Manotok v. Barque | GR 162335 & 162605 | March 6, 2012 | J.Villarama, Jr.

FACTS:
The surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA
for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177
issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which wa destroyed in the fire
that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition,
petitioners submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real
estate tax receipts, tax declarations andthe Plan FLS 3168 D covering the
property. The Manotoks filed their opposition to the Barques petition,
claiming that the lot covered by the title sought to be reconstituted by the
latter forms part of the land covered by the formers own reconstituted
title, TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of
Homer L. Barque is spurious. The reconstitution was denied on grounds
that the two lots covered bythe Barques title appear to duplicate the lot
covered by the Manotoksown reconstituted title; and that the Barques
plan, Fls-3168-D, is a spurious document.On appeal, the LRA reversed the
reconstituting officer and ordered that reconstitution of the Barques title
be given due course, but only after the Manotoks own title has been
cancelled upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The CA ordered
the Register of Deeds to cancel the Manotoks title. The latter filed these
petitions to the SC.
ISSUE: Who is the legal owner of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City?
HELD: The national government of The Republic of the Philippines is the
legal owner of the subject property. The Supreme Court denied with
finality all the motions for reconsideration filed by all parties in this case. A
valid certificate of sale issued to Severino the official documented
nominated as Sale Certificate clearly required both the signatures of the
Director of Lands who issued such sale certificate to an applicant
settler/occupant and the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural
Resources indicating his approval of the sale. These forms had been
prepared and issued by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, consistent with Act No. 1120.
Manotoks assignors cannot simply be presumed from the execution of

assignment documents in his favor. Neither can it be deduced from the

alleged issuance of the half-torn TCT, itself a doubtful document as its
authenticity was not established, much less the veracity of its recitals
because the name of the registered owner and date of issuance do not
appear at all. No Register of Deeds had testified and attested to the fact
that the original of TCT No. 22813 wa snot under his/her custody, nor that
said certificate of title in the name of Severino Manotok existed in the files
of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan or Quezon City. The claim of the
Barques who, just like the Manahans, were unable t oproduce an authentic
and genuine sale certificate, must likewise fail. The Decision discussed
extensively the findings of the CA that th eBarques documentary
evidence were either spurious or irregularl yprocured, which even
buttressed the earlier findings mentioned in the December 18, 2008
Resolution. On the other hand, the belatedly submitted copy of Sale
Certificate No.511 by the Manahans was not among those official
documents which the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) offered as
evidence, as in fac tno copy thereof can be found in the records of either
the DENR-NCR orLMB. Moreover, the sudden emergence of this
unauthenticated document is suspicious, considering that Celzo who
testified, as witness for both the OSG and the Manahans, categorically
admitted that she never actually saw the application to purchase and
alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 of the Manahans.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened
of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would
be an axercise in futility.

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the
state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the
trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that
all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and
did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before
the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of
the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners

contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social

institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that

the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer
the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of
BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.

Constitutional law; Equal protection. There was a violation of the equal

protection clause of the Constitution when the former President gave
preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno. The former Presidents constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP
as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National
Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the
conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines
and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly
favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The
conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore
made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO et al., v. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al., G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
Pleadings and practice. It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and
injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act
that is already fait accompli. Where the act sought to be prohibited or
enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or
injunction becomes moot.
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still
resolve its merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition,
yet evading review.
It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican
schoolmaster, a teacher in a vital national seminar. There are times when the
controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence and to assure
respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a
case.
Administrative law. We have held that an administrative regulation adopted
pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and
policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board
of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates
have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon
executive and administrative agencies, including the President himself/herself
as chief executor of laws.

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
President Benigni Simeon Aquino III signed Executive Order No.
1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission).
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an independent collegial body, it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject
to his control.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the

Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it

cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose
criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate
patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a
particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with
the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations;
and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the
State. Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct
research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to
prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or
formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for
prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms. Thus, their main goals
range from retribution to reconciliation.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test ofreasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clauseHeld:
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend
to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must

include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are
to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the
law to him.
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It
must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be
in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of

knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice

because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that
of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that
is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be
struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate
of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,

during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
[Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is
but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot
be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier
administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports
of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the
Arroyo administration.
Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be
true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other
past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the

PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale
and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of
the people, committed by public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough
fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred
to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-

BMA
Bureau of Customs v Teves G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

Facts:
Former Pres. Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 for the purpose of
optimizing the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
BOC and to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.
The Boards in the BIR and BOC are composed of Secretaries of Finance,
Budget and their undersecretaries, Dir Gen NEDA and his deputy Dir Gen,
Commissioners of BIR and BOC and their deputy commissioners, two
representatives from rank and file employees and representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to;
1. Prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the Fund;
2. Set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
3. Terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
Board;
4. Prescribe a system for performance evaluation;
5. Perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations
and;
6. Submit an annual report to Congress.
Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) contends
that enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities.
Pursuant to RA 9335 and its IRR, Collection District Performance Contracts
was disseminated to lower ranking officials and employees for signing.
BOCEA contends that the target was impossible to meet due to
governments own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big
business, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other
economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were
coerced and forced to sign the performance contract. The personnel were
threatened if they will not sign they would face possible reassignment,
reshuffling, or worse be placed on floating status.
Petition was filed to the Supreme Court. BOCEA argued among others, that
its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their
jobs should they failed to meet the required target, in clear violation of

their constitutional right of security of tenure and their respective families

prejudice.
During the first year implementation of RA 9335, BOC employees exerted
commendable efforts and exceed their target of 196B of as much as 2B for
that year alone. However this was attained because oil companies made
advance tax payments to BOC. Rewards are given, which they described
as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials of BOC
got huge reward while the employees received only P 8,500.00.
Issues:
3. WON RA9335 and its IRR violates equal protection clause unduly
discriminates against BIR and BOC as compared to other revenue
generating government agencies.
The law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They
principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully
satisfy the demands of equal protection.37

Tariff and Customs Code; Revised Administrative Code Customs Memorandum Order
No. 27-2003. Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The
Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of CMO
27-2003 when he failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative
Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws when he provided for an
unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and (3) went beyond his
powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs
officer to examine and assess imported articles. CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior
notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the following: (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation
of the equal protection clause under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it
came from. Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003
have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade
wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the
importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only
be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation,
therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs
officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before
tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article
even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of
Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to
wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officers prior examination and
assessment of the proper classification of the wheat. Commissioner of Customs vs.
Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.