G.R. No.

L-27072 January 9, 1970

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings
Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION

SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made
by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar,
with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this
Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally
signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot
desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three
lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to
Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom
of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only
from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum,Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom
of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and
purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor
General points out, contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring
to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover
up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it
is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision
that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par.
7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment herein was rendered and
signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala
and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate
Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even
before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this
case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The
motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates
"incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
"unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of
"petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision."
The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared
unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce
evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the
appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor
capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but only served to
delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but
destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a
reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the
Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.

(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous
decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a
double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better
and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said
decision without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts
through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and
Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by
the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments
legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients.
It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be
deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to
"Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also
voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe
that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them,
and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by
the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial
prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the
recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself
in contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the
violation of moral principle involved and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to
inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his
correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's
resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for
reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor.
He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still
included through inadvertence.

On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended
motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice
Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the
dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July
31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted
in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that
he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he
present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned
statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client
MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed
be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred
that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of
civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance
under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not
signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his
assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further
clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference
to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates;
that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services,
which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he
advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to
another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and
he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner
in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied
participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was
on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for
MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of
MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new
counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds
raised, and contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part. ... . only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance
because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was
absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its
quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either
raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of
property and /or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial
branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested
rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of
law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation
is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to
show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for
contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion
for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and
requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request
twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the
allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to
the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the
motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the
true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in
the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to
require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return
[of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton
Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct
that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally

appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt
proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty.
Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to
Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer
nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned
Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left
Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read
it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he
went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared.
Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or
second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file
the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose
office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the
fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the
motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion
was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the
motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with
Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of
Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because
said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that
it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that
the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also
included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton
Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first
and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we,
indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as
"vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false,
erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary
injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of
an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the
decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president
of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a

significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem
that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that
lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that
there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular
cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible
to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be
above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a
member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already
begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as
disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this
paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only
because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference;
it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared
on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision
"many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is
truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he
paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government
officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against
respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority
and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics.
Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a
sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or
indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals,
including the President", should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the
whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors
or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or
their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent.
For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be
considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not

certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court.
We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country.
Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well
concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such
disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith,
counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called
upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444,
as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could
hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to
a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of
an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to
the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." 2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek
to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of
his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice,
oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his
well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it
is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a
trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may
happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err
in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse
conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the

administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8 is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty
of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by
the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He
brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as
"corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges
petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the
surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is
no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines
surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in
the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused
convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his
own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A
simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a
small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a
disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."

It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered
offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There
should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the
circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct
of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in
every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration
of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.

3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago
to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Correctly did Regala insist and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents that he
had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even
know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.

4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy.
Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the
pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration
is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been
done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as
follows: "Justices; who may take part. ... only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the
provision in its entire thought should be read thus
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the
court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication,
whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission; however,
only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take
part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a
desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about the
portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22
of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and
fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote."
While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate
deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that
qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were
injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World
Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than
fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A
notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross

inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a
decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And
yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the
contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has
read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at
the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to
pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration.
He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty
of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth
motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair
appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was
Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations
thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he
would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the
fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not
forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with
Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the
fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not
resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his
client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client
persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics
meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break
faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court
of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a
standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had
really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our
decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the
invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds
will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been

submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid
unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if
the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of
this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of
contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds
Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M.
Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton
F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever
action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such
action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records
of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed
against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal
of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the
constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio
H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel
a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his
first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the

appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the
appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417,
May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss
the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution
in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said
case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26,

1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic
vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as
his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by
him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition
until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his
proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had
earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder
he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero
vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967
resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November
17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that
this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest
latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment
you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure,

it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy
brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or
how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy
eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite,
first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to
them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his
petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in
the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated
with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the
members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings
will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment
on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their

stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is
given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis,
DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the
war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were
compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that
you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong
public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf
and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to

no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.

impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves
to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We
have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have
his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this
Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a firstimpression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper
role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is
to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the
Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed
the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the
last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be
feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune
that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated

different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding
that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099),
this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this
matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give
every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from

the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this
Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or
ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did),
but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This
rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule
15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state
the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at
least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held
that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil.
81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine
whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this
Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there
is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration.
We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he
sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ
with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they
are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press and
the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit.
Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of
public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in
the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp.
487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to
see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated
by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he
may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of
an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212,
216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed,
but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more
basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards
as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the

bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into
a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the timehonored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations
or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in
the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then
the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed
judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject
to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is
BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did
not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge
concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that
money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15
Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first
case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication
by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and
of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the
strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the
due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman
who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He
wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the
judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of
the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the
people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts
and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot
be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged
with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with
the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he
possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases
that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment
and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism
that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a
vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal
was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension
from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that
the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties,
and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression
that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this
court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges
to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would
justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the
duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts,
or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial
officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against
the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of
the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when
such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of
professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my
clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision
in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from
this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court
as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the
court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of
the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at
all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating
facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of
the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the
bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in
them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights
he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the
part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in
a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked

conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"

"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming
of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This
lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning
both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published
in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals
and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from
its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall
not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify
every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by
him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made,
could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would
not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can
resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any
words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a
libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute
an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly
different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune,
as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as
a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally,
he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in
open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as
regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney
upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial
acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical
and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While
the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to
criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of
the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any
person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if
only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel
the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly
man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has
been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court."
Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re
Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the
City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not
law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was
decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted
by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust
rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before
the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like

manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much
the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a
letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of
the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it
was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain
respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as
an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to
the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas.
408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's
Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained
as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him
and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence
of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public,
for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared
over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his
acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of
the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser

appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent
in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature
have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although
resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not,
and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt
of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted
the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching
to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge
the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a
statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law,
but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor
and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the

press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case,
who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct
the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and
integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court
into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in
his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the
Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks
of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of
this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It
makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these
is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the
point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is
that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and
respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and
some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted
yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

18

which, in the interest of

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal
rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks
or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied
emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality.
For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to.
A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial
which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of
the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an
adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them
may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally

punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded

against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act
or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In
the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to
be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or nonpendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is
to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated.
Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right,
but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost
universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts,
and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as
a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise
of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent
or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the
object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said
move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition
bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and
its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically
denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to
the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding
its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause
of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his
actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward
the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead,
with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks
for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the
spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature,
and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The
way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy,
and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must
be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total
distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being
intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members
thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and
distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted
court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if
there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would
be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of
men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in
this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled
by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the
dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed
where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be
futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there
is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last
and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also
because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to
completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which
is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The
merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]

JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY.
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay,
que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only
to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure
up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves
reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities
and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded
for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of
the offense will be dealt with more severely.

RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:

Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use
of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.
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As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal
Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel
for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering
his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the
latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many
people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be
suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming
that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly
irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence.
The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:
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". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was
because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and
crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this
representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school
and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife

of this representation and if yes, right then and there l would sock his face."

cralaw virtua1aw library

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice;
and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court,
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay,
que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only
to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure
up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves
reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities
and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of
Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by complainants
own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when
respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.

chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanroble s.com :chanrobles.com .ph

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA
BOSQUE,defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.

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In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia
Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the
Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such
was not qualified for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1 Phil.
Rep., 88), and an order was entered accordingly.
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In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney,

a practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a
circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established an
office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands
and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and
office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law
Office - Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto espaol - C.W.
Ney, abogado americano."
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Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared
in the courts, and with one exception, occuring through an
inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with the firm
name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but
with the words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado."
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On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September

15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the

names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the

2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the AttorneyGeneral to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon
instituted this proceeding.
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The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their

acts as being within the law.
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Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every

pleading must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not
permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of
any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a
signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an
attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor was it aided by
the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of
a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by
the fact that one of the agents so named was a person residing in
these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to
the bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly
rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of
names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other
than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts
to a signing by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being
originally one of agency. ( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not,
however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm
designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to
practice.
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It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for

the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his office as
attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court,
could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that
reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
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Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?

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Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as

follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court
or judge;
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2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is
restricted to punishment for acts so defined. ( Ex parte Robinson,
86 U.S., 505.)
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As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or

command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the
defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can have
disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This
order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding
proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his part of
ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even
had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any
license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order
made on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force,
must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed
by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a substantial
attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting
forth the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in
all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right
and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he would
devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a
lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the
law of other foreign countries, in regard to which a skilled person
might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated on

the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a

disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands. Independent
of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status
disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent American
advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest
in the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2
Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the defendant
Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding
to which he was a party.
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Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is

obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the
court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney,
as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to
misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of
Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney
participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was
chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the
signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the
man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his
persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not
commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive character of
certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on
the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
members of the bar.
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The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in

the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this
court within ten days, with the costsde oficio. So ordered.
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Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.

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[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court

VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,
and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya

addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence
by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent
acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,
hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at
San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and
which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right
hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage
PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was
payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among
other things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind
and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa
& Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,
who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the
contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances,
that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took
to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated
February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the
same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing
loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. He
also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the
Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both
of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly
duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."
a

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May
1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."
c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,

Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996
-- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26." In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
[1]

1.
"Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2.
"Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"
3.

"Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4.
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler,
forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea
that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined
(sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.
[2]

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" in which he questioned

the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal
Family **."
[3]

[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less

aggressive, even obsequious tones, Alauya requested the former to give him
a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. He stated
[5]

[6]

that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines
of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996,
Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
his salary. He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he
gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with
the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); and as
far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money
he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.
[7]

[8]

[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. He was
induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy
[10]

[11]

[12]

from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not
do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.
[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya
prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having
come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk
of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title
but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
[14]

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her)
and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya
had written inter alia that:
1)
Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2)
Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3)
Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him
by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4)
Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa
& Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his)
authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was
merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.
[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at
all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct
and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."
[16]

[17]

[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra;
or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling.
As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
[19]

scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is

expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms
might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
[20]

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already
had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not fullfledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
[21]

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellorat-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid
or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does
not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED
for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney;
and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977

JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA,
JR., respondents.

SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of
respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a
writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an
accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence
thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on
behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1

Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite
due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his
evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent
Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of
default, the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the
decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the
law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by
declaring him in default, it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the
matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral damages is
contrary to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The
decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L.
Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was
then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was
granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is
not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately
protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due
process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of
a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of
counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon ". . . could
have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals ... " 6
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution,
issued by respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the
judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.

Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is welltaken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who
represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial
proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in
court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the
judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fidemembers of the Bar in seeking a
reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and
justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings
before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner
himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged
counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend
the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a
proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby
dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao,
Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why
Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when
he is not a member of the Bar.
Fernando, (Chairman) Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON,respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul
the decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay
private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash
payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of
actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved
should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues
the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have
heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with
their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily
"boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also
required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any
deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed
to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of
Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September
6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him.
He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and
conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative
basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for
work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day.
Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed
that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits
for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these
were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was
allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their
taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of
the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal
deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents
two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction

of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to
controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from
February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1,
1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It,
accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not
illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before
us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck
down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage
in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against
requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has
recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were
illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his worker to
make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of
or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when
the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice
of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined
by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to
tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or
permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his
"boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for
which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance
due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00

1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits
through valesor he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of
P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even
in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that
since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount
of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the
issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a
tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean
condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the
amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in
this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the
context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments
they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the
taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly
noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair
play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they
represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it
may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he
was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of
the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a
reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client

relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless
the client's representative is a lawyer. 8

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is

hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's
fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by
petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest
thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA,
ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO
CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.
Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.
Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.
RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:
Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition, relief
from judgment, as well as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking
us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.
This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private
respondent Vicente Caeda ("Caeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants,
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985,
rendered judgment; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants
and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their
house/apartment and surrender possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a month from January 1987 as the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises until the land is actually
vacated, and the costs of suit. 1
No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August
1985, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
XXXII) seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside an
order of its execution. The petition was in due time dismissed. Again, no appeal was taken
therefrom.
On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was
filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the
nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the ground
of res judicata. This time, petitioners appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a

writ of execution was issued by the MTC for the enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was
held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash
plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court
was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to
remove their house on the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of
demolition was issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began. Before the completion of the
demolition, a restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX)
following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and restraining order, filed by petitioners.
On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the
MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief
(docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which,
again, issued a restraining order. 2
Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An exparte motion of petitioners for the issuance of a second restraining order was this time denied by the
RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23 August 1990,4 the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs
against petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce
its decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in question was
proclaimed an area for priority development by the National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987
by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.
The petition is totally without merit.
In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No.
98446, entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case
is intimately related, where we ruled:
. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court
is the implication of Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban
Land Reform Law," and its amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation
No. 1893, as amended by Proclamation No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016.
All the above statutes are being implemented by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council,
Office of the President.
There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On
May 20, 1992, this Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a
Comment on the status of the program of acquisition by the Government of the land

area which includes the disputed property, as part of the Areas for Priority
Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees and proclamations.
In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the
Metro Manila Project Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the
following report on the status of Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis
Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the Carlos Estate, an APD site. Pertinent
portions of the report read:
Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890
Obesis St., Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case
and located within the Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 1967, is not for acquisition by NHA.
The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the
Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program
(CMP). The site, however, is under the administration of the
Presidential Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) for acquisition and
upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)
The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged
negotiation for the acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila.
The NHA is definitely NOT acquiring the said lot for its program.
It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts, in
order to avoid eviction from the disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the
same allegedly under the Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing
Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same. Consequently, the
petition is DISMISSED. 5
What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners,
through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this Court has
been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate
intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become
final and executory.
Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision
before different branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this
practice be countenanced. 6
The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to
the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must
uphold and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge; thus LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor
consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not
delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)
We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of
the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is
contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the
contempt power. 7
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly
CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with
most severely. Double costs against petitioners.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES

BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty.

James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys
for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and
using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.
[1]

In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she

is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but
that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two
children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants
custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the
complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of
Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C.
Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to

complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that
the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed
complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not
received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
[2]

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged

resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her.
Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two
dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something
amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her
children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied
by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the
custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the
help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay
City Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the
police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the
police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order. In order to diffuse the
tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for
one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City.
This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police
Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
[3]

In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received

information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children
were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel
and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the
morning.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of
the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified
the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January
18, 2002 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been
issued.
[4]

[5]

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002,
respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent
violated his attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious
Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore,
respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another
offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. On June 23, 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation
of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be
increased to six years.
[6]

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held

administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good
faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to
be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented
the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at
least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas

Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, which he filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the
assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover
custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who
used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its
fabrication.
[7]

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on
the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is
asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the
defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.
Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:
[8]

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as
a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in
his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language
should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyers
arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed
by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of
truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
[9]

[10]

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession.

They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is
prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six
years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two
years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby
imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of
respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993

EDUARDO R. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO C.

PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Respondent.
Eduardo R. Santos for and in his own behalf.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil
Case No. 90-1706, an action for unlawful detainer commenced on 5
May 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan
while the respondent is the presiding Judge of the said court. In his
verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator
on 18 March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with
gross ignorance of the law and gross incompetence. The
complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the
answer in the said case was filed and "without notice and hearing,"
the latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, 1 the decretal
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby
respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with
plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitled case.
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SO ORDERED.
He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bulacan, in its Order of 19 January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No.
03-M-93 2 - a petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in Civil
Case No. 90-1706 - had already opined that the said decision is void
upon its face because it:
. . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or
obvious reason that the same cannot be considered a decision at all.
Instead of deciding or ordering something to be done, it merely
prays that judgment be rendered.

but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his]
final decision [of 28 June 1991] in order to nullify the order of a
superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a new decision in Civil Case
No. 90-1706 3 promulgated on 25 January 1993. The dispositive
portion of this new decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff by:
1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any rights under them
to vacate the premises occupied by them, more particularly the
portion on which are erected their respective dwelling
structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot of
plaintiff aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling
structure/units from said subject premises of plaintiff;
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2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of P350.00

Philippine Currency, per month by way of monthly rental
commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall
have vacated the premises of the plaintiff;
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3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of

P2,000.00, Philippine currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's
fees (retainer) and P500.00, Philippine Currency, for every
hearing/trial attended by said attorney before this Honorable Court;
and
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4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.
According to the complainant, the dispositive portion of the 28 June
1991 Decision exhibits the respondent's gross ignorance in "decision
preparation," and that respondent's "haste to amend the same to
favor plaintiff was both appalling (sic) and downright improper." The

complainant then prays that the respondent "be removed from

office if only to save the integrity of the judiciary."
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In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993, 4 the respondent denies the

imputations and alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was
not the original counsel for the defendants but one Atty. Adriano
Javier, Sr. who represented the latter until the time that the parties
were directed to file their respective position papers, specifically
until 29 November 1991 when Atty. Javier filed a motion to
withdraw his appearance and the complainant filed his notice of
appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the Decision of 28
June 1991 was rendered only after a preliminary conference was
held where the parties with their respective counsels discussed the
possibility of an amicable settlement and after the defendants failed
to comply with the 16 November 1990 Order for the parties to
submit in writing their "respective position statements setting forth
the law and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidences in support thereof
within fifteen (15) days from receipt" thereof, prompting the plaintiff
to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion praying that judgment be
rendered in this case; (3) the defendants did not appeal from the 28
June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for execution
on 2 September 1991, which the defendants did not oppose;
instead they filed a motion for reconsideration and to declare the
decision null and void on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her
pre-trail brief and there was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4
December 1991, the plaintiff's motion for execution was granted
and a writ of execution was issued, a copy of which was sent to the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January
1991, 5he received an order from Branch 18 of the RTC of Bulacan
directing him to desist from implementing the writ of execution; (6)
the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B.
Macapagal, Sr., issued on 19 January 1993 its order disposing of Sp.
Civil Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter, he (respondent) handed

down a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25 January 1993

that contained "completely the missing sentences needed in the
dispositive portion" of its earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing
therefrom, the defendants filed on 4 February 1993 a motion to set
aside the decision, which the court set for its consideration and to
which the plaintiff filed its opposition on 8 February 1993 together
with a motion for immediate execution; (9) on 22 March 1993, the
complainant filed a motion to inhibit the respondent by the former
did not appear on the date it was set for consideration. He finally
contends that the issue regarding the dispositive portion of the 28
June 1991 Decision was rendered moot and academic by the
corrections made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that the
charge of gross ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded; and the
complainant's sweeping conclusions show his disrespectful
attitude.
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In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993, 6 the

complainant reiterates his charge that the respondent is
incompetent because he lacks the "ability to prepare a sensible and
credible decision," and maintains that the respondent's attempt to
convince this Court that the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991
Decision is permissible and proper shows "gross ignorance." Further,
that the respondent believes that "he could correct the decision
after its finality" and after the RTC of Bulacan had declared it to be
null and void upon its face clearly manifests his "patent ignorance of
our laws and jurisprudence."
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In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 1993, 7 the respondent argues

that while the 28 June 1991 Decision "could hardly be enforced for
the reason that there is some sort of ambiguity or omission (sic) in
its dispositive portion," he was not prohibited from having the defect
"timely corrected and clarified," which was what he had in fact
done, and that the "clarified decision" did not prejudice "the
substantial rights of the parties" since they "were given their day in
court and passed through the usual course of the proceedings."

Accordingly, he could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law and

of lack of competence.
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Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to Surrejoinder and Manifestation on 28 July 1993. 8 Not to be outdone,
the respondent filed a Manifestation to Reply on 9 August 1993. 9
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The Court referred this to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
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On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted

its Memorandum containing its evaluation, report and
recommendation. After summarizing the antecedent facts, the said
office submitted that the instant complaint is meritorious, and made
the following findings:
It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have
overlooked the missing dispositive portion of his original decision
which is considered the executory portion thereof. The only
ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision
before he signed the same. If only he devoted even only a little time
to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be the most
important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention.
The alleged dispositive portion was a prayer. It did not have the
effect of finally disposing the case. Presumably, this must have been
simply copied from plaintiff's complaint.
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True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original

defective decision since the RTC dismissed the petition
for certiorari although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what
was rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at
all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2 years to discover and correct
his error; the error could have easily been discovered at the time
the Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the
writ was nonetheless issued on December 4, 1991. Hence, the

belated correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no

denying that the quality of a decision rendered by the judge such as
herein respondent, is a reflection on the integrity of the court in
dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very
least careless in failing to read carefully the decision that he signed.
In fact, both the original and amended decisions still contained
errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there was no adequate
editing of the decision that was signed by him. If he had been more
careful, he would have avoided such fractured phrases as:
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1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion, countered as follows:

(Page 5, Decision, June 28, 1991);
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2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid);

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library

3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid);

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4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract
of lease of which right becomes one of a detainer plain and
simple (page 6, Ibid);
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5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the
property(Ibid).
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It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for
their fractured constructions have no place in a court decision.
Careful editing and rewriting should have been done.
and recommends that:
. . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning
that any repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be meted
with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is also
admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions.

We find the above observations of the Office of the Court

Administrator to be sufficiently supported by the pleadings
submitted by the parties in this case.
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After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28

June 1991, we do find its body to be flawed with grammatical and
syntactic errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of, resolves or
decrees nothing. It cannot even be called a dispositive or decretal
portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the
plaintiff, such as the Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation
and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after the
defendants failed to file their position paper, although not from the
complaint as suspected by the Court Administrator. How it gained
entry into what should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any
attempt to unravel the mystery may only complicate the matter
against the respondent who is only charged herein with gross
ignorance or incompetence.
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There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar

and syntax and the fatally infirmed "dispositive portion" is the
inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the
respondent betraying the absence of due care, diligence,
conscientiousness and thoroughness - qualities which Judges must,
among others, possess. Respondent could have easily avoided the
errors and defects had he taken a little more time and effort to at
least read its original copy before he finally affixed his signature
thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge to be an expert
on the English language or an authority in grammar, he must,
however, do everything he can, through constant study,
extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce a
decision which fosters respect for and encourages obedience to it
and enhances the prestige of the court.
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As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two

standard of conduct prescribed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics,

namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an industry and application

commensurate with the duties imposed upon him" 10 and that he
should be conscientious, studious and thorough. 11
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Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed

"decision," he even granted the motion for its execution and issued
the corresponding writ with full knowledge that there was nothing to
execute. He could not have feigned ignorance of such nothingness
for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its
execution, exhibiting once more his inefficiency, carelessness,
negligence, or even his incompetence.
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We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must
be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas. The counsel for the
parties in the case knew or ought to have known the fatal defect of
the dispositive portion and the obvious inefficacy of any writ of
execution, yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for
execution, while the counsel for the defendants - the complainant
herein - merely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely on
the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that
there was no valid pre-trial order. Obviously, the complainant
initially believed in thecompleteness of the decision. As a matter of
fact, when he assailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged
that what was amended was a " final decision," a position totally
inconsistent with his claim that the latter was void as declared by
the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court who owe to it candor,
fairness and good faith, 12 both attorneys should have called the
court's attention to the glaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of
the 28 June 1991 Decision.
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We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very
least, inefficiency, neglect of duty and the violation of Canons 5 and
31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could not, however, be liable
for ignorance of law and jurisprudence or for incompetence when he
handed down a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June 1991

Decision was "incomplete" since, for all legal intents and purposes,
it had no fallo and could not attain finality, hence the respondent
had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law and
justice. 13 It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant
suggested, that the order of the RTC of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action
No. 03-M-93 stating that the respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991
is "void upon its face" forever bars the respondent from rendering a
new or amended decision in the ejectment case.
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We take this opportunity to stress once again that the

administration of justice is a sacred task and all those involved in it
must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle
solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public
trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice
and lead modest lives. 14 Every Judge should never forget that he is
the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice.15 Therefore, he must constantly be the embodiment of
competence, diligence, conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency,
and integrity so as to preserve, promote and enhance the people's
confidence in the Judiciary.
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A few words must also be made of record regarding the

complainant. We note that in his complaint in this case he alleged
under oath that after the defendants filed their answer, the
respondent "without any hearing, or at least this counsel was never
notified of any such hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision.
This is of course inaccurate, if not outright false. What the
complainant conveniently left out in his complaint was that, as
disclosed in the Comment which he did not refute, after the
defendants' answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court,
the case was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the
parties were required to submit their position papers and the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence. We find that the

case was properly placed and considered under the Rule on

Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court could decide the
case on the basis of the submitted position papers, affidavits and
other pieces of evidence. Complainant further suppressed the fact
that he entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only
after the court had conducted the preliminary conference and issued
the order for the submission of the foregoing pleadings and
documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to any notice before
then.
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The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended
by the complainant to give his complaint a strong prima facie case
against the respondent. While he was entitled to adopt certain
strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to this Court
absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither
condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of
important facts which would have a bearing on its initial action.
Complainant should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere
to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a

violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
respondent Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay
a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further warned
that a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with
more severely.
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Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the

drafting of pleadings, always keeping in mind his duty under Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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SO ORDERED.
Cruz and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994

ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff
versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following
order:
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to
conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the
Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal
action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.)
After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through
herein complainant, charged respondents as follows:
That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for PEDRO
CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff
vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully
introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a
falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case
thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation
of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)
Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said
sheriff's return.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12,
1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature
above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not

his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty.
Umali.
With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation:
There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that
Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the
Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.
The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the
following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified
as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" Sworn Statement
of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the falsified
Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the
Manila
RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali
and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the
respondents (Exh. "H" Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G",
Exh. "I" Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva, Chief
Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the
Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil case,
filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" Motion to
Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge
Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in
said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" Demand Letter
dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter
of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh. "Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"),
the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion To Declare
Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as
shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and
"V-2").
After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the
Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in
this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance
with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does
not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party.
At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the

qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the
courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on
the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear
in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are
above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only
secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196
SCRA 10 [1991].
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer
that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of
DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant
is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Per Rec. Nos. 3527, 3408

August 23, 1935

JUSTA MONTEREY, complainant,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO V. ARAYATA and TERESO MA. MONTOYA, respondents.
Eustaquio V. Arayata in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
IMPERIAL, J.:
It is alleged in the charges filed against Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata (1) that on August 27, 1931,
while practicing his profession, he prepared and drew up in his favor a deed of sale of the land
described in transfer certificate of title No. 7591, for the sum of P4,000, stating therein that the
person who executed the document and sold the land to him was his father, Arcadio Arayata, when
he knew positively that this alleged vendor had already died on November 5, 1916; that knowing the
document to be fictitious, he appeared before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and made the latter
legalize said document and state that Arcadio Arayata personally appeared before him, although
said fact was not true; and he later succeeded in having the register of deeds cancel the transfer
certificate of title issued to Arcadio Arayata and issue transfer certificate of title No. 8370 in his favor;
and (2) that on June 5, 1933, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil, he filed an application to
marry Engracia F. Ortega, stating therein under oath that he was single when in fact he was married,
said marriage not having been dissolved.
The charge filed against attorney and notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya consists in having ratified
the deed of sale and having stated that Arcadio Arayata personally appeared before him and
confirmed the sale, knowing fully well that said person is already dead and therefore could do neither
the one nor the other.
The investigation was finally conducted by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Cavite, who recommended that a disciplinary action be taken against Arayata and that Montoya be
exonerated, it having been clearly established that the latter, in ratifying the document, acted in good

faith and relied on Arayata's assurance that the old man then with him was really the vendor Arcadio
Arayata who ratified all the contents of the instrument. We concur in the appreciation of the facts and
we are of the opinion that said notary public and attorney should really be exonerated and held
innocent.
The established facts show that the respondent Arayata is the son of Arcadio Arayata who died on
November 5, 1916, leaving a widow and five children; that Arcadio Arayata in life, purchased from
the Bureau of Lands lot No. 3448 of the Hacienda de Santa Cruz de Malabon, for which transfer
certificate of title No. 7591 was issued to him; that on August 27, 1931, many years after Arcadio
Arayata's death, the respondent attorney prepared the deed, Exhibit A, stating therein that his father
sold the land in question to him for the sum of P4,000; that after affixing the names of the alleged
vendor and the two witnesses, the respondent brought an old man and the two witnesses before
notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and requested the latter to ratify said document, assuring him that
the old man was the grantor and vendor and the other two were the instrumental witnesses thereto;
that the notary honestly believing said information, legalized and registered the document after
verifying from the old man that he ratified the contents thereof; that the transfer was invalid and the
document not genuine because another, not Arcadio Arayata, signed it; that the respondent later
applied for and obtained transfer certificate of title No. 8370 of said land from the registry of deeds of
Cavite after the former title was cancelled; that sometime later, or on April 11, 1933, the respondent
sold a portion of said land having an area of two and one-half (2 ) hectares to Sinforosa Torres,
married to Basilio Sorosoro, for the sum of P500.
With regard to the second charge, it likewise appears established that on June 5, 1933, the
respondent, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil and said marriage not having been dissolved,
signed under oath an application to marry Engracia F. Ortega stating therein that he was single, he
being in fact married; the application was registered and duly considered and on September 25,
1933, the register of the Province of Cavite issued the corresponding license upon payment by the
respondent of the sum of P2; for some unknown reasons the marriage applied for was not
solemnized; the respondent's wife, nevertheless, filed a complaint for bigamy against the former,
which is now pending in the justice of the peace court of Santa Rosa, Laguna, for which reason the
investigator is of the opinion, and so recommends, that no action should be taken on the second
charge. The recommendation is well founded and has our approval.
In his first answer, respondent Arayata admitted that the sale had been made by his father who was
his true predecessor in interest, but alleged that nobody, including the complainant, could complain
of the transfer because none was prejudiced, he being the true and only heir. In his second answer,
however, and in the course of the investigation, he set up another defense alleging that the person
who had really sold him the land was his uncle Januario Arayata who, in the deed and relative to the
land, assumed the name of Arcadio Arayata. He further alleged that it was his said uncle who signed
the deed of transfer and ratified it before notary Montoya. We find this second new defense
improbable and unestablished.
The acts committed by the respondent Arayata relative to the deed of sale Exhibit A, and his
statements to notary Montoya with regard to said document, constitute malpractice and
unprofessional conduct under the provisions of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, meriting
for him a disciplinary action mitigated in this case by the circumstance that he was apparently the

heir entitled to the ownership of the land and that the complainant has neither real nor direct interest
in the transaction complained of by her.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata guilty of malpractice and suspend
him from the practice of his profession for one (1) month, hereby reprimanding him for having
prepared and executed the deed of sale in question. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers
& Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter

referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into
separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly
the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the
Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in
his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the
FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a
month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February
19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a
modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on
September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed
upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the
Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of
which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining."
Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein
the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said
Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for
other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted
that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done.
Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees AssociationNATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point
by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counterproposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies,
the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would no
longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to
October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise
dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss
the remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory
result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded
from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary
increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and
figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own

proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to
declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary
nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to
strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at
Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose
M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter
(exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the
office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike
or in the fairness of the Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced
to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some
management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia,
assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section,
respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building.
Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay;
a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three busloads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in
penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers
and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila.
During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition
for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the
pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31,
1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding,
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the
free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the
strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of
our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions
open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or
without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if
there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June
1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported,
we may be forced to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved
"slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the
ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced,
the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially
rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal
charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies
without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically
all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some
but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active

in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents,"
without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused
readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees'
Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later
that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks
computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted
although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by
sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a
promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by
warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced;
and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the
strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the
complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez,
rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On
August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision,
and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out
individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of
employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials
and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the
opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the
legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full
back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment.

I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate
exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking
employees individually by registered special delivery mail at that without being coursed
through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining.
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike
following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be
operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to
come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with
the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually
instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur.
563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining
agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with
changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the
strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with
the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus,
the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms
inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the
exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621).
It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to
return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform
their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor
practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine
the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the
employer's molestation.1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to
entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution
(NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it contained
threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on
June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the
expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or
reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co.,
211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with
"comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in
excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and
return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair
labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to

striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus
offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts:
the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a
request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after
the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking
employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers'
abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6
weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers
returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance,
profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that
"the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work
on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the
respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the
letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later
decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which
tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a
strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was
susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For
success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited
act constitutes unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within
the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct
which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be
direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements
of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of
the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective
bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A.,
1948, 170 F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be
read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters
should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on
the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the
background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine"
expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves,
frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they
were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias

or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or

interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal
of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage
and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant
corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served
on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect
compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the
Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the
former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department
of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally,
Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining
between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually
sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work
upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and
manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted
by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the
Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru
the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on
the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents brought against the
picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight
misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an
injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing,
etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free
movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the
same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent again individually and by
registered special delivery mail to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not
report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the
respondents thru a screening committee of which Ramon Garcia was a member refused to
admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when
almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused
admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were
readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges
who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo,
Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office
found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused
admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to
admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were
dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..
lwph1.t

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A
and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if
not destroy unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to
protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on
the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective
bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually
know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27,
1958, states, inter alia:
TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANILA
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go
on strike against
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga, Manila
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP
Plaza Moraga, Manila
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila .
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January
27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective
bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents
categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as
material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed
a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing
`deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the
union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the
actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double
crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the
unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden
resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in
responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958,

p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the
respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they
could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh.
7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union
shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act
875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within ten days from
receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula
which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62;
tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must
be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges
against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since
the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on
June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second
condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of
the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite
the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members
were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the
Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending
against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges
against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances.
This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is
therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the
active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines.
Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to
secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against
them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his
union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines,
not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the
record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the
strikers who were denied reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the
Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal
strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of
discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's
right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by
them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)

It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of

discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents delegated the
power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the
personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists
reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees having been involved
in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike were hostile to the strikers. Needless
to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of
reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the
machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and
reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in
another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473,
citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545;
emphasis supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening
committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around
to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the
management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee admitted the nonstrikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella,
chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the
blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the
management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed
responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an
employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of
the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia tried to explain the basis for such
discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the
picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was serious
were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of slight
misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either
reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on
record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the
alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was
given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier
mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents
refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except
three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still
refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the respondents in the
following stereotyped tenor:

This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU
Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of
misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute
sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are
giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every
year of your service in the Group Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M.
OLBES
President, Insurance
Life
Acting President, FGU.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed
strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and
the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate
sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June
2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial
and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned
his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the
management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned
the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them
when Olbes refused them an audience to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He
likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes'
secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the
respondents to produce De Asis and Enage who testified anyway as witnesses for the
respondents on several occasions to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind.
Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and
asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents
dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being
dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not
constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not

reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at various
times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking
back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on
account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until
after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the
discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,
58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725,
728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission
on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee
reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning
further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies
spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands;
hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this allegation
convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand.
Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a
trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined
business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to
Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official
rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear
on the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to
Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not
therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could
not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public
accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales'
trip which the respondents never denied or tried to
disprove his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise
the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which
guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the
existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or
by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of
every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected
thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to
justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to
reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to
accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of
management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by
the Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to
me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor

oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working

conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the
records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ...
(Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65
Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not
only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But
nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and
Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the
relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with regard
to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance
Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given
them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a
"general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more
inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez,
opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they
not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the
personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21,
1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead acts
considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that
there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who
elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers
did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both
suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958,
there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened. The
picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report,
exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover,
although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta,
Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal,
Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section,
reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they
were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal
charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first
instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their
grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate
exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault
or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to
violence.
lwph1.t

The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish
the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: .

We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any
extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with
economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the
depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket
line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the
contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this
nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of
the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing
therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act
would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the
Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of
reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews,
Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary
incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held
that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole
Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they
amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor
Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking
employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending
charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in
order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those
whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that
union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the
Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third
Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he
committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers
and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to
have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and
company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the

record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only
when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or
without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The
picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the unionmanagement dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic
fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p.
752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's
misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only
evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony
of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU
Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise
testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p.
27) another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the
circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of
the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union
activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of
union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint
or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join
unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no
discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to
the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair
labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional
labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by
fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an exemployee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766,
and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the
Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case, coupled
with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices
committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work upon the
invitation of the respondents they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and officials of
the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an
employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to
reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)
[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is
entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was

illegal." (Id., citingWaterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v.

Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F.
2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg.
Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these
union members have already been filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or
where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the
employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out
employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no
job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved
employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if
necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable
position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all
the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees
wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable
to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to
reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is caused by
an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just
before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor
practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for
backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion
for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the
cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive
backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the
latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal
charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were also facing
criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June
2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to
backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay,
Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered
sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially
so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents'
men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of
the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other employment or
other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during
that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the
company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense

of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205
[1955]).
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed
employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under
Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice, or, in the
absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a
dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate
the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or,
in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the
termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket
authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind
such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final
order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has
been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al.,
99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from
digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education Employees v.
Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea
Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge
Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents,
on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition
for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as
to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the
adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the
mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense
in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or
neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said
employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee
of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to
impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the
criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the employees now
under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a
just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication

Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.)

(emphasis supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored
portions of the above citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are
inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A
reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really
contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by
the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the nonfiling of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the
dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article
as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his
official functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This
being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed
or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal
Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal
prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by
the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling
that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption
that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not
necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may
warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not
even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the
criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the
employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion,"
which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political
pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees,
which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but
an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made
in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a
reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be
achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees
now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause
for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the
respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81.
Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..."
whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and
last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in

the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately
succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the
respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is
more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to
mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is
not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical
errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima
facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it
verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the
quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the
particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the
criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees,
should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is
the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they
should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers
and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil
Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort.
We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the
decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever
present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court
may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public
who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge
their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's
decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the
last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as
well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in
the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their
mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing
jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to
reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar
positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs
against the respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

ATTY. LEON L. ASA and ATTY. JOSE A.

OLIVEROS,
Complainants,
-versus-

A.C. No. 6501

(CBD Case Nos. 03-1076,
03-1108, 03-1109, 031125)

Present:

ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and

ATTY. GINGER ANNE CASTILLO,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO,
Complainant,
-versusATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS,
Respondent.
x -----------------------x
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO,
Complainant,
-versusATTY. LEON L. ASA,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

ATTY. LEON L. ASA,

Complainant,
-versus-

QUISUMBING,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
August 31, 2006

ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO,

Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of the present Decision are four administrative cases, docketed by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) Case Nos. 03-1076,03-1108,03-1109, and 03-1125.
I. CBD Case No. 03-1076
In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an associate of the Laurel
Law Offices of which Attorneys Leon L. Asa (Asa) and Jose
A. Oliveros (Oliveros) are partners, endorsed to the law firm a guardianship case,
Special Proceeding No. 5222, In re: Guardianship of the Minors Honeylyn,
Alexandra and Jerill Nonan, which was pending before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59. Castillo appeared as counsel of record for the
therein petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, guardian ad litem of the
minors Nonan who appear to have inherited a sizeable amount of US dollars.
A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and Castillo as regards their
sharing in the attorneys fees in the guardianship case.
On page 6 of a pleading entitled Reply to Petitioner-Guardians
Comment/Opposition,[1] ETC. dated July 19, 2002 filed before Branch 59 of the
Angeles RTC and signed by Castillos daughter Ginger Anne Castillo (Ginger
Anne) as counsel for Castillo who filed a Notice Ad Cautelam, it was alleged
that, inter alia, Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his services in
providing coffee and opening doors whenever there is a conference at the Laurel
Law Offices.[2]

Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger Anne to be a brazen

falsehood concocted to besmirch Asas reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed before
IBP an administrative complaint[3] against Castillo and Ginger Anne, for gross
violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
case was docketed asCBD Case No. 03-1076.
In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged Castillo with machinations
and deceit arising from the following alleged incidents:
In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior to January 20, 2000
attended by Dr. Laurel, the Nonan minors counsel abroad Atty.
Benjamin Cassiday III (Cassiday),Asa and Castillo, it was agreed that the amount
to be received by Dr. Laurel in trust for the Nonan heirs would be deposited at
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis Square
Branch, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-00043-0. Castillo,
however, proposed that the funds be deposited instead at the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), he explaining that he knew an employee there who could
facilitate the transaction. Dr. Laurel rejected this proposition and instead
instructed Castillo to file the appropriate motion to have the funds deposited at the
RCBC.[4]
Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was instructed to prepare,
Castillo filed the same with the Angeles trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently
received a copy of a March 2, 2000 RTC Order[5] signed by the then trial
Judge Eliezer R. De los Santos granting his motion and accordingly directing that
the funds to be held in trust for the Nonanchildren be deposited at the Trust
Department of the UCPB Head Office. Dr. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus filed
with the Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the
March 2, 2000 Angeles RTC Order in order to have the funds deposited at the
RCBC transferred to the RTC, as previously agreed upon. This motion was
granted.
Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged that in a Reply to
Answer[7] dated June 25, 2001 filed by Castillo with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 01-506, Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut

Planters Bank, Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S. Hernandez, Castillo again

committed a clear falsehood when he therein stated that:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of
Appeals who personally knew the plaintiff [Castillo] was also profuse in
extolling his academic credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer
as follows:
Q:
A:

Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?

Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers
of the Laurel Law Offices,[8] (Underscoring supplied),

he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at any time a lawyer at the
Laurel Law Offices. In support of this allegation, they appended to the complaint a
certified true copy of the Service Record [9] of Justice Kalalo which does not show
that he was ever connected with the Laurel Law Office.

In their Answer[10] to the complaint, Castillo and Ginger Anne declared:

There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the statement that Asas services
in the guardianship case consisted in providing coffee and opening doors whenever
there was a conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was in fact the truth, the
comportment being strictly in accordance with long cherished Filipino
hospitality, and he [Castillo] would have done the same with his own
visitors.[11] In any event, they claim that the assailed factual narration was
material and relevant to Castillos question why Asa was given the lions share of
attorneys fees when he had not rendered any known material service which
redounded to the benefit of the Nonan children.
Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the Nonan funds at the
UCPB was not attended with malice or bad faith, nor was it intended to benefit
them as the funds could only be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had exclusive access
to all the information pertaining to the interest and benefits accruing thereto.

As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer filed with
the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 01-506, the Castillos asserted that Castillo had
no control nor influence over the voluntary and spontaneous testimony of retired
Justice Kalalo in his favor during the proceedings adverted to.[12]
II. CBD Case No. 03-1108
Castillo subsequently filed a complaint[13] against Oliveros before the IBP,
docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyers oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in embezzling US

$950,000 representing the share adjudicated to the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy
with Dr. Laurel and a certain Atty. Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum
shopping to undermine and defeat the jurisdiction of the Philippine court in the
guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros, along with Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday,
perpetuated other acts of fraud in the guardianship proceedings; and (4) Oliveros,
together with Asa, deliberately and maliciously filed a groundless administrative
complaint against him and Ginger Anne.
In his Answer[14] to the Complaint in CBD Case No. 03-1108, Oliveros,
decrying the allegations against him as patently false, baseless and malicious,
claimed that the complaint was Castillos way of retaliating against him for having
joined Asa in filing the administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne
(CBD Case No. 03-1076).
III. CBD Case No. 03-1109

Castillo also filed an administrative complaint[15] against Asa before the

IBP, charging him with embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse of
confidence and violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1109.
Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel scandalously
mismanaged the estate of the Nonan heirs, the bulk of which they indiscriminately
pocketed; (2) Asa andOliveros filed a groundless administrative complaint against
him and Ginger Anne to compel him to withdraw his claim for attorneys fees
against Dr. Laurel and his bid to replace the latter as guardian of the Nonan heirs;
(3) despite an Agreement[16] dated February 16, 2000 between him and Asa that the
latter would receive only 25% of whatever he (Castillo) would receive as
attorneys fees, Asa secretly pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from
the guardianship case on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to account for and turn
over the amount of $130,000 in attorneys fees which belonged to him
(Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked on a scheme to force him into resigning as
counsel for Dr. Laurel to enable them to exercise absolute control over the
guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the attorneys fees allocated for
him.
In his Answer to the Complaint[17] in CBD Case No. 03-1109, Asa alleged as
follows: It was in fact Castillo who reneged on their February 16, 2000 Agreement
as the latter had earlier bluntly told him that he changed his mind and that he
would not give him (Asa) any share in the attorneys fees he would receive from
the guardianship case, Castillo reasoning that he was the therein counsel of record
and had endorsed the case to the Laurel Law Offices. He thus reported the matter
to Dr. Laurel and informed him that he would likewise not give Castillos share in
the attorneys fees he [Asa] might receive because [Castillo] has no word of
honor.[18]

As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly pocketed, Asa explained

that several days prior to April 18, 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed the
attorneys fees of both Castillo and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the amount to
be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per heir. When the first
heir Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on April 18, 2000, he
deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and his wifes joint Dollar Account No.
247-702-9275 at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), OrtigasBranch as his share
in the attorneys fees, while he opened a new account in the name of Dr. Laurel to
which he deposited the amount of $160,500.
Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own $25,000 plus interest
amounting to $25,023.13 representing full payment of his attorneys fees
from Merceditas, as evidenced by a Receipt[19] dated May 2, 2000 signed by
Castillo.
Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 belonging to Dr. Laurel,
$100,000 represented partial payment for his consenting to be the
guardian ad litem of the Nonanheirs and $60,000 represented reimbursement for
expenses incurred over several years by Dr. Laurel, the total of which was placed
temporarily on April 18, 2000 in his (Asas) Dollar Account No. 8-250-00047-3 in
RCBC. Dr. Laurel, however, withdrew $160,000.00 the following day from RCBC
and placed it in his own Dollar Time Deposit Account for which $500.00 was spent
for the purpose. A Certification[20] to this effect, issued by RCBC Ortigas Business
Center Manager Dolores L. Del Valle, was appended to AsasAnswer.
Finally, Asa declared that Castillos claim for $130,000 in attorneys fees is
baseless and unconscionable, and that Castillo filed the complaint merely to harass
him in retaliation for the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed against him and
Ginger Anne.

IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125

On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another administrative complaint,
against Castillo before the IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD
Case No. 03-1125, charging him with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, immoral conduct, violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of his baseless, malicious and derogatory
allegations in CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on deceit and deliberate
falsehood, and of promoting a groundless, false and unlawful suit.
[21]

IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:

By Report and Recommendation[22] of February 27, 2004, the IBP CBD,
through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of
the consolidated cases in this wise.
From the facts and evidence presented, what have been shown by the
counsels are mutual bickerings, unjustified recriminations and offensive
personalities between brother lawyers which detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and do not deserve the attention of the Commission. The voluminous
case record contains but personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies hurled by the
counsels against each other which constitute highly unprofessional conduct. A
great part of mans comfort, as well as of his success at the bar, depends upon his
relations with his professional brethren. With them he is in daily necessary
intercourse, and he must have their respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail
along in smooth waters. Hence, the parties are advised to conduct themselves
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and try to maintain the dignity of
the legal profession.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

By Resolution[24] of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved the February 27, 2004 Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the consolidated cases for lack of merit.

The records of the cases were then forwarded for final action to this Court.
Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion for
Reconsideration[25] in CBD Case No. 03-1125. He too, together with Oliveros,
filed on August 3, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration[26] in CBD Case No. 031076.
Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated Omnibus Motion for
Partial Reconsideration[27] dated August 9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108 and
CBD Case No. 03-1109.
On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment[28] on Castillos Consolidated
Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109 while
also Oliveros filed his Comment on the same motion on February 28, 2005.
On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated Reply to the Comments
of Asa and Oliveros, with Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner.[29]
THIS COURTS RULING
In his questioned Reply to Petitioner-Guardians Comment/Opposition,
Castillos statement reads:
x x x Atty. Leon Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his
services in providing coffee and opening the doors whenever there is a conference
at the Laurel Law Offices. He also conveniently provides himself with
the Nonan expediente to give assistance to the parties during their so-called
conferences. Worse, his express reluctance to appear before this Honorable Court
was repeatedly announced by Atty. Jose Oliveros because of his so-called failing
health x x x[30]

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer

shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 of
the same Canon mandates that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe honorable, candid and
courteous dealing with other lawyers[31] and employ respectful and restrained
language is in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [32] It is through a
scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his
observance or respect due to the courts and judicial officers.[33]
In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Annes choice of words manifestly
falls short of this criterion. Their disparaging statements in the pleading referred to
above belie their proffered good intention and exceed the bounds of civility and
propriety.
Castillos claim that the statement about Asas services is relevant and
pertinent to the claim for attorneys fees and was, for all legal intents and purposes,
a privileged communication[34] deserves short shrift. Indulging in offensive
personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional
conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof is privileged.
[35]

x x x this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory

authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected
of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged
communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability
based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the member of the
legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any
speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof, but
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said
speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains subject to this Courts supervisory and

disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the
legal profession.[36] (Underscoring supplied)

Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus ADMONISHED to exercise greater care
and circumspection in the preparation of their pleadings and refrain from using
offensive or otherwise improper language.
In support of Asa and Oliveros allegation that Castillo employed deceit and
falsehood in attempting to change the depositary bank for the funds to be held in
trust by Dr. Laurel for the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2, 2000 RTC
Order directing Dr. Laurel and his principal counsel Castillo to deposit the balance
of the proceeds of the settlement with any and all of the adjudicated heirs with
UCPB and the March 14, 2000 RTC Order directing the deposit of the settlement
proceeds with the RCBC.
A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8,
2000 signed by Dr. Laurel, however, fails to establish any wrongdoing on the part
of Castillo in having filed the Motion to deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply
stated that:
Considering the present raging controversy arising from the P50 Billion
coconut levy funds, the stability of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Head Office at Makati, may be seriously affected x x x
The Petitioner-Guardian can best protect the deposits of
the Nonan children if the proceeds of the settlement will be deposited with a
solvent and more conservative bank like the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION (RCBC) x x x[37]

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is

clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show the

dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof. [38] In the case
at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show
that Castillo willfully and deliberately resorted to deceit and falsehood in filing the
Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.
Respecting Castillos June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer in the Makati RTC
Civil Case No. 01-506, he therein alleged:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals
who personally knew the plaintiff, was also profuse in extolling his academic
credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer, as follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers at the
Laurel Law Offices.
Q: How could you characterize and rate the trial competency,
performance and expertise of Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: He is highly competent, low key, aggressive and very brilliant in the
conduct of trial, as well as, in the formulation of courtroom
strategies. His pleadings are also very well written, direct to the
point, convincing, scholarly and exhaustive. To be sure, he is one
of the popular trial lawyers of our firm (The Laurel Law Offices),
not only because he came from an exclusive school, but also
because of his scholastic records at Ateneo de Manila was also
impressive. That is why he was taken in by former VP Salvador H.
Laurel even before the release of the 1964 bar where he was also
No. 2 among the Ateneo bar candidates for the year. He was No.
15 among the bar topnotchers. This is not to mention his
impressive and highly (sic) batting average of winning about 80%
to 90% of his load cases and work. He was also one of the busy
lawyers of our office, until he went on private practice and excelled
as one of the more successful and respected trial practitioners.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied)

To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo committed clear falsehood for

Justice Kalalo had never been a lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices.

Castillo explained, however, that he can only say that he has no control, nor
influence on the voluntary and spontaneous declaration and testimony of Retired
Justice FelipeKalalo of the Court of Appeals in his favor during the highly
adversarial proceedings.[40]
Castillos explanation does not impress, however. The records show that the
above-quoted statements attributed by Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted from an
unsigned and unsubscribed affidavit entitled Question and Answer Format in Lieu
of Direct Testimony of Justice Felipe Kalalo[41] dated January 21, 1993. This
affidavit was earlier filed by Castillo with the Pasig RTC, Branch 154 in
connection with his claim for attorneys fees in Civil Cases Nos. 43049 and 56637
which affidavit was subsequently withdrawn,[42]however, as it was unsigned and
unsubscribed.
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon
specifically commands that a member of the bar shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the same Canon provides that a member of
the bar shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court directs that a lawyer must
employ such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or
law.[43]
Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from lawyers, particularly
when they appear and plead before the courts. [44] They have an obligation to the

court as well as to the opposing party to make only truthful statements in their
pleadings.[45] The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not
take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined.[46]
In light of the above findings reflecting Castillos administrative culpability,
his charge against Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases against
him and Ginger Anne necessarily fails.
As regards Castillos claim that Asa secretly pocketed $24,500 and
$160,500, the undated certification issued by RCBC Branch Operation Head
Dolores del Valle reading:
This is to certify that on April 18, 2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar
Savings Account at our Business Center. A credit was made to his assigned
Dollar Savings Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in the amount of US Dollars:
One Hundred Sixty Thousand Five Hundred (USD: 160,500.00) as initial
transaction. We further certify that on April 19, 2000, there was a debit made for
said account in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty Thousand (USD:
160,000.00) and that same amount was placed in the Dollar Time Deposit Account
of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr. Leon Asa left the amount of USD: Five Hundred in
his account to serve as the maintaining balance requirement. Subject Dollar
Savings Account had closed already,[47]

and
Dr.
Laurel
Partial
Inventory,
Account
and
Report
of
Guardian[48] dated February 13, 2002 filed with the Angeles City RTC, Branch 59
in Sp. Proc. No. 5222 stating that:
3. On April 18, 2000, Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and his
Principal Foreign Legal Counsel, Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III received by way of
settlement from one of the duly adjudicated heirs of Larry
Lee Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem,
Milagros Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was deposited with
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis Square

Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in the name of Salvador H. Laurel, in
trust for Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril Nonan, in compliance with the Order of
this Honorable Court dated April 26, 2000;
4. Pursuant to the above-stated Orders of this Honorable Court, the
Guardian Ad Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III disbursed the following
amounts for the purposes indicated:
A. ATTORNEYS FEES & OTHER NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:
xxxx
(7) Partial payment of the fee of Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be
the guardian ad litem of the Nonan children and accepting all responsibilities
attached to said position .US$100,000.00
(8) Reimbursement to Salvador H. Laurel for expenses incurred during the
last six (6) years for airfare, car rentals, overseas calls, and representation and
other incidental expenses while in the various states in the United States in order
to pursue the claim of the Nonan children against the Hillblom estate
.US$60,000.00
x x x x[49] (Underscoring supplied),

validate Asas explanation that the amount of $160,500 belonged to Dr. Laurel but
was merely temporarily placed in his (Asas) account.
The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian shows that $12,500
was received by Asa as attorneys fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo from
1996 to 2000.[50] Confirming such disbursement is a Receipt [51] dated April 18,
2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500 of the $25,000 attorneys fees
of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon by Dr. Laurel and Cassiday) were remitted
by Asa to the Laurel Law Offices as Official Receipt No. 1766[52] issued by the
treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices datedApril 19, 2000 shows:
RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum of Twelve thousand five hundred US
Dollars US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of LLO [Laurel Law Offices]

in attorneys fees of US$25,000 of Atty.Asa in SP Proc. 5222 of RTC Angeles

City, Br. 59.
Cash.US$12,500By: Sgd.
Treasurer/Cashier

On Asas alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillos attorneys fees: It

appears that Asa and Castillo each received $25,000 as attorneys fees but pursuant
to their February 2000 Agreement, the aggregate amount of $50,000 would be
divided between them, and Castillo would receive 75% thereof or $37,500,
while Asa would receive 25% or $12,500. The records show that Asa kept only
$12,500 for himself, he having remitted, as reflected above, the remaining $12,500
to the Laurel Law Offices.
Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the $12,500
which Asa remitted to the Laurel Law Offices, as reflected in the Partial Inventory,
Account and Report of Guardian.[53]
Respecting Castillos claim that, in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros embarked on another sinister strategy to spite,
insult and provoke him to ostracize him and make him feel unwanted to continue
as [Dr. Laurels] lawyer in furtherance of their conspiracy to force him into
resignation for them to replace him and have absolute control over the
guardianship case, the funds of the estate and the attorneys fees, the same is
unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further consideration.
As to Castillos charge against Asa and Oliveros of embezzlement due to
alleged scandalous mismanagement of the estate of the Nonan heirs, premised on
the October 13, 2003 RTC Order[54] in SP No. 5222, this Court finds the evidence
presented insufficient to warrant the imposition of sanctions against them.

Finally, on Castillos Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner, the

matters raised therein[55] being entirely inappropriate, to say the least, for
consideration in these administrative proceedings, the same is denied.
A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being engaged in
bickering and recrimination is far from edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified
recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court. [56] Personal
colloquies between counsels which promote unseemly wrangling should thus be
carefully avoided.[57]
It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended for Six (6) Months by
this Court in CBD Case No. 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo,[58] for committing
falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He was then warned that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would call for the imposition of a more severe penalty. This
Court thus imposes upon him a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of One (1) year.
WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed against Atty. Leon
L. Asa and Atty. Jose A. Oliveros are DISMISSED.
Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of breach of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby admonished to refrain from
using offensive and improper language in her pleadings.
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8,
as well as Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of One (1) Year, effective
upon receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the respective personal records of

Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo and of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let copies too be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987

ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON.
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).

CRUZ, J.:
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on
February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6,
1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on
March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after
fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December
8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to
us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. 2

These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and lawyers.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the
ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had
operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the
land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment
would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was
guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the
land registered in their the pursuant thereto. 4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and
executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They
slept on their rights forthirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the
cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen
more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The
herein petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition for
review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet become
final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners
rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the case within one year after
the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied this remedy before the decree is
issued? 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend that they
have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been registered and the one-year
reglementary period has not yet expired?
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was held:
... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of
the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the
grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this
provision a literal interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition for review

cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further
reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the
Legislatureand that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that
such petitioners must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry
of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no
possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is
entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for review
under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition of the court's
decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of
registration. (Emphasissupplied).
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should
not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for
thirty one years.Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and
to even ordinary common sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment
has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated
to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." 8
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary,
much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far
from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially
so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9
This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft
of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality.
From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of
such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law.
Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again. 10

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal
of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as
March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the
hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the parties asking for relief,
and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the land in dispute.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret
the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they

frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the
sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be
condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval
of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients
by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately
executory. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-22320

July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically
directed against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners
resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their
counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which
has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned
or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for
those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while
submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects
adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation
and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the
protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause
delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez'
position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly
by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the
courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were
conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R.
29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the
litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal

fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years
after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels,
sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil
case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or
ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene
following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth
Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the
said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the
proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts
of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October
4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying
out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or
ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to
issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently
issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil
case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as
justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso
Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence
in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during
the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing,
counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the
motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present
evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion
is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez,
now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch
which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and
their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the
preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by
injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very
day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the
basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963,
which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19,
1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the
denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to
replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in
the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963,
the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but
the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied
the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the
avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular
counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable
that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies"
projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,
one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the
second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are
persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292
as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which
are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is
not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with
the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be
established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of
a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had
already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the
judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having
been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be
considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the
suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted
to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the
controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil
cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts
did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of

First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to
restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of
preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of
the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said
cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532
when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil
case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said
civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292,
the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the
said civil case until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the
parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened
to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of
the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation
of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs
are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word
"counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant
the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the
execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered
its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such
counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about
the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil
Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision abovementioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he
filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall
writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over
the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs.
Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is
hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and
severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Fernando, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often
than not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on
pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the
controversy, wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law
profession, debased into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only
of the questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical
implications, on its merits as well.

We turn to the facts.

The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R
Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he
executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979,
and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his
failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land
were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R
Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no
imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L &
R Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties
subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise
stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19,
1982, the court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner himself
concede 4 for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the
sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner
moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it does
not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with
respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on
the other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem
the said properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to
advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over
the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we
are inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral
ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale
and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner,
first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private
respondent alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to
finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay,
the properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed
of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds
(for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the

Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public

auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public
auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the
respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The
court granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary
restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he
commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various
criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On
December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of
document, 13 praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that
"the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3,
1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a
mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter
would lend the money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for
the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner
moved for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration
complained of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's]
rights" 16 "to protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has
paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of
reconveyance based on the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case,
pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment
creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from
his failure to redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the
petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers
by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case
abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually
attained a character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of
Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting
execution over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the
petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining

order directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set
aside.

The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On
December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged
resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied
reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure.
Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC
G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC
G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC
G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT
RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE
PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged
legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed
orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of
judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the
nature of interlocutory issuances.

On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we
have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is
explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however,
that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded
as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of
his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court
reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner
Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely
implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed
vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the
respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had
entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise
agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the
former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent
designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to
him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno
R. Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that
petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty,
Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that
respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his
plan." 25) Aside from being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not
amount to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of
an appeal 26and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular
implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule,
"irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 28 In
the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his
motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted
hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance
of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular
execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.

The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to
his lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is
uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him
and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of
this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose,
gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment solely
of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated,
we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would
exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all
people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be an
impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon
the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing
entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a
development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his
interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ...
with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of
judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his
own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay
no man for money." 36

It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so
at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule
138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do
not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had
rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify
payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions
of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner
to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome
prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We
are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that
vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in
satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise)
between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties
themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were purportedly
provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the
amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066,
recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was
executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant
to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39Whatever right he had, it was, arguably with respect alone
to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements" 40due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.

The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement
and subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of
the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it.
We find this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the
proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace"
against the private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be
sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact
parting with his own money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to
assume that he did not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to
the properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic]
petition for annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the
petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent
sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a preprepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption
over the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier
averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his
counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private
respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate
attempts to keep his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart
from the fact that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We
are of the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to
forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall
acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier
terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the
redemption"in order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the
Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the
properties in their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a
gesture of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he
cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the
conveyance document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as
originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption
and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of
Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor.
He admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the
registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning
of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court
is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of
the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate, the agreement is
clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.

But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper occasion for it
we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is
subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of
the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the
prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so
that the property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in pursuance of what had been
agreed upon on compromise in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption
rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of
such a subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any
litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from

possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the
mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is
noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale
between him and the private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said,
issued a writ of execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have
the same enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the
compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier
detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear
tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties
have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the
petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of
properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his
hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said
respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco
Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of
P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000.
00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of
P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments,
be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of
the petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases
and in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the
dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of
general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the
outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we
have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but
if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have
done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a
barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit
and counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We
likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished
what convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.

1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco
Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him
for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be
consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for
execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson) and Medialdea, ** JJ., concur.
Paras and Padilla, JJ., took no part.