Falsification

People v. Romualdez, 57 Phil. 148

Beradio v. CA, 103 SCRA 567
Luague v. CA, 112 SCRA 97
Cabigas v. People, 152 SCRA 18
People v. Sandaydiego, 81 SCRA 120
Siquian v. People, 171 SCRA 223
People v. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521
Use of falsified documents
People v. Dava, 202 SCRA 62

G.R. No. 31012

September 10, 1932

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.
Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for
Vicente
J.
Francisco
and
Claro
M.
Recto
for
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

appellant
appellant

Romualdez.
Mabunay.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public and
official documents, committed, according to the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public functions as secretary
to the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and
by reason of said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers and
documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of candidates to the
bar held in the months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the
archives of the said court, confabulating with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting
in common accord with him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar
Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of the
Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the compositions, which
were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that
examination. Once in possession of the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and
Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and acting in common accord, willfully, illegally, and
criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and
M. Guevara to the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the
accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the
grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del

Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay,
and in its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and by means of these alterations the said
accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative merits
of those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements and
declarations contrary to what they really made, and the accused Estela Romualdez and
Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in the
aforesaid public and official documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained
the general average required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in securing the
latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the great
prejudice of the public.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and
documentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by the
prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice Norberto
Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on November 1,
1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar examinations
held in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on July
11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination committee for
admission to the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as
chairman of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926, and upon
recommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of the
examination committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law;
Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge
Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin
Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors was
appointed, composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil
Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law;
Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice
Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, of
the Bureau of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits
and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the
Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law; Rufino
Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors in
International Law; and Anatalio Maalac, of the Bureau of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as
correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was substituted by Jeronimo

Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors were designated by clerk of court Albert
with the approval of the chairman of the examination committee.
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of the
questions in their respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the articles, legal
provisions and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were taken. The
work of reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the correctors designated for
each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note or memorandum, and a set of rules,
patterned after those of the Civil Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to
guide the correctors in grading the examination papers.
The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject assigned
to them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but in a separate
note book, which were later checked with the grades given by the other corrector in the same
subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to be given to the composition.
The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the year
1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and was published
on the fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared the
name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. The grades of Mabunay in
each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the publication of the
result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in
Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises. However, a later revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the
grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law
(Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking out the
grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fiftyeight (58) theretofore given to the composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation
of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show the
identity of the person who altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the compositions
Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity of
her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis are
in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four and the figures 64%
inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said composition are also in my regular
handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person who
wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures alleged to have been
falsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under which said
changes and alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for the
defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as private
secretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as corrector and at the same time
supervisor of the correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions
already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given by them.

Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered the
accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the correctors; and
explaining the powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand that in
order to do justice to the compositions, she could review the compositions already
graded by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done
in order to do justice to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were
known."
Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by the
corresponding correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified that
said alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said accused (pages
723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said that
the chairman of the examining committee, gave her to understand that she "was authorized to
correct any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that she
had never corrected any composition after the name of the corresponding candidate was
identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known Luis Mabunay, and said that the
first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez may
be summarized in two following propositions: 1st that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of
the examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary, the accused
Estela Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects in which she was not a
corrector and which had already been graded by the other correctors, and much less the
power to alter or change the grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd that
granting that the chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the accused
Estela Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner prescribed by said chairman,
namely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on the condition that the revision and the
changes of grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom the
compositions belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice Romualdez
was appointed by the Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination committee of the
year 1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance with law and the rules,
and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can not by himself exercise the
individual powers of the committee, among which were the powers to review, and to change or
alter the grades given to the compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution, specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accused
Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom she knew said
compositions belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of the
examination committee when she was given said authority.
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence for
the prosecution shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in the

alteration by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of raising to
75% the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power of
supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is
not contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said
Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section 2 of the
rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926, and
that when said court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee
without designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and conferred upon
him ample powers to do what in his judgment was most in line with justice and the law, and
that no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of the
procedure employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the powers
conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman was responsible only to the
Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to whom
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the alteration of the grades
appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said accused,
corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped in the preparation of
the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and the identification
numbers of the candidates were opened just one day before the publication of the result of the
examination, and that in order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates on
said list, they had to work continuously from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the
evening on the day prior to the publication of the result of the examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense, the
court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the
examination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were
considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects assigned to them but also
as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and authority
so that neither could consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears,
however, that while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the accused Estela
Romualdez, to understand that she "was authorized to revise the compositions already graded
by the other correctors provided the new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justice
to the compositions and that the same were mad before the names of the candidates were
known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo
Samson, to whom he said nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the
accused Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the committee about the
corrections or alterations made by her in compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the
latter examine said compositions to determine whether or not their merits justified the changes
so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of the information against his said
secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, she made no report to the chairman of the
examination committee of any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told
him during the progress of the work of grading the papers that they were being graded very
strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for
that reason Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of
the kind come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do

justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such case in which, in her
opinion, some injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put things in order (page
781, s. n.), and the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary (page 780,
s. n.).
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of the
examination committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a
discretionary power of supervision that in its exercise she should act independently, not only of
the correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination
committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee appointed
by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer such
power of supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercise
that power when she made the changes in the compositions in question?
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations of
the grades originally given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the
only person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances under which said
alterations were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was not
able to explain how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. When pressed
by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state the circumstances under which she came
across those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez said: "If I were
to make any statement with reference to the circumstances under which I came across these
compositions, you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember" (page 823,
s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her initials under or at the side
of those alterations she made on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say,
when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials which
were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her initials on said compositions because
she graded them as corrector, and she did not put her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 because she revised them in her capacity as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also
said, that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing the original grade
on any composition, but as supervisor "she was under no obligation" to put her initials (page
830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination committee "has not gone into such minor
details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the altered
grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and immediately before the initials of the
correctors she said: "Because on that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.).
Neither does the accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory authority
with respect to the other five compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B2 (page 840, s. n.); and when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase
given by her to the grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the
general average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the accused answered
that "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.).
With these answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a
satisfactory explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the encouragement given
by Justice Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions was left to her
discretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar
examinations of 1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject already
graded and increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in other words, that she
could, at her pleasure, do or undo the work done by the correctors without the necessity of
accounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a note or memorandum of the
compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.

The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity as
chairman of the examination committee, the compositions of the candidates who filed motions
for reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of the
examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he noted in a
memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to each answer of the candidate, but
also the total grade obtained by the candidate in the revision, together with such other data
which would explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.
The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand that
she had such unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in designating said Justice as
chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer such
powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his designation was made so
that he should conduct the examinations in accordance with law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by the
correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of the powers
conferred upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground in
support of her claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the compositions, and
without knowing the name of the candidate to whom they belonged?
Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor,
which, according to the defense is not worthy of credit because of the contradictions and
inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain facts
from which such knowledge can be inferred.
It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering over
8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with the intervention of
the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor
and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of this list, sometime
during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing the identification
numbers attached to each composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on the
upper part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and that work lasted
several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of the candidates
contained in the envelopes attached to the compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.),
and then the grades in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s. n.),
leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samson
wrote on an adding machine the grades in each composition as they were read out by one of
the helpers, and then the corresponding general average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.),
and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said grades in the space corresponding to
each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding
machine was presented as Exhibit C-6.
After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of each
candidate, who was theretofore known by his identification number only, was prepared, the
envelopes containing the names corresponding to the identification numbers written on said list
were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the names of the candidates were
inserted in said list by those who assisted in the preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.)
among whom was the accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination,
having written many of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, s.
n.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the examination committee submitted to the
Supreme Court a report recommending the admission to the bar and not only for those
candidates with a general average of 75% or more, but also of those who had obtained a

general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic increase was ordered noted
on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation was not approved by the Supreme
Court on the ground that said automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for
that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepare
another list containing only the names of the candidates who had originally obtained a general
average of 75% without having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance
thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved by
the Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with
an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2 was
prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the compositions;
while one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machine
and computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper used by Deputy
Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the
office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of the irregularities
in the examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that
investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay, identified with
number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been prepared
simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law
of candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the same candidate is
73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial
Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a difference also being noted
between the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and his
general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to the
revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the examinations of 1926, which were united
to his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and written by the
respective correctors on the compositions of said candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and
Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further, that the grades that appeared on said
compositions before the alterations were identical with those that appeared on the roll, Exhibit
C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers
73, 64, and 75 in the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General
Average, respectively, were written after erasing with rubber what was there originally written.
It may also be noted, upon an examination of the alterations appearing on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors,
authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to make out
said original grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades written
by the correctors on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make it
appear that said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second, that said
alterations were made after the grades written by the correctors had been noted on the adding
machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously;
third, that after said alterations had been made, and in order that the grades so altered should
agree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law and
Remedial Law were erased with rubber, and in place thereof were written the grades now
appearing in said compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she was
the author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her admission and the facts
above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not only the grades originally written
by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the

columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list Exhibit C-1, and the same
person who wrote the grades now appearing in said columns, and which agree with those
written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez
erased in the manner stated the grades originally written, and substituted for them the grades
now appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well as in the columns
corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that
in making such erasures and alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing her
identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the candidate to whom said
composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the names of the candidates
were already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in the office of Justice
Romualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute control as private secretary
and supervisor of the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay
called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days before the publication of
the results of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the
participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other evidence for the
prosecution establishing certain facts which show strong indications that he operated in the act
before or at the time of its execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the bar
examinations in 1926; that the general average obtained by him, according to the computation
appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally written in the list
Exhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the
examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75% be automatically
raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful candidates which
was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the increase
of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which was made by
his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades theretofore given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motive
whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not know him and
that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in view of
her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis Mabunay had been
benefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the power to
revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the compositions
already graded by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her knowledge, or
which might be brought to her attention (page 781, s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation,
because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions of her coaccused Luis
Mabunay was due only and solely to a happy coincidence.
Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the
prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings account in
the Philippine Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the
publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when correlated with the deposit
of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H)
with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps,
give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with
just the necessary points to reach the lowest passing general average. It is also true that
Estela Romualdez testified that said amount had been sent to her by her cousin named Prisca
Magpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise for sale at the latter's

store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was not corroborated either by her
said cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by
the corresponding check or postal money order, as she had done when referring other
deposits in the bank.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the information
are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter as
accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents with which they are charged
and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela Romualdez, who was a Government
employee at the time of the commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300
of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one day of prision
mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without
subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who was a
private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer, under the provisions of article 301
as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four
months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a
fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay onehalf part of the costs.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of
"falsification of public and official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer imprisonment
without due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled
"An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the future Political
Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous Government
for those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully authorized
to make the alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits
B-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of
Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926,
concerning the authority granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and
impartial trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez with
reference to his authority as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, to
confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon her, in
connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to the
fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and truly conferred
upon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination.

III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the powers
conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, within the limits
fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the compositions be made
in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the corresponding candidates were
known.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the general
average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list
Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo
Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the opinion of said
lawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised by
the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2
belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the court
erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926,
was not authorized by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers which
she exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she altered the grades of
said compositions willfully and feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her
identity when she revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers as
supervisor of the correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and B2 only, in order to regrade them.
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay
the sum of P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification with
which she is charged, the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in its
commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a joint
memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of the
Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was disqualified
to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices were in favor of
affirming the decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of acquitting the
defendants. The court being unable to reach a decision in the usual course, an attempt was made on
February 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:

The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No.
31012, those participating being all the members of the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez,
who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere, particularly in the
United States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal division in the court and
there is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment appealed from stand affirmed, and in
accordance with the action taken in the case of Nacionalista Party vs. Municipal Board of
Manila, No. 21265 the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avancea
and Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in favor of the motion. Messrs.
Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr. Justice
Johnson based his dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the Philippine
Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further order
of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be considered
separately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by the court. He renewed
his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground that no severance had
been asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason that there was a prospect that the
membership of the court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement of
three justices only six of the former members remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as
attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing before the
court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the
dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to reach a determination
from the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had
been denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional memorandum,
to which the Attorney-General filed a reply.
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the lower
court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any criminal
offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend that
the appointment of the committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and grade the
examination papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the defendant
Estela Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question did
not constitute a crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this
contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was composed of two groups of attorneys:
Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to grade the
papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the way in which the examination was
conducted and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and some eight
thousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys
appointed to prepare the questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a
contention is clearly untenable. The attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in the
grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group of
attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the
"correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and the
intervention of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.

It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered were
not public or official documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys,
the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be
maintained with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the course of the
examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstances
alleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. (In
re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as
"falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of
Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)
In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year make
all the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated Justice
Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one group of attorneys to
prepare the questions and another group to grade the papers. If any of these attorneys were
designated by the clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the authority of Justice
Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in the
ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be
committed in the following eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry
or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the
grades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because she
blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials,
without indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed to
the "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why she
altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in the
American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the

Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for admission
to the bar by any person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The Senate wished to know
whether such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of the
Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion.
They replied that such a law would be unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the
judicial department decides that the marking of the written examinations may be performed by
competent persons not members of the board but acting under the direction of such members, that
pertains directly to the ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the
judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also stated that the plan of employing
assistants to aid the bar examiners in marking the papers had been approved by the Supreme
Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial court
erred in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the
examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee
for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the
authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that he
gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof.
The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela
Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as
supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any grade to
correct an injustice, without consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the "correctors'
who had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record thereof
or any report to him or to anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance
with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given
his secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law, and it is
inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary the
unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade
or any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of
such a claim shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by him
as a supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he was
regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused Estela
Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement. Justice
Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to understand
that if a case should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so
long as she did not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked where
she was when the pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not remember.

There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising the
revision of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her, and he was
supposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority
which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now in
question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her
coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by the
trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect
that the accused acted within the authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a
mere expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused
Estela Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of
her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did
not confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explain
how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise the grades in question, how she
happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades
that had been altered by her.
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she freely
and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the alterations had been made by
her, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statement
of fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made
by her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of testimony
and announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the
handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from the
fiscal's office a photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a specimen of
defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez
made the alterations under the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she already knew that
the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention that she acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent evidence,
criminal intent may be and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the introduction
of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing the absence
of such criminal intent.
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court erred in
failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on this assignment of
error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such contention. If the
learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in
arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the stenographic
record of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal
and a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most part
embraced in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have already considered. These
remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of error it is
alleged that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode,
Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of
said attorneys as to the correct grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.

The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three attorneys on
the ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense might call the members
of the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key
thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true
therefore that the lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the examination
papers in question deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez gave
them. The attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly the
persons best qualified to decide whether or not the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of
other attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no
merit in this assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of the
accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2
was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez committed
the crime of falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in concluding that the
accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez ever
reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she merely raised
his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own words, a
passing mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court as to why she raised the grades of Luis
Mabunay so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not show
that she raised the grades of any other candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed in
the examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining
committee recommended that not only those having the required general average of 75 per cent be
admitted, but also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the
record as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the
Supreme Court, and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only
those who had obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included
in the new list submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general
average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the
grades now in question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required for
admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust
Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine
Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purpose
he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly

so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very
means by which it may assist him.
In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laid
down the following rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge, and it
is apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts and
circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious
circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he fails to offer such
proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to
sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is manifest
that proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution.
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10
by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said
it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she could
not name the person that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She
did not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her
cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produce
evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce evidence is explained away, is that the
tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's case. (U.
S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean Wigmore in
his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to inference
against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect of
the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on the
prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law to produce evidence; but
nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming paradox,
which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has misled a
few courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.
The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of
her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court
had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore
made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his
coaccused that he had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accused
Mabunay to present evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the
bank. As this court said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):
When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to
offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstances
in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the
proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him, and the court
is justified in acting upon that conclusion.

The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the third
time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of his grades, based on an
alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It was
subsequently found that alterations had been made in his examination papers, and he and Juan
Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed full
responsibility for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not know anything
about the making of the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case
for the purpose of taking disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in
banc, said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of
public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the
falsification of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys the name
of an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that space,
although he had not admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote his name in the
register under the direction of an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He was
convicted, and on appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The trial court
suggests in the opinion that the offense committed required the participation of some unfaithful
employee of the court. But this fact, as the court found, did not lessen the criminal responsibility of the
appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord in
the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved
except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the
acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of actual participation,
rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, or consent to,
the actions of others is relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and
generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words of
one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the
evidence.
As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, the
trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No.
2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory
penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification to
hold any public office.

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one day
to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be
imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years. The penalty
imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one day
of prision mayor.
The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the
Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of the
Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.
We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a
conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal
Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that has
been changed by the Revised Penal Code to prision correccional in the medium and maximum
degrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one days
to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased
to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional.
The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed,
with the costs against the appellants.
G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981
SALUD
P.
BERADIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC in
Rosales, Pangasinan, who was convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of falsification of public or
official documents of the seven (7) separate informations filed against her for making false entries in
her daily time records, elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No.
20319 to 20322 promulgated on September 18, 1978, affirming in toto the judgment of conviction
rendered on July 30, 1976 by the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and with the prosecution not having established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the herein accused and for insufficiency
of evidence or the lack of it, the Court hereby finds. as it so holds, accussed Salud P.
Beradio NOT GUILTY of the charges in Criminal cases Nos. CCC-0258, CCC-0259,
and CCC-0263; consequently, she is hereby acquitted therefrom with costs de oficio;
and decreeing the bail bonds posted for her provisional release in these cases
cancelled and discharged.
On the other hand, however, the Court so finds and holds accused Salud P. Beradio
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public or official

document as charged in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 as to entry on July 13, 1973
only, Criminal Case No. CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 as to entry on May
28, 1973 only, and Criminal Case No. CCC-0264, defined and penalized under Article
17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Act, hereby accordingly
sentences said Salud P. Beradio to serve an indeterminate prison term in the following
manner, to wit:
a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay
a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) but without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and, to pay the cost;
b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the cost;
c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correcional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay
a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the cost.
d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1 a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR(4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and 0NE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay
fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the cost.
The penalties herein imposed shall be served successively with the maximum duration
of the sentences not to exceed threefold the length of tune corresponding to one penalty
imposed upon tier in accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260, and on
May 30, 1973, the Court finds no sufficient Evidence to hold the accused liable.
Consequently, the accused is hereby absolved therefrom.
The facts pertinent to the specified dates of falsification as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
... On the following particular dates, as reflected in her daily time records (Exhs. "D" to
"H"), BERADIO reported her attendance in office and actual hours of work performed
as:
On
1

)
March

7:35
a.m.

12:00
n.;

15,
1973

2)
March
23,
1973

3) May
28,
1973

4) June
6, 1973

5) June
22,
1973

6) July
13,1973

1:00
p.m.
to

5:00
p.m.

7:30
a.m.

12:00
n;

1:00
p.m.
to

5:00
p.m.

7:45
a.m.

12:00
n;

1:00
p.m.
to

5:00
p.m.

7:30
a.m.

12:00
n;

1:00
p.m.
to

5:00
p.m.

7:35
a.m.

12:00
n;

1:00
p.m.
to

5:00
p.m.

8:00
a.m.

12:00
n;

1:00
p.m.
to

5:00
p.m.

The veracity of the foregoing reports were negated by the following:

1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the applicants at the initial
hearing and reception of evidence in land Registration Case No. 19-R before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Rosales, in both morning and afternoon
sessions (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2").

2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the petitioner
in the hearing of Special Proceedings No. 24-R (summary settlement of the estate of
Vicente Oria, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, at Resales, which was
called first in open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M" and M-1 ").
3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp. Proc. No. 24-R, BERADIO again appeared
as counsel for the petitioner in the same court which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45
(Exh. "M").
4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the defendant in
CAR Case No. 19882-.TP '73, entitled "Pepito Felipe vs. Ismael Pontes and Camilo
Tamce before CAR Branch 11 in Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh. "J"). Minutes of the pre-trial
conference which the appellant attended are manifest in the pre-trial order that was
dictated in open court (Exh. "J-1").
5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio appeared in Sp. Proc. No. 24-R before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at Rosales (Exh. "M").
6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio appeared as counsel for plaintiff at the pretrial conference of Civil Case No. 137R, "Venancia Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" before
Branch XIV of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Exhs. "L" to "I-3").
It is thus clear that while in the six abovementioned dates, BERADIO made it appear in
her daily time records that she was in her office and performed her work on the dates
and hours she specified, the facts were that she was elsewhere attending court
sessions. 2
From the said decision of the Court of Appeals and the denial of her motion for reconsideration on
November 28, 1978, Salud Beradio filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to the Court. We
asked the Solicitor General to comment on the petition and thereafter, We resolved to give due
course to said petition it appearing that the issues raised are, in the main questions of law rendered
novel by the peculiar circumstances of the case. Thus, he raised the following legal issues:
I
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE 171, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS
LEGAL AND PROPER.
II
WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL BE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY
PROSECUTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHERE SHE WAS NO LONGER A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL
III
WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL OBLIGATION TO FILL UP AND SUBMIT
TIME RECORD.
IV

ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE STATEMENTS THEREIN REFLECTED IN HER

TIME RECORD BEAR ANY' COLOR OF TRUTH'.
V
WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OR
OFFICIAL DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO MOMENT.
VI
IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE LAW AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONER
IS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) on February 1, 1964 (Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972 and 1973, she was
stationed in Resales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office, Office of the Election Registrar, COMELEC
holding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 o'clock to
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work, she was required to fill up and
submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time records after having been countersigned by her provincial supervisor. 3
On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, CCC-0261) granted her
request for permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the case before the
Court of Agrarian Relations in Rosales, Pangasinan. 4
During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez filed
with the COMELEC, sometime in September, 1973, an administrative complaint charging her of
unauthorized practice of law. On the other hand, Salud Beradio tendered her resignation as Election
Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC resolution (Exhibit B) of October 25, 1973,
was accepted and made to retroact on the close of office hours on September 30, 1973. She was
duly granted clearance by all the offices of the COMELEC, and she received her retirement benefits
under the law.
Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the status of his administrative case
against Salud P. Beradio, and upon being informed of her separation from the service, he initiated the
filing of criminal charges against Salud Beradio on grounds of falsification of daily time records
defined and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code as falsification of
public documents. In the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan where he lodged the criminal
charges, Jose Peralta, and his wife Paz de Guzman-Peralta, trial attorney of Agrarian Legal
Assistance (DAR) submitted affidavits in support of the charges against Salud P. Beradio.
On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate informations all dated
July 7, 1975 with the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, charging Salud P.
Beradio with falsification of public or official documents for making false entries in her daily time
.records on: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case CCC-0258; 2) September 4, 1973 in Criminal Case
CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and 22, 1973 in Criminal
Case CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and 30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3, 1973 in Criminal
Case CCC-0263; and 7) March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0264 that she submitted to
the Commission on Election in Manila. 5 The separate informations allege that petitioner was absent
the whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the "damage and prejudice of the National
Government," she made it appear in her time records that she was not so absent from the office,

when in fact she well knew that on such date or time she was in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Resales, Pangasinan, appearing in her cases .
While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal issues which, to Us, point to the more basic issues
inherent in actsmala in se as contra distinguished from mala prohibita, We narrowed down these
issues, for proper disposition of the instant case, into whether or not the alleged acts of falsification
of public documents imputed against the petitioner were tainted with criminal intent (dolo), and
whether or not the act of alleged false narration of facts in the daily time record bears, under the law,
some semblance of colorable truth. This We did in full considerations of the peculiar circumstances
which render the instant case novel in some respects, worthy of pronouncements from this Court.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the offense of falsification of public or
official documents, defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
the requisite elements thereof must be clearly established, namely: 1) the offender makes in a
document false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false, and 4) the perversion of
truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 6
Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is the wrongful
intent (dolo), without which it cannot exist. 7 Actus non facit reum nisi mens set rea, the act itself does
not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code clearly
indicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases where the element required is negligence
(culpa).
On one point, however, the claim of the petitioner that she is not under strict obligation to keep and
submit a time record is not at all empty with justification. While it is true, as held by the respondent
court, 8 that the obligation to disclose the literal truth in filling up the daily time record is required of all
officers and employees in the civil service of the government in accordance with Civil Service Rule
XV, Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909, this vague provision, however, is rendered clear by
Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service Rule, dated December 3, 1962, later Memorandum Circular
No. II, Series of 1965 which exempt from requirements of keeping and submitting the daily time
records three categories of public officers, namely: 1) Presidential appointees; 2) chiefs and assistant
chiefs of agencies; and 3) officers in the three branches of the government. Clearly thus, petitioner as
Chief of theOffice, Office ofElection Registrar, COMELEC in the municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan
exercising supervision over four (4) subordinate employess, would fall under the third category
aforementioned. An Election Registrar of the municipality performing the powers, dutied ,
responsibilities of the COMELEC, a constitutional body, in the conduct of national or local election,
referenda, and plebiscites, in aparticular voting district may be regarded as an officer who rank higher
thab such chiefs or assistant chiefs of agencies although he may not be a presidential appointee.
Notwithstan ding such an exemption, if the election registrars of the various municipalities all
throughout the country, who occassionaly work more than ordinary eight-hours on the last day of the
registration or on lection day, are keeping and submitting the daily time records to the main office in
Manila, it may be only to the sake of adminstrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice,
but by reason of strict legal obligation.
On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep and
submit the daily time records, We are definitely inclined to the view that the alleged false entries
made in the time records on the specified dates contained in the information do not constitute
falsification for having been made with no malice or deliberate intent. Noteworthy is the fact that
petitioner consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all candor her appearances in six (6) different
ways, on March 15, March 23, May 28, June 22, July 13,, all in 1973 before the Court of First

Instance, Branch XIV, Rosales, Pangasinan, in the aforementiones cases, claiming that she did not
reflect this absences in her daily time records because they were for few minute-duration, the longest
was on March 15, 1973 being for forty-five (45) minutes; they could be absorbed within the allowed
coffee breaks of 30 minutes in the morning and in the afternoon; that as Chief of Office, and all
Election Registrars of the COMELEC for that matter, she is allowed to have one (1) day leave during
week days provided she worked on a Saturday: and that her brief absences did not in any way
interfere with or interrupt her official duties as an Election Registrar. Above all, petitioner categorically
emphasized that her appearances in court were duly authorized by the COMELEC, which in certain
instances were as counsel de oficio, and no remuneration whatsoever from her clients was received
by her,
Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio as unavailing, the Court of Appeals ruled that her
various appearances in court were not on official business, and the permission granted her by the
COMELEC was to appear in behalf of her relatives, and she was still obligated to reflect in her daily
time records only the hours when she was actually in the office. 9
We are not convinced. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan, is only two
(2) meters from her own office as Election Registrar in the said municipality. She had standing
authority to act as de oficio counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in furtherance of the free legal
aid service program of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the Government
itself, 10 especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had been held during the regime of
martial law, did not have much office work to keep them busy. This state of virtual absence of
electoral activities is what prompted COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take active part in the free
legal aid program above adverted to, if to do so would not unduly interfere with their work. In
recognition of the long standing policy of the COMELEC in response to the legal aid program of the
Government 11 and the "free access to the courts" provision of the 1973 Constitution, 12 the
COMELEC, by Resolution No. 1401, 13 formally created the Legal Assistance Office thereby
constituting all COMELEC lawyers with rank of division chief and below as COMELEC Legal
Assistance Officers. Even prior to the formal creation of the Legal Assistance Office, the liberal policy
of the COMELEC in allowing its Election Registrars to act as counsel in areas where there are no
lawyers available is, indeed, laudable.
Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to commit the
crime with which she is charged can be imputed against the petitioner. In the information, it was
alleged that the petitioner was not in her office for the full office hours from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon
and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified dates therein as she was then busy attending her
cases in court. On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution belies its allegation of the wholeday
absence in office as Election Registrar. Records reveal that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5,
30, 40 or 45 minutes a day for her appearances therein, at no instance exceeding one (1) hours.
If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question making it appear that she
attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more than
color of truth in the entry made. It is not shown that she did not report first to her office as Election
Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to the courtroom just two (2) meters away. Petitioner
thus likened her appearance to going out for the usual coffee breaks. The comparison is not even apt
for during the while she appeared in court, she was rendering service more, if not wholly, for the
public good, than just for her own well-being as when she goes out for snack during the coffee-break
period. The court being only two (2) meters away from her office, she did not even have to go so far
as when one goes out for snack. What is more, everytime she appeared in court, she surely must
have made this fact officially of record in the court proceedings, something which is not done with
leaving the office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the entries in petitioner's daily time records were not
absolutely false. The alleged false entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and

willful falsehood which alone would constitute falsification as a crime. 14 As Cuello Calon stated: "La
mera inexacted tio es bastante para integrar este delito (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal 6th Ed. Vol.
11, p. 216, cited in People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691; People vs. La Corte, CA-G. R. No. 05818CR; U.S. vs. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518)."
In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief that
she was just making of record the fact that, as was her honest opinion, she was entitled to receive her
full pay even for those days she appeared in court, rendering what she felt was no less a public
service, being in furtherance of a public policy on free legal assistance. As a lawyer, and as in officer
of the court, she, for one, aids in the administration of justice, oathbound servant of society whose
duty is not solely for the benefit of her clients but for the public, particularly in the administration of
justice. The court a quo itself recognize, that the COMELEC registrars, at that time, are directed to
appear as counsel de oficio when there are no lawyers to represent the parties in litigation. 15If
petitioner is not at all appointed as counsel de oficio strictly in accordance with the Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 138, it is an undisputed fact, as reflected in court records, that petitioner, true to her oath,
acted as counsel in certain cases. On this point, if one fills up his daily time record in the belief that,
on the basis of the time so indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay
corresponding to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of public
document can be ascribed to her. In the case of the herein petitioner, she was only submitting a time
record she knew would be the basis for computing the pay she honestly felt she deserved for the
period indicated. Indeed, the time record is required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of serving
as basis for the determination of the amount of pay an employee is entitled to receive for a given
period.
Further, on the issue of malus animus or criminal intent, it was ruled by the court a quo, confirmed by
the respondent Court of Appeals, that in falsification of public document, in contradistinction to
private document, the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, for, what is
penalized is the undermining or infringement of the public faith and the violation of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed, invoking the case ofPeople vs. Po Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing against this
ruling, petitioner cited the case of People us. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the ponente in the instant
case upheld in the case of People vs. Motus, CA-G.R. No. 18267-CR when he was in the Court of
Appeals, that although the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, htis Court
emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in th epublic document
must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change in the public document must be such
as to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for,
unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime
which is required by Article 1 (now Article 3) of the Penal Code.
We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the evident purpose of requiring government employees to
keep time record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely
adhering tot he policy of no work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if not solely, intended to
prevent damage or loss tot he government as would result in instances where it pays an employee for
no work done. The integrity of the daily time record as an official document, however, remains
untarnished if the damages sought to be prevented has not been produced. As this ponente observed
in the case of People v. Motus, supra while it is true that a time record is an official document, it is
not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage to
the government. It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interest
affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is
necessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In the instant case, the time
records have already served their purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government or
third person because under the facts duly proven, petitioner may be said to have rendered service in
the interest of the public, with proper permission from her superiors. They may now even be

condemned as having no more use to require their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not
been harmed by their contents, and continuing faith in their verity is not affected.
As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in the daily time records of officers and employees in
the Government service is a matter of administrative procedural convenience in the computation of
salary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and strict measure of professional
discipline, efficiency, dedication, honestly and competence.
Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner-appellant surely is entitled to receive the pay as if she
had stayed in her office the whole period covered by the official hours prescribed. ,She had perhaps
made herself even more useful in the general benefit of the public than if she had remained
practically Idle in her office as Election Registrar with perhaps no work at all to attend to, its is
generally the case long before elections take place, specially during the martial law regime. The
COMELEC must have been fully cognizant of the legal implications of the peculiar facts and
circumstances that obtained in this case, when it gave petitioner full clearance after she presented
her resignation when an administrative charge was filed against her by the same complainant as in
the criminal charge. The courts, in the present criminal prosecution, should do no less. It would be too
harsh and cruel for the courts to punish petitioner not only with imprisonment but with general
disqualification and possible disbarment, for an act or omission which she performed or failed to
perform without any criminal intent. Such an insignificant transgression, if ever it is one, would not
beam the scales of justice against the petitioner, for courts must always be, as they are, the
repositories of fairness and justice. It is inconceivable that a person who, without any attempt to
conceal her appearances in court for this is a matter always made officially of record in the court
proceedings, emphatically, not for his own private gain, but animated by the zeal of service not
wanting in public benefit, and as an officer of the court, petitioner could have acted with a deliberate
criminal intent. Moreover, what she stated in her daily time record, as earlier observed, had more than
a mere color of truth to exclude such act from the pale of the criminal offense of falsification of public
document with which she is charged.
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not to have been established beyond reasonable doubt,
the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent court in affirming that of the trial court is hereby
reversed, and petitioner, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982
PILAR
S.
LUAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 22414-16 CR which affirmed
the decision of The Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch X, convicting the petitioner of three
counts of falsification of commercial documents in Criminal Cases Nos. 599, 600 and 601.
The facts are stated in the poorly written decision of the Court of Appeals thus:

Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar,
died at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January
24, 1972 after he was confined in said hospital since January 3, 1972.
Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants
[Exhibits A (599), A (600) and A (601)] to the Superintendent of schools at Catarman
Northern Samar who in turn forwarded them to the District Supervisor, Florencio
Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks.
The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers
certifying that on his official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rolls
had received the salary warrant indicated opposite his name on February 7, 1972,
February 17, 1972 and February 25, 1972, respectively, and returned the same to Jose
Figueroa, the District Administrative Officer of Northern Samar.
Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar S. Luague, while Exhibit A (600) was
received by Glen S. Luague. Exhibit A (601) was received by Edmundo Echano, a
relative of Iliuminado Luague and who claimed to be employed in the Office of the
District Supervisor.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to
return the treasury warrants issued in the name of her husband Iluminado Luague,
further claiming that appellant promised to do so, but actually did not. Upon the receipt
of the xerox copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of Public Schools, Guillermo
discovered that the treasury warrants in question had been encashed by appellant and
Glen Luague with different local stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599) was cleared on
February 22, 1972, while Exhibit A (600) was deposited to the account of a certain Lee
and/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at Philippine Bank of Communications; and Exhibit A (601) was
deposited to the account of Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Appellant admitted
having endorsed the treasury warrants by means of which she was able to encash the
same.
For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasury
warrants for purposes of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note: The appellant was charged
with three counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial document but was
convicted of falsification only.]
It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of Appeals that she acted in good
faith or had no criminal intent when she cashed her deceased husband's paychecks. As stated in the
decision of the Court of Appeals:
Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in signing theme of her deceased husband
in the treasury warrants in question.
Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on leave from January 3 to February 9,
1972, as evidenced by his approved application for sick leave. On January 23, 1972,
the Principal, Jose Infante, while visiting Iluminado Luague in the hospital, handed to
Luague a check representing his differentials. Luague in turn handed over the check to
his wife, the herein appellant, who was then present. Before Infante left, he informed the
Luague spouses that Luague's pay check for the second half of January 1972 had

arrived and advised Mrs. Luague to get the same from Florencio Guillermo so that she
could use it to pay for medicine and hospital expenses of her husband.
Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife to get the check from Florencio
Guillermo. Appellant went to the house of Guillermo in the afternoon of January 23,
1972. Guillermo asked her to sign the name of her husband on the payroll warrant
register and counter-sign with her initials. Guillermo then handed her the treasury
warrant [Exhibit A (599)].
Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972. From the proceeds of the warrants they
received were paid the amount the Luague family owed the drugstores owned by Amor
Carandang, Purisima Saba and Luz Tan. A treasury warrant was also paid to Edward
Kam from whom they bought construction materials for the tomb of the deceased and to
Ong Kiat store for the payment of materials used for the coffin of the late Iluminado
Luague which were purchased on credit.
Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on her belief and upon suggestion of
Florencio Guillermo himself that the warrants could be used to settle their financial
obligations incurred by the hospitalization and death of her late husband, appellant
indorsed the said treasury warrants by signing the name of Iluminado Luague.
Heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the
deceased employee failed to receive. Appellant claims that it was upon this honest
belief that she endorsed the treasury warrants of her late husband to defray for the
necessary expenses incurred due to the latter's hospitalization, funeral and burial.
The Court of Appeals did not reject the petitioner's version, except in respect of the date when the
first paycheck was delivered. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals followed
the simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law, namely: there was falsification
because the petitioner "signed her husband's name in indorsing the treasury warrants in question."
The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That the petitioner signed her
husband's name to the checks because they were delivered to her by no less than her husband's
district supervisor long after the husband's death which was known to the supervisor; that she used
the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husband's last illness and his burial; and
that she believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her husband's
vacation and sick leave credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the checks. In the
fight of these circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal intent to the petitioner. We sustain her claim
that she acted in good faith.
During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due to
the encashment of the checks because the petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation and sick
leaves the money value of which exceeded the value of the three paychecks and the value of the
checks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves. This explains why the petitioner
was not convicted of estafa but of falsification only. While we do not mean to imply that if there is no
damage there can be no falsification, We do say that the absence of damage is an element to be
considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.
We notice here the lack of compassion on the part of the prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge, and the
Court of Appeals. Even the Solicitor General who is alert in seeking to correct improper convictions by
trial courts has somehow misappreciated the evidence in this case.

The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of bewilderment due to the recent death of
her husband when she cashed the paychecks. She was also in dire need of money to settle the
expenses for her husband's last illness and his burial. A compassionate attitude repeatedly urged by
the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the
petitioner is acquitted of the charges against her. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Manila
EN BANC

DARIO

CABIGAS

CACHO,

Petitioner,
G. R. No. L-67472
July 3, 1987
-versusPEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
Under separate Informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of the Tanodbayan charges
Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two [2] counts with the crime of
falsification of official documents allegedly committed in the following manner:
[1] Criminal Case No. 6529
That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez,
both public officers being then employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk,
respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation, conspiring together, taking advantage of their official position and committing
the crime herein charged in relation to their Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 evidencing, among others, receipt
by them in their official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A-000064 up to A000082 of the
795th series, by then and there making alterations and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only
Treasury Bills bearing SN-A-000064 to A-000076 were received by them on March 9, 1982, for the
purpose of hiding or concealing the loss, while in their custody, of six [6] Treasury Bills bearing SN-A000077 to A-000082 of the 795th series, thereby changing the meaning of said Securities Delivery
Receipt.cralaw

[2] Criminal Case No. 6938

That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez,
both public officers, being then employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk,
respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation, conspiring together and taking advantage of their official positions and
committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under custody dated March 30,
1982, which is an official document evidencing the securities transactions and/or operations of the
Makati Branch of the aforenamed bank, and which it was their official duty to prepare and submit to
their superiors, by then and there indicating in said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss or
disappearance while in their custody of six [6] Treasury Bills of the 795th series, with face value of
P500,000.00 each, that the beginning balance of securities under their custody as to volume was
1,533 pieces, when the ending balance as to volume in the previous day's report was 1,539 pieces
and that the beginning balance as to face value in the previous day's report was P610,095,000.00
and thereafter falsely stating in the footnote of the same document that the reduction was due to
"Adjustment on Erroneous Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" the truth being that the six [6] pieces of
Treasury Bills with aggregate face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the
Securities Delivery Receipt or the Daily Report of Securities/ Documents under Custody, both dated
March 9, 1982, but were discovered to have been missing after an inventory conducted by accused
on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in violation of par. 4
of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.cralaw
After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both cases, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 6529, acquitting the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes
y Lopez, with costs de officio and ordering their bail bonds in the said case cancelled.
2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:
[a] Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of Falsification of a Public or Official Document defined and penalized under Article 171,
paragraph No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances;
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day of prision correccional as minimum, to
eight [8] years and one [1] day of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
[b] Acquitting accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio, and ordering his bail bond
cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
The instant petition is an appeal interposed by herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y Cacho from the
foregoing decision in Criminal Case No. 6938. The following pertinent facts are not disputed:
Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the
Philippines assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work is Benedicto

Reynes, the Securities Receiving Clerk. The Fund Management Department [FMD] of the Land Bank
of the Philippines is engaged in money market and securities trading transactions. The securities
which are in the form of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the Securities Section of
the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch.
On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department delivered to the Securities Section, Makati
Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and
treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR)
Exh. "D", was issued to the Fund Management Dept. while the original of the same was retained by
the Securities Section. Included in the securities received on March 9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury
bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of P500,000.00 each,
or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities, the accused would prepare the
Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody [DR SDUC] evidencing the securities
transactions and operations of the Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been
the routine procedure being adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a Securities
Custodian.cralaw
On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited with them,
Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six [6] treasury bills of the 795th series with a total value
of P3,000,000.00. Upon verification that Securities Delivery Receipt [SDR] dated March 9, 1982,
Exhibit "C", was the source document of the missing securities which were delivered to them for
safekeeping, accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in the said document the last two digits "82"
and the addition after them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the 19
treasury bills of the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then at the bottom of
the SDR Cabigas placed the notation "For Adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then, upon
Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram. When
the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills of the 795th series
stood at 1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.00.cralaw
The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30, 1982 by carrying forward the ending
balance of the treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated March 29, 1982.
However, instead of following the draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas prepared his own report DR
SDUC [Exh. "G "] dated March 30, 1982 wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the
795th series with a total amount of P607,095,000.00, which the latter claimed to be the number of
securities of the 795th series in his possession at the time of the preparation of said report. At the
bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas placed the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry
[incoming] dated March 9, 1982" as legend of the asterisk [*] sign which appears after the figure
"1,533."
On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the
Philippines a Treasury Bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of
P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram was the one who negotiated the said treasury bill
with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation revealed that the five [5] missing Treasury Bills
with series numbers A-000077 to A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home Savings Bank
to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the assistance of the NBI in investigating the
case. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the

investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying
the Securities Delivery Receipt [SDR] dated March 9, 1982 [Exh. "C"] and the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents under custody [DR SDUC] Exh. "G" dated March 30, 1982 and for which the
corresponding Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both accused were acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho was convicted in Criminal Case
No. 6938, while his co-accused was acquitted therein.cralaw
In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan stated in its now assailed Decision
that:
In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody [DR SDUC] for
March 30, 1982, the alleged falsification consists of the following entries [figures] pertaining to
Treasury Bills: "1,533", "607,095,000.00", "1,533 and 607,095,000.00 "marked on the document as
Exhibit "G-1", and the legend of the asterisk [*] sign at the bottom portion reading, "Adjustment on
Erroneous Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" marked as Exhibit "G-2". The numbers "1,533" and
"607,095,000.00" represent the volume and the total face/maturity value, respectively, of the Treasury
Bills supposedly in the custody of the Securities Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries were
falsifications, the prosecution maintains, because the correct number of Treasury Bills deposited
with the Securities Section as of that date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said figures
were altered to "1,533 and 607,095,000.00," respectively, to conceal the loss or disappearance of 6
Treasury Bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the footnote at the bottom portion of the document
[Exh. "G-2"] was written to attribute the reduction in the number of Treasury Bills from "1,539" to
"1,533" to mistake or error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 [Exh.
"C"].
The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 [Exh. "F"], the
ending balance on the number of Treasury Bills at the close of office hours on that day was 1,539
pieces with a total face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 [Exh. "F-1"]. Accordingly, the beginning
balance on the number of the same treasury bills on the following day, March 30, 1982, must also be
1,539 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the
DR SDUC for March 30, 1982 [Exhs. "G" and "G-1"], the beginning and ending balances on the
number and value of Treasury Bills for that date were 1,533 pieces and P607,095,000.00 maturity
value.
The question now is, who caused the alterations and what caused the alteration and what was the
purpose behind them.
xxx xxx xxx
By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from "1,539" and "610" to "1,533" and
"607", respectively, and causing Reynes to type the final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis of the
corrected draft, Cabigas caused the document to show that the Treasury Bills in their custody as of
March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P607,095,000.00. By placing,
likewise, an asterisk [*] sign after the figure "1,533" and writing the words "Adjustment on Erroneous
Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk [*] sign, Cabigas caused to make it appear
that the discrepancy of 6 Treasury Bills valued at P3,000,000.00 was due to error in the entries in the
Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 [Exh. "C"]. Considering that the said SDR of March 9,
1982 [Exh. "C"] did not contain any error but reflected the number of securities received by them on
that day, it is obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in Exhibit "G" and the misleading footnote

[Exh. "G-2"] in order to suppress, hide or conceal the fact that the 6 Treasury Bills comprising the
discrepancy were lost while in their custody.
The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit "G", a public or official document, under
paragraph No. 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts. As Securities Custodian, Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in the said
document, the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under his official custody as
of March 30, 1982.
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171, which
reads "by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts", the following elements must concur:
[a] That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
[b] That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
[c] That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
[d] That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person.
Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar. The
correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of Treasury Bills
under custody is not falsification because it was made to speak the truth [US vs. Mateo, 25 Phil.
324]. The placing of an asterisk [*] sign after the figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on
Erroneous Entry [incoming] dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the
respondent court, was not effected to hide or conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were
lost. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was no asterisk or footnote in
the DR SDUC Exh. "G". In fact, the evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss
on March 29, 1982, petitioner reported the matter to his immediate supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and
Branch Manager of the Securities Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive
on the part of petitioner to conceal the said loss.
Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody [DR SDUC]
is a form purely devised and adopted by him. This form was never required, neither was it introduced
nor prescribed by the Land Bank. Petitioner, therefore, was not under "legal obligation" to disclose in
the DR SDUC or SDR, the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under their official
custody as of a given date. It is purely optional on the part of petitioner to use the said forms.cralaw
The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be acquitted because:
There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh. "G", for the alleged falsification
of which petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the submission of which was or
is required by law. In the Petition for Review, petitioner points out that as testified by him, the form
was not an official form of the Land Bank. The form was his own initiative adopted "for our own
convenience and also for reference purposes." Petitioner, therefore, was not under legal obligation to
disclose or reveal the truth by said DR SDUC. In the absence of such obligation and of the alleged
wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of falsification of public
document with which he is charged. [People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333].
WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case

No. 6938 is hereby reversed and another one rendered acquitting the petitioner, Dario Cabigas y
Cacho. Cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN
SAMSON anddefendant-appellant.
PROVINCE
OF
PANGASINAN, offended
vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *

party-appellee,

Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.

Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y
Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle
from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE
OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed
by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses
"were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably
because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds
being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28,
1969, reads:

I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of
sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in
check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
This is signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the
provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is
chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs
two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As
accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan
Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan
the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of
the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check No.
.................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the
stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the
payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and
hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the UminganTayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to
invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The
alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to the
provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher (RIV)
No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the
signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P.
Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B.
Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their signatures
in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For
and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the
imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.

(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969,
containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake
because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice
No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged
signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those
documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the
goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber allegedly
purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district
forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on
the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of
certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the
following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for
number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the
Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at
the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the
Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at
the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their
signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the
said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting
the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could not
be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that
the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his
company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were

cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges
were fictitious.
The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and
hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official
receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the
serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the
provincial government.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the
pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the provincial
government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented that
firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and
provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of their
offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by
Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's
office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a
laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded
Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper
lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial
t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought
them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for the
latter's signature (Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked
Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher
After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the
amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as
representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on March
31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly
authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense
is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office
concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he
received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and
hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's
office (Exh. 6-12 Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 28,
1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871
dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28,
P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L33253.
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969
in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty
of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the following
penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months
and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twenty-one days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity
the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in the
same amount; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months
and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-one days
of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity
the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death
extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's
appeal read s follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the
judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and
executory extinguished hiscriminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal
or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art.
89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action
in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la
Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained
of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in
determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had
issued an order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487
and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting the
civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to
inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased
insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten children
named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and
Manolo (deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the
following.Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not
necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of
malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private prosecutors
Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to
proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of
the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of
the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired
whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in

representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was a
board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had
authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private prosecutors.
The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No.
23350).
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated
November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal
and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the
private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's)
control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to
examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the
motion (155 tsn).
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were
present together with the private prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule
that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec.
1683, Revised Administrative Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have
been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the
proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality.
The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the
documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court
anchored the judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the
propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion
perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced
"malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant
provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3
of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure because
the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson)
had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it

was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3,
1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred
in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After
the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3,
1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts
covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1"
placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in.
instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding
with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when the
treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the
cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As
noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office
when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the
Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers
for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received, was blank.
The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the exhibition of
Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have
been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had
been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to
the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court
said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the
provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to
Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments
were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27,
1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to
Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh.
13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers
inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen
meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because
the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the
treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a
crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same).
This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution

show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned
vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor,
then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention
because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence
against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the
treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the
treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon
by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor
apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was
established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts
malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred
in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in
finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on
circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in
fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had
conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the
fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and
convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had
already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause
and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule
assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case
on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they
would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then
tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary
investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the
preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First
Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon,
86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is
that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signatures.

Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of
Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the
exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions
of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there
are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in
implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his
residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction
Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial
government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures
terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature
in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried
Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him
(Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn
July 16, 1970).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and
when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed.,
1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were
Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the
vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed
creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the
provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He
actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the
forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in
the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49
Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document
and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government
and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the
falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first
voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial
court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is
not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego
signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of
Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds
of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office
(p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego
allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the
vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong circumstantial
evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the
six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he
contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts
covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were never
delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant
manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six
vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried
Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six
vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six
vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction
materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer
Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on
a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.
Recapitulations. In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation
on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial

engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers.
The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the
vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received the
said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in the
offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and
denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having
committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the
provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have
some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically
fake.
Penalties. The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and
malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes
two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit
malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671;
People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal
treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons
worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts
covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal
funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons
mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex
crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each
falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished
separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct
penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and
bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification
was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.

The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single
criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes
six separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of
malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession
of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial
treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial
treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring
with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People vs.
Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs.
Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide
or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos.
11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal
Code is prision mayorminimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos.
1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in
paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying
circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate
sentence.
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six
crimes of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:

For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years ofreclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of
P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO.
23349, L-33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years ofreclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of
P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is
sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum,
to eight (8) of prision mayorminimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum,
to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years
to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51)
years (see People vs. Peas, 68 Phil. 533).
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art.
70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil.
58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in
the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal
Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989
MANUEL
L.
SIQUIAN petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:
The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan,
Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:
That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and
within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then
the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such Municipal
Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false document,
knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July
1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon
to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by
stating and making it appear in said document that there was such a position existing and that funds
therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was no
such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan
for 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating the
necessary funds therefor.
xxx
[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case
ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:
It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a
resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of
Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and
her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy.
When she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the
Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused told
Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be included in the budget.

The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung the
treasurer agreed that she could report for work.
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there.
When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her
appointment papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July
1, 1975 by the accused.
xxx
Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS Form
No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements
of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service,
Manila (Exh. "C").
xxx
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on
the same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of July,
August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was
not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her
salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the
accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that there
was no money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol
in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty.
Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment
papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her
complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").
It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact
the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2").
Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975,
was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year
1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental
budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 19751976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal
Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council
appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled up as early
as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits
"J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the
Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June
16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was
held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K"
and "K-l").
xxx
[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]

After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public document as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences said
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and
to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby
therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused- appellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner
Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a question of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial court
convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following
A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness,
shows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused.
B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when he
made the allegedly falsified certification.
C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion
of law.
D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with
the trial in his absence despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo,
p. 13.]
Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.
The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements
in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites
must concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472,
July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the
mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of
facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant
Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the
function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial
whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the
document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with
the standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission)
pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v.
Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed when
the petitioner stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed
when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been
appropriated therefor.
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a
conclusion of law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's
arguments, correctly ruled as follows:
Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from
a fact or combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts
pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362].
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for
the position are available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that
funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of
personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated
therefor.
In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and
funds therefor referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the
records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).
It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year,
1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh.
"B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal
Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the
Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no
appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus
rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the
statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what
is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the
foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third requirements laid down in
the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.
The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations,
specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and
"D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed
by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer
authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as
revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said

certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled
up.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not
necessary when the falsified document is a public document. This has already been authoritatively
decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the
aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third
person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. The rationale for
this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been stated by
the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials
or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In
falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause
such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence
of criminal intent on his part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid
defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts
[U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since
the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.
Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides
at all meetings of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all
ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative
Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976,
Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual
Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position
of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even
affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot
claim good faith in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the questioned position since at
the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already
commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon
had been enacted by the municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing
the absolutely false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law
considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public
document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that
petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the
unlawful act, stands unrebutted.
Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying
the document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public
document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige
or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150

(1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in
connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise
intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v.
Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of
issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with
the trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue
with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the record reveals that
petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner,
granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had
rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]
It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035,
December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether
an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law:
. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded
against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him,with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.
. . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v.
Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence
on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court
ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. For
under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial
[Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf
[People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]
It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set
for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to
the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear [See Order dated January
18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner,
manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that
he has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence,
the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the
same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]
192 SCRA 521

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and
FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel Castaeda on
January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the
herein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of
dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo
Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary
Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorneyin-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's
Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney, and was able to
obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of
attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on
February 13, 1964.:- nad
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been paid, the
mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta
Quinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972,
complainant allegedly discovered that their property was already registered in the name of said
Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the former from the
premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document was
filed against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the information
reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private
individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a
Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and
affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter of
fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof,
nor gave his permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with intent of gain and
by means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said
falsified public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from the People's
Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequential
damages." 2

After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and the
prosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a
handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was not continued as counsel for private
respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime
charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he
authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him and his
brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was foreclosed
by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to sign
a document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de
Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother
said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you to
sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned
by you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that?
xxx
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of
identification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This document
consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and the second
page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court what is this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient basis for
the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years had
elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information charges the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the more serious
crime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code.
The more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the public document which is

punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine not exceeding
P5,000.00. Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the same prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged the date of
the commission of the crime which was February 5, 1964 and the information was filed only on March
29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10) years has passed
from the commission of the crime to the filing of the information. No other allegation having been
made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that the period of
prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was committed. He asserts that, from the
date appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the
mortgage documents were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February
13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on the same date. To support his
theory, private respondent made the following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it is
known at the time of its commission.:-cralaw
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire series of
transactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection
with said transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and the period of
prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th
Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended was
an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only quoting
what his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get a
loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be considered
should not be the date of registration of the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It argued
that the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed an action
to eject complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in the information because it was
considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be in accord with the
legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner submits that
"(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castaeda of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had
prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge
Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court. In a
resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a petition for review
on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for review and the
corresponding comment and reply of the parties having been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court
resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required petitioner and private respondent
to submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private respondent
would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;

2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private
respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished by
prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs. City
Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the
defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal
by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of
the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence
or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely
legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient
basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a public document
may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial
documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification
of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to
complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of
petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the offense
charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera
and of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense that
the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by the evidence
because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly shows that what was
intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding
that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other
words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half
portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the following
quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get
a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his brother
Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano
Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru falsification
of a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however, determinative of the
validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.: nad

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that for the
most serious component offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of
estafa thru falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification which
carries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable by
correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91
thereof states that the prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to
mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loan
of P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru
falsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim that
the ten-year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972
by reason of the ejectment suit against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a public registry
is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. On
these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that
in the crime of falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences from the time
the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered
with the Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the
discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case of mistake or
fraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held that the
discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world and this
should apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad
We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on constructive
notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable
to private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with
earlier, that is, from the time the questioned documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13, 1964. The
criminal information against private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or more
than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent was charged has indubitably
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders of
public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991
MICHAEL
T.
DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.:p
On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner
Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-professional driver's license No. 1474427 1 with official receipt
No. 7023037, 2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death
to former and physical injuries to the latter.

As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters where his
driver's license was confiscated by Cpl. Daniel Severino who later submitted Dava's driver's license to
the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license was thereafter presented as prosecution evidence in criminal
case for homicide and serious physical injuries reckless imprudence filed against Dava in the then
Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig. 3
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava
driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver's
license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava,
Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in apprehending Dava for
driving without a license. 4 The Ministry of Defense later indorsed Roxas' request for assistance to the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).
At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya of
the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car described by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide
Department Store near the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and his
companion arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver for his license. They
were shown non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 5 with official receipt No. 0605870 6 issued
by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his
license, Dava informed them that his officemate had secured it for him.
Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for questioning.
Dava refused to give a statement upon the advice of his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report to
Col. Maristela stating therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false representation
in the application of a driver's license intended to be used as a legal license." 7 In his affidavit of
apprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising stated that he was 'about to book him for violation of
Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when subsequent investigation revealed that the Driver's License
above-mentioned is a Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification and use of falsified
documents under Section 172 of the Revised Penal Code should be filed against Dava. 8 Lising
concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he compared it with the xerox copy of
Dava's license which was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and the
dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not tally." 9
Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. 10 One of the prosecution witnesses was
Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). He testified
that hen was then the registrar of the said office when Dava's driver' license was brought to him by
lawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing whether it was genuine or fake and if was
issued by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He examine it and found out that it was "fake or
illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one of the fifty (50) forms which had been reported
missing from their office sometime in November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant
for a license. 11 He added that any license that was not included their office index card was
considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency." 12

Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine, 13 the signature of the issuing
official was fake. 14 He "believed" certain persons had been apprehended for "plasticization" of
licenses outside their office 15 and that sometime November, 1976, agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation raided the house of a certain person who had in his possession some of the forms which
had been missing from office. 16 He concluded that the license was fake because the form was issued
by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its face to have been issued the
San Fernando, Pampanga agency. 17
Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of Appeals 18 which affirmed the
lower court's decision on January 29, 1982. Dava filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case. On April 27, 1982, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its decision and issued a resolution the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and
another judgment shall be entered annulling the proceedings in the court a quo without
prejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)
Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47 at San
Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The information for falsification of a public document reads
as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto, in the
municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MICHAEL T. DAVA, a
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause
to be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No. 2706887 covered by
Official Receipt No. 0605870, dated January 24, 1978, a public document, by making it
appear that the signatories therein who are officials of the Pampanga LTC Agency
participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not so
participate and the accused made use of the same knowing it to be falsified.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava driving a car
and that, knowing that Dava's license had been confiscated as a result of the filing of the homicide
and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence case, he thereafter sought the assistance
of then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license. 19 For his part, Domingo
Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in court how he first saw Daya driving a car along Banahaw
and N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon City until he finally confronted Dava at the vicinity of the Araneta
Coliseum and confiscated his driver's license. As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's license
shown to him by Dava was fake because he noticed that, when compared with the license attached to
record of the criminal case filed against Dava, the license confiscated bore a different signature and
date of birth. 20
Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he investigated the traffic
incident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19, 1975 which involved Dava and the two relatives of
Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's no professional driver's license No. 1474427 which he
later turn over to the fiscal's office. 21
In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court that, upon a resolution
of the Court of Appeals, Dava was allowed by the lower court having jurisdiction over Criminal Case

No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's license 1474427 from the records of said case. 22 When confronted
by the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said license in December, 1982 and surrendered it to
the BLT Western District Office so that he could renew his license. 23 Hence, the evidence presented
before the Court was a mere xerox copy of said license 24 which also bears a notation that Dava
received original driver's license and its receipt on December 15, 1982. 25
Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT and whose
name appears registrar thereof in official receipt No. 0605870 which was supposed to be attached to
Dava's driver's license No. 270688 admitted that the form of the said license was genuine although
he could not tell whether its contents were likewise genuine because it was "opened" and
"spliced." 26 He asserted, however, that since the said form "did not emanate" from his office and "a
facsimile was not printed" over his name, said license was "not OK". 27
Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional office that the number in
the license was one of "the numbers requisitioned by (the) Angeles City agency." 28 He affirmed that
drivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by (their) agency" 29 although when recalled to the
stand, he admitted that the "2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on the face of license No.
2706887 referred to the San Fernando agency. 30 Martin also confirmed the genuineness of official
receipt No. 0605870 although it was his assistant who signed it for him 31 and affirmed that the
amount of P10.00 indicated therein had been collected and received by his office. 32
Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its chief and
inquire about the number of driver's license issued to Dava and whether said office had indeed issued
them. According to him, the head of the office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to verify from the index
card in the possession of the License Division head whether the Angeles City agency had indeed
issued Dava's license. 33 Thereafter, the officer-in-charge of the License Division of the BLT in East
Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina, issued a certification dated December 24, 1979 to the
effect that non-professional drivers license No. 2706887 in the name of Dava was "not registered in
(their) Index Card." 34
Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles City BLT
agency, had died on May 12, 1980. 35 He offered in evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh. J.
Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken on January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case No.
Q-10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. It was marked as
Exh. K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was transmitted to the
Regional Trial Court Pampanga. 36
The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his former cotrainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a pharmaceutical firm, Manalili testified that Dava quested him to
secure a driver's license for him because he had none. Manalili went to the San Fernando office of
the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to secure own license. At the LTC branch
office, he was "approached" 37 the fixers who roamed around the compound. When he as them how
much it would cost to secure a driver's license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00. 38 He agreed
to pay amount and gave the fixers the personal data of Dava. 39
After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic jacket. (Manalili identified
the license as Exh. B.) He examined it and found out that it looked "like a genuine and authentic
driver's license" to him. The license, which opened and unsealed, bore a signature in the portion
which showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of Dava. Because it did not

bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave the license to Dava and told him to sign it
immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's presence. 40
On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision 41 finding that the license in question was
"fake or spurious", that was not duly issued by any proper government licensing age and that the
accused directly participated in the commission of the falsification or caused said falsification. The
court took into account the facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license because of his work as a
detailman; that he received his genuine license from the court only on December 15, 1982, and that
Dava himself personally requested his friend, Manalili, to secure the license for him. It arrived at the
conclusion that since Dava was the possessor or user of the fake license, he himself was the forger
or the one who caused its forgery or falsification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of Falsification of a Public
Document, as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code, and considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer
an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correecional as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days ofprision
correccional as maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five Hundred
(P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus the costs of this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, 42 which on September 30, 1985 affirmed
in in toto the decision of the trial court. On February 27, 1986, the appellate court denied Dava's
motion for the reconsideration of said decision finding that no new grounds had been raised therein.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of Carolino Vinluan on the
ground that being a part of the annulled proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may not be
considered as admissible in evidence as it cannot qualify as a "testimony at a former trial" under the
provisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR, expressly annulled the proceedings had in Criminal Case No. Q10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the case. That ruling is founded on solid
jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the absence of proof that the party raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel, 43 a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction
is a total nullity. 44 Being worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. 45 Hence, the testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in evidence but may well be
considered as totally nonexistent.
With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there sufficient evidence to warrant
the conviction of petitioner for the crime charged?
The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's license
No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in in-preparation and with
having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are found
on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any private individual
who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof
which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any

act proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with
having knowingly used a false document under the last paragraph of Article 172.
The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license, asked
his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him. Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his
own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's license No.
2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said locality. 46 On
January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said office by paying the amount of P10.00 for
which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870. 47
In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt showing
that at the previous year the licensee had paid for his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and
to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve the issuance of "another form," a
driver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license. The said agency would
then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but the driver's license itself would
not be changed. 48
Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No.
864321 49 were presented to the San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein issued officialreceipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not personally signed by
office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt 50was genuine and the amount indicated
therein was actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando agency. 51 The driver's license itself
may not have been issued by said agency 52 but its form was likewise genuine. However, according
to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed
over" his name therein.53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of the
Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional driver's license No.
2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in their index card. 54
Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the evidence do
not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence
which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of the falsified
driver's license knowing it to be so.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a
judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew
that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171
or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in judicial
proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used
with intent to cause such damage. 55 Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond
reason doubt in this case.
It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He
misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. 56 Through this
misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's
license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was
able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject
driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a
without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have
been motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he
knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee
then was only P15.00. 57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but
to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said

fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a
principal by inducement in the commission of said crime.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No.
2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he knew that it was not legally possible for him
to secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent to his
friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even with this
misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili would be able to secure a
driver's license through legal means in about an hour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in obtaining
driver's license No. 2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious
and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he himself was
surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of Michael Dava on
November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the fixer's assistance. 59 In those days, all plastic
jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the release of the
license applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say that
petitioner did not know that his license was a fake. 60
A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of
the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. 61 Thus, when
driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the
region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the
driver's license became a public document.
The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was
apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was what he presented Lising
to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is
probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used
driver's license No. 2706887.
The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to
another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of
public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and
the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.62
In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs.
Sendaydiego, 63 should be applied in his favor:
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that
he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering
of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user
or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have
close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs.
Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28:
People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the
absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of
Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs. Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute
as it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in

possession of a false document. 64 His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly

in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not have acted on
his own accord without the prodding of petitioner.
We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government agencies.
To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do things fast for the right amount. He is "not
necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and he
shares his fees with "insiders." 65
Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they
proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not all
fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless provide
sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact business with the government
and for corruption of the gullible government employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt with
accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government agencies the better for all of us.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of this
decision be served on that Department of Transportation and Communication. Cost against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.