l 50 Part I: Practice

ll world.I will end by arguingthat boundariesof practiceare not sim-

ple linesof demarcationbetweeninsideand outside,but form a com-
I plex sociallandscapeofboundariesand peripheries.
' Practiceas locality. chapter 5 addressesthe scope and
limits of the
ChapterI

tl conceptof community of practice.I will discusswhen to view a social

configuration asone community or as a consteilationof communities
Meaning

rir
tl
of practice.I will thus start talking about other leversof socialstruc-
ture, but still in terms of practice.I will leavethe discussionof other
types ofstructuring processesfor Part IL
' Knowing in practice. coda I ends this discussion practice

rrii of
brief essayon knowing in practice.Echoing rhe argumentof part I,
I will summarizethe themes introduced in each chapter by using
with a
Our attemptsto understandhuman life open a vast spaceof relevant
guestions- from the origin of the universeto the workingsof the brain,

i]lil
them to ponder what it meansto know in practice.This wil result in
from the details of every thought to the purpose of life. In this vast
a definitionof learningasan interplayof experienceand competence.
rpace of questions,the concept of practice is useful for addressinga
rpecific slice:a focus on the experienceof meaningfulness. Practiceis,
il Becausecoda I givesan overviewof part I, it offersa logical start-
ing point if you like to begin with an overview and are comfortable first and foremost,a processby which we can experiencethe world and

Lil with terms that are not yet well-defined.You would first see- in a syn-
optic fashionand in a specificcontext - how the whole argument fits
our engagementwith it as meaningful.
Of course,in order to engagein practice,we must be alive in a world

tl together, and then be able to obtain details by referring to individ-

ual chapters.
in which we can act and interact.We must havea body with a brain that
is functioning well enough to participate in social communities. We
must have waysto communicate with one another.But a focus on prac-

lrll tice is not merely a functional perspectiveon human activities,even

rctivities involving multiple individuals.It doesnot addresssimply the
mechanicsof getting somethingdone, individually or in groups; it is

tli not a mechanicalperspective.It includesnot just bodies(or even coor-

dinatedbodies)and not just brains (evencoordinatedones),but more-

lrI over that which gives meaningto the motions of bodies and the work-
ings of brains.t
Let me illustrate this point by analogyto a work of art. There are all
iiil sortsof mechanicsinvolved in producinga painting: a canvas,brushes,
color pigments,and sophisticatedtechniques.The image itself is but a

lil thin veneer.Yet in the end, for the painter and for the viewer, it is the
paintingasan experienceof meaningthat counts.Similarly, in the pur-

ltr suit of our enterprises,we engagein all sortsof activitieswith complex

bodiesthat are the result of millennia of evolution.Still, in the end, it

tl is the meaningswe produce that matter.

This focuson meaningfulnessis thereforenot primarily on the tech-
nicalities of "meaning." It is not on meaning as it sits locked up in
dictionaries.It is not iust on meaningas a relation betweena sign and
a reference.But neitheris it on meaningas a grandquestion- on the
5l
 52 Part I: Practice
meaningof life as a philosophicalissue.Practiceis aboutmeaningas an
ercperienceof eaeryd.aylife.
If the kind of meaningI am interestedin is an experience,and if it
is not the kind we can find in dictionarydefinitionsor in philosophical
discussions, then I need to addressthe questionsof where it is located
and how it is constituted.In this chapter,I will first arguethat:
l) meaning is located in a processI will call the negotiationof
meaning
2) the negotiationof meaninginvolvesthe interactionof two con-
stituent processes,which I will call participation and reifcation
3) participationand reificationform a duality that is fundamental
to the human experienceof meaningand thus to the nature of
practice.
These conceptsare essentialto my argument, and I will start by ex-.
plaining in some detail what I mean by them and just why they are
important.
Negotiation of meaning
The experienceof meaningis not producedout of thin air, but
neither is it simply a mechanicalrealizationof a routine or a procedure.
For Ariel, no two claimsare the same,even though she has learnedto
coercetheseclaimsinto manageable categories.Indeed,medicalclaims
processingis largely a classificatoryactivity. Its purpose is to impose
standardsof sameness and differencein the midst of a flow of changeso
that claims can be recognizedas belonging to categoriesamenableto
well-understoodtreatment.But for Ariel. this routinizationmust con-
stantly be achievedanew,claim after claim.
Our engagementin practicemay have patterns,but it is the produc-
tion of suchpatternsanewthat givesrise to an experienceof meaning.
When we sit down for lunch for the thousandthtime with the samecol-
leaguesin the samecafeteria,we haveseenit all before.We know all the
i steps.We may even know today'smenu by heart; we may love it or we
may dread it. And yet we eat again,we taste again.We may know our
colleaguesvery well, and yet we repeatedlyengagein conversations.
ii All that we do and saymay refer to what hasbeen done and said in the
past,and yet we produceagaina new situation,an impression,an expe-
rience: we produce meaningsthat extend, redirect, dismiss,reinter-
pret, modify or confirm - in a word, negotiateanew- the historiesof
ChapterI: Meaning 53
meaningsof which they are part. In this sense,living is a constantpro-
cessof negotiationof neaning.
I will use the concept of negotiationof meaning very generallyto
characterizethe processby which we experiencethe world and our en-
gagementin it as meaningful.2Whether we are talking, acting, think-
ing, solving problems,or daydreaming,we are concernedwith mean-
ings. I have argued that even routine activitieslike claims processing
or eating in a cafeteriainvolve the negotiationof meaning,but it is all
the more true when we are involved in activitiesthat we care about or
that presentus with challenges:when we look in wonder at a beautiful
landscape,when we closea delicatedeal,when we go on a specialdate,
when we solvea difficult mystery,when we listen to a moving piece of
music,when we read a good book, or when we mourn a dear friend. In
suchcases,the intensity of the processis obvious,but the sameprocess
is at work evenif what we end up negotiatingturns out to be an expe-
rienceof meaninglessness. Human engagementin the world is first and
foremosta processof negotiatingmeaning.3
The negotiationof meaningmay involve language,but it is not lim-
ited to it. It includesour socialrelationsas factorsin the negotiation,
but it doesnot necessarilyinvolve a conversationor even direct inter-
oction with other human beings.The conceptof negotiationoften de-
notes reaching an agreementbetween people, as in "negotiating a
price," but it is not limited to that usage.It is alsoused to suggestan
accomplishmentthat requiressustainedattentionand readjustment,as
in "negotiatinga sharp curve." I want to captureboth aspectsat once,
in order to suggestthat living meaningfullyimplies:
l) an active processof producing meaning that is both dynamic
and historical
2) a world of both resistanceand malleability
3) the mutual ability to affectand to be affected
+) the engagementof a multiplicity of factorsand perspectives
5) the productionofa new resolutionto the convergenceofthese
factorsand perspectives
6) the incompleteness of this resolution,which canbe partial, ten-
tative, ephemeral,and specificto a situation.
I intend the term negotiationto conveya flavor ofcontinuous inter-
tction, of gradualachievement, and of give-and-take.By living in the
just
world we do not make meaningsup independentlyof the world,
5+ Part I: Practice
but neitherdoesthe world simply imposemeaningson us. The negotia-
tion of meaningis a productiveprocess,but negotiatingmeaningis not
constructingit from scratch.Meaning is not pre-existing,but neither is
it simply made up. Negotiatedmeaningis at once both historicaland
dynamic,contextualand unique.
The negotiationof meaningis a processthat is shapedby multiple
elementsand that affectstheseelements.As a result, this negotiation
constantlychangesthe situationsto which it givesmeaningand affects
all participants.In this process,negotiatingmeaning entails both in-
terpretation and action. In fact, this perspectivedoes not imply a
fundamental distinction between interpreting and acting, doing and
thinking, or understandingand responding.All are part of the ongoing
processof negotiatingmeaning.This processalwaysgeneratesnew cir-
cumstancesfor further negotiationand further meanings.It constantly
producesnew relations with and in the world. The meaningfulness
of our engagementin the world is not a stateof affairs,but a continual
processof renewednegotiation.a
From this perspective,meaningis alwaysthe product of its negotia-
tion, by which I meanthat it existsin this processof negotiation.Mean-
ing existsneither in us, nor in the world, but in the dynamicrelation of
living in the world.
meaning
Thedynamicsof negotiated
The processingof a given claim form by a processorlike Ariel
is an exampleof the negotiationof meaning. It takesplace in a con-
text that combinesa vast array of factors,including the organizationof
the insuranceindustry,the officialand unofficialtraining the processor
underwent, the way the particular claim looks, past experienceswith
similar claims,the way the day is going, who elseis around,what else
is happening,and so on. The contextsthat contribute to shapingthe
experienceof a claim reachfar and wide in time and space.
When Ariel grabs a new claim, she may not know exactly what to
do, but she is in familiar territory. Even if there is a problem, she may
be annoyedbut she is not surprised;it will be resolvedeventually.In
fact, she can hardly recall the tentativenessof that first day,the unset-
tling mysteriousness of thosetraining weeks,the reachingout during
her first monthson the floor, when just about every claim she was pro-
cessingpresentedone problemor another.It had seemedso big then -
Chapter l: Meaning 55
claims processing,Alinsu, the medical establishment.But now it is
farniliar. It is her job, and she is reasonablygood at it.
The claim too comes with a history. It started out as a blank form
designed by technicalspecialists at Alinsu. Ir was approvedby various
professional associationsbefore it was printed. It was sent to a client
corrrpany where a benefit representativedistributed it to an employee.
It was partially filled out by that employeeand submitted to medical
professionalswho completedit. Then it was sent back to Alinsu, where
it was first sorted by clerical personnel to be routed in a bundle to
Ariel's processingunit. And now it is on her desk,to be coerced some-
how into the confinesof the processible.
Processing claims requires a very specificway of looking at a claim
form. The ability to interpret a claim form reflects the relations that
both the claim and Ariel have to particular practices.Ariel contributes
to the negotiation of meaningby being a member of a community and
bringing to bear her history of participation in its practice. similarly,
the claim contributes to this processby reflecting aspectsof practice
that have been congealedin it and fixed in its shape.I would saythat the
processorasa member of a community of practiceembodiesa long and
diverse processof what I will call participation similarly, the claim as
rn artifact of certain practicesembodiesa long and diverse processof
what I will call reifcation. It is in the convergenceof these tw' pro-
cessesin the act of processingthe claim that the negotiationof meaning
takes place.
As a pair, participation and reificationrefer to a duality fundamental
ro the negotiation of meaning.In order to clarify why this is so, I will
first discusseachterm separatelybeforeturning to the duality that their
complementarityforms.
Participation
My use of the term participationfallswithin common usage.It
is therefore helpful to start with webster's definition: "To have or take
i pirrt or sharewith others(in someactivity,enterprise,etc.)." partici-
Pirtionrefers to a processof taking part and alsoto the relationswith
'thcrs that reflect this process.It suggestsboth actionand connection.
In this brok, I will use the term participationto describethe social
erpcricncc of living in rhe world in termsof membershipin socialcom-
rrrrrnilicsirnclactivc involvcmcntin socialenterprises. participation
 l
56 Part I: Practice
in this senseis both personal and social. It is a complex processthat
combines doing, talking, thinking, feeling, and belonging.It involves
our whole person, including our bodies, minds, emotions, and social
li relations.
Participation is an active process, but I will reserve the term for
lli
actors who are members of social communities. For instance.I will not
say that a computer "participates" in a community of practice, even
though it may be part of that practice and play an activerole in getting
liir certain things done.sNeither will I say that a fish in its bowl in the living
room participatesin a family. But I would be open to consideringthat
a family dog, for instance, participates in some peripheralbut real way
in that family. In this regard, what I take to characterizeparticipationis
the possibility of mutual recognition. When we shavea piece of wood
lrl
or mold a piece of clay, we do not construe our shapingtheseobjectsas
contributing to their experience of meaning. But when we engagein a
conversation,we somehow recognize in each other somethingof our-
I selves,which we address.What we recognize hasto do with our mutual
ll
i
ability to negotiate meaning. This mutuality does not, however,entail
equality or respect. The relations between parentsand children or be-
tween workers and their direct supervisor are mutual in the sensethat
participants shape each other's experiences of meaning. In doing so,
they can recognize something of themselves in each other. But these
are not relations of equality. In practice, even the meaningsof inequal-
ity are negotiatedin the context of this processof mutual recognition.
In this experienceof mutuality, participation is a sourceof identity.
By recognizing the mutuality of our participation, we becomepart of
il each other. In fact, the concept of identity is so centralthat I will post-
pone more detailed discussion until Part II, where it will be the main
topic. Here I will just say that a defining characteristicof participation
is the possibility of developing an "identity of participation,"that is, an
identity constituted through relations of participation.
Before I proceed, it is worth clarifying a few more points about my
use of the term participation.
. Firsl, participation as I will use the term is not tantamountto collab-
oration. It can involve all kinds of relations. conflictualaswell ashar-
monious, intimate as well as political, competitive as well as cooper-
ative.
. Second,participationin social communities shapesour experience,
and it also shapesthose communities; the transformativcpotential
Chapterl: Meaning 57
goesboth ways.Indeed, our ability (or inability) to shapethe practice
of our communities is an important aspect of our experienceof
participation.
. Finally, as a constituent of meaning, participation is broader than
mere engagementin practice. Claims processorsare not claimspro-
cessorsjust while they work in the office. Of course,that time of in-
tenseengagementwith their work and with one anotheris especially
significant.But they do not cease to be claims processorsat five
o'clock. Their participation is not something they simply turn off
when they leave.Its effectson their experienceare not restrictedto
the specificcontext of their engagement.It is a part of who they are
that they alwayscarry with them and that will surfaceif, for instance,
they themselveshappento go to the doctor, fill out an insuranceform,
or call a customer service center. In this sense,participation goes
beyond direct engagementin specific activitieswith specificpeople.
It placesthe negotiationof meaning in the context of our forms of
membershipin various communities. It is a constituentof our iden-
tities. As such, participation is not somethingwe turn on and off.
From this perspective,our engagementwith the world is social,even
when it does not clearly involve interactions with others. Being in a
hotel room by yourself preparing a set of slidesfor a presentationthe
next morning may not seemlike a particularly socialevent,yet its mean-
ing is fundamentallysocial.Not only is the audiencethere with you as
you attempt to makeyour points understandableto them, but your col-
leaguesare there too, looking over your shoulder,asit were,represent-
ing for you your senseofaccountability to the professionalstandardsof
your community.A child doing homework, a doctor making a decision,
e traveler reading a book - all these activities implicitly involve other
peoplewho may not be present. The meaningsof what we do are al-
wayssocial.By "social" I do not refer iust to family dinners,company
picnics,schooldances,and church socials.Even drasticisolation- asin
rolitary confinement,monasticseclusion,or writing - is given meaning
through socialparticipation. The concept of participationis meant to
capturethis profoundlysocialcharacterofour experienceoflife.
Reification
The term re'iJication
is less common than participation.But I
hopc to show that, in conjunctionwith participation,reificationis a
58 Part I: Practice
very usefulconceptto describeour engagementwith the world as pro-
ductiveof meaning.Again, it will help to start with Webster'sdefinition
of reification:"To treat (an abstraction)as substantiallyexisting,or as
a concretematerial object."6
Etymologically,the term reificationmeans"making into a thing." Its
usagein Englishhasa significanttwist, however:it is usedto conveythe
idea that what is turned into a concrete,materialobjectis not properly
a concrete,material object. For instance,we make representationsof
"justice" asa blindfolded maid holding a scale,or use expressionssuch
as "the hand of fate."
In everydaydiscourse,abstractionslike "democracy" or "the econ-
omy" are often talked about as though they were active agents.When
a newscastreportsthat "democracytook a blow during a military coup,"
or that "the economyreactedslowly to the government'sactionr"the
processof reificationprovidesa shortcut to communication.
This succinctnessderivesfrom a slight illusion of excessivereality,
but it is usefulbecauseit focusesthe negotiationof meaning.This is the
subtle idea I want to captureby using the term reification.We project
our meaningsinto the world and then we perceivethem as existingin
the world, ashaving a reality of their own. For example,my own use of
the term reificationin the context of this book is itself a casein point.
The term is a projectionof what I mean.It is an abstraction.It doesnot
do the work by itself. But after a while, as I use it to think with, it starts
talking to me as though it were alive. Whereasin participationwe rec-
ognizeourselvesin eachother, in reificationwe project ourselvesonto
the world, and not having to recognizeourselvesin those projections,
we attribute to our meaningsan independentexistence.This contrast
betweenmutuality and projection is an important differencebetween
participationand reification.
The conceptof rei,frcation
I will use the conceptof reification very generallyto refer to
the processof giving form to our experienceby producingobjectsthat
congealthis experienceinto "thingness."In so doing we createpoints
of focus around which the negotiationof meaningbecomesorganized.
Again my use of the term reificationis its own example.I am introduc-
ing it into the discoursebecauseI want to createa new distinction to
serveasa point of focusaroundwhich to organizemy discussion.Writ-
ing down a law, creatinga procedure,or producinga trxrl is a similar
Chapter1: Meaning 59
process.A certain understandingis given form. This form then be-
comesa focus for the negotiationof meaning,as peopleuse the law to
arguea point, use the procedureto know what to do, or use the tool to
perform an action.
I would claim that the processof reification so construedis central
to every practice. Any community of practice producesabstractions,
tools,symbols,stories,terms, and conceptsthat reify somethingof that
practicein a congealedform. clearly, I want to use the conceptof rei-
fication in a much broader sensethan its dictionary definition. But I
want to preservethe connotationsof excessiveconcretenessand pro-
jectedreality that are suggestedby the dictionarydefinition. Indeed,no
abstraction,tool, or symbolactuallycapturesin its form the practicesin
the contextof which it contributesto an experienceof meaning.A med-
ical claim, for instance,reifies in its form a complex web of conven-
tions,agreements,expectations,commitments,and obligations,includ-
ing (on the part of medical professionals)the right to bilr for certain
servicesand the obligationto do so in a srandardizedwayand (on the
part of the insurancecompany)the right to decideif the claim is legiti-
mateand duly filled out, togetherwith the obligationto honor the claim
if it is.?
with the term reificationI mean to cover a wide range of processes
that include making, designing,representing,naming, encoding,and
describing,as well as perceiving,interpreting, using, reusing, decod-
ing, and recasting.Reificationoccupiesmuch of our collectiveenergy:
from entriesin a journal to historicalrecords,from poemsto encyclo-
pedias,from names to classificationsystems,from dolmens to space
probes,from the Constitution to a signatureon a credit card slip, from
gourmet recipesto medical procedures,from flashyadvertisementsto
censusdata, from single conceptsto entire theories,from the evening
newsto nationalarchives,from lessonplansto the compilationof text-
books,from private addresslists to sophisticatedcredit reporting data-
bases,from tortuous political speechesto the yellow pages.In all these
cases,aspectsof human experienceand practice are congealedinto
fixed forms and given the statusof object.
Reificationshapesour experience.It can do so in very concreteways.
Having a tool to perform an activity changesrhe nature of that activity.
A word processor,for instance,reifiesa view of the activity of writing,
but alsochangeshow one goesabout writing. The effectsof reification
canalsobe lessobvious.Reifyingthe conceptof gravitymay not change
its cffecton our brdics, but it doeschangeour experienceof the worrd
 60 Part I: Prachce
by focusingour attentionin a particular way and enablingnew kinds of
understanding.Similarly,reifying the conceptof body weight asa mea-
sure of self-worth doesnot make us heavierbut can weigh heavily on
our senseof self.The reificationof claimsprocessingthrough the type
of forms and proceduresdescribedin Vignette II can detachwork activ-
ities from other personalexperiencesto the point where the generally
reificativenatureof the work givesthe job of claimsprocessinga partic-
ular character.Even the regularly scheduledbreaksreify what is work
and what is not.
Again, I should clarify a few points about my use of the conceptof
reificationbeforeproceeding.
Reificationcan refer both to a processand its producr, and I will use
the term in both senses.This liberty is not just a lack of rigor, but
part of the point.If meaningexistsonly in its negotiationthen,at the
level of meaning,the processand the product are not distinct. Reifi-
cation is not just objectification;it doesnot end in an object.It does
not simply translatemeaninginto an object.On the contrary,my use
of the conceptis meantto suggestthat suchtranslationis never pos-
sible,and that the processand the product alwaysimply eachother.
Claims processorsare not the designersof the rules and forms they
use,yet they must absorbthem into their practice.In an institutional
environmentsuchas a claimsprocessingsite, a very large portion of
the reification involved in work practicescomes from outside the
I
communitiesof workers.Even so, however,reification must be re-
appropriatedinto a local processin order to becomemeaningful.8
The processof reificationdoesnot necessarilyoriginatein design.A
detectivemay spendmuch time studyingfingerprintson a doorknob;
an archaeologistis fascinatedby tracesof ancientlife in a cave.Most
human activitiesproducemarks in the physicalworld. These marks
are vestiges.They freezefleeting moments of engagementin prac-
tice into monuments,which persistand disappearin their own time.
Whether intentionally produced or not, they can then be reinte-
gratedas reificationinto new moments of negotiationof meaning.
Reificationcan take a greatvariety of forms: a fleeting smokesignal
or an age-old pyramid, an abstractformula or a concretetruck, a
small logo or a huge information-processingsystem,a simple word
jotted on a pageor a complex argument developedin a whole book,
a telling glanceor a long silence,a private knot on a handkerchiefor
a controversial statueon a public square,an impressionist paintingol'
a butterflyor a scientificspecimenin an entomologicllcollcction.
ChapterI: Meaning
6l
what is imporrant_about ail theseobjectsis that they are onry the tip
of an iceberg,which indicatesrargerconrextsof significance
realizedin
human pracrices.Their characterasreificationis iot onry
in their form
but also in the processesby which they are integratedinto
theseprac-
tices.Properly speaking,the productsof reificatilor,
,rot si_ply corr_
crete' material objects.Rather, they are reflections"r"
of thesepractices,
tokensof vast expansesof human meaninss.
Thedoubleedgeof reification
As an evocativeshortcut,the processofreification can
be very
powerful. A politician can reify voters' inarticulate
longings in one
phrasethat galvanizessupport.A good tool can reify
an so as to
amplify its effectswhile making the activity effortress.A""iiuiiy
procei.rre ca'
reify a conceptso that its applicationis automatic.A formula
can ex_
pressin a few terms a regularity that pervadesthe
universe.
But the power of reification - its succinctness,its portability,
its
potenrial physicalpersistence,its focusing effect -
is aiso its danger.
The politician'sslogancan becomea substitutefor a deep
understand-
ing of and commitment to what it standsfor. The tool ."n
orriry
ity aroundits inertness.procedurescan hide broadermeanings ""tiu-
in blind
sequencesof operations.And the knowledgeof a formula
c-anlead to
the illusion that one fuily understandsthe processesit describes.
The evocativepower of reification is thus double_edged.
. Classify_
ing people under broad categoriescan focus attention on
a kind of
diversity,but the reificationcan give differencesand similarities
a con-
cretenessthey do nor actuailypossess.similarly, if an organization
dis-
plays a statementof varuesin its robby,it has created
a reificationof
romething that does or should pervadethe organization.
Though this
"romething" is probably much more diffuse and intangible in- prac-
tice, it gainsa new concretenessonce framed in the tobb"y.It
becomes
romething people can point to, refer to, strive for, appealto,
and use
or misusein arguments'yet, asa reification,it may seemdisconnected,
frozeninto a rext that doesnor caprurethe richnessoflived.*f..i"n."
ffid.that can be appropriatedin misleadingways. As a focus
of at_
lcntion that can be detachedfrom practice,the reification may
even
be scen with cynicism,as an ironic substitutefor what it was intended
lo rcflcct.
Indced,my use of the term reificationdoesnot assumean
inherent
crrrrcsp'ndcnce hctwccna svmboland a referent,a tool and a function,
Ot I phcn,mcn,n lnd ln intcrprctation.C)nthc c'ntrary, the concepr
62 Part I: Practice Chapter I: Meaning 63
of reification suggeststhat forms can take a life of their own, beyond
their contextof origin. They gain a degreeof autonomyfrom the occa-
sion and purposesof their production.Their meaningfulnessis always
potentiallyexpandedand potentiallylost. Reificationasa constituentof
meaningis alwaysincomplete,ongoing,potentially enriching,and po-
tentially misleading.The notion of assigningthe status of object to
somethingthat really is not an objectconveysa senseof mistakensolid-
ity, of projectedconcreteness. It conveysa senseof useful illusion.The
use of the term reification standsboth as a tribute to the generative
power of the processand as a gentlereminder of its delusoryperils.

The duality of meaning

In their interplay,participationand reificationare both distinct
and complementary,assuggestedby the illustrationin Figure l.l.' The Figure l.l. The duality of participationand reification.
reificationof a Constitutionis just a form; it is not equivalentto a citi-
zenry.Yet it is empty without the participationof the citizensinvolved.
More generally,the negotiationof meaningweavesparticipationand
Conversely,the productionof sucha reificationis crucial to the kind of
reification so seamlesslythat meaning seemsto have its own unitary,
negotiationthat is necessaryfor them to act as citizensand to bring to-
self-contained existence:a medicalclaim is a medicalclaim;a smile is
getherthe multiple perspectives, interests,and interpretationsthat par-
a smile;a jokeis a joke.Of course,it is often convenientto act asthough
ticipation entails.
meaningsare in actionsor artifactsthemselves.So a medicalclaim is in-
As the figure suggests,participationand reificationcannotbe consid-
deeda medicalclaim; it wasproducedto be a medicalclaim;it existsfor
ered in isolation:they comeasa pair. They form a unity in their duality.
us in a civilizationwhere everythingconcursto makeit a medicalclaim.
Given one, it is a useful heuristic to wonder where the other is. To
And yet what it is to be a medicalclaim is alwaysdefinedwith respect
understandone,it is necessaryto understandthe other. To enableone,
to specificforms of participationthat contextualizemeaning.It cannot
it is necessaryto enable the other. They come about through each
be assumedto be intrinsicor universal.
other, but they cannot replaceeach other. It is through their various
combinationsthat they give rise to a variety of experiencesof meaning.
We don't usuallythink of the experienceof meaningas a duality be- of participationand reffication
Thecomplementarit.y
causethe interplay of participationand reification remainslargely un-
Although seamlessly woyeninto our practices,the complemen-
problematic.Processes of reificationand participationcan be woven so
tarity of participationand reificationis somethingfamiliar.We use it as
tightly that the distinction between them seemsalmost blurred. The
ir matter of coursein order to securesomecontinuity of meaningacross
useof languagein face-to-faceinteractionsis a good example.Words as
time and space.Indeed,in their complementarity, participationand re-
projectionsof human meaning are certainly a form of reification. In
ificationcanmakeup for their respectivelimitations.They cancompen-
face-to-faceinteractions,however, speech is extremely evanescent;
satefor eachother's shortcomings,so to speak.
words affectthe negotiationof meaningthrough a processthat seems
like pure participation.As a consequence, words can take advantageof . On the one hand, participationmakesup for the inherent limitations
shared participation among interlocutorsto create shortcutsto com- <lfreification.We sendambassadors with our treatiesand hire judges
munication.It is this tight interweavingof reificationand participation t<linterpret<lurlaws;we offer 800 numbersas customerservicefor
that makesconversations sucha powerfulform of communicrrtion. our productsin rtclclition
to our carefuldocumentation; we convenea
 65
64 Part I: Practtce ChaPterI: .Meantng
obvi-
meeting to introduce a new policy in order to avoid misunderstand- The complemenrarityof participationand reificationyields an
of
ings; we discuss what we read in order to compare and enrich our ous but profound principle]or .ndeauorsthat rely on some degree
interpretations. Participation is essential to repairing the potential -
continuiiy of meaning communication, design, instruction,or collab-
and
misalignments inherent in reification. When the stiffness of its form oration. Participationand reification must be in such proportion
too
renders reification obsolete,when its mute ambiguity is misleading, relation as to compensatefor their respectiveshortcomings'When
continu-
or when its purpose is lost in the distance, then it is participation that much relianceis placedon one at the expenseof the other, the
comes to the rescue. ity of meaningis likely to become problematic in practice'
. On the other hand, reification also makes up for the inherent limita- -
. If participationprevails- if most of what mattersis left unreified
tions of participation. We create monuments to remember the dead; of
then there may not be enoughmaterial to anchorthe specificities
we take notes to remind ourselves of decisions made in the past; we
coordinationandtouncoverdivergingassumptions.Thisiswhylaw-
share our notes with colleagues who could not attend a meeting; we
yers alwayswant everythingin writing'
are surprised by the way someone else describes a common event . If reificationprevails- if everythingis reified' but with little oppor-
or object; we clarify our intentions with explanations and represen-
tunityforsharedexperienceandinteractivenegotiation_thenthere
tational devices; we coordinate our coming and going with clocks.
-"y no, be enoughoue,l"p in participationto recovera coordinated'
Mirroring the role of participation, reification is essential to repair- putting
relevant, or generativemeaning' This helps explain why
ing the potential misalignments inherent in participation: when the
everythingin writing doesnot seemto solveall our problems'
informality of participation is confusingly loose, when the fluidity
in
of its implicitness impedes coordination, when its locality is too con- In casesof mismatches'it is necessaryto analyzethe situation
imbalance' Merely adding more
fining or its partiality too narrow, then it is reification that comes to terms of the duality and to redressany
not
the rescue. participationto participationor more reificationto reificationmay
itself un-
irelp much, because for- of participationor reificationis by
One advantageof viewing the negotiation of meaning as constituted " not iust
likely to correct its own shortcomings:not iust anothermemo'
by a dual process is that we can consider the various trade-offs involved
anothermeeting..'.
in the complementarity of participation and reification. lndeed, given
an action or an artifact, it becomes a relevant question to ask how the
production of meaning is distributed, that is, what is reified and what is A fundamentaldualitY
left to participation. The duality of participation and reification will appear again
is a fun-
. A computer program, for instance, could be described as an extreme rrndagainasI developmy argumentin this book' This duality
their
tlame"ntal aspectof the constitutionof communitiesof practice,of
kind of reification, which can be interpreted by a machine incapable identities
cvolutionover time, of the relationsamongpractices'of the
of any participation in its meaning. in which communities
. A poem, by contrast, is designed to rely on participation, that is, to of participants,and of the broader organizations
of practiceexist.
maximize the work that the ambiguity inherent in its form can do in
Inthiscontext'asltriedtoemphasizewiththediagramofFigure
the negotiation of meaning. reifi-
I . I , it is important nnt to interpretthe duality of participationand
end this chapterby expand-
From such a perspective, communication is not just a quantitative cationin teims of a simpleopposition.I will
issue. Indeed, what says more: the few lines of a tightly written poem ing this point. Ifyou in a hurry and feel that enoughhasbeensaid
"i. here and
or a volume of analytical comments on it? The communicative ability rrlrcady,you may want to skip the fine points I am making
the incli-
of artifacts depends on how the work of negotiating meaning is dis- nloveon to the next chapter.But if you havethe patienceand
the nature of the relation
tributed between reification and participation. Different mixes become nrltion,then readingon will help clarifyboth
what I mean
differentially productive of meaning. bclu'ccnplrticillitrionrrndreificationand,more Senerally'
66 Part I: Practtce
by a duality as opposedto a dichotomy. The latter clarification will
be useful since I will introduce a number of dualities in the coming
chapters.Indeed, thinking in terms of complex dualities rather than
mere dichotomiesis fundamentalto the conceptualframework of this
book.
As suggestedby Figure 1.1,a duality is a singleconceptualunit that
is formed by two inseparableand mutually constitutiveelementswhose
inherent tension and complementaritygive the concept richnessand
dynamism.In what follows, I will clarify this idea by contrastingthe
duality of participationand reificationwith related)more traditional di*
chotomiesof opposites- for example,tacit versusexplicit, formal ver-
sus informal, individual versus collective,private versus public, con-
sciousversusunconscious,or peopleversusthings.I will do so via a list
of statements,in eachcasesayingboth what the duality of participation
and reificationis and what it is not.
) Participationand reifcation are a duality, nlt lpposites.
Participationand reification are not defined merely by opposition to
each other. The tacit is that which is not made explicit; the informal
that which is not formalized; the unconsciousthat which is not con-
scious.But participationis not merely what is not reified. Both partici-
pation and reificationare processes definedeachin their own terms. As
a result, they are not mutually exclusive.On the contrary, they take
placetogether;they are two constituentsintrinsic to the processof ne-
gotiation of meaning,and their complementarityreflectsthe inherent
duality of this process.
Participationand reificationboth require and enableeachother. On
the one hand, it takesour participationto produce,interpret, and use
reification;so there is no reificationwithout participation.On the other
hand, our participationrequires interaction and thus generatesshort-
cuts to coordinatedmeaningsthat reflect our enterprisesand our takes
on the world; so there is no participationwithout reification.
) Participationand reificationa.retno d,imensions
that interact;they
do not definee spectrum.
One way to avoid thinking starklyin terms of oppositesis to considera
spectrum. Knowledge can be more or less explicit; learning can be
more or less formal; an impressioncan be more or less conscious;a
meaning can be more or less individual. While a continuum does al-
low more nuanceddistinctions,it is still a relationbetweenopposites.
Chapter1: Meaning 67
Moving to one side implies leavingthe other. More of one implies less
of the other.
With an interacting duality, by contrast,both elementsare always
involved, and both can take different forms and degrees.In particular,
there can be both intenseparticipationand intensereification.In fact,
the creativegenius of great scientistsand artists can be construedas
stemmingfrom their ability to bring the two together:on rhe one hand,
an intense involvement with the reificative formalismsof their disci-
pline; and on the other, a deepparticipativeintuition of what thosefor-
malismsare about. This is true of a scientistlike Albert Einstein. who
insistedon the importanceof exploringideasintuitively aswell asbeing
able to give them mathematicalexpression.It is as true of a musician
like Johann SebastianBach, who combined intricate forms of musical
structurewith melodic inspiration.
Such a perspectivehaspedagogicalimplicationsfor teachingcomplex
knowledge:an excessiveemphasison formalism without correspond-
ing levelsof participation,or converselya neglectof explanationsand
formal structure,can easilyresult in an experienceof meaninglessness.
I Participation and refficationimply eachother; they do not substi-
tutefor eachother.
Increasingthe level of participation or reification does nor dispense
with the other. On the contrary, it will tend to increasethe require-
ments for the other.
Indeed, reificationalwaysrestson participation:what is said,repre-
sented, or otherwise brought into focus always assumesa history of
participationas a context for its interpretation. In turn, participation
alwaysorganizesitself aroundreificationbecauseit alwaysinvolvesarti-
facts,words, and conceptsthat allow it to proceed.
Explicit knowledgeis thus not freed from the tacit. Formal processes
are not freedfrom the informal. In fact, in terms of meaningfulness, the
oppositeis more likely. To be understoodmeaningfullyasa representa-
tion of a pieceof physicsknowledge,an abstractreificationlike E = mc2
does not obviate a closeconnectionto the physicscommunity but, on
the contrary,requiresit. In general,viewed as a reification,a more ab-
stract formulation will require more intense and specificparticipation
to remainmeaningful,not less.
From such a perspective,it is not possibleto make everything ex-
plicit and thus gct rid of the tacit, or to make everything formal and
thus get rid ol'thc infilrmal.It is possibleonly to changetheir relation.
68 Part I: Practrce
I Participation and,refficationtransformtheir relation; they d,onot
translateinto eachother.
A dichotomy tends to suggestthat there must be a processby which
one can move from one to the other by translationinto a different but
equivalentstate.We can transformtacit knowledgeinto explicit knowl-
edge or vice versa;we can formalize a learning process;we can share
our thoughts;we can make our emotionsmore conscious.By contrast,
a changein the relationsof participationand reification is never neu-
tral; it alwaystransformsthe possibilitiesfor negotiatingmeaning.
. Participationis neversimply the realizationof a descriptionor a pre-
scription. Participatingin an activity that has been describedis not
iust translatingthe description into embodied experience,but re-
negotiatingits meaningin a new context.
. Reificationis not a mere articulationof somethingthat alreadyexists.
Writing down a statementof values,expressingan idea, painting a
picture, recounting an event, articulating an emotion, or building a
tool is not merely giving expressionto existingmeanings,but in fact
creatingthe conditionsfor new meanings.
As a consequence,such processesas making something explicit, for-
malizing,or sharingare not merely translations;they are indeed trans-
formations- the production of a new context of both participationand
reification, in which the relationsbetween the tacit and the explicit,
the formal and the informal, the individual and the collective,are to be
renegotiated.
I Participation and refficationd,escribe
an interplay; they are not
ory categories.
classificat
There is a fundamentaldifferencebetweenusing a distinction to clas-
sify things (e.9.,meanings,thoughts,knowledge,learning) as one pole
or the other and using a distinctionto describean inherent interplay.
In a duality, what is of interest is understandingthe interplay, not
classifying.The duality of participationand reification is not a classi-
ficatory scheme.It does not classifymeanings,thoughts, knowledge,
or learning as tacit or explicit, formal or informal, consciousor un-
conscious,individual or collective.Rather, it providesa framework to
analyzethe variouswaysin which they are alwaysboth at once.
Traditional dichotomiesare useful distinctionswhen they are used
to highlight an aspectof a processthat has not receivedenoughatten-
tion. But when it comesto issueslike meaning,knowing,or lcarning,
Chapter 1: Meaning 69
dichotomiescannotprovide cleanclassificatorycategoriesbecausethey
focuson surfacefeaturesrather than on fundamentalprocesses. For in-
stance,the contrastbetweenexplicit and tacit knowledgeis quite useful
becauseit is important to recognizethe existenceof aspectsof knowl-
edgethat we cannoteasilyarticulate;hence,being ableto tellandbeing
able to do arenot equivalent.
Classifyingknowledgeas explicit or tacit runs inro difficulties,how-
ever,becauseboth aspectsare alwayspresentto somedegree.For ex-
ample, peoplewho know how to ride a bicycle often cannot articulate
how they keep their balance.In particular,they cannotsay which way
they steer in order to avoid falling, even though they do it right.roTo
classifyriding a bicycle as tacit knowledgeis tricky becausepeopleare
not exactlyspeechless aboutthe process.They cantell you, for instance,
that you must pedaland steer,hold the bar, and not wiggle too much or
sit backwardunlessyou're a pro. Classifyingknowledgethen becomes
a matter of deciding what counrsas explicit, and that dependson rhe
enterprisewe are involved in.
Walking is a very embodiedknowledge,but if someonetells me ro
walk, I can do it. Requiring only this yields a good enoughrelation be-
tween the explicit and the tacit for cerrain purposes,though probably
not good enoughfor an orthopedistwho needsto know which muscles
I use to keepmy balanceand move my legs- but that is a different en-
terprise altogether.Conversely,I'd bet that physicists,whose knowl-
edge many of us would consider very explicit, would have as hard a
time articulatingexactlyhow they makesenseof conceptssuchas force
and space-timeas we have explaininghow we ride a bicycle.When it
comesto meaningfulknowing in the context of any enterprise,the ex-
plicit must alwaysstop somewhere.It is alwayspossibleto find aspecs
that are not explicit, and this is exactly what a duality of participation
and reificationwould predict: we produce preciselythe reification we
need in order to proceedwith the practicesin which we parricipate.
The duality of participationand reificationis more fundamentalthan
our ability to put things in words,createformalisms,articulateour feel-
ings,or shareour thoughts.It is thereforeimportant not to reducepar-
ticipation and reificationto any of the dichotomiesI havementioned.
. For instance,participationis not just tacit, informal, or unconscious,
becauseour participationincludesactionslike havinga conversation,
teachinga formalizedcurriculum, or reflectingon our motives.
. Reificationis not just explicit, becausethere are many ways of rei-
fying thrrttrc not simply putting things into words.A painting,for
70 Part I: Practice Chapter I: Meaning 7l
instance,reifiesa perceptionof the world, an understanding.It is an In this interplay, our experienceand our world shape each other
expressionthat makesa statementand focusesour attention in spe- through a reciprocalrelation that goesto the very essenceof who we
cific ways.But it is difficult to saywhether this expressionis explicit are. The world as we shapeit, and our experienceas the world shapes
or tacit. Similarly, building a tool or systematicallyignoring people it, are like the mountain and the river. They shapeeachother, but they
to let them know they are outsidersare actsofreification that cannot havetheir own shape.They are reflectionsofeach other, but they have
easilybe classifiedas tacit or explicit. their own existence,in their own realms.They fit around each other,
. Neither participationnor reificationcan be easilythought of in terms but they remain distinct from eachother. They cannotbe transformed
of contrastsof individual versuscollective,or private versuspublic. into each other, yet they transform each other. The river only carves
Participationis clearlya socialprocess,but it is alsoa personalexpe- and the mountain only guides,yet in their interaction,the carving be-
rience. Reificationallows us to coordinateour actionsand is there- comesthe guiding and the guiding becomesthe carving.
fore of a collectivecharacter,but it shapesour own perceptionsof
the world and ourselves.
. Reificationcan be public to the extent thar it producestangible ob-
jects, but participationcan alsobe public ro the extent rhat our ac-
tions are observable.Moreover,the effectsof both on our experience
are not so visible or easilyclassifiedas public or private.
Finally, the duality of participationand reificationis not just a distinc-
tion betweenpeople and things. It is true that participationis some-
thing we do as persons,and reificationhas to do with objects.But the
duality of participationand reificationsuggestspreciselythat, in rerms
of meaning, people and things cannot be defined independently of
eachother.
. On the one hand, we experiencethe world as we make it amenable
to our practices.I rememberbeing awed by the complex systemof
distinctions and nuancesthat wine tasters have developedto de-
scribewhat to most peopleis merely a better or worseglassof wine.
. On the other hand, our senseof ourselvesincludesthe objectswith
which we identify becausethey furnish our practices.Mastering the
wine-tastingvocabularyand being able to appreciateand discussall
the nuancesof a good wine canbecomea sourceof distinction,pride,
and identity.
What it meansto be a personand what it meansto be a thing both in-
volve an interplay of participationand reification.From this perspec-
tive, peopleand things do not haveto be positedasa point ofdeparture.
They need not be assumedas given to start with. It is engagementin
socialpracticethat provides the baseline.Through the negotiationof
meaning,it is the interplay of participationand reificationthat makes
peopleand things what they are.