero, Jr. While she submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000
memorandum requiring Almarvez to explain why he was not in the office on September
8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his affixing of his signature in the logbook on
those dates indicating that he reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on
September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in
her September 7, 2000 memorandum, which explanation is supported by the September
14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug
Board. As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez explanation that he was
actually present in the morning but left in the afternoon for the Supreme Court was not
controverted.
[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the OCA
that he should be faulted therefor:
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods covering January to
June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed to
perform his official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance
ratings given him is tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book
V of Executive Order No. 292, quoted as follows:
Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal through
the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of his copy of his performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the prescribed period
shall be deemed a waiver of such right.
The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to drop him from the
Rolls. However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with the
requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service
Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he was able to make up and cure his
inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to improve his performance in his detail to
Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his performance rating for the period April to June 2001
with a very satisfactory rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer be
appropriate (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[30]

Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the above-quoted
findings of the OCA reads:

2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.

(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be
dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee
concerned is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is
sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from
the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall
contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by the
OCA, is thus in order.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas,
Almarvez failed to substantiate the same.
Judge Paas order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are
required to undergo a drug test prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To
be drug-free is not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement
to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil service. However, considering that
the order was issued after Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it
elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly
reprimanded.
C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:
By Judge Paas own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit, she
was aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and
orders in a case lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it, [w]hile the same appears to
be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a message that Atty.
Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special
treatment by other judges or court personnel.
[31]

[32]

The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge and
her spouse, Atty. Paas:
SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of
Justice and Promoting Respect for their Officials and Employers reads:

As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be preserved and
enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees must:
1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for disciplinary
action under, as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial
Conduct; and Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully comply with the norms of
conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);
2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;
xxx
6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or
judicial functions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, Rule 2.03
thereof provides that:
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)
SC Circular No. 3-92, dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
[33]

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR

COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for
purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be
devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for
carrying on therein any trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case
involving unauthorized and improper use of the courts premises for dwelling purposes by
respondent and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found
respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient
administration of justice and best interest of the service, and imposed on him the penalty of
SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the courts premises inevitably degrades

the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or
damage. (Underscoring supplied.)
By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other
courts, Judge Paas indeed allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of
advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the
above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less serious
charge under the Rules of Court and is punishable under the same Rule.
[34]

[35]

[36]

A judges official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety;
and his behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life
should be beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judges official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a
Judges attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary.
[37]

On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive
address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his
cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in
violation of the following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 3A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Canon 10A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Canon 13a LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY IMPROPERITY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Canon 15A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.

The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case, instead of banking on his
relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance
of influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional and
dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyers
prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and
improper conduct.
This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to
ensure receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow
him to have his court notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for
his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office address but there is no showing that he failed to
receive the notices sent to that address. While a lawyer should make the necessary
arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of any court action, these should not
violate his lawyers oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an
opportunity for a member of the judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under
Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of
inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;
(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning
that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;
(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,
(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular
No. 3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to
pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely; and
(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and appended to respondents personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA

October 15, 2008

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP

NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For consideration of this Court are several motions for reconsideration of our Decision
dated September 9, 2008, sanctioning several justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
improprieties or irregularities in connection with CA G.R.-SP No. 103692, entitled "Antonio
Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al." (the Meralco-GSIS case).
The incidents to be resolved are:
(a) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 24, 2008 filed by Justice Vicente
Q. Roxas;
(b) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 15, 2008 filed by Justice Jose L.
Sabio;
(c) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 24, 2008 filed by Presiding
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.;
(d) A Plea for Compassion and Clemency dated September 22, 2008 filed by Justice
Myrna Dimaranan Vidal (which we shall consider a motion for reconsideration); and

(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2008 filed by Mr. Francis de
Borja.
At the outset, the Court stresses that our Decision was fully supported by the facts on
record and is in accordance with the law and prevailing jurisprudence. After a perusal of
the various arguments presented in the pleadings listed above, we find that there are no
substantial grounds for the Court to reverse its previous judgment in this administrative
matter.
We now discuss each incident in greater detail.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF JUSTICE VICENTE Q. ROXAS
In his Motion, Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas) seeks a reconsideration of the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon him and prays that should a penalty still be
imposed, the penalty be accordingly reduced to two months suspension at the most.
Justice Roxas attempts to explain the "haste" in which his decision was promulgated
by claiming that it was but due to his intention (a) to "efficiently" dispose of the MeralcoGSIS case and (b) to preserve confidentiality (i.e. avoid leakages and outside influence).
He likewise asserts that he was in compliance with Canon 6, Section 5 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides: "Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."
Certainly, the speedy resolution of a case in itself is not indicative of any wrongdoing on
the part of a judge or magistrate. However, it must be recalled that the haste in which the
decision was promulgated was taken in context with other suspicious circumstances and
improprieties on Justice Roxas' part which led the Panel and this Court to believe that he
was unduly interested in the Meralco-GSIS case. We need not elaborate on these
circumstances and improprieties here as we have extensively discussed them in our
Decision. Moreover, Justice Roxas cannot seek refuge in Canon 6, Section 5 of the
Canons of Judicial Conduct. That provision does not sanction procedural shortcuts with
dubious motivations such as non-resolution of pending incidents or drafting a decision
before all required pleadings have been filed. Indeed, instead of protecting the integrity of
the appellate court as Justice Roxas claims he was doing, he brought the institution he
works for to disrepute.
Justice Roxas further cites the confusion that arose due to the chairmanship dispute
between Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Bienvenido L. Reyes. He asserts that he acted
in good faith and believed by virtue of the reorganization of the CA and their internal rules

it was the Eighth Division which should decide the Meralco-GSIS case. To our mind,
Justice Roxas' full knowledge of the existence of the chairmanship dispute and the
differences of opinion among his colleagues regarding the proper interpretation of the
rules should have all the more induced him to wait for a final resolution of the dispute
before deciding the case. His "rush to judgment," as one member of the Panel termed it,
despite the pendency of the chairmanship dispute and his own request for an opinion from
the Presiding Justice, only opened his act of deciding the case to more questions and
attacks not only from the other justices but from the public as well.
As regards the "Transcript of Deliberation" which the Panel found to be a fabrication and
containing falsehoods, Justice Roxas claims it was better termed "Minutes of the
Deliberation" and being unsigned, should be considered a "draft" and not an official
document. We find that line of argument flimsy and a mere afterthought since they are
proferred only after the Panel already questioned those irregularities attending the
production of said "Transcript of Deliberation."
As for the promulgation of his ponencia not being intended to be a discourtesy to the
Presiding Justice since Justice Roxas believed the Presiding Justice, who was of the
opinion that he had no authority to act on the matter, would not resolve Justice Roxas'
interpleader petition, we cannot give such claim credit. Presiding Justice Conrado
Vasquez, Jr. testified that when Justice Roxas personally filed the interpleader petition he
told Justice Roxas that he will study the matter1 and in fact rendered his opinion within
days from the filing of the interpleader petition.
Justice Roxas also asserts that he believed that he had either resolved all pending
motions, or that said motions had become moot in view of transpiring events. For one, it is
a matter of record that there were still pending motions unresolved and Justice Roxas,
who had possession of the rollo of the case most of the time prior to the promulgation of
his decision, could not have been unaware of said motions. Second, the transpiring event,
i.e. the promulgation of the decision, which he claims had mooted certain motions, being
an event of his making, could hardly be cited in his defense. Also if Justice Roxas truly
believed that certain motions, such as the Motion for Inhibition, were unmeritorious then
we have greater reason to believe that Justice Roxas could have easily resolved them
before rendering a decision on the merits.
With respect to arguments related to the acts of others involved in the controversy, these
do not aid Justice Roxas' cause. To begin with, Justice Roxas' actions must be judged on
their own and the improprieties committed by others will not negate nor mitigate his own
liabilities in the matter at hand. Indeed, Justice Roxas' choice of personalities whose
improprieties and wrongdoings were highlighted in his motion does not reflect well on
Justice Roxas who has already been found to have shown undue interest in the case.

With respect to his claim that his decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 was anchored on
existing law and jurisprudence and evidenced his good faith, we cannot rule upon this
point considering that the said decision is under appeal with this Court and we cannot
preempt the resolution of that appeal on the merits. Nevertheless, we must emphasize
that the subject matter of this administrative case involves the irregularities and
improprieties that attended the deliberation, drafting and/or promulgation of the decision
which should be deemed entirely separate from and independent of the merits of the
decision itself.
As for his complaint that he was not informed by the Panel that he was a "respondent" or
"accused" and thus, he was not able to emphasize his intentions for greater efficiency and
confidentiality in the discharge of his functions during the investigation, we find little merit
in the same. It is common knowledge that the mandate of the Panel was to investigate the
alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692. The Panel was not limited to the chairmanship dispute nor to the bribery
allegations of Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., as Justice Roxas claims to believe. Moreover, the
questions asked by the Panel and his colleagues in relation to his actions in the MeralcoGSIS case could lead to no other conclusion but that the propriety of Justice Roxas'
conduct was under scrutiny in these proceedings. In any event, Justice Roxas was given
by the Panel ample opportunity to present his side and his evidence and to cross-examine
the testimonies of the other participants in the investigation.
Finally, Justice Roxas interposes a plea of mercy in consideration of the difficulties he and
his family has had to face in the wake of his dismissal from the service. The Court is not at
all insensitive to situation of dismissed court officials and personnel, especially in these
turbulent economic times. However, we must emphasize that where the finding of
administrative guilt is well supported by the evidence on record, as in this case, this Court
must impose the penalty warranted under the law and prevailing jurisprudence. This is in
accord with our duty to protect and preserve the integrity and independence of the Court
of Appeals and the whole Judiciary.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF JUSTICE JOSE L. SABIO, JR.
On September 17, 2008, Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, praying that the Court (a) review the portion of our Decision finding
Justice Sabio guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the
Court of Appeals and (b) remove the two month suspension imposed upon him.
In seeking the reversal of our Decision with respect to his participation in CA G.R.-SP No.
103692, Justice Sabio cites the following arguments:

I. Justice Sabio did not violate any Canons of Professional Ethics by speaking with
his brother, Camilo - truth is - Justice Sabio declined his brother's offer. How can
that be taken against him?
II. Although Justice Sabio defended Camilo's having telephoned him (during the
hearings), that was mereobiter dicta which cannot render the Justice liable for his
brother's act. (a) Justice Sabio did not initiate the phone call; (b) Justice Sabio did
not agree to the request of Camilo; (c) Justice Sabio stated he would rule on the
matter based on good conscience. (d) The brothers never spoke again on the
matter. What was Justice Sabio's wrongdoing?
III. The panel's conclusion that "Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the
chairmanship" and had "unusual interest in holding on to the case" is
mischaracterization. (a) The unrebutted testimonies of Justice Sabio and of Justice
Villarama establish that the latter advised Justice Sabio on June 23, 2008, the very
morning of the hearing in issue, to remain as Chairman because that was the
correct interpretation of the rules; (b) Likewise, the suspicious actuations of Justice
Reyes and Justice Roxas constrained Justice Sabio "to stand his ground" in order to
protect the integrity of the CA.
IV. The panel's findings that Justice Sabio failed to tell De Borja that
"he could not, and would not talk about the MERALCO case" is factual
misappreciation and mischaracterization. The unrebbuted affidavit and testimony in
open hearing of Justice Sabio is that he did not know and could not have known the
reason for De Borja's urgent plea to meet. In truth, Justice Sabio told off De Borja
when the latter came to the Atoneo Faculty Lounge. But since De Borja kept
badgering Justice Sabio by text messages, Justice Sabio finally had to call De Borja
to warn him against his pestering texts
V. The Honorable Court's conclusion that Justice Sabio's conversations with his
brother and with Mr. De Borja were "indiscreet and imprudent" would only be true
and correct if Sabio knew before the fact of (a) what was to be discussed or (b) if he
agreed to the proposals. Justice Sabio is not guilty of either.
VI. Justice Sabio initiated this investigation by his letter to PJ Vasquez. Justice
Sabio spoke the truth at great personal risk to himself and to his family. He even
prejudiced his older brother whom he dearly loves by his revelations. Should this not
have been at the very least positively noted by the investigating panel in its
findings? Are the panel's findings not sending a subconscious message: that Justice
Sabio would have been far better-off had he accepted the bribe offer (or kept silent
about it); correspondingly ignoring the perceptible infidelities all about him?2

After a careful consideration of the foregoing justifications, we find no reason to overturn

our previous findings with respect to Justice Sabio.
Justice Sabio's Telephone Conversation With His Brother Chairman Camilo Sabio
In the Motion, Justice Sabio claims he did not violate Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility3considering that: (a) it was his brother Chairman Camilo Sabio
(Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) who
initiated the call; (b) all Justice Sabio did was answer a call from his brother without
knowing beforehand what the call was about; (c) Justice Sabio told his brother that he
would vote according to his conscience and did not do as his brother asked; (d) after that
call, they never spoke on the matter again; (e) even though Justice Sabio defended his
brother's "act of enlisting the Justice's support," he (Justice Sabio) should not be made
liable for his brother's act.
From the foregoing, it would appear that Justice Sabio is arguing from the mistaken
premise that he was likewise being held accountable under Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or that he is being held accountable for the acts of his brother.
The Panel of Investigators indeed used Canon 13 to characterize his conversation with his
brother as improper and the same provision was the basis for this Court to refer Chairman
Sabio's act to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action. However, as Justice Sabio noted in
his own motion, the Panel found him in violation of the following provisions of the Canon of
Judicial Conduct on independence:
Canon 1
Independence
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.
xxx
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent
to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and
influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also
appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

This Court agrees with the panel that Justice Sabio, by his own action, or more accurately
inaction, failed to maintain the high standard of independence and propriety that is
required of him.
While it is true that Justice Sabio could not have possibly known prior to his brother's call
that his brother intended to speak to him about the Meralco-GSIS case, the fact remains
that Justice Sabio continued to entertain a call from his brother, who also happens to be
an officer of the executive branch, despite realizing that the conversation was going to
involve a pending case. In his Motion, Justice Sabio asks the Court if he should have
immediately slammed the phone on his brother. Certainly, such boorish behavior is not
required. However, as soon as Justice Sabio realized that his brother intended to discuss
a case pending before him or in his division, Justice Sabio should have respectfully but
firmly ended the discussion. Justice Sabio in his own affidavit narrated that Chairman
Sabio told him of matters in the Meralco-GSIS case that Justice Sabio himself had not
been formally informed.4 He further alleged that his brother tried to convince him of
rightness of the stand of GSIS and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
improper substance of the conversation was confirmed in Chairman Sabio's own
statement before the Panel.5 Justice Sabio had no business discussing with his brother
court matters (such as his assignment to a particular case, the possibility of issuance of a
TRO, etc.) which by his own account are not yet "official" and more importantly, he should
not have allowed the conversation to progress to a point that his brother was already
discussing the merits of the case and persuading him (Justice Sabio) to rule in favor of
one of the parties.
That Justice Sabio did not do as his brother asked is of no moment. Section 5, Canon 1 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct maintains such a high bar of ethical conduct that actual
influence is not a prerequisite before a violation is deemed committed. If a magistrate's
actions allow even just the appearance of being influenced, it is deemed a violation. To be
sure, as a complement to Canon 1, the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise provides:
Canon 4
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.
xxx

By allowing his brother to discuss with him the merits of one party's position, Justice Sabio
gave his brother the opportunity to influence him. Any reasonable person would tend to
doubt Justice Sabio's independence and objectivity after such a conversation with a close
family member who also happens to hold a high government position. As a magistrate,
Justice Sabio has the duty to prevent any circumstance that would cast doubt on his ability
to decide a case without interference or pressure from litigants, counsels or their
surrogates.
This Court further notes that had Justice Sabio been prudent enough to nip the improper
conversation with his brother in the bud, he would have prevented his own brother from
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. If Justice Sabio and his
brother find themselves in such a quandary, it is a quandary of their own making.
Justice Sabio's Various Conversations with Mr. Francis de Borja
Justice Sabio's communications with Mr. Francis de Borja (Mr. de Borja) are inextricably
related to the same charge of failure to comply with the canons of judicial independence
and propriety cited in his conversation with his brother. By his own admission, Justice
Sabio had communications with Mr. de Borja on at least four (4) occasions in relation to
the Meralco case:
(a) On May 31, 2008, Mr. de Borja allegedly called Justice Sabio and greeted him
with "Mabuhay ka, Justice" and informed the latter that the Makati Business Club is
happy with the issuance of a TRO in the Meralco case. Mr. de Borja also praised
Justice Sabio for not succumbing to pressure. Justice Sabio allegedly replied that he
voted according to his conscience.
(b) On July 1, 2008, Mr. de Borja called up Justice Sabio again and urgently pleaded
with the latter to meet on an "important" matter. Justice Sabio allegedly agreed to
meet after his 6-8pm class at the Ateneo Law School but told Mr. de Borja that he
could not stay long since his wife and daughter would be waiting for him.
(c) Later July 1, 2008, Justice Sabio and Mr. de Borja indeed met face to face at the
Lobby Lounge of the Ateneo Law School after Justice Sabio's class. It was during
that meeting that Mr. de Borja allegedly offered Justice Sabio Ten Million Pesos to
"give way to Justice [Bienvenido L.] Reyes" in their chairmanship dispute over the
Meralco-GSIS case. Justice Sabio was shocked and insulted by Mr. de Borja's
insinuation that he could be bribed and rejected the offer outright.
(d) On July 3, 2008, Justice Sabio called Mr. de Borja purportedly to tell the latter to
stop pestering him with text messages. When Mr. de Borja answered the justice's

call, he allegedly said "Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang
deadline ng submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo na bang mabuti ang
offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo tatanggapin, kasi kahit aabot itong kaso
sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung 10 million. Baka sisihin ka pa
ng mga anak mo."6 Justice Sabio claimed that he was again shocked and insulted
that Mr. de Borja would repeat the reprehensible offer that he (Justice Sabio)
already rejected.
Anent the first call from Mr. de Borja on May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio would have this
Court characterize that conversation as an innocent call from an acquaintance
congratulating the justice on his having acted in a certain way in a case of public interest.
Justice Sabio further claims that conversation did not give him any inkling that Mr. de
Borja was lobbying for Meralco. However, taken with the other circumstances on record,
we cannot take the view that first call was entirely proper.
To begin with, in Justice Sabio's "Reaction" to Mr. de Borja's widely publicized Affidavit
dated July 31, 2008,7Justice Sabio admitted that Mr. de Borja's allegation that he is a
businessman engaged in, among others, "brokering contracts," "deal making" and "project
packaging" was consistent with what Justice Sabio knows of him. In other words, Justice
Sabio was not entirely oblivious to the sort of business that Mr. de Borja dabbled in.
Justice Sabio further admits that prior to May 31, 2008, he had not had any
communication with Mr. de Borja for about a year. That first call should have already put
Justice Sabio on guard, for why would an acquaintance with whom he had lost touch
suddenly feel the need to deliberately seek him out just to congratulate him on a particular
action in a controversial case? Even then, Mr. de Borja was already making improper
insinuations regarding the possibility that Justice Sabio was being subjected to undue
pressure in relation to his participation in the Meralco-GSIS case. From that point, Justice
Sabio should have viewed with wariness any further communications from Mr. de Borja.
Thus, this Court could not accept Justice Sabio's explanation that the second call from Mr.
de Borja was likewise innocent. According to Justice Sabio, there is nothing in that call
that could have raised the suspicion Mr. de Borja was going to make him an offer. We
disagree. Although Mr. de Borja did not expressly state that the "important matter" he
wanted to discuss was the Meralco-GSIS case, considering that Justice Sabio's last
conversation with Mr. de Borja involved said controversial case (a conversation
memorable enough that Justice Sabio could even offer a supposed verbatim reproduction
of it in his affidavit submitted to the Panel), Justice Sabio should have proceeded with
even more caution before agreeing to the face to face meeting at the Ateneo Law School.
The prudent course of action for Justice Sabio under the circumstances was to ascertain
first the nature of the urgent matter Mr. de Borja needed to discuss with him before
acceding to the request for a meeting.

Consequently, if the July 1, 2008 meeting between Justice Sabio and Mr. de Borja turned
sour and Justice Sabio felt insulted by Mr. de Borja's alleged attempt to bribe him, Justice
Sabio shares part of the blame. Justice Sabio himself provided Mr. de Borja the
opportunity to make him an offer. Justices and judges should be immediately wary of
persons wishing to speak with them without being upfront regarding their motives [for the
motives are likely to be unethical or dishonorable]. Indeed, one can even infer that Mr. de
Borja was probably emboldened to make his offer in light of Justice Sabio's willingness to
meet with him without even determining beforehand his true motives. It behooves this
Court to remind all magistrates to guard their reputations jealously and not put themselves
in a position that another person would have the opportunity to corrupt them or sully their
good name. As this Court has often held, judges must be like Ceasar's wife - above
suspicion and beyond reproach.8
As for the July 3, 2008 call of Justice Sabio to Mr. de Borja, Justice Sabio cites in his
defense the circumstances that (a) it was the only time he ever initiated any call to Mr. de
Borja; and (b) the purpose for the call was to tell Mr. de Borja to stop pestering him once
and for all. Justice Sabio likewise takes exception to the following findings of the Panel:
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that
he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly
perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De
Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop "pestering" him
with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been
insulted would never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who had
disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borja's calls.xxx9
In Justice Sabio's opinion, the conclusion of the Panel that he should have just ignored Mr.
de Borja's texts or calls was unwarranted. He cites studies in the field of psychology to the
effect that "to fight" is just as natural a reaction as "to flee" when a person is subjected to
great stress. He claims that there is no scientific formula, no universal "common sense"
reaction to a given situation. Justice Sabio argues his decision "to fight" (i.e. calling Mr. de
Borja and demanding that he stop pestering him) was a valid reaction on his part.
While it may be true that from a psychological stand point ordinary persons can have a
wide variety of valid reactions to any given situation, Justice Sabio should bear in mind his
high office as a magistrate of the appellate court sets him apart from ordinary persons.
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, members of the bench should freely and
willingly accept behavioral restrictions that may be viewed by ordinary citizens as
burdensome.10

The Court is of the view that the best course of action on the part of Justice Sabio was to
cut off all communications with Mr. de Borja after the first alleged bribery attempt. By
calling his adversary, no matter what the reason, Justice Sabio merely set himself up for
another insult or assault on his integrity. Again, Justice Sabio exhibited poor judgment in
exposing himself to yet another compromising or humiliating situation.
Taking his conversation with his brother and his encounters with Mr. de Borja together,
Justice Sabio gives the impression that he is accessible to lobbyists who would unfairly try
to manipulate court proceedings. Even assuming arguendo that Justice Sabio was not
moved by his brother's request and that he rejected Mr. de Borja's bribe offer, the Court
feels compelled to call Justice Sabio's attention to his own shortcomings under the
circumstances. At the very least, Justice Sabio should have realized that his discussions
of court matters, especially those that have not yet been made of public record, with
persons who are interested in the case were incredibly indiscreet and tended to
undermine the integrity of judicial processes. We see no reason to reverse the Panel's
finding that Justice Sabio's conversations with his brother and Mr. de Borja were
"indiscreet and imprudent."
Justice Sabio's Refusal to Yield Chairmanship of the Special Division Handling the
Meralco-GSIS case
As defenses to this charge, Justice Sabio cites (a) the opinion of Justice Martin Villarama,
Jr. that under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) Justice Sabio should
remain as chairman and (b) the suspicious actuations of Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas
that constrained him (Justice Sabio) "to stand his ground" in order to protect the integrity
of the CA.
That another senior justice of the CA interpreted the rules in Justice Sabio's favor does not
justify his unyielding and hostile stance. We point out that Justice Sabio refused to accept
Justice Edgardo Cruz's earlier opinion in favor of Justice Reyes because it was allegedly
made in a personal capacity and not as Chairman of the Rules Committee. In other words,
Justice Sabio deemed Justice Cruz's personal opinion non-binding. If that is the case,
then Justice Villarama's personal opinion or interpretation of the IRCA, even if he is a
more senior justice, is likewise non-binding and did not settle the chairmanship dispute.
Neither do Justice Sabio's suspicions of impropriety or wrongdoing on the part of the
Justices Reyes and Roxas justify Justice Sabio's aggressive and combatant attitude.
Again, what this Court finds unbecoming is the failure of Justice Sabio to cooperate with
his colleagues in finding an amicable resolution to the conflicting interpretations of the
IRCA. Moreover, this Court cannot see why magistrates of the appellate court cannot
respectfully disagree and civilly suggest solutions to the chairmanship dispute. Justice

Sabio's "fighting stance" against Justice Reyes is unseemly and tends to demean the
institution that he claims to protect.
The Court took into account all relevant circumstances in determining the
appropriate penalty for Justice Sabio.
Finally, Justice Sabio points out that by writing to Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez to
investigate the irregularities in the Meralco-GSIS case he spoke the truth at great personal
risk to himself and his family. He further argues that the Panel's findings which highlighted
the faults and ignored the good in the justices investigated send the wrong signal to the
public.
We must point out that the Court in fact took into account Justice Sabio's apparent lack of
ill-motive and his effort to bring to light irregularities in the Meralco-GSIS case. However,
we cannot close our eyes to the improprieties that Justice Sabio undisputedly committed
notwithstanding his good faith.
Any transgression or deviation from the established norm of conduct, work-related or not,
amounts to misconduct.11 To constitute grave misconduct, the acts complained of
should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or constitute a flagrant
disregard of well-known legal rules. It is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.12
In this instance, we found Justice Sabio liable for simple misconduct. Under Rule 140,
simple misconduct is considered a less grave offense13 which is punishable by: (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month
nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.14 However, the Court is of the considered view that the penalty of suspension
of two (2) months without pay was appropriate in the light of the additional, albeit lighter,
offense of conduct unbecoming of a CA Justice, for which we found Justice Sabio also
liable.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, JR.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding
Justice Vasquez) prays that the findings against him in our Decision be reconsidered and
set aside and that the penalty of severe reprimand imposed upon him be removed. He
relies upon the following grounds:

(a) The Panel did not inform him that he was to be a respondent in relation to any
administrative charge or liability, to enable him to present a thorough explanation or
account of his actions and actuations on the chairmanship impasse between
Justices Sabio and Reyes.
(b) The Panel's characterizations of his actions on the issue of the chairmanship and
on the report of the bribe-offer as vacillation and temporizing was unwarranted,
considering that he did everything possible and permissible as a primus inter
pares to quickly and tactfully resolve the chairmanship impasse. On the report of the
bribe offer, he had nothing to go by except the report of Justice Sabio, Jr. who did
not share even the identity of the supposed offeror with anyone until the alleged
bribe offeror himself came out with an affidavit on the issue.
(c) The fact that he had two daughters, a sister and a niece employed in GSIS did
not influence any action that he took in relation to the Meralco-GSIS case.
First, we emphasize that the Panel was conducting a general investigation precisely to
determine if improprieties were committed in relation to CA-G.R. SP. No. 103692 and who
were liable for such improprieties. Moreover, every person summoned to the Panel's
investigation, including Presiding Justice Vasquez, was given the fullest opportunity to
present his or her side. Each of them was given the chance to submit their sworn affidavits
and other documentary evidence, to cross-examine the other witnesses and to present
rebuttal evidence, if necessary.
Second, in our Decision, although we noted with favor most of the Panel's findings, we
cited Presiding Justice Vasquez only for his failure to timely and effectively act in the
chairmanship dispute between Justices Sabio and Reyes, which greatly tarnished the
image of the institution that he leads. As soon as it became evident that Justices Sabio
and Reyes were unable to settle the matter on their own, he should have stepped in to
prevent the dispute and enmity between the two from escalating. Even if he honestly
believed at the time that the IRCA did not allow him to rule on the matter, Presiding Justice
Vasquez could have ordered reconstituted the Rules Committee or submitted the matter to
the court en banc. However, we do believe that he acted in good faith for the most part
and that there is insufficient evidence that his actions were influenced by the fact that he
had relatives in GSIS. Certainly, had we found otherwise, we would have meted out a
much more severe penalty than a reprimand.
Third, even after a careful consideration of his more extensive explanation of his actions
or lack thereof as contained in his Motion for Reconsideration, we find no compelling
reason to reverse our ruling that he failed to act promptly and decisively in order to avert a
situation that seriously damaged the reputation of the appellate court.

A PLEA FOR COMPASSION AND CLEMENCY FILED BY JUSTICE MYRNA

DIMARANAN VIDAL
In her pleading, Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal (Justice Vidal) prays that the Court revoke
and set aside the admonition meted out to her in our Decision dated September 9, 2008.
In support of her plea for clemency, Justice Vidal cites the sufferings she and her family
experienced with the promulgation of our Decision, her unblemished record of 43 years in
government service marked by various citations and awards, the probative weight given
by the Panel to her testimony against Justice Roxas and the alleged practice of CA
Justices to dispense with actual deliberations and simply manifest concurrence or dissent
to a ponente's draft. However, she admits to being remiss with respect to being compliant
to the representations of Justice Roxas in the Meralco-GSIS case but asserts that she has
learned her lesson and will be more circumspect and vigilant in the discharge of her
duties.
At the outset, we wish to clarify that our admonition of Justice Vidal was not in the nature
of a penalty. What is considered a penalty under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court is an
"admonition with warning" which should be distinguished from a plain admonition. This
Court has held that an admonition is "a warning or reminder, counseling on a fault, error or
oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning."15 It is in consideration of
mitigating circumstances in the case of Justice Vidal that we settled on simply
admonishing her for her lapses in the Meralco-GSIS case. We see no need to be even
more compassionate than we already have when Justice Vidal herself admits to being
"remiss" in this instance.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MR. FRANCIS DE BORJA
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Mr. Francis de Borja (Mr. de Borja) prays for the
deletion or clarification of certain statements in our Decision on the grounds that such
statements may be construed as our having prejudged his case in violation of his
constitutional rights to be presumed innocent, to due process and to equal protection of
the laws. He likewise prayed for referral of the actions of PCGG Chairman Camilo R.
Sabio and Justice Sabio to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action, referral
of the actions of lawyers Estrella Elamparo Tayag and Jesus I. Santos to the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the DOJ for appropriate action and the modification of the penalties
imposed upon Justice Sabio and Presiding Justice Vasquez to dismissal from the service.
First, we must clarify that Mr. Borja is neither a complainant nor a respondent in the
present administrative matter, an investigation of the alleged improprieties of certain CA
justices in the Meralco-GSIS case. Under the circumstances, he has no personality to
seek reconsideration of our Decision except insofar as it affects him directly or personally.

Indeed, we do not see how he can be benefited or adversely affected by the findings
regarding the other personalities in this case. On the other hand, his choice of persons to
include in his prayer for further investigation or more severe sanctions tend to indicate that
in filing this motion for reconsideration Mr. de Borja is not acting purely on his own
interests but rather the interests of another party.
As for his claim of prejudgment, we find the same unmeritorious. The Panel and this Court
could not, and in fact did not, rule upon the criminal charge of attempt or offer to bribe a
public officer against Mr. de Borja in these administrative proceedings. It is for this reason
that the matter has been referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate
action. It is for the DOJ to conduct its own proceedings and to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to find probable cause to hold Mr. de Borja liable for the said charge.
We trust that the DOJ would accord Mr. de Borja the fullest opportunity to defend himself
and would give due respect to all his constitutional rights. Mr. de Borja's fear that his case
will be railroaded by the DOJ is speculative and does not warrant a reversal of our
decision to refer the matter to that agency, which in the first place has jurisdiction over the
criminal investigation.
We find it unnecessary to pass upon the other arguments and reliefs prayed for by Mr. de
Borja for lack of standing. This is, however, without prejudice to the continuation or
resolution of any complaints that may already have been filed against the personalities
mentioned in the motion.
Parenthetically, one of the Justices submitted a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion setting forth his observations and evaluation, as follows:
1. On Justice Vicente Q. Roxas
Justice Vicente Roxas is guilty of various infractions of judicial ethics, rendering him
unfit to continue as Associate Justice of the CA.
The findings of the Panel on Justice Roxas' actions are sufficient to show his
incompatibility with the high judicial office he holds.
First, he ignored or refused to act on several pending motions before him. His
excuse that he "believed" that he had already resolved the pending motions or that
they had become moot16 is, at best, tenuous. It does not justify his non-feasance in
his duties. Second, his dishonesty and deceit have no place in the Judiciary. He
fabricated the "Transcript of Final Decision," to make it appear that deliberations had
been conducted before the drafting of the Meralco decision when, in fact, there had
been none. His undue interest and improper haste in having the Meralco decision

signed speak of his questionable partiality. His reason for personally bringing a draft
of the decision to Justice Dimaranan Vidal is a lie. Moreover, he was utterly
disrespectful to his colleagues, Presiding Justice Vasquez and Dimaranan Vidal.
These constitute grave misconduct and abuses of judicial ethics that this Court
cannot tolerate.
2. On Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
a. It was unethical for Justice Sabio to entertain and expose himself to pressure
from PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio.
Justice Sabio's improper conversation with his brother, Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) Chairman Camilo Sabio, was a flagrant transgression of
several judicial ethical principles.
As found by the Panel, by allowing his brother to influence his conduct in the
Meralco case, Justice Sabio violated17 Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, impressing upon magistrates the duty to uphold judicial
independence. It raised serious questions on his integrity and independence.
Justice Sabio, however, defends the phone call of his older brother by citing Filipino
tradition and culture. According to him, "it would be unthinkable for a brother not to
call another brother."18 He says it is assumed that relatives and friends will call up on
a case but it is up to the Justice concerned whether to favor that relative or
friend.19 Coming from a Justice of the CA, to find nothing improper or unethical about
that phone call is appalling. It is a dangerous precedent when a magistrate himself
justifies an improper conduct on the basis of filial relations.
The Panel also established that Justice Sabio was remiss in his duty to inform
Presiding Justice Vasquez of Chairman Sabio's phone call to him.20 While he was
very vigilant in his crusade against Francis Roa De Borja's attempt to bribe him, he
was selective with respect to his brother. It was only after the Meralco mess hit the
fan that he disclosed his brother's unethical conduct.
A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence the judge.21 By continuing his participation in the case, he unduly gave
the impression that he could be influenced by external factors or forces.
b. It was highly inappropriate for Justice Sabio to communicate and discuss the
Meralco case with De Borja.

Even if We accept Justice Sabio's allegation that Francis Roa De Borja attempted to
bribe him with P10 million to give up the chairmanship of the Special 9th Division,
his own actuations after the offer showed grave misconduct.
First, by meeting De Borja at the Ateneo Law School; entertaining his call on
several instances; and discussing the Meralco case, Justice Sabio broke the shield
of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in court.22 He transgressed
Section 9, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits judges
from using or disclosing any confidential information acquired by them for any other
purpose related to their judicial duties. Second, it was highly improper for him to
fraternize with De Borja, whom he knew from the past as a broker, who had actually
given him monetary consideration while he was a sitting judge in Cagayan de Oro
City, and who was now interested in the Meralco-GSIS case.
His independence was rendered questionable, not merely by virtue of his
conversations with Chairman Sabio, but also by his openness to De Borja who he
said was brokering for Meralco. Justice Sabio breached Section 1, Canon 1 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, that "[j]udges shall exercise the judicial function
independently x x x free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat
or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter for any reason."
Justice Sabio also ignored Section 3, Canon 3 of the same Code, mandating that
judges "shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases."
c. Justice Sabio should have inhibited himself from the Meralco case; instead, he
showed unusual interest as he suspiciously held on to it.
When his brother tried to influence him to vote against the TRO, Justice
Sabio should have voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. He should have
voluntarily recused himself from participating in further proceedings.
I agree with the Panel's finding on Justice Sabio's "unusual interest" in the Meralco
case, viz.:
For his part, although Justice Sabio, Jr., against his brother's advice, did sign
the TRO in favour of Meralco, his unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco
case, seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced to "help
GSIS" as Secretary Sabio had advised. This may be deduced from the
following actuations: - (1) he adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of

the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Bienvenido
L. Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) he officiously
prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to
perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralco's "Motion
for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9th Division," which
he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction
beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of
the GSIS.23
Justice Sabio ignored even the opinion of Justice Edgardo Cruz, the CA Rules
Committee chairman,24 on the matter. This, despite Presiding Justice Vasquez' own
endorsement of the impasse to Justice Cruz. On June 20, 2008, Justice Sabio
received a letter from Justice Cruz addressed to the Presiding Justice, opining that
Justice B.L. Reyes should preside over the June 23, 2008 hearing, viz.:25
It appears that because of your leave of absence in May 2008, Associate Justice
Jose Catral Mendoza was designated as acting chairman. However, Justice
Mendoza voluntarily inhibited himself from the case, resulting in his replacement by
Associate Justice Jose Sabio, Jr., as acting chairman. It was during the stint of
Justice Sabio as acting chairman that the TRO was issued.
Sec 2(d), Rule VI of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended, reads:
"Sec 2. Justices Who May Participate in the Adjudication of Cases. - In the
determination of the two other Justices who shall participate in the
adjudication of cases, the following shall be observed:
xxxx
(d) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or
proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary
injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting execution pending appeal
have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is
assigned for study and report and the Justices who participated herein,
regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station."
Issuance of a TRO is not among the instances where "the Justice who participated"
in the case shall "remain" therein. Consequently, notwithstanding the issuance of
the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction) the case reverted to the regular
chairman (Justice Bienvenido Reyes) of the ninth division upon his
return.26(Emphasis supplied)

Justice Sabio rejected Justice Cruz' opinion on the lame excuse that (1) it was
rendered in Justice Cruz' personal capacity, and (2) Justice Cruz is merely his junior
in the CA. These, however, do not detract from the fact that Justice Sabio's own
superior, Presiding Justice Vasquez, recognized Justice Cruz' expertise on the
matter.
Being aware of the persuasions around him, Justice Sabio ought to have recused
himself from the case to preclude all doubts on his ability to dispense justice
impartially. In not doing so, Justice Sabio ignored the rule that a judge should not
take part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.27
Too, by failing to distance himself from a case where his impartiality and integrity
could be tainted, Justice Sabio ran afoul of Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct which states that "[j]udges shall disqualify themselves from
participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable
to decide the matter impartially."
d. Justice Sabio is not a genuine whistle-blower. His wrongful insistence to chair the
Roxas division is the root cause of all this mess.
Justice Sabio claimed that pressure from both sides was being exerted on him. He
presumed the same or greater pressure on the other justices was not far behind. If
Justice Sabio truly wanted to preserve the integrity of the CA, he should have
exposed the attempts to influence him at the first instance and then distanced
himself from the case.
Sadly, that is not what happened here. He did not divulge his brother's phone call to
influence his TRO vote, immediately after it was made on May 30, 2008. He waited
from July 1, 2008 (the day De Borja allegedly offered the P10 million to him) to July
26, 2006 (when he finally wrote the Presiding Justice about the bribe offer), before
finally going on record about the bribery attempt. His letter to the Presiding Justice
regarding the bribe offer came only after Justice L. Bienvenido Reyes' 8th Division
promulgated the decision on the Meralco case,28 leaving him and Justice Vidal out in
the cold. What took him so long to publicly denounce these efforts to pressure him?
Likewise, he first kept suspiciously silent on the name of the bribe-offeror.29
Justice Sabio's obstinate refusal to vacate the chairmanship of the Special 9th
Division flames suspicion on his motive. As the Panel intimated, he may have been
actually influenced "to help GSIS."

Whistle-blowers are most certainly welcome. However, I cannot in good conscience

appreciate it in this case, especially when the claim of whistle-blowing is belated,
smacks of afterthought and reeks of dubious motives.
e. Justice Sabio's other admissions show conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Judiciary.
During the hearings, De Borja alleged that he gave Justice Sabio P300,000 as token
for his legal advice on a Roa property deal when Justice Sabio was still an RTC
judge in Cagayan de Oro. Justice Sabio admitted receipt of the P300,000.00. That
was an impermissible moonlighting.
While the Panel was only tasked to determine the improprieties of the CA Justices in
relation to the Meralco case, Justice Sabio's acceptance of the P300,000 gift is an
impropriety that cannot be condoned. It goes into his very fitness to hold a seat in
the Judiciary. Judges are prohibited from private practice of law while they are active
members of the judiciary.30 This includes giving professional advice as members of
the bar31 on cases, pending or otherwise, to litigants and third parties.
Moreover, Justice Sabio himself in a motion admits a regrettable incident that
occurred not long ago. During a meeting among division chairmen of the CA, Justice
Sabio admitted having challenged the then Presiding Justice to a fistfight.32 It
bears stressing that Justice B. L. Reyes was reprimanded for discourtesy for signing
the Roxas ponencia without waiting for the belated action of the Presiding Justice.
Justice Sabio's bullying, belligerent conduct towards a Presiding Justice is worse
than a discourtesy. It is conduct unbecoming of a magistrate.
f. Justice Sabio's gross improprieties and unethical conduct, aggravated by his
teaching of Legal and Judicial Ethics, show that he is unfit to continue in the
Judiciary.
Justice Sabio has violated several ethical principles, enshrined in the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The violations are not simple but grave misconduct. A brief suspension is
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses.
It is alarming that Justice Sabio even proudly proclaims his being a professor of
Legal Ethics, a member of the Philippine Judicial Academy's (PHILJA) Ethics and
Judicial Conduct Department, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
lecturer and Ateneo Law School's Pre-bar reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics.33His
breach of the ethical principles he ought to know by heart aggravates his offenses.

3. On Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.

The Panel found that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership
expected of him as head of the CA.34 While he advances three arguments to strike
that down, the finding has strong bases.
First, the CA en banc's decision referring "the propriety of the actions of the
Justices concerned" to this Court does not show that the investigation should
exclude Presiding Justice Vasquez. No CA justices were specified, and in order to
get to the bottom of the truth, the investigation had to be full-blown. In addition to
being the Presiding Justice, Vasquez was also personally embroiled in the Meralco
controversy. There was no reason for him to think his own actions would not be
inquired into by the Panel, or that he would merely be considered a "resource
speaker."35 He cannot justify his acts of omission by merely arguing that he was
unable to render "more complete explanations or more focused justifications vis-vis the charge against"36him. All he had to do during the investigation was to tell the
truth, and if the truth revealed lapses on his part, he should be responsible for his
actions. Second, during the proceedings, Presiding Justice Vasquez showed his
incapacity to lead the CA. As the Panel found, he was indecisive in dealing with the
turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized in resolving the
chairmanship impasse.37Having referred the matter to Justice Cruz, he ignored the
latter's opinion and deferred to that of Justice Sabio. Worse, he refused to take
action on the reported bribe offer by De Borja (or Meralco) to Justice Sabio. He
hesitated to assert his authority even when the parties themselves repeatedly urged
him to lay down the rule for him to follow.38 His justification that he wanted Justices
B.L. Reyes and Sabio to resolve the chairmanship issue between them 39 precisely
shows his lack of leadership. Also, his belief that the dispute was beyond his
jurisdiction because it is a judicial matter,40 is disturbing as it reveals that he does not
know what his duties are as Presiding Justice. As the Panel pointed out, he is
authorized to act on any matter involving the court and its members.41 Verily, his
failed leadership caused the Meralco situation to deteriorate. Third, intended efforts
to clean up the CA will be pointless if not backed up by a strong and coherent
leadership that will initiate and implement reforms. Presiding Justice Vasquez has
proven himself inadequate in this respect. He cannot be expected to be the
torchbearer and forerunner in reforming and restoring faith in the CA. How can the
CA "overcome"42 the difficulties of public distrust and heal itself towards moral
recovery with a weak leader at the helm? Vasquez' continued stay in the appellate
court will be ineffective and self-defeating.
4. On Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal

Justice Vidal's acts were not merely lapses in judgment; they constitute failure to
uphold independence in the Judiciary.
Justice Dimaranan Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be
rushed by Justice Roxas into signing the Meralco decision without having read the
parties' memoranda, and without deliberation among its members, given the
significance of the case.43 She admits her lapse when she merely relied on the
representation of Justice Roxas that it was urgent for her to immediately sign the
decision. These are not mere accidents or mistakes made by an ordinary employee.
These indicate lack of caution on the part of one who has been deigned to don the
judicial robe.
Thus, she should not expect to be treated with kid gloves for the reasons advanced
in her motion for reconsideration, including the fact of her impending retirement.
Accordingly, the writer of the separate opinion voted to deny the motions for
reconsideration filed by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, and Justices Jose L.
Sabio, Jr., Vicente Q. Roxas, and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal. Instead he voted:
1. to affirm the dismissal of Justice Roxas from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any.
2. to dismiss Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. from the service.
3. to order Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez' forced retirement with entitlement
to leave credits and retirement benefits, without prejudice to re-employment in the
government service.44
4. to substitute reprimand for admonition to Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
One more Justice who maintains his vote in the Court's per curiam decision wrote a
separate concurring opinion, to wit:
Another justice regards the extremely adverse comments and observations about
Justice Sabio to be unwarranted nitpicking that sees all the imperfections of
individual trees but completely misses the forest. More than anything else, this
justice believes that the liability of the CA justices should be taken in the total
context of what they did in relation with the problems that confronted them.
More than anything else, this justice believes that the liability of the CA justices
should be taken in the total context of what they did in relation with the problems
that confronted them.

What should not be missed with respect to Justice Sabio is the fact that he blew the
whistle on what was happening, thus triggering the investigation that transpired.
Without Sabio's whistleblowing, the whole Meralco-GSIS mess at the CA would
have been effectively covered up, ending as one of the stories whispered about in
judicial corridors and in gossip columns to the detriment of the whole judicial
system. Justice Sabio's act was really the first of its kind in judicial history when one
sitting justice spoke about an on-going corruption in the courts. To be sure, this is
not the first incidence of corruption in the appellate court and in the judiciary as a
whole. The distinguishing feature of this one is that a sitting justice openly spoke
and made a proper report about it. As the committee's findings confirm, Justice
Sabio reported the attempted bribery to Presiding Justice Vasquez and at some
point exerted efforts to report it to the Chief Justice. That was how determined
Justice Sabio was to fully expose the anomaly he found himself in. His passion for
truth was such that he could have simply kept his brother's call to himself as nobody
knew about it except the two of them. Yet, casting aside familial sympathies, he
disclosed the matter if only to fully ventilate the totality of what he knew about the
Meralco-GSIS affair. The apparently forgotten bottom line in Justice Sabio's action
was the manner he voted; he voted against his brother's side by granting the
temporary restraining order that Meralco prayed for.
As a lesson from the whole affair, the commenting Justice bewails that whistle
blowing has not been accorded the attention it deserves in the Committee Report as
well as in the Court's consideration of the matter. Even our laws have not given
whistle blowers recognition although these same laws recognize the need and
utilitarian value of state witnesses in criminal prosecutions and accordingly give
them special treatment for their contribution. If this is done in the prosecution of
crimes in general, with more reason should whistle blowing be given due recognition
in graft and corruption cases where the whistle blower is not necessarily a party to
the misdeed. Corruption, too, is never done in the open, only in darkness and
secrecy where it can be effectively hidden. To effectively combat such easily
concealed misdeeds, the law and this Court should not disregard the lights that
whistle blowers offer, very often at substantial risk to themselves. Stated positively,
these lights should be recognized and appreciated instead of being disregarded, or
worse, snuffed out. Thus, Justice Sabio should be treated with understanding and
leniency instead of being nitpicked and totally condemned.
Apart from the above-mentioned separate concurring and dissenting opinion of one
Justice, the Justices' votes and inhibitions remained unchanged.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 24, 2008 filed by Justice
Vicente Q. Roxas; Motion for Reconsideration dated September 15, 2008 filed by Justice

Jose L. Sabio, Jr.; Motion for Reconsideration dated September 24, 2008 filed by
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.; A Plea for Compassion and Clemency dated
September 22, 2008 filed by Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal; and Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 26, 2008 filed by Mr. Francis de Borja are DENIED
WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
ADM. CASE No. 7006

October 9, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE

PROSECUTOR.
DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No.
5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge
Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC
of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the
Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by
the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of
murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail
Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original
charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec.
4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the
case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he
"lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of
the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge
Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved
the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002,
which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In
October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and
February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of
an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao
judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a
murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion
that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a
policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo
admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases
when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge
F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from
the case for an unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and
would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are
displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed
respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily,
to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for
indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its
presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser
described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30,
2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself
from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that
respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When
asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only
source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge
Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear
reason," was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to
answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a
motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of
court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated
September 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to
give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor
Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on
August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which
is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have
committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP
is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a
bond ofP100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.7
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio StationDXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the
trial court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required
respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he
should not be held in contempt for his media interviewsthat degraded the court and the
presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule
13.02 of Canon 13.9
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and
that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program
between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony
Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In
those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know
the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and
needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to
properly prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill
of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and
statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor
informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4,
2003 cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for,"
and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he
should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated
October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of
January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS.
He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was
approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court,
and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He
also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance.
He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional
right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without
malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has
grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave
professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served

at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court
for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10
The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on
October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng
panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato
duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your
mind yet?)
BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang
pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka
abogado, mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of
the law should be disbarred. That's it.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga
hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod,
magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bagong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at
unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod
ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo
sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagkaabogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang
pagkabakakon . . . .
(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of
the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the
law to insure that when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not
know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of
the law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just
take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako
nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy
sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad
nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order
was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state the amount
of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)
BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako
siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon
siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal."
Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")
xxx
BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.
Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross
ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx
TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?
(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na
siya sa pagka abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibawan nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug

ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is
not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for
a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the
law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the
case of murder . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero
unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto,
iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man
lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo,
Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong
hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a
democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you
did not accord me due process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to
humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but
because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan,
what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That
when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not
accord me due process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan
kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the
problems in the Supreme Court.)
BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang
balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao
bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are
ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been

reading? I heard that he is a mahjong aficionado(mahjongero) and that is why he is

studying mahjong.11
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the
court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not
promote distrust in the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law
under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec.
2713 of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to
be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the
Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar
Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension from the practice of law,
dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article
in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity
and independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial
court's Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in
connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by
respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when
respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order
of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been
reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among
the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are

broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law
as a consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations.18 Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to
"observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should
insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall
submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a
press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao
judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003
issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were
made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of
studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to [his] clients."
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the
example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers. Montecillo v. Gica19 held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an
officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to
which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect,
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules
clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because
respect for the institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of
violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with aSTERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.