[No.9989.March13,1918.

]
EDUARDOCUAYCONGETAL.,plaintiffsandappellees,vs.RAMONA
BENEDICTOETAL.,defendantsandappellants.
1. 1.
ROADSANDSTREETS;EASEMENTS;REGISTRATIONOFLAND;
TORRENSTITLE.Unlessitismadetoappearuponthecertificateoftitle
thattheboundariesofanygivenhighway,way,orprivatewayupontheland
havebeendetermined,therighttosuchhighway,way,orprivatewayis
unaffectedbytheregistrationofthetitle.
2. 2.
REALTY;ENCUMBRANCES;PRESUMPTIONS.Realpropertyispresumedto
befreefrom.liensandencumbrances.
3. 3.
ROADSANDSTREETS;UPKEEPBYGOVERNMENT;PRESUMPTION.
Whereitappearsthataroadhasbeenkeptinrepairbyprivateenterpriseand
thattheGovernmenthasnotcontributedtothecostofitsconstructionor
maintenance,suchroadwillbepresumedtobeprivate.
4. 4.
ID.;PRESUMPTION;USER;TOLERANCE;PUBLICUSE.Themerefactthat
atractoflandhasbeenusedforalongtimeasaroadwillnotalonewarrantthe
presumptionthatithasbeendedicatedtothepublic.
5. 5.
REALTY;PRESCRIPTION;POSSESSION;TOLERANCEPossession,to
constitutethefoundationofaprescriptiveright,mustbepossessionunder
claimoftitle.Actsofapossessorycharacter
782

782
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

1. perfformedbyonewhoholdsbythemeretoleranceoftheownercannotbe
madethebasisoftheprescriptiveacquisitionofrights.
2. 6.
IMMEMORIALPOSSESSION;EVIDENCE.UndertheSpanishlawtheproofof
immemorialpossessionrequiredsomethingmorethanthememoryofliving
witnesses.
3. 7.

EASEMENTSOFWAY;USER;TOLERANCE;PRESCRIPTION.The
permissiveusebyanadjacentproprietorofaroadorpathoverthelandof
anothernomatterhowlongcontinued,willnotcreateaneasementofwayby
prescription.

APPEALfromajudgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofOccidental
Negros.Campbell,J.
Thefactsarestatedintheopinionofthecourt.
RupertoMontinolaandAurelioMontinolaforappellants.
Noappearanceforappellees.
FlSHER,J.:
Theissuesinthiscaserelatetotherightofplaintiffstomakeuseoftwo
roadsexistingontheHaciendaToreno,atractoflandinthemunicipality
of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the property of the defendants, Blasa
BenedictoandRamonaBenedicto.Oneoftheseroadsisreferredtointhe
proceedingsastheNancaVictoriasroadandtheotherastheDacuman
Torenoroad.TheCourtofFirstInstanceheldthatthoseoftheplaintiffs
whoclaimedtobeentitledtomakeuseoftheDacumanTorenoroadhad
failedtoestablishtheassertedright,anddismissedtheactionastothem.
Fromthisdecisiontheyappealedtothiscourtbut,theirbriefnothaving
been filed within the time prescribed by the rules, their appeal was
dismissed, on motion of defendants, by resolution dated February 14,
1916. Consequently, the issues presented on this appeal are limited to
thosewhichrelatetotherightsofthepartieswithrespecttotheNanca
Victoriasroad,andthedeterminationofthecorrectnessofthedecisionof
thecourtconcerningthatpartofthecontroversysubmittedtoitsdecision.
The allegations in the complaint with respect to the NancaVictorias
road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and
EulalioDolor,aretheownersofa
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

783
783

Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

group of haciendas situated between the southern boundary of the

HaciendaTorenoandthebarrioofNanca,ofthemunicipalityofSaravia,
and that the appellees Silverio Ginoo, Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan
Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said haciendas; that for more than

twentyyearstheappelleesandtheirpredecessorsininteresthavemadeuse
oftheNancaVictoriasroad,whichcrossestheHaciendaToreno,openly,
publicly,andcontinuously,withtheknowledgeoftheownersofthesaid
hacienda,forthepurposeofconveyingtheproductsoftheirhaciendasto
thetownofVictoriasandtothelandingplacetheresituated,andforthe
purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their haciendas,
makinguseofthesaidroadbymeansofcarts,carabaos,andotherusual
meansoftransportation;thatthereisnooutlettoapublicroadfromthe
haciendaoccupiedbytheseplaintiffs,theonlyroadandwaybywhichthe
productsoftheplaintiffs'propertycanbetakentothetownofVictorias
andtothelandingplacetherebeingacrosstheHaciendaTorenobythe
roadmarkedontheplan"attachedtothecomplaint;thatonthefifteenth
dayofNovember,1912,thedefendantsclosedtheroadinquestionatthe
point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno, and refused to permit
plaintiffstocontinueusingit;thatplaintiffswereabouttocommenceto
grindtheircropofsugarcane,andthat,ifpreventedfromtransporting
their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of embarcation,
wouldsuffferdamagesdifficulttoestimate.Upontheseavermentsoffact
theplaintiffsprayedforajudgmentthattheyareentitledtousetheroadin
question as they have been using it in the past, and that a perpetual
injunctionbeissuedagainstplaintiffsrestrainingthemfromimpedingsuch
use.Uponthefilingofthecomplaint,plaintiffsmovedthecourttoissuea
preliminaryinjunctionrestrainingdefendantsfrominterferingwiththeuse
oftheroadduringthependencyofthesuit,whichmotionwasgrantedby
thecourt.
Defendantsintheiranswerputinissueallthespecialavermentsofthe
complaint,as abovesetforth,andbywayofcounterclaimandspecial
defense,averredthattheroad
784

784
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of
passage,istheprivatepropertyofdefendants;and,further,thattheyhave
notrefusedplaintiffspermissiontopassoverthisroadbuthaverequired
themtopaytollfortheprivilegeofdoingso.Defendantsalsoclaimed
damagesfortheuseoftheroadbyplaintiffsduringthependencyofthe

suit,allegingthatthepreliminaryinjunctionhadbeenimprovidentlyissued
upon f false statements contained in the verified complaint filed by
plaintiffs.
The case was tried in July, 1913. The court on December 8, 1913,
renderedjudgment,dismissingthecomplaintwithrespecttotheplaintiffs
Felix Suarez, Probo Jereza, Enrique Azcona, and Melecio Pido, these
being the plaintiffs who claimed the right to use the DacumanToreno
road.WithrespecttotheNancaVictoriasroad,thecourtheldthatitwasa
public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use by
immemorial prescription, and ordered the issuance of a perpetual
injunction against plaintiffs, restraining them from interfering in any
mannerwiththeuseofthesaidroad.
The conclusion of the court with respect to the facts affecting the
NancaVictoriasroadareasfollows:
"Turning to a consideration of the evidence relative to the Nanca
Victoriasroadwefindincontestableproofthatithasbeeninexistencefor
at least forty years. That the hacenderos located in the southwestern
sectionofVictoriasandthepublicgenerallypassedoveritfreelyandthat
itwasusedforallpurposesoftransportationoffarmproduce,animals,etc.
andbypedestriansaswellascarromatasandotherconveyanceswithout
breakorinterruptionuntiltwoorthreeyearsagowhenthedefendants
announcedthattheroadwasprivateandthatthosewhowishedtopass
overitwithsugarcartswouldbeobligedtopayatolloftencentavosall
other vehicles, it appears, were permitted to pass free of charge. This
arrangementseemstohaveexistedduringtheyearsof1911and1912and
partof1913,themoneybeingcollectedapparentlyfromsomehacenderos
andnotfromothers.Thereissomereasontobelievefrom
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

785
785

Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

the evidence presented by defendants themselves that the practice of

makingthesepaymentstohaciendaToreno'originatedinanattemptto
raiseafundfortherepairoftheroad.Thereisnoevidencethatanyother
hacenderosbetweenNancaandVictoriasoranyotherpersonmadeany
attempttoclosetheroadortocollecttoll.Onthecontrarytheroadappears
to havebeenrepaired bythehacenderos whenitneededrepairing and

everyone used it on equal terms until the defendants in 1910 or 1911

interposedtheobjectionthattheroadindisputewasprivate.Thiswethink
isafairdeductionfromtheevidenceandalthoughitisassertedthattoll
wascollectedatanearlierdatebythelateLeonMontinola,brotherofthe
defendantRupertoMontinola,thereisnotangibleevidencethatthiswas
soandallthecircumstancesarestronglyindicativeofthefactthattollhas
beenpaidonlyduringtheyearsof1911,1912,andpartof1913."
Thequestionpresentedbytheassignmentoferrorareineffect:
1. (a)
IstheNancaVictoriasroadatthepointatwhichittraversesthe
HaciendaTorenoapublichighwayornot?
2. (b)
Ifitbeheldthattheroadinquestionisnotapublichighway,have
plaintiffsproventheiracquisitionofaneasementofwayoverthe
HaciendaTorenoatthepointtraversedbytheroadinquestion?
Thetrialjudge,inholdingthattheroadinquestionispublic,baseshis
conclusionuponthefact,whichhedeemstohavebeenproven,thatthe
road has been in existence "from time immemorial," and had been
"continuouslyusedasapublicroad***andopentopublicassuchfor
thirtyorfortyyears***until***thedefendantsundertooktoclaimit
asprivateandtocollecttollforthepassageofcarts."(BillofExceptions,
p.56.)Thereisnodoubtthatforthepastthirtyorfortyyearsaroadhas
existedbetweenthefformersiteofthetownofVictoriasandthebarrioof
Nanca, of the municipality of Saravia, and that this road crosses
defendants'hacienda.Itisalsotruethatduringthisperiodtheplaintiffs
andtheir
786

786
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

predecessorsintheownershipofthehaciendanowheldbythemhave
madeuseofthisroadforthepurposeofgoingandcomingfromtheir
haciendastothetownofVictorias;butthequestioniswhetherthisusewas
limitedtotheplaintiffs,andtheirtenantsandemployees,orwhetherit
was,asheldbythelowercourt,auseenjoyedbythepublicingeneral.
Plaintiffsproducedonlytwowitnesses,SegundodeLeon(stet.notes,pp.
2122)andEduardoCuaycong,(stet.notes,pp.2733)totestifyasregards

theuseoftheNancaVictoriasroad.Severalotherwitnessestestifiedon
behalf of plaintiffs, but their testimony relates to the DacumanToreno
road,whichisnotinvolvedinthisappeal.Wehavecarefullyreadthe
testimonyofthewitnessesLeonandCuaycong,givenupontheirdirect
andcrossexamination,butwehavebeenunabletofindthateitherofthem
has testified that the road in question was ever used by the public in
general.Thesewitnessestestifiedwithregardtotheuseoftheroadbythe
present and former owners and occupants of the estates of Bacayan,
Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores for the transportation of the
productsoftheseestatestothetownofVictorias,andofsuppliesand
agricultural implements from Victorias to the haciendas, but neither of
themtestifiedexpresslythatanyotherusehadbeenmadeofsaidroad.
Nevertheless,itmaybereasonablyinferredfromthetestimonyofthese
witnessesthatallpersonshavingoccasiontotravelbetweenVictoriasand
the haciendas of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores,
whetherornottheywereowners,tenants,oremployeesofsaidestates,
madeuseoftheroadnowindispute,crossingtheHaciendaToreno,andto
thislimitedextentitmaybesaidthatthepublicmadeuseoftheroad,but
thereisnothingintheevidencetoindicatethatthesocalled publicuse
extendedbeyondthis.
Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the
finding of the court concerning the general public use of the road in
dispute,therecordcontainsdatastronglytendingtoshowthatwhenthe
complaintwas
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

787
787

Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

filedplaintiffsdidnotcontendthattheroadwasapublichighway,but
merelycontendedthattheyhadacquiredbyprescriptionaneasementof
wayacrosstheHaciendaToreno.Forexample,theactionisentitledan
"actionconcerningarightofway."(BillofExceptions,pp.64and65.)It
isnotaverredinthecomplaintthattheroadinquestionwasusedbythe
public.Onthecontrary,itisaverredthatitwasusedbytheplaintiffsand
theirpredecessors.Theavermentinparagraph8ofthecomplaintthatthe
plaintiffshavenoother"outlettoapublicroad"thanthatwhichtheyhave
beenaccustomedtousebygoingacrossthedefendants'haciendaforthe

purpose of going to the town of Victorias also shows that when they
commencedthisactiontheyhadinmindtheprovisionsofarticles564,et
seq. of the Civil Code, which relate to the method ofestablishing the
compulsoryeasementofway.Theownersofanexistingeasement,aswell
as those whose properties are adjacent with a public road, have no
occasion to invoke these provisions of the Code, which relate to the
creation of new rights, and not the enforcement of rights already in
existence.
Itistruethatintheopeningstatementmadetothecourt,counselfor
plaintiffs,whowasnotthesameattorneybywhomthecomplaintwas
signed,statedthatplaintiffscontendthattheroadinquestionispublic,but
as no evidence was introduced tending to establish this contention
concerning the NancaVictorias road, counsel for defendants had no
occasiontoobjectuponthegroundthatsuchtestimonywasnotrelevantto
theavermentsofthecomplaint.Noevidencewastakentoindicatethatat
anytimesincetheroadinquestionhasbeeninexistenceanypartofthe
expenseofitsupkeephasbeendefrayedbythegeneralgovernment,the
province,orthemunicipality.Thetrialjudgesaiduponthissubject:
"Itisalsotruethatwhateverrepairsweremadeontheroadweremade
irregularly.ThemunicipalityofVictoriashadnofundstodevotetothe
constructionandrepairofroads,andtheupkeepoftheroaddepending
entirelythere
788

788
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

foreontheinitiativeofthepersonswhousedit,wasattendedtoonlyat
suchtimesasrepairswereabsolutelynecessary."(BillofExceptions,p.
49.)
Thecourtalsoheldthatitappearsfromthegovernmentgrantissuedin
1885 to the original owner of the hacienda adjacent to the Hacienda
Torenoonitswesternboundary,thattheNancaVictoriasroadatthattime
separated that estate from the Jalbuena Hacienda, and that these facts
constitute"circumstantialevidencethattheroadwasinexistencein1885."
Wehaveexaminedthedocumenttowhichthecourtrefers,andweagree
thattheroadinquestionexistedin1885;butwedonotbelievethatthe
documentinquestionprovesthatthesaidroadwasapublichighway.

Another circumstance established by the evidence, and which is of

someimportanceinthedeterminationofthisissue,isthatalthoughthe
defendantsclosedtheNanca"VictoriasroadinthemonthofFebruary,
1911,andsincethattimehavecollectedtollfrompersonspassingoverit
withcartsloadedwithsugar,includingthosebelongingtoseveralofthe
plaintiffs,nothingwasdonebythemtopreventthecontinuationofthis
restrictionuntilDecember,1912,whenthisactionwascommenced.Itis
naturaltoassumethatifplaintiffshadconsideredthattheroadinquestion
waspublic,theywouldhaveprotestedimmediatelyagainsttheactionof
thedefendants,andwouldhaveeithercommencedacivilaction,asthey
subsequentlydid,orwouldhavebroughtaboutaprosecutionundersection
16ofActNo.1511.
Upontheevidencetakenandadmissionscontainedinthepleadingsand
thosemadeduringthecourseofthetrialweconsiderthatthefollowing
findingsarewarranted:
1. 1.
ThetownofVictoriashasalwaysbeentheshippingpointoftheproducts
oftheHaciendaToreno,andofthehaciendasofappellees,aswellas
theplacefromwhichsupplieswerebroughttothoseproperties.
2. 2.
Forthirtyorfortyyearsbeforethecommencementofthesuitawagon
road,hereincalledtheNancaVictorias
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

789
789

Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

1. road,hasbeeninexistence,connectingthehaciendasofappelleeswith
the town of Victorias, and this road traverses the property of
defendants.SincetheremovalofthetownofVictoriastoanewsite
theNancaVictoriasroadhasbeenusedbyappelleesintravelling
betweentheirpropertiesandtheprovincialroadwhichcrossesthe
HaciendaTorenofromeasttowest.
2. 3.
Nopublicfundshaveatanytimebeenexpendedontheconstructionor
upkeepoftheNancaVictoriasroad,butffromtimetotimeworkhas
beendoneonitbythelaborersemployedbythepresentandformer

ownersoftheHaciendaTorenoandthehaciendasownedbythe
appelleesandtheirpredecessorsintitle.
3. 4.
TheNancaVictoriaswagonroad,includingthatpartofitwhichcrosses
theHaciendaToreno,hasforthirtyfiveorffortyyearsbeenusedby
theappelleesandtheirpredecessorsintitleforthetransportation,by
theusualmeans,oftheproductsoftheirestatestotheirshipping
pointsinornearthetownofVictorias,andthetransportationtotheir
estatesofallsuppliesrequiredbythem,andhasbeenusedbyall
personshavingoccasiontotraveltoandfromalloranyoftheestates
nowownedbytheappellees.
4. 5.
TheuseoftheNancaVictoriasroadinthemannerandbythepersons
abovementionedwaspermittedwithoutobjectionbytheownersof
theHaciendaTorenountiltheyear1911,whentheyclosedit,and
beganchargingatollof5centavosforeachcartwhichpassedover
theroad,includingcartsbelongingtotheappellants,untilrestrained
fromcontinuingtodosobythepreliminaryinjunctiongrantedinthis
case.
5. 6.
TheNancaVictoriasroadconstitutestheonlyoutletfromtheestatesof
appellantstothenearestpublicroadwhichistheprovincial,road
whichcrossestheHaciendaTorenoffromeasttowest.
Uponthesefactsthequestionsoflawtobedecidedare.
1. (a)
IstheNancaVictoriasroadapublichighway?
2. (b)
IftheNancaVictoriasroad,orthatpartofitwhichcrossestheHacienda
Toreno,isnotapublichighway,isit
790

790
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

subjecttoaprivateeasementofwayinfavoroftheappellees?
ThedefendantsaretheownersoftheHaciendaTorenounderaTorrens
titleissuedinaccordancewiththeLandRegistrationAct,conferringto
themitsabsoluteownership,subjectonlytothelimitationsofparagraph

fourofsection39ofsaidAct,Itisadmittedthatthereisnoannotationon
the certificate of title regarding the road here in question, either as a
"publicroad"orasa"privatewayestablishedbylaw,"and,therefore,the
questionspresentedbythisappealaretobedeterminedpreciselyasthey
wouldbehadtheHaciendaTorenonotbeenbroughtundertheoperation
of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiffs being the owners of the
propertyinquestion,thepresumptionoflawisthatitisfreefromanylien
orencumbrancewhatever,andtheburdenthereforerestsuponplaintiffsto
establishthecontrary.AsthiscourtsaidinthecaseofFabievs.Lichauco
andthechildrenofFranciscoL.Roxas(11Phil.Rep.,14):
"Itisasettleddoctrineoflawthatapropertyisassumedtobefreefrom
allencumbranceunlessthecontraryisproved."
Thereisadmittedlynoevidencetoshowthatthelandoccupiedbythe
roadhereinquestionwasatanytimeconveyedtothegeneralgovernment
oranyofitspoliticalsubdivisionsbythepresentoranyoftheformer
owners of the Hacienda Toreno. There is no evidence, even remotely,
tendingtoshowthattheroadexistedpriortothetimewhentheproperty
now known as the Hacienda Toreno passedfrom the State into private
ownership,Therecordfailstodiscloseanyevidencewhatevertendingto
showthattheGovernmenthasatanytimeassertedanyrightortitleinorto
thelandoccupiedbytheroad,orthatithasincurredanyexpensewhatever
initsupkeeporconstruction.TheCivilCodedefinesaspublicroadsthose
whichareconstructedbytheState(art.339),andasprovincialandtown
roadsthose"theexpenseofwhichisbornebysuchtownsorprovinces."
(CivilCode,art.344.)Whileitisnot
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

791
791

Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

contendedthatthisdefinitionisexclusive,itdoesshowthatduringthe
Spanishregime,undernormalconditions,roadswhichwerepublicwere
maintainedatthepublicexpense,andthatthefactthatatnotimewasany
expense incurred by the Government with respect to the road here in
questiontendsstronglytosupportthecontentionofthedefendantsthatitis
privateway.
DuringtheSpanishregimethelawrequiredeachablebodiedcitizen
notwithinoneoftheexemptedclassestoworkacertainnumberofdaysin

eachyear,hislabortobedevotedto"servicesofgeneralutility"tothe
municipality of his residence. (Royal Decree of July 11, 1883, art. 5.)
UnderthisDecreeandtheRegulationsforitsenforcement(Berriz,vol.11,
258)thegreaterpartoftheworkonthepublicroadsoftheIslandswas
accomplished. Had the road here in question been a public way, it is
reasonabletoassumethatthepolistasofthetownofVictoriaswouldhave
beenemployedinmaintainingit.Itismostsignificantthatnomentionis
made in the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses of any work of this
characterhavingbeendoneontheroadatanytime,particularlyinviewof
thefactthattheirattentionwasdrawntothispoint.(Stet.notes,pp.8,10,
11,12,13and14.)
Theevidenceshowsthattherepairsweremadebytheownersofthe
estatesbenefitedbytheroad,andbytheirlaborers,asapurelyvoluntary
actfortheirownconvenienceandinterest.Therebeingnoevidenceofa
direct grant to the government of .the land occupied by the road in
questionorthatanyGovernmentfundsorlaborwereexpendeduponit,the
questionpresentsitselfwhethertheusetowhichtheroadhasbeenputwas
suchastojustifytheconclusionofthelowercourtthatithasbecome
publicproperty.Therebeingnoevidencethattheoriginaluseoftheroad
byplaintiffs'predecessorswasbaseduponanyexpressgrantoftheffeeto
theroadorofaneasementofway,orthatitbeganundertheassertionofa
rightontheirpart,thepresumptionmustbethattheoriginoftheusewas
themeretoleranceorlicenseoftheownersoftheestatesaffected.
792

792
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

Thisbeingso,hasthatmerelypermissiveusebeenconvertedintoatitle
vested in the public at large, or in the plaintiffs by reason of their
ownershipofthelandbeneficiallyaffectedbytheuse?
Hadit beenshownthat theroadhadbeenmaintainedat thepublic
expense,withtheacquiescenceoftheownersoftheestatescrossedbyit,
this would indicate such adverse possession by the government as in
courseoftimewouldripenintotitleorwarrantthepresumptionofagrant
orofadedication.Butinthiscasethereisnosuchevidence,andthe
claimsofplaintiffs,whetherregardedasmembersofthepublicassertinga
righttousetheroadassuch,,oraspersonsclaimingaprivateeasementof

wayoverthelandofanothermustberegardedasrestinguponthemere
factofuser.
Iftheownerofatractofland,toaccommodatehisneighborsorthe
publicingeneral,permitsthemtocrosshisproperty,itisreasonableto
supposethatitisnothisintention,insodoing,todivesthimselfofthe
ownershipofthelandsoused,ortoestablishaneasementuponit,andthat
thepersonstowhomsuchpermission,tacitorexpress,isgranted,donot
regardtheirprivilegeofuseasbeingbaseduponanythingmorethanthe
mere tolerance of the owner. Clearly, such permissive use is in its
inceptionbaseduponanessentiallyrevocablelicense.Iftheusecontinues
foralongperiodoftime,nochangebeingmadeintherelationsofthe
parties by any express or implied agreement, does the owner of the
property affected lose his right of revocation ? Or, putting the same
questioninanotherform,doesthemerepermissiveuseripenintotitleby
prescription?
Itisafundamentalprincipleofthelawinthisjurisdictionconcerning
thepossessionofrealpropertythatsuchpossessionisnotaffectedbyacts
ofapossessorycharacterwhichare"merelytolerated"bythepossessor,or
which are due to his license (Civil Code, arts. 444 and 1942). This
principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the
dominiumasawhole,buttothepre
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

793
793

Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

scriptionofrightinrem.InthecaseofCortesvs.PalancaYuTibo(2Phil.
Rep.,24,38),theCourtsaid:
"Theprovisionofarticle1942oftheCivilCodetotheeffectthatacts
whicharemerelytoleratedproducenoeffectwithrespectto.possessionis
applicableasmuchtotheprescriptionofrealrightsastotheprescription
ofthefee,itbeingaglaringandselfevidenterrortoaffirmthecontrary,as
does the appellant in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental
basisoftheprescription.Withoutitnokindofprescriptionispossible,not
eventheextraordinary.Consequently,ifactsofmeretoleranceproduceno
effectwithrespecttopossession,asthatarticleprovides,inconformity
witharticle444ofthesameCode,itisevidentthattheycanproduceno
effectwithrespecttoprescription,whetherordinaryorextraordinary.This

istruewhethertheprescriptiveacquisitionbeofafeeorofrealrights,for
thesamereasonholdsinoneandtheothercase;thatis,thattherehasbeen
notruepossessioninthelegalsenseoftheword." (Seealso Ayalade
Roxasvs.Maglonso,8Phil.Rep.,745;MunicipalityofNuevaCaceresvs.
DirectorofLandsandRomanCatholicBishopofNuevaCaceres,24Phil.
Rep.,485.)
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptiveright,mustbepossessionunderclaimoftitle(enconceptode
dueo), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be
adverse. Actsofapossessorycharacterperformedbyonewhoholdsby
meretoleranceoftheownerareclearlynot enconceptodedueo, and
suchpossessoryacts,nomatterhowlongsocontinued,donotstartthe
runningoftheperiodofprescription.
AsimilarquestionwaspresentedinthecaseoftheRomanCatholic
Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas (22 Phil Rep., 450), in which case it
appearedthatRoxas,theownerofthe HaciendadeSanPedroMacati,
claimedarightofwayacrossthepropertyofthechurchtoCalleTejeron,a
publicStreetofthetownofSanPedroMacati.Theproofshowedthatthe
roadinquestionhadbeenusedbythetenantsofthe HaciendadeSan
PedroMacatiforthepassageofcartsincomingandleavingthehacienda
"fromtimeimmemo
794

794
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

rial,"andfurtherthattheroadhadbeenusedfortimeoutofmind,notonly
bythetenantsofthehaciendabutbymanyotherpeopleingoingand
comingfromachurchhalfwaybetweentheboundarylineofthehacienda
andCalleTejeron. Thecourtheld that thefactsdid notgive rise toa
prescriptiverightofeasementinfavoroftheownerofthehacienda,upon
thegroundthatsuchuse"istoberegardedaspermissiveandunderan
impliedlicense,andnotadverse.Suchauseisnotinconsistentwiththe
onlyusewhichtheproprietorthoughtfittomakeoftheland,anduntilthe
appelleethinkspropertoincloseit,suchuseisnotadverseandwillnot
precludeitfromenclosingthe.landwhenotherviewsofitsinterestrender
itpropertodoso.Andthoughanadjacentproprietormaymakesuchuse
oftheopenlandmorefrequentlythananother,yetthesamerulewillapply

unlesstherebesomedecisiveactindicatingaseparateandexclusiveuse
under aclaim of right. A different doctrine would haveatendencyto
destroyallneighborhoodaccommodationsinthewayoftravel;forifit
wereonceunderstoodthataman,byallowinghisneighbortopassthrough
his farm without objection over the passway which he used himself,
wouldthereby,afterthelapseoftime,conferarightonsuchneighborto
require the passway to be kept open for his benefit and enjoyment, a
prohibitionagainstallsuchtravelwouldimmediatelyensue."
The decisions of the supreme court of Louisiana, a State whose
jurisdictionisbased,asisourown,upontheRomanLaw,andwhoseCivil
Codeistaken,asisourown,verylargelyfromtheCodeofNapoleon,are
particularlypersuasiveinmattersofthischaracter.InthecaseofTorres
vs.Fargoust(37La.Ann.,497),citedbyappellantsintheirbrief,inwhich
theissueswereverysimilartothoseofthepresentcase,thecourtheldthat

"Themerefactthatforthirtyorfortyyearsthepublicwaspermittedto
pass over this ground would not of itself constitute the place a locus
publicus***dedicationmustbeshownbyevidencesoconclusiveasto
excludeall
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

795
795

Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

ideaofprivateownership;***suchdedicationcannotbeinferredfrom
mereuseralone;***nooneispresumedtogiveawayhisproperty.The
burdenisonhimwhoaversadivestitureofownershiptoproveitclearly."
We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts
establishedbytheevidenceitdoesnotappearthattheroadinquestionisa
publicroadorway.Wearealsooftheopinionthatplaintiffshavefailedto
showthattheyhaveacquiredbyprescriptionaprivaterightofpassage
overthelandsofdefendants.ThesupremecourtofSpainhasdecidedthat
under the law in f force bef ore the enactment of the Civil Code, the
easement of way was discontinuous, and that while such an easement
mightbeacquiredbyprescription,itmustbeusedingoodfaith,inthe
belief of the existence of the right, and such user must have been
continuousfromtimeimmemorial.(JudgmentofDecember15,1882.)In
the appealeddecision thecourt below saysthatthe plaintiffs andtheir

predecessorsmadeuseoftheroadinquestion"fromtimeimmemorial,"
butthereisnoevidencewhateverintherecordtosupportthisfinding,
althoughitistruethattheevidenceshowstheexistenceoftheroadandits
usebytheplaintiffsandtheirpredecessorsforthirtyfiveorfortyyears.
Speaking of the evidence required under the present Code of Civil
Proceduretoshowimmemorialuseofaneasement,thiscourtsaidinthe
caseofAyaladeRoxasvs.Case(8Phil.Rep.,197,198):
"Thethird Partida intitle31,law15***saysthatdiscontinuous
servitudes***mustbeprovedbyusageoratermsolongthatmencan
notrememberitscommencement.***Inmanyjudgmentsthesupreme
courtofSpainhasrefusedtoacceptproofofanydefinitenumberofyears
asasatisfactionofthisrequirementofthelaw.***Weareoftheopinion
thatinordertoestablisharightofprescription[titleofprescriptionbased
upon use from time immemorial] something more is required than the
memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be the
declarationofpersonslongdead,repeatedbythosewhotestify,asexacted
bytheSpanishlaw,
796

796
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Cuaycongvs.Benedicto.

orshouldbethecommonreputationofownershiprecognizedbytheCode
of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us to decide. On either theory the
appellanthasfailedinhisproof***."
Thesamethingmaybesaidinthiscase.Witnesseshavetestifiedthat
theyhaveknowntheroadforacertainperiodofyears,beginningatatime
priortotheenactmentoftheCivilCode,butnoevidencehasbeenmadeto
proveimmemorialusebyeitherofthemeansofproofmentionedinthis
decision cited, noris immemorial user averred in the complaint as the
basisoftheright.Itisevident,therefore,thatnovestedrightbyuserf
fromtimeimmemorialhadbeenacquiredbyplaintiffsatthetimetheCivil
Codetookeffect.UnderthatCode(art.539)nodiscontinuouseasement
could be acquired by prescription in any event. Assuming, without
deciding,thatthisrulehasbeenchangedbytheprovisionsofthepresent
Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, and that since its
enactmentdiscontinuouseasementmaybeacquiredbyprescription,itis
clearthatthiswouldnotavailplaintiffs.TheCodeofCivilProcedurewent

intoeffectonOctober1,1901.Thetermofprescriptionfortheacquisition
ofrightsinrealestateisfixedbytheCode(sec.41)attenyears.The
evidenceshowsthatinFebruary,1911,beforetheexpirationofthetermof
ten years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the
defendantsinterruptedtheuseoftheroadbyplaintiffsbyconstructingand
maintainingatollgateonitandcollectingtollfrompersonsmakinguseof
it with carts and continued to do so until they were enjoined by the
granting of the preliminary injunction by the trial court in December,
1912,Ourconclusionis,therefore,thatplaintiffshavenotacquiredby
prescriptionarighttoaneasementofwayoverthedefendants'property;
thattheiruseoftheNancaVictoriasroadacrosstheHaciendaTorenowas
duemerelytothetacitlicenseandtoleranceofthedefendantsandtheir
predecessorsintitle;thatthelicensewasessentiallyrevokable;andthat,
therefore,thedefendantswerewithintheirrightswhentheyclosedthe
roadin1911.
VOL.37,MARCH13,1918.

797
797

UnitedStatesvs.Dinola.

Whileintheallegationsfromplaintiffs'complaintitmightbeinferredthat
itwastheirpurposetoseektoimposeupondefendantstheeasementto
whicharts.564etseq.oftheCivilCoderelate,thatpurposewasevidently
abandoned,andthecasewastrieduponawhollydifferenttheory.Proof
wasofferedtoshowthattherightofpassageacrossdefendants'landis
necessarytoenableplaintiffstogettheirproductstomarket,buttherewas
noofferontheirparttopaydefendantstheindemnityrequiredbysection
564.
Forthereasonsstatedthejudgmentofthecourtbelowisreversed,the
injunction issued against defendants is dissolved, and the action is
dismissed.Nocostswillbeallowedonthisappeal.Soordered.
Arellano,C.J.,Torres,Araullo,Street,Malcolm, andAvancea,JJ.,
concur.
JOHNSON,J.,dissents.
Judgmentreversed;injunctiondissolved,andactiondismissed.
______________

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