Rule 14 - Compiled

RULE 14: SUMMONS
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CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean Mawis,
RULE 14: SUMMONS

Section 1. Clerk to issue summons. Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the
requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the
defendants. (1a)
Section 2. Contents. The summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by the clerk of court
under seal and contain (a) the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action; (b) a
direction that the defendant answer within the time fixed by these Rules; (c) a notice that unless the
defendant so answers plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.
A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem if any, shall be attached to the
original and each copy of the summons. (3a)
Section 3. By whom served. The summons may be served by the sheriff, his deputy, or other proper
court officer, or for justifiable reasons by any suitable person authorized by the court issuing the
summons. (5a)
Section 4. Return. When the service has been completed, the server shall, within five (5) days
therefrom, serve a copy of the return, personally or by registered mail, to the plaintiff's counsel, and
shall return the summons to the clerk, who issued it, accompanied by proof of service. (6a)
Section 5. Issuance of alias summons. If a summons is returned without being served on any or all
of the defendants, the server shall also serve a copy of the return on the plaintiff's counsel, stating the
reasons for the failure of service, within five (5) days therefrom. In such a case, or if the summons has
been lost, the clerk, on demand of the plaintiff, may issue an alias summons. (4a)
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him. (7a)
Section 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. (8a)
Section 8. Service upon entity without juridical personality. When persons associated in an entity
without juridical personality are sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known,
service may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of them, or upon the person
in charge of the office or place of business maintained in such name. But such service shall not bind
individually any person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been severed before
the action was brought. (9a)
Section 9. Service upon prisoners. When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or institution,
service shall be effected upon him by the officer having the management of such jail or institution who
is deemed deputized as a special sheriff for said purpose. (12a)
Section 10. Service upon minors and incompetents. When the defendant is a minor, insane or
otherwise an incompetent, service shall be made upon him personally and on his legal guardian if he
has one, or if none his guardian ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the
case of a minor, service may also be made on his father or mother. (l0a, 11a)
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. (13a)
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Pielago, Sartillo, Von Arx
Abergos, De Guzman, Jampac, Ong,
RULE 14: SUMMONS

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Section 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entities. When the defendant is a foreign private
juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines. (14a)
Section 13. Service upon public corporations. When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines,
service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like
public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers
as the law or the court may direct. (15)
Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as
the court may order. (16a)
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section
6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail
to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any
order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer. (17a)
Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by
leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (18a)
Section 17. Leave of court. Any application to the court under this Rule for leave to effect service in
any manner for which leave of court is necessary shall be made by motion in writing, supported by
affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth the grounds for the application. (19)
Section 18. Proof of service. The proof of service of a summons shall be made in writing by the
server and shall set forth the manner, place, and date of service; shall specify any papers which have
been served with the process and the name of the person who received the same; and shall be sworn
to when made by a person other than a sheriff or his deputy. (20)
Section 19. Proof of service by publication. If the service has been made by publication, service
may be proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or
advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached and by an affidavit
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage
prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address. (21)
Section 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (23a)
March 15, 2011

EN BANC
A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC
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AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON

FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY
Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 12.Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity
which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law
to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent, service may, with
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following means:
a)By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
b)By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found and
by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of the
defendant;
c)By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or DaIAcC
d)By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct."
This rule shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
(SGD.) RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Published in The Philippine Star on March 24, 2011.
||| (Amendment of Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on Service Upon Foreign Private Juridical Entity, A.M.
No. 11-3-6-SC [2011])
January 17, 2012

EN BANC
A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC
NOTICE
Sir/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC (Re: Proposed Revision of Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on Service upon Foreign
Private Juridical Entity). The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter dated December 13, 2011 of Atty. Ian R.P.
Malilong of Solis Medina Limpingco & Fajardo requesting for copies of Court issuances, opinions, minutes of
proceedings and the like, setting the guidelines for carrying out the extraordinary means of service of summons
under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, considering that the rule is relatively novel and that jurisprudence
on this matter is still lacking." Brion, J., on official leave. (adv133a) TDEASC
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
||| (Re: Proposed Revision of Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on Service Upon Foreign Private Juridical
Entity, A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC [2012])
(RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. SPOUSES VILLA, G.R. NO.
184197, FEBRUARY 11, 2010)
Facts: (Petition for review on Certiorari)
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Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants
including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).
After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta (Zapanta), court process
server, resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents' househelp who did not
acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. Thus Zapanta stated in the Return of
Summons.
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to
Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default" which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.
More than eight months thereafter or on January 30, 2006, respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Default, claiming that on January 27, 2006 they "officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint
and Annexes. Motion to Dismiss of the Solicitor General and the ORDER dated May 3, 2005 granting the
Motion to Declare them in Default."
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to
Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default" which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.
By Order of July 17, 2006, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein respondents five
days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file
a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted by Order of February 21, 2007.
On April 18, 2007, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring
them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons due to invalid service of summons.
The trial court denied respondents' Omnibus Motion by Order of May 22, 2007 and proceeded to receive ex
parte evidence for petitioner.
Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial court's February 21, 2007 and April 18, 2007 Orders before
the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, the trial court, by Decision of September 4, 2007, rendered
judgment in favor of petitioner.
CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant even if there is no valid service of
summons?
Held:
It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this
rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is
considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
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PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP VS HON JAPZON
A vehicular collision took place in Tarlac involving a Ford truck on its way to Manila and an unidentified
motor vehicle that hit and sideswept the jeepney then driven by Macasieb. Two (2) passengers of the
jeepney, namely Jose Lara and Paed sustained physical injuries.
Lara and Paed filed a civil case for damages against Garcia, Natividad (jeepney operators), Macasieb
(jeepney driver), Manuel (truck driver) and impleaded Paramount as insurer of the Ford truck.
Atty. Segundo Gloria filed a notice of appearance informing the court that he was appearing for and in
behalf of the defendants Natividad, Manuel and Paramount.
In the interim period, a fire gutted the City Hall of Manila and the records of the case were burned to ashes.
Lara and Paed filed a petition for reconstitution of the judicial records of the case.
TC reiterated its order before the reconstitution of the judicial records declaring defendants Natividad,
Manuel and Paramount in default in view of their continued failure to appear during the trial of the case
and allowed the plaintiffs Lara and Paed to make a formal offer of exhibits.
RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
A copy of the said decision was served on the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Segundo Gloria, on October 5,
1981.
No appeal from the judgment having been filed within the reglementary period, the same became final and
executory.
On March 2, 1984, Lara and Paed filed an ex-parte motion for execution of the said judgment. TC granted
the same on July 10, 1984.
It was only on March 3, 1984 that Paramount, filed a motion to set aside the Decision raising the issue that
the court has not validly acquired jurisdiction over its person for not having been validly served with
summons and a copy of the complaint nor did it actively participate in the said proceedings. It alleged that
Atty. Segundo Gloria was not its retained counsel at that time nor was he authorized by petitioner to act for
and in its behalf. And that private respondents' claims for moral, exemplary and compensatory damages as
well as attorney's fees are not recoverable from petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the court validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner for not having been validly served with summons
RULING:
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court
and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons is intended to give notice to
the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The defendant or respondent is thus
put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner's contentions that it was not properly served with summons and that Atty. Segundo Gloria
was not authorized to appear for and in its behalf are untenable.
Petitioners failed to substantiate its allegation that it was not properly served with summons. Hence, the disputable
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails. The records of the case showed that all the
pleadings, including the answer with crossclaim and counterclaim filed by Atty. Segundo Gloria stated that he
represented the defendants Natividad, Manuel and Paramount. In fact, he even filed a notice of appearance
informing the court that he is representing the said defendants.
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It is worth noting that this is not the first time petitioner raised the issue of warrant of jurisdiction over its person as
well as warrant of authority of a lawyer to appear for and in its behalf. In the case docketed as G.R. No. 68066
entitled "Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna," this Court had the opportunity to rule that "the mere filling of the
answer with crossclaim raised a presumption of authority to appear for petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation
. . . in accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such presumption is rebuttable, but only by clear
and positive proof. In the absence of such clear and positive proof, the presumption of authority . . . should prevail
over the petitioner's self-serving denial of such authority.
To the mind of the Court, the instant petition is filed merely to derail its execution. It took Paramount almost six
years to question the jurisdiction of the lower court. Moreover, as earlier adverted to, the controverted Decision of
August 30, 1983, became final and executory on October 20, 1983. In any event, it is axiomatic that there is no
justification in law and in fact for the reopening of a case which has long become final and which in fact was
already executed on July 18, 1984. Time and again, this Court has said that the doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice and at the risk of occasional error, the
judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law.
BOTICANO VS CHU
Petition for review on certitorari

Petitioner Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck that was hit and bumped by a Bedford
truck owned by private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. and driven by Jaime Sigua. Manuel Chu, Jr. agreed with
petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the repair and damages. Manuel Chu, Jr. failed to comply with
agreement in spite of repeated demands by Boticano.
Boticano filed a complaint for damages before the CFI of Nueva Ecija against Chu and Sigua.
Summons was issued on December 12, 1977 but was returned unserved for defendant Jaime Sigua
because he was no longer connected with San Pedro Saw Mill, Guagua, Pampanga.
Another copy of the summons for Manuel Chu, Jr. was returned duly served on him thru his wife Veronica
Chu at his dwelling house.
On February 15, 1978 petitioner moved to dismiss the case against Jaime Sigua and to declare Manuel Chu,
Jr. in default for failure to file responsive pleadings within the reglementary period.
The motion was granted allowing petitioner to adduce his evidence ex parte on October 17, 1978.
TC found that private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. is responsible for the fault and negligence of his driver
Sigua.
On March 19, 1979 private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. filed with the trial court a "Notice of Appeal" and an
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to file Record on Appeal. TC granted.
On May 4, 1979 petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for execution for
hearing.
Hearing was set on May 14, 1979 wherein private respondent's counsel personally appeared and opposed
petitioner's motion.
Petitioner filed his reply to opposition.
On May 16, 1979 the trial court issued an order denying aforesaid Motion to Dismiss.
On May 22, 1979, the trial court issued another order approving private respondent's Record on Appeal.
Case was brought to the CA. CA ruled that appealed judgment be set aside for being null and void;
directed the case to be remanded to the court of origin; that appellant be properly served with summons
and a copy of the complaint; and that the necessary and appropriate proceedings or action be taken
thereafter.
Petitioner filed MR and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration days later. CA denied.
ISSUE:
WON Manuel Chu was not properly served with summons.
RULING:
SC affirmed TC. Jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of respondent thru both
service of summons and voluntary appearance in court.
Private respondent insists that there was no valid service of summons because private respondent is a partner and
general manager in San Pedro Sawmill. Consequently the wife of private respondent to whom summons and
complaint were allegedly served not being partnership, cannot receive the same under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.
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Petitioner contends in favor of validity of such service while private respondent maintains the opposite view which
was sustained by respondent Court of Appeals to the effect that the Sheriff resorted to substituted service under
Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, without first complying with the mode of personal service required under
Section 7 of the same Rule.
The principal issue which arises in this case which involves an inquiry into procedural due process, is whether or
not the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be raised for the first time on appeal. The
question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court. In fact, one of the circumstances considered by
the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person
arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First
Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising
from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be
waived by a failure to make seasonable objections.
Coming to the case at bar, it has been pointed out that during the stages of the proceedings in the court below,
defendant-appellant could have questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not. It can of course be
argued that the failure to question the lower court's jurisdiction cannot be accounted against Chu for his having
been declared in default gave him no chance to participate in the court deliberations and therefore no chance to
raise the jurisdictional issue, but then, he could have done so, in the subsequent pleadings he filed.
Besides, even assuming that such failure cannot be taken against him, the fact is he had VOLUNTARILY
submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction. He voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court.
He filed a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal,
Record on Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance, Notice of Appearance and Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Not only did he submit
pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing held and
orally argued in open court on the pending incident.
Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service. Thus, under this principle, it has been consistently held by the
Supreme Court that the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant.
PAN-ASIATIC VS. CA
FACTS:
Destinations Travel Phil., Inc. filed a complaint against Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp. for the refund of the price of
alleged unutilized airplane tickets, which totalled P48,742.33.
Destinations filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. PAN-ASIATIC, by way of special appearance, filed a
Motion to Dismiss for the sole purpose of objecting to the trial court's jurisdiction over its person on the ground
that it was not properly served with summons.
Destinations filed an amended complaint increasing its claim for reimbursement of refunds to P103,866.35. At
the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, Pan-Asiatic was informed of the filing of the amended complaint; hence,
it withdrew its Motion to Dismiss.
A copy of the amended complaint and summons were served on PAN-ASIATIC. PAN-ASIATIC filed several
motions for extension of time within which to file its answer. Instead of filing an Answer, it filed a Motion for Bill
of Particulars which was granted by the trial court.
DESTINATIONS did not file a Bill of Particulars. Instead, it served and filed a Motion to Admit attached "Second
Amended Complaint, which was admitted by the trial judge in an Order dated May 28, 1981, which Order was
served on petitioner on June 9, 1981. However, no new summons was served on petitioner.
On July 15, 1981 DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default which was granted. On January
4, 1982 the trial court rendered judgment by default against PAN-ASIATIC, which received a copy of the
decision on January 25, 1982.
On February 24, 1982, petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Vacate Judgment by
Default, alleging that the trial court's decision was rendered without jurisdiction because petitioner was never
served with summons on the Second Amended Complaint. Motion was denied by the trial judge in an Order
dated March 31, 1982. A copy of the Order was served on petitioner on April 2, 1982. On the same date, April
2, 1982, PAN-ASIATIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of March 31.
While the Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner filed on April 30, 1982 its notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal, and at the same time withdrew its Motion for Reconsideration which withdrawal
was granted by the trial court.
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DESTINATIONS filed a Motion for Execution which the trial court granted on June 15, 1982. Meanwhile, the
appeal of PAN-ASIATIC, was Dismissed on the ground that the Decision of January 4, 1982 had become final and
executory and that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period.
PAN-ASIATIC filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial
court acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not new summons should be served on Pan-Asiatic
HELD:
No.
Petitioner contends that the Second Amended Complaint introduced new causes of action not alleged in the
original nor in the first amended complaint. Hence, it is argued that new summons had to be served on petitioner,
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over its (petitioner's) person.
In the 1923 case of Atkins, Kroll and Co. v. Domingo, this Court had occasion to lay down the rule that if the
defendant had appeared in the action, service of an amended complaint (which introduces a new cause of action)
in the same manner as any other pleading or motion is sufficient, even if no new summons is served.
If defendant had not yet appeared, a new summons must be served upon him as regards the amended complaint,
otherwise the court would have no power to try the new causes of action alleged therein, unless he had lodged an
answer thereto. Simply sending a copy of the amended complaint to the defendant by registered mail is not
equivalent to service of summons in such case. However, if the defendant had already appeared in response to the
first summons, so that he was already in court when the amended complaint was filed, then ordinary service of
that pleading upon him, personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new summons need be served upon
him.
In the instant case, summons on the first amended complaint was properly served on PAN-ASIATIC. After which, the
company filed several motions for extension of time within which to file responsive pleading, and then a Motion for
Bill of Particulars, all of which motions were granted by the trial court. With the filing of these motions, PAN-ASIATIC
had effectively appeared in the case and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, no new
summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary, ordinary service being sufficient.
In cases where a complaint is amended, the Rules of Court provide for the period within which the defendant must
answer thus:
SEC. 3. Answer to amended complaint.If the complaint is amended, the time fixed for the filing
and service of the answer shall, unless otherwise ordered, run from notice of the order admitting
the amended complaint. An answer filed before the amendment shall stand as an answer to the
amended complaint, unless a new answer is filed within ten (10) days from notice of service as
herein provided.
There is no question that PAN-ASIATIC was properly served with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint and that
on June 9, 1981, it received a copy of the Order admitting said Second Amended Complaint. Since it failed to serve
and file its Answer within fifteen (15) days from June 9, 1981, the trial court was correct in declaring the company
in default, in holding trial ex parte, and in eventually rendering judgment by default.
SANDOVAL vs. HRET AND ORETA

FACTS:
Sandoval and Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas during the 2001
national elections. Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against Sandoval.
On 7 June 2001 HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the summons by substituted service upon a certain
Gene Maga who signed the process server's copy of the summons and indicated thereon his position as
"maintenance."
On 12 July 2001 HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of petitioner Sandoval's failure to file an
answer within ten (10) days from date of service of the summons on 7 June 2001.
HRET ordered the parties to proceed to preliminary conference. On 18 July 2001 the HRET ordered both
petitioner and respondent to file their respective preliminary conference briefs.
On 1 August 2001, only Oreta filed the required brief.
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On 6 August 2001, instead of filing brief, Sandoval moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 and
prayed for the admission of his answer with counter-protest. He argued that the substituted service of
summons upon him was improperly effected. HRET denied through Resolution No. 01-118.
On 30 August 2001 petitioner Sandoval filed the instant petition with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction
questioning Resolutions Nos. 01-081 and 01-118 and assailing the HRET's jurisdiction over his person. Plea for
injunctive writs was denied. Sandoval was constrained to file his preliminary conference brief ad cautelam and
to attend the preliminary conference on 18 October 2001.
On 29 October 2001 respondent Oreta filed her Comment to the instant petition. On 3 January 2002 the Office
of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment. The Solicitor General found that
the substituted service of summons upon petitioner was faulty and thus recommended favorable action on the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substituted service of summons was validly effected on Sandoval
HELD:
No.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies
of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
Summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice
desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished.
If however efforts to find him
personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. As safeguard measures for this drastic
manner of bringing in a person to answer for a claim, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service
must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary
first to establish the following circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential
that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer's return itself and
only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with this rule renders
absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant or the respondent.
We find no merit in respondent Oreta's austere argument that personal service need not be exhausted before
substituted service may be used since time in election protest cases is of the essence. Precisely, time in election
protest cases is very critical so all efforts must be realized to serve the summons and a copy of the election
protest by the means most likely to reach the protestee. There ought to be no rational basis for distinguishing
between regular court cases and election protest cases pending before the HRET.
The purported substituted service of summons upon petitioner Sandoval was irregularly executed. There is
absolutely nothing in the process server's affidavit of service indicating the impossibility of personal service of
summons upon petitioner within a reasonable time. We can take judicial notice of the fact that petitioner is a very
visible and active member of Congress such that to effect personal service upon him, all it would have taken the
process server was a few hours more of a little extra work
Moreover, we do not find in the record that the summons and a copy of the election protest were served on a
competent person in charge of petitioner's office. It must be emphasized that Gene Maga, the recipient of the
summons, was merely a "maintenance" man who offered his services not only to petitioner but to anyone who was
so minded to hire his assistance.
Granting that Gene Maga was an employee of petitioner at his district office, still it cannot be said that he was
qualified to receive the summons. To be a "competent" person to receive the summons means that he should be
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"duly qualified" and "having sufficient capacity, ability or authority." In Keister v. Navarro we set out the
qualifications of the persons designated by the Rules of Court to whom copies of the process may be left: "The
rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the
defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him
notice thereof."
Not only was Gene Maga an incompetent person to receive the summons, he was also, more plainly, not in charge
of petitioners office. To be "in charge" means to have "care and custody of, under control of, or entrusted to the
management or direction of." Applied to the instant case, Maga had obviously no control and management of the
district office as noticeably shown by his occupation as "maintenance" man.
In light of the defective and irregular substituted service of summons, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner and consequently the period within which to file his answer with counter-protest did
not start to run.
OAMINAL V CASTILLO
8 OCTOBER 2003
Facts:
- Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against Sps. Castillo with RTC Ozamis City praying to pay P1.5M by
way of liquidated damages and P150k as attys fees
- Summons with complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, Mrs. Castillos secretary on May 30 2000
- On June 6 2000, Sps. Castillo filed their Urgent motion to declare service of summons improper and
legally defective alleging that sheriffs return has failed to comply with Rule 14 of substituted service of summons
- On Oct 19 2000, Oaminal filed an Omnibus motion to declare in default and to render judgment because
no answer was filed
- Sps. Castillo fortwith filed the ff:
- Omnibus motion ad cautelam to admit to dismiss and answer with compulsory counterclaim Nov
9 2000
- Urgent motion to dismiss Nov 9 2000
- Answer with compulsory counterclaim Nov 9 2000
- Judge Zapatos denied MD, admitted Answer, and set aside pre trial to Jan 17 2001
- Sps. Castillo then filed an Urgent motion to inhibit ad cautelam against Judge Zapatos, which Judge
Zapatos denied
- Sps. Then filed an Urgent omnibus MR with accompanying plea to reset dated Jan 22 2001
- Judge ruled that the Omnibus motion ad cautelam to admit motion to dismiss and answer with
counterclaim was filed outside the period to file answer; hence he
- Denied Motion to admit motion to dismiss and answer
- Declared Sps. Castillo in default
- Ordered Oaminal to present evidence ex-parte within 10 days from receipt of order which the
case will be dismissed
- Judge ruled in favor of Oaminal
- Sps. Castillo then filed with CA a petition for certiorari raising the issue of whether the trial court had validly
acquired jurisdiction over them
- CA issued TRO to enjoin the lower court from issuing a writ of execution to enforce the latters decision
Issue: Oaminal contends that RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Sps. Castillo because the latter
never denied that they had actually received the summons through their secretary
- Sps. Castillo insist that the substituted service of summons on them was improper; thus, they allege that RTC did
not have the authority to render its Aug 23 2001 decision
Held: Defect in service waived
- For substituted service of summons to be valid:
- Personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible
- Efforts were exerted to locate the party
- Summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at partys residence or upon
a competent person in charge of the partys office or regular place of business
- Required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances are stated in the proof of service or
officers return
- In the case, sheriffs return failed to state that efforts had been made to personally serve the summons on
respondents
- Neither did the Return indicate that it was impossible to do so within a reasonable time
- NONETHELESS, nothing in the records show that Sps. Castillo denied actual receipt of the summons through their
secretary
- They did not deny receipt thereof, merely assailed the manner of its service
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- Sps. Castillo did not raise in their Motion to dismiss the issue of jurisdiction over their person and raised only
improper venue and litis pendentia
- Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of service should be deemed waived
MASON V CA
13 OCTOBER 2003
Facts:
- On Mar 30 1993, Sps. Mason and Columbus Phil. Bus Corp. entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus
undertook to construct a building worth P10M at the end of the 3rd year of lease
- Columbus defaulted in its obligation, prompting Sps. To file a complaint for rescission of contract with damages
before RTC Pasay City
- Summons was served through a certain Ayreen Rejalde; while the receiving copy of the summons
described Rejalde as secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate
president, duly authorized to receive legal processes
- Columbus failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence Sps. Filed a motion to declare Columbus in
default; which was granted and Sps. Were allowed to present evidence ex-parte
- RTC rendered its decision in favor of Sps.; which became final on May 12 1999
- Columbus filed a Motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by Sps.; court then ordered to
submit their memo
- Without waiting for the same, RTC denied motion
- Columbus then filed MR, which was again denied
- Again, filed a Manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution, denied for being dilatory
- Columbus appealed to CA, which ruled in its favor
- Held that the RTC erred when it denied Columbus motion to lift order of default; that Columbus was not
properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer
- Since service was made through Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in Columbus office, as evidenced by the
latters employment record, such service cannot be considered valid
ISSUE: WON there was valid service of summons upon Columbus for RTC to acquire jurisdiction
- Sps. Contend that while Rule 14 clearly specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a
private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial compliance rule
- That even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk, there was substantial compliance
because the summons actually reached Columbus
- EB Villarosa v Judge Benito: misplaced because there was no showing in that case that actual receipt by
defendant corporation, while in this case, Columbus actually received summons
- Columbus counters that the Millenium case held that as a general rule, service upon one who is not enumerated
in Rule 14 is invalid; an exception is when the summons is actually received by the corporation, which means that
there was substantial compliance with the rule - since the exception referred to old rule, it cannot be made to
apply to the new rule, which clearly specifies and limits the persons authorized to receive the summons in behalf of
the corporation
- That at the time the complaint in this case was filed with RTC, the 1997 ROC were already in effect; the
case law applicable then is Villarosa which provides for the proper interpretation of the new rule on the service of
summons upon domestic corporation (strict interpretation of the Rules of Court on who summons can be given to)
Held: Service of summons INVALID (in favor of Columbus)
- Millenium case was decided with 1964 ROC, and thus, was overruled by the Villarosa case
- See arguments of Columbus
Rule 14: Summons
SPOUSES PATRICK JOSE AND RAFAELA JOSE, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES HELEN
BOYON AND ROMEO BOYON, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003
Doctrine: Before effecting substituted service of summons, the process service must clearly state first in the Proof
or Return of Service the material facts on why personal summons cannot be complied with. Failure of stating such
would render the summons improper. #2: Summons by publication is only for cases in rem or quisi in rem.
Facts:
Original Action: Complaint for specific performance filed by Sps Jose against Sps Boyon to transfer ownership of a
land subject to sale.
-
Action lodged in RTC of Muntinlupa.

As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly
because efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents] failed.
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-
On December 9, 1998, [petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to
Effect Summons by Publication. On December 28, 1998, public respondent issued an Order granting the
Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. On July 30, 1999, the respondent
judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file
their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to
submit their evidence ex-parte.
RTC granted case ordering the transfer of ownership.
1/5/2000: Respondent Boyon who is residing in the US heard of the case for the first time and questioned
the validity of the service of summons thereafter. MR denied.
CA:
o The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders.
According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents
because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to comply with
the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in the Return of
Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving
the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by
publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific
performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the
Orders were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
Issue:
WoN the CA is correct in stating that the summons were improperly served
Held:
-
YES. The process server hastily resorted to substituted service without earnest effort to locate respondents:
Summons via Personal Service defective:
o A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive,
Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents.
While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because
Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly
what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not
specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their
whereabouts.
o On the necessity of stating in the Return or Proof of Service the material facts:
(Hamilton v Levy) The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any
substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is
a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed
and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was
made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service renders said service ineffective.
Summons via publication also defective:
o It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication
applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the
thing itself instead of against the defendants person; in the latter, an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece of property to the
obligation or loan burdening it.
o In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance
directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or
possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it.
Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action
in personam
Rule 14: Summons
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner,

vs.
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VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent.

G.R. No. 158407
January 17, 2005
Doctrine: Summons must be served in the residence of the person receiving (personal service or substituted).
There is no valid service of summons if the summons was served in a residence where the person receiving was
merely a visitor.
Facts:
Original Action: Complaint for forcible entry filed by Domagas against Jensen in MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
-
Summons was not served to Respondent who is allegedly out of the country. Instead, the Sheriff left the
Summons and the Complaint to the Respondents brother who was residing on the address provided.
May 1999: MTC still rendered judgment, ordering the respondent and all occupants of the land to vacate
said property, payment of rentals, and misc damages.
Respondent failed to appeal, thus it became final on September 1999.
August 2000: Respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of the aforementioned decision.
Respondent alleged improper service of summon due to:
(a) when the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, she was not a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway, and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno
received the summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales;
(b) she was in Oslo, Norway, at the time the summons and the complaint were served;
(c) her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a
resident nor an occupant thereof when he received the complaint and summons; and
(d) Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.
Respondent also alleged that MTC did not have jurisdiction because petitioner failed prior
occupation.
o As proof, respondent provided evidence that she is married to a Norweigian and has been staying
in Norway since 1993, along with other documents proving her statements.
Petitioner assert that summons was proper since Oscar Layno, respondents brother, received it for the
respondent.
MTC found for Respondent and ordered the annulment of the first case, and ordered payment of damages
from petitioner
CA found that the complaint is an ejectment case which is quasi in rem, and thus, since the Respondent is
outside the country, he summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service
under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave
of court. Since this was not complied, judgment on the first case is void for lack of jurisdiction.
MR denied, hence this case.
o
Issue:
WoN there was a proper service of summons

Held:
-
Everyones decision is incorrect, but service of summons is still improper because the summons were
served in the house of registered address of the respondent WHILE THE BROTHER WAS MERELY A VISITOR.
The Court states that
o The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to
have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he
ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
o As gleaned from the said return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the
Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is
there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on
the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and
that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him.
o THUS, while the could have been a valid substitute service of Summons, since the Summons were
served outside the residence of the brother, while the brother was merely visiting, invalidates the
summons.
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-
CAs decision erroneous:

o The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character . Whether
a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature
and purpose, and by these only. The case filed is forcible entry, thus it is in personam.
Respondents address is still here in the Philippines:
o In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl
Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This
can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that
she was a resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated
February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the petitioner
categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on
February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served
on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
BIACO vs PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURALBANK

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA decision dismissing the Biacos
petition to Annul Judgment.
Petitioner Biacos husband, previously worked at respondent bank. During that period, The husband
obtained several loans from respondent bank. To secure the loans, a REM was executed over certain
properties. The REMs bore petitioners signature.
The loans were not paid, and the bank sought to foreclose on the REM over one of the properties by filing a
complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the Biaco spouses before the RTC.
o Summons was served to spouses Biaco through the husband at his office address [he left the
bank sometime before the filing of the suit].
o The husband received the summons but didnt file an Answer. He was declared in default, and the
RTC ruled for the bank.
o The Sheriff personally served the judgment to the husband at his office address.
o The spouses didnt appeal therefrom.
o The bank filed a motion for a writ of execution, which the RTC granted.
o The Sheriff served a copy of the writ of execution to the spouses Biaco at their home address.
Said copy was received by the husband.
o The property was sold, but was not enough to satisfy the judgment. Bank filed a motion for writ of
execution against the other properties. RTC granted.
o Sheriff tried to levy upon the properties, but the notice of levy were denied since the lots were
already sold by petitioner to her daughters.
Petitioner now files a petition for Annulment of Judgment in the CA. She said that there was invalid
summons on her as it was received only by the husband, hence the court didnt acquire jurisdiction over
her person.
CA ruled that since the foreclosure is an action quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the res is enough, and the
RTC didnt need to acquire jurisdiction over her person.
ISSUE:
WON the service of summons was sufficient.
RULING:
NO.
The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the action
is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
likewise apply according to the nature of the action. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not
for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.
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Petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons was served through her husband
at his office without any explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted to as shown by the
Sheriffs Return.1
Without ruling on petitioners allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to prevent summons from being
served upon her personally, we can see that petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in
the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioners constitutional right to due
process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial
court.
There is more, the trial court granted respondent PCRBs ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment and ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short,
the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses
Biaco. This cannot be countenanced.
While the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the
res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioners personal liability. In
doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her
constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.
WHEREFORE, the CA decision is set aside. The RTC Judgment and Order for Writ of Execution are set aside.
BPI VS SPOUSES IRENEO AND LIWANAG SANTIAGO, CENTROGEN REPRESENTED BY

EDWIN SANTIAGO
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision affirming the RTC Order enjoining the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property.
CENTROGEN acquired several loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) (now merged with BPI)
totaling 4.6M. As security for a fraction of the loan, Ireneo (Edwins father) mortgaged a Laguna property
for the amount of 490K. Later it also covered a 1.5M loan.
CENTROGEN defaulted in its payments.
BPI filed an Extrajudicial Foreclosure of REM. A Notice of Sale was issued by the Sheriff.
On the same day as the Notice of Sale was issued, spouses filed with the RTC a petition for a TRO, Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and in the alternative Annulment of the REM. The spouses raised the defense of
payment to the loan obligation of 490K with interest covered by the REM on the Laguna property.
o First summons was served on the BPI Lagunas Branch Manager.
o BPI filed a MTD, alleging that the Laguna branchs Bank Manager was not one of the people
authorized by Rule 14 Sec 11 to receive summons on behalf of the corporation.
o RTC denied the MTD, and held that the nature of case merited its removal from the purview of Sec
11 Rule 14 due to the presence of extreme urgency in the granting of the TRO. RTC granted the
TRO.
o 6 days later, RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI to avoid further arguments on the
propriety of the service of summons.
o Second summons was served on the Office Secretary of BPI.
o RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction pending resolution of the main action of Annulment
of REM.
o BPI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA affirmed, holding that jurisdiction was acquired
upon the service of new summons.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over BPI thru the original service of summons.
RULING:
YES. Petition dismissed.
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The
officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
1 That on March 16, 2000, the undersigned served the copies of Summons, complaint and its annexes to the
defendants Sps. Ernesto R. & Ma. Teresa Ch. Biaco thru Ernesto R. Biaco[,] defendant of the above-entitled case at
his office EXPORT & INDUSTRY BANK, Jofelmore Bldg.[,] Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City and he acknowledged
receipt thereof as evidenced with his signature appearing on the original copy of the Summons
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action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation
that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
Since the original summons was served on the Branch Manager, who is not one of the persons enumerated in the
Rule, the service of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the corporation. The original summons was
defective and thus void and ineffectual.
However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March 2003, before the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued on 20 March 2003, whatever defect attended the service of the original
summons, was promptly and accordingly cured.
Inarguably, before the Order granting the application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, the RTC already
acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI by virtue of the new summons validly served on the Corporate
Secretary. The fact that the original summons was invalidly served is of no moment since jurisdiction over BPI was
subsequently acquired by the service of a new summons.
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should
be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he
had not been validly summoned, that the case against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be
actually served on said defendant. It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an "original" or an
"alias" summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons
complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the
defendant together with the prevailing complaint.
In the test of validity of service of summons, substantial justice must take precedence over technicality.
In any event, as it is evident from the records of the case that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was
validly acquired by the court by the valid service of a new summons before the writ of preliminary injunction was
issued, the SC held that the proceedings attendant to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction were
regular.
THE PHIL AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. V BREVA

Respondent filed for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums against the petitioner with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons
and other court processes through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City. Summon was
received by its Service Insurance Agent. Petitioner filed Motion to Dismiss on ground of improper service of
summon as said Service Insurance Agent was not one of those named in Section 11, Rule 14. Respondent filed an
Amended Complaint, which is to be served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita,
Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons. RTC denied petitioners MTD
because improper service of summons on the petitioner is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint considering
that the case was still in its initial stage. It ruled that the remedy was to issue an alias summons to be served at
the principal office of the petitioner. MR was also dismissed. CA affirmed the decision, hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner due to improper service of summons.
The petitioner further avers that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it upon the service of alias
summons on the amended complaint because such alias summons was improperly issued. Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the previous summons must have been lost or
unserved to warrant the issuance of alias summons. The petitioner opines that the issuance of an alias summons
presupposes the existence of a previous valid summons which, however, has not been served or has been lost. It
maintains that considering that there are specific circumstances that need to exist to warrant its issuance, the alias
summons cannot be treated as a matter of nomenclature
Held: Petition is without merit.
Ratio:
Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court states that:
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be
difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining
that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias
summons can be actually served on said defendant.
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When no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons for the amended complaint must
be served on him.
In the instant case, since at the time the complaint was amended no summons had been properly served on the
petitioner and it had not yet appeared in court, new summons should have been issued on the amended complaint.
Hence, the CA was correct when it held that, technically, the trial court should have ordered the issuance of an
original summons, not an alias summons After all, an alias summons is merely a continuation of the original
summons. In this case, however, there was no sense in issuing an alias summons on the original complaint since
the complaint had already been amended. The trial court should have instead issued a new summons on the
amended complaint.
Nevertheless, it is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an original or an alias summons as
long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the
requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing
complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules, both as to its content and
the manner of service.
BELEN V CHAVEZ, GR 175334

Facts : The instant petition originated from the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment against
petitioners, spouses Belen, filed by private respondent spouses Pacleb for collection of sum of money. Respondents
secured favorable decision against petitioners in said foreign judgment. The summons was served on petitioners
address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna received by a certain Marcelo M. Belen. Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara
entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners, stating that his legal services were retained at the instance of
petitioners relatives. Atty. Alcantara subsequently filed an answer, alleging that contrary to private respondents
averment, petitioners were actually residents of California, USA. The answer also claimed that petitioners liability
had been extinguished via a release of abstract judgment issued in the same collection case. But because Atty.
Alcantara failed to attach a copy of the decision, his MTD was denied.
For their part, respondents averred that they filed an amended complaint stating that due to prohibitive cost of
litigation in California, they were forced to withdraw their complaint from said California Court.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents. A copy of the RTC decision intended for Atty. Alcantara was
returned with the notation "Addressee Deceased. Respondents sought the execution of said judgment, after which
real properties of petitioners were levied upon.
Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners seeking the quashal of writ of execution.
Denied. MR was likewise denied.
Issue : Whether there was improper service of summon WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE APPEARANCE OF THE COUNSEL
AS THEIR SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT ALTHOUGH SUCH APPEARANCE OF THE SAID
COUNSEL WAS WITHOUT THEIR EXPRESS AUTHORITY BUT WAS DONE BY THEIR ALLEGED RELATIVES.
Held: Petition is dismissed.
Ratio:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can
be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he
cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in
accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country,
with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant
is physically present in the country. If he is
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not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly
try and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a
non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and
who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the
second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.
On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident
who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action
relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the
Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines service of summons may be
effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of the complaint, is for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment is in the nature of an action in personam because private respondents are suing to enforce their personal
rights under said judgment.
Personal service is the preferred mode of service, or substituted service if the defendant, for justifiable reason,
cannot be served with the summon within reasonable time.
If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine
resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines under Rule 14, Section 15.
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in
personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding decision.
In the instant case, the petitioners have been permanent residents of California, U.S.A. not physically present in the
Philippines.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of
numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners. Through certain acts, Atty.
Alcantara was impliedly authorized by petitioners to appear on their behalf. For instance, in support of the motion
to dismiss the complaint, Atty. Alcantara attached thereto a duly authenticated copy of the judgment of dismissal
and a photocopy of the identification page of petitioner Domingo Belens U.S. passport. These documents could
have been supplied only by petitioners, indicating that they have consented to the appearance of Atty. Alcantara
on their behalf. In sum, petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves through Atty. Alcantara to the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
(SANTOS,
JR. V. PNOC EXPLORATION CORP., G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money
against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167. It sought to collect
the amount of P698, 502.10 representing petitioner's unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address
despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service of
summons by publication
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case be set
for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated September 11,
2003.
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer".
He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by
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respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk
of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003
order. He prayed that respondent's evidence ex parte be stricken off the records and that his answer be
admitted.
RTC denied motion. Petition then appealed before the CA via petition for certiorari however it sustained the RTC
decision and dismissed the petition and denied MR. Hence, this petition. (In particular, he claims that the rule
on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not
actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of service of a
copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not respondent's messenger).
Issue:
WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant?
Held:
YES.
Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order.
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts,
respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.
The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action
to which the rule was applicable. 10 Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in
rem actions only. The present rule expressly states that it applies "in any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or
quasi in rem.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. In this
connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
(WONG
V. FACTOR-KOYAMA, G.R. No. 183802, September 17, 2009)
The present controversy originates from a Complaint dated 17 July 2007, for specific performance, sum of
money, and damages, filed with the RTC by private respondent Catherine Factor-Koyama (Koyama) against
Wong, docketed as Civil Case No. C-21860. Koyama alleged in her Complaint that Wong deliberately
refused to execute and deliver a deed of absolute sale, and to surrender the condominium certificate of
title (CCT) pertaining to a condominium unit. Koyama further averred that she had been renting out the
subject property to foreign tourists, but Wong padlocked the same while she was in Japan attending to her
business. When she requested him to open the subject property, he reportedly mauled her, causing her
physical injuries, and also took her personal belongings.
On 24 July 2007, the RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence, No. 21 West Riverside
Street, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. However, the original summons and the accompanying copy
of the Complaint and its Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff Baloloy. Sheriff Baloloy
then attempted to leave the summons with Criz Mira (Mira), Wong's caretaker, who is of legal age, and
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residing at the same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the
same.
After the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period Wong was declared in default. On 25 Sept. 2007 an order
declared Wong in default. Wong subsequently filed with the RTC by registered mail a Manifestation claiming
that did not receive summons from said court and only found out through a tricycle driver. Wong asserted
that he would not hesitate to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, should the proper procedure be
observed.
RTC still declared him in default So Wong through counsel filed a MTD which was denied. Wong appealed
before the CA but respectively declared him in default and he should have availed of the ff remedies:
a)The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now
Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b)If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the
same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c)If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38; and
d)He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41).
Issue:
WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant?
Held:
YES.
Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner described in Sections 6 and 7, Rule
14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is generally preferred over substituted
service. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since
it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is
served not upon him but upon another to whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending
proceedings.
The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloy's afore-quoted Return, finds that he improperly resorted to
substituted service upon Wong of the summons for Civil Case No. C-21860. (He did not serve summons in Mr.
Wongs office even if he was informed by the maids that hes at work)
Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court recognizes
that:
Section 20.Voluntary Appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
The Court is not referring to Wong's filing of his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C21860, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over his person, because that clearly does not
constitute voluntary appearance. The Court, instead, calls attention to the RTC Order dated 20
November 2008 allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama.
SANSIO VS MOGOL
Petition for Review on Certiorari. under Rule 45.
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Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against respondent
spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila. At the request of herein petitioner, the process server of the
MeTC of Manila served the summons and the copy of the complaint on respondent spouses Mogol at the
courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, while waiting for the scheduled hearing of the criminal case for violations
of BP 22(for paying petitioner dishonored checks). Upon being so informed of the summons and the
complaint, respondents gave the summons to their counsel and the copy of the complaint and read the
same. Counsel pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should
be served only at the address (residence of sps Mogol in Lucena City) that was stated the summons and
the copy of the complaint. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol returned the summons and the copy
of the complaint to the process server.
Process server issued a Return on Service of Summons.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare in Default. They averred that the summons were already validly served
upon respondents at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila and never submitted any responsive pleading to
the complaint.
Spouses Mogol filed an Opposition.
MTC granted Motion to Declare Respondents in Default. It ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 does not specify
where service is to be effected because service of summons is made by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, the same may be undertaken wherever the defendant may be found. Although the
Return on the Service of Summons indicated that the original and the duplicate copies thereof were
returned "UNSERVED," the same could not be taken to mean that respondent spouses Mogol had not yet
been served with summons. That allegation in the return was clearly prompted by the statement in the first
paragraph thereof that respondents spouses Mogol "refused to receive the summons and the copy of the
complaint with no valid reason at all." Respondent spouses Mogol were, thus, validly served with summons
and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any responsive pleading before the lapse of the reglementary
period therefor, the Motion to Declare in Default filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious.
Respondent spouses Mogol filed MR denied.
Spouses Mogol filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the RTC Manila.
RTC dismissed holding that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not mandate that summons be
served strictly at the address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said provision states
that the service of summons may be made wherever such is possible and practicable.
Respondent spouses Mogol filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.
CA held that there was no proper service of summons thus the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of spouses Mogol.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, questioning the rulings of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
WON there was valid service of summons
RULING:
Yes. There was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol.
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof
to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively
ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. The essence
of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he
may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.
In the instant case, the process server presented the summons and the copy of the complaint to respondent
spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. The latter immediately referred the matter to their
counsel, who was present with them in the aforesaid courtroom. At the express direction of his clients, the counsel
took the summons and the copy of the complaint, read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of
the said documents. Ineluctably, at that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the
summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was
done with the latters behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of "handing" a copy of the
summons to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol
was already acquired.
Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the summons and the
copy of the complaint under the lame excuse that the same must be served only in the address stated was a gross
mistake. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in
person must be effected only at the latters residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is
crystal clear that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or
if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. As correctly held by the
RTC of Manila, the service of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 24 was the most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process server need not wait for
respondent spouses Mogol to reach their given address. Due to the distance of the said address, service therein
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would have been more costly and would have entailed a longer delay on the part of the process server in effecting
the service of the summons.
Much more important than considerations of practicality, however, is the fact that respondent spouses Mogol
based their case on a wrong appreciation of the provisions of the Rules of Court. Respondent spouses Mogol
principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14 cannot be singled out without construing the same with Section 7. They
posit that, in a civil case, summons must be served upon the defendants personally at the designated place
alleged in the complaint. If the defendants refuse to receive and sign the summons, then the process server must
tender the same to them by leaving a copy at the residence of the defendants. If the summons cannot be served in
person because of the absence of the defendants at the address stated, then the same can be served by (1)
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein, or (2) leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Said arguments must fail because Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply
simultaneously. Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 provisions do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons,
which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules,
service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. Substituted
service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method, since it seeks to bind the
respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even though notice of such action is served not upon
him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For
substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of
summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a
competent person in charge of the partys office or place of business.
B. D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC. VS R. S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC.
Petitioner B. D. Long Span Builders, Inc. and respondent R. S. Ampeloquio Realty Development, Inc. are
corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Parties entered
into an agreement wherein petitioner will render "rip rapping" construction services at respondents
Ampeloquio International Resort. Respondent failed to fulfill its obligations resulting in the cancellation of
the project.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages against respondent.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served on respondent, through its staff member, Romel
Dolahoy.
Respondent failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the complaint.
Upon motion of petitioner, RTC declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present evidence
ex parte.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered rescission of the contract agreement.
Upon receipt of the RTC decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals rendered judgment which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Petitioner filed MR CA denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON there was invalid service of summons upon respondent.
RULING:
Yes. Service on Romel Dolahoy did not constitute substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service
The summons was not served personally on the defendant through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of
Rule 14 (president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel).
Rather, summons was served by substituted service on the defendants staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Substituted
service was resorted to on the servers first attempt at service of summons, and there was no indication that prior
efforts were made to render prompt personal service on the defendant.
In this case, the Return by Process Server certified
xxx that Mr Romel Dalahoy, a staff of said Realty received the said Summons with the attached
complaint & its annexes as evidenced by the former's signature as appearing on the original copy
of the Summons.
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Henceforth, the said Summons with the attached complaint xxx is respectfully returned, DULY
SERVED, by substituted service. Xxx
In Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., 17 this Court held that in case of substituted service, there
should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was one with
whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.
Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member who received the summons in
respondents behalf, shared such relation of confidence ensuring that respondent would surely receive the
summons. Thus, following our ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioners contention that service on Romel
Dolahoy constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
Also, petitioners contention that respondents filing of Notice of Appeal effectively cured any defect in the service
of summons is devoid of merit. It is well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the
following remedies, to wit:
(1) he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside
the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense;
(2) if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final
and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
(3) if he discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief
under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
(4) he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if
no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. Thus, respondent, which had been
declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial courts judgment without being
considered to have submitted to the trial courts authority.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. CHANDUMAL

FACTS:
The case stemmed from a contract to sell a parcel of land, together with improvements, between BF Homes
and herein respondent Chandumal. BF Homes sold to PDB all its rights, participations and interests over the
contract.
Chandumal defaulted in her payments. PDB issued Notice of Delinquency and Rescission of Contract with
Demand to Vacate PDB. Despite demand, Chandumal still failed to settle her obligation.
An action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDB against
Chandumal. According to PDB, it tried to deliver the cash surrender value of the subject property, as required
under R.A. No. 6552; however, the defendant was unavailable for such purpose.
Summons was issued and served by deputy sheriff Galing. According to his return, Sheriff Galing attempted to
personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on July 15, 19 and 22, 1999 but it was unavailing as she was
always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons on August 5,
1999 by serving the same through Chandumals mother who acknowledged receipt thereof.
For her failure to file an answer within the prescribed period, PDB filed on an ex parte motion to declare
Chandumal in default. RTC granted.
Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer. She maintained
that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of the same. She further alleged that her failure
to file an answer within the reglementary period was due to fraud, mistake or excusable negligence. Denied.
MR denied.
RTC allowed PDB to present its evidence ex parte. RTC rendered a Decision in favor of PDB.
Chandumal appealed to the CA, which, without ruling on the propriety of the judicial confirmation of the
notarial rescission, rendered the assailed decision nullifying the RTC decision due to invalid and ineffective
substituted service of summons. MR denied.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons

Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
HELD:
1.
No.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons,
summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service; (2) specific details in the return; (3) a person of
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suitable age and discretion; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to
understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons.
CA correctly ruled that the sheriffs return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons. The Return of
Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by
the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely
states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was verified from a
person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed, the sheriffs return shows a mere perfunctory attempt to cause
personal service of the summons on Chandumal. There was no indication if he even asked Chandumals mother as
to her specific whereabouts except that she was "out of the house", where she can be reached or whether he even
tried to await her return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff clearly do not suffice to justify substituted service and
his failure to comply with the requisites renders such service ineffective.
2. Yes.
Despite that there was no valid substituted service of summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that Chandumal
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, per Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she
effectively submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an
affirmative relief is equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the defendants
person. Thus, it was ruled that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is considered
voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court notes that aside from the allegation that she did not
receive any summons, Chandumals motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer failed to
positively assert the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. In fact, what was set forth therein was the substantial claim
that PDB failed to comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6552 on payment of cash surrender value, which
already delves into the merits of PDBs cause of action. In addition, Chandumal even appealed the RTC decision to
the CA, an act which demonstrates her recognition of the trial courts jurisdiction to render said judgment.
Given Chandumals voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the RTC, Las Pias City, Branch 255,
had all authority to render its Decision dated May 31, 2004. The CA, therefore, erred in nullifying said RTC decision
and dispensing with the resolution of the substantial issue raised herein, i.e., validity of the notarial rescission.
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET
BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS VS. CO
FACTS:
Co, a retired police officer sued Abante Tonite and petitioners claiming damages because of an allegedly
libelous article petitioners
RTC issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address.
Sheriff Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the
defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a
second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He
decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriffs return.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsels special appearance in their behalf,
alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of
summons. They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on
each of them. Denied. Defendants were directed to file their Answers. MR denied.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at CA denied. MR denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not summons was properly served
HELD:
Yes.
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever
practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person,
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or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant
cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a)
by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the
defendant is made through his substitute.
Only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time may substituted service be
resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the proof of
service or sheriffs return. Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of prompt personal service as
basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant either expressly or impliedly.
There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person
at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same
date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other
petitioners were "always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office
address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the
business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a
reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or
required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was
expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a
reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While
we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that
governs.
In reality, petitioners insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had
actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings
in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They
had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their
voluntary appearance in the action.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. V CATALAN

18 OCTOBER 2004
2 Petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 filed separately by HSBank and HSBC Trustee
Facts:
- Catalan filed before RTC a complaint for a sum of money with damages against HSBank due to alleged wanton
refusal to pay her the value of 5 HSBank checks issued by Thomson amounting to HK$3.2M
- Feb 7 2001: Summons was served on HSBank (Makati City)
- Feb 21 2001: HSBank filed a Motion for extension of time to file an answer or Motion to dismiss
- March 8 2001: HSBank filed a Motion to dismiss on the grounds that:
- RTC has no jurisdiction over subject matter, has not acquired jurisdiction for failure of plaintiff to pay the
correct docket fees, over the person of HSBank, complaint does not state cause of action, plaintiff engages in
forum-shopping
- Sep 10 2001: Catalan filed Amended complaint impleading HSBC Trustee as co-defendant invoking
Art 19 of CC as basis for cause of action
- Alleges that HSBank and HSBC Trustee are corporations duly organized under laws of British Virgin Islands
(Channel Islands) and may be served with summons through main office in Manila (Makati City)
- March 1997: Thomson issued 5 HSBank checks payable to Catalan. These were returned for reason of payment
stopped pending confirmation despite the fact that the checks were duly funded
- Despite several demands (until Thomsons death), HSBank refused to clear the checks
- Catalan forwarded demand to HSBC Trustee, which required Catalan to submit original copies of the
returned checks
- April 21 1999, Catalan and former counsel went to HK at their own expense to personally deliver original
copies but HSBC Trustee still refused to pay Catalans claim
- Having seen and received the original checks, HSBC Trustee is deemed to have impliedly
accepted the checks
- Oct 2 2001: HSBank filed a Motion to dismiss amended complaint on the grounds that:
- RTC has no jurisdiction over subject matter, Catalan engages in forum shopping, amended complaint
states no cause of action, has no jurisdiction over person, it did not submit to the jurisdiction of RTC by filing a
motion for extension of time to file a motion to dismiss
- Oct17 2001: summons for HSBC Trustee was tendered to its Makati Branch
- Oct 19 2001: HSBC Trustee filed a Special appearance for motion to dismiss amended complaint
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- That HSBank Makati did not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it because it is a corporation separate
and distinct from HSBank, does not hold office at HSBank Makati or any in the Philippines, it has not authorized
HSBank Makati to receive summons for it, it has no resident agent upon whom summons may be served because it
does not transact business in the Philippines
- Nov 15 2001: HSBC Trustee filed a Submission attaching Affidavit executed in HK by Lam, Senior VP
of HSBC Trustee attesting:
- That HSBC Trustee has not done nor it is doing business in Philippines, does not maintain any
office in Makati or any in Philippines, it has not appointed any agent in the Philippines, HSBank
Makati has no authority to receive any summons or court processes for HSBC Trustee
- May 15 2002: RTC issued Order denying the 2 MDs
- That it has jurisdiction over subject matter under Art 19 (CC) for the acts of unjustly refusing to honor
checks; that Catalan did not engage in forum shopping as the elements are not attendant in the case; that
question of cause of action should be threshed out during proceedings in the main action and after plaintiff and
defendants have adduced evidence in their favor; that question of whether a foreign corporation is doing business
in Philippines or not cannot be a subject to MD but should be ventilated in the trial of merits; that defendants
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of RTC setting up their MDs other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
- HSBank and HSBC Trustee filed separate MRs but denied by RTC (Dec 20 2002)
- Feb 21 2003: Catalan moved to declare HSBank and HSBC Trustee in default for failure to file their Answer to
amended complaint
- March 5 2002: HSBank and HSBC Trustee filed separate petitions for certiorari
- March 18 2003: HSBank and HSBC Trustee filed before RTC separate Answers ad cautelam as a
precaution against being declared in default without prejudice to the separate petitions for certiorari
pending with CA
- Two petitions before CA were consolidated and after responsive pleadings were filed, cases were deemed
submitted for decision
- Aug 14 2003: CA dismissed two petitions:
- That the filing of petitioners answers before the RTC rendered moot and academic the issue of RTCs lack
of jurisdiction over person of the petitioners; that RTC has jurisdiction under Art 19 (CC); that amended complaint
states a cause of action under Art 19 (CC); that Catalan may have prayed for payment of the value of checks but
ratiocinated that she merely used the value as basis for computation of damages
Issue: That CA committed serious error in not ordering the dismissal of the amended complaint against HSBC
Trustee despite the fact it has not been duly served with summons
Held: YES; summons tendered to HSBank (Makati Branch) for HSBC Trustee was improper
- French Oil Machinery V. CA: that it is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign
corporation is doing business; for purposes on the rule on summons, the fact of doing business must first be
established by appropriate allegations in the complaint and the court in determining such fact need not go
beyond the allegations therein
- The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did not sufficiently show the fact of HSBC
Trustees doing business in the Philippines; it does not appear that HSBC Trustee had performed any act which
would give the general public the impression that it had been engaging, or intends to engage in its ordinary and
usual business undertakings in the country; thus, is not placed within the sphere of the courts jurisdiction
- There is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBank is the domestic agent of HSBC Trustee to warrant
service of summons upon it
CHU V MACH ASIA TRADING CORP.

1 APRIL 2013
Petition for review on certiorari assailing CA decision and resolution denying petitioners MR
Facts:
- Dec 8 1998: Chu purchased on installment 1 Hitachi Excavator for P900k from Mach Asia; paid P180k with
balance of P720k payable in 12 months through Prime Bank postdated checks
- Mar 29 1999: Chu purchased 2 heavy equipments (motorgrader and payloader) on installment for P1M; paid
P200k with balance of P800k payable in 12 months through Land Bank postdated checks
- Upon presentment of checks for encashment, they were dishonored by the bank either by reason of closed
account, drawn against insufficient funds, or payment stopped. Chu explained that his business was badly hit
by the Asian economic crisis
- Nov 11 1999: Mach Asia filed a complaint before RTC Cebu City for sum of money, replevin (legal action to
recover the possession of items of personal property), attys fees and damages
- Nov 29 1999: RTC issued Order allowing issuance of writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments
- Dec 9 1999: Sheriff Cortes proceeded at petitioners given address for purpose of serving summons, together with
complaint, writ of replevin and bond; however, petitioner was not there.
- Sheriff resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by a certain
Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner
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- Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading, prompting respondent to move for the declaration of defendant in
default
- Jan 12 2000: RTC issued Order declaring defendant in default and allowed respondent to present its
evidence ex parte
- Dec 15 2000: RTC rendered decision against petitioner
- Petitioner sought recourse before CA arguing that RTC erred in concluding that the substituted service of
summons was valid, thus, there was error on the part of RTC when it declared him in default
- July 25 2007: CA rendered decision affirming RTC decision ruling that the requirement of due process was
complied with, considering that petitioner actually received summons through his security guard
- That where the summons was in fact received by the defendant, his argument that Sheriff should have
first tried to serve summons on him personally before resorting to substituted service of summons deserves scant
consideration
- That petitioner failed to set up a meritorious defense aside from his contention that summons was not
properly served
- Petitioner filed MR but was denied
ISSUE: WON substituted service of summons was improper
HELD: Yes, substituted service of summons was improper
- As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant; it is only when summons cannot be served
personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to (Sec. 7, Rule 14 ROC)
- In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in
the defendants behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summons
- Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the
defendant personally and that such efforts have failed
- In this case, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was
authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons
- Service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service
Rule 14: Summons
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, petitioner,

vs.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondent.
G.R. No. 175799
November 28, 2011
Doctrine: For actions in rem and quasi in rem, extraterritorial service of summons applies. For actions in personam,
it does not apply because the court cannot have jurisdiction over the person. But if petitioner seeks affirmative
relief, he then placed himself under the jurisdiction of the court.
Facts:
Original Action: Action to declare the loan and hedging contract between Lepanto and NM Rothschild as void for
being against Article 2018 of the Civil Code
-
Trial court authorized respondents counsel to serve the summons to the Philippine Consulate General in
Sydney (following Section 15, Rule 14, Extraterritorial Service)
Petitioner filed a filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (a) the court
has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of
summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against
petitioner; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
On November 29, 2005, petitioner filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to take the deposition of Mr.
Paul Murray (Director, Risk Management of petitioner) before the Philippine Consul General; and (2) a
Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories on respondent.
Petitioner filed other motions in the pendency of the case: discovery, admission, deposition (affirmative
reliefs)
TC denied motion to dismiss and the twin Motion for Leave.
CA denied the MtD stating that since its interlocutory, cannot be subject to certiorari.
Hence this petition
Issue:
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Held:
-
NO. Since the action is an ACTION IN PERSONAM, the extraterritorial service of summons does not apply:
o Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in
rem, but not if an action is in personam.
When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial service of
summons can be made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons is not for
the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair
play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to
protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or
respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action involved
is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in
court
BUT COURT HAS JURISDICTION BECAUSE PETITIONER ASKED FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF:
o In this regard, respondent vigorously argues that petitioner should be held to have voluntarily
appeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and was actually afforded, specific reliefs from
the trial court.39 Respondent points out that while petitioners Motion to Dismiss was still pending,
petitioner prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery against respondent, such as
written interrogatories, requests for admission, deposition, and motions for production of
documents.
o Mindful of the foregoing, in Signetics Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Freuhauf Electronics
Phils., Inc. (225 SCRA 737, 738), we lately ruled:
o
o "This is not to say, however, that the petitioner's right to question the jurisdiction of the court over
its person is now to be deemed a foreclosed matter. If it is true, as Signetics claims, that its only
involvement in the Philippines was through a passive investment in Sigfil, which it even later
disposed of, and that TEAM Pacific is not its agent, then it cannot really be said to be doing
business in the Philippines. It is a defense, however, that requires the contravention of the
allegations of the complaint, as well as a full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case,
which should not thus be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss. So, also, the issue posed
by the petitioner as to whether a foreign corporation which has done business in the country, but
which has ceased to do business at the time of the filing of a complaint, can still be made to
answer for a cause of action which accrued while it was doing business, is another matter that
would yet have to await the reception and admission of evidence. Since these points have
seasonably been raised by the petitioner, there should be no real cause for what may
understandably be its apprehension, i.e., that by its participation during the trial on the
merits, it may, absent an invocation of separate or independent reliefs of its own, be
considered to have voluntarily submitted itself to the court's jurisdiction."43 (Emphases
supplied.)
o
In order to conform to the ruling in La Naval, which was decided by this Court in 1994, the former
Section 23, Rule 1444 concerning voluntary appearance was amended to include a second
sentence in its equivalent provision in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Section 20)
Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when the
respondents' motion for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of
Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking
affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation
of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court's jurisdiction.47 (Emphasis supplied.) <-- magulo to, dapat ata petitioner yan, hindi
respondent.
Rule 14: Summons

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DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs.

RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 165016
June 17, 2008
Doctrine: Summons on Seaman.
Facts:
Original Action: 1999: Petition for support filed by Dolores Montefalcon with Laurence Montefalcon against Ronnie
Vasquez
-
Vasquez signed as the father of Laurence in a birth certificate

A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother returned the documents
to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons
Vazques is a seaman on contract and is currently abroad
Motion to declare Vazques in default denied due to non-service of summons
2000: Alias summon was issued upn Vasquez residence in Taguig
o Vasquez was not found, sheriff caused for substituted service of summons
o Return of Summons State:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on the 19th day of July 2000 the undersigned sheriff caused the service of
summons issued by the court in the above-entitled case together with the copy of the complaint
and annexes attached thereon upon defendant RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, by substituted service, thru
his caretaker, RAQUEL BEJER, a person of sufficient discretion, who acknowledged the receipt
thereof at No. 10 Int. President Garcia St. Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, as evidenced
by her signature appearing at the lower portion of the original copy of summons.
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to the court of origin DULY SERVED for its records
and information.
Upon motion, court decalred Vasquez in default
2001: Court found for petitioner, ordering Vasquez to pay support
Vasquez filed a notice of appeal stating there was no proper service of summons. CA found for Vasquez
stating that the return was defective because it did not indicate the explanation of the impossibility of
service and the attempt to effect personal service. Case to be remanded.
Petitioner filed MR, denied.
Issue:
Held:
-
YES, there was a proper substituted service:

o The sheriff in both Naga and Taguig tried to execute personal service to no avail:
The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the Naga Citybased sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to serve the summons personally
on Vasquez. When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the whereabouts of
Vasquez. Upon being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga court commissioned a
Taguig City-based sheriff to serve the summons. Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs
inquired about Vasquez's whereabouts, signifying that they did not immediately resort to
substituted service. There was no undue haste in effecting substituted service. The fact
that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time to locate Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows
that there was indeed no precipitate haste in serving the summons.
In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and
justified because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the
summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct
of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty. Also, the person
who received the alias summons was of suitable age and discretion, then residing at
Vasquez's dwelling. There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence, as evidenced
by his employment contract, executed under the supervision and authority of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Vasquez cannot deny that in his
contract of employment and seafarer's information sheet, both bearing POEA's letterhead,
his address in Metro Manila was what was correctly mentioned in the alias summons that
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Bejer received. She must have informed Vasquez one way or another of the suit upon his
return in October 2000 after finishing his nine-month contract with Fathom Ship
Management.
-
On the defect:
o More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final
sheriff's return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively
prove that the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly prejudice petitioners if what was
undisclosed was in fact done. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been submitted
by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service24
had Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It was only
when a judgment against him was rendered by the trial court that he questioned the validity of
service of summons before the appellate court. Such failure to appear, and then later to question
the court's jurisdiction over his person, should not be taken against herein petitioners.
o Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only came to know of the case when his mother
told him about the trial court's decision and the sheriff's return on the substituted service which
carries a presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of more faith and credit.
The sheriff's certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts set out in it. Only
clear and convincing evidence may overcome its presumption of regularity. Given the
circumstances in the present case, we agree that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty on the part of the sheriff stands.
CARIAGA vs CFI Judge MALAYA, CARIAGA

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the CFI Judges Orders affirming the validity of the service of
summons by registered mail on petitioners who are residing abroad.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT: Private respondents filed for herself and in her daughters behalf a suit for
Annulment of Extrajudicial Partition of real property, and Recovery.
o The defendants in the original action responded, except for petitioners Cariaga. Petitioners were
residing abroad and did not receive summons.
o CFI granted respondents Motion for Extrajudicial Service of Summons per Rule 14, Secs. 7, 17, and
18.
o Summons by registered mail were sent to Guam and US, where the petitioners resided.
o Original defendants filed a motion to declare the service of summons by registered mail as a nullity.
o CFI held there was substantial compliance with Rule 14, since petitioners received a copy of the
complaint anyway. Further, CFI gave petitioners 90 days from receipt of the Order within which to
file responsive pleadings.
o Petitioners, by special appearance and thru counsel, filed a Motion to Declare the Service of
Summons Null and Void. They averred that sending of the copy of summons and the complaint
must be coupled with publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
CFI denied. Hence the petition.

ISSUE:
WON the service of summons was sufficient.
RULING:
YES. Petition dismissed.
Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property in the Philippines; and
(4) when defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines.
In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in
three ways:
(1) by personal service;
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; and
(3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
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The third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with in this case.
There is no question that the requirement of due process has been met as shown by the fact that defendants
actually received the summonses and copies of the complaint and as evidenced by the Registry Return Cards.
Whatever defect there may have been in the service of summons was aptly corrected by the court a quo in its
assailed order which gave said defendants ninety (90) days from receipt of order within which to file their
responsive pleadings. Defendants have no reason to complain that they were unaware of the action filed against
them or claim that they were denied due process.
MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS vs ABELARDO LICAROS

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision refusing to annul the RTC decision finding
the marriage of the spouses void and ordering the dissolution of the spouses CPG.
Abelardo and Margarita lawfully married and had two children. After a few years, Margarita and Abelardo
were separated de facto.
Margarita took her two children to the US to settle down.
Margarita filed for divorce in the Superior Court of California, which was granted. After she was granted the
decree of divorce, she and Abelardo executed an Agreement on Separation of Properties.
After the execution of the Agreement, Abelardo filed a petition to with the RTC to dissolve the CPG and for
approval of the Agreement on Separation of Properties. RTC granted.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT: 6 months after the grant of the dissolution, Abelardo filed an Article 36 (Family
Code) petition with the RTC.
o Since Margarita was in California, Abelardo moved that summons be sent by an international
courier service.
o RTC denied, and instead ordered the publication of the summons in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for 3 weeks, and furnishing Margarita with a copy of the summons and
complaint at her address in California through the DFA in the US. Margarita was given 60 days after
the publication to file an Answer.
o No Answer was filed. The case was referred to a Trial Prosecutor to check for collusion.
o RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage void.
CURRENT COMPLAINT: After 9 years, Margarita filed a petition to Annul Judgment by the RTC declaring her
marriage void. She found out about the judgment when a lawyer sent her a letter 9 years ago informing
her that she cannot use the name Licaros anymore as her marriage was dissolved.
o CA dismissed the petition. CA held jurisdiction over her was not required, as the complaint was an
action in rem or quasi in rem as it refers to the marital status of Abelardo.
ISSUE:
WON the service of summons was necessary and sufficient.
RULING:
YES. CA affirmed. Petition dismissed.
As a rule, when the non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines cannot be tried by Philippine courts
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But
when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts
have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not
essential.
Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed
against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world.
Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper:
(5) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(6) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(7) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest in property in the Philippines; and
(8) when defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines.
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In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in
three ways:
(4) by personal service;
(5) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; and
(6) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
Since Margarita is a non-resident defendant and the action is an action in rem, jurisdiction over her person is not
required, but service of summons is still needed only to satisfy the requirements of due process. Hence being an in
rem action, the RTC correctly allowed extraterritorial service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, along with service of a copy of the summons and complaint thru the DFA in the US . This situation falls
within the 3rd mode of extraterritorial service of summons.
The Court Process Servers Return shows that the summons addressed to Margarita together with the complaint
and its annexes were sent by mail to the DFA with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Servers certificate
of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. Before
proceeding to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its
Decision dated 8 November 1991 that "compliance with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e) (sic) been
duly established."
Delivery to the DFA was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required
and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant
to Section 15 of Rule 14.
BUSUEGO V CA
Petitioner filed for a recovery of parcel of land against defendants Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and
Vivencio Lopez (three of whom are respondents herein).
Summons was issued in the name of the four defendants and per sheriff's return, was personally served at the
address given in the complaint, upon the defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto Lazaro, personally."
Defendants filed motion for extension twice which was duly granted. But since no answer was filed despite the
extensions, order of default was issued. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Motion for execution was granted.
Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants, filed for motion for suspension of writ for humanitarian purposes. It was
granted. Thereafter, defendants filed to lift the order of default due to lack of service of judgment. Denied.
Undaunted, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion to lift order of default due to lack of notice.Denied.
Third motion was filed averring that the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because of lack
of proper service of summons; and that the motion for extension of time to vacate the premises, filed by their codefendant Romeo Lazaro, after the judgment by default had become executory, was not equivalent to waiver of
summons.
CA ruled that there was valid service of summon to Ernesto Lazaro, but not to the rest.
Issue: The issues raised may be further simplified into whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the
court a quo over the persons of the respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lazaro.
Held: Reversed.
Basically, there are two (2) ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or
respondent: (a) by service of summons upon the defendant; and (b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant in
court and his submission to its authority.
With respect to service of summons, the Revised Rules of Court prescribe that a copy of the summons be served
personally upon the defendant by "handing him a copy thereof in person or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering
it to him. 9 Personal service, however, may be dispensed with and substituted service may be availed of if the
defendant cannot be served personally "within a reasonable time."
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In the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service in seeking to serve the summons
upon all the defendants by serving a copy thereof "through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally." Perusal, however, of the
sheriff's return reveals that the sheriff failed to specify therein what prior efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve
summons upon the other defendants personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such
efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. Such specification in the sheriff's return is essential for
enforcement of the rule under the Revised Rules of Court that substituted service may be resorted to only where it
is not possible to serve the defendant or defendants promptly in person. As this Court ruled in Keister vs. Navarro.
[T]he impossibility of prompt service in person should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed This statement should be made in the
proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
of service.
We therefore uphold the respondent appellate court's finding that, while Ernesto Lazaro was validly served, with
respect to respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, there was no valid service of summons
effected.
We are, nonetheless, unable to sustain its conclusion that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of the said respondents.
As earlier noted, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can also be acquired by his voluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority, for voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons. In the case
before us, the defendants appeared before the trial court a number of times without raising any objection to the
improper service of summons.
The respondents assert that only voluntary appearance during trial is equivalent to waiver of service, and that
therefore, the motion for extension of time within which to vacate the premises filed by Romeo Lazaro after trial
and after rendition of judgment, was not equivalent to waiver of Summons.
We are not persuaded by this argument of the respondents. In Soriano vs. Palacio, this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that:
Assuming, arguendo, that the court below originally did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner
Soriano, the latter certainly submitted to it when he filed his first motion for reconsideration and
for annulment of previous proceedings on 14 March 1960. Therefore, the denial of that motion, by
the order of 19 March 1960, was binding on petitioner Soriano.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as concerns
respondents Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez. With respect, however, to defendant Ernesto Lazaro,
same decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
PINLAC V CA AND VILMA SUBDIVISION OWNERS

Facts: Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they
filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City . In particular,
petitioners claimed that the real property were part of forest lands belonging to the government; that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said property continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than
thirty (30) years; and that they have accordingly filed applications for land titling in their respective names with the
appropriate government agency.
They named as respondents several persons and corporations who are titled owners of subdivided parcels of land
within the subject property. One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision
(hereinafter, Vil-Ma).
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings, while the others, including Vil-Ma,
failed to answer, and were thus declared in default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence
ex parte against the defaulted respondents.
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Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners. One year later, Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed by the respondents on the ground that :
They were never made parties to Civil Case No. Q-35672, nor were their lots described in the complaint, published
summons, and Partial Decision. Named defendant was VIL-MA, a totally separate and independent entity which
had already ceased to exist way back in January of 1976. Moreover, the summons, as well as the Partial Decision
was not published in a newspaper or periodical of general circulation. Thus, the defective service of summons to
said defendant did not place the individual lot owners under the trial courts jurisdiction, nor are they bound by the
adverse judgment.
CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Said the court:
x x x becomes all the more apparent when petitioners claim or asseverate that the assailed Partial Decision
can not bind Vilar-Maloles (VILMA), the umbrella name, for the simple reason that said PARTNERSHIP was
dissolved on January 26, 1976, for it can no longer be sued as it had no more juridical personality.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that the summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local
newspaper edited in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan known as METROPOLITAN NEWSWEEK implying
that said summons and Partial Decision were not published in a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon
City as required by PD 1079, Sec. 1 thereof.
Issue : WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A-QUO HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENT VILMA MALOLES
SUBDIVISION BY THE PUBLICATION OF THE SUMMONS AND PETITION AS ORDERED BY THE COURT WAS LEGAL,
VALID AND PROPER.
Held: We find no merit in the instant petition.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Partial Decision is null and void insofar as private
respondents are concerned since the latter were not duly served summons or notified of the proceedings against
them. The summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited and published in
Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of Appeals found the publication in said newspaper,
namely the Metropolitan Newsweek, to be invalid because the said periodical is not considered a newspaper of
general circulation in Quezon City where the subject property is located, as required by Presidential Decree No.
1079, Section 1.
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not
cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan Newsweek is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City.
The Rules strictly require that publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such time as the court may order.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the rules, the service of summons would
still be ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was
filed on November 2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Maloles
Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Dissolution issued by the SEC dated January 26, 1976. Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost its
juridical personality.
On the issue of order of default:
The conclusion that the Partial Decision of the court a quo, with regards to order of default, is void.
Section 5(c) of the then Rules of Court, provides:
Rule 10,
(c)
Effect of partial default. - When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against
several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against
all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
Whatever defense and evidence the non-defaulted respondents may present which would be applicable to the
situation of the defaulted respondents should inure to the benefit of the latter
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RULE 14: SUMMONS

2-B LPU 2014

CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean Mawis,

RULE 14: SUMMONS

Abergos, De Guzman, Jampac, Ong,

RULE 14: SUMMONS

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RULE 14: SUMMONS

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VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent.

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WoN there was a proper service of summons

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CENTROGEN defaulted in its payments.