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On States, Strategy and Strategic States

Posted By INTERVIEW WITH FAREED ZAKARIA On October 19, 2009 @ 8:12 AM In TÊTE À
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Q Which country has the deepest and most sophisticated strategic culture?

A Well, it’s a very interesting question. I think that there are several models. I don’t know
that there is one that is better than all the rest, but you look at China, for example, and
they are beginning to develop a strategic culture – an interesting one. Chinese decision-
making – because this is basically a dictatorship – has an enormous amount of stability
and continuity. It is also a strategic elite that is almost entirely technocrats: China is run
by engineers. So it tends to be very fact-driven, very pragmatic and there’s little idealism,
ideology or vision in that sense. And so what you see developing is a kind of very
straightforward, pragmatic, long-term-oriented decision-making that prizes a set of
objectives that might be pursued over a long period of time; objectives that are fairly
narrowly defined. Chinese national interests are fairly narrowly defined. One could even
facetiously say that China’s only foreign policy as far as one could tell right now is raw
materials and Taiwan. They want to secure raw materials, and they want to secure
Taiwan. They don’t really care about everything else. If you push them very hard, they
will do it. But the truth is actually broader than that. They have a very clear interest, and
have maintained a very clear interest, in having good relations with the US ever since the
late 1970s, and they have seen that as their path into the world economy and
international system. Now, there is clearly some debate about this developing in China,
but my sense is that this is still the dominant interest. They are beginning to move
somewhat more slowly and cautiously on some broader issues of global order, one might
say – with North Korea being the best example. But it is still a fairly tightly circumscribed
national interest, pursued in a fairly consistent, bloodless way.

Q So you don’t think there’s a broad strategic imagination or room for a strategic
imagination that’s rooted in the great Chinese texts?

A I don’t see it at all. First of all, when people talk about the great texts, it sort of sounds
good, but great Chinese texts, like Confucius – all Confucius says is be pragmatic – are an
incredibly practical kind of guide. Maybe they will provide you with some sense of Chinese
negotiating strategies, but I don’t think that Chinese strategies are that much different

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from Iranian negotiating strategies. I think that the structure of the regime tells you a lot
more than the Chinese culture does. There is one layer that I would add to this analysis,
and that is culture – that is, China does not have a monotheistic tradition. In fact,
basically, the Chinese don’t believe in God. That means that there is much less of an
impulse toward proselytization and universal conversion, which is at the heart of the great
monotheistic traditions – certainly Christianity. And I think that you see this translate into
Chinese foreign policy. China does not fulfill its world-historical mission by making the rest
of the world like itself. It fulfills it by being Chinese, and by creating a great China. So
then you look at the other model I’m really struck by – the Anglo-American one – which is
deeply influenced by its high Protestant tradition. It is expansionist, universalist,
moralizing and visionary, suffused with idealism, suffused with ideas, suffused with a kind
of sense of responsibility for the world. It is also executed by democratic systems. And
these systems tend to be much more decentralized, with much less of a sense of very
long-term planning, and much less of a sense of unified decision-making. But there is a
broad strategic elite – if you include people beyond just the government: people in think
tanks, the media, and things like that – a broader strategic elite that is actually very well
versed in the world, very aware of trends around the world, constantly criticizing and
critiquing policy. People will often belittle the US government for not knowing much about
this or much about that. At the end of the day, however, given the scope of what the
Americans are dealing with, I think it’s fair to say that it’s actually breathtaking how many
experts there are, and how much knowledge has developed, in Washington on a wide
variety of countries. You want to find the best experts on Pakistan? They’re likely to be in
America – outside of Pakistan. The best experts on China? Likely to be in America –
outside of China. The best experts on the Congo? Again, likely to be in America – outside
of the Congo. And this is because it is a much broader phenomenon than just a narrow
decision-making elite. It’s almost a societal interest that has developed – and it
developed, by the way, in Britain in the 19th century, when London was the capital of the
world. Everything I’ve said about experts in America would have been true in London.

Q So this is the thesis of the ilk of Niall Ferguson – that Oxbridge people used to
go and populate the missions abroad, and that there was a deep talent pool to
export in order to run world affairs?

A Precisely. And I think that in Britain it had to be kind of an imperial function, as opposed
to pure technocracy. In Britain, I think it had to do with the peculiar structure of Britain’s
class system, where the second sons and third sons didn’t have anything to do, and
middle-class families would end up finding great glory in places like India. But at heart it
was the same thing, which is that the society got interested in this much broader view. It
remains to be seen whether that’ll be true in China, but I think that the strategic elite in
the US is much looser, more diffuse, more short-term, but in many ways more inventive,
more imaginative, more likely to correct mistakes. So each one has its strengths. I don’t
think that one is better than the other.

Q How do you square this democratic function that forces creative and strategic
elites into a little bit of a box, with really robust constraints on what they can do,
with these same elites’ strategic coverage and imagination? How does this
‘squaring’ compare with that of elites in, say, Russia, who are less constrained
by the democratic function? What are the tradeoffs there – the pros and cons in
the two types of strategic traditions?

A I think that there’s a tendency, from the time of Tocqueville, to say that democracies
can’t make good foreign policy: they tend to be emotional, short-term-oriented and, as a
result, prone to policy blunders. I tend to think that the reality is actually more
complicated. Look at the Cold War: the US was never able to execute the kind of ruthless,
brutal, consistent policy that the Soviet Union was able to, but American policy was
constantly subject to external checks, to critiques, to people second-guessing everything
from the missile gap to the war in Vietnam to the deployment of troops in Lebanon. And,
as a result, I think that there’s a very healthy, self-correcting aspect to it. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, drove itself off a cliff, because who was going to tell Leonid
Brezhnev that the Soviet Union was wildly unpopular, despised, that its economic system
made no sense, and that it needed fundamental change? This is not easy to explain in a
dictatorship, whereas George W. Bush heard from large, influential segments of the US
population and from American strategic elites about the necessity for fundamental change
in his Iraq strategy every single day, and every week. And that surely had some influence
on the course correction that took place in Iraq. So I tend to think that the American
system has enormous virtues in that you have a porous elite – lots of criticism, and lots of
second-guessing, which is very useful. The danger for the American system is really less

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about the system than about the lack of any checks or balances internationally. The US is
so powerful today that it can afford a series of silly policies – such as the Cuban embargo,
such as various sets of sanctions on countries like Burma, which are not doing anything,
and not changing the situation on the ground, but make you feel good in Washington. This
is certainly fuelled by the democratic system: emotional foreign policy is something that
democracies love to do because it gives them a sense of great moral satisfaction and self-
righteousness. And then you move on to something else and forget about the fact that the
policy in Haiti remains exactly as it was, and that Burma remains exactly as it was, and
that your policies have done virtually nothing – perhaps even making things worse by
isolating the country. The real problem, then, for democratic foreign policy is the danger
of a kind of special interest-driven foreign policy, where special interests care more about
the issue than the country as a whole, and are, as a result, able to drive policy. For
instance, regarding Cuba, 70 percent of the American people think that the Cuban
embargo should be relaxed or abolished, relaxed or repealed. But it persists – even under
Obama – because the Cubans in Miami are a strong enough group that they can wrest
control of that policy.

Q Let’s move to your country of birth – you are a Mumbaikite. What do you think
about Indian strategic tradition and the different strategic futures for that
country?

A India, in cultural terms, actually has some similarity with China in the sense that there
isn’t a monotheistic, proselytizing impulse in Indian strategic culture – in spite of the fact
that, while the Chinese don’t believe in God, the Indians believe in thousands of gods. The
essence of Hinduism is really to live and to let live. Hinduism embraces everything – every
possible orientation. You can be vegetarian and be Hindu; you can be non-vegetarian and
be Hindu; you can believe in one god, 20 gods or even 2,000, which is a very eclectic
worldview. The Rig Veda, which is the great central Veda at the core of Hinduism,
basically asks: “How is the world created?” And it says that we don’t know. Maybe the
creator knows, but maybe he doesn’t. It’s a masterfully ambiguous philosophical
statement. And compare that to the moral fortitude of the book of Genesis. This is exactly
how it happened, and this is why it happened. So I think that this leaves the Indians,
again, without a very, very powerful kind of proselytizing core. But the real determinant of
Indian foreign policy might actually not be the millennial Hindu culture as much as
something related – the deep decentralization of the Indian state and nation. What was
Churchill’s expression? He said that India was a geographical expression, not a country.
Maybe extreme, but it’s certainly true that it is a civilization masquerading as a state.

Q That’s just Mumbai alone, no?

A Yeah, exactly. And if you look at the last Indian elections, you’ll see that these were
really a series of regional elections, which had entirely local issues that were totally
unrelated, so that what was happening in Tamil Nadu had nothing to do with what was
happening in Uttar Pradesh, which in turn had nothing to do with what’s happening in
Punjab. So you have that reality, which then limits the degree to which there is a
purposeful, coherent, strategic kind of worldview. You get that sense of coherence when
you go to China. You feel like the whole country is on a kind of Chinese national team
trying to host the Olympics, or to move ahead economically. In India, you get the sense
of a very decentralized, disparate population: enormous vitality and diversity, but also
very much a sense of a lack of central direction and a degree of chaos. But I do think that
every country has to have a strategic direction, and maybe New Delhi will be able to do it,
despite the fact that it has a very decentralized tradition. The US in some ways was very
similar – certainly before the two world wars – and was finally able to create a kind of
strategic culture.

Q Any reflections on Canadian strategic culture or potential?

A Canada, I think, is positioned very well in this evolving world, and it is an advanced
industrial country that has a highly skilled population, but also has enormous natural
resources. It has managed to maintain a political-economic system that is basically very
healthy and robust. I think that it is benefiting from two great friends, at the moment –
one of which is the great global financial crisis. It’s benefiting because it wisely chose to
maintain some of the shock absorbers on its financial industry, while the rest of the
Western world dismantled them. And the second one is, of course, global warming, which
is making – or will perhaps make, over time – parts of Canada that were inhabitable far
more habitable. I think that its pensions, health care and immigration systems are
increasingly seen as extremely sensible. So I think that Canada has the raw materials to
very successfully thrive in this new world. Will it develop the kind of strategic culture that

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allows it to punch at its weight or above its weight? The Canadians seem less interested in
that. There does not seem to be a powerful desire to do that. And I sometimes wonder
why that is. Is it living in the shadow of the superpower? Is it the fact that it was always –
for so long, for so many decades – ruled from London? But there does seem to be some
sense of comfort in Canada in being a little bit off the radar screen – following, rather than
leading. I honestly don’t see any indication that this is changing. It’s up to Canadians to
decide whether they want it to, but my sense is that there is a contentment in Canada
with being prosperous, being successful, having a strong social market as well as a
dynamic economy, but no great desire to have global influence.

Q So should a country think about changing the world or is its first imperative
necessarily to care for its immediate population?

A We’re moving into a system where power is going to be shared: the US will have to get
more countries to the table – to include them – to help shape global institutions and
global order. And Canada would be a natural partner and powerful player. Its ideas about
almost every issue are actually very close to those of the US. It would be a very useful
ally – a partner – and so I think that it’s unfortunate that Canada does not have a more
vigorous desire to have a greater global influence. Perhaps it will change; perhaps it can
be persuaded to become more of a stakeholder in the system, and less of a free rider. I
say this with the full understanding that Canada has contributed significantly.

Q Finally, what about the strategic cultures of Russia and Iran?

A I think that, in the case of Russia, you have a dominant state elite – a statist tradition
that I think is somewhat divorced from Russia as a culture. But it is a very strong state
that has always controlled this vast territory through a very powerful capital. And I think
that what you see in the case of Russian strategy is the desire of Moscow and of Russia
and the Russian state to assert control over the country – over the neighbourhood – and
to do it in a fairly old-fashioned way: the use of hard power. The Russians seem to have
no interest in, or understanding of, the idea of soft power. They also, I think, have very
little sense of the complications of the exercise of power, such that the exercise of muscle
in, say, Georgia might produce anti-Russian sentiment along its entire European border –
which might be far more damaging than whatever little gain they might get in Georgia. I
find Russian strategy rather unsophisticated. It is the brutish strategy of a strong state.
The Iranians, however, have perhaps one of the great, most misunderstood strategic
cultures. The popular impression is of the mad mullahs running around, willing to commit
a celestial act of hara-kiri in getting nuclear weapons. I think, however, that this is
actually an old, bazaar culture, based on centuries of bargaining and negotiating. The
Iranians are in the centre of a very complex world, and always have been. This is a place
at the crossroads of great powers – a crossroads of trade routes. The Iranians have
always had to deal with foreigners, and they are actually playing a very, very shrewd
game in the exercise of Iranian influence in various ways. And I think that they view
nuclear power as one more weapon in the arsenal that will allow them to exercise
influence in complex ways; whether it’s through Hezbollah and Lebanon, through Shiite
religious parties in Iraq, through their appeal to the street in the Arab world, or through
the support for the Palestinian cause. The Iranians are playing a very complex game of
chess – perhaps even more than that – and we in return have a hammer, and just keep
banging away at the table. It’s kind of a perfect case of a lack of understanding of a very
complex strategic culture.

Q Will Iran acquire the nuclear weapon?

A I think that it’s a more complex question than people realize. I’m sure that Iran wishes
to acquire nuclear technology and nuclear power. That seems to be an absolutely core
national goal. They may, however – in keeping with this very clever, sophisticated
tradition – decide that they want to stay just under the radar screen, and just within
international law. Therefore, they will develop a very sophisticated missile programme,
and a very sophisticated nuclear power programme, but they will not marry the two
together; that is to say, they will not weaponize. Now, everybody knows that you can
weaponize the programme in a matter of months – that you have breakout capacity. But
I’m not as convinced that they are absolutely dead set on building nuclear weapons. And
this actually makes the problem more complicated – not less.

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Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek International, host of CNN’s Fareed

Zakaria GPS, and the best-selling author of The Post American World.

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