Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 175929

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

ROMMEL DELA CRUZ,

Accused-Appellant.

December 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MURDER is one of the odious crimes a man can commit against another. It is no respecter of blood
relations.
[1]

Accused-appellant Rommel dela Cruz seeks a reversal of his conviction by the Court of Appeals (CA)
and the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[2] for murder.

The Facts
Mario Pader, Manny Viscaya and Rafael Santarin are neighbors and friends. [3] Santarin and appellant
Dela Cruz are first cousins.[4]
On August 7, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m., Santarin, Pader and Viscaya were conversing[5] near
the barangay hall in Nadurata St., Caloocan City. Fronting the barangay hall is a street which was lighted
by a fluorescent lamp.[6] Santarin was seated between Pader and Viscaya.[7] They were arms-length away of
each other.[8] Appellant was sanding behind them,[9] at a distance of about two (2) meters.[10]
Viscaya went to buy some cigarettes from a nearby store beside the barangay hall[11] and returned to the
place where Santarin and Pader were.[12]

first.

[15]

Suddenly, appellant came from behind and stabbed Santarin [13] once.[14] Santarin fell to the ground, chin
Pader and Viscaya were instantly shocked and were unable to move.[16]

Appellant immediately fled the scene.[17] Subsequently, people from the barangay hall arrived and
brought Santarin to the nearest hospital.[18] He, however, succumbed to death due to the stab wound.[19]
Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
conducted an autopsy on the victims body. According to his findings,[21] Santarin sustained one stab wound
in the back[22] which was 15 centimeters deep.[23] The wound reached the left lung[24] causing his death.
[25]
According to Dr. Muoz, the weapon used by the assailant was a sharp, pointed single-bladed instrument
which could either be a kitchen knife or a balisong.[26]
[20]

On December 13, 1995, appellant was indicted for murder in an Information that read:
I N F O R M AT I O N
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMMEL DELA CRUZ of the crime
of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995 in Kaloocan City, MetroManila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack and stab with a bladed weapon on the back portion of the
body one RAFAEL SANTARIN y DELA CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious physical injuries which injuries caused his death upon arrival at the
Ospital ng Kalookan, this city.
Contrary to law.
Kaloocan City, Metro Manila, December 6, 1995.
(SGD.) AFABLE E. CAJIGAL
Assistant City Prosecutor[27]
Appellant evaded arrest. The long arm of the law, however, caught up with him when he was arrested in
Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.
When arraigned on June 7, 2000, appellant, assisted by Atty. Jimmy Edmund Batara, pleaded not
guilty[28] to the Information. Trial on the merits ensued after.
The prosecution evidence, which portrayed the foregoing facts, was supplied by the combined testimonies
of Viscaya and Dr. Muoz.
Appellants version of the events is premised on denial and alibi.[29] He claimed that on the night
of August 7, 1995, at about 7:00 p.m., he went to collect his fees for electrical services rendered from
neighbors.[30] It was about that time when he passed by the group of Viscaya who were seated in front of
the barangay hall at Libis Nadurata,Caloocan City.[31]
Appellant did not join the group but went on his separate way. He went to the houses of his clients to
collect his fees until 8:00 p.m.[32] He did not go home to his parents house later that evening because he was

angry with them and his siblings.[33] He slept in a parked passenger jeep that was half a kilometer away from his
parents house.[34] He woke up at 3:00 a.m.[35] and took a passenger jeep bound for the pier.[36] He took a boat
to Cebu City, arriving there the following day at about 6:00 a.m.[37] He stayed in Cebu City for four years.
[38]
His family in Cebu City was surprised to see him when he got there.[39]
Sometime in 1999, appellant returned, his family in tow, to his parents house in Caloocan City. His
mother, however, refused to accept them for her fear of trouble because of his alleged involvement in the killing
of his first cousin.[40] As a result, he and his family proceeded to the house of his sister
at P. Zamora Street, Caloocan City.[41] His mother later allowed his wife and children to stay in her house at
Libis, but not him.[42]
Appellant proceeded to Tabang, Plaridel Bulacan[43] and stayed there for eight (8) months.[44] He told his
relatives there that his mother was keeping him away as his life was in danger.[45] He also feared for his life
because he was accused of killing his first cousin. [46] Appellant later transferred to Aliaga, Nueva Ecija where
he was arrested on June 7, 1999.[47]
According to appellant, Viscaya had ill-motives in testifying falsely against him. They had a
misunderstanding sometime in 1989 after appellant meddled in a quarrel between Viscaya and a friend. Since
then, Viscaya resented him.
Appellant insisted that he is innocent. When asked why he was charged for the killing of his first
cousin, his reply was hindi ko po alam sa kanila.[48]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On February 26, 2001, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ROMMEL DELA
CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of Murder, as defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Rep. Act No.
7659. Accordingly, he shall serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties under the law and shall pay the costs.
Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused
shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention.
By way of death Indemnity, the accused shall pay the victims heirs the amount
of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.
As funeral and related expenses, the accused shall also pay the victims heirs the amount
of P20,900.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Branch Clerk of this Court shall now issue the corresponding Commitment Order for
the accuseds confinement at the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.[49]
By virtue of this Courts decision in People v. Mateo,[50] the Court issued a resolution on September 6,
2004, transferring this case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
On July 28, 2006, the CA affirmed the trial courts disposition, with modification on the award of
damages. The fallo of the CA decision reads:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THESE CASES, THUS, the appealed Decision
finding the accused-appellant Rommel Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and
sentencing
him
to
suffer
the
penalty
of reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
civil
aspect
of
the
case
of MODIFIED to read: the accused-appellant is herebyORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P20,900.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs shall also be assessed against
the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[51]
Undaunted, appellant took the present recourse.
Issues
In his final bid to seek reversal of his conviction, appellant imputes to the trial court the following errors,
to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE ACCOUNT OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ANENT THE SUBJECT
INCIDENT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE CRIME
COMMITTED IS ONLY HOMICIDE.[52] (Underscoring supplied)
The first and second issues, being related, will be resolved jointly.
Our Ruling
I.
The trial court did not err in convicting appellant. It did not also err in giving full faith and
credence to the account of the prosecution witness. Positive identification prevails over
denial and alibi. Flight is an indication of guilt.
In support of the first and second assigned errors, appellant claims that the testimony of Viscaya leaves
much to be desired. According to him, there is a gaping hole in Viscayas testimony [53] that seriously militates
against his conviction. Although Viscaya testified about the presence of appellant at the scene of the crime, he,
nonetheless, categorically admitted that he did not see the weapon used in stabbing the victim.[54]
The contention is untenable. The emphasis, gesture and inflection of the voice are potent aids in
understanding the testimony of witnesses. The trial court has the opportunity and is presumed to take advantage
of these aids in weighing the testimony of the witnesses. But as they cannot be incorporated into the record, this
Court has no assistance in the examination of the testimony and must, therefore, rely upon the good judgment of
the trial court.[55] Thus, in the absence of any showing that the trial courts calibration of credibility was
flawed, We are bound by its assessment.[56]

More than that, a reading of the testimony of Viscaya would show that the trial court did not, in any way,
err in calibrating the credibility of his testimony:
MANNY VISCAYAS DIRECT EXAMINATION CONDUCTED
BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FILOMENO BAJAR
xxxx
Fiscal: On August 7, 1995 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, do you still remember your
whereabouts?
Witness: I was there at the side of the barangay hall.
xxxx
Q: Now, were you alone then or do you have companion with you on said place?
A: Mario Pader was with me and we were talking.
Q: Who else were there, if you know?
A: We were 3 then, Rafael Santarin, Mario Pader and myself.
xxxx
Q: While the 3 of you were conversing on August 7, 1995 at around 7:00 p.m., do you
remember if any unusual incident that transpired?
A: While we were conversing, I spotted Rommel dela Cruz on our back.
Q: How far was Rommel dela Cruz from you when you saw him?
A: He was about two (2) meters away from us.
Q: What was he doing when you saw him for the first time in that distance for two (2) meters?
A: He was standing there, Sir.
Q: After seeing him, what happened?
A: When I saw him coming from our back, he immediately attacked.
Q: Whom did he attack?
A: Rafael Santarin, Sir.
xxxx
Q: So, when you said attack, what actually do you mean by that?
A: Rafael Santarin was stabbed, Sir.
Q: Before we go further, this Rommel dela Cruz who was your neighbor for 15 years, if he
is in court, can you identify him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Please point to him?
A: That one, Sir.

Interpreter: The witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who identified himself as
Rommel dela Cruz?
Fiscal: How were you able to see the stabbing of the victim in this case by Rommel dela
Cruz when according to you, your back was against him?
Witness: Because after I spotted Rommel dela Cruz from our back, I bought cigarette and
after buying cigarette, that was the time that he stabbed the victim.
xxxx
Q: When you saw the stabbing of the victim by Rommel dela Cruz, what was then your
position in relation to Rommel and Rafael?
A: My side was facing the two.
Q: Were you still buying cigarette or, you have already bought cigarette when you saw them?
A: I already bought cigarette, Sir.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to us how Rommel dela Cruz stabbed the victim?
Interpreter: The witness is demonstrating a forward thrust using his right hand.
Fiscal: Were the two (2) protagonists facing each other?
Witness: No, Sir.
Q: What was then the position of the victim in relation to the stabber?
A: The back of the victim was against the accused.
Q: Did you see the weapon that was used by the accused in stabbing the victim?
A: I did not see it because the incident happened so fast.
Q: How many times did he stab the victim?
Witness: Only one, Sir.
xxxx
Q: When these people arrived and lifted the victim, where was then the accused?
A: The accused ran away, Sir.
xxxx
Fiscal: What happened to the victim after he was stabbed by the accused?
A: He fell on the ground.
xxxx
Q: Were you investigated by the police in relation to the incident that you saw?
A: Yes, Sir, at the District Office of the police.

Q: What did you tell the police?

A: I told them that I saw the incident.
Q: Before the stabbing of your friend by the accused, was there any conversation that
transpired between the two?
A: None, Sir.[57] (Emphasis ours)
No rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible.
Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.[59] Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion
of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such
testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone
testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.[60] Although the number of witnesses may be
considered a factor in the appreciation of
evidence,
preponderance
is
not
necessarily with the greatest number.[61] Conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness.[62]
[58]

That Viscaya did not see the weapon used does not impair his credibility. As he explained, he failed to
see the weapon used to stab Santarin because the incident happened so fast. [63] There is neither jurisprudence
nor rules of evidence that a witness credibility is affected if there is failure to see the weapon used in the
commission of the crime. To rule along the twisted logic of appellant could be absurd.
Viscaya was unrelenting in positively identifying appellant as the one who stabbed Santarin. Note that
Viscaya and appellant were neighbors for about fifteen (15) years. [64] There could have been no mistake in
Viscayas identification of appellant as the assailant. It is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor
should normally be accepted.[65] Absent any evidence showing any reason and motive for the witness to
prevaricate, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.[66]
Appellant has not presented any shred of evidence that Viscaya was impelled by an improper motive in
identifying him as the assailant. When appellant was asked why he was charged with the killing of his first
cousin, all he could say was hindi ko po alam sa kanila.[67] Appellants claim that Viscaya had an evil motive
in testifying against him because they had a previous misunderstanding is too flimsy an excuse.
Appellants denial and alibi are not worthy of belief. It is an oft-quoted doctrine that positive
identification prevails over denial and alibi.[68] Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[69]
Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must establish that (a) he was in another place
at the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) he was so far away that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.[70] Appellant does
not dispute that he was near the scene of the crime on August 7, 1995. It was not also physically impossible for
him to have been the author of the crime, and after, hide to avoid being prosecuted. In fact, during crossexamination, appellant explicitly admitted that the distance from where he slept and place of the stabbing
incident was only for a short distance. Thus:
Q: You claimed in your Affidavit that you are (sic) only sleeping in the parked jeep near the
school and your distance is not even 20 meters walk from where you were sleeping to the
place of the stabbing incident?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Less than?

A: Yes, Sir, by mere walking, one would reach the place of the incident from the place where I
used to sleep in front of the elementary school, Sir.[71]
Another circumstance which glaringly points to the guilt of appellant is his flight, not only from the
scene of the crime, but also from the clutches of the authorities. Flight of an accused from the scene of the
crime removes any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt. [72] Indeed, the wicked flee, when no man pursueth,
but the innocent are bold as a lion.[73]
Consider the following:
First. On the night of the killing, appellant did not go home to his parents house and instead slept inside
a parked passenger jeep which was half a kilometer away from his parents house. His reason was his alleged
anger with his parents and siblings. He did not, however, explain what caused his anger for his parents and
siblings which could have made his claim of not going home on that night believable.
Second. Appellant proceeded to the pier at 3:00 a.m. and took a boat for Cebu City where he admittedly
stayed for 4 years.
Third. Although he and his family returned to Caloocan City in 1999, appellant opted not to stay in the
city. He instead went to Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan where he told his relatives that his mother was keeping him
away as his life was in danger. He also told them that he feared for his life because he was accused of killing his
first cousin.
Fourth. Continuing his flight, appellant finally sought sanctuary in the house of his relatives in Nueva
Ecija where he was eventually caught.
Taken all together, these circumstances show that appellant entertained fear for what had happened to his
first cousin. This could hardly be the conduct of an innocent man.
In his supplemental brief,[74] appellant also claims that the non-presentation of Pader as witness is
tantamount to suppression of evidence.[75]
If appellant felt that the prosecution was suppressing evidence, he should have asserted during trial his
constitutional right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence on his behalf.[76] This he did not do. Appellant cannot now be heard for the
first time on appeal to complain that he could not secure the presence of witnesses at the trial. It does not
appear that he made any effort to do so before or during the progress of the trial, or that he sought the aid of the
court to compel the attendance of his witnesses, or objected to proceeding without them.[77]
Also, there was no necessity for the prosecution panel to present Pader as witness for the simple reason
that his testimony would have merely been corroborative. As earlier mentioned, the testimony of Viscaya is
credible of belief, thus, any testimony of Pader would have only been a superfluity.
The elements of murder are: (1) That a person is killed; (2) That the accused killed him; (3) That the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (4) The killing is not parricide or infanticide.[78]
Appellant claims that there was no concrete evidence proving that, indeed, treachery was
employed in committing the crime charged.[79] According to him, the prosecution failed to present
evidence that accused-appellant has resolved to commit the crime prior to the moment of killing. There was
no proof that the death of the deceased was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection.[80]

Appellant is mistaken. There is treachery when a victim is set upon by the accused without warning;
when the attack is sudden and unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim; or is,
in any event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring the execution
of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.[81] In order to sustain a finding of treachery, two conditions
must be present, to wit: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked not
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.[82]
Appellants attack on Santarin was so sudden and launched from behind that the latter was caught off
guard. Appellant gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself, as the latter was innocently conversing with
Viscaya and Pader. Appellants attack was swift, deliberate and unexpected. [83] There was no slightest
provocation on the part of Santarin. Treachery is, without question, present.
It is clear from the records that appellant had pondered upon the mode or method of his attack to insure
the killing of Santarin or remove or diminish any risk to himself that might arise from the defense that Santarin
might make. Appellant suddenly stabbed Santarin at the back, even in the absence of provocation by the
victim, to insure himself against the risk from any possible defense that Santarin might make.
Dr. Muoz, who conducted the autopsy on Santarins corpse, also found out that Santarin sustained one
stab wound at the back portion of his body, which caused his death. This corroborated the testimony of Viscaya
that appellant stabbed the victim once at the back.

In one case, this Court ruled that treachery attended the killing of the victim since the stabbing was
sudden and unexpected, and the victim was not only unarmed, but was unable to defend himself. [84] In another
case[85] where treachery was also appreciated, it was shown that the victims were totally unprepared for the
sudden and unexpected attack of appellant.
II.
Appellant was correctly convicted of murder. There was no violation of the right of appellant to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Appellant contends that while it is not disputed that treachery was stated in the information,
nonetheless, the same was not specified therein as a qualifying circumstance[86] in an ordinary and concise
language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what were those
qualifying circumstances.[87] Thus, assuming he is guilty, he could only be convicted of homicide, not
murder.
Appellant is building castle on sand. It is true that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [88] The Constitution uses the word shall,
hence, the same is mandatory. A violation of this right prevents the conviction of the accused with the crime
charged in the Information.
The constitutional guaranty has a three-fold purpose: First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform
the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.[89]
The en banc per curiam Resolution of this Court in People v. Aquino[90] provides for the proper way of
making allegations of qualifying or aggravating circumstances in an Information as mandated by Sections
8[91] and 9[92] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x the Court has repeatedly held even after the recent amendments to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. x x x
In the recent case of People v. Lab-eo, the appellant there questioned the decision of the
lower court raising the killing to murder. The appellant there argued that he could only be
convicted of homicide since the Information merely stated that the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft attended the commission of
the offense. The appellant also asserted that since the circumstances were merely described as
aggravating and not qualifying, he should only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide. On
this score, the Court ruled that
The fact that the circumstances were described as aggravating instead of
qualifying does not take the Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 248 does not use the word qualifying or
aggravating in enumerating the circumstances that raise a killing to the category
of murder. Article 248 merely refers to the enumerated circumstances as the
attendant circumstances.
xxxx
The use of the words aggravating/qualifying circumstances will not add any essential
element to the crime. Neither will the use of such words further apprise the accused of the nature
of the charge. The specific allegation of the attendant circumstance in the Information, coupled

with the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts constituting the offense as required
in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, is sufficient to warn the accused x x x.
x
x
x The
words
aggravating
circumstances
include
qualifying
circumstances. Qualifying circumstances are aggravating circumstances which, by express
provision of law, change the nature of the crime to a higher category. The words attendant
circumstances, which still appear in Article 248 (raising homicide to murder), refer to
qualifying circumstances those aggravating circumstances that, by express provision of law,
change the nature of the crime when present in the commission of the crime.
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the
x x x qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know x x x (the) qualifying and aggravating circumstances x x x.
Thus, even the attendant circumstance itself, which is the essential element that raises the
crime to a higher category, need not be stated in the language of the law. With more reason, the
words aggravating/qualifying circumstances as used in the law need not appear in the
Information, especially since these words are merely descriptive of the attendant circumstances
and do not constitute an essential element of the crime. These words are also not necessary in
informing the accused that he is charged of a qualified crime. What properly informs the
accused of the nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of the circumstances
mentioned in the law that raise the crime to a higher category.
Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Section 8 merely requires the Information to specify
the circumstances. Section 8 does not require the use of the words qualifying or qualified by
to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the words
qualifying or qualified by that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation
of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher
category.
xxxx
We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the
Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to
qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words
aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualified by to be considered as qualifying
circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise
the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus
precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information
the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law.
This includes the death penalty in proper cases.
xxxx
To guide the bench and the bar, this Resolution clarifies and resolves the issue of how to
allege or specify qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the Information. The words

aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated by need

not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the
Information. (Emphasis ours)
The Information in this case clearly forewarns appellant that without any justifiable cause, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, he did then and willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack and stab, with a bladed weapon, on the back portion of the body, Santarin, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious physical injury which injury caused his death.[93] These allegations, once
they were proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, qualify the killing of Santarin to murder.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Court of Appeals Decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 164368-69
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

- versus -

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL
DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 2, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint Resolution dated July 12,
2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in
Crim. Case No. 26565.[2]

THE FACTS

On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of
alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in
Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly
authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the
offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED
during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE
VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose
Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another
Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905,was filed with the Sandiganbayan
against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear,
and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.
[3]

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the
Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge,
as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo
(Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada
opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as Jose Velarde in the
account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and
Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a certain
Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several checks in
PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account name Jose Velarde on the following dates
(as evidenced by deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999
(Exh. MMMMM)
b. 8 November 1999
(Exh. LLLLL)
c.
22 November 1999
(Exh. NNNNN)
d. 24 November 1999
(Exh. OOOOO)
e.
25 November 1999
(Exh. PPPPP)
f.
20 December 1999
(Exh. QQQQQ)
g. 21 December 1999
(Exh. RRRRR)
h. 29 December 1999
(Exh. SSSSS)
i.
4 January 2000
(Exh. TTTTT)
j.
10 May 2000
(Exh. UUUUU)
k. 6 June 2000
(Exh. VVVVV)
l.
25 July 2000
(Exh. WWWWW)
(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of
the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and
when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan
admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003.[4] The accused separately moved to reconsider
the Sandiganbayan Resolution;[5] the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to
the motions.[6] The Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.[7]
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence
in these cases.[8] In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004,[9]the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense
leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. [10] His demurrer to
evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds[11]:
1.

Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms.
Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000),
they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;

2.

The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001
as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October
2001;

3.

There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be
revealed without following proper procedures; and

4.

The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the following
arguments:[12]
1.

That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP
No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of
alias was already prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and
not BSP Circular No. 302;

2.

Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;

3.

Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and
the habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this
regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and

4.

Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not
absorbed in plunder.

Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.

THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient
points of the assailed resolution are:
First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence
for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information i.e., the testimonies and
documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that
the use of the disjunctiveor between on or about 04 February 2000 and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to
or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecutions procedural tool to guard against
any variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation in which
time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission
that includes acts and/or events separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date on or about
04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the
disjunctive or prevented it from interpreting the Information any other way.
Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of the offense. The
Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished
under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by
the Supreme Court inUrsua v. Court of Appeals.[13] It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context
of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estradas case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the
application of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature of the
transaction involved the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made
during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,[14] and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.
[15]

Estrada did not publicly use the alias Jose Velarde:

a.
Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde in his dealings with Dichavez and
Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under
the Information were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, Estrada did
represent himself as Jose Velarde in several transactions, standing alone, violates Estradas right to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This phrase is
qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which
is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities. Thus, Estradas representations before persons other than those mentioned in
the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities specified in the Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not
therefore covered by the indictment.
b.
The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel that mere
communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to
the way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to
the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed
strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if
it applies, considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be nonactionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged communication
under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:
Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank documents being absolutely confidential,
the witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law
cannot be considered as public as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account
of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to
beknown by this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate
publicity. Ursua instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the
user intends to be knownby this name in addition to his real name from that day
forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
c.
The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known by the name
Jose Velarde is shown by the nature of a numbered account a perfectly valid banking transaction at the
time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan
further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No.
6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and liabilities. [16] Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405
and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of
his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account
(such as the name he used to open it).
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.[17] The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute
prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all
other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that
allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 another confirmation that the opening
of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily
be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute

should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the
Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias
within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank
officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No.
142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1.

Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case
No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose
Velarde was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando
Chua on 4 February 2000;

2.

Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case
No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose
Velarde was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
Commonwealth Act No. 142;

3.

Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case
No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias
punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142;

4.

Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A.
No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;

5.

Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of
the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias Jose Velarde by
respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;

6.

Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier
final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appealsand forcing its application
to the instant case.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted
practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at
birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in
case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons

whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized,
have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil
registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no
person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for
an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names
other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The
judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than
his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias a name or names
used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habituallyusually in business transactions in
addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or indication that the
user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the
use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.[18]
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No.
142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among
the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious
names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who,
rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.[19]
Following the doctrine of stare decisis,[20] we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime
punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is
unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds
from Estradas position in the government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the
President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument
sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the
Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any
distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to
Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used
even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of
the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we
make based on the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA
No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. [21] The
mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be.

The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6,
2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the
application of Ursua under the following tenor:
The use of the term alias in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case
outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]),
on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term alias means otherwise
known as (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using
an alias logically implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise,
he will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts to several
transactions and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the
Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or
indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his
real name.[22]
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding
this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The
People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it
resurrected the application of Ursua,resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a
mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion to quash[23] that cannot be given the attributes of
finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the
whole, of or particular matters in, a case.[24] The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to
undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest.[25] It is basic remedial law that an
interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. [26] Perez v. Court of Appeals,[27] albeit a civil
case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory

matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be
no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or
judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but
was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform
certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining
order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners
and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction.
In other words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be
considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond
under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the restraining
order was lifted.[28]

Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the
Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any
evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had
a fuller view of the prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions evidence
was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan
may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA
142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of
law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its
petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used
and intended to continually use the alias Jose Velarde in addition to the name Joseph Estrada; (2)
Estradas use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias Jose
Velarde was designed to cause and did cause confusion and fraud in business transactions which the antialias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more
than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established
that Estradas use of the alias was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall now
examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to
evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the
Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in
the use of an alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the
coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde
on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction one that took place on February 4, 2000
but there were other transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information
specifically referred to several transactions with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities. To the People, the restrictive finding that the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto is absorbed
by the phrase on or about 04 February 2000 drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the
constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the documents
signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship between the allegations of the
multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent of prior to or subsequent thereto,
on the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto into a
useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the
constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the
commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the time given in
the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not need to
be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the
action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20,
22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause prior to or

subsequent thereto; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense
finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could
have taken place that would prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified
him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this
constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed. [29] As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.[30] The date of the commission of
the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a
material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.[31]
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting
forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense.[32] In short, the allegations in the complaint or information,
as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused the primary reader of and the party directly affected
by the complaint or information of the charge/s laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused [did] willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF
AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose
Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the Information, as this was how the
accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis,
prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information
plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or
subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as Jose Velarde in
several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or
about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on
February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the
Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative
approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto would effectively be a
surplusage that has no meaning separately from the on or about already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary
consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the THERETO that referred back
to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and
would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the Information simply used

AND instead of OR to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on
various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the
People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this
reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the
multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of
an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the
Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information, another
issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a
violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the Information.
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case, as it deals a fatal blow on the
Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an
alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or
use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to
secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and
Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the bank documents as Jose Velarde amounted to a public use
of an alias that violates CA No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estradas
prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and
constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening of
bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute
enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular
No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with violation of CA
No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in
bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No.
142, the use of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already
prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did
not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done
so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the
effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since
nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People
posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least
related with one another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely
related to one another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a
different conduct, and covers a different class of persons, [33] and there was no need to force their application
to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of conflict or

incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present
case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account
No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People,
may not be considered a deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust
and deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is
separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered
by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as
amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the transaction or
communication was privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A.
No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other than his
original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the
bank employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances
enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank
employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making
public his use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public
exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers
does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of
ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to
silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The People contends that
the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for
the commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and
applied so that right and justice would prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of
libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No.
142. Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be
culpable and the historical reasons we cited above tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is
more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made
openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable
for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly
be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened
Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose
Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to
Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President;
Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while
Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy
and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be
for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that
time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the
evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were
made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction
that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.[34] We previously rejected, in Ejercito v.
Sandiganbayan,[35] the Peoples nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and
trust transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as used in
R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the
trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term deposits
used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a
creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to
give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking
institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic
development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)

If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to
third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely
seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement
between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit, placement or
investment of funds by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under
Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be
invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would
encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures,
contrary to the policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term deposits was
intended to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines,
its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or
in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation of
deposits. Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law

applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further
shows that the law was not intended to apply only to deposits in the strict sense of the
word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase or invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.[36]
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.[37] Given the private nature of Estradas act of
signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim
that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not
even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is
essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This
statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done
publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it
clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted
banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an
indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the
constitutional.
We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt to
harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily
rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No.
1405 is significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the law
considers private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the
parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment
under CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that
requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together when
these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to
the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining in Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde vis--vis theUrsua requisites. We do not decide here
whether Estradas use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and
legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense
charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on
the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People
fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do
so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.[38]

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an
attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must
necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of
R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the
law considers private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to
the parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment
under CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that
requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together when
these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to
the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining in Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde vis--vis theUrsua requisites. We do not decide here
whether Estradas use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and
legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense
charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on
the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People
fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do
so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
CESAR P. GUY,
Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 166794-96

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
PERALTA, JJ.*
Promulgated:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

March 20, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
FELIX T. RIPALDA, CONCEPCION
C. ESPERAS, EDUARDO
VILLAMOR, and ERVIN C.
MARTINEZ,
Petitioners,

G.R. Nos. 166880-82

- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

NARCISA A. GREFIEL,
Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 167088-90

- versus THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 2
September 2004 in Criminal Cases No. 26508-10[1] which found petitioners guilty of violating Sec. 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019).
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioners Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo R. Villamor, and Ervin C. Martinez (Ripalda, et
al.) are officers and employees of the City Engineers Office of the City of Tacloban.[2] Meanwhile, petitioners
Cesar P. Guy (Guy)[3] and Narcisa A. Grefiel (Grefiel)[4] are the Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer,
respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City (Barangay 36). Said petitioners, together with
Edgar Amago, a private individual, owner and proprietor of Amago Construction were charged in three (3)
separate Informations with violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay 36,
namely: an elevated path walk, a basketball court and a day care center.

It appears that an audit investigation was conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) in response to a
letter-complaint of one Alfredo Alberca regarding the three projects.[5] The audit team found that the
Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay 36, acting as the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)
accepted bid proposals from Amago Construction and General Services (Amago Construction) without issuing
the proper plans and specifications for the basketball court and day care projects and that the work
programs for the day care center and the elevated path walk were prepared long after the construction had been
completed. Likewise, Guy and Grefiel reported the construction of the projects to the City Engineers Office
only after they had already been completed; thus, petitioner employees inspected the projects only after they
had already been accomplished. Petitioner employees approved the accomplishment of the projects despite the
absence of material documents, according to the audit teams report. Finally, the audit team found material
defects in the projects and discovered that the contract cost for the basketball court and elevated path walk was
overpriced.[6]
The Ombudsman Prosecutor (Ombudsman-Visayas) filed the corresponding information for the offenses,
essentially charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioner employees claimed that the participation of the City Engineers Office of Tacloban City in the
barangay infrastructure projects was only to provide technical assistance to implementing barangays and that it
was the barangay officials who supervised the construction of the projects. They aver that the City Engineers
Office was not a member of the PBAC which conducted the bidding process for the subject projects, and that
they did not personally know their co-accused Guy and Grefiel, much more did they have any association with
them prior to the approval of the three projects. It was Guy and Grefiel who requested the City Engineers
Office to inspect the projects, and that when the City Engineers Office conducted the inspection, it found the
projects already completed. Lastly, they found the three projects to be in accordance with the plans and
specifications set for them and there were no anomalies or irregularities in their construction. They add that the
residents of Barangay 36 have benefited from the three projects.[7]

On the other hand, Guy maintained that the three projects were authorized by resolutions duly-enacted by
the Sangguniang Barangay. He claimed that a public bidding was conducted before the construction of the
projects and that Amago Construction was the winning bidder. He added that Amago Construction constructed
the projects and was accordingly paid for the work done and the materials supplied by it.[8]
Meanwhile, Grefiel argued that her only participation in the projects was her signing of the blank
disbursement vouchers and blank checks covering the projects, and that it was Guy who instructed her to affix
her signature on the said documents. She added that she did not participate in the supervision of the
construction of the projects nor in the disbursement of the payment of any amount for the projects to Amago
Construction.[9]
On 2 September 2004, the Sandiganbayan decided the case against petitioners.
The Sandiganbayan found that Guy and Grefiel awarded the contracts to Amago Construction even if there
were no plans and specifications for the day care center and basketball court projects prior to
their construction; and that while there was a plan and specification for the elevated path walk, they tolerated
Amago Constructions failure to abide by the said plan.[10] Furthermore, Guy and Grefiel are also responsible
for giving Amago Construction the check payments even before requests for obligation of appropriations and
disbursement vouchers were made.[11] The graft court also found that the construction of the projects were
reported to petitioner employees after the projects had already been completed, and that these anomalies
notwithstanding, petitioner employees certified that the projects were made in accordance with the plans and
that the same were 100% completed. Further, the Sandiganbayan found that the quality of the day care center

project was substandard, the program of work was not followed, and worse, the contract amounts for the
basketball court and the elevated path walk exceeded the allowable project costs.[12] Finally, the Sandiganbayan
ruled that the acts of the petitioners, taken collectively, satisfactorily prove the existence of conspiracy.[13]
Disposing of the graft cases, the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:
Considering that all the elements of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) were without doubt established in these cases and
the allegation of conspiracy shown, a moral certainty is achieved to find the accused liable for the acts they
committed.

WHEREFORE, accused FELIX RIPALDA, EDUARDO VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION ESPERAS, ERVIN

MARTINEZ, CESAR GUY and NARCISA GREFIEL are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
violated R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) month as minimum and nine (9) years as maximum for each of the three offenses, perpetual disqualification
from public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in
the amount of eleven thousand eight hundred ninety (P11, 895.00).
Since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused EDGAR AMAGO, let the cases
against him be, in the meantime, archived, the same to be revived upon his arrest. Let an alias warrant of arrest
be then issued against accused EDGAR AMAGO.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the decision. However, on 25 January 2005, the
Sandiganbayan denied all their motions.[15]
Before this Court, petitioners separately raise the following issues, thus:
In 166794-96 (Cesar P. Guy v. People of the Philippines):
1.
The SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) has decided the above numbered three (3) criminal
cases in gross disregard and contrary to the applicable decision of this Honorable Court in the case of LACSON
v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., and thus, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the questioned DECISION and RESOLUTION despite the fact that it
had no jurisdiction over the instant three (3) cases due to the failure to aver the specific factual allegations in
the INFORMATIONS that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official
duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.
2.
GRANTING ARGUENDO that the SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) had jurisdiction over
these three (3) criminal casesit further committed serious errors of law and disregarded applicable
jurisprudence of this Honorable Court and thus, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in
excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed DECISION convicting herein petitioner and his co-accused
and issued the questioned RESOLUTION denying their MOTIONs FOR RECONSIDERATION despite the fact
that the prosecution evidently failed to prove the guilt of petitioner and his co-accused beyond reasonable doubt
and further miserably failed to prove the allegation of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.[16]

In G.R. No. 167088-90 ( Narcisa M. Grefiel v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines):
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF
THE PETITIONER TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND, INSTEAD, REVERSED THE PRESUMPTION
AND CONVICTED THE PETITIONER OF VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW INSPITE OF THE
CONCEDED FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN THE
PRE-BIDDING, BIDDING, AWARD, PROSECUTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE PROJECTS OF THE
BARANGAY, THE CONVICTION RESTING NOT ON THE BASIS OF CONCRETE INCULPATORY
EVIDENCE BUT ON THE SWEEPING DECLARATION THAT SHE WAS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES
OF THE DISBURSEMENT VOUCHERS AND THE CHECKS RESULTED IN A DUBIOUS FINDING THAT
THE PETITIONER CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH HER CO-ACCUED FOR THE
SUBSTANDARD CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARANGAY PROJECTS.[17]
In G.R. No. 166880-82 (Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo Villamor, and Ervin
C. Martinez v. People of the Philippines):
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
I
THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
II
THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT;
III
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT A QUO FRINDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON ESTIMATES, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND/OR
CONJECTURES[18]
In essence, petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan had not acquired jurisdiction over them because the
three informations failed to state the specific actual allegations that would indicate the connection between the
discharge of their official duties and the commission of the offenses charged; or alternatively, assuming that the
Sandiganbayan had actually acquired jurisdiction, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, as well as the existence of conspiracy.
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), argues that the averments
in the Informations are complete and wanting of the slightest vagueness as to denote another interpretation or
mislead anyone.[19] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court merely require the information to
describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with
and to enable the court to pronounce judgment, such that evidentiary matters need not be alleged in the
information. The OMB adds that if it were true that the allegations are vague or indefinite, petitioners should
have filed a motion for a bill of particulars as provided under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to

question the alleged insufficiency of the informations, or a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred
do not constitute an offense.
The OMB asserts that the prosecution had satisfactorily proven the existence of the elements of the offense
under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the existence of conspiracy among the accused.[20]
In addition, the OMB alleges that Grefiels claim that she was merely constrained to sign the disbursement
vouchers and checks relative to the subject projects is pure sophistry, since as barangay treasurer she is
mandated to disburse funds in accordance with the Local Government Code. Even Grefiels claim of miniscule
educational attainment should not excuse her from liability.[21] The OMB posits that petitioners allegation of
error is actually designed to lure the Court into re-opening the case on the basis of the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses which, however, on close scrutiny appear to be credible and substantiated.[22]
The petitions have to be denied.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which states:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must be established, viz:

(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in
relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.[23]
Petitioners, citing the case of Lacson v. The Executive Secretary,[24] assert that the informations do not
contain the specific factual allegations showing the close intimacy between the discharge of
petitioners official duties and the commission of the offense charged to qualify the offense as one
committed in relation to public office. InLacson, the Court ruled that before the Sandiganbayan may acquire
jurisdiction over the offense charged, the intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of
official duties must be alleged in the information.[25]

Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with cases describing when an offense is deemed committed in relation
to office. In Montilla and Tobia v. Hilario and Crisologo,[26]this Court held that for an offense to be
committed in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not
accidental, such that the offense cannot exist without the office. In Adaza v. Sandiganbayan,[27] we held that:
It does not thus suffice to merely allege in the information that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office or that he took advantage of his position as these are conclusions of law. The
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
the offenders official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office, are controlling.[28]
The Court finds that the Informations sufficiently show the close intimacy between petitioners
discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense charged. We reproduce the accusatory portions
of the Informations in the subject cases, thus:
Criminal Case No. 26508
That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the City of Tacloban, Province
of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused: FELIX T.
RIPALDA, EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, public
officers, being the City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector and ICD Representative, City
Administrators Office, respectively, of the City Government of Tacloban, CESAR P. GUY and NARCISA A.
GREFIEL, also public officers, being Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay 36,
Sabang District, Tacloban City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating together and mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private individual,
Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban City, with deliberate
intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
construct and/or cause the construction of an elevated path walk of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban
City, with the contract cost of SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P62,000.00), Philippine Currency without
following the approved program of work and drawing plan, in violation of the DILG Memorandum Circular No.
94-185, dated October 20, 1994, thereby resulting to (sic) an increase in the project cost by 17.5% or NINE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR PESOS AND EIGHTY-FOUR CENTAVOS (P9,274.84),
Philippine Currency, thus accused in the course of the performance of their official functions had given
unwarranted benefits to themselves and to accused Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[29]
Criminal Case No. 26509
That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, the City of Tacloban, Province of
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused: FELIX T.
RIPALDA, EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, public
officers, being the City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector and ICD Representative, City
Administrators Office, respectively, of the City Government of Tacloban, CESAR P. GUY and NARCISA A.
GREFIEL, also public officers, being the Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay
36, Sabang District, Tacloban City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating together and mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private individual,

Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban City, with deliberate
intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
construct and/or cause the construction of the Basketball Court of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City,
without adhering to the approved program of work and non-preparation of the plans and specifications in
violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October 20, 1994, thus resulting to (sic) the
increase in the contract amount to SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P68,000.00), Philippine Currency,
thus accused in the course of the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted benefits to
themselves and to accused Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[30]
Criminal Case No. 26510
That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, the City of Tacloban, Province of
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused: FELIX T.
RIPALDA, EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, public
officers, being the City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector and ICD Representative, City
Administrators Office, respectively, of the City Government of Tacloban, CESAR P. GUY and NARCISA A.
GREFIEL, also public officers, being the Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay
36, Sabang District, Tacloban City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating together and mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private individual,
Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban City, with deliberate
intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
construct and/or cause the construction of the Day Care Center of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City,
without plans and specifications, and not in accordance with the approved program of work, as the said center
was constructed and completed before the completion of the program of work, thereby resulting to (sic) the
increase and overpricing of construction cost, which was originally fixed at FORTY-TWO

THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00), Philippine Currency, to NINETY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS

(P93,000.00), Philippine Currency, in violation of the DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October
20, 1994, thus accused in the course of the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted
benefits to themselves and to accused Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[31]
The Lacson case is not applicable because in that case there was a failure to show that the charge of murder
was intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of the accused. Specifically, the Court
observed:
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime
of murder in relation to their public office,[] there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.[32]
In the case at bar, all the elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) R.A. No. 3019 are indicated in the
Informations. The Informations allege that while in the performance of their respective functions either as city
or barangay officials, petitioners caused the construction of the subject structures, either without following the
approved program of work and drawing plan, or worse, even without any plans and specifications; and
furthermore, had given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice
of the government.
Contrary also to petitioners assertions, the specific acts of the accused do not have to be described in
detail in the information, as it is enough that the offense be described with sufficient particularity to make sure
the accused fully understand what he is being charged with. The particularity must be such that a person of
ordinary intelligence immediately knows what the charge is.[33] Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement
of the crime suffices.[34] It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts
necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general
rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be
averred.[35] The particular acts of the accused which pertain to matters of evidence, such as how accused city
officials prepared the inspection reports despite the absence of a project plan or how the contractor was able to
use substandard materials, do not have to be indicated in the information.
Petitioners also question the propriety of the guilty verdict handed down by the Sandiganbayan, alleging
that the prosecution failed to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, an appeal
throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even reverse the
trial courts decision on grounds other than those that the parties raise as errors.[36] We have examined the
records of the case and find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. We find that
the evidence on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of the respondent court. The elements of
the offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution.
First, petitioners could not have committed the offense charged were it not for their official duties or functions
as public officials. Their malfeasance or misfeasance in relation to their duties and functions underlies their
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Second, the undue injury caused to the government is evident from the
clear deviation from the material specifications indicated in the project plans such as in the case of the
basketball court and elevated path walk, and in the use of substandard materials in the case of the day care
center. Otherwise stated, the People did not get the full worth of their money in terms of the benefits they will

derive from the (above) sub-standard infrastructure projects.[37] Third, unwarranted benefits were accorded to
Amago Construction when the three projects were not inspected and supervised during construction, allowing it
to cut costs and save money by using substandard materials and deviating from the specific materials and
measurements prescribed in the work programs. Moreover, Amago Construction was able to receive payments
for the projects even before the processing of the disbursement vouchers, thereby preventing the government
from refusing or deferring payment on account of discovered defects of the said projects. Fourth, it is clear that
from the very inception of the construction of the subject projects up to their completion, petitioners
had exhibited manifest partiality for Amago Construction, and acted with evident bad faith against the
government and the public which they had sworn to serve.
Neither are we inclined to vacate the Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy among petitioners.
Jurisprudence teaches us that proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the agreement itself
may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding among them with respect to
the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered
into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal
objective is to be carried out.[38] Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
means is proved.[39] Conspiracy was thus properly appreciated by the Sandiganbayan because even though there
was no direct proof that petitioners agreed to cause injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits to
Amago Construction, their individual acts when taken together as a whole showed that they were acting in
concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful objective. The barangay officials award of the contract
to Amago Construction without the benefit of specific plans and specifications, the preparation of work
programs only after the constructions had been completed, the issuance and encashment of checks in favor of
Amago Construction even before any request to obligate the appropriation or to issue a disbursement voucher
was made, and the subsequent inspection and issuance of certificates of completion by petitioner
employees despite the absence of material documents were all geared towards one purposeto cause undue
injury to the government and unduly favor Amago Construction.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Case Nos. 26508-10 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.