PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEOFILO TANEO.

On May 23, 1994, Mencina Taneo, a barrio lass, with physical virginity, was
with her parents and three (3) younger sisters in their house at Sitio Bihang,
Bongoyan, Borbon Cebu. She was then below 18 years of age, having been
born on June 6, 1976. Her mother had just recovered from a fever. Despite
the condition of her mother, her father, Teofilo Taneo, who just arrived from
his carpentry work in Cebu City, insisted that her mother get the sack of corn
grits from a store about one kilometer away from their house .Her father
used to fetch and bring the sacks of corn grits for their consumption, but on
that day, he insisted and prevailed upon his wife to get the sack of corn grits.
After lunch, about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, Mencinas mother to avoid
further altercation with her husband, went to the store, accompanied by her
other daughter Ginda, to get the corn grits. But before her mother left their
house, she instructed Mencina to look after her infant sister. Together with
Mencina in the house after her mother left that afternoon of May 23, 1994
were her father Teofilo Taneo, her sisters Aida (seven years old), Aiza (five
years old), and Dyna (the infant). Mencina watched her sister and put her to
sleep on a hammock. When her baby sister was already asleep, she also went
to sleep as her wont after luncH. While she was asleep, her two young sisters
were sent away by her father Teofilo Taneo to the farm so he could be alone
with her. This she learned later. She was awakened by the pain in her
genetalia and when she opened her eyes, she saw her father Teofilo Taneo
already naked from the waist down and on top of her. She also noticed that
the cycling pants and black panty she wore before she went to sleep were
already removed, and leaving her half-naked. Her father kept on inserting his
finger into her vagina; his left arm pinned her down while he was on top of
her. She tried to free herself, but to no avail as persisted in his lustful
intention and overpowered her threatening her with a bolo and told her not
to shout.
To her pleas of mercy, her father Teofilo said that he would rather be the first
to taste her virginity that her boyfriend, as he was the one who raised her to
womanhood. After removing his finger, her father inserted his penis to her
vagina penetrating it up to the labia minora. Her father eventually
succeeded in deflowering her. She did not notice any blood or bloodstains in
her organ when she wiped herself dry. After her father succeeded in raping
her, she kept silent because he made the threat to kill her mother first, and
she the next, if she will report the incident. She remained in the house and
continued to watch her younger sister. Then her father left the house around
4:00 oclock in the afternoon, to follow her mother to the store.
Mencinas mother arrived home at 6:00 oclock in the evening of the day of
the incident but se did not reveal to her what transpired between her and her
father. The next day, she looked for means to go to her aunt and made the
excuse of fetching water from a well. Instead, she went directly to her aunts
house and there she tearfully revealed to her aunt, Paciencia Taneo who

resides also in Sitio Bihang, Borbon, Cebu, about half a kilometer from the
house of Teofilo Taneo that she was raped by her own father and requested
her aunt to accompany her to the poblacion in order to report to the police
the incident. At this juncture, Teofilo Taneo arrived and asked Pacencia Taneo
why the slippers of Mencina was there. Upon seeing her daughter, he
ordered her to go down. Teofilo Taneo then brought his daughter home after
maltreating her.
Paciencia Taneo reported to a passing policeman, Expedito Urot, the incident
reported to her earlier by Mencina Taneo.
Meanwhile, in the house of Teofilo Taneo, the latter continued maltreating his
daughter. With bolo in his hand, he told Mencina that it is better to kill her if
she would report the incident to the authorities. He told her not to leave the
house.
Later, Borbon policeman arrived who disarmed her father who was holding a
bolo, and arrested him. Her father was brought to the Borbon Police Station
where he was investigated and detained. She was also brought to the police
station in a separate vehicle.
On May 24, 1994, Mencina was sent to the Danao General Hospital in Danao
City accompanied by SPO3 Expedito Urot. There she was examined briefly by
Dr. Gemma T. Macachor. She felt pain when her private parts were examined
and saw extracted from it a whitish substance. She went home and executed
an affidavit an signed a complaint on May 25, 1994 two days after the date
of the incident. She was asked searching questions by Judge Perla C. Vilo,
Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Court of Borbon-Tabogon, Cebu.

After the arraignment of her father Teofilo Taneo before this Court, she went
home to her town in Borbon, Cebu, to deliver a subpoena to the police station
thereat, to be served on SPO3 Expedito Urot of the Borbon Police Force.

In his first assignment of error, appellant insist that private complainants

allegations are highly improbable, implausible, and utterly ridiculous,
hence unworthy of belief.

ISSUE: WON THE COUNSEL VIOLATED HIS DUTY TO THE COURT

RULING
It is unfortunate that cousel for appellant has made hasty accusation

against the trial court for the above pronouncement as taking a

partial and biased position and having adopted its own biased
interpretation of the physical evidence. We do not find any cogent
and valid ground in the records of this case which could justify such
a grave imputation upon a member of the bench who merely
performed his function and expressed his observation on the
conduct of the examination. Counsel should be reminded of his duty
to observe and maintain the respect due the courts of justice and
judicial officers. Arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to
both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another.

With the trial courts formidable observation and the victims unrebutted
testimony, appellants reliance with the medical certificate, as well as the
testimony of the doctor, assumes no significance.

In any event, appellants argument proceeds from a misconception that a

medical certificate is an indespensible element in the prosecution for rape
and runs roughshod over the well-settled rule that the absence of medical
findings by a medico-legal officer does no disprove the occurrence of rape.
The fact that the medical certificate show no external signs of physical
injuries and spermatozoa on the victim does not negate the commission of
rape for the slightness penetration of the labia consummates the offense. The
medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is
merely corroborative in character. What is important is that the testimony of
private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible.
When a woman testifie that she has been raped, she says all that is needed
to signify that the crime has been committed. On this score, the trial court
declared:

The Court subjected the testimony of the offended girl with painstaking
scrutiny, which was given in a straight-forward manner, and found it
unimpaired by material discrepancies and contradictions and consistent with
ordinary human experience. Her testimony undoubtedly bears the imprint of
truth and, therefore, must be accepted.

Furthermore, private complainants firm resolve, quickness and spontaneity in

devising a way to flee immediately after the day she was violated from the
appellants clutches and in tearfully confiding her harrowing ordeal to her
aunt speak well of the natural reaction of a virtuous and an aggrieved
woman. Likewise, when she was given a choice whether to exclude the

public during her trial, private complainant appeared resolute in testifying

before an open court. Her conduct simply shows the fervent drive to place
before the bar of justice her ruthless assailant. Our jurisprudential annals, in
this connection, reveal that no woman, especially of tender age, as in this
case, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public
trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. Verily, like the trial court we find no valid reason
to doubt private complainants testimony which bears the earmarks of truth.
Besides, this Court accords due deference to the trial courts views
on who should be given credence, since the latter is in a better
position to assess the credibility of witnesses considering its
opportunity to observe their demeanor, as well as their deportment
and manner of testifying during trial.[28] To be sure, this rule is
subject to some well definced exceptions[29] none of which,
however, is attendant in this case.

Appellant claims in his third assessment of error that the trial court
erred in not giving credence to his defenses of alibi and denial.
Apart from this general averment, however, appellant did not
elaborate why his defense should be accepted. Appellant thereafter
trails his attack on the alleged erroneous shifting of the burden of proof from
the prosecution to the defense. Thus:
Lastly, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution has the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused and the weakness of the defense does
not relieve it of this responsibility. (People vs. Bacalzo, 195 SCRA 557; People
vs. Lagnas, 222 SCRA 745) However, it appears that this is not so in the case
at bar. The trial court, apparently taking a partial and biased position,
appeared to have shifted the burden of proof on the defense when it took
against the owner of the store where the Taneo ocuple went to get their
supply of corn grits. In an unprecedented stance, the trial court substantially
deduced an unfavorable presumption against the accused-appellant for his
supposed failure to present Ms. Mangubat as a defense witness. (Decision, p.
21). This is a clear violation of the rules on criminal procedure and evidence
and should not therefore be countenanced, more so considering that this is a
capital offense where the very life and limb of the accused-appellant is at
stake. With due respect, it is thus our unqualified position that to unfairly
deprive the accused-appellant of his life for an offense he never committed is
too high a price ot pay for judicial convenience. We therefore opt for his total
acquittal of the offense charged. x x x [30]
Bare denial cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.
It is well-settled that greater weight is given to the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to
the accuseds denial and explanation concerning the commission of

the crime

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
NOTE: YUNG CASE TALAGA WAS ABOUT TH CASE BUT THE LAWYER, YUNG
PROSECUTOR LAWYER IS FISCAL BERCILES BUT NO NAME YUNG DEFENSE
SORRY.

GAUDENCIO S. URBINA and VEDASTO B. GESMUNDO vs. JUDGE MAXIMO A.

MACEREN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

After the Court's resolution of February 6, 1974 dismissing the complaint "for
failure to make out a prima facie case without prejudice to respondent's filing
a separate administrative complaint for unwarranted harassment against
complainant Atty. Vedasto B. Gesmundo as sought in respondent's comment,"
there were belatedly reported to the Court (a) the verified Joint motion for
suspension and/or to declare respondent and Atty. Marcial Esguerra in
contempt of court" filed by complainant Gaudencio S. Urbina on December
27, 1973 for allegedly having made through said complainant's former
counsel, Atty. Marcial Esguerra, grave threats against complainant's life if he
(complainant) did not withdraw his complaints against respondent * and (b)
the 1st Indorsement dated December 5, 1973 and received on January 9,
1974 of Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora of the Office of the
President referring for comment complainant Gesmundo's letter of October
31, 1973 submitting his "objection to re-appointment" of respondent judge,
both of which were referred to respondent for comment as per the Court's
resolution of February 19, 1974.

In respondent's comment of March 8, 1974, he submitted the ten-page

dismissal dated March 5, 1974 by the acting provincial fiscal of Laguna of

complainant Urbina's criminal complaint against respondent for "Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Judgment" wherein the fiscal correctly ruled that "(The
decision of the respondent that is claimed to be unjust is now pending
appeal. The question therefore of whether or not it is unjust is sub-judice. It
would not be proper for this Office at this time to determine whether or not
the said decision is unjust," and that assuming that he as a mere fiscal and a
non-judicial officer could pass in judgment upon the justness or unjustness of
respondent's decision complained of as unjust by the losing party (who has
appealed the same to a higher court), there was no basis for concluding that
the respondent judge knew that his judgment was unjust. Not only does he
believe that his judgment is just and correct; his view that a probate court
cannot decide questions involving title or ownership of real properties is well
supported by the long line of decisions of the Supreme Court cited in his
comment." (at pages 9-10)

Respondent convincingly denies as pointless the alleged threat thru Atty.

Esguerra against complainant Urbina's life to compel him to withdraw his
charges in this administrative complaint since there would remain another
complainant in the person of Atty. Gesmundo.

Respondent did admit that in a chance meeting in the courthouse with Atty.
Esguerra, he requested the latter should meet his former client (Urbina) who
alone filed the criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment" to inform Urbina that "respondent bears no ill will against him and
if he feels aggrieved by the decision why not limit his action to an ordinary
appeal to the higher courts as he has already done." Respondent
categorically denied having made any threats whatsoever against Urbina,
directly or through another, confident as he was (although harassed) that the
criminal complaint would ultimately be, as in fact it was, dismissed by the
fiscal for being without basis in law and in fact.

Respondent further submitted the corroborative affidavit of Atty. Esguerra,

stating that he merely telephoned Urbina to suggest that the pending appeal
rather than the criminal complaint for allegedly knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment was his proper recourse against respondent's adverse
decision, and unqualifiedly stating that he never made any threats nor went
to Urbina's house and that "The statements I allegedly made as stated in the
affidavit of Gaudencio Urbina did not come from my lips."

While there are thus conflicting factual averments on the part of complainant

and respondent, the Court is satisfied from the factual background of the
administrative complaint which it has already dismissed previously for not
making out a prima facie case and from the baselessness of the criminal
complaint for allegedly "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" which has
also been correctly dismissed by the fiscal, that the complainant's charge of
threats cannot be sustained, resting as it does flimsily on complainant's bare
assertion as against the respondent's categorical denial supported by Atty.
Esguerra's affidavit. In the light of ordinary human conduct and experience, it
is difficult to give any inherent credence to the complaint for it would have
been extremely foolhardy and pointless for respondent to have asked Atty.
Esguerra to make the alleged threats against complainant. The Court finds
respondent's comment to be satisfactory and will not subject respondent to
further needless harassment and distraction if it were to give due course to
the complaint-motion, as insisted by complainant in his reply to comment.

It is appropriate to enjoin complainants and members of the bar who file

administrative complaints against judges of inferior courts that they should
do so after proper circumspection and without the use of disrespectful
language and offensive personalities, so as not to unduly burden the Court in
the discharge of its function of administrative supervision over inferior court
judges and court personnel. The Court has meted the corresponding
disciplinary measures against erring judges, including dismissal and
suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest efforts of the bar to
assist it in the task. But lawyers should also bear in mind that they owe
fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and that the filing on behalf of
disgruntled litigants of unfounded or frivolous charges against inferior court
judges and the use of offensive and intemperate language as a means of
harassing judges whose decisions have not been to their liking (irrespective
of the law and jurisprudence on the matter) will subject them to appropriate
disciplinary action as officers of the Court.

The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively
liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a
showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part. As stressed by the now
Chief Justice in Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52, "(T)o hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment
and would make his position unbearable." Much less can a judge be so held
accountable where to all indications, as in this case, his verdict complained of
(and now pending review on appeal) is far from erroneous.

ACCORDINGLY, complainant Urbina's "joint motion" is denied.

The clerk of court is directed to furnish Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo

B. Zamora of the Office of the President with a copy of this resolution as well
as of the previous resolution of February 6, 1974, by way of reply to his 1st
indorsement dated December 5, 1973.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28546

July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,

vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.

Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this
Court for more than a decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a

replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or
pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court,

in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial
court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of
P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied,
and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The
sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago
moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the
petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were
denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the
highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem,
and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of
the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.

However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago,
as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the
obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in
the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's onehalf share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon
and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the
judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party
in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution
was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a
party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and
resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of

preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and
the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from
cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the
petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus
arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City
court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted
the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds
of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new
ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession
was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary
restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the
court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining
order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966,
docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the
petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on
August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then
appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the petition in a
minute resolution on February 8, 1967.

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed
another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CAG.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of

possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986
on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed

the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.

1.
We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the
orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not
interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against
the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of
Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.

2.
Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in
one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their
conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago
similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their
conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with
the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the
protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the
Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's
business venture.

3.
Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held
that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to
half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate court
assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her
husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living
with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that
failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction
sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in
Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third
person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a
complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the
latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between
the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third
parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly
inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the
ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ
of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and
even up to the present.

4.
We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San
Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise
the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to
Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's
activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction
sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband
had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction
to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff
executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to
redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could
be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to
prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife
filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the
wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she

was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit.
The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various
proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars
them from raising it.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2

5.
The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal
infirmities.

(a)
It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu
Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere
expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into
title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of
the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that
injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never
arise. 4

(b)
The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of
its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house
5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor
could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would prevent
the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by
Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does
not stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife,
prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal
properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.

6.
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by
their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended

prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,

maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the
judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in
the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried
to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become
an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator
for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and
moral justice.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's

cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the

intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If
he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
7

7.
In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for
purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in
the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate
courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the record
of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that

(a)
the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but
trial on the merits has not even started;

(b)
after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a
counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they
impleaded new parties-defendants;

(c)
after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a
motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an
additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this
motion);

(d)
the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental
complaint; and

(e)
the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974,
grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p.
815)

We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental
complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the
reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon
conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to
be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that
he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not
the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same
issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the
decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the
dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as
well to the first cause of action of the complaint.

Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and

took possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof,
to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second
cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that
the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.

It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal
properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not
require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the
amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the
fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a
mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the
sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718
where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment
value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos
suffered P174,877.08 in damages.

Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require
payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the
purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed,
he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his
judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)

The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees
Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the
annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.

Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the
amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.

This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action
and is moreover barred by prior judgment.

The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by

the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of
action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes
of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must
necessarily fail.

The Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was
unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain
the services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos
obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such
deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of
the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which
is for the court to assess.

The Supplemental Complaint

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the
complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the
preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident
intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the
sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold
to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the
purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants
mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the
parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also
acted in bad faith.

The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages

caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid
agreements and transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the

supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that,
still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano,
in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy

Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and
Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%)
and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge
that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of

the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the
validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first
cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no
transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties
by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas
and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also
true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal
properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps
prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first
cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must
therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint
and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of
action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside.
Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and
independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago
and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.
Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison
in the custody of the Clerk of Court.